Cases - 2006 term

Fry v. Pliler

Tue, 20 Mar 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-5247

Petitioner

John Francis Fry

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cheryl K. Pliler, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Thursday, December 7, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, March 20, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2007

Advocates

Victor S. Haltom (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After extraordinarily long deliberations, a jury convicted John Fry of two counts of first degree murder. Near the end of the trial, the defense attempted to bring a witness who would testify that her cousin rather than Fry had committed the murders. The trial judge refused to let the witness testify. After exhausting his state court appeals, Fry petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.

The District Court held that the trial judge had been wrong to exclude the witness, but it ruled that the decision was harmless error and upheld the conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the judge's decision met the test for harmless error in Brecht v. Abrahamson. Under the Brecht test, evidence is held to be harmless unless it has a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Fry argued that the standard for harmless error in habeas cases should instead be the one defined in Chapman v. California. The Chapman test requires the state to prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Question

1) What standard for determining harmless error applies to habeas cases where the constitutional error is not recognized until the case is appealed to federal court? 2) If the Brecht standard applies, does the defense or the prosecution bear the burden of persuasion on the question of injurious influence?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Pliler, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

The Court held unanimously that a federal court "must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the 'substantial and injurious effect' standard set forth in Brecht, [...] whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard set forth in Chapman." The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia ruled that neither the Court's previous precedents nor the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 required courts to use the more stringent Chapman standard in such cases. As the government conceded during the proceedings, the State would bear the burden of persuasion on the question of injurious influence. A 5-4 majority declined to decide the question of whether the exclusion of the witness in Fry's trial was harmless error under the Brecht standard. This question was deemed to be not included in the petitioner's question presented. The dissenting opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens would have held the exclusion prejudicial to the fairness of the trial and reversed the Ninth Circuit.

Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman

Wed, 17 Jan 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-11284

Petitioner

Jalil Abdul-Kabir, fka Ted Calvin Cole

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Brent Ray Brewer v. Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, No. 05-11287

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, October 13, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, January 17, 2007

Decided

Wednesday, April 25, 2007

Advocates

Carla E. Eldred (Attorney for Respondent, Attorney for Respondent)

Edward L. Marshall (Attorney for Respondent)

Robert C. Owen (Attorney for Petitioner, Attorney for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Jalil Abdul-Kabir was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. At his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir presented mitigating evidence of his destructive family background and neurological defects. The jury was instructed to give effect to all mitigating evidence by making yes-or-no determinations on Texas's two "special issues" for capital sentencing: the deliberateness of the crime and the future dangerousness of the criminal. After his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing that the special issues had not allowed the jury to give full consideration and effect to his mitigating evidence as required by the Supreme Court in Penry v. Johnson. The District Court denied Abdul-Kabir habeas relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

The Fifth Circuit held that the mitigating evidence was not "constitutionally relevant," and that in any case the jury could have given it consideration as part of the "deliberateness" and "dangerousness" determinations. After the Supreme Court rejected the "constitutional relevance" test, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its decision that Abdul-Kabir's mitigating evidence had been given full consideration and effect under the Texas special issues. The case was consolidated with Brewer v. Quarterman No. 05-11287.

Question

Do Texas's "special issue" jury instructions for capital sentencing allow jurors to give full consideration and effect to mitigating evidence about a defendant's destructive family background and mental defects, as required by the Eighth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Abdul-Kabir, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. The Court ruled 5-4 that the Texas jury instructions conflicted with Supreme Court precedents requiring that jurors be given the opportunity "to give meaningful consideration and effect to all mitigating evidence that might provide a basis for refusing to impose the death penalty." The majority opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens found Texas's scheme of yes-or-no determinations of deliberateness and future dangerousness to be far too constraining. This was particularly true when the defense offers "double edged" evidence, which can be mitigating or aggravating depending on the jury's interpretation. The Court faulted the Fifth Circuit for not recognizing that Abdul-Kabir had presented mitigating evidence of his deprived childhood and his lack of self-control in order to show his relative lack of moral culpability - not to dispute either the deliberateness of his crime or his likely future dangerousness (which indeed might be aggravated by the evidence). Since the instruction did not allow the jury to consider the evidence as mitigating in the sense Abdul-Kabir intended, it was unconstitutional.

Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood

Wed, 08 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1382

Petitioner

Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 19, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, November 8, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, April 18, 2007

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Eve C. Gartner (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Planned Parenthood sued the Attorney General of the United States, arguing that the Act was unconstitutional under the right to an abortion protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and subsequent cases. The District Court agreed and stopped the Act from going into effect.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Though the government claimed that the Act banned only a narrow, rare category of abortions, the Circuit Court ruled that the Act applied to the common abortion procedure known as "D&E;" ("dilation and evacuation"), as well as to the far less common "intact D&E;," sometimes called "D&X;" ("dilation and extraction"). This made the ban expansive enough to qualify as an unconstitutional "undue burden" on the right to abortion, as defined in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.

The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the Act's lack of an exception for abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother rendered it unconstitutional. Congress had included in the Act a finding that partial-birth abortions were never medically necessary, but the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart required the health exception in all cases where medical opinion on the necessity an abortion procedure is divided.

Finally, the Circuit Court ruled that the Act was unconstitutionally vague, because the inclusion of ambiguous statutory terms such as "partial-birth abortion" would prevent physicians from knowing which methods of abortion were covered. The Circuit Court determined that the proper course of action was to block enforcement of the entire Act.

Question

Is the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it lacks an exception for partial-birth abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother or because it is unconstitutionally vague?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gonzales, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1531

No. The Court ruled by a 5-4 vote that Congress's ban on partial-birth abortion was not unconstitutionally vague and did not impose an undue burden on the right to an abortion. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority. The Court held that, under the most reasonable interpretation, the Act applies only to the intact D&E; method (also known as "partial-birth abortion") and not to the more common D&E; procedure. The Act's application was limited by provisions that restrict enforcement to cases where the physician intends to perform an intact D&E; and delivers the still-living fetus past specific "anatomical landmarks." Because the majority found that the Act applies only to a specific method of abortion, it held that the ban was not unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, or an undue burden on the decision to obtain an abortion. The Court also held that Congress, after finding intact D&E; never to be medically necessary, could validly omit a health exception from the ban, even when "some part of the medical community" considers the procedure necessary. To require the exception whenever "medical uncertainty" exists would be "too exacting a standard to impose on the legislative power [...] to regulate the medical profession." The Court left open the possibility that an as-applied challenge could be brought against the Act if it were ever applied in a situation in which an intact D&E; was necessary to preserve a woman's health. Justice Ginsburg's dissent disputed the majority's claim that the opinion was consistent with the Casey and Stenberg precedents and said "The Court's hostility to the right Roe and Casey secured is not concealed."

Uttecht v. Brown

Tue, 17 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-413

Petitioner

Jeffrey Uttecht, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cal Coburn Brown

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 12, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, April 17, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 4, 2007

Advocates

Suzanne Lee Elliott (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Washington State jury sentenced Cal Brown to death for murder. Brown protested that unfair jury selection had guaranteed a "verdict of death." One potential juror who expressed willingness to impose the death penalty only in "severe situations" was dismissed by the judge for cause. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the dismissal.

Brown appealed first to a federal district court and then to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ruled that the dismissed juror was not "substantially impaired" in his ability to follow the law. Supreme Court precedent required that jurors only be dismissed if their personal views prevent them from performing their duties. The prosecution unsuccessfully petitioned for the Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en banc on the ground that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act required appeals courts to give deference to trial judges' evaluations of jurors.

Question

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit fail to give proper deference to a trial judge's dismissal of a juror on the grounds that he could not carry out the duties of a juror in a capital sentencing case?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Uttecht, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled that appellate courts "owe deference to the trial court, which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror." Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The substance of the potential juror's comments had indicated confusion over the proper application of Washington's death penalty law, so the trial court had acted reasonably when it found the juror substantially impaired and excused him. The Court held that the trial judge was especially entitled to deference because the trial judge, unlike appellate judges, has access to contextual information that is not reflected in the transcript of the jury selection questioning. The Court also considered it significant that, although the defense counsel vigorously objected to other juror dismissals, he originally made no objection to the dismissal of the juror at issue in the subsequent appeal. Justice John Paul Stevens argued in dissent that "the Court has fundamentally redefined--or maybe just misunderstood--the meaning of 'substantially impaired,' and, in doing so, has gotten it horribly backwards."

Bowles v. Russell

Mon, 26 Mar 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-5306

Petitioner

Keith Bowles

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harry Russell, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Thursday, December 7, 2006

Argued

Monday, March 26, 2007

Decided

Thursday, June 14, 2007

Advocates

Paul Mancino Jr. (on behalf of Petitioner)

William P. Marshall (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Keith Bowles was convicted of murder. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, and was denied. Bowles did not receive timely notice of the District Court's ruling, so he missed the deadline for appeal. He filed a motion under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) to reopen the appeal period. The District Court granted Bowles's motion, and gave him until February 27, 2004 to file his appeal. However, Rule 4(a)(6) allows only a 14-day extension of the appeal period, which would put the deadline on February 24, 2004. Bowles filed his appeal on February 26 - on time according to the court's deadline, but untimely according to Rule 4(a)(6).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at first declined to dismiss Bowles's appeal. Later, on its own motion, the Sixth Circuit "correct[ed] [its] error" and dismissed the appeal, saying Rule 4(a)(6) "is not susceptible to extension through mistake, courtesy, or grace."

Question

May a federal Court of Appeals, acting on its own, dismiss an appeal as too late under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) when the appeal is filed after the 14-day extension specified in the Rule but before the deadline established by the District Court?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Russell, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes. The Court ruled that, even though Bowles was relying on the mistaken order of the District Court, the Circuit Court was correct to dismiss his untimely appeal. Justice Clarence Thomas's opinion for the 5-4 majority held that statutory time limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional, and therefore the Circuit Court had no choice but to dismiss Bowles's appeal once it found that the appeal was filed too late. The Court ruled that it had no authority to create an exception for Bowles under the little-used doctrine of "unique circumstances," and it overruled its precedents "to the extent they purport to authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule." The majority left it to Congress to change the rule if Congress thought it unfair. In dissent, Justice David Souter wrote: "It is intolerable for the judicial system to treat people this way, and there is not even a technical justification for condoning this bait and switch."

Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corporation

Tue, 09 Jan 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-102

Petitioner

Sinochem International Co., Ltd.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Malaysia International Shipping Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, January 9, 2007

Decided

Monday, March 5, 2007

Advocates

Gregory A. Castanias (on behalf of Petitioner)

Gregory A. Castanias (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Gregory Andrew Castanias (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Ann-Michele G. Higgins (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (MISC) owned a vessel carrying steel coils for Sinochem International, a Chinese company. Sinochem brought an action in Chinese Admiralty Court, alleging that MISC had backdated documents pertaining to the loading of the cargo, and seeking to have the ship detained in China. MISC filed suit in a Pennsylvania district court, accusing Sinochem of fraudulent misrepresentation. Sinochem argued that the U.S. had no personal jurisdiction over the Chinese company, but the District Court declined to rule on the issue. Instead the court dismissed the suit on grounds of "forum non conveniens," which means that the case could be more conveniently tried in another forum, in this case the Chinese Admiralty Court.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, ruling that the lower court should have first ruled on the jurisdictional issue. The Third Circuit acknowledged the inconvenience of determining jurisdiction before dismissing the case anyway, but nevertheless sent the case back to the District Court.

Question

Does a district court have to establish its jurisdiction over a case before dismissing the suit on the ground that it should be argued in another court that is more convenient for the parties ("forum non conveniens")?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sinochem International Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. The Court ruled 9-0 that "a court need not resolve whether it has [...] personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines that [...] a foreign tribunal is plainly the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the case." The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that while the first step of a court is normally to determine whether it has jurisdiction, a court can dismiss a case for forum non conveniens without establishing subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. The Court held that determination of jurisdiction is only important when there is a chance that the court will rule on the merits of the case. When it is clear that the case would be more conveniently tried in a foreign court, a court should immediately dismiss for forum non conveniens rather than undergo a burdensome and unnecessary determination of jurisdiction before dismissing the case anyway.

Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corporation

Wed, 01 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-848

Respondent

Duke Energy Corporation, et al.

Petitioner Type

Respondent

Petitioners

Environmental Defense, et al.

Respondent Type

Petitioners

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, May 15, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, November 1, 2006

Decided

Monday, April 2, 2007

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Respondent Duke Energy Corporation)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Respondent United States in support of petitioners)

Sean H. Donahue (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A 1977 amendment to the Clean Air Act created the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program (PSD), which requires power companies that want to make emissions-increasing modifications to their facilities to first apply for permits. Between 1988 and 2000, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) made twenty- nine extensive improvements to its power plants without obtaining PSD permits. When the government, along with Environmental Defense and several other environmental groups, sued Duke, the company pointed to a PSD regulation explicitly defining "modification" for purposes of PSD as any change that increases the hourly rate of emissions from a facility. Duke's improvements increased the number of hours the plants remained open, and therefore also increased the total annual emissions from the plants. But since the improvements left the hourly rate of emissions unchanged, Duke argued that it did not have to obtain PSD permits. The government countered by citing the Environmental Protection Agency's current interpretation of the PSD regulations, which holds that a power company making improvements that increase the hours of operation of its plants does need to obtain a permit in all cases where construction is involved.

The District Court ruled in favor of Duke. The judge refused to rely on the EPA's current interpretation, ruling that it was inconsistent with the wording of the PSD regulations. Environmental Defense appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's decision. The Fourth Circuit pointed out that the 1977 PSD amendment had taken its definition of "modification" directly from a 1975 Clean Air Act amendment concerning the New Source Performance Standards program (NSPS). In the 1975 amendment, the term "modification" explicitly excluded improvements that merely increase the hours of operation of a facility. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held, the EPA did not have statutory authority to interpret "modification" differently for the PSD program. Environmental Defense appealed to the Supreme Court, with the added argument that the Fourth Circuit never should have heard the case, because challenges to Clean Air Act regulations can only be brought in the D.C. Cricuit.

Question

1) Did the Fourth Circuit's decision violate the section of the Clean Air Act that provides that national Clean Air Act regulations are subject to challenge only in the D.C. Circuit?

2) Does the Clean Air Act require the EPA to interpret the term "modification" consistently in its Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) provisions and New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) regulations?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Environmental Defense, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clean Air

Unanswered and No. In a unanimous opinion by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the EPA need not interpret "modification" in PSD regulations the same way the term is interpreted in NSPS regulations. The Court's opinion acknowledged that two occurrences of the same term - sharing the same definition - are normally given the same meaning. However, the word "modification" and its definition appear in the context of two broad, open- ended grants of regulatory authority to the EPA. The Court held that "EPA's construction need do no more than fall within the limits of what is reasonable, as set by the Act's common definition." The Court concluded that differing circumstances involved in regulating under the PSD provisions as opposed to the NSPS provisions may well necessitate giving a different meaning to the term "modification" as it appears in each.

Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke

Mon, 16 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-593

Petitioner

Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Evelyn Coke

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 5, 2007

Argued

Monday, April 16, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2007

Advocates

Harold C. Becker (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Long Island Care at Home (Long Island) employed Evelyn Coke as a "home healthcare attendant" for the elderly. Coke sued her employer, claiming rights to overtime and minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The District Court ruled for Long Island, holding that Coke fell under the FLSA's exemption for employees engaged in "companionship services." The court gave deference to the Department of Labor's regulation 29 CFR Section 552.109(a), which applies the exemption to employees in "companionship services" who are "employed by an employer or agency other than the family or household using their services."

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It ruled that the regulation was a misinterpretation of the statute, and was therefore unenforceable. The Second Circuit declined to give the Department's regulation any of the judicial deference normally due to administrative regulations. No Chevron deference ("strong deference") was due, because the regulation was under a section titled "Interpretations." Regulations that are interpretive rather than legislative are not entitled to Chevron deference. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the regulation was "unpersuasive in the context of the entire statutory and regulatory scheme," and thus not entitled to Skidmore deference ("weak deference") either.

Question

1) Is a regulation found under a subpart headed "Interpretations" still entitled to be given Chevron deference by the courts?

2) Did the Second Circuit err in holding a Department of Labor regulation unpersuasive and thus undeserving of Skidmore deference?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards

Yes and yes. A unanimous Court ruled that the Department of Labor's regulation was "valid and binding" and therefore entitled to all of the deference courts normally give to administrative regulations. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer considered the regulation a normal instance of an agency "filling a statutory gap," and rejected each of the lower court's arguments that it was unlawful. The regulation was intended to be legally binding even though it was under a section titled "Interpretations." This was evidenced by the importance of the regulation and the fact that the Department went through full public notice-and-comment procedures. The "Interpretations" heading may have simply referred to that section's more detailed focus, which interpreted the more general regulations of the previous section. Since the regulation was valid and proper, the Court held, the FLSA's "companionship services" exemption continues to apply to workers paid by third-party agencies.

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency

Wed, 29 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1120

Respondent

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Petitioner Type

Respondent

Petitioners

Massachusetts, et al.

Respondent Type

Petitioners

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 26, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, November 29, 2006

Decided

Monday, April 2, 2007

Advocates

James R. Milkey (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Massachusetts and several other states petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), asking EPA to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases that contribute to global warming from new motor vehicles. Massachusetts argued that EPA was required to regulate these "greenhouse gases" by the Clean Air Act - which states that Congress must regulate "any air pollutant" that can "reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."

EPA denied the petition, claiming that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Even if it did, EPA argued, the Agency had discretion to defer a decision until more research could be done on "the causes, extent and significance of climate change and the potential options for addressing it." Massachusetts appealed the denial of the petition to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and a divided panel ruled in favor of EPA.

Question

1) May the EPA decline to issue emission standards for motor vehicles based on policy considerations not enumerated in the Clean Air Act?

2) Does the Clean Air Act give the EPA authority to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Massachusetts, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No and yes. By a 5-4 vote the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and ruled in favor of Massachusetts. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens held that Massachusetts, due to its "stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests" as a state, had standing to sue the EPA over potential damage caused to its territory by global warming. The Court rejected the EPA's argument that the Clean Air Act was not meant to refer to carbon emissions in the section giving the EPA authority to regulate "air pollution agent[s]". The Act's definition of air pollutant was written with "sweeping," "capacious" language so that it would not become obsolete. Finally, the majority ruled that the EPA was unjustified in delaying its decision on the basis of prudential and policy considerations. The Court held that if the EPA wishes to continue its inaction on carbon regulation, it is required by the Act to base the decision on a consideration of "whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change." Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion argued that Massachusetts should not have had standing to sue, because the potential injuries from global warming were not concrete or particularized (individual and personal). Justice Scalia's dissent argued that the Clean Air Act was intended to combat conventional lower-atmosphere pollutants and not global climate change.

Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation

Wed, 28 Feb 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-157

Petitioner

Jay F. Hein, Director, White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, December 1, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, February 28, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2007

Facts of the Case

Shortly after taking office, President Bush created by executive order the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, a program aimed at allowing religious charitable organizations to compete alongside non-religious ones for federal funding. Another executive order instructed various executive departments to hold conferences promoting the Faith-Based Initiative. The Freedom from Religion Foundation sued, alleging that the conferences favored religious organizations over non-religious ones and thereby violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The government argued that there was no "Case or Controversy" as required by Article III of the Constitution. According to the government, the Foundation had no standing to sue, because the Foundation had not been harmed in any way by the conferences. The fact that an individual pays taxes to the federal government is not normally enough to give the individual standing to challenge a federal program, but the Foundation noted that exceptions have been made for Establishment Clause challenges (see Flast v. Cohen and Bowen v. Kendrick).

The District Court ruled that the Foundation lacked standing to sue. The court held that the exceptions only covered challenges to specific congressional expenditures, not executive-branch actions funded by the general funds allotted to the executive departments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, ruling that any taxpayer has standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge against an executive-branch program, whether funded by a specific congressional grant or by a discretionary use of a general appropriation.

Question

Do taxpayers have standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge against Executive Branch actions funded by general appropriations rather than by any specific congressional grant?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Hein, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. By a 5-4 vote, the Court ruled that citizens do not have standing as taxpayers to bring Establishment Clause challenges against Executive Branch programs that are funded by appropriations for general administrative expenses. Justice Samuel Alito's plurality opinion called Flast v. Cohen a "narrow exception" to the general rule that taxpayer status does not grant standing to sue the government, and held that Flast did not support the Seventh Circuit's broad interpretation. In order to have standing under Flast, a taxpayer must not only challenge a policy on the basis of the Establishment Clause, but also bring the challenge against a congressional expenditure. Since no specific congressional appropriation was implicated in the suit, the Court ruled that there was no "Case or Controversy" under the Flast exception. To extend Flast to executive actions, the Court said, would threaten the separation of powers by relaxing the doctrine of standing and turning federal courts into "general complaint bureaus." In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia called the plurality's distinction "utterly meaningless," and argued that Flast should be overruled. Justice Souter argued in dissent that "When executive agencies spend identifiable sums of tax money for religious purposes, no less than when Congress authorizes the same thing, taxpayers suffer injury."

Carey v. Musladin

Wed, 11 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-785

Petitioner

Thomas L. Carey, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mathew Musladin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, April 17, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, October 11, 2006

Decided

Monday, December 11, 2006

Advocates

David W. Fermino (on behalf of Respondent)

David Wayne Fermino (argued the cause for Respondent)

Gregory A. Ott (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Mathew Musladin was convicted of the murder of Tom Studer. At Musladin's trial, Studer's family wore buttons showing pictures of the victim. Musladin's defense attorney requested that the trial judge tell the family to take off the buttons because they were prejudicial to the defense, but the judge denied the motion. Musladin later appealed his conviction to a state appellate court, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court. The appellate court held that though the buttons were an "impermissible factor" and should be discouraged, they were not so prejudicial that he had been denied his Due Process right to a fair trial. Musladin filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, but it was denied. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed the appellate court, and sent the case back the District Court.

Under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1), a provision of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court can grant habeas relief to a defendant convicted in state court only if the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." The Ninth Circuit found that this standard had been met, because the state court decision had been "objectively unreasonable." The Ninth Circuit ruled that the state court should have recognized the buttons as inherently prejudicial to the defense. In addition to Supreme Court precedents, the majority of the Circuit Court panel relied on one of the Circuit's own precedents that specifically dealt with buttons in the courtroom. The dissent argued that this reliance contradicted AEDPA's requirement that habeas courts consider the law "as determined by the Supreme Court." The majority considered the use of the Circuit precedent appropriate because it applied general principles set down by the Supreme Court.

Question

Did the Ninth Circuit exceed its authority under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1) when it overturned a murder conviction because the victim's family members appeared in the Courtroom wearing buttons with pictures of the victim?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Carey, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of any clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Court did not explicitly say that Circuit Courts cannot cite their own Circuit precedents when granting habeas relief, but the Court only addressed the Supreme Court precedents cited by the Ninth Circuit. Those precedents only dealt with government-sponsored practices that may prejudice a jury, such as forcing a defendant to appear in court wearing prison clothing. The Court's opinion called the issue of spectator conduct, like the kind at issue in Musladin's trial, an "open question in our jurisprudence." Since there was no clearly established federal law on the issue of spectator conduct, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit was wrong to grant habeas relief and overturn Musladin's conviction.

United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.

Mon, 23 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-562

Petitioner

United States

Respondent

Atlantic Research Corporation

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 19, 2007

Argued

Monday, April 23, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2007

Advocates

Thomas G. Hungar (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Owen T. Armstrong Jr. (argued the cause for the respondent)

Jay D. Geck (on behalf of Washington, et al., as amici curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Atlantic Research Corp. (Atlantic) built rocket motors for the United States government at an Arkansas facility. When residue from burnt rocket fuel contaminated the site, Atlantic voluntarily cleaned up the contamination and later sought cost recovery from the government under Section 107(a) and Section 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Some Courts of Appeals had interpreted Section 107(a) as implicitly allowing a party responsible for contamination to compel other partly-responsible parties to contribute to the clean-up. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 added Section 113(f), which makes explicit the right to sue for contribution.

While Atlantic was negotiating with the government, the Supreme Court ruled in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. that a party cannot bring a Section 113(f) claim for contribution unless it is already the subject of a Section 107(a) contamination action. Atlantic filed a new claim for contribution under Section 107(a), but a district court denied the claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had previously ruled that a liable party must use Section 113(f), not Section 107(a), to file a contribution claim. Atlantic argued that failure to meet the requirements of Section 113(f) did not foreclose the implied Section 107(a) right to sue other partly-responsible parties for contribution.

Question

Can a party that is potentially responsible for the cost of cleaning up contaminated property under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) bring an action against another potentially responsible party under Section 107(a), even if the party does not satisfy the requirements for bringing an action for contribution under Section 113(f) of CERCLA?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Atlantic Research Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 9607

Yes. The Court ruled unanimously that Section 107(a) of CERCLA allows potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to sue other PRPs for cost recovery. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas affirmed the Eighth Circuit and ruled for Atlantic Research. The government had claimed that the phrase "any other person" in Section 107(a) was meant to include only non-PRPs, but the Court, relying on the plain language of the statute, held that "the Governmentís interpretation makes little textual sense." Since almost any party likely to incur clean-up costs could be designated a PRP, the government's interpretation risked rendering Section 107(a) functionless. The Court explained that its interpretation would not result in improper overlap between Section 113(f) and Section 107(a). A party can sue another PRP for contribution under 113(f), but the party can only sue under Section 107(a) for reimbursement of its own clean-up costs. Therefore, parties cannot take advantage of Section 107(a)'s longer limitations period by bringing contribution claims under 107(a).

Limtiaco v. Camacho

Mon, 08 Jan 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-116

Petitioner

Alicia G. Limtiaco, Attorney General of Guam

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Felix P. Camacho, Governor of Guam

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Argued

Monday, January 8, 2007

Decided

Tuesday, March 27, 2007

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (argued the cause for Respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Governor Camacho of Guam sought to borrow over $400 million through the issuance of bonds. Guam Attorney General Moylan argued that the bond issuance violated the Guam Organic Act, a federal law governing the Territory of Guam. The Organic Act sets the limit for government borrowing to 10% of the "aggregate tax valuation of the property on Guam." The Governor asked the Supreme Court of Guam for a decision on the disputed text. The Guam legislature had interpreted the phrase "aggregate tax valuation" to mean the assessed value of property on Guam for purposes of taxation. However, the Guam Supreme Court declined to follow the legislature's interpretation and ruled that the "aggregate tax valuation" was equivalent to the full appraised value of property on Guam. Under that interpretation, the debt-limit would be about $1.1 billion.

The Attorney General appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While the case was pending, Congress passed a law allowing parties to appeal directly from the Guam Supreme Court to the U.S. Supreme Court. When the Ninth Circuit declined to hear the case, Moylan appealed to the Supreme Court. Normally parties must seek Supreme Court review within 90 days of a lower court's decision, but the case had been pending before the Ninth Circuit for two years. The Supreme Court directed the parties to argue the question of whether the time the case was pending before the Ninth Circuit counted toward the time limit.

Question

1) Did the Supreme Court of Guam err in interpreting the phrase "aggregate tax valuation" in the Guam Organic Act to mean the full value of property on Guam rather than the assessed value for the purposes of taxation?

2) Does the time the case was pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals count toward the time limit for seeking Supreme Court review?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Limtiaco, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 48 U.S.C. 1423

Yes and no. The Court agreed unanimously that the time the case was pending in the Ninth Circuit did not count toward the 90-day time limit for Supreme Court appeals, though this ruling was limited to the "unique procedural circumstances" presented by the case. On question of the interpretation of "tax valuation" in the Organic Act of Guam, the Court split 5-4. The majority opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas held that, contrary to the Guam Supreme Court's interpretation, the phrase must mean the assessed value for tax purposes of property on Guam. "The word 'tax' modifies 'valuation,' not 'property,'" the Court reasoned, so "tax valuation" "refers to the type of valuation to be conducted, not the object that is valued." The dissenting Justices argued that deciding the case on the basis of textual analysis and comparison to state debt limitations would amount to a "coin toss." In the dissenters' view, Congress's purpose was to set a "hard cap" on debt, which would indicate that the debt limitation should be based on the full market (appraised) value of property on Guam rather than dependent on the changeable assessment rate.

Philip Morris USA v. Williams

Tue, 31 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1256

Petitioner

Philip Morris USA

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mayola Williams, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jesse D. Williams, Deceased

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, May 30, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, October 31, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Advocates

Robert S. Peck (argued the cause for Respondent)

Andrew L. Frey (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Jesse Williams died of lung cancer at age 67 after a life spent smoking three packs of Marlboro cigarettes per day. His widow sued Phillip Morris, the maker of Marlboro cigarettes, alleging that the company had engaged in a deliberate, wide-spread campaign of misinformation on the dangers of smoking. The jury found for Williams and awarded her $821,485.50 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages. However, the trial judge found the punitive damages excessive and reduced them to $32 million.

Under the Supreme Court's decision BMW v. Gore, punitive damages must be reasonably related to the harm done to the plaintiff, but larger punitive damage awards may be appropriate if the defendant displayed reprehensible conduct. Citing Gore, the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the $79.5 million award, holding that Phillip Morris's conduct was reprehensible enough to warrant the large amount.

The Oregon Supreme Court declined to take the case. However, the U.S. Supreme Court sent the case back for consideration in light of State Farm v. Campbell, which held that punitive damages can normally only be as much as nine times greater than compensatory damages. The Oregon Court of Appeals again affirmed the $79.5 million award, ruling that the reprehensibility of Phillip Morris's conduct justified the larger ratio. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the decision.

Phillip Morris appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the court had unreasonably exceeded federal guidelines on punitive damages. Phillip Morris also argued that it was unfair to punish the company for its actions toward other smokers who were not parties to the suit.

Question

1) Can a court's determination that a defendant's conduct was highly reprehensible and analogous to crime override the constitutional requirement that punitive damages must be reasonably related to the harm to the plaintiff?

2) Does due process permit a jury to punish a defendant for the effects of its conduct on non-parties?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Philip Morris USA, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

1) Unconsidered and 2) no. The Court ruled 5-4 that "the Constitution's Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties." The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that it would be unfair to allow courts to award punitive damages for harm done to "strangers to the litigation," because defendants cannot defend themselves against such limitless and arbitrary charges. The Court did note that "risk of harm to the general public" can be taken into account as a component of the reprehensibility of the defendant's actions. Highly reprehensible actions may warrant a larger award of punitive damages, but the award cannot be increased as a direct result of harms inflicted on non-parties. The Court decided not to rule on the question of whether the $79.5 million award was excessive.

Brendlin v. California

Mon, 23 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-8120

Petitioner

Bruce Edward Brendlin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 19, 2007

Argued

Monday, April 23, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 18, 2007

Advocates

Elizabeth M. Campbell (on behalf of Petitioner)

Clifford E. Zall (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Police stopped Karen Simeroth's car for having expired registration tabs. Bruce Brendlin, who had a warrant out for his arrest, was riding in the passenger seat. Police found methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia in the car and on Simeroth's person. In a California trial court, Brendlin filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained at the traffic stop, claiming that the stop was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court found that Brendlin had never been detained or "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It denied the motion, and Brendlin pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine. A California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a traffic stop necessarily results in a Fourth Amendment seizure.

The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled for California. The court held that the driver of the car is the only one detained in a traffic stop. The movement of any passengers is also stopped as a practical matter, but the court considered this merely a necessary byproduct of the detention of the driver. The court held that Brendlin had been free to leave the scene of the traffic stop or to simply ignore the police. Since he was never "seized," however, he could not claim a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Question

When a vehicle is subject to a traffic stop, is a passenger in the vehicle "detained" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Brendlin, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice David Souter, the Court held that when a vehicle is stopped at a traffic stop, the passenger as well as the driver is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The justices said, "We resolve this question by asking whether a reasonable person in Brendlin's position when the car stopped would have believed himself free to 'terminate the encounter' between the police and himself." The Court held that Brendlin would have reasonably believed himself to be intentionally detained and subject to the authority of the police. Thus, he was justified in asserting his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizure. The Court noted that its ruling would not extend to more incidental restrictions on freedom of movement, such as when motorists are forced to slow down or stop because other vehicles are being detained. To accept the state's arguments, however, would be to "invite police officers to stop cars with passengers regardless of probable cause or reasonable suspicion of anything illegal."

Davenport v. Washington Education Association

Wed, 10 Jan 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1589

Petitioner

Gary Davenport, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Washington Education Association

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Washington v. Washington Education Association, No. 05-1657

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, January 10, 2007

Decided

Thursday, June 14, 2007

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Robert M. McKenna (argued the cause for Petitioners)

John M. West (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In some states, public sector labor unions are allowed to collect fees from non-union members. The Supreme Court has ruled that unions may use these fees for political purposes, but only if the non-union member does not object. Washington state also has a "paycheck protection" law, RCW 42.17.760, which requires unions to obtain specific permission from non-members before using their fees for political activity. Davenport, a non-union teacher, sued the Washington Education Association (WEA) teacher's union for violating the law.

WEA appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, arguing that Washington's requirement that unions get prior permission was an unconstitutional burden on the unions' First Amendment right to associate for political purposes. Davenport countered that his own First Amendment rights were being violated when his fees went to political causes he did not agree with. The state Court of Appeals ruled in favor of WEA.

On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the burden must lie on the nonmember to assert his rights and object to the political fees.

Question

Does a state law requiring labor unions to obtain permission from non-union members before using the non-members' fees for political purposes violate unions' First Amendment rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Davenport, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the First Amendment allows a state to require public-sector unions collecting "agency-shop" fees from non-union employees to obtain permission from the employees before using the money for political purposes. The Court's opinion held that "[...] unions have no constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees." It would be constitutional for a state to eliminate agency-shop fees altogether, and it is likewise constitutional for a state to take the lesser step of requiring permission from non-union employees before their fees are used for political purposes. The Court faulted the Washington Supreme Court for misinterpreting the Court's precedents as requiring that the burden always be on the objecting employee. The Court concluded that the law was viewpoint-neutral and that it did not suppress any political ideas, since it involved a limitation on how unions can obtain money from non-members and not a limitation how they can choose spend it once they have it. Thus, the Court held that the union's First Amendment right was not abridged by the permission requirement.

Travelers Casualty v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co.

Tue, 16 Jan 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1429

Petitioner

Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, October 6, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 2007

Decided

Tuesday, March 20, 2007

Advocates

G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. (for the petitioner)

E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Prior to declaring bankruptcy, Pacific Gas & Electric company (PG & E) purchased surety bonds from Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America (Travelers). These bonds obliged Travelers to settle debts PG & E couldn't repay. When PG & E went bankrupt, Travelers hired attorneys to protect its interests. State law mandated that PG & E cover all attorney fees incurred by Travelers during state bankruptcy proceedings. The litigation later moved to federal court. PG & E refused to pay for Travelers's expenditures in federal court, claiming responsibility only for fees incurred during state proceedings.

The Bankruptcy Court denied Travelers's request for reimbursement because the precedents of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that only federal laws could ensure payment for federal litigation. PG & E was only under contractual and legal obligation to pay for state-court attorney fees. The District Court and the Ninth Circuit denied Travelers's claim on the same grounds. Travelers appealed to the Supreme Court, citing inconsistent rulings among the Circuit Courts of Appeals.

Question

Can a litigant in a bankruptcy case involving federal bankruptcy law collect attorneys' fees that are granted by a contract or a state law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Travelers Casualty, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

Yes. Justice Samuel Alito issued the unanimous opinion, which found that the Bankruptcy Code did not expressly waive the contractual obligation to reimburse attorney fees even if incurred in federal litigation. Because the Bankruptcy Code "says nothing about unsecured claims for contractual attorney's fees incurred while litigating issues of bankruptcy law," the Court could "presume that claims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed." Since none of the nine exemptions waiving contractual obligation to reimburse attorney fees set forth in 11 U.S.C. Section 502(b) applied to Travelers, nothing undermined the debtor's contractual or state-law obligation to pay.

Jones v. Bock

Mon, 30 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-7058

Petitioner

Lorenzo L. Jones

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Barbara Bock, Warden, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Timothy Williams v. William S. Overton, et al., No. 05-7142

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, March 6, 2006

Argued

Monday, October 30, 2006

Decided

Monday, January 22, 2007

Advocates

Linda M. Olivieri (on behalf of Respondents)

Jean-Claude Andre (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Congress passed the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in 1995 in an effort to cut down on frivolous lawsuits by prisoners. Under the PLRA, before bringing a federal civil rights suit a prisoner must go through his prison's internal complaint process. Only after exhausting all of these "administrative remedies" can the prisoner bring the complaint to federal court.

Lorenzo Jones sustained serious injuries in a car accident while in custody. He sued prison officials in federal court, claiming that they were violating his Eighth Amendment rights by making him do arduous work despite his injuries. The officials moved to dismiss the suit, because Jones had not provided any evidence or description of the administrative remedies he claimed to have pursued. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the suit.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit Court ruled that in order for Jones to sue, he would have had to provide the court with copies of his grievance forms or at least describe the administrative processes he had exhausted. The Circuit Court further ruled that the PLRA requires "total exhaustion," which means that if a prisoner's suit has multiple claims, administrative remedies must have been exhausted for each and every claim.

The Supreme Court accepted review in order to resolve the conflict between Circuit Courts over which side bears the burden of proving exhaustion of administrative remedies.

In Williams v. Overton, Timothy Williams suffered from a medical condition which caused tumor growth and disfigurement in his arm. He claimed that prison officials were violating his rights by ignoring his medical needs. Williams's complaint had two claims: he needed additional surgery on his arm and a single-occupancy, handicapped-accessible cell. Williams went through the administrative remedial process on both grievances and both claims were denied. Williams then sued in federal court.

The District Court dismissed the suit, because Williams had neglected to name any prison officials as defendants in his medical complaint. Therefore, the court ruled, the administrative remedies for that claim could not be considered to have been exhausted.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, ruling that "The prisoner must demonstrate that he has exhausted the administrative remedies with respect to each individual he intends to sue." The Circuit Court also ruled that the PLRA requires "total exhaustion," which meant that Williams's entire suit was dismissed because of his unexhausted medical claim, even though the administrative remedies for his request for a new cell had been exhausted.

Question

1) Does the Prisoner Litigation and Reform Act require that a prisoner bringing a federal civil rights suit show how he exhausted his administrative remedies before suing, rather than requiring that the defense prove that the administrative remedies were not exhausted?

2) Does the Prisoner Litigation and Reform Act require a court to dismiss a prisoner's civil rights suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies whenever there is a single unexhausted claim, despite the presence of other exhausted claims?

From Williams v. Overton:

3) Does the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act require that a prisoner name a particular defendant in his administrative grievance in order to exhaust his administrative remedies as to that defendant and preserve his right to sue?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jones, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1997

No to all. The Court ruled unanimously that the Sixth Circuit's rules for exhaustion of administrative remedies were not required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts held that prisoners bring civil rights lawsuits do not need to demonstrate that they have already exhausted all administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit had assumed that Congress had intended to put the burden on the plaintiff, but the Court ruled that an explicit statement by Congress would have been required. The Justices also held that when a court is presented with a suit with both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the court can let the exhausted claims proceed rather than dismissing the entire suit. The Court rejected the argument that the statute's use of the word "action" instead of "claim" indicated that the entire suit should be dismissed. The opinion explained that Congress was merely using "boilerplate language." Finally, the Court ruled that the PLRA did not require a prisoner to name each defendant in his administrative grievance in order to name the defendant in his subsequent lawsuit. By imposing these extraneous rules, the Sixth Circuit had exceeded its legitimate authority over the management of its docket.

KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.

Tue, 28 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1350

Petitioner

KSR International Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Teleflex, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 26, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, November 28, 2006

Decided

Monday, April 30, 2007

Advocates

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Petitioner)

James W. Dabney (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Teleflex sued KSR International (KSR), alleging that KSR had infringed on its patent for an adjustable gas-pedal system composed of an adjustable accelerator pedal and an electronic throttle control. KSR countered that Teleflex's patent was obvious, and therefore unenforceable. Under 25 U.S.C. Section 103(a), obvious inventions cannot be patented. A federal District Court granted summary judgment for KSR, accepting KSR's argument that the invention was obvious because each of the invention's components existed in previous patents. Anyone with knowledge or experience in the industry, the District Court ruled, would have considered it obvious that the two components could be combined. Teleflex appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the District Court. The Circuit Court found the lower court's analysis incomplete, because the District Court had not applied a full "teaching-suggestion-motivation test." Under this test, in order to label the patent obvious the District Court would have needed to identify the specific "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" that would have led a knowledgeable person to combine the two previously-existing components. KSR appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Circuit Court's test conflicted with Supreme Court precedent and that it would allow too many patents of obvious inventions.

Question

Was the Federal Circuit correct in holding that an invention cannot be held "obvious", and thus unpatentable, without a finding of some "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" that would have led a "person of ordinary skill in the art" to the invention by combining previously-existing ideas?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for KSR International Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 35 U.S.C. 103

No. The Court ruled unanimously that the Federal Circuit "analyzed the issue in a narrow, rigid manner inconsistent with [Section 103(a)] and our precedents." Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, which ruled in favor of KSR and reversed the Court of Appeals. The opinion acknowledged that a patent is not necessarily obvious by virtue of being a combination of two previously existing components and that it can be helpful in such cases for a court to identify a reason that would have motivated a knowledgeable person to combine the components. However, the Court held that Federal Circuit's "teaching-suggestion-motivation test" was not to be applied as a mandatory rule. This test for determining obviousness was too narrow, because it only took into account teachings on the specific problem the patentee was attempting to solve. Teleflex's gas pedal patent was inspired by previous inventions aimed at different problems. Even though no one had combined the pre-existing adjustable gas pedal and electronic sensor technology in the precise way Teleflex's patent did, the Court held that the existence of the technology would have caused any person of ordinary skill to see the obvious benefit of combining the two. Consequently, Teleflex's patent was obvious and therefore invalid.

Smith v. Texas

Wed, 17 Jan 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-11304

Petitioner

LaRoyce Lathair Smith

Respondent

Texas

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, October 6, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, January 17, 2007

Decided

Wednesday, April 25, 2007

Advocates

Jordan Steiker (argued the cause for the petitioner)

R. Ted Cruz (argued the cause for the respondent)

Gene C. Schaerr (argued the cause for California, et al., as amici curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

LaRoyce Smith was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. In 2004, the Supreme Court overturned his death sentence and sent the case back to state court because of a judge's improper jury instruction. (See Smith v. Texas, No. 04-5323.) Nevertheless, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals re-imposed the sentence, holding that the erroneous instruction had not done any "egregious harm" to the fairness of Smith's sentencing. The Texas court found that the jury had still been able to consider all relevant mitigating evidence, despite the unconstitutional instruction. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case a second time.

Question

1) Was the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals correct in holding that the improper instruction given to Smith's jury was harmless error and not sufficient to invalidate his death sentence?

2) Was the Texas court correct to require a standard of "egregious harm" when evaluating whether an unconstitutional jury instruction should invalidate a death sentence?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Smith, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Unanswered and no. The Court ruled 5-4 that the jury instructions did not give meaningful effect to Smith's mitigating evidence, and that a subsequent corrective instruction was not sufficient to correct the error. The Texas court had ruled that because Smith had abandoned his objection to the instructions in the course of the proceedings, he must show that "egregious harm" had been done to his trial. The Court criticized the Fifth Circuit for misreading the record and the Court's instructions: "The requirement that Smith show egregious harm was predicated, [...] on a misunderstanding of the federal right Smith asserts [...]" Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority.

Gonzales v. Carhart

Wed, 08 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Carhart's Residence

111 South 18th Plaza Omaha NE 68102

Omaha, NE 68102

United States

41° 15' 33.0984" N, 95° 56' 23.1756" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-380

Petitioner

Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General

Respondent

Leroy Carhart, et al.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. 124 (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, November 8, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, April 18, 2007

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Priscilla J. Smith (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, Congress passed and the President signed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. The controversial concept of partial-birth abortion is defined in the Act as any abortion in which the death of the fetus occurs when "the entire fetal head [...] or [...] any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother." Dr. Leroy Carhart and other physicians who perform late-term abortions sued to stop the Act from going into effect. The plaintiffs argued that the Act could apply to a more common abortion procedure known as "D&E;" ("dilation and evacuation"), as well as to the less common "intact D&E;," sometimes called D&X; ("dilation and extraction"). With this application the Act would ban most late-term abortions and thus be an unconstitutional "undue burden" on the right to an abortion, as defined by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The plaintiffs also argued that the Act's lack of an exception for abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother rendered it unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, regardless of Congress's finding in the Act that partial-birth abortions are never medically necessary.

A federal District Court agreed and ruled the Act unconstitutional on both grounds. The government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The government argued that the Act only bans a narrow category of abortion procedures, and that a health exception is not required when Congress determines that a banned abortion procedure is never necessary for the health of the mother. The Eighth Circuit disagreed and upheld the District Court, ruling that a health exception is required for all bans on abortion procedures when "substantial medical authority" supports the necessity of the procedure. The Circuit Court ruled that the ongoing disagreement among medical experts over the necessity of intact D&E; abortions was sufficient to establish that the Act was unconstitutional without a health exception. The Circuit Court did not reach the question of whether the Act was so broad as to qualify as an unconstitutional "undue burden."

Question

Is the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 an unconstitutional violation of personal liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment because the Act lacks an exception for partial-birth abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gonzales, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1531

Ayers v. Belmontes

Tue, 03 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-493

Petitioner

Robert L. Ayers, Jr., Acting Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fernando Belmontes

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 1, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, October 3, 2006

Decided

Monday, November 13, 2006

Advocates

Eric S. Multhaup (argued the cause for Respondent)

Mark A. Johnson (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."

After the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.

After the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or "unadorned" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.

Question

1) Is an "unadorned" factor (k) instruction sufficient to inform a jury that it must consider any mitigating evidence that a defendant may present concerning his probability of rehabilitation and good behavior as a prisoner?

2) Is the Ninth Circuit's ruling that factor (k) is constitutionally inadequate a "new constitutional rule of criminal procedure," in which case it would not be applied retroactively to other defendants whose cases are already final?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Ayers, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Yes and unanswered. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the factor (k) instruction, allowing Belmontes's death sentence to go forward. The opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy held that "The factor (k) instruction is consistent with the constitutional right to present mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings." Following the analysis in Boyde v. California, the Justices ruled that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury had misunderstood the instruction. The Court held that the jurors had interpreted factor (k) as a broad catch-all under which they could consider forward-looking mitigating factors such as the possibility of rehabilitation. Since the jury had considered all of Belmontes's mitigating evidence before his sentencing, the sentence was constitutional.

Rita v. United States

Tue, 20 Feb 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-5754

Petitioner

Victor A. Rita

Respondent

United States

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, November 3, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Decided

Thursday, June 21, 2007

Advocates

Thomas N. Cochran (for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Victor Rita received a thirty-three month sentence from a trial judge after a jury convicted him of perjury, obstruction of justice, and making false statements. Though the sentence fell within the range prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and under the statutory maximum, Rita appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. He argued that the judge should not have sentenced him without explicitly considering factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) that might justify imposing a lesser sentence. The government argued that the judge could presume the sentence reasonable if it fell within the guidelines, even without an explicit analysis of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The Supreme Court had previously ruled in U.S. v. Booker that sentencing judges could only treat the guidelines as advisory, not as mandatory. The Fourth Circuit accepted the government's arguments and ruled that a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences did not violate Booker.

Question

1) Does the Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Booker allow courts to accord a presumption of reasonableness to sentences that fall within the Federal Sentencing Guidelines? 2) If so, may a court presume a within- Guidelines sentence reasonable without an explicit analysis of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors that might justify a lesser sentence?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

Yes and yes. The Court ruled that courts of appeals may apply a nonbinding presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that when the sentencing judge and the guidelines established by the Sentencing Commission agree on the proper sentence in a case, the "double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one." The Court reasoned that since the presumption of reasonableness for within- Guidelines sentences does not forbid any judge from imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines, the presumption is consistent with Booker. This presumption of reasonableness does not imply that courts can apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences outside the Guidelines ranges. The Court also found that the District judge had acted reasonably in imposing Rita's within-Guidelines sentence. Though the judge had not undertaken an explicit extended analysis of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the Court found his analysis "brief but legally sufficient." It was clear from the context that the judge had considered and rejected each factor that might have justified a lesser sentence, and the Court said, "we cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting upon a full opinion in every case."

Wilkie v. Robbins

Mon, 19 Mar 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-219

Petitioner

Charles Wilkie, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harvey Frank Robbins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, December 1, 2006

Argued

Monday, March 19, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2007

Facts of the Case

Harvey Robbins owned a private dude ranch which was intermingled with federal lands. The previous owner had granted the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) right-of-way across the private land, but after Robbins bought the ranch he refused to re-grant it. Robbins alleged that BLM officials harassed him with threats and meritless criminal charges, with the aim of forcing him to grant the government right-of-way. Robbins sued the BLM officials for extortion in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). He also brought a Bivens action (an action seeking monetary damages from a federal agent for a constitutional violation). Robbins argued that the Fifth Amendment protects a "right to exclude" government officials from one's property, and that the BLM agents had retaliated against him for his exercise of this right. The District Court dismissed both claims, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the government argued that the BLM officials, while acting on behalf of the government, had qualified immunity and therefore could not be sued for extortion under RICO. The government also claimed that no Bivens action could be brought, because review of the BLM's actions was already available under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Question

1) Can government officials acting pursuant to their regulatory authority be guilty of extortion under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for attempting to obtain property for the benefit of the government? 2) Is a Bivens claim based on Fifth Amendment rights precluded by the availability of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act? 3) Does the Fifth Amendment protect against retaliation for exercising a "right to exclude" the government from one's property?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Wilkie, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

No, unanswered, and no. The Court ruled 7-2 that "neither Bivens nor RICO gives Robbins a cause of action," so he could not sue the government for retaliation. In an opinion by Justice David Souter, the Court declined to extend the availability of Bivens actions to cases of retaliation for the exercise of the right to exclude the government from one's property. The Court noted that Robbins had other administrative and judicial remedies for the government's various violations, though it acknowledged that these amounted to a difficult-to-use "patchwork." Because of the impossibly of devising a framework to separate constitutional violations from government actions that are merely borderline improper, the Court would not add a Bivens remedy to landowners' toolkit. The government can be expected to engage in some hardball tactics during land negotiations, the majority held, and inviting an "onslaught of Bivens actions" in an effort to counter the occasional overreach would be a "cure [...] worse than the disease." Robbins's RICO claim failed as well, because extortion has not normally been understood to encompass the actions of government officials seeking to obtain property for the government rather than for themselves. The Court called the cases that Robbins cited in favor of his claim obscure and off-point.

EC Term of Years Trust v. United States

Mon, 26 Feb 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1541

Petitioner

EC Term of Years Trust

Respondent

United States

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, October 27, 2006

Argued

Monday, February 26, 2007

Decided

Monday, April 30, 2007

Advocates

Francis S. Ainsa Jr (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Deanne E. Maynard (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contended that Elmer and Dorothy Cullers had established a trust for the purpose of evading taxes. The IRS filed tax liens against the trust, freezing the trustees' assets until the outstanding taxes were paid. The trustees disagreed with the IRS, but opened a bank account to settle the tax dispute. A month later, the IRS collected the outstanding taxes from the bank account. EC Term of Years Trust sued the IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7426, which entitles trustees to challenge wrongful IRS collections, and 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), which entitles taxpayers to recover erroneously collected taxes. A district court decided that only 26 U.S.C. 7426 allowed third-party tax recoveries, so the court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), the general provision for tax recovery. The court dismissed the 26 U.S.C. 7426 claim because the nine-month filing time limit had expired. EC Trust claimed in a second suit that the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Williams meant that the possibility of a suit under 26 U.S.C. 7426 did not preclude suits under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1). The District Court rejected the argument, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Can a party challenge, under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), an Internal Revenue Service tax levy on its property intended to collect taxes owed by another party, even if the party could have sued under 26 U.S.C. 7426 but failed to file the suit before the time limit expired?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

No. In a unanimous decision written by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that "Resisting the force of the better-fitted statute [28 U.S.C. 7426] requires a good countervailing reason, and none appears here." The Court held that Section 7426 is the exclusive legal vehicle for challenging a wrongful tax levy, so after having missed the deadline EC Term of Years Trust could not bring its suit as a tax refund claim under 1346(a)(1). The Court acknowledged that in United States v. Williams it had allowed liens to be challenged under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), but the Court held that the principle in Williams was limited to cases in which there is no other remedy available. The Justices ruled that it would not make sense to allow claims under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), which has a 9-month limitations period, to be duplicated under 26 U.S.C. 7426, which has a time limit of four years.

Winkelman v. Parma City School District

Tue, 27 Feb 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-983

Petitioner

Jacob Winkelman, a Minor, By and Through His Parents and Legal Guardians, Jeff and Sandee Winkelman, et al.

Respondent

Parma City School District

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, October 27, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, February 27, 2007

Decided

Monday, May 21, 2007

Advocates

Jean-Claude Andre (for the petitioners)

David B. Salmons (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Pierre H. Bergeron (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Jeff and Sandee Winkelman claimed that Parma City School District failed to give their disabled son Jacob a "free appropriate public education" as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Despite the Winkelmans' opposition, the school district planned to place Jacob in a public elementary school. After a preliminary school district hearing affirmed Jacob's placement, the Winkelmans placed Jacob in a private school at their own expense and petitioned a federal District Court for reimbursement.

The District Court ruled for the School District. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the suit because the Winkelmans lacked a lawyer. The Winkelmans argued that according to the IDEA, "any party aggrieved by the findings" of a preliminary school district hearing may appeal in a federal court. Also, because the IDEA demands active parental involvement in order to enforce proper child placement, the parent should be able to appear in court "pro se" - without a lawyer. The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments and held that the IDEA does not establish any right of a non-lawyer parent to represent his disabled child in federal court. Non-lawyer parents cannot represent themselves either, the Circuit Court ruled, because the IDEA protects the rights of the child, not the parents.

Question

In a lawsuit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), may a non-lawyer parent of a disabled child argue in federal court either on his own behalf ("pro se") or on behalf of his child?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Winkelman, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 20 U.S.C. 1400

Yes. The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit by a 7-2 vote, ruling that "[p]arents enjoy rights under IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf." Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion held that since the IDEA gives parents enforceable rights in the administrative stage of disputes over "free appropriate public education," it would be inconsistent if they could not exercise the same rights in federal court. An interpretation where some rights inhere and both parents and child while others inhere only in the child would be unnecessarily confusing and was not indicated by the text and structure of IDEA. Therefore the Court ruled that a parent can be a "party aggrieved" under the statute and that sections referring to the rights of the child need not be read to exclude the parent. The dissenters would have held that IDEA gives parents the right to represent themselves in court when they seek reimbursement or challenge violations of their own procedural rights, but not when they challenge the adequacy of their child's free appropriate public education. Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the child, as the one who is receiving the education, is the only one with a right to it, and he accused the majority of "spraying statutory sections about like buckshot [to] create a substantive parental right to education where none exists."

National Association of Home Builders, et al. v. Defenders of Wildlife

Tue, 17 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-340

Petitioner

National Association of Home Builders, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Defenders of Wildlife, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Environmental Protection Agency v. Defenders of Wildlife, et al., No. 06-549

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 5, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, April 17, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2007

Facts of the Case

The Clean Water Act (CWA) instructs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to turn over pollution permitting authority to a state if the state's proposal meets nine listed criteria. When Arizona issued such a proposal, the EPA regional office raised the concern that the transfer might violate Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which prohibits agencies from taking actions that might jeopardize endangered species. In accordance with the ESA, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The FWS's opinion was that the ESA was inapplicable because the agency had no authority to consider any additional factors beyond the nine CWA criteria (none of which concerned endangered species). On the advice of the FWS, the EPA approved the transfer.

The Defenders of Wildlife challenged the transfer, arguing that the ESA imposed an authoritative, independent requirement on the EPA's decision to approve the transfer. The agency countered the ESA was not an independent source of authority. Rather, the ESA imposes requirements only on the discretionary decisions of federal agencies. Since its decision was non- discretionary under the CWA, the agency argued, the ESA did not apply. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Defenders of Wildlife and invalidated the transfer. The Ninth Circuit found the FWS opinion legally flawed and the EPA's reliance on it "arbitrary and capricious." It noted that the EPA's decision was inconsistent with previous transfers of permitting authority, in which the impact on endangered species was considered.

Question

1) Can a court require that state Clean Water Act pollution permitting programs include protections for endangered species?

2) Does Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act constitute an independent source of authority for federal agencies?

3) Is the EPA's approval of a state permitting program the legally relevant cause of impacts to endangered species resulting from future private land use activities?

4) Was the Court of Appeals correct that the EPA's decision to transfer pollution-permitting authority to Arizona under the Clean Water Act was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on inconsistent interpretations of Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act? If so, should the Court of Appeals have sent the case back to the EPA for further proceedings without ruling on the interpretation of Section 7(a)(2)?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for National Association of Home Builders, et al., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

No to all. By a 5-4 vote the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and sustained the FWS's determination that Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act applies only to discretionary actions of federal agencies. EPA's transfer of permitting authority was a nondiscretionary action, so the EPA needed only to consider the nine criteria in the Clean Water Act. The majority opinion held that Section 7(a)(2)'s provisions for protecting endangered species do not establish a "tenth criterion" for the EPA to consider before transferring permitting authority. By this interpretation the Court sought to "harmonize[]" the ESA with the CWA, in keeping with the Court's interpretive principle that a statute should generally not be interpreted to repeal an earlier statute unless the more recent statute has explicit language to that effect. Because the Court found that the decisions of the EPA and FWS consistently and reasonably interpreted both statutes, it deferred to the views of the administrative agencies. Justice Stevens's dissent argued that the ESA's requirements properly applied to all agency decisions both discretionary and non-discretionary, and that EPA's interpretation was not entitled to deference because "[t]he Departments of the Interior and Commerce, not EPA, are charged with administering the ESA."

Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez

Tue, 05 Dec 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1629

Petitioner

Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Luis Alexander Duenas-Alvarez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, December 5, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, January 17, 2007

Advocates

Christopher J. Meade (argued the cause for Respondent)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Luis Duenas-Alvarez, a Peruvian citizen living in California, was convicted of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows for the deportation of aliens who are convicted of an aggravated felony, which includes "theft offenses." The Department of Homeland Security began deportation proceedings against Duenas-Alvarez. An immigration judge ruled in favor of the government and ordered Duenas-Alvarez deported to Peru, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.

On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Duenas-Alvarez argued that he was not guilty of a theft offense for purposes of the INA because he had only aided and abetted the theft of the car. The California anti-theft law did not distinguish between auto-theft and merely aiding an auto-theft, but the Ninth Circuit had ruled that the INA "theft offense" includes only the person who actually stole and took possession of the car, and not necessarily anyone who aided in the theft. Accordingly, the Circuit Court ruled in favor of Duenas-Alvarez and reversed the lower courts.

Question

Does the "theft offense" aggravated felony in the Immigration and Nationality Act include aiding and abetting a theft?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gonzales, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

Yes. The Court ruled unanimously that aiding and abetting a theft qualifies as a "theft offense" for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that the common law had done away with all distinctions between "principals" and "aiders and abettors" of theft crimes. Duenas-Alvarez argued that California's theft law was unique in that it included offenses beyond the "generic theft" contemplated by the Immigration and Nationality Act. However, the Court's analysis of California case law led it to the conclusion that California's law, like those of other states, encompassed the generic definition of theft. Because Duenas-Alvarez had not raised the issue in the Questions Presented, the Court refused to consider whether the California theft law included the less severe theft crime of joyriding, which might not fall under "generic theft" for purposes of the INA.

Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life

Wed, 25 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-969

Petitioner

Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.

Respondent

Federal Election Commission

Consolidation

McCain, et al. v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 06-970

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Argued

Wednesday, April 25, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2007

Facts of the Case

Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), a nonprofit political advocacy corporation, ran three advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two U.S. Senators and tell them to oppose filibusters of judicial nominees. WRTL intended to keep running the ads through the 2004 election, but the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60-day period prior to an election. WRTL sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), claiming that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to the advertisements. In 2006, the Supreme Court let the "as applied" challenge proceed (see Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission, 04-1581). In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Court had upheld Congress's power to regulate "express advocacy" ads that support or oppose political candidates, but WRTL claimed that its ads were "issue ads" rather than express advocacy. WRTL also argued that the government lacked a compelling interest sufficient to override the corporation's First Amendment free speech interest. The FEC countered that WRTL's ads were "sham issue ads," which refrain from explicitly endorsing or opposing a candidate but are intended to affect an election.

A three-judge District Court agreed with WRTL's arguments and ruled the BCRA unconstitutional as applied to the ads. The court refused the FEC's request that it inquire into the intent and likely effect of the ads, because those determinations would be impractical and would have a chilling effect on protected speech. Analyzing only the explicit content of the ads, the court found them to be legitimate issue ads and not express advocacy or sham issue ads. The court also held that the government's justification for banning express advocacy ads by corporations - the need to reduce political corruption and public cynicism - did not apply to ads that do not endorse or oppose a candidate. Therefore, the court ruled that the government lacked a compelling interest to justify the burden on WRTL's First Amendment rights.

Question

Is the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's ban on the use of corporate treasury funds for political advertisements in the 60 days before an election unconstitutional as applied to advertisements that do not explicitly endorse or oppose a candidate?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Wisconsin Right to Life, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Election Campaign

Yes. By a 5-4 vote the Court ruled that BCRA's limitations on political advertising were unconstitutional as they applied to issue ads like WRTL's. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that the ads were genuine issue ads, not express political advocacy or its functional equivalent (which Congress can concededly regulate). The Court held that McConnell v. FEC did not establish the test that any ad intended to influence an election and having that effect is express advocacy. Such a test would be open-ended and burdensome, would lead to bizarre results, and would "unquestionably chill a substantial amount of political speech." Instead, the Court adopted the test that "an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." The Court further held that the compelling state interests invoked by the government to regulate advocacy did not apply with equal force to genuine issue ads. Neither the interest in preventing corruption nor the goal of limiting the distorting effects of corporate wealth was sufficient to override the right of a corporation to speak through ads on public issues. This conclusion, the Court held, was necessary in order to "give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship." The dissent by Justice Souter called WRTL's ads indistinguishable from political advocacy ads and accused the majority of implicitly overruling McConnell v. FEC.

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company

Mon, 27 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1074

Petitioner

Lilly M. Ledbetter

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 26, 2006

Argued

Monday, November 27, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 2007

Advocates

Kevin K. Russell (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Glen D. Nager (argued the cause for Respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Over her nineteen-year career at Goodyear Tire, Lilly Ledbetter was consistently given low rankings in annual performance-and-salary reviews and low raises relative to other employees. Ledbetter sued Goodyear for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the company had given her a low salary because of her gender. A jury found for Ledbetter and awarded her over $3.5 million, which the district judge later reduced to $360,000.

Goodyear appealed, citing a Title VII provision that requires discrimination complaints to made within 180 days of the employer's discriminatory conduct. The jury had examined Ledbetter's entire career for evidence of discrimination, but Goodyear argued that the jury should only have considered the one annual salary review that had occurred within the 180-day limitations period before Ledbetter's complaint.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court, but without adopting Goodyear's position entirely. Instead the Circuit Court ruled that the jury could only examine Ledbetter's career for evidence of discrimination as far back as the last annual salary review before the start of the 180-day limitations period. The Circuit Court ruled that the fact that Ledbetter was getting a low salary during the 180 days did not justify the evaluation of Goodyear's decisions over Ledbetter's entire career. Instead, only those annual reviews that could have affected Ledbetter's payment during the 180 days could be evaluated. The Circuit Court found no evidence of discrimination in those reviews, so it reversed the District Court and dismissed Ledbetter's complaint.

Question

Can a plaintiff bring a salary discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when the disparate pay is received during the 180-day statutory limitations period, but is the result of discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations period?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

No. By a 5-4 vote the Court ruled that Ledbetter's claim was time-barred by Title VII's limitations period. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito held that "current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination." For a timely claim, Ledbetter would have needed to file within 180 days of a discriminatory salary decision; the Court did not consider it significant that paychecks she received during the 180 days prior to her claim were affected by the past discrimination. Discriminatory intent is a crucial element of a Title VII disparate-treatment claim, the Court held, but each instance of Goodyear's discriminatory intent fell outside the limitations period. The majority noted that the short time limit was enacted to ensure quick resolution of pay discrimination disputes, which can become more difficult to defend against as time passes. To adopt Ledbetter's argument would be to allow even "discriminatory pay decision[s] made 20 years ago" to be the subject of Title VII claims. In dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg called the majority's ruling out of tune with the realities of wage discrimination and "a cramped interpretation of Title VII, incompatible with the statute's broad remedial purpose." She suggested that "the Legislature may act to correct this Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII."

Osborn v. Haley

Mon, 30 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-593

Petitioner

Pat Osborn

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Barry Haley, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, May 15, 2006

Argued

Monday, October 30, 2006

Decided

Monday, January 22, 2007

Advocates

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (argued the cause for Respondents)

Eric Grant (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Pat Osborn, an employee of a private contractor for the U.S. Forest Service, sued Barry Haley, an employee of the Forest Service, in state court. Osborn alleged that Haley had influenced her employer to fire her. Under the Westfall Act, federal employees are immune from such lawsuits if the employee acts "within the scope of his employment." If the Attorney General certifies that the employee acted within his scope, the case can be transferred to federal court and the United States can be substituted for the employee as the defendant. The government conceded that if Osborn's version of events were correct, Haley would have been outside his scope. Nevertheless, the government certified that Haley was within his scope, because it denied that Haley had any role in Osborn's firing.

The government brought the case to federal District Court, but the court decided that it lacked the authority to settle the factual dispute at the root of the Attorney General's certification. Instead, the court assumed that Osborn's account was true, ruled that Haley had been outside the scope of his employment by influencing Haley's firing, and sent the case back to state court.

The government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the lower court. The Circuit Court ruled that the Westfall Act gives the courts power to settle factual disputes over the incident at issue in a lawsuit, even if the dispute is over whether or not the incident happened at all. The Sixth Circuit also ruled that the District Court should not have sent the case back to state court, because the Westfall Act gives the federal courts jurisdiction over the case even after the federal District Court finds that the Attorney General was wrong to certify the federal employee.

Osborn appealed to the Supreme Court, which instructed the parties to submit briefs on the additional question of whether the Westfall Act gives a Court of Appeals the authority to review a District Court's order remanding a case back to state court.

Question

1) Does the Westfall Act authorize the Attorney General to certify that an employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of an incident by denying that the incident occurred at all?

2) Does the Westfall Act forbid a district court to send a case back to state court after finding that the Attorney General's certification was not authorized by the Act?

3) Do courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review a court's order sending a case back to a state court?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Haley, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 2679

Yes to all. In a 7-2 decision, the Court upheld the Sixth Circuit and ruled that "Westfall Act certification is proper when a federal officer charged with misconduct asserts, and the Attorney General concludes, that the incident or episode in suit never occurred." The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the Act would be ineffective at shielding federal employees from suit if the government were required to accept for immunity purposes the plaintiff's allegation that the event in question occurred. The Court also rejected Osborn's jurisdictional arguments. Relying on the Westfall Act's provision that certification from the Attorney General "shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal," the Court held that after the Attorney General's certification federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, even if the federal court eventually finds the certification invalid. In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) removed the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to review the District Court's order sending the case back to state court. The majority held that 1447(d) did not apply to orders based on findings of invalid certification.

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.

Wed, 04 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-608

Petitioner

MedImmune, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Genentech, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, October 4, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, January 9, 2007

Advocates

John G. Kester (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Maureen E. Mahoney (argued the cause for Respondents)

Deanne E. Maynard (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Genentech held the patent for "Cabilly I", a process for using cell cultures to manufacture human antibodies. MedImmune had a licensing agreement with Genentech under which MedImmune paid royalties to Genentech in return for the use of the patent. Later, Genentech also obtained the patent to "Cabilly II," a continuation of the Cabilly I process. Under the licensing agreement, MedImmune became a licensee for Cabilly II as well. Genentech informed MedImmune that it would have to pay royalties on one of its most lucrative products, Synagis, which uses the Cabilly II process. MedImmune sued Genentech, claiming that the patent was invalid and unenforceable. However, MedImmune kept paying the royalties.

A federal District Court dismissed the suit because it did not present a controversy. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases or controversies." This is implemented in the Declaratory Judgment Act, which requires that a suit involve an "actual controversy." Genentech argued that since MedImmune was still paying royalties on the patent, there was no controversy. MedImmune countered that though it was indeed still paying royalties on the patent it claimed was invalid, it was paying "under protest." It would be unreasonable, MedImmune argued, for the company to be required to break its contractual obligations by stopping royalty payments before suing. This might jeopardize MedImmune's legal rights to one of its best-selling products.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled for Genentech and upheld the District Court, holding that the suit presented no actual controversy.

Question

Does the "actual controversy" requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act require that a patent licensee break its licensing agreement by refusing to pay royalties before suing to declare a patent invalid and unenforceable?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for MedImmune, Inc., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court reversed the Federal Circuit and ruled for MedImmune. The Court held that MedImmune was not required to break its contract before suing, because "The rule that a plaintiff must [...] risk treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business[] before seeking a declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article III." The Declaratory Judgment Act only requires that disputes be non-hypothetical and non-abstract. The mere fact that royalties were still being paid, the Court ruled, was not sufficient to remove the courts' jurisdiction under Article III. In a lone dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the Court's expansive approach toward Article III jurisdiction would improperly allow parties to bring premature, theoretical suits.

BP America Production Company v. Burton

Wed, 04 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-669

Respondent

Rejane Burton, Acting Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals Management, Department of the Interior, et al.

Petitioner Type

Respondent

Petitioners

BP America Production Company, Successor in Interest to Amoco Production Company, et al.

Respondent Type

Petitioners

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, April 17, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, October 4, 2006

Decided

Monday, December 11, 2006

Advocates

Daryl Joseffer (argued the cause for Respondents)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Department of the Interior (DOI) leases the rights to the mining of natural resources on federal lands to private companies like BP America Production (BP) in return for royalty payments. BP obtained a lease for the mining of coalbed methane gas, a natural gas that requires removal of excess carbon dioxide from the gas in order to make in marketable. In 1996, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the DOI issued an administrative order clarifying that the companies themselves must bear the full cost of removing the carbon dioxide. BP had been deducting the removal cost from its royalty payments, so the MMS ordered BP to pay more than $4 million in past royalites. BP cited 28 U.S.C. Section 2415(a), which establishes a six-year statute of limitations for government actions for monetary damages. BP argued that the government could not claim past royalties from more than six years before the 1996 administrative order, because the six-year time limit had expired.

The DOI Assistant Secretary rejected BP's arguments and ruled for the government. A District Court affirmed the decision, ruling that an agency administrative order was not a government action for monetary damages, so the statute of limitations did not apply. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the lower court's ruling. The Circuit Court ruled that the government would have had to file a complaint in court in order for the statute of limitations to take effect; an agency administrative order did not activate the time limit.

Question

Does the six-year statute of limitations for government actions for monetary damages in 28 U.S.C. 2415(a) govern the issuance of administrative orders, as opposed to the government's filing of a complaint in court?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Burton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 2415

No. The Court ruled 7-0 that "the 6-year statute of limitations in 2415(a) applies only to court actions and not to the administrative proceedings involved in this case." The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito relied on the plain meaning of the language in Section 2415(a). The statute used the terms "action" and "complaint" when referring to the statute of limitations. The Court held that these terms, when used by themselves, refer only to judicial proceedings, not administrative ones. Additionally, the Court noted that statutes of limitations on government actions are normally construed in favor of the government.

BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 11:52:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-341

Petitioner

BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles

Respondent

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Friday, January 5, 2007

Decided

Thursday, April 12, 2007

Facts of the Case

BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles fired African-American employee Stephen Peters. Human Resources Manager Pat Edgar decided to fire Peters in part because of a report of insubordination filed against Peters by his immediate supervisor, Cesar Grado. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claimed that Peters was a victim of invidious discrimination because Grado, an Hispanic, treated non-African American employees less harshly. EEOC filed suit against BCI on behalf of Stephens under Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination against employees. Though a District Court concluded that Grado was racially biased, it dismissed the case because the evidence failed to prove that Edgar's decision to fire Stephens was sufficiently affected by Grado's discriminatory bias.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that a jury should determine whether or not Grado's bias affected Edgar's decision to fire Stephens, and it sent the case to trial. The Tenth Circuit cited the subordinate bias theory of liability, which holds a company liable for a discriminatory firing even if the employee who made the actual decision to fire was not the employee harboring racial bias.

Question

If an employer with no discriminatory motive fires a subordinate based in part on the influence of another employee with a discriminatory motive, can the employer be held liable for discrimination under Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Dismissal, per Court rule 46

Unanswered. Prior to oral argument, BCI Coca-Cola moved to have the case dismissed. The government raised no objection, and the Court granted the motion.

Morse v. Frederick

Mon, 19 Mar 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-278

Petitioner

Deborah Morse, et al.

Respondent

Joseph Frederick

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, December 1, 2006

Argued

Monday, March 19, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2007

Facts of the Case

At a school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick held up a banner with the message "Bong Hits 4 Jesus," a slang reference to marijuana smoking. Principal Deborah Morse took away the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days. She justified her actions by citing the school's policy against the display of material that promotes the use of illegal drugs. Frederick sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the federal civil rights statute, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found no constitutional violation and ruled in favor of Morse. The court held that even if there were a violation, the principal had qualified immunity from lawsuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, which extended First Amendment protection to student speech except where the speech would cause a disturbance. Because Frederick was punished for his message rather than for any disturbance, the Circuit Court ruled, the punishment was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the principal had no qualified immunity, because any reasonable principal would have known that Morse's actions were unlawful.

Question

1) Does the First Amendment allow public schools to prohibit students from displaying messages promoting the use of illegal drugs at school-supervised events?

2) Does a school official have qualified immunity from a damages lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 when, in accordance with school policy, she disciplines a student for displaying a banner with a drug reference at a school-supervised event?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Morse, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes and not reached. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit by a 5-4 vote, ruling that school officials can prohibit students from displaying messages that promote illegal drug use. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that although students do have some right to political speech even while in school, this right does not extend to pro-drug messages that may undermine the school's important mission to discourage drug use. The majority held that Frederick's message, though "cryptic," was reasonably interpreted as promoting marijuana use - equivalent to "[Take] bong hits" or "bong hits [are a good thing]." In ruling for Morse, the Court affirmed that the speech rights of public school students are not as extensive as those adults normally enjoy, and that the highly protective standard set by Tinker would not always be applied. In concurring opinions, Justice Thomas expressed his view that the right to free speech does not apply to students and his wish to see Tinker overturned altogether, while Justice Alito stressed that the decision applied only to pro-drug messages and not to broader political speech. The dissent conceded that the principal should have had immunity from the lawsuit, but argued that the majority opinion was "[...] deaf to the constitutional imperative to permit unfettered debate, even among high-school students [...]."

Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.

Mon, 26 Mar 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-480

Petitioner

Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc.

Respondent

PSKS, Inc., dba Kay's Kloset...Kay's Shoes

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Thursday, December 7, 2006

Argued

Monday, March 26, 2007

Decided

Thursday, June 28, 2007

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Thomas G. Hungar (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Robert W. Coykendall (argued the cause for the respondent)

Barbara D. Underwood (Solicitor General, New York, on behalf of New York et al. as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Leegin Creative Leather Products, a manufacturer of women's accessories, entered into vertical minimum price agreements with its retailers. The agreements required the retailers to charge no less than certain minimum prices for Leegin products. According to Leegin, the price minimums were intended to encourage competition among retailers in customer service and product promotion. When one retailer, PSKS, discounted Leegin products below the minimum, Leegin dropped the retailer. PSKS sued, arguing that Leegin was violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act by engaging in anticompetitive price fixing. Under the Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., mandatory minimum price agreements are per se illegal under the Act - that is, they are automatically illegal regardless of the circumstances.

Leegin argued that this rule was based on outdated economics. It contended that a better legal analysis would be the "rule of reason," under which price minimums would be held illegal only in cases where they could be shown to be anticompetitive. Both the District Court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments. The courts felt compelled to follow the Supreme Court's rule in the Dr. Miles case, under which Leegin's practices were illegal regardless of the economic arguments put forward by the company.

Question

Is it per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to set mandatory minimum prices for its products?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sherman

No. The Court ruled 5-4 that "Dr. Miles should be overruled and that vertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason." Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion held that Dr. Miles had erred by treating vertical minimum price agreements between manufacturers and retailers as analogous to horizontal price-fixing agreements between sellers. The Court cited evidence from the economic literature that vertical minimum price agreements are rarely anticompetitive and can often function to increase interbrand competition. The Court acknowledged that in some cases vertical price minimums might facilitate manufacturer cartels, but it held that instances where the price agreements are abused for illegal anticompetitive purposes can be determined on a case-by-case basis under the rule of reason. The mere fact that vertical price minimums may lead to higher prices for goods cannot reflect negatively on its legality under the Sherman Act, because there are many legitimate business decisions that may ultimately result in higher prices. The majority also acknowledged that the principle of stare decisis would weigh against overruling the nearly 100-year-old precedent in Dr. Miles, but it held that the Sherman Act is to be treated as a "common-law statute," which must be allowed to evolve in the courts as economic knowledge and circumstances change. The dissenters, in an opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, saw no change in circumstances that would justify overruling Dr. Miles, and they argued that the reliance of the business community on that decision supported adherence to stare decisis.

Dayton v. Hanson

Tue, 24 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-618

Appellee

Brad Hanson

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Office of Senator Mark Dayton

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Argued

Tuesday, April 24, 2007

Decided

Monday, May 21, 2007

Advocates

Thomas E. Caballero (for United States Senate, as amicus curiae, supporting Appellee)

Jean M. Manning (on behalf of Appellant)

Richard A. Salzman (on behalf of Appellee)

Facts of the Case

Brad Hanson worked as State Office Manager for U.S. Senator Mark Dayton. Shortly after Hanson took medical leave for a heart problem, Dayton fired him. Hanson sued under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, claiming that Dayton had discriminated against him based on a perceived disability. Dayton filed a motion to have the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He argued that he was immunized from the suit by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution ("for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.") Dayton claimed that because Hanson's duties were directly related to Dayton's legislative functions, the decision to fire him could not be challenged. The District Court denied the motion.

Overturning its own precedent, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that the Speech or Debate Clause does not bar the suit. The clause can be invoked to exclude evidence that would involve legislative acts, but the D.C. Circuit ruled that it is not a blanket ban on suits involving legislative employees. The employee would simply have to make his case without questioning legislative acts or motivations for legislative acts. Senator Dayton appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Accountability Act requires the Court to hear the appeal. He also argued that Hanson's suit should be dismissed because the case had become moot after Dayton retired from the Senate.

Question

1) Does the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution bar federal court jurisdiction of suits under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 by congressional employees whose job duties are part of the due functioning of the legislative process?

2) Was the Office of Senator Mark Dayton entitled to appeal the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit directly to the Supreme Court?

3) Was the case rendered moot by the expiration of Senator Dayton's term of office?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Hanson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 2 U.S.C. 1412

Unanswered, no, and unanswered. The Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to hear Senator Dayton's appeal and dismissed the case without reaching the merits. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion for the 8-0 Court. The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 only authorizes direct Supreme Court appeal of rulings "upon the constitutionality" of the statute. The Justices held that the decisions of the lower courts (holding that Hanson's suit should not be dismissed under the Speech or Debate Clause) did not qualify as rulings on the constitutional validity of the Act. They were better characterized as rulings on the Act's scope. Direct appeal was therefore not authorized by the Act, and the Court declined to grant certiorari.

The Permanent Mission of India v. City of New York

Tue, 24 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-134

Petitioner

The Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of New York, New York

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 19, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, April 24, 2007

Decided

Thursday, June 14, 2007

Advocates

Michael A. Cardozo (on behalf of Respondent)

John J.P. Howley (on behalf of Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Foreign countries can own buildings surrounding the United Nations in New York City tax-free if the buildings are used exclusively for diplomatic purposes. The City filed lawsuits against the Indian and Mongolian consulates in a District Court for failing to pay taxes on properties used for non-diplomatic purposes. The two consulates argued that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) granted them immunity from suit. The District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the suit under the FSIA's "immovable property" exception, which removes immunity from foreign countries when "rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue." The two countries argued that "rights" denoted a narrow set of property laws and did not extend to tax matters. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

Question

1) Does a suit to recover property taxes imposed on property owned by a foreign state fall within the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act's "immovable property" exception to sovereign immunity?

2) Did the court of appeals err in relying on two international agreements to which the United States is not a party in the course of interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for City of New York, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1602

Yes and unanswered. The Court held 7-2 that the "immovable property" exception to sovereign immunity in the FSIA covers disputes over tax liens on the property as well as disputes over ownership and possession. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas ruled that a tax lien, by both its dictionary definition and its practical effect, is an interest or right in property. This broad interpretation of the exception was consistent with Congress's purpose in passing FSIA to adopt a much more restrictive theory of sovereign immunity than the previous, virtually absolute one. The Court found some of the evidence from contemporaneous international agreements to be ambiguous and equivocal, but it held that its interpretation was consistent with Congress's intention to codify the state of international law at the time of FSIA's enactment. Justice Stevens's dissent argued that "[s]uch a broad exception to sovereign immunity threatens [...] to swallow the rule."

Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights

Wed, 28 Mar 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Tellabs Inc. Corporate Headquarters

1415 W Diehl Rd

Naperville, IL 60563

United States

41° 48' 2.8764" N, 88° 11' 29.13" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-484

Petitioner

Tellabs, Inc., et al.

Respondent

Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., et al.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 5, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, March 28, 2007

Decided

Thursday, June 21, 2007

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (for the petitioners)

Kannon K. Shanmugam (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Arthur R. Miller (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Several plaintiffs brought a class action securities fraud lawsuit against Tellabs, Inc., a manufacturer of equipment for fiber optic cable networks. The plaintiffs alleged that Tellabs had misrepresented the strength of its products and earnings in order to conceal the declining value of the company's stock. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), plaintiffs bringing securities fraud complaints must allege specific facts that give rise to a "strong inference" that the defendant intended to deceive investors (scienter).

The District Court dismissed the complaints. The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were too vague to establish a "strong inference" of scienter on the part of Tellabs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed one of the lower court's dismissals. The Seventh Circuit ruled that a plaintiff need only allege "acts from which, if true, a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent." The Court of Appeals decided to consider only the plausibility of the inference of a guilty mental state, and not any competing inferences of an innocent mental state. This decision was due in part to the court's concern that weighing competing inferences was more properly the task of a jury. The Seventh Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other Courts of Appeals, which required plaintiffs to show that the inference of scienter supported by the alleged facts was more plausible than any competing inference of innocent intent.

Question

In considering whether a securities fraud complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish a "strong inference" that the defendant acted with intent to deceive, as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, must a court also consider competing inferences of an innocent mental state that might be drawn from the same facts?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Tellabs Inc., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 78

Yes. The Court ruled by a vote of 8-1 that a securities fraud complaint must allege facts establishing an inference of guilty intent that is "cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that opinion for the Court, which held that the Seventh Circuit's more relaxed standard was not strong enough to comport with Congress's intent in PSLRA to limit securities fraud litigation. "The strength of an inference cannot be decided in a vacuum. The inquiry is inherently comparative [...]," the Court ruled. A court must consider each plausible inference of intent, both fraudulent and nonfraudulent, and then decide whether a reasonable person would consider the guilty inference "at least as strong as any opposing inference." The lower court need not have worried about impinging on the jury's prerogatives, because it is the role of judges to decide whether there exists an issue for the jury to hear, and the role a the jury to evaluate the issue. Two concurring Justices, Antonin Scalia and Samuel A. Alito Jr., argued that the phrase "strong inference" required that the inference of fraudulent intent be stronger than the competing inferences, while Justice John Paul Stevens's lone dissent argued for a more plaintiff-friendly probable-cause standard.

Rockwell International Corp. v. United States ex rel Stone

Tue, 05 Dec 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1272

Petitioner

Rockwell International Corp., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States and United States ex rel James S. Stone

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, December 5, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, March 27, 2007

Advocates

Maureen E. Mahoney (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Maria T. Vullo (argued the cause for Respondent Stone)

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondent United States)

Facts of the Case

Stone sued his employer, nuclear weapons plant operator Rockwell International, under the False Claims Act (FCA). He took advantage of the FCA's "qui tam" provision, which allows an individual to sue on behalf of the government. Stone alleged that Rockwell had made false claims about the environmental safety of "pondcrete," a mixture of cement and sludge used for nuclear waste storage. In a qui tam action under the FCA, the person bringing the suit must be the "original source" of the information on which his claim is based. Rockwell argued that Stone was not an original source because he did not have "direct and independent knowledge" of the information at issue in the suit, as required by the FCA.

The District Court ruled that Stone qualified as an original source, and a divided panel of the U.S. Circuit Court for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed to resolve the question of how much and what kind of knowledge an FCA qui tam plaintiff must have.

Question

What kind of "direct and independent" knowledge must an employee bringing suit under the False Claims Act have in order to qualify as an "original source"?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Rockwell International Corp., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal False Claims

The Court ruled 6-2 that Stone did not qualify as an "original source" with "direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based" for purposes of the False Claims Act. Justice Antonin Scalia's opinion interpreted the word "information" as referring to information on which the relator's (in this case Stone's) claim is based and not to any information underlying publicly disclosed allegations. The Court further pinpointed the meaning of the ambiguous statute by holding that "allegations" means the allegations in the relator's amended complaint and not just those in the original complaint. The Court concluded that "[j]udged according to the principles set forth above, Stone's knowledge falls short." The government's investigation did turn up Rockwell's deceptions concerning the production of defective pondcrete, but the information provided by Stone was not directly related to the government's discoveries. In order for Stone to bring a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, he would have had to be the original source of information that was actually used to prosecute Rockwell. Since the claims involving Stone's information were ultimately dropped in the amended complaint, he could not bring the suit. The government, the Court ruled, would have to continue the action without Stone as co-plaintiff.

United Haulers Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority

Mon, 08 Jan 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1345

Petitioner

United Haulers Association, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Argued

Monday, January 8, 2007

Decided

Monday, April 30, 2007

Advocates

Michael J. Cahill (argued the cause for Respondents)

Evan Mark Tager (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Caitlin J. Halligan (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Oneida and Herkimer counties adopted a local "flow control" ordinance requiring locally-produced garbage to be delivered to local publicly-owned facilities. The United Haulers Association filed suit in federal district court, arguing that by prohibiting the export of waste and preventing waste haulers from using less expensive out-of-state facilities, the ordinance ran afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause forbids any state law that regulates interstate commerce. The District Court ruled against United Haulers and held that the ordinance was constitutional because it did not discriminate against out-of-state businesses.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the ordinance imposed a slight burden on interstate commerce, the effect was outweighed by the ordinance's local benefits.

Question

Does an ordinance requiring delivery of all solid waste to a publicly owned local facility impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce and therefore violate the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

No. The Court voted 6-3 to affirm the Second Circuit and uphold the ordinance. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion distinguished the Oneida- Herkimer ordinance from previous ordinances that were struck down by the Court by emphasizing that the favored waste-disposal facilities were publicly operated. The majority found that "[t]he flow control ordinances in this case benefit a clearly public facility, while treating all private companies exactly the same." After deeming the ordinance nondiscriminatory, the Court balanced its burden on commerce against its financial, health, and environmental benefits. The Court found that it imposed only an "incidental burden." The majority declined to "rigorously scrutinize" the economic effects of the ordinance, preferring to leave the policy analysis to local government. The dissent by Justice Alito would have held that the ordinance discriminated against commerce and was thus unconstitutional.

Watters v. Wachovia Bank

Wed, 29 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1342

Petitioner

Linda A. Watters, Commissioner, Michigan Office of Insurance and Financial Services

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wachovia Bank, N.A., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 19, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, November 29, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, April 17, 2007

Advocates

E. John Blanchard (on behalf of Petitioner)

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Respondents)

Robert A. Long, Jr. (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Under 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a), states do not have regulatory powers over national banks. In 2001 the federal Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) issued federal regulation 12 C.F.R. 7.4006, which applied 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a) to state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks. Wachovia Mortgage was an operating subsidiary of the national bank Wachovia Bank, and was registered with the state of Michigan.

When Michigan attempted to exercise its regulatory powers over Wachovia Mortgage, Wachovia Bank sued Watters, a Michigan official, seeking a judgment that Michigan's laws on operating subsidies of national banks were superceded by 12 U.S.C Section 484(a). Michigan argued that the OCC had exceeded the authority given it by Congress by extending the definition of "national bank" to cover state-registered operating subsidiaries. Michigan also argued that the extension of federal authority over state entities like Wachovia Mortgage violates the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to states all powers not delegated to the federal government.

The District Court rejected these arguments and ruled for Wachovia, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit Court found that the decision of the OCC to apply rules for national banks to their operating subsidiaries was a reasonable interpretation of Congress's intent, and therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The Sixth Circuit also held that Congress had the power to regulate operating subsidiaries of national banks under the Commerce Clause, so the Tenth Amendment did not reserve that power to the states.

Question

1) Is the decision of the Comptroller of Currency that federal authority over national banks extends to state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks entitled to judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council?

2) Does 12 CFR 7.4006 violate the Tenth Amendment by treating a state- chartered operating subsidiary the same as a national bank for purposes of federal regulation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Wachovia Bank, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 12 U.S.C. 1

Unanswered and no. The Court ruled 5-3 that state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks are subject to regulation by the federal Office of the Comptroller of Currency and not by the states in which they are located. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "[...] the level of deference owed to the regulation is an academic question," because "Section 7.4006 merely clarifies and confirms what the [National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a)] already conveys: A national bank has the power to engage in real estate lending through an operating subsidiary, subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the national bank itself; that power cannot be significantly impaired or impeded by state law." The Court interpreted the statute broadly, as a shield against burdensome state regulation of national banks and their subsidiaries, so the OCC's regulation preempting Michigan's regulatory laws was firmly grounded in the statute. The Court briefly and definitively disposed of Watters's Tenth Amendment argument, holding that the regulation of subsidiaries of national banks is a legitimate application of Congress's Commerce Power and therefore is not reserved to the states.

Altadis USA, Inc. v. Sea Star Line, LLC

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 11:52:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-606

Petitioner

Altadis USA, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sea Star Line, LLC, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Friday, January 5, 2007

Decided

Monday, February 12, 2007

Facts of the Case

Altadis USA, Inc. hired Sea Star Line, LLC (Sea Star) to ship a container of cigars from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Tampa, Florida. According to the contract, which was negotiated under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), the container would travel by ship until it reached port at Jacksonville, Florida. From there, American Trans-Freight, Inc. (ATF) would truck it to Tampa. Sea Star issued a "'through' bill of lading" which held Sea Star liable for the container's safety during both the land and sea portions of its transport. The container was stolen from an ATF truck and Altadis filed a claim against Sea Star in District Court. The one-year statute of limitations for filing a COGSA claim had expired and the District Court dismissed the suit. Altadis argued that the Carmack Amendment imposed a two-year minimum statute of limitations period on liability claims relating to the transport of goods into the United States.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the Carmack Amendment's liability rules did not apply to the inland portion of transport because ATF did not issue a separate bill of lading. Other U.S. Courts of Appeals had ruled that the Carmack Amendment did not require a separate bill of lading to cover the inland portion of transport.

Question

Does the Carmack Amendment apply to the inland portion of a shipment's transport into the United States even if the inland carrier does not issue a separate bill of lading?

Conclusion

Unanswered. Before hearing oral arguments, the parties reached a settlement and the Court granted their motion to dismiss the case.

Watson v. Philip Morris

Wed, 25 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1284

Petitioner

Lisa Watson, et al.

Respondent

Philip Morris Companies, Inc., et al.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 12, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, April 25, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2007

Advocates

David C. Frederick (for the petitioners)

Irving L. Gornstein (for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

Theodore B. Olson (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Lisa Watson filed a class action lawsuit against the tobacco company Philip Morris, claiming that the company had violated Arkansas law by misrepresenting the amount of tar and nicotine in cigarettes branded as "light." Seeking to have the case removed to federal court, Philip Morris invoked 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), which allows removal when a party is sued for actions taken while "acting under" a federal officer. Philip Morris claimed that it was acting under the direct control of regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), so 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) applied. After the federal District Court denied Watson's motion to have the case sent back to state court, Watson appealed.

The dispute centered on the degree of control exercised by the FTC over Philip Morris. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of Philip Morris, allowing the case to continue in the federal court system. The Eighth Circuit held that the question of whether 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) applies "depends on the detail and specificity of the federal direction of the defendant's activities and whether the government exercises control over the defendant." In the case of the tobacco industry, the Eighth Circuit found "unprecedented" government involvement, including detailed FTC regulations concerning the testing and disclosure of tar and nicotine levels. Therefore, Philip Morris was "acting under a federal officer" and consequently entitled to remove the case to federal court.

Question

Is the need to comply with Federal Trade Commission advertising regulations sufficient to establish that a tobacco company is a "person acting under a federal officer" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1)?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Watson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1442

No. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court ruled that Philip Morris could not remove its case to federal court, because it was not "acting under a federal officer" in the sense of the statute. Justice Breyer wrote that "broad language is not limitless. And a liberal construction nonetheless can find limits in a textís language, context, history, and purposes." The Court held that the phrase "acting under" connotes a subordinate acting to assist his superior. A company complying with a regulation, no matter how restrictive, was not in the type of relationship covered by the statute. Philip Morris analogized its situation to government contractors that have been held to fall under the statute, but the Court ruled that the contractor's contractual "principal/agent" relationship assisted the government in a way that Philip Morris's mere compliance with stringent regulations did not.

James v. United States

Tue, 07 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-9264

Petitioner

Alphonso James, Jr.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 12, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, November 7, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, April 18, 2007

Advocates

Craig L. Crawford (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Jonathan L. Marcus (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

When Alphonso James was convicted of firearm possession after having been convicted of a felony, the government sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The ACCA allows for a minimum 15-year sentence if the convicted criminal has three prior convictions for serious drug offenses or violent felonies. A "violent felony" under the ACCA includes burglary and "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." James had previously been convicted once for attempted burglary and twice for drug trafficking, so the government argued that he had the necessary three "countable" convictions for the increased sentence. James argued that one of his drug-related convictions did not count as a serious drug offense, and that attempted burglary did not count as a violent felony. A federal District Court held that attempted burglary was a violent felony, but also that James's drug offense was not serious. Therefore, James had only two countable offenses and could not be sentenced under the ACCA.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that James's drug-trafficking offense was serious. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that attempted burglary counted as a violent felony, a ruling that put it at odds with other Circuits. The Circuit Court ruled that attempted burglary is a violent felony because it presents as much risk of violence as a successful burglary.

Question

Does a conviction for attempted burglary qualify as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

Yes. The Court ruled 5-3 that attempted burglary is a "violent felony" for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito held that attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, is included in the residual provision of the ACCA governing "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." The Court rejected James's argument that attempted burglary should be excluded because the example crimes listed before the residual provision included only completed - as opposed to attempted - crimes. Instead, the Court held that the common element in the list was that "these offenses, while not technically crimes against the person, nevertheless create significant risks of bodily injury or confrontation that might result in bodily injury." Since the risk associated with attempted burglary was comparable to the risks caused by the listed crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives, attempted burglary was included in the definition of "violent felony."

Weyerhaeuser Company v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc.

Tue, 28 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-381

Petitioner

Weyerhaeuser Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 26, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, November 28, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Advocates

Andrew J. Pincus (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Kannon K. Shanmugam (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Michael E. Haglund (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. (Ross-Simmons) sued Weyerhaeuser, a competing sawmill, for "predatory buying" in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, Weyerhaeuser was accused of buying more raw materials than it needed at unnecessarily high prices. Ross-Simmons alleged that Weyerhaeuser's business practices were aimed at monopolizing the market for purchasing unprocessed sawlogs and forcing its competitors out of business. At the jury trial, jurors were instructed to rule against Weyerhaeuser if Ross-Simmons could prove that Weyerhaeuser bought more sawlogs "than it needed" and paid more "than necessary" for them. Weyerhaeuser objected, arguing that the more stringent guidelines in the case of Brooke Group v. Williamson Tobacco Corp. required a ruling in its favor. In Brooke Group, the Court held that in order for a company to be liable for "predatory pricing," a company must be shown to have been operating at a loss, and to have a "dangerous probability" of recouping its losses.

The District Court rejected Weyerhaeuser's motion, ruling that Brooke Group applies only to predatory pricing, where a company prices its products too low in order force competitors out of the market, and not to predatory buying. Under the less stringent guidelines, the jury found Weyerhaeuser to be in violation of the Sherman Act, and awarded Ross-Simmons $78.8 million in damages. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court, ruling that the higher standard of liability for predatory pricing compared to predatory buying is appropriate, because business practices that resemble predatory pricing may result in benefits such as efficiency incentives and lower prices for consumers.

Question

Does a plaintiff alleging predatory buying in violation of the Sherman Act need to establish that the defendant paid so much for raw materials that it operated at a loss and the defendant had a "dangerous probability" of recouping its losses?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Weyerhaeuser Company, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sherman

Yes. The Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit decision and ruled that the Brooke Group standard applies to predatory bidding as well as predatory pricing. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas noted the economic similarity between the monopoly conditions created by predatory pricing and the monopsony or "buyer's monopoly" conditions created by predatory bidding. The Court held that the "theoretical and practical similarities of predatory pricing and predatory bidding convince us that our two-pronged Brooke Group test should apply to predatory-bidding claims." Since Ross-Simmons had not met the Court's test, the jury's verdict against Weyerhaeuser was invalid.

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1

Mon, 04 Dec 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Seattle School District

2445 3rd Avenue South Seattle WA 98134

Seattle, WA 98134

United States

47° 34' 49.4076" N, 122° 19' 48.1404" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-908

Petitioner

Parents Involved in Community Schools

Respondent

Seattle School District No. 1, et al.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. 701 (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 5, 2006

Argued

Monday, December 4, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 28, 2007

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Harry J.F. Korrell (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Michael F. Madden (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Seattle School District allowed students to apply to any high school in the District. Since certain schools often became oversubscribed when too many students chose them as their first choice, the District used a system of tiebreakers to decide which students would be admitted to the popular schools. The second most important tiebreaker was a racial factor intended to maintain racial diversity. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student population (approximately 40% white and 60% non- white), the racial tiebreaker went into effect. At a particular school either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal.

A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents), sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. A federal District Court dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. On appeal, a three-judge panel the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.

Under the Supreme Court's precedents on racial classification in higher education, Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, race-based classifications must be directed toward a "compelling government interest" and must be "narrowly tailored" to that interest. Applying these precedents to K-12 education, the Circuit Court found that the tiebreaker scheme was not narrowly tailored. The District then petitioned for an "en banc" ruling by a panel of 11 Ninth Circuit judges. The en banc panel came to the opposite conclusion and upheld the tiebreaker. The majority ruled that the District had a compelling interest in maintaining racial diversity. Applying a test from Grutter, the Circuit Court also ruled that the tiebreaker plan was narrowly tailored, because 1) the District did not employ quotas, 2) the District had considered race-neutral alternatives, 3) the plan caused no undue harm to races, and 4) the plan had an ending point.

Question

1) Do the decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger apply to public high school students?

2) Is racial diversity a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting students for admission to public high schools?

3) Does a school district that normally permits a student to attend the high school of her choice violate the Equal Protection Clause by denying the student admission to her chosen school because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racial balance?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Parents Involved in Community Schools, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No, no, and yes. By a 5-4 vote, the Court applied a "strict scrutiny" framework and found the District's racial tiebreaker plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the plurality opinion that "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." The Court acknowledged that it had previously held that racial diversity can be a compelling government interest in university admissions, but it ruled that "[t]he present cases are not governed by Grutter." Unlike the cases pertaining to higher education, the District's plan involved no individualized consideration of students, and it employed a very limited notion of diversity ("white" and "non-white"). The District's goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the Court's standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race: "Racial balancing is not transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 'racial diversity.'" The plans also lacked the narrow tailoring that is necessary for race-conscious programs. The Court held that the District's tiebreaker plan was actually targeted toward demographic goals and not toward any demonstrable educational benefit from racial diversity. The District also failed to show that its objectives could not have been met with non-race-conscious means. In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy agreed that the District's use of race was unconstitutional but stressed that public schools may sometimes consider race to ensure equal educational opportunity.

Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd. v. Billing

Tue, 27 Mar 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1157

Petitioner

Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, fka Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Glen Billing, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Thursday, December 7, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, March 27, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 18, 2007

Advocates

Christopher Lovell (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Billing and other investors filed a class action lawsuit against Credit Suisse and other Wall Street investment firms. The lawsuit alleged that the firms had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by conspiring to drive up the cost of initial public offering (IPO) securities during the stock market boom of the 1990s. The firms allegedly entered into illegal contracts with IPO purchasers, requiring subsequent investors to pay artificially inflated prices for the secutities. Credit Suisse argued that the suit should be dismissed, because the firms had implied antitrust immunity. It claimed that the firms' conduct was normal business practice, and was closely regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. If plaintiffs were able to bring antitrust suits against investment firms for securities violations, Credit Suisse argued, the plaintiffs would be able to subvert the securities laws that Congress intended to govern such suits.

The federal District Court agreed with Credit Suisse and dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court and reinstated the suit. The Second Circuit held that there was no evidence that Congress had intended securities laws like the Securities Act of 1933 to foreclose antitrust suits challenging practices like those engaged in by Credit Suisse.

Question

Do defendants in private antitrust lawsuits have implied immunity when the challenged conduct is highly regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and when the lawsuit has the potential to conflict with securities laws?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

Yes. The Court reversed the Second Circuit and ruled that the applicable securities laws granted the defendant implied antitrust immunity. The 7-1 ruling by Justice Stephen G. Breyer noted four factors indicating that the Securities Act of 1933 foreclosed antitrust lawsuits in cases of alleged artificial inflation of aftermarket IPO share prices. First, the challenged conduct fell within "an area of conduct squarely within the heartland of securities regulations." Second, securities laws gave the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) clear authority to regulate in this area. Third, the SEC in fact actively regulated the challenged conduct. Fourth, overlapping antitrust and securities-law regimes would risk producing "conflicting guidance, requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of conduct." To allow the blunter instrument of antitrust law to govern the conduct at issue in the case would be to risk chilling legitimate business practices in an area that requires diligent regulation by the SEC to separate disapproved conduct from necessary, approved conduct. In a lone dissent Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the savings clause of the Securities Act - preserving "[...] any and all other rights and remedies that may exist in law [...] - was broad enough that it preserved the right to sue under antitrust laws.

Beck v. PACE International Union

Tue, 24 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1448

Petitioner

Jeffrey H. Beck, Liquidating Trustee of the Estates of Crown Vantage, Inc. and Crown Paper Company

Respondent

PACE International Union, et al.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 19, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, April 24, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2007

Advocates

M. Miller Baker (on behalf of the petitioners)

Matthew D. Roberts (for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioner)

Julia P. Clark (on behalf of the respondents)

Facts of the Case

During Chapter 11 liquidation proceedings, Crown Vantage, Inc. (Crown) terminated its employee pension plan and purchased an annuity for the employee participants as a replacement. The participants advocated merging the current plan into a multiemployer PACE International Union (PACE) pension plan but Crown did not investigate the possibility. The participants alleged that Crown breached its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by not acting "solely in the interests of the participants" (Section 1104(a)(1)). A bankruptcy court ordered Crown to maintain the plan's funds until they were distributed to the participants.

A District Court affirmed, finding that Crown failed to consider its employees' interest. Crown appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that it did not consider the PACE plan because Section 4041 of ERISA prevents termination by way of a merger into a multiemployer plan. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court, ruling that ERISA does allow termination by way of a merger into a multiemployer plan.

Question

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 require an employer to consider merging an employee pension plan into a multiemployer pension plan prior to terminating the plan?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Beck, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "merger is not a permissible method of terminating a single-employer defined-benefit pension plan." Therefore, PACE's argument that Crown was required by ERISA to consider merger as a method of terminating the pension plan was rejected. Since ERISA does not expressly list merger as a method of termination, the Court relied on the view of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) that merger is not covered under the statute's residual clause. This interpretation was supported by the structure of ERISA, which deals with mergers in a separate section.

Scott v. Harris

Mon, 26 Feb 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1631

Petitioner

Timothy Scott

Respondent

Victor Harris

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, October 27, 2006

Argued

Monday, February 26, 2007

Decided

Monday, April 30, 2007

Advocates

Philip W. Savrin (for the petitioner)

Gregory G. Garre (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Craig T. Jones (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After a police officer attempted to pull him over for speeding, Victor Harris fled in his vehicle, initiating a high-speed car chase. Attempting to end the chase, Deputy Timothy Scott rammed Harris's vehicle with his police cruiser. Harris crashed and was rendered a quadriplegic. Harris sued Scott in federal District Court, alleging that Scott had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. Scott claimed qualified immunity as a government official acting in his official capacity, but the District Court rejected the claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

In order to show that a government official is not entitled to qualified immunity, a plaintiff is required to prove that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Scott's actions constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because there was no imminent threat - Harris remained in control of his vehicle and the roads were relatively empty - Scott's use of deadly force was unconstitutional. Although no Appellate Court had ruled on the specific question of the use of deadly force in a high-speed chase, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the limits on deadly force were "clearly established."

Question

1) Does a police officer who stops a high-speed chase by ramming a fleeing suspect's car violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizure?

2) Was it "clearly established" in federal law that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment by using deadly force during a high-speed chase?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Scott, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. The Court ruled 8-1 that Scott's actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia relied heavily on a videotape of the car chase, which it said contradicted the plaintiff's claim that he was driving responsibly even while being pursued by the police. The majority held that "[...] it is clear from the videotape that [Harris] posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase." The opinion weighed the need to prevent the harm Harris could have caused against the high probability that Harris himself would be harmed by Scott's use of force. It also took into account Harris's culpability for starting the chase in the first place. The Court concluded that it is reasonable for a police officer to use deadly force to prevent harm to innocent bystanders, even to the point of putting the fleeing motorist at serious risk of injury or death. Justice Stevens's lone dissent argued that the videotape was not as definitive as the majority made it out to be and that a jury should make the determination on the justifiability of deadly force.

Panetti v. Quarterman

Wed, 18 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-6407

Petitioner

Scott Louis Panetti

Respondent

Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 5, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, April 18, 2007

Decided

Thursday, June 28, 2007

Advocates

Gregory W. Wiercioch (argued the cause for the petitioner)

R. Ted Cruz (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Scott Louis Panetti was convicted of the murder of his wife's parents and sentenced to death. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court, claiming mental illness. The Supreme Court had ruled in Ford v. Wainwright that execution of the mentally ill is barred by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. A psychiatric evaluation found that Panetti believed that the State was "in league with the forces of evil" and was executing him in order to "prevent him from preaching the Gospel." However, doctors also found Panetti to be aware of his crime, of the fact that he was to be executed, and of the State's stated reason for executing him. The District Court concluded that he was sufficiently sane to be executed.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court. The Fifth Circuit rejected Panetti's argument that an inmate cannot be executed if he lacks a rational understanding of the State's motivation for the execution. The Court of Appeals instead relied on Justice Lewis Powell's concurrence in Ford, holding that an inmate need only have an awareness of the State's reason for execution, not necessarily a rational understanding of it.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment permit the execution of an inmate who has a factual awareness of the State's stated reason for his execution, but who lacks, due to mental illness, a rational understanding of the State's justification?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Panetti, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Unanswered. In an opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy for a 5-4 majority, the Court held that the Fifth Circuit's analysis was too restrictive under Ford v. Wainwright, because it treated Panetti's mental condition as irrelevant as long as he had in some sense a factual awareness of the state's rationale. The Court rejected the state's arguments that the Court did not have jurisdiction and that the state court was entitled to deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In doing so, the Court held that a prisoner may sometimes bring a habeas petition claiming mental incompetency even if he did not raise the claim in his first petition and that state courts can be held to have unreasonably applied a legal principle even if the principle was addressed to somewhat different facts than those of the case at hand. The state court had unreasonably applied Ford by failing to give Panetti a fair hearing to fully present his psychiatric evidence. The Court also ruled that the Fifth Circuit "rests on a flawed interpretation of Ford," because it failed to consider that Panetti's delusions may have prevented him from understanding the meaning of his punishment even though he professed to be aware of the facts. The Court did not undertake its own analysis of what kind of rational understanding the Eighth Amendment requires a death row inmate to have, saying, "Although we reject the standard followed by the Court of Appeals, we do not attempt to set down a rule governing all competency determinations." The Court expressed the hope that expert psychiatric evidence would shed light on which delusions might distort an inmate's sense of reality so much as to render him incompetent to be executed.

Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education

Mon, 04 Dec 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-915

Petitioner

Crystal D. Meredith, Custodial Parent and Next Friend of Joshua Ryan McDonald

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jefferson County Board of Education, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 5, 2006

Argued

Monday, December 4, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 28, 2007

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Francis J. Mellen, Jr. (argued the cause for Respondents)

Teddy B. Gordon (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) were integrated by court order until 2000. After its release from the order, JCPS implemented an enrollment plan to maintain substantial racial integration. Students were given a choice of schools, but not all schools could accommodate all applicants. In those cases, student enrollment was decided on the basis of several factors, including place of residence, school capacity, and random chance, as well as race. However, no school was allowed to have an enrollment of black students less than 15% or greater than 50% of its student population.

Meredith and other parents sued the school district, arguing that the plan's racial classifications violated the students' Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. Under the Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, race-based classifications must be directed toward a "compelling government interest" and must be "narrowly tailored" to that interest.

The District Court ruled that the plan was constitutional because the school had a compelling interest in maintaining racial diversity. The court held that though the plan paid "some attention to numbers," it did not constitute a rigid quota system. According to the Supreme Court's precedents, rigid racial quotas are never narrowly tailored. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court without issuing an opinion of its own, and Meredith appealed to the Supreme Court. (See also Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District #1, No. 05-908)

Question

1) Do Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger allow a school district to use race as the sole factor to assign high school students to public schools?

2) Can a student enrollment plan that requires each school's student population to be between 15% and 50% African-American meet the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that racial classifications be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Meredith, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No and no. By a 5-4 vote, the Court applied a "strict scrutiny" framework and found Jefferson County's enrollment plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the plurality opinion that "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." The Court acknowledged that it had previously held that racial diversity can be a compelling government interest in university admissions, but it ruled that "[t]he present cases are not governed by Grutter." Unlike the cases pertaining to higher education, Jefferson County's plan involved no individualized consideration of students, and it employed a very limited notion of diversity ("black" and "other"). Jefferson County's goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the Court's standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race: "Racial balancing is not transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 'racial diversity.'" The plans also lacked the narrow tailoring that is necessary for race-conscious programs. The Court held that Jefferson County's enrollment plan was actually targeted toward demographic goals and not toward any demonstrable educational benefit from racial diversity. Jefferson County also failed to show that its objectives could not have been met with non-race-conscious means. In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy agreed that Jefferson County's use of race was unconstitutional but stressed that public schools may sometimes consider race to ensure equal educational opportunity.

Cunningham v. California

Wed, 11 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-6551

Petitioner

John Cunningham

Respondent

California

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, October 11, 2006

Decided

Monday, January 22, 2007

Advocates

Peter Gold (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Jeffrey M.K. Laurence (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

John Cunningham, a former police officer, was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of his young son. Under California's Determinate Sentencing Law, the trial judge can choose between three possible sentences for a given crime: a minimum, medium, and maximum sentence. Judges normally hand down the medium sentence unless there are special circumstances. In Cunningham's case, the judge found six aggravating factors, and sentenced him to the maximum 16-year sentence. However, in determining some of the aggravating factors the judge relied on evidence not considered by the jury.

Cunningham appealed his sentence, arguing that the judge's discretion was a violation of Cunningham's right to a trial by jury. In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court had ruled that for the right to a jury trial to be effective, any fact which increases a sentence "beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" must be proved before the jury. Cunningham argued that the judge can consider only factors determined by the jury when deciding which sentence to impose.

A California Court of Appeal disagreed and upheld the sentence, ruling that the judge had merely handed down the maximum sentence prescribed by the statute. The California Supreme Court denied Cunningham's appeal, but the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

Question

Does California's Determinate Sentencing Law violate the 6th Amendment right to a jury trial by permitting judges to impose enhanced sentences based on their determination of facts not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Cunningham, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Trial By Jury

Yes. The Court ruled 6-3 that California's Determinate Sentencing Law was inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "[...] under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence." Because the maximum sentence could not be given unless aggravating circumstances were found, and because the aggravating circumstances "depend[ed] on facts found discretely and solely by the judge," the Court found that California's sentencing system circumvented the process of trial by jury. In his dissent, Justice Alito argued that the California system was similar to the advisory federal sentencing guidelines which were upheld in United States v. Booker.

Microsoft Corporation v. AT&T Corp.

Wed, 21 Feb 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1056

Petitioner

Microsoft Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

AT&T Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, October 27, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, February 21, 2007

Decided

Monday, April 30, 2007

Facts of the Case

AT&T; owned the patent for certain speech codecs (a type of software code) included in Microsoft's Windows operating system. When Microsoft sent master versions of the software overseas, copied them, and sold the copied software, AT&T; sued for patent infringement. A company is guilty of infringement under the Patent Act if it "supplies...from the United States...components of a patented invention...in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components." Microsoft argued that it was not liable because 1) software code is intangible and cannot not be considered a "component" of an invention and 2) no software had been "supplied" from the U.S. because the copies were made overseas.

The District Court rejected both of Microsoft's arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Federal Circuit ruled that software code could be a component, because the Patent Act was not limited to physical structures. The Circuit Court also held that each overseas copy made of the U.S.-originated software code was "supplied" from the United States.

Question

1) Can software code be a component of a patented invention for purposes of the Patent Act?

2) Are copies of software code "supplied from the United States" for purposes of the Patent Act when the copies are created overseas from a master version that is supplied from the United States?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Microsoft Corporation, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 35 U.S.C. 271

No and no. The Court ruled 7-1 that Microsoft was not liable for infringement of AT&T;'s patent. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "software code is an idea without physical embodiment"; it cannot be a component of a patented invention. While leaving open the possibility that intangible things could be components in some cases, the opinion compared software code to a blueprint - something that can precisely describe the combination of the components, but is not itself a component. The majority held that Microsoft's Windows software does not become a component for purposes of AT&T;'s patent until it is converted into copies that can be read by a computer. The Court acknowledged that the copying from the master versions was an easy step, but it was nonetheless "essential." Since the crucial step occurred outside the United States, the copies were "supplied from the United States" under the meaning of the Patent Act. Instead, each functional copy was produced overseas from the master version of the software code. Justice Stevens's lone dissent disagreed with the Court's comparison of software code to a blueprint. He compared the exported master disk to a "warehouse of components."

Hinck v. United States

Mon, 23 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-376

Petitioner

John F. Hinck, et ux.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 12, 2007

Argued

Monday, April 23, 2007

Decided

Monday, May 21, 2007

Advocates

Thomas E. Redding (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed over $20,000 in interest fees for outstanding taxes against John and Pamela Hinck. The Hincks claimed that the interest accrued because of IRS delays and errors. Section 6404(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the abatement of interest fees that are caused by IRS delays. The IRS rejected the Hincks' interest abatement claim in 2000. In 2003, the United States Court of Federal Claims determined that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case because Section 6404(h) of the Internal Revenue Code granted the United States Tax Court jurisdiction over interest abatement disputes.

The Hincks appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Tucker Act granted subject matter jurisdiction to the Federal Claims Court. The Federal Circuit held that Section 6404(h) grants the Tax Court exclusive jurisdiction over interest abatement disputes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had previously ruled to the contrary.

Question

Does Section 6404(h) of the Internal Revenue Code grant the United States Tax Court exclusive jurisdiction to review interest abatement claims made against the Internal Revenue Service?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote for a unanimous court that Section 6404(e)(1) requires that claims challenging a refusal to abate (i.e. forgive) interest be brought exclusively in Tax Court. The Court reasoned that its ruling was consistent with the principle that when Congress enacts a detailed, specific judicial remedy (such as 6404(e)(1)) where there was no remedy before, the new remedy will be regarded as exclusive. The Court insisted on reading the statute as a unified whole, so that all of the procedures outlined by Congress for interest abatement claims applied exclusively to the forum (U.S. Tax Court) that Congress mentioned in the same statute. To do otherwise would be to "disaggregat[e] a statute Congress plainly envisioned as a package deal."

Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.

Mon, 16 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-85

Petitioner

Powerex Corp.

Respondent

Reliant Energy Services, Inc., et al.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 19, 2007

Argued

Monday, April 16, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 18, 2007

Advocates

David C. Frederick (for the petitioner)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court)

Leonard B. Simon (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The state of California suffered an energy crisis in 2001. Citizens filed suit against energy company Reliant Energy Services et al (Reliant) for conspiring to fix energy price levels. Reliant filed cross-claims against multiple energy companies and regulatory agencies involved in the price fixing, including the Canadian company Powerex Corporation. PowerEx exported surplus Canadian hydropower on behalf of its owner, the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (BC Hydro). Since BC Hydro was a governmental corporation and Powerex was its subsidiary, both argued that they were entitled to sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA). FSIA defines a foreign sovereign as an "organ of a foreign state" (28 U.S.C. Section 1603(b)). Reliant claimed that the two companies were exempt from FSIA sovereign immunity because their commercial activity had a "direct effect" on California energy markets.

A District Court ruled that BC Hydro was a foreign sovereign, but PowerEx was not. The District Court issued a remand order sending the case back to state court. Powerex appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that it operated for the "public interest" as an instrumentality of the government. The Ninth Circuit held that PowerEx was not a "foreign sovereign" because BC Hydro, not the Canadian government, owned PowerEx's shares.

Question

1) Does an entity whose shares are wholly owned by a governmental corporation that acts on behalf of a foreign state qualify as an "organ of a foreign state" for purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and therefore have sovereign immunity?

2) Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review the District Court's order sending the case back to state court?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for PowerEx Corp., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1447

Unanswered and no. In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled 7-2 that the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review the District Court's remand order. The Court relied on 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), which precludes appellate review of remands based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The District Court remanded the case because it found itself lacking the power to adjudicate the dispute after it determined that Powerex was not a foreign sovereign and thus could not remove the case to federal court. Since "the District Court relied upon a ground that is colorably characterized as subject-matter jurisdiction," the remand could not be reviewed on appeal. The Court ruled that Section 1447(d) clearly applied to FSIA sovereign immunity cases, and rejected the argument that Congress could not have intended to deny review of remand orders in such cases. The Court acknowledged that Section 1447(d) had "undesirable consequences in the FSIA context," but it said a change of the law in the internationally sensitive area of sovereign immunity would have to be left to Congress. Justice Stephen G. Breyer's dissent argued that there is an implicit exception for FSIA in Section 1447(d).

Global Crossing Telecommunications v. Metrophones Telecommunications

Tue, 10 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-705

Petitioner

Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, April 17, 2007

Advocates

Roy T. Englert, Jr. (argued the cause for Respondent)

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Jeffrey L. Fisher (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress declared that payphone service providers (PSPs) must be compensated for every completed call using their payphones. Previously, PSPs were not compensated for coinless "dial-around" long-distance calls in which the caller pays a long distance carrier rather than the PSP. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted rules requiring the carriers to pay the PSPs on a per-call basis. Metrophones Telecommunications, a PSP, sued Global Crossing Telecommunications, a long- distance carrier, alleging that Global Crossing had failed to pay for calls placed from Metrophones's payphones.

The District Court dismissed Metrophones's first complaint because the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not create a private right of action to recover compensation from long-distance carriers. Metrophones then filed an amended complaint based on Section 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, which deals with "unjust and unreasonable" practices of carriers. Global Communications argued that Metrophones had no right to sue under this statute either, but the District Court disagreed and ruled for Metrophones.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Circuit Court relied heavily on the FCC's interpretation of the statute, which was that failure to pay compensation to PSPs is an "unjust and unreasonable" practice in violation of Section 201(b) and that PSPs have a private right of action to sue carriers for such violations. The Circuit Court held that though the FCC rule on the subject was brief, it was entitled to deference from the courts in the absence of specific guidance from the statute.

Question

Does Section 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 create a private right of action for a payphone service provider to sue a long distance carrier for violations of the FCC's regulations concerning compensation for coinless payphone calls?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Metrophones Telecommunications, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Communication Act of 1934

Yes. The Court ruled 7-2 that Section 201(b) allows PSPs to sue long distance carriers for "unjust and unreasonable practices." The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that the FCC's regulation on the subject was reasonable and therefore entitled to deference. Justice Breyer wrote that "The [FCC's] determination easily fits within the language of the statutory phrase." "[I]n ordinary English," a carrier's refusal to pay compensation for a benefit received from payphone service providers can be said to be an unreasonable practice, the Court ruled. The majority also emphasized the similarities between the FCC's payphone regulation and traditional regulations of transportation communications.

Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly

Mon, 27 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1126

Respondent

William Twombly, et al.

Petitioner Type

Respondent

Petitioners

Bell Atlantic Corporation, et al.

Respondent Type

Petitioners

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 26, 2006

Argued

Monday, November 27, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 21, 2007

Advocates

Thomas O. Barnett (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Michael K. Kellogg (argued the cause for Petitioners)

J. Douglas Richards (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

William Twombly and other consumers brought a class action lawsuit against Bell Atlantic Corp. and other telecommunications companies. Twombly alleged that the companies had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to end competition among themselves and to stifle new competition. In the suit, Twombly claimed that the companies had agreed not to branch out into and compete in one another's territories, even though the Telecommunications Act of 1996 might have made it relatively inexpensive to do so.

The District Court granted Bell Atlantic's motion to dismiss the suit, however, because Twombly had failed to "allege sufficient facts from which a conspiracy can be inferred." In order to sufficiently claim a Section 1 violation, the court held, the plaintiffs needed to establish a "plus factor" - a piece of evidence showing that the defendants' behavior would be against their economic self-interest unless there was a conspiratorial agreement. Twombly had not established a plus factor, the court held, because the companies' defensive behavior could have been motivated by economic factors rather than conspiracy.

Twombly appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the lower court. The Second Circuit ruled that Twombly needed only to allege a conspiracy and specific facts that would support a Section 1 violation. Since he had alleged that the companies had engaged in suspicious "parallel conduct" and conspired to preserve monopoly conditions, his claim was sufficient and the suit could proceed.

Question

Can a plaintiff claim a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act by alleging parallel conduct by defendants amounting to a conspiracy?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Bell Atlantic Corporation, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sherman

No. The Court ruled 7-2 that a plaintiff claiming a Section 1 violation must also allege facts that, if true, would suggest a conspiratorial agreement. The opinion by Justice David Souter held that "Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy [...]" and "A statement of parallel conduct [...] needs some setting suggesting the [conspiratorial] agreement [...]" The Court laid out a "plausibility standard" for the pleading stage of Section 1 suits. Claims are valid only if they allege facts that plausibly suggest a conspiracy. To allege facts that are merely consistent with a conspiracy is not sufficient. The suggestive facts need only be alleged; a suit can go forward even if the facts are unlikely to be proven by the plaintiff. The Court held that Twombly's claim should be dismissed, because he had failed to identify any facts that suggested illegal conspiracy over the alternative: a concurrent appraisal of the economic situation by several telecomm companies. The dissenting Justices accused the majority of acting on the basis of practical concerns over "enormously expensive" antitrust lawsuits with the potential to confuse juries.

Roper v. Weaver

Wed, 21 Mar 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-313

Petitioner

Don Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center

Respondent

William Weaver

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Thursday, December 7, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, March 21, 2007

Decided

Monday, May 21, 2007

Advocates

Andrea K. Spillars (on behalf of the Petitioner)

John H. Blume (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

William Weaver was convicted of the first degree murder of a prospective witness in a drug trial. During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor gave a closing statement arguing for a death sentence. In the course of the statement, the prosecutor said: "You've got to think beyond William Weaver [...] This is society's worst nightmare" and "Sometimes killing is not only fair and justified; it's right. Sometimes it's your duty [...] it's right to kill him [Weaver] now." The jury sentenced Weaver to death. Weaver appealed in state court, arguing that the prosecutor's statements had inflamed and prejudiced the jury.

The Missouri state courts denied the appeal, but a federal District Court granted habeas corpus. The District Court overturned the sentence, ruling that the "unfairly inflammatory" closing statement had violated Weaver's right to due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the state cited the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which states that federal courts shall not grant a prisoner's habeas petition unless the state court's decision was "contrary to [...] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." The Eighth Circuit had cited some Supreme Court cases pertaining to prejudicial closing statements in the guilt phase of the trial, but the state argued that the federal courts should not have granted habeas relief, because the Supreme Court had not specifically addressed the issue of closing statements in the penalty phase.

Question

Does a federal Court of Appeals exceed its authority under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 by overturning a death sentence on the ground that the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument was "unfairly inflammatory"?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Weaver, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Unanswered. By a 6-3 vote, the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted, citing elements of the case's "unusual procedural history." Weaver had filed a habeas petition before AEDPA went into effect, but the district court had ruled that he must abandon his habeas petition if he wanted to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court made it clear in 2007 that the district court's decision had been incorrect (see Lawrence v. Florida). After the Court denied his petition for certiorari, Weaver refiled the habeas petition - but by then AEDPA was in effect, with its stricter requirements for habeas petitions. Rather than risk allowing Weaver's fate to hinge on the district court's mistake, the majority decided to dismiss the case. The dissenters argued that these considerations should not prevent the Court from correcting the Eighth Circuit's mistreatment of AEDPA. Justice Scalia suggested in dissent that other Circuit Courts should "do unto the Eighth Circuitís decision just what it did unto AEDPA: ignore it."

Safeco Insurance Company of America, et al. v. Charles Burr

Tue, 16 Jan 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-84

Petitioner

Safeco Insurance Company of America, et al.

Respondent

Charles Burr, et al.

Consolidation

GEICO General Insurance Company, et al. v. Ajene Edo, No. 06-100

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 4, 2007

Advocates

Michael K. Kellogg (Attorney for Petitioners)

Scott A. Shorr (Attorney for Respondent, Attorney for Respondents)

Maureen E. Mahoney (Attorney for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In No. 06-100, Edo, a consumer, sued GEICO General Insurance Company, alleging that GEICO had violated the requirement in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) that insurance companies give consumers notice before raising rates. Edo sought statutory and punitive damages, which the FCRA awards only when a company "willfully" violates the law. Similarly, in 06-84, several consumers sued Safeco for failing to notify them that better credit ratings would have entitled them to better premiums. It was GEICO's policy to notify new applicants only if their credit ratings were worse than a certain "neutral" (average) value, while Safeco as a matter of policy did not give "adverse action" notices to any new applicants. GEICO argued that it was unaware that the FCRA applied to the setting of premiums for new applicants such as Edo, and thus could not be considered to have acted willfully. The District Court ruled for GEICO and Safeco, holding that their actions did not qualify as willful.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that that the concept of willfulness includes "reckless disregard" for the law as well as actual knowledge that the conduct was illegal. The ruling put the Ninth Circuit in conflict with most other circuit courts, but the court argued that its interpretation was more consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the purpose of the FCRA.

Question

Is a company guilty of a "willful" violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act if it shows "reckless disregard" for the law, even if the company has no actual knowledge that the conduct violates the Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Safeco Insurance Company of America, et al., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1681

Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that insurance companies can be liable for willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act if they show "reckless disregard" for the law. The justices held that the meaning of the term "willful" is contextually determined. Under the common law reckless violations are considered willful violations, and the term is given its common meaning unless Congress intended to change it. The Court called the evidence of such an intent "shaky," and it pointed to another section of the statute which indicated that Congress was treating "knowing" and "reckless" violations as subcategories of "willful" violations. Though GEICO and Safeco lost on the issue of the meaning of "willful," the Court held that neither company had acted with reckless disregard. GEICO's policy - giving adverse action notices to new applicants only where they were likely to make a difference - was a correct interpretation of the statute. Though Safeco was in violation, its error was neither reckless nor willful.

Sole v. Wyner

Tue, 17 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-531

Petitioner

Michael W. Sole, Secretary, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

T. A. Wyner, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 12, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, April 17, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 4, 2007

Advocates

Seth M. Galanter (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Florida state park officials prohibited T.A. Wyner and George Simon from forming a peace symbol from nude individuals at a public beach. Wyner and Simon petitioned a district court, which issued a preliminary injunction barring the officials' interference and awarded Wyner and Simon their attorney fees in accordance with 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. Later, the district court reversed the injunction because state laws prohibited nudity at the beach. The officials argued that Wyner and Simon did not qualify as a "prevailing party," and therefore should not have their attorney fees refunded.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Wyner and Simon were the "prevailing party" because the district court had decided to issue the preliminary injunction based on merits of the case. The park officials responded that the preliminary injunction was based on a "mistake of the law," because the case was dismissed upon further review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had previously ruled that a preliminary injunction is not a ruling based on the merits, and therefore does not determine the "prevailing party."

Question

Can a preliminary injunction that is later reversed be the basis for awarding a party the status of the "prevailing party" and therefore entitling that party to attorney's fees?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sole, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards

No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's opinion for the unanimous Court held that a preliminary injunction that is later reversed or otherwise undone cannot be the basis for "prevailing party" status for purposes of awarding attorney's fees. Though Wyner had been able to perform the nude peace symbol display without interference after her victory at the preliminary hearing, her victory had been "transient," "fleeting," and "ephemeral." Because she eventually lost on the merits of her claim that the government's interference was unconstitutional, she failed to gain the enduring "chang[e] [in] the legal relationship" of the parties that is required for prevailing party status. The Court left open the possibility that a preliminary injunction could be the basis for awarding attorney's fees if it were not later superseded as was Wyner's.

Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v. Brentwood Academy

Wed, 18 Apr 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-427

Petitioner

Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brentwood Academy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, January 5, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, April 18, 2007

Decided

Thursday, June 21, 2007

Facts of the Case

Brentwood Academy, a private school, was a voluntary member of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA). After Brentwood's football coach violated TSSAA recruiting rules by contacting some prospective players at other schools, the TSSAA imposed various penalties on Brentwood. Brentwood sued the TSSAA, claiming that its First Amendment and Due Process rights were being violated. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that because the TSSAA was composed primarily of public schools, it was a state actor subject to the limitations of the Constitution (see Brentwood Acad. v. TN Sec. School Ath. Assn. No. 99-901). Accordingly, the District Court faulted the TSSAA for violations of Brentwood's constitutional rights and threw out the TSSAA's penalties.

On appeal, the TSSAA argued that it had not exercised the "police power" of the State, but merely enforced a voluntary contractual agreement with Brentwood. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth circuit rejected this argument, characterizing the TSSAA's actions as those of a "government regulator." The Sixth Circuit held that the state interest in regulating athletic competition was not substantial enough to counter-balance Brentwood's First Amendment rights, and it affirmed the lower court's ruling for Brentwood.

Question

Does a voluntary association composed primarily of public schools violate the First Amendment's protection of free speech when the association punishes a member school for violating athletic recruiting rules that the school agreed to follow?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

In a unanimous opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that "[t]he anti-recruiting rule strikes nowhere near the heart of the First Amendment." Brentwood's speech rights do not extend to potentially coercive one-on-one communications between a coach and potential students, especially after the school voluntarily agreed to the anti-recruiting rule. The Court drew an analogy to the case of Ohralik v. State Bar Assn., in which the justices had ruled that a lawyer's in-person solicitation of clients was not protected speech. In that case as well as Brentwood's, activities with a potential for pressure, misrepresentation, or coercion were found to be outside the First Amendment's scope even though speech was involved. The Court also considered Brentwood's voluntary acceptance of the anti-recruiting rule to be significant. The TSSAA is allowed to impose limited conditions on the free speech of its members as long as these conditions are necessary for its purposes as an athletic league, and "the First Amendment does not excuse Brentwood" from abiding by them. In concurring opinions, a narrow majority of justices disagreed with Justice Stevens's invocation of Ohralik on the ground that it was not meant to extend beyond the attorney-client relationship. Justice Thomas recommended that the Court revisit and overrule its previous holding that TSSAA is a state actor.

United States v. Resendiz-Ponce

Tue, 10 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-998

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Juan Resendiz-Ponce

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, April 17, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, January 9, 2007

Advocates

Atmore Baggot (Attorneys for Respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Juan Resendiz-Ponce, a Mexican national, was convicted of kidnapping and deported. When Resendiz-Ponce tried to reenter the U.S. using false identification, he was arrested and indicted for attempting to reenter the country after being deported. Resendiz-Ponce moved to dismiss his indictment because it failed to allege that he had "committed an overt act that was a substantial step toward reentering" - an essential element of the criminal offense. The trial judge denied the motion and the jury convicted Resendiz- Ponce.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial judge's decision to deny the motion. The Ninth Circuit ruled that because the indictment failed to explicitly mention that Resendiz-Ponce had physically crossed the border and presented false identification, it was insufficient and should be dismissed. The government argued that the omission was "harmless error," a minor mistake that would not invalidate the indictment, but the Circuit Court ruled that the omission was instead a "fatal flaw."

Question

Can the omission of an element of a criminal offense from a federal indictment constitute harmless error?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 8 U.S.C. 1326

Unanswered. The Court ruled that Resendiz-Ponce's indictment was not defective at all, and thus it did not reach the question of whether a failure to state each element of the charged crime can ever be harmless error. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the indictment's language stating that Resendiz-Ponce had "attempted" to illegally reenter the United States was sufficient, even without a more detailed description of his actions. The majority reasoned that "the word 'attempt' [...] encompasses both the overt act and intent elements." Therefore, Resendiz-Ponce's indictment did not lack any essential element of the crime. In a lone dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the word "attempt" did not necessarily imply an action that would constitute a "substantial step" toward reentering. Justice Scalia would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit and dismissed the indictment as structurally flawed.

Wallace v. Kato

Mon, 06 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1240

Petitioner

Andre Wallace

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chicago Police Officers Kristen Kato and Eugene Roy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 19, 2006

Argued

Monday, November 6, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, February 21, 2007

Advocates

Benna Ruth Solomon (argued the cause for Respondents)

Kenneth N. Flaxman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, Andre Wallace was arrested and charged with murder. Two years later he was convicted and sent to prison. Wallace appealed, arguing that the police had arrested him without probable cause and coerced him into confessing to the crime. In 1998, an appeals court agreed that Wallace had been arrested without probable cause and granted him a new trial. Finally, in 2002, the prosecution dropped its case against him. The next year Wallace sued the police officers and the city of Chicago for violating his Fourth Amendment rights through false arrest.

The District Court ruled against Wallace, because his suit was time-barred. In Illinois there is a two-year statute of limitations on false-arrest claims. Since Wallace had not brought suit within two years of either his arrest or the time the arrest was declared invalid, his time was up. Wallace appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the two-year limit did not begin until his conviction was finally set aside in 2002.

The Circuit Court upheld the District Court, ruling against Wallace. The Circuit Court panel acknowledged that other Circuits had failed to agree on the question of when the statute of limitations for a false arrest claim should begin. The Seventh Circuit opted for a clear rule - the two-year limit starts at the time of the arrest, and therefore Wallace's suit was too late

Question

When does the statute of limitations for a claim for damages arising out of a false arrest start running when the fruits of the search were introduced in a person's criminal trial and he was convicted?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Kato, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

By a 7-2 vote, the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia held that "the statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged false imprisonment ends." Since false imprisonment is detention without legal process, the Court ruled, the false imprisonment ends when legal processes begin. At that point, the clock begins to run on the time limit for filing a false imprisonment claim.

Claiborne v. United States

Tue, 20 Feb 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-5618

Petitioner

Mario Claiborne

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

551 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Friday, November 3, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 4, 2007

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of Respondent)

Michael Dwyer (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction." Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.

Question

1) Was the District Court's sentence reasonable, even though it fell below the advised minimum in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines? 2) Does the Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Booker allow a court to require extraordinary circumstances to justify a sentence which constitutes a substantial variance from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Unanswered. Mario Claiborne was killed in a shooting incident in St. Louis, and his case was dismissed as moot.

Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts

Mon, 06 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-996

Petitioner

Robert Louis Marrama

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 12, 2006

Argued

Monday, November 6, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, February 21, 2007

Advocates

David G. Baker (argued the cause for Petitioner)

G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. (argued the cause for Respondents)

Lisa S. Blatt (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Robert Marrama filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and agreed to turn over all of his non-exempt assets to a trustee for payment of his creditors. Trustees later accused Marrama of acting in bad faith by attempting to conceal two assets: a tax refund and some real estate. Marrama then moved to convert his bankruptcy petition from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, which would allow him to keep more of his assets. Citizens Bank, one of Marrama's creditors, opposed the conversion. Citizens Bank argued that Marrama should not be able to convert to Chapter 13 due to his initial bad faith Chapter 7 petition. The bankruptcy court agreed and denied the conversion.

The bankruptcy appeals panel affirmed the court's ruling. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Marrama argued that the plain language of Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code supported his right to convert to Chapter 13, regardless of the circumstances. Section 706(a) states, "The debtor may convert a case under [Chapter 7] to a case under Chapter 11, 12 or 13 of this title at any time [...]" Citizens Bank countered that the word "may" indicates a privilege rather than a right. It also argued that the bankruptcy system could be abused if debtors were able to convert to Chapter 13 after filing bad faith Chapter 7 petitions. The First Circuit upheld the panel's ruling, denying Marrama his conversion.

Question

Can the right in Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to convert a Chapter 7 bankruptcy to another chapter be denied because of bad faith?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that there is a "bad faith" exception to the right of conversion in Section 706(a). The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens held that although the vast majority of Chapter 7 debtors can convert to Chapter 13, a Chapter 7 debtor who engages in bad faith conduct does not qualify as a "debtor" under Chapter 13 and thus cannot convert his petition. The majority also wrote that courts have the inherent power to deny the motions of litigants who act in bad faith. The Court concluded that "Nothing in the text of [...] 706 [...] limits the authority of the court to take appropriate action in response to fraudulent conduct by the atypical litigant who has demonstrated that he is not entitled to the relief available to the typical debtor."

Lopez v. Gonzales

Tue, 03 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-547

Petitioner

Jose Antonio Lopez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Reymundo Toledo-Flores v. United States, No. 05-7664

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, April 3, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, October 3, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, December 5, 2006

Advocates

Timothy Crooks (argued the cause for Petitioner Toledo-Flores)

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Respondents)

Robert A. Long, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioner Lopez)

Facts of the Case

Jose Lopez, a Mexican national living in South Dakota, was convicted of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine. The crime is a felony under South Dakota law, but only a misdemeanor under the federal Controlled Substances Act.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service began proceedings to remove Lopez from the country. Lopez applied for a cancellation of his removal, citing the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). The INA allows an alien to avoid removal if he meets certain qualifications and has no prior "aggravated felony" convictions. Lopez argued that he was eligible for cancellation of his removal because his drug offense was only a misdemeanor under federal law.

An Immigration Judge denied Lopez's request for cancellation, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, on the grounds that Lopez had committed an aggravated felony. Lopez then sued the Attorney General and brought his case to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Circuit Court affirmed the lower courts, ruling that a crime is an aggravated felony under the INA if it is a felony under either federal or state law.

Question

Does a drug crime constitute an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Naturalization Act if the crime is a felony under state law but only a misdemeanor under federal law?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Lopez, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

No. The Court ruled 8-1 that a drug crime must be a felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in order to count as an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA. The opinion by Justice David Souter rejected as unnatural the government's interpretation of the term "aggravated felony" in the INA as encompassing any state-law felony punishable under the CSA, whether as a felony or not. Instead, the Court looked to the crimes classified as felonies in the CSA in order to define INA aggravated felonies. Illicit trafficking is a felony drug crime under the CSA, but the Court ruled that Lopez's drug- possession crime could not be considered "trafficking." The Court's approach avoided state-by-state disparities in the types of crimes that can be used to justify deportation.

Lawrence v. Florida

Tue, 31 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-8820

Petitioner

Gary Lawrence

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, March 27, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, October 31, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Advocates

Mary Catherine Bonner (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Christopher M. Kise (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Gary Lawrence was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Lawrence appealed his conviction, arguing that his counsel had been ineffective. After exhausting his state-court appeals, Lawrence filed a petition for certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to review the decisions of the Florida courts. Later, Lawrence petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which would allow his appeal to be heard in federal court.

The federal District Court rejected Lawrence's habeas petition, because he had exceeded the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The AEDPA gives defendants one year to submit habeas petitions, but that does not include any time that the petitioner has a "properly filed application" pending for "State post- conviction or other collateral review." In Lawrence's case, whether or not he had exceeded the one-year time limit depended on whether or not the time spent waiting for the Supreme Court to process his pending certiorari petition counted toward the time limit. Federal Circuit Courts have disagreed on this question.

In his appeal, Lawrence argued that time spent on Supreme Court certiorari petitions, like time spent on state-court appeals, was not countable toward the one-year statute of limitations. Lawrence also made an alternative argument that the incompetence of his state-appointed counsel, as well as the disagreement among federal courts on the statute of limitations question, constituted "extraordinary circumstances." If the Court were to find that the delay was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond the defendant's control, it could set aside the time limit under the doctrine of "equitable tolling."

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the District Court and rejected Lawrence's petition. The Circuit Court ruled that Lawrence had failed to demonstrate how his lawyer's actions or the confusion over the statute of limitations caused him to miss the deadline. The Circuit Court acknowledged that the statute of limitations had been in dispute, but it followed Circuit precedent that said time spent waiting for a pending Supreme Court certiorari petition did count toward the AEDPA's one-year time limit.

Question

1) When a defendant facing death has a certiorari petition pending before the United States Supreme Court, does the time the petition is pending count toward the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act?

2) Does the division in the Circuit Courts over the statute of limitations constitute an extraordinary circumstance that would allow the Court to set aside the time limit?

3) Does the ineffectiveness of a defendant's counsel constitute an extraordinary circumstance that would allow the Court to set aside the time limit?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Florida, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes, no, and no. The Court ruled 5-4 that the time a habeas petition is pending before the Supreme Court counts toward the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Section 2244(d)(2) of the Act stops the clock on the time limit while the prisoner appeals in state courts, but the Court ruled that appeals to the Supreme Court are not part of the process referred to in the Act. Justice Clarence Thomas's opinion held that "Read naturally, the text of the statute must mean that the statute of limitations is tolled only while state courts review the application." The Court noted that suspending the statute of limitations for certiorari petitions might cause prisoners to file petitions "as a delay tactic." Finally, the Court rejected Lawrence's equitable tolling claims, holding that attorney miscalculation is not a credible reason for the Court to set aside a deadline.

Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Sorrell

Tue, 10 Oct 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-746

Petitioner

Norfolk Southern Railway Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Timothy Sorrell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, May 15, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, January 10, 2007

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Mary L. Perry (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Sorrell, an employee of Norfolk Southern Railway, crashed his company truck while swerving to avoid another company truck. Sorrell suffered injuries and sued Norfolk Southern for damages under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). Both Sorrell and the railroad had been negligent in the incident to some extent. Norfolk Southern argued that under the FELA, the "causation standard" - the standard for assigning the blame for an incident - was the same for both the employee and the railroad. According to Norfolk Southern, any damages awarded to Sorrell for the railroad's negligence had to be reduced by the amount of the damages that was attributable to Sorrell's own negligence. (If Sorrell was 60% responsible for the accident, for example, the damages would be reduced by 60%.)

The trial ruled instead that the causation standards were different: the railroad was responsible for any negligence that contributed to the accident, but the employee was only responsible for negligence that directly caused damage. Under this more lenient standard for employee negligence, the trial court awarded Sorrell $1.5 million.

The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. The Missouri Supreme Court declined to hear the case, but the U.S. Supreme Court granted review.

Question

Is the causation standard for employee negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act different from the causation standard for railroad negligence?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Norfolk Southern Railway Company, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Employers' Liability

No. The Court ruled unanimously that the causation standard for employee negligence is the same as the standard for railroad negligence. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts held that "the common law applied the same causation standard to defendant and plaintiff negligence, and FELA did not expressly depart from that approach." In the absence of any explicit indication from the text of FELA, the Court relied on common law principles of negligence. The Court held that Congress had most likely intended for juries to compare each party's contribution under the same standard - a simple "apples to apples" comparison. The Court ruled only that the causation standards were the same; it declined to rule on the question of what the standard of causation should be.

Zuni Public School District v. U.S. Department of Education

Wed, 10 Jan 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1508

Petitioner

Zuni Public School District No. 89, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

U.S. Department of Education, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, January 10, 2007

Decided

Tuesday, April 17, 2007

Advocates

Leigh Marc Manasevit (argued the cause for Respondent, on behalf of state respondent)

Ronald J. VanAmberg (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Department of Education certified that the state of New Mexico equalizes educational expenditures among school districts. The certification of equalization allowed New Mexico to offset its funding of districts located on Indian Reservations by a proportion of the federal Impact Aid payments made to those districts. Zuni Public School District objected to the certification, arguing that the Department had not followed the statutory formula for determining that a state's expenditures are equalized. Outlier school districts falling above the 95th or below the 5th percentile in per-pupil expenditures were excluded from consideration when the Department determined equalization. The Department calculated these percentiles based on the total student population, but Zuni argued that 20 U.S.C. Section 7709 had repealed that policy.

An administrative judge dismissed Zuni's complaint, and the Secretary of Education affirmed on the ground that the law was ambiguous. A divided panel of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the Secretary's decision as a valid interpretation of the statute. In a rehearing by the entire Circuit Court, the 12 judges split evenly, again upholding the ruling.

Question

Was the Secretary of Education's regulatory formula for determining whether a state's education funding is equalized among its school districts consistent with 20 U.S.C. Section 7709, the Federal Impact Aid Program?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for U.S. Department of Education, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 20 U.S.C. 7709

Yes. The Court voted 5-4 in favor of the Department of Education, affirming the lower court. In his majority opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer agreed with the Secretary of Education's argument that 20 U.S.C. 7709 was ambiguous on the specific formula to be used. Since administrative agencies have wide latitude to interpret their governing statutes, the Court gave deference to the Secretary's formula for calculating the 5th and 95th percentiles for the purpose of determining expenditure equalization. The majority concluded that "[...] the history of the statute strongly supports the Secretary." No member of Congress had expressed an opinion on the formula to be used, so the Department would have been free to calculate the percentiles using either formula. In response to Zuni's statutory-language based argument, the Court ruled that the statute's phrasing could encompass the Secretary's method of calculating excluded districts based on per-pupil expenditure percentiles of the total student population. The four dissenting Justices argued that the statute required the Secretary to calculate the percentiles based on a comparison of the per-pupil expenditures of the districts.

Schriro v. Landrigan

Tue, 09 Jan 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-1575

Petitioner

Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jeffrey Timothy Landrigan, aka Billy Patrick Wayne Hill

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

550 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, January 9, 2007

Decided

Monday, May 14, 2007

Advocates

Kent E. Cattani (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Jeffrey Landrigan was convicted of first degree murder. During sentencing, Landrigan's counsel attempted to call witnesses to testify to Landrigan's disadvantaged upbringing and good character. However, Landrigan opposed his lawyer's decision to present this mitigating evidence, and the witnesses were never called. Landrigan was sentenced to death. He appealed, arguing that his counsel had been ineffective. Landrigan claimed that he had wanted the lawyer to present mitigating evidence showing Landrigan's genetic predisposition to violence.

After state courts rejected the claim as frivolous, Landrigan filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court. The District Court ruled against Landrigan, but he finally prevailed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Despite the high degree of deference to state courts required by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the state court had been unreasonable to uphold Landrigan's death sentence. Landrigan's lawyer should have presented the mitigating evidence, the Court ruled, and the omission had rendered counsel ineffective.

Question

1) Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the state court unreasonably determined the facts of the case when it found that Landrigan "instructed his attorney not to present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing"?

2) Was the Ninth Circuit correct to hold that counsel for Landrigan's failure to present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase rendered him objectively ineffective, even though Landrigan had opposed the admission of the evidence?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Schriro, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes and no. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled that the District Court was within its discretion when it upheld Landrigan's sentence without granting him a new evidentiary hearing. The Justices split 5-4 with Justice Clarence Thomas writing the opinion for the majority. The Court rejected the Ninth's Circuit's holding that the District Court took out of context statements Landrigan made during his trial. Instead, the Court held that those statements clearly indicated that Landrigan had been aware of the mitigating evidence that could have been presented, but had simply chosen not to have it presented. The District Court could have reasonably concluded that Landrigan would refuse all mitigating evidence, rendering Landrigan's counsel's investigation ineffectual no matter how thorough it might have been. The dissenters noted that Landrigan's counsel's investigation had been inadequate, and argued that Landrigan might have agreed to present the evidence if his lawyer had investigated his case more thoroughly.

Burton v. Waddington

Tue, 07 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-9222

Petitioner

Lonnie Lee Burton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Douglas Waddington, Superintendent, Stafford Creek Corrections Center

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 5, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, November 7, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, January 9, 2007

Advocates

William B. Collins (argued the cause for Respondent)

Matthew D. Roberts (argued the cause for Respondent)

Jeffrey L. Fisher (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Burton was convicted of burglary, robbery, and rape. Under the standard state sentencing guidelines, the burglary and robbery alone warranted the maximum sentence for a single criminal event. In order to make sure the rape was punished as well, the trial judge added a consecutive sentence for the rape to the standard sentence.

Burton filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his sentence in federal court. He argued that under Blakely v. Washington, handed down after his conviction, the jury rather than the judge should have decided whether to add the extra sentence. The government argued that the holding in Blakely was a "new rule." Under the Court's decision in Teague v. Lane, new rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively. Burton countered that the relevant rule was actually established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, a decision handed down before his conviction became final. Burton also argued that even if Blakely is a new rule, it is essential for a fair trial. New rules that are essential for the fundamental fairness of trials can apply retroactively.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Burton. The Appeals Court held that Blakely was a new rule, so it could not be used by Burton in his appeal.

Question

1) Is the holding in Blakely v. Washington a new rule or was it dictated by Apprendi v. New Jersey?

2) If Blakely is a new rule, does its requirement that facts resulting in an enhanced statutory maximum be proved before a jury apply retroactively?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Waddington, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 2244

Unanswered. In a 9-0 per curiam opinion, the Court ruled that Burton's habeas petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Burton had earlier filed a habeas petition challenging his conviction. Four years later, when he filed the habeas petition challenging only his sentence, Burton neglected to obtain the court authorization necessary for a "second or successive" petition. The Ninth Circuit had excused Burton's oversight because his first petition was filed before his sentence became final, but the Court held that Burton's second petition was nevertheless a "second or successive" petition requiring authorization. Since Burton's petition was invalid, the Justices did not address either of the questions presented.

Whorton v. Bockting

Wed, 01 Nov 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-595

Petitioner

Glen Whorton, Director, Nevada Department of Corrections

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Marvin Howard Bockting

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

549 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, May 15, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, November 1, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, February 28, 2007

Advocates

George J. Chanos (on behalf of Petitioner)

Franny A. Forsman (Attorneys for Respondent, Counsel of Record)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Marvin Bockting was accused of sexually assaulting his six year old stepdaughter. The girl told a detective about Bockting's crimes against her, but at the trial she became very upset and refused to testify. The judge declared the witness unavailable and allowed the detective to give hearsay testimony on what Bockting's daughter had told him. Bockting was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without having had a chance to cross-examine the only witness against him.

Bockting's appeals in state court were denied. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court, claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser had been violated. During Bockting's appeals, the Supreme Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington that hearsay testimony given outside the court by an unavailable witness is only admissible if the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness before trial.

Bockting appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Nith Circuit, arguing that Crawford should apply retroactively to his case. The Circuit Court ruled that Crawford had announced a "new rule" of criminal procedure; new rules are normally not applied to cases that were final before the rule was announced. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the rule on hearsay testimony was a "watershed" rule that was fundamental to a fair trial. Under an exception defined by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, watershed rules are applied retroactively.

Question

Is the Court's decision on the admissibility of hearsay testimony in Crawford v. Washington a watershed rule that applies retroactively?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Whorton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: retroactive application of a constitutional right

No. The Court ruled unanimously "that Crawford announced a 'new rule' of criminal procedure and that this rule does not fall within the Teague exception for watershed rules." Justice Samuel Alito's opinion called the Crawford ruling "flatly inconsistent" with the prior precedents that it overruled. It was therefore a new rule of criminal procedure. However, the ruling failed to meet the Court's two criteria for a watershed rule. Although Crawford was aimed at increasing the accuracy of criminal convictions, it was not absolutely necessary to prevent an "impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction," as was the archetypal watershed ruling Gideon v. Wainwright. The Court acknowledged that the Crawford's holding was "important," but it was not as "profound," "sweeping," or "central[]" as the Gideon watershed rule, which had been "essential to the fairness" of the judicial system. Since the Crawford ruling did not meet the criteria for a watershed rule, the Court ruled that the decision's restrictions on hearsay testimony did not apply retroactively.

Montana v. Wyoming and North Dakota

jgoldman — Mon, 10 Jan 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

44° 54' 10.8972" N, 107° 2' 6.252" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

137 ORIG

Plaintiff

Montana

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

Wyoming and North Dakota

Respondent Type

Defendant

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 2011

Decided

Monday, May 2, 2011

Advocates

Steve Bullock (Attorney General of Montana, for the plaintiff)

Peter Kenneth Michael (Senior Assistant Attorney General of Wyoming, for the defendant)

William M. Jay (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the defendants)

Facts of the Case

1950, Montana, Wyoming and North Dakota signed the Yellowstone River Compact, which spelled out how the states would share water. In 2007, Montana sued Wyoming, alleging farmers and other water users along the Powder and Tongue rivers were being harmed by Wyoming's excessive water use. Attorneys for Wyoming argued that much of the water used by the state's residents and businesses was not covered by the 1950 agreement.

Special Master Barton Thompson issued an interim report, finding that Montana had grounds to sue over Wyoming's expanded use of water since 1950. However, Thompson rejected Montana's claim that Wyoming should be held liable for increased water use due to irrigation improvements. Meanwhile, North Dakota, also a member of the Yellowstone compact, was named as a second defendant in the original lawsuit. But Montana officials have said its inclusion was a formality and that they have no disagreement with their eastern neighbor.

Question

Has Wyoming violated the Yellowstone River Compact by leaving less water in the river for Montana's uses?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Wyoming, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Yellowstone River Compact

No. In an opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court agreed with the Special Master who found that "Montana's allegation fails to state a claim because more efficient irrigation systems are permissible under the compact so long as the conserved water is used to irrigate the same acreage watered in 1950." Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, arguing that the "court's analysis substitutes its none-too-confident reading of the common law and the compact's definition of 'beneficial use.'" Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.