Cases - 2005 term

United States v. Grubbs

Wed, 18 Jan 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1414

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jeffrey Grubbs

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, January 18, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, March 21, 2006

Advocates

Mark J. Reichel (argued the cause for Respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

On federal trial for possessing child pornography, Grubbs asked the judge to suppress evidence officers seized from his home. Grubbs said the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers showed him an "anticipatory warrant," something valid only after triggering events take place, with no mention of the triggering conditions. The condition set on this warrant was that officers could search Grubbs' house only after he received a pornographic video in the mail. The judge denied Grubbs' motion because the trigger was set forth in an affidavit that the officers carried during the search and that the warrant referenced. The Ninth Circuit reversed and said officers had to show the triggering events for an anticipatory warrant to the person being searched.

Question

Did the Fourth Amendment require suppression of evidence seized during a search that had been authorized by an anticipatory warrant, when the warrant's triggering events were not shown to the person searched?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. Justice Antonin Scalia, in the majority opinion, wrote that under the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement a warrant need not set out the conditions that trigger it, only the place to be searched and the persons or things to be searched for. The fact that the triggering conditions were included in the affidavit, even if they were never showed to Grubbs, was therefore sufficient.

Schaffer v. Weast

Wed, 05 Oct 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-698

Petitioner

Brian Schaffer, a Minor, By His Parents and Next Friends, Jocelyn and Martin Schaffer, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jerry Weast, Superintendent, Montgomery County Public Schools, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 2005

Decided

Monday, November 14, 2005

Advocates

David B. Salmons (argued the cause for Respondents)

William H. Hurd (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The parents of Brian Schaffer, a disabled child, sued their public school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Schaffer's parents claimed the Individualized Education Program that the school system devised for their son, and which IDEA required for each disabled student, was inadequate. The district court ruled for the Schaffers, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court incorrectly assigned the burden of proof to the school system. Because IDEA was silent on whether the parents or the school system bear the burden of proof, the Fourth Circuit held, the general rule that the party initiating the suit bears that burden should be applied.

Question

Do the parents or school system bear the burden of proof in disputes over a child's individualized education program under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Weast, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Education of the Handicapped, Education for All Handicapped Children, or Individuals with Disabilities Education Acts, or related statutes, as amended; also see ADA

In a 6 to 2 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the party bringing the suit bears the burden of proof, whether that party is the parents or the school system. In the majority opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that "absent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise, ... we will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief."

United States v. Olson

Wed, 12 Oct 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-759

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joseph Olson, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 7, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, October 12, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, November 8, 2005

Advocates

Thomas G. Cotter (argued the cause for Respondents)

Deanne E. Maynard (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Injured workers sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that federal mine inspectors' negligence helped cause a mine accident. The FTCA authorized private tort actions against the U.S. when the federal government, if a private person in similar circumstances, would be liable according to the law of the place where the incident occurred. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the allegations failed to show Arizona law would have imposed liability on a private person in like circumstances. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding federal mine inspections were a governmental function with no private analogue. In such cases, the Ninth Circuit held, the FTCA waived sovereign immunity if a state or municipal entity would be held liable under the law where the activity occurred.

Question

Did the Federal Tort Claims Act waive the United States' sovereign immunity in cases where local law would make a state or municipal entity liable?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Tort Claims, or Alien Tort Statute

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the United States waived sovereign immunity only where local law would make a "private person" liable in tort, not where local law would make a "state or municipal entity" liable. Nothing in the FTCA's "context, history, or objectives" supported the Ninth Circuit's holding that the act waived sovereign immunity where the United States, if a state or municipal entity, would be liable. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit treated the act's requirement that there be "like circumstances" to require the "same circumstances." Private analogies did, in fact, exist for the federal mine inspectors' conduct.

Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt

Mon, 28 Nov 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1186

Petitioner

Wachovia Bank, National Association

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Daniel G. Schmidt, III, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, June 13, 2005

Argued

Monday, November 28, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, January 17, 2006

Advocates

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Andrew L. Frey (argued the cause for Petitioner)

James R. Gilreath (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Schmidt, a South Carolina citizen, sued Wachovia Bank in a South Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing him to participate in an illegal tax shelter. Wachovia is a national bank with its main office in North Carolina and branch offices in several other states, including South Carolina. Under federal diversity jurisdiction, federal courts can hear cases in which the parties are citizens of different states. Wachovia filed a petition in Federal District Court, seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute. After the petition was denied on the merits, Wachovia appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1348, national banks are "deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." The Circuit Court interpreted "located" to mean any state where the bank has a branch location. Noting that the statute uses both "located" and "established" to refer to the presence of a bank, the Circuit Court determined that a national bank is "established" in the state where its main office is located, and "located" in every state where it has a branch office. Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, Wachovia was "located" in, and a citizen of, South Carolina (as well as several other states with branch offices). Since both parties, Schmidt and Wachovia, had South Carolina citizenship, the Circuit Court dismissed the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction.

Question

For the purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, is a national bank "located" in every state in which it maintains a branch office?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Wachovia Bank, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1348

No. In an 8-0 decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that a national bank is "located" in, and therefore a "citizen" of, only the state in which its main office is located. Looking to the history of Congress's diversity jurisdiction statutes, the Court concluded that the word "located" need not be interpreted to mean any state where a bank has a physical presence. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Fourth Circuit had erred in drawing a distinction between the words "located" and "established": "the Congress may well have comprehended the words 'located' and 'established,' as used in [Section] 1348, as synonymous terms." Justice Thomas took no part in the decision of the case.

Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.

Tue, 28 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-260

Petitioner

Joel Sereboff, et ux.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 28, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, March 28, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2006

Advocates

Gregory S. Coleman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Peter K. Stris (argued the cause for Petitioners)

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Mr. and Mrs. Sereboff held a health insurance policy with Mid Atlantic Medical Services that was governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). If a beneficiary is injured, Mid Atlantic pays for all covered medical expenses. However, the plan also has a provision that requires the beneficiaries to reimburse Mid Atlantic when an injury has been caused by a third party and the beneficiary receives compensation from that third party. In this case, the Sereboffs were injured in an automobile accident caused by a third party. After they settled their suit against that third party, Mid Atlantic filed suit in federal district court under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA to recover the money it had spent on medical expenses. 502(a)(3) provides that a health insurer may bring suit "to obtain ... appropriate equitable relief ... to enforce ... the terms of the plan." The Sereboff's objected, arguing that the sort of reimbursement provision at issue in this case was not "equitable" because the Sereboffs had not had the funds in their possession when they agreed to the plan. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, siding with Mid Atlantic.

Question

Is a health insurance plan that requires the beneficiary to reimburse the insurer for its expenses when the beneficiary recovers damages from a third party that is responsible for the injury "equitable" under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

Yes. Chief Justice John Roberts, for a unanimous Supreme Court, pointed to Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117 (1914), in deciding this case. In Barnes, an attorney's promise to pay two other attorneys a portion of the money he collected from a case that had yet to be decided was held legally binding. Roberts wrote that equity had once required a contract to specify an existing fund from which money would be paid (which could not have happened in this case), but that after Barnes this was no longer the case. Roberts wrote that "the most (the Sereboffs) can muster ... are several state cases predating Barnes and a single decision that rests .. on the simple conclusion that a contractual provision purporting to secure an equitable lien did not properly do so.."

Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission (FEC)

Tue, 17 Jan 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1581

Appellee

Federal Election Commission

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 2006

Decided

Monday, January 23, 2006

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondent)

James Bopp, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60-day period prior to an election. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL) ran a series of television advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two U.S. Senators and tell them to oppose judicial filibusters. WRTL anticipated that the ads would probably run afoul of BCRA and sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), seeking an order barring the FEC from enforcing BCRA against the ads. WRTL's suit alleged that BCRA is unconstitutional as it applies to the ads, which it claimed are "grassroots lobbying advertisements" unrelated to electoral campaigning. The FEC argued that the Supreme Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) had ruled out all "as-applied" challenges to BCRA. The U.S. District Court for D.C. agreed and denied WRTL's motion.

Question

Does McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) allow "as-applied" challenges to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's prohibitions on corporate funding of political advertisements?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wisconsin Right to Life, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 2 U.S.C. 441

Yes. The unanimous per curiam opinion reversed the District Court's judgment, allowing WRTL to proceed with its as-applied challenge. The opinion explained that the District Court had misinterpreted a footnote in McConnell that seemed to foreclose such challenges. The Justices instructed the lower court to consider the larger question of whether the BCRA is constitutional as applied to WRTL's ads.

S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection

Tue, 21 Feb 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1527

Petitioner

S.D. Warren Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Maine Board of Environmental Protection, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, October 11, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2006

Advocates

William J. Kayatta, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Jeffrey P. Minear (argued the cause for Respondent)

G. Steven Rowe (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

S.D. Warren Company (Warren) operates several hydroelectric dams in Maine. Under Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act, companies must obtain state approval of "any activity" "which may result in any discharge into the [Nation's] navigable waters." When Warren sought to renew the federal licenses for its dams, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) required that it first get approval from the Maine Board of Environmental Protection because, FERC ruled, the dams resulted in a "discharge." Warren disagreed, arguing that the water which moved through the hydroelectric dams was not actually a "discharge" because it was water from the same river which had just been temporarily re-routed. After Warren's administrative appeals and state court suit (which went to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court) failed, it appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Question

Do hydroelectric dams result in "discharge" under the meaning of Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Maine Board of Environmental Protection, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the term "discharge" in section 401 had historically been given a broad meaning by FERC, the Environmental Protection Agency, and even the Supreme Court. Justice David Souter, in the Opinion of the Court, wrote that "[w]hen it applies to water, 'discharge' commonly means a 'flowing or issuing out.' ... In fact, this understanding of the word was accepted by all Members of the Court sitting in our only other case focused on Section 401 of the Clean Water Act." The discharge from hydroelectric dams fit this definition perfectly, and Section 401 therefore mandated state approval.

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.

Wed, 11 Jan 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-944

Petitioner

Jenifer Arbaugh

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Y & H Corporation, dba The Moonlight Cafe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 16, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 2006

Advocates

Brett John Prendergast (argued the cause for Respondent)

Jeffrey A. Schwartz (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Daryl Joseffer (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Jennifer Arbaugh, a waitress at the Moonlight Cafe in Louisiana, sued her employer, the Y&H; Corporation, for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The federal district court jury ruled for Arbaugh. Filing a motion to dismiss, Y&H; claimed it did not qualify as an employer under Title VII, because it did not employ 15 or more employees for 20 or more calendar weeks during the relevant time period. The district court then reversed the jury judgment, holding that the number of employees determines a court's subject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII suit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act applied the prohibition of employment discrimination to employers with fifteen or more employees. Did this limit federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction, or did it only raise an issue going to the merits of a Title VII claim?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Arbaugh, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

The Court held that the number-of-employees requirement is an element of the merits of a Title VII claim, not a jurisdictional limitation. The 8-0 opinion (Justice Alito not participating) by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg reversed the Circuit Court, noting the "unfair[ness]" and "waste of judicial resources" that could result from a jurisdictional interpretation of the number-of- employees requirement as well as the lack of any specific jurisdictional language that would require such an interpretation. The Court relied on a "readily administrable bright line" rule that statutory limitations should be treated as non-jurisdictional unless specified as jurisdictional by Congress.

Kansas v. Marsh

Wed, 07 Dec 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1170

Petitioner

Kansas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Lee Marsh, II

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, December 7, 2005

Reargued:

Tuesday, April 25, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 26, 2006

Advocates

Phill Kline (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Rebecca E. Woodman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Michael Lee Marsh II was convicted of murdering a mother and her young daughter. During the sentencing phase of the trial, jurors found that the mitigating factors and aggravating factors were in equipoise (i.e., of equal weight). The Kansas capital punishment statute specifically provided for the imposition of the death penalty in that circumstance, so Marsh was sentenced to death. After Marsh's sentencing, however, the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Kleypas found fault with the concept of the death penalty as a "tie-breaker." The ruled in Kleypas that "fundamental fairness requires that a 'tie goes to the defendant' when life or death is at issue." The State argued that while the prosecution has the burden of proof during the trial, the burden can be shifted to the defendant during the sentencing phase, so that the defendant must show that he deserves less than a death sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed, and overturned Kansas's death penalty statute as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.

Question

(1) Does a statute that provides for the death penalty when mitigating and aggravating factors are in equipoise violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment? (2) Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review the Kansas Supreme Court's judgment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kansas, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No and Yes. By a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court and upheld the Kansas death penalty statute. The Court found that the Kansas Supreme Court's decision had necessarily rested on a federal constitutional issue, so the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The opinion by Justice Thomas drew a comparison with a similar death penalty statute in Arizona that was upheld in Walton v. Arizona. The Court decided to let the Walton precedent stand and uphold the Kansas statute as well. Even apart from the Walton precedent, however, the Court would have upheld the statute as "consistent with Eighth Amendment requirements." As long as juries are allowed to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence, states are allowed to require the death penalty when aggravating and mitigating factors are equally balanced. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented from the Court's opinion. Justice Souter wrote that various death penalty precedents suggested that the statute could not stand up to "reasoned moral judgment." He called the Kansas death penalty statute "morally absurd," "a moral irrationality," and "obtuse by any moral or social measure." Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent arguing that the Court should never have agreed to hear the case.

Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation

Mon, 03 Oct 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-631

Petitioner

Joan Wagnon, Secretary, Kansas Department of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, February 28, 2005

Argued

Monday, October 3, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, December 6, 2005

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Ian Heath Gershengorn (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, a sovereign Indian tribe, raises revenue with a tax on the gasoline sold at an on-reservation gas station. The Nation purchases the gas from non-Indian, off-reservation distributors. Kansas imposed a tax on distributors of motor fuels, which the distributors pass on to the gas stations they sell to. The Nation sued Wagnon, the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Revenue, seeking to avoid the tax. The Nation argued that the state's tax interfered with the tribe's sovereignty, and therefore was not allowed by federal law. Wagnon claimed that since the tax was on off- reservation suppliers, the Nation's sovereignty was unaffected. The District Court accepted that argument and ruled for Wagnon. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, applying the interest-balancing test prescribed by White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker. The Circuit Court found that the tribe's interests in economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government out-weighed Kansas's interest in raising revenue.

Question

When a State taxes receipt of fuel by non-tribal, off-reservation distributors, manufacturers, and importers, should the White Mountain Apache v. Bracker interest-balancing test apply if the fuel is later sold by an Indian tribe?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Wagnon, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that the White Mountain Apache v. Bracker balancing test applies only where "a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation." The Court ruled for Wagnon and upheld the tax, agreeing with the District Court that the balancing test should not apply to taxes on off-reservation distributors. Justice Thomas wrote that keeping the scope of the test narrow would maintain the traditional concept of tribal sovereignty, establish a "bright-line standard" in Indian tax-immunity, and still respect tribal authority over on-reservation activities. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justice Kennedy joined.

Maryland v. Blake

Tue, 01 Nov 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-373

Petitioner

Maryland

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Leeander Jerome Blake

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 18, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, November 1, 2005

Decided

Monday, November 14, 2005

Advocates

Kenneth W. Ravenell (argued the cause for Respondent)

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Kathryn Grill Graeff (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Following his arrest for murder, Leeander Blake invoked his right to speak with a lawyer. Before Blake's attorney arrived, however, an officer and a detective approached Blake to give him a copy of the charges against him. The statement of the charges included "DEATH" as a possible penalty, although Blake was 17 years old and therefore too young to face the death penalty. The officer said to Blake "I bet you want to talk now, huh!" The detective then said "No, he doesn't want to talk to us. He already asked for a lawyer. We cannot talk to him now." A half hour later Blake decided to speak to the police without his lawyer, and he proceeded to make incriminating statements about the murder. At trial, Blake argued that the incriminating statements were the product of an illegal interrogation, and therefore inadmissible. (Under Edwards v. Arizona, police must cease interrogating a suspect after he requests an attorney, unless the suspect waives his previous request.) A county circuit court agreed with Blake, and ruled the statement inadmissible. On appeal, Maryland argued that Blake's interaction with the officer and the detective did not constitute an interrogation, because the officer's statement was a mere rhetorical question, and in any case was quickly corrected by the detective. An intermediate state appeals court agreed and allowed the statement to be admitted as evidence. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that the detective's correction did not reduce the severity of the officer's inappropriate statement. Since the officer's statement was ruled an illegal interrogation in violation of Blake's Miranda rights, the incriminating statement could not be used as evidence at trial.

Question

When a police officer improperly communicates with a suspect after the suspect has invoked his right to an attorney, does Edwards v. Arizona permit consideration of curative measures by the police (such as the detective's quick correction of the officer's improper statement) to conclude that a suspect later initiated communication with the police?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Blake, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Unanswered. Shortly after oral argument, the Court dismissed the case. The anonymous Per Curiam opinion stated simply: "The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted."

Merrill Lynch v. Dabit

Wed, 18 Jan 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1371

Petitioner

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shadi Dabit

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, January 18, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, March 21, 2006

Advocates

Jay B. Kasner (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Petitioner)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Shadi Dabit, formerly a stockbroker at Merrill Lynch, brought a class action suit against his former employer alleging that the company had defrauded brokers by deceptively inflating stock prices, causing the brokers to hold onto stocks they would otherwise have sold. Dabit's class action was filed in the U.S. District Court based on federal diversity jurisdiction, but was based on Oklahoma state law.

In response to perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in securities litigation, Congress had passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which placed restrictions on federal securities fraud class actions. When plaintiffs began avoiding the law by bringing the suits in state courts instead of federal courts, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), which pre-empts federal class action securities fraud claims brought under state law that allege misrepresentation "in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security."

Merrill Lynch argued that Dabit's suit was pre-empted by SLUSA and therefore could not be brought under state law. Dabit countered that the suit alleged misrepresentation concerning only the holding of stocks, and therefore was beyond the scope of SLUSA. The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Merrill Lynch, finding the language of SLUSA broad enough to include suits such as Dabit's. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that suits by holders of stocks are distinct from suits by sellers and purchasers and that SLUSA was meant to pre-empt only the latter.

Question

Are class action securities fraud suits brought under state law pre-empted by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 if the suits allege that misleading statements or omissions induced brokers to hold, not sell or purchase, securities?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Merrill Lynch, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 78

Yes. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court held that "holder" class actions such as Dabit's are "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a security and therefore are pre-empted by SLUSA. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens reasoned that Congress must have been aware of the broad interpretation the Court had given that phrase when it passed SLUSA, and that a broad interpretation of SLUSA is more consistent with the law's stated purpose. "For purposes of SLUSA pre-emption, that distinction [between sellers/purchasers and holders] is irrelevant," Justice Stevens wrote.

Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corporation

Mon, 27 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-433

Petitioner

Joseph Anza, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ideal Steel Supply Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 28, 2005

Argued

Monday, March 27, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 5, 2006

Advocates

Kevin P. Roddy (argued the cause for Respondent)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Ideal Steel Supply Corporation filed a civil suit against its competitor, National Steel Supply, Inc. in federal court. Ideal alleged that National had failed to charge sales tax for cash purchases, giving it a competitive (but fraudulent) advantage. Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, "[a]ny person injured in his business or property" by racketeering activity may bring a civil suit. Ideal argued that it had been injured through lost sales because of National's illegal lower prices, and therefore had standing to sue.

The federal district court disagreed, dismissing the suit because Ideal had not had any direct encounters with National or relied on their fraudulent tax records. A Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, however, finding that a company can sue under RICO when its competitor uses racketeering to gain an advantage.

Question

Can a competitor be "injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when the competitor is not the party defrauded and did not rely on the fraudulent behavior, but claims to have lost a competitive advantage because of the fraud?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Anza, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

No. Eight members of the Supreme Court agreed that Ideal did not have standing to bring the suit because the relationship between its injuries and the fraudulent conduct of National was too remote. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a seven-member majority, wrote that "[w]hen a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries. In the instance case, the answer is no." Justice Stephen Breyer wrote separately to say that the decisive factor in this case was not just the indirectness of the injury but also the fact that legitimate business practices (the lowering of prices) had actually caused it, even though those practices were made possible by the fraud. The ninth member - Justice Clarence Thomas - wrote that while he disagreed with the other justices' concern about directness, he too would have ruled in National's favor because the case had nothing to do with organized crime, RICO's original target.

Empire HealthChoice Assurance v. McVeigh

Tue, 25 Apr 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-200

Petitioner

Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc., dba Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Denise F. McVeigh, as Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph E. McVeigh

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Friday, January 6, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, April 25, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 15, 2006

Advocates

Thomas J. Stock (argued the cause for Respondent)

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Anthony F. Shelley (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In accordance with the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA), the Office of Personnel Management has negotiated a health insurance plan for federal employees with the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association. The plan requires the administrator to make a reasonable effort to recoup amounts paid for medical care from beneficiaries if those beneficiaries receive recoveries from another source (for example, a law suit or settlement against a third party that caused injury). In New York State, the plan is administered by Empire Healthchoice Assurance (Empire).

Empire brought suit in federal district court against the estate of Joseph McVeigh, a former federal employee who was injured in an accident and eventually won a settlement with the third party allegedly responsible for his injuries. Empire sought reimbursement for the money spent on McVeigh's medical care. Denise McVeigh, the administrator of Joseph McVeigh's estate, argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case under FEHBA and that it should be heard instead by the state court. The district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Question

Under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959, are suits brought by insurers against beneficiaries to recoup medical expenses heard in federal or state court?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for McVeigh, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1331

In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that jurisdiction for this case lay in state court. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that while FEHBA stated that any claims against the United States would be heard in federal district court, it made no provisions for suits brought by insurers seeking to recoup medical expenses from private beneficiaries. Absent that specific provision, a significant conflict with an identifiable federal interest, or the need to resolve a substantial question of federal law in order to establish the insurer's right to recovery, there was no reason to depart from the ordinarily-governing state law. Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Souter and Alito dissented.

Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales

Wed, 22 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1376

Petitioner

Humberto Fernandez-Vargas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, October 31, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 22, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 2006

Advocates

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Respondent)

David M. Gossett (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Humberto Fernandez-Vargas entered the United States illegally and was deported in 1981. He illegally re-entered in 1982 and lived in the U.S. until 2001, when he married a U.S. citizen and applied to adjust his status to permanent resident. While applying, Fernandez-Vargas was arrested and eventually deported pursuant to Section 241(a)(5) (the "reinstatement statute") of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The reinstatement statute, which became effective in 1997, allows prior deportation orders to be reinstated against aliens who re-enter the country illegally, and denies those aliens any form of relief under the INA. Fernandez-Vargas petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review, arguing that Section 421(a)(5) was not intended to reinstate deportation orders that were issued prior to its enactment. The Circuit Court denied the petition. It held that Fernandez-Vargas' application for permanent resident status was a form of relief not allowd by the reinstatement statute. It also held that Congress did intend the reinstatement statute to apply to deportation orders, such as Fernandez-Vargas', that were issued before the statute went into effect. Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that this application of the law was not impermissibly retroactive, because Fernandez-Vargas had no "protectable expectation of being able to adjust his status."

Question

(1) Does the reinstatement statute of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allows a prior deportation order against an illegal alien to be reinstated, apply to aliens who re-entered the U.S. before the statute went into effect? (2) If so, is this application impermissibly retroactive?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Gonzales, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

Yes and no. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the reinstatement statute does apply to illegal aliens who re- entered the U.S. before the effective date of the statute, and that the application to such aliens was not impermissibly retroactive. The Court held that the purpose of Section 421(a)(5) was most consistent with a broad application, and "Common principles of statutory interpretation fail to unsettle the apparent application [...] to any reentrant present in the country, whatever the date of return." The majority opinion affirmed the presumption against retroactive statutes, but found the reinstatement statute permissible under a test set out in Landgraf v. USI Film Products. The main weakness in Fernandez-Vargas's argument was that his offense was not a "past act that he is helpless to undo," but rather the "continuing violation" of remaining in the country illegally.

In a lone dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens disagreed with both of the Court's conclusions. He wrote that Fernandez-Vargas "legitimately complains that the Government has changed the rules midgame."

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno

Wed, 01 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1704

Petitioner

William W. Wilkins, Tax Commissioner for the State of Ohio, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Charlotte Cuno, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Wilkins v. Cuno, No. 04-1724

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2006

Advocates

Peter Enrich (argued the cause for Respondents)

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Petitioners in No. 04-1724)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Petitioners in No. 04-1704)

Facts of the Case

As part of Ohio's economic development plan, DaimlerChrysler agreed to expand its operations in Toledo in exchange for tax exemptions and tax credits worth roughly $280 million. Charlotte Cuno and others challenged the deal, however, arguing that Ohio had violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by offering the tax incentives. A federal district court disagreed, ruling for DaimlerChrysler, but on appeal a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The panel found that the tax incentives coerced businesses to expand in Ohio at the expense of other states, and were therefore unconstitutional manipulations of interstate commerce.

Question

Did Ohio violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by giving businesses tax incentives to expand their manufacturing operations inside Ohio?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for DaimlerChrysler Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

The Supreme Court did not reach the central question presented, finding instead that Cuno and the other plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the suit. Chief Justice John Roberts, for the unanimous Court, wrote that simply alleging standing based on their status as taxpayers in Ohio and Michigan did not give them a sufficiently strong interest in the case. The citizens from Ohio could not definitively show that the tax incentives had decreased the amount of money available to the state treasury (and thus increased their tax burden or decreased the services available to them) because the point of the incentive was to increase long-term tax revenue. The citizens from Michigan, meanwhile, could not show that any tax revenue increase in Michigan that could have resulted from DaimlerChrysler expanding there instead of in Ohio would have actually benefited them directly, because it might have been used for programs that they did not benefit from. Without any clear injury, they had no standing to sue.

Hill v. McDonough

Wed, 26 Apr 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-8794

Petitioner

Clarence E. Hill

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James R. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, April 24, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, April 26, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 12, 2006

Advocates

Carolyn M. Snurkowski (argued the cause for Respondents)

Kannon K. Shanmugam (argued the cause for Respondents)

D. Todd Doss (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Clarence Hill was sentenced to death in Florida, which ordinarily uses a three-drug combination for executions. Hill claimed that this particular form of lethal injection was unnecessarily and gratuitously painful, and that it therefore violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. However, Hill had previously filed for a federal writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction, and the federal district court ruled that his new challenge was the practical equivalent of a second habeas corpus appeal. Successive habeas corpus appeals are not allowed under 28 U.S.C. 2244, and so the district court rejected Hill's petition. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Question

Is a prisoner's challenge to a particular form of execution - but not to the execution sentence itself - the practical equivalent of a federal habeas corpus petition and therefore barred if the prisoner has already sought habeas review?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hill, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that challenging the form of execution was fundamentally different from challenging the lawfulness of a conviction or sentence, the traditional purposes of a habeas corpus appeal. This finding was supported by the fact that Hill conceded other forms of execution would be constitutional, and that Florida state law does not require the particular form of execution at issue in this case. "Under these circumstances," Justice Kennedy wrote, "a grant of injunctive relief could not be seen as barring the execution of Hill's sentence."

Lab Corp. v. Metabolite

Tue, 21 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-607

Petitioner

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, dba LabCorp

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, October 31, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, March 21, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 2006

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (argued the cause for Respondents)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of United States as amicus curiae)

Jonathan S. Franklin (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In the 1980s, research scientists at University Patents, Inc. (UPI) discovered that high levels of the amino acid homocysteine in the body are correlated with dangerously low levels of two B vitamins. UPI filed for a patent, seeking to license both the method of testing for the amino acid, and the correlation of the amino acid levels with B vitamin levels. UPI's successor licensed Metabolite Laboratories, which in 1992 sub-licensed the patent to Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (LabCorp). When in 1998 LabCorp started using another company's test and stopped paying Metabolite royalties, Metabolite sued. A jury found LabCorp guilty of patent infringement and breach of contract and awarded damages to Metabolite. In an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, LabCorp argued that the patent was invalid. Natural phenomena themselves are not patentable, but new applications of them normally are. LabCorp argued that Metabolite had impermissibly patented a relationship that already existed in nature. The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, however, ruling that Metabolite could patent its discovery of the correlation and that any association of homocysteine levels with B vitamin deficiency could constitute patent infringement. LabCorp appealed its case to the Supreme Court.

Question

Is it permissible to patent a correlational relationship in a medical test result, such that a doctor necessarily infringes on the patent simply by thinking about the relationship after looking at the test result?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Metabolite, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Unanswered. By a vote of 5-3, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The decision of the Federal Circuit was left in place, as if the Supreme Court had never agreed to hear the case at all. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented from the order. The dissent argued that the Court should have taken the case in order to lend necessary clarity to an important issue in patent law. In the dissenters' view, a natural correlation between two substances in the body is a "natural phenomenon" that cannot be patented.

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England

Wed, 30 Nov 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1144

Petitioner

Kelly A. Ayotte, Attorney General of New Hampshire

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 23, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 30, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 2006

Advocates

Jennifer E. Dalven (argued the cause for Respondents)

Kelly A. Ayotte (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After New Hampshire's state legislature approved the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act but before the act went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenged the law in federal district court. They claimed that the law, which requires that parents be notified before their minor daughter has an abortion, violated the "undue burden" test laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a 1992 Supreme Court decision that reformulated the constitutional protections given to abortion in Roe v. Wade. Specifically, they argued that an exemption in the law for abortions necessary to prevent the death of the mother, but not for those abortions necessary to protect merely her health, was unconstitutionally narrow.

The federal district court agreed, rejecting the argument of New Hampshire's Attorney General that the judicial bypass procedure included in the law, in which a judge could approve an abortion without parental notification for a minor who showed she was mature enough to make the decision on her own, could be used to permit abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother. The judge also rejected New Hampshire's argument that the law could not be challenged until it had actually been implemented. A First Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously affirmed the decision.

Question

May Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenge the constitutionality of the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act in federal court before it is put into effect? Does the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act, through the judicial bypass procedure or other safeguards, adequately protect the health of minors seeking abortions?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ayotte, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a rare unanimous decision regarding abortion, the Supreme Court sidestepped the most contentious questions of the case and focused instead on the proper remedy when a portion of a statute is found unconstitutional. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that the statute would be unconstitutional when applied to the very small percentage of minors for whom an emergency abortion would be necessary to avert serious damage to their health. The lower court's decision to invalidate the entire statute based on its unconstitutional results in this small percentage of cases, however, was unnecessary. Instead, O'Connor wrote, "in this case the lower courts can issue a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting [only] the statute's unconstitutional application."

O'Connor warned, however, that a court should be wary of upholding an act while strike down some of its applications when it was obvious that a legislature would prefer the entire act be declared unconstitutional. Because of some disagreement about which course the legislature would have preferred - wholesale nullification or narrower individual rulings - the Court remanded the case to lower court to determine legislative intent.

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart

Mon, 24 Apr 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-502

Petitioner

Brigham City, Utah

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Charles W. Stuart, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Friday, January 6, 2006

Argued

Monday, April 24, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 22, 2006

Advocates

Paul J. Mcnulty (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Michael Patrick Studebaker (argued the cause for Respondents)

Jeffrey S. Gray (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Responding to a complaint about a loud party, police arrived at a house where they saw minors drinking alcohol outside and heard shouting inside. As they approached the house, they saw a fight through the window involving a juvenile and four adults, one of whom was punched hard enough to make him spit blood. The officers announced their presence, but the people fighting did not hear them so they entered the home. They arrested the men for contributing to the delinquency of a minor and other related offenses. The trial court judge, however, refused to allow the evidence collected after the police entered the home because it was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the government argued that the search was covered by the "emergency aid doctrine" because the officers were responding to seeing the man be punched. The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed, however, ruling that the doctrine only applies when there is an unconscious, semiconscious, or missing person who is feared injured or dead. The Court also gave weight to the fact that the officers acted exclusively in a law enforcement capacity, not to assist the injured man.

Question

What objectively reasonable level of concern is necessary to trigger the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Brigham City, Utah, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that police may enter a building without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an occupant is "seriously injured or threatened with such injury." Quoting from Mincey v. Arizona, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that "[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency."

Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna

Tue, 29 Nov 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1264

Petitioner

Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John Cardegna, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, June 20, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, November 29, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Advocates

F. Paul Bland, Jr. (argued the cause for Respondents)

Christopher Landau (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

John Cardegna signed a contract for a loan from Buckeye Check Cashing. The contract contained a clause in which Cardegna agreed to resolve any controversies over the loan through arbitration. Cardegna later sued Buckeye, claiming that the conditions for the loan stipulated by the contract were illegal. Buckeye filed a motion in Florida district court to have the case resolved by arbitration, as required by the contract. Cardegna countered that the contract as a whole was illegal and that the arbitration clause was therefore not enforceable. The court agreed and ruled for Cardegna.

On appeal, the state appeals court reversed, holding that the Federal Arbirtration Act, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, allows arbitration clauses to be enforced even if they are part of otherwise invalid contracts. The appeals court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court's use of Prima Paint, however, because the contract in that case had been merely voidable, while the contract in Cardegna's case was actually illegal. The Florida Supreme Court therefore reversed, ruling in favor of Cardegna.

Question

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, may a party avoid arbitration by arguing that the contract in which the arbitration clause is contained is illegal?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Buckeye Check Cashing, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 1

No. The 7-1 majority (Justice Samuel Alito not participating) ruled that challenges to the legality of a contract as a whole must be argued before the arbitrator rather than a court. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia explained that "unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance." The Court held that the Florida Supreme Court had been wrong to rely on a distinction between void and merely voidable contracts, because the word "contract" in the Federal Arbitration Act includes contracts later found to be void. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented due to his long-held view that the FAA does not apply in state courts.

League of Latin American Citizens v. Perry

Wed, 01 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-204

Petitioner

Rick Perry, Governor of Texas, et al.

Respondent

League of United Latin American Citizens, et al.

Consolidation

Travis County, Texas v. Perry, No. 05-254

Jackson v. Perry, No. 05-276

GI Forum v. Perry, No. 05-439

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, December 12, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2006

Advocates

R. Ted Cruz (argued the cause for Appellees)

Nina Perales (argued the cause for Appellants in No. 05-439)

Paul M. Smith (argued the cause for Appellants in No. 05-276)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Appellees)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, the Texas State Legislature passed a redistricting plan that replaced the one created by a federal judge following the 2000 census. Critics of the plan charged that it was unconstitutional and violated section 2 the Voting Rights Act because it diluted racial minority voting strength and was designed to maximize partisan advantage. A three-judge district court panel disagreed, finding that the plan was constitutional and that the legislature had the right to redistrict in 2003 using census data from 2000.

The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but while it was pending the Court decided Vieth v. Jubelirer, another redistricting case from Pennsylvania. Justice Anthony Kennedy, the deciding vote in that case, wrote that the Court could hear claims of partisan discrimination in redistricting cases, but left open the question of the test those claims would be subjected to.

The three-district panel in this case then affirmed its earlier decision, finding that the Texas redistricting plan was not substantively unfair.

Question

Did the Texas legislature violate the Constitution and and the Voting Rights Act when it used 2000 census data to redistrict in 2003 for partisan advantage, resulting in districts that (by 2003 numbers) did not conform to the one person, one vote standard?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for League of Latin American Citizens, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

The Supreme Court held that the Texas Legislature's redistricting plan did not violate the Constitution, but that part of the plan violated the Voting Rights Act. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a majority of the justices, stated that District 23 had been redrawn in such a way as to deny Latino voters as a group the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choosing, thereby violating the Voting Rights Act. Justice Kennedy also wrote, however, that nothing in the Constitution prevented the state from redrawing its electoral boundaries as many times as it wanted, so long as it did so at least once every ten years.

Hammon v. Indiana

Mon, 20 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-5705

Petitioner

Hershel Hammon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Indiana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, October 31, 2005

Argued

Monday, March 20, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 19, 2006

Advocates

Richard D. Friedman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Thomas M. Fisher (argued the cause for Respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Hershel Hammon was charged with domestic abuse after police responded to a call from his house. When they arrived, Hammon's wife told police that her husband had beaten her. While Mrs. Hammon did not testify at Mr. Hammon's trial, the police officer did testify about what she had told him. Mr. Hammon's attorney objected to the admission of the testimony without cross- examination, but the judge allowed it under the "excited utterance" exception to the general rule against hearsay testimony (second-hand reports of what someone said or did). The police officer was not trying to preserve evidence but merely to assess the incident, so Mrs. Hammon's statements to him were not the sort of testimony prohibited under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington.

Question

Under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in Crawford v. Washington, may statements made to police during investigation of a crime, though not made with the intent to preserve evidence, be admitted in court without allowing defendants to cross-examine the person who made the original statements?

Conclusion

Yes. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, does not apply to "non-testimonial" statements not intended to be preserved as evidence at trial. In Hammon's case, however, the Court ruled that Mrs. Hammon's statements to the police were testimonial. At the time of her questioning, Hammon faced "no emergency in progress" and "no immediate threat to her person." Instead, the relative safety of the conversation between Mrs. Hammon and the officer made it "formal enough" to qualify as a "testimonial" statement intended as evidence of the past crime. The Court left open the possibility that Hershel Hammon could have forfeited his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him by coercively preventing his wife from testifying. Otherwise, however, the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment did not allow Mrs. Hammon's testimony to be used against Mr. Hammon without her presence at the trial. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent criticizing the Court's test as unworkable. In Justice Thomas's view, Hammon's statement was not testimonial, because the conversation was not a "formalized dialogue." This case was decided along with Davis v. Washington.

Jones v. Flowers

Tue, 17 Jan 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1477

Petitioner

Gary Kent Jones

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Linda K. Flowers, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 2006

Advocates

Michael T. Kirkpatrick (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Respondents)

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, Gary Jones moved out of his house and into an apartment, while his wife continued to live in the house. Jones failed to notify the state of his new address, however, and after several years of unpaid property taxes the tax authority sent a letter by certified mail to the house notifying him that, if the taxes went unpaid, the house would be sold. The letter was returnes as "unclaimed" (because Jones was not living at the house) and the property was eventually sold to Linda Flowers, the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands.

Jones sued in state court, claiming that the sale violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because he was never actually notified of the sale. The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed, however, finding that under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dusenberg v. United States actual notice is not required as long as the state makes a reasonable effort to notify the party of his rights.

Question

When mailed notice of a tax sale or property forfeiture is returned undelivered, does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause require the government to make any additional effort to locate the owner before taking the property?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Jones, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 5-3 decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court overruled the Arkansas Supreme Court, ruling that "additional reasonable steps" are required after a mailed notice is returned undelivered. The Court noted that the Due Process Clause does not require that every property owner receive actual notice, but the government must make a sincere effort. In this case, the government knew that its first effort to notify Jones had failed. Therefore, the Court ruled that the government should have taken additional steps, such as remailing the notice or posting a notice on the house's door. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Alito took no part in the decision.

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez

Tue, 18 Apr 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-352

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Friday, January 6, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, April 18, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 26, 2006

Advocates

Jeffrey L. Fisher (argued the cause for Respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez hired Joseph Low, an attorney, to represent him in a federal criminal trial. The district court judge refused to allow Low to represent Gonzalez-Lopez, however, because the judge ruled that Low had violated a court rule in a previous case. Gonzalez-Lopez was subsequently convicted. On appeal, he argued that his Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of his own choosing had been violated and that the conviction should therefore be overturned. The Eighth Circuit agreed, holding that the trial judge had misinterpreted the court rule and that Low's conduct had been acceptable under a proper understanding of the rule. The decision to not allow him to represent Gonzalez-Lopez was therefore wrong, and resulted in a violation of Gonzalez- Lopez's Sixth Amendment rights significant enough to warrant overturning the conviction.

Question

If a trial court judge wrongly denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney of his own choosing, is the defendant automatically entitled to have his conviction overturned?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gonzalez-Lopez, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court held that a denial of the Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of one's own choosing is "structural" error. Unlike some other kinds of errors in which a defendant must also prove that the result would likely have been different had his rights not been violated, structural errors must result in automatic reversal of the conviction. "[T]he erroneous denial of counsel bears directly on the 'framework within which the trial proceeds,'" Justice Scalia wrote. "It is impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings. ... Harmless error analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe."

Beard v. Banks

Mon, 27 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1739

Petitioner

Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ronald Banks, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 14, 2005

Argued

Monday, March 27, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2006

Advocates

Jere Krakoff (argued the cause for Respondent)

Jonathan L. Marcus (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Louis J. Rovelli (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Pennsylvania houses "incorrigible, recalcitrant" prisoners in the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU). Ronald Banks was one of about 40 prisoners in level 2 of the LTSU, which is reserved for the most dangerous, worst-behaved inmates. It is the policy of the LTSU to impose severe restrictions on the privileges of level 2 inmates. In particular, level 2 prisoners are the only ones denied newspapers, magazines, and photographs. Beard, the Secretary of the PA Department of Corrections, argued that this policy was necessary to promote rehabilitation and ensure prison safety. Banks brought a suit challenging the policy as a violation of the First Amendment. On the recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court ruled in favor of Beard. On appeal, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Circuit Court found that the prison's policy failed to meet the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment rights of the prisoners took precedence, because the policy was unrelated to the goal of rehabilitation, and an ineffective method of increasing prison safety.

Question

Does a prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines, and photographs to the worst-behaved prisoners violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Beard, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-2 decision, the Court reversed the Third Circuit and upheld the prison's policy. The plurality opinion by Justice Breyer held that Banks had failed to present sufficient evidence that the prison had acted unreasonably in denying newspapers, magazines, and photographs to its most troublesome inmates. The Court found that the policy met the four-part test established in Turner v. Safley: (1) it was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of motivating good behavior; (2) though prisoners had no alternate means of exercising their rights, they could potentially graduate to the less-restrictive level 1; (3) accommodating prisoners' rights could result in negative consequences (worse behavior); and (4) there was no alternate means of accomplishing the prison's goals without restricting the prisoners' rights. Justice Thomas concurred separately in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, arguing that "This case reveals the shortcomings of the Turner framework." Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both wrote dissents. Justice Stevens called the policy "perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control," while Justice Ginsburg criticized the high evidentiary burden the plurality placed on the prisoners. Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.

Lance v. Dennis

Thu, 17 May 2012 05:06:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-555

Appellee

Dennis

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Lance

Respondent Type

Appellant

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Facts of the Case

When the Colorado legislature failed to pass a redistricting plan in 2000, the state courts created one at the request of a group of voters. The legislature succeeded in passing a redistricting plan in 2003. The state attorney general brought suit in the Colorado State Supreme Court to require the secretary of state to use the court-ordered plan, and the Colorado General Assembly defended its own plan. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the legislature's plan violated Article V of the State Constitution. A group of citizens including Keith Lance brought another suit in federal court alleging that Article V of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court, violated the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Under the Supreme Court's Rooker-Feldman doctrine, no federal court except the Supreme Court may hear appeals from state courts. The District Court held that since Lance was in privity with the General Assembly - that is, their claims were similar enough to constitute a mutual interest - Lance's suit was in effect an appeal of the General Assembly's loss in state court. Therefore, the District Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and declined to hear the case.

Question

Does the Rooker-Feldman doctrine preclude plaintiffs from bringing suit in federal court when they are in privity with a party that lost in state court?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lance, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an anonymous 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the District Court. The Court held that "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because [...] they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment." Since Lance was not a party to the state-court suit, and was in no position to appeal the Colorado Supreme Court's decision, the District Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a lone dissent expressing a desire to address the validity of the claims brought by Lance's suit.

Zedner v. United States

Tue, 18 Apr 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-5992

Petitioner

Jacob Zedner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Friday, January 6, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, April 18, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 5, 2006

Advocates

Edward Scott Zas (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Daryl Joseffer (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, a federal criminal trial must begin within 70 days of the defendant's arrest or first appearance in court. The Act includes a list of delays which do not count toward this 70-day period, and one of these acceptable delays occurs when a federal district court finds on the record that the "ends of justice" served by granting a delay outweigh the public's and defendant's interest in a speedy trial. In this case, Zedner was a defendant in a criminal trial and twice asked the district court to issue such an order. The third time he requested one, the district court judge suggested that he sign a waiver of his right to a speedy trial under the Act for all time. Zedner signed the form, and accordingly the next time he asked for a delay the judge did not make on-the-record findings exempting the 91-day delay. Four years later, Zedner filed a motion to dismiss based on the failure to comply with the Act's 70-day period that resulted from that 91-day delay. The district court rejected the motion because of the waiver, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Zedner appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the waiver he signed was invalid under the Act.

Question

(1) May a defendant waive his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974? (2) May Zedner, who had previously signed a waiver of his rights under the Act, later base an appeal on the fact that such a waiver was invalid? (3) And was the judge's failure to exempt the 91-day period on the record harmless error?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Zedner, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3161

No, yes, and no. In an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a defendant may not simply waive his right to a speedy trial under the Act. The list of acceptable reasons for an "ends-of-justice" order by the judge includes specific mention of the defendant's need for time to obtain counsel and prepare his case. If the defendant could simply waive his rights under the Act in order to meet these needs, the judge would not need to give them special consideration.

Unitherm Food Systems v. Swift Eckrich

Wed, 02 Nov 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-597

Petitioner

Unitherm Food Systems, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Swift-Eckrich, Inc., dba ConAgra Refrigerated Foods

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, February 28, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 2, 2005

Decided

Monday, January 23, 2006

Advocates

Burck Bailey (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Robert A. Schroeder (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

When ConAgra, Swift-Eckrich's parent company, attempted to enforce its patent for a process for browning precooked meats, Unitherm claimed that the patent was invalid because Unitherm's president had invented the process six years before. Unitherm sued, alleging that ConAgra had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by attempting to enforce a patent obtained by fraud. Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ConAgra moved for judgment as a matter of law, asking the Disrict Court to dismiss the case based on insufficiency of evidence. The court denied the motion and sent the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for Unitherm. ConAgra appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, again arguing that the evidence was insufficent to prove an antitrust violation. However, ConAgra did not renew the motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict, pursuant to Rule 50(b), or move for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59. Normally, parties must file the Rule 50(b) motion after an unfavorable verdict in order to obtain judgment as a matter of law on appeal. Unitherm argued that since ConAgra had failed to renew its motion under Rule 50(b), the Court of Appeals could not consider the insufficiency-of-evidence claim. ConAgra took the position that renewal of the motion is optional. The Federal Circuit considered itself bound to apply the precedent of the relevant regional Circuit Court (the Tenth), under which Rule 50(b) is indeed optional, in contrast to the precedents of the other Circuit Courts. The Federal Circuit found the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict, so it reversed the District Court and ordered a new trial. Unitherm appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the procedural dispute.

Question

May a court of appeals review the sufficiency of evidence supporting a jury's verdict if the appellant failed to renew the motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) or move for a new trial under Rule 59?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Unitherm Food Systems, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that a party must renew its motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) if the motion is to be the basis for an appeal. The District Court's denial of the initial Rule 50(a) motion could not itself form the basis of an appeal, because the denial was within the District Court's discretion. "The only error here," Justice Thomas noted, "was counsel's failure to file a postverdict motion pursuant to Rule 50(b)." Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Kennedy, arguing that in exceptional cases courts of appeals can consider substantive issues even when procedural oversights by appellants would normally preclude them.

Will v. Hallock

Mon, 28 Nov 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1332

Petitioner

Richard Will, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Susan Hallock, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, June 6, 2005

Argued

Monday, November 28, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 2006

Advocates

Allison M. Zieve (argued the cause for Respondents)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

U.S. Customs Service agents investigating a child pornography website raided Susan and Richard Hallock's residence and seized several computers. The Hallocks were cleared of any guilt, but the computers were damaged beyond repair. Susan Hallock originally sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which waives the government's sovereign immunity in certain cases. The District Court dismissed that case for lack of jurisdiction, because the FTCA's waiver has an exception for claims arising from the detention of goods by customs. Hallock then sued Will and the other customs agents as individuals. The agents made a motion for dismissal under a provision of the FTCA that bars suits where a judgment on the claim has already been entered. The District Court denied the motion, accepting Hallock's argument that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction did not constitute a final judgment. Although the trial had not yet concluded, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted the agents' appeal of the District Court's ruling on the motion and affirmed the District Court, ruling that since Hallock had not properly brought a claim in the original suit, no judgment had been entered. The Circuit Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the collateral order doctrine, under which some decisions of lower courts other than final judgments can be appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of the motion to dismiss, but instructed the parties to argue the question of the Circuit Court's authority to hear the appeal.

Question

1) If a claim under the FTCA is dismissed on the grounds that it is covered by one of the Act's exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity, is the dismissal a final judgment that bars a subsequent suit against the individual federal employees who were involved? 2) Did the Circuit Court have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to hear an appeal of the District Court's order?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Will, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1291

Unanswered, and no. In a unanimous opinion, the Court ruled that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Writing for the Court, Justice David Souter stressed the narrow scope of the doctrine. The Court reiterated that only orders that cannot be "effectively" reviewed after a final judgment can be appealed before the close of the trial. Essential to this determination is the importance of the interest at stake. In this case, the Court ruled that the agents' interest in appealing the District Court's order had no "greater importance than the typical defense of claim preclusion" and it therefore warranted "no immediate appeal of right as a collateral order."

Texaco Inc. v. Dagher

Tue, 10 Jan 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-805

Petitioner

Shell Oil Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fouad N. Dagher, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Shell Oil Co. v. Dagher, No. 04-814

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, January 10, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, February 28, 2006

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Glen D. Nager (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Joseph Michaelangelo Alioto (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1998, Texaco and Shell Oil agreed to stop competing for the U.S. oil market. The two companies formed a joint venture, Equilon Enterprises, which would manage the refining and marketing of gasoline in the western United States. The joint venture was charged with setting prices for Texaco and Shell gasoline, which would be sold under the original brand names. When Equilon set the same price for both brands, Dagher and other service station owners sued under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that Equilon was engaging in illegal price-fixing. The dispute turned on whether Equilon's actions fell under the Sherman Act's per se rule against price-fixing, under which all such instances of price-fixing by joint ventures would be illegal without regard to the specific harm caused in any particular case. The District Court granted summary judgment for Texaco, holding that the per se rule did not apply to the price-setting engaged in by Equilon. The District Judge reasoned that all enterprises, including joint ventures, must eventually set prices for their products. Therefore Equilon was merely engaged in a normal business practice, not the type of unreasonable, anticompetitive price- fixing that would run afoul of the Supreme Court's non-literal interpretation of the Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Equilon's actions constituted price-fixing under the Sherman Act's per se rule and therefore could not be legal.

Question

Does Section 1 of the Sherman Act always prohibit a lawful joint venture from setting the prices at which its goods will be sold?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Texaco Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sherman

No. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court ruled that the per se rule against price-fixing should not be applied to price-setting by joint ventures. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas held that "though Equilon's pricing policy may be price fixing in a literal sense, it is not price fixing in the antitrust sense." The Court distinguished 'horizontal' price-fixing schemes between competitors, which are per se illegal, from the "internal pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture," which are not.

Bank of China v. NBM LLC

Thu, 17 May 2012 05:06:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1559

Petitioner

Bank of China, New York Branch

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

NBM L.L.C., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, November 15, 2005

Advocates

Richard A. De Palma (Attorneys for Petitioner, Counsel of Record)

Facts of the Case

Bank of China alleged that John Chou and Sherry Liu attempted to defraud the bank by borrowing large sums of money and misrepresenting them as debts owed by the bank to various independent businesses. Bank of China alleged that those businesses, such as NBM LLC, were actually just fronts set up for Chou and Liu's scheme. In addition to criminal charges, a civil suit was commenced against Chou, Liu, NBM LLC and other involved businesses, and Patrick Young, a bank employee accused of assisting with the fraudulent transactions. A jury found the defendants guilty of various charges, including mail fraud and wire fraud in violation of the conspiracy provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and it awarded the Bank large compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, NBM argued that the District Court should have instructed the jury that in order to find a violation of RICO, they needed to determine that the Bank was justified in believing NBM's misrepresentations. In common-law fraud cases, this is known as "reasonable reliance." Bank of China argued that the RICO statute does not require a demonstration of reasonable reliance, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals accepted NBM's argument and reversed the jury verdict. The Circuit Court faulted the District Court for instructing the jury that the Bank could have been defrauded in violation of RICO even if some bank officials (such as Young) had known the true nature of the misrepresented sums. Instead, the Circuit Court said, the jury should have been instructed to determine whether Bank of China was justifiably misled by the misrepresentations.

Question

Does a plaintiff in a civil suit alleging mail fraud and wire fraud in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) need to establish "reasonable reliance"?

Conclusion

Unanswered. On November 15, 2005, before the case was argued, the Supreme Court dismissed the case without explanation under rule 46.

Holmes v. South Carolina

Wed, 22 Feb 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1327

Petitioner

Bobby Lee Holmes

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

South Carolina

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, February 22, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 1, 2006

Advocates

Donald John Zelenka (argued the cause for Respondent)

John H. Blume (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Steffen N. Johnson (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Bobby Lee Holmes was sentenced to death after he was convicted of murder and several other crimes. At trial, he was not permitted to introduce evidence suggesting that another person had committed the crimes.

Under South Carolina law, defendants "seeking to present evidence of third- party guilt must [limit the evidence] to such facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence." Evidence that merely casts a bare suspicion on another person is not admissible. Using this standard, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision not to allow the evidence.

Question

Does South Carolina's rule governing the admissibility of evidence of third- party guilt violate a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and compulsory process (the ability to compel witnesses to testify)?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Holmes, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito - his first as a Supreme Court Justice - held that evidence of third-party guilt brought by the defense could not be excluded only on the basis of the strength of the prosecution's case. Although the Constitution is not violated by the exclusion of evidence based on "certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury," the Court held that exclusion of a defendant's evidence based on the strength of the prosecution's evidence denies the defendant his constitutional right to "'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'"

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR)

Tue, 06 Dec 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1152

Petitioner

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 2, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, December 6, 2005

Decided

Monday, March 6, 2006

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

E. Joshua Rosenkranz (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds some federal funding from colleges and universities that deny U.S. military recruiters the same access to students that other employers are given. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the law, arguing that it violated the schools' First Amendment rights to expressive association by requiring them to assist in military recruitment. The district court rejected the suit, but a Third Court of Appeals panel reversed. It held that, while the schools still had the right to forfeit funds so as to avoid unwanted endorsement of military policy under the amendment, forcing the schools to make such a decision was unconstitutional. Congress could not require them to forfeit a constitutional right in order to receive federal funds.

Question

Does the Solomon Amendment, which witholds certain federal funds from colleges and universities that restrict the access of military recruiters to students, violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Rumsfeld, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 10 U.S.C. 983

No. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, held that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, not speech, and was therefore constitutional. Including military recruiters in receptions and interviews does not necessarily indicate university endorsement of the recruiters, so requiring their inclusion does not constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. This would be true even if Congress had decided to make the requirement direct, rather than making it indirect as a condition for receiving federal funds. Roberts wrote, "Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds."

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon

Wed, 29 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-10566

Petitioner

Moises Sanchez-Llamas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gene M. Johnson, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Bustillo v. Johnson, No. 05-51

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 7, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 29, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2006

Advocates

William E. Thro (argued the cause for Respondent in No. 05-51)

Mark T. Stancil (argued the cause for Petitioner in No. 04-01566, on behalf of peptitioner in No. 05-51)

Peter Gartlan (argued the cause for Petitioner in No. 04-01566)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Respondent in No. 05-51)

Mary H. Williams (argued the cause for Respondent in No. 04-10566)

Facts of the Case

Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the U.S. is a party, any person detained in a foreign country has the right to notify the consulate of his home country of his detention.

Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican national, was arrested for his role in a shootout with the police. He was given a Miranda warning, but not informed of his right under Article 36 to notify his consulate. After Sanchez-Llamas made incriminating statements to the police, he was charged with attempted murder. Sanchez-Llamas moved to dismiss the charge. He argued that he had a right under Article 36 which had been violated, and that his confession should consequently be inadmissible as evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court both affirmed, holding that the Vienna Convention does not create individual rights, but only rights of countries.

Mario Bustillo, a Honduran national, was arrested for murdering a man with a baseball bat. He was not informed that Article 36 would allow him to notify his consulate of his arrest. At trial, Bustillo's counsel brought witnesses testifying that another man had committed the crime. Nevertheless, Bustillo was convicted of first-degree murder, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. Bustillo then filed a petition for review in state habeas court. He argued for the first time that his conviction should be thrown out because his Article 36 right to notify his consulate had been violated. The state habeas court denied the petition. The court ruled that the petition was "procedurally barred" under state law because he had failed to raise the issue at trial. The Virginia Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal.

Question

(1) Does Article 36 of the Vienna Convention create individual, substantive rights? (2) Must evidence obtained after a violation of Article 36 be excluded from trial? (3) May a state refuse to consider a claim of a violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention because of a procedural bar under state law?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Oregon, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Treaty

Unanswered, and no. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Oregon Supreme Court and ruled that evidence obtained in violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention need not be excluded from trial. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts held that it would be "startling" if the Vienna Convention required suppression of evidence as a penalty for its violation, since the United States is the only country to have the "exclusionary rule" for illegaly-obtained evidence. Absent any language in the Convention requiring suppression, the Court could not impose it on states. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an Article 36 violation was not the type of evidence- related violation that normally requires the exclusionary rule. The Court declined to decide the larger issue of whether the Vienna Convention creates individual rights that are enforcable in court. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissenters would have decided that the Convention did create individual rights. Justice Breyer also thought that "suppression may sometimes provide an appropriate remedy" for Article 36 violations.

With respect to state law, the Court ruled that states are allowed to have procedural rules that require courts to deny Article 36 claims if they are not raised at the proper time. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts noted that the Convention provides that Article 36 "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State." In an adversarial system like that of the United States, the Court ruled, this means that states must be allowed to decide when claims need to be raised. The Justices also ruled that rulings of the International Court of Justice are not binding on U.S. courts. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissent took exception to the absolute language of the majority opinion, arguing that "sometimes state procedural default rules must yield" to the Convention's requirement that domestic laws give it "full effect."

Clark v. Arizona

Wed, 19 Apr 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-5966

Petitioner

Eric Michael Clark

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arizona

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, December 5, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, April 19, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 2006

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondent)

Randall M. Howe (argued the cause for Respondent)

David I. Goldberg (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Eric Clark shot and killed a police officer during a traffic stop. At trial in Arizona state court, Clark, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic who believed his town had been taken over by aliens, introduced expert evidence about his mental state. He wanted to use this evidence not only to prove that he was insane (a claim on which he bore the burden of proof) but also to show that he could not form the criminal intent that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge, however, ruled that Arizona law confined the use of the expert evidence to his insanity claim and did not permit him to use it to show he could not form the necessary criminal intent. The court ruled that he had not sufficiently proved his insanity defense, and Clark was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does a defendant have a Fourteenth Amendment due process right, separate from his insanity plea, to present expert evidence about his mental state to counter the prosecution's evidence of criminal intent?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Arizona, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a 5-to-4 decision by Justice David Souter, the Supreme Court held that Arizona could constitutionally limit the use of expert evidence about a defendant's mental state to his insanity defense. A defendant is presumed sane until he proves otherwise, but Justice Souter argued that allowing a defendant to use evidence of insanity to show that he could not form the necessary criminal intent would enable him to get around that presumption. "Clark presses no objection to Arizona's decision to require persuasion to a clear and convincing degree before the presumption of sanity and normal responsibility," Justice Souter wrote. "But if a State is to have this authority in practice as well as in theory, it must be able to deny a defendant the opportunity to displace the presumption of sanity more easily when addressing a different issue in the course of the criminal trial."

United States v. Georgia

Wed, 09 Nov 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1203

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Georgia, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Goodman v. Georgia et al., No. 04-1236

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 16, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 9, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, January 10, 2006

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioner in No. 04-1203)

Gregory A. Castanias (argued the cause for Respondents)

Gregory Andrew Castanias (argued the cause for Respondents)

Samuel R. Bagenstos (argued the cause for Petitioner in No. 04-1236)

Gene C. Schaerr (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Goodman, a paraplegic held in a Georgia state prison, sued Georgia in federal court for maintaining prison conditions that allegedly discriminated against disabled people and violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Georgia claimed the 11th Amendment provided the state immunity from such suits. The district court ruled for Georgia, but the 11th Circuit reversed.

Before the 11th Circuit ruled in the case, the United States sued Georgia, arguing that the ADA's Title II abolished state sovereign immunity from monetary suits. Congress could do this, the U.S. argued, by exercising its 14th Amendment power to enforce equal protection.

Question

Did Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 validly abrogate state sovereign immunity for suits by prisoners with disabilities challenging discrimination by state prisons? Was Title II a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to the administration of prison systems?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes and yes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that Title II abrogates sovereign immunity in cases where violations of the 8th Amendment are alleged. The 14th Amendment incorporates the 8th Amendment (that is, applies it to the states). Congress can enforce the 14th Amendment against the states "by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations" of its provisions, which can involve abrogating state sovereign immunity. However, the Court did not address the question of whether Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity when the 8th Amendment is not involved.

Day v. McDonough

Mon, 27 Feb 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1324

Petitioner

Patrick Day

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James R. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Monday, February 27, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 2006

Advocates

J. Brett Busby (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Christopher M. Kise (argued the cause for Respondent)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Patrick Day was convicted of murder in state court. After a long delay, he filed a petition for federal review, arguing that his counsel was inadequate. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within a one-year time limit. Day's petition was late, but the state of Florida failed to notice the untimeliness of the petition and instead addressed only the merits of Day's argument. Later a Federal Magistrate Judge did notice Day's failure to meet the deadline, and recommended to the District Court that the petition be dismissed. Day argued that by responding to the petition without disputing the timeliness, the state had forfeited the statute-of-limitations defense. The District Court disagreed and dismissed the petition. Day appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that the District Court had acted unfairly when it ruled against him based on an argument that the state had not made. The Circuit Court rejected Day's argument and affirmed the District Court, ruling that the state's erroneous concession of the timeliness of the petition did not prevent the court from dismissing it.

Question

May a court dismiss a federal habeas petition as untimely, even after the state concedes the timeliness of the petition and submits other arguments?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for McDonough, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court and ruled that the District Court was within its discretion when it dismissed Day's petition. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "if a judge does detect a clear computation error, no Rule, statute, or constitutional provision commands the judge to suppress that knowledge." The majority held that federal courts are not obligated to dismiss petitions for untimeliness if the state does not raise the issue, but they may as long as they give the petitioner notice and an opportunity to dispute the timeliness. Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion but dissented from the judgment. Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissent joined by Justices Thomas and Breyer.

Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi

Thu, 17 May 2012 05:06:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1095

Petitioner

Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dariush Elahi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Facts of the Case

Dariush Elahi sued in federal court claiming that the Islamic Republic of Iran had murdered his brother, and he won $300 million in damages. When Iran's Ministry of Defense won an arbitration award against a third party, Elahi sued to claim the award as part of the damages due to him. The Ministry objected, arguing that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) granted its property immunity from such claims. The District Court ruled for Elahi on the grounds that the Ministry had waived its immunity when it sued to enforce its award against the third party. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the District Court's reasoning, but it also ruled for Elahi, pointing to a provision of the FSIA that excepts from immunity the property of any "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign government if the agency is "engaged in commercial activity in the United States." The Ninth Circuit ruled that the exception covers any foreign state as long as it is "engaged in commercial activity in the United States."

Question

Is the property of a foreign state excepted from immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 if the state is "engaged in commercial activity in the United States?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1602

No. In an anonymous, unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and ruled that the exception only applies to "agenc[ies] and instrumentalit[ies]" of foreign states, not to the states themselves. The Court faulted the Ninth Circuit for ignoring this "critical" distinction. Although the Court's ruling was confined to the narrow legal question presented, the Court also hinted strongly that the Ministry of Defense of Iran should be considered an integral part of the state of Iran, not an "agency or instrumentality" of the state. The Ninth Circuit's judgment was reversed and the case was sent back for further consideration consistent with the Court's opinion.

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.

Tue, 08 Nov 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1140

Petitioner

Gerald T. Martin, et ux.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Franklin Capital Corporation, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 25, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, November 8, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, December 7, 2005

Advocates

Jan T. Chilton (argued the cause for Respondents)

Samuel H. Heldman (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. The Court ruled that the state court did not act unreasonably when it determined that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations were credible. Although there might have been some evidence that could be interpreted as undermining the prosecutor's credibility, the trial court was in a better position to determine those facts. The Court faulted the Ninth Circuit for substituting "its own debatable interpretation of the record" for the trial courts findings, and for "misapplying settled rules that limit [the Circuit Court's] role and authority."

Question

What standard should federal courts use when determining whether to award attorney's fees after an improperly removed case is remanded to state court?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Franklin Capital Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1447

In a unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court ruled that "absent unusual circumstances, attorney's fees should not be awarded when the removing party has an objectively reasonable basis for removal." The Court admitted that Section 1447 is unclear on when attorney's fees should be added. The Court's reading of the statute detected no strong textual bias for or against awarding fees. Considering the likely motives of Congress, the Court ruled that attorney's fees should only be awarded when a party sought removal without an objectively reasonable basis. Since Franklin had such a basis, Martin was not entitled to any fees.

Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche

Tue, 11 Oct 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-712

Petitioner

Lincoln Property Company, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Christophe Roche, et ux.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, February 28, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, November 29, 2005

Advocates

Gregory P. Joseph (argued the cause for Respondents)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Christophe and Juanita Roche leased an apartment in Virginia managed by Lincoln Property Company. The Roches sued Lincoln, which they identified as a Texas company, and other defendants in state court, alleging a variety of problems that arose from their exposure to toxic mold in their apartment. Lincoln moved the litigation to a federal district court, citing diversity of citizenship, which arises when opposing parties are from different states. The Roches then asked that the case be sent back to state court because there was no diversity of citizenship. Rather, one of the partners in the Lincoln-owned subsidiary partnership resided in Virgina. The court denied the motion and held that Lincoln was a Texas citizen. The Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Lincoln failed to show complete diversity of citizenship, because it did not disprove the exsistence of an affiliated Virginia entity that was a real party in interest.

Question

Could defendants remove an action on the basis of diversity of citizenship if there was complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and all named defendants, and no defendant was a citizen of the forum state?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lincoln Property Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1441

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Lincoln did not need to negate the existence of a potential defendant whose presence in the action would destroy diversity. To remove the suit to federal court, Lincoln only needed to show complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and all named defendants.

Samson v. California

Wed, 22 Feb 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-9728

Petitioner

Donald Curtis Samson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, February 22, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 19, 2006

Advocates

Jonathan L. Marcus (argued the cause for Respondent)

Ronald E. Niver (argued the cause for Respondent)

Robert A. Long, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A police officer stopped and searched Samson on the street in San Bruno, California. The officer had no warrant and later admitted he had stopped Samson only because he knew him to be on parole. The officer found that Samson was in possession of methamphetamines. Samson was arrested and charged with drug possession in state court. At trial Samson argued the drugs were inadmissible as evidence, because the search had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion and the state supreme court declined to hear the case.

Question

Did the Fourth Amendment prohibit police from conducting a warrantless search of a person who was subject to a parole search condition, where there was no suspicion of criminal wrongdoing and the sole reason for the search was because the person was on parole?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for California, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Samson "did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate." Parole allows convicted criminals out of prison before their sentence is completed. An inmate who chooses to complete his sentence outside of direct physical custody, however, remains in the Department of Correction's legal custody until the conclusion of his sentence, and therefore has significantly reduced privacy rights. In this case, Samson had also been required, as a condition of his parole, to sign an agreement that he would be "subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer..., with or without a search warrant and with or without cause." This written consent to suspicionless searches, along with his already reduced privacy interests as a parolee, combined to make the search constitutional. Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer dissented, arguing that parolees have an expectation of privacy greater than that of prisoners, which was violated by the search at issue in this case.

Dixon v. United States

Tue, 25 Apr 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-7053

Petitioner

Keshia Cherie Ashford Dixon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Friday, January 13, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, April 25, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 2006

Advocates

J. Craig Jett (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Keshia Dixon was arrested for illegally purchasing firearms. At her trial, Dixon raised a duress defense, claiming that her boyfriend abused her and that she feared he would harm or kill her or her daughters if she did not buy the firearms. Upon being convicted, Dixon appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that she should not bear the evidentiary burden of proving her duress claim. The Circuit Court rejected Dixon's argument, noting that the circuit's previous cases had clearly established that the duress defense requires the defendant to prove duress by a preponderance of evidence. This ruling conflicted with a ruling on a similar case in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Dixon appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the narrow question of the burden of proof.

Question

When a defendant raises a duress defense, is the burden of proof on the defendant to prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence, or on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that duress is not applicable?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

The burden of proof is on the defendant. In a 7-to-2 decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that the government meets its evidentiary burden when it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted "knowingly" and "willfully." Dixon had argued that duress would make it impossible for a defendant to act "willfully" (and that the government therefore had to prove she did not act under duress in order to prove she acted willfully). The Court rejected that argument, however, because under Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, acting "willfully" means simply that a defendant "acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful."

eBay v. MercExchange

Wed, 29 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-130

Petitioner

eBay Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

MercExchange, L.L.C.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 28, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 29, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2006

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (argued the cause for Respondent)

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

MercExchange patented a design for an online marketplace in which a single company provides the trustworthy framework within which buyers and sellers can negotiate for goods. After negotiations with eBay and Half.com to license the patent failed, MercExchange brought suit in federal district court alleging patent violation under the Patent Act. The jury sided with MercExchange, ruling that its patent had been violated, but the district court judge refused to issue a permanent injunction. The injunction would have forced eBay and Half.com to stop using the contested framework, but the judge applied the traditional four-part test to determine whether an injunction was necessary and found that it was not. That decision was reversed, however, by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which applied a "general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringements absent exceptional circumstances."

Question

Under the Patent Act, should a permanent injunction always be issued when a patent has been violated, absent exceptional circumstances?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for eBay, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 1

No. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the appeals court's general rule was an unwarranted departure from the traditional four-part test applied to determine whether an injunction is necessary. That test requires the plaintiff to prove (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that the law does not provide other adequate ways to compensate it; (3) that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, an injunction is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be harmed by a permanent injunction. The Court found no reason to make decisions on injunctions under the Patent Act different from other decisions on injunctions, and so the appeals court's general rule was rejected and the decision reversed.

Garcetti v. Ceballos

Wed, 12 Oct 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-473

Petitioner

Gil Garcetti, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Richard Ceballos

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, February 28, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, October 12, 2005

Reargued:

Tuesday, March 21, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, May 30, 2006

Advocates

Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer (argued the cause for Respondent)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Cindy S. Lee (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Richard Ceballos, an employee of the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, found that a sheriff misrepresented facts in a search warrant affidavit. Ceballos notified the attorneys prosecuting the case stemming from that arrest and all agreed that the affidavit was questionable, but the D.A.'s office refused to dismiss the case. Ceballos then told the defense he believed the affidavit contained false statements, and defense counsel subpoenaed him to testify. Seeking damages in federal district court, Ceballos alleged that D.A.s in the office retaliated against him for his cooperation with the defense, which he argued was protected by the First Amendment. The district court ruled that the district attorneys were protected by qualified immunity, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled for Ceballos, holding that qualified immunity was not available to the defendants because Ceballos had been engaged in speech that addressed matters of public concern and was thus protected by the First Amendment.

Question

Should a public employee's purely job-related speech, expressed strictly pursuant to the duties of employment, be protected by the First Amendment simply because it touched on a matter of public concern, or must the speech also be engaged in "as a citizen?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Garcetti, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that speech by a public official is only protected if it is engaged in as a private citizen, not if it is expressed as part of the official's public duties. Ceballos's employers were justified in taking action against him based on his testimony and cooperation with the defense, therefore, because it happened as part of his official duties. "The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write," Justice Kennedy wrote, "does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance." Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.

Lockhart v. United States

Wed, 02 Nov 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-881

Petitioner

James Lockhart

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 25, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 2, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, December 7, 2005

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (argued the cause for Respondents)

Brian Wolfman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 2002 the U.S. began withholding a portion of Lockhart's Social Security payments to offset his debt on federally reinsured student loans that were more than 10 years overdue. Lockhart sued, arguing the offset was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations of the Debt Collection Act (1982). The district court dismissed Lockhart's suit, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Could the United States offset Social Security benefits to collect a student loan debt that had been outstanding for over 10 years?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 31 U.S.C. 3716

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Debt Collection Improvement Act made Social Security benefits subject to offset and that the Higher Education Technical Amendments removed the 10-year limit that would otherwise bar the offset.

Woodford v. Ngo

Wed, 22 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-416

Petitioner

Jeanne S. Woodford, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Viet Mike Ngo

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 14, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 22, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 2006

Advocates

Jennifer G. Perkell (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Meir Feder (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), prisoners must exhaust any available administrative remedies for resolving disputes within the prison system before they can bring suit in federal court. Viet Mike Ngo filed a grievance with the California prison system, but it was dismissed because he had waited too long to file it. He then brought suit in federal district court. California objected, arguing that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and that the fact those remedies were no longer available to him because of his delay in filing was immaterial. The district court agreed, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that all of Ngo's administrative remedies were "exhausted" because they were no longer available to him.

Question

Does a prisoner satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995's requirement that he exhaust all administrative remedies available to him before bringing suit in federal court by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance which is rejected?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Woodford, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1997

No. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner must properly exhaust any available administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court. This understanding of the PLRA's exhaustion provision mirrors that of the traditional exhaustion provision in administrative law and is "substantively similar" to that of habeas corpus law. An alternative ruling, Justice Alito wrote, would allow prisoners to circumvent the obvious purpose of the act (channeling initial appeals through the administrative system rather than the courts) by simply waiting until their administrative appeals were no longer timely.

Northern Insurance Company of New York v. Chatham County, GA

Wed, 01 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1618

Petitioner

Northern Insurance Company of New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chatham County, Georgia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, October 11, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, April 25, 2006

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (argued the cause for Petitioner)

R. Jonathan Hart (argued the cause for Respondent)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

James Ludwig's yacht was damaged when it collided with a drawbridge. Ludwig's insurance company, Northern, sued Chatham County to recover its costs. The county claimed that it was immune from civil suits due to its sovereign immunity under common law. The District Court agreed and ruled for the county. The court held that the county had sovereign immunity as a local government exercising power delegated by the state. Under Supreme Court precedent, sovereign immunity does not apply to local governments, but only to states and "arms of the state." Although the county did not qualify as an arm of the state under those precedents, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. The Circuit Court held that common law nevertheless guaranteed the county a "residual immunity."

Question

May a county claim sovereign immunity under common law, even if the county is not acting as an "arm of the state"?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Northern Insurance Company of New York, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled that Chatham County was not entitled to immunity from suit. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas held that since the county was not acting as an "arm of the state," it could not claim 11th Amendment immunity. The Court also refused to recognize a less expansive form of "residual" immunity for counties under common law.

Domino's Pizza v. McDonald

Tue, 06 Dec 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-593

Petitioner

Domino's Pizza, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John McDonald

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, April 25, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, December 6, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 2006

Advocates

Maureen E. Mahoney (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Allen Lichtenstein (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

John McDonald was the president and sole shareholder of JWM Investments. After Domino's terminated its contract with JWM, McDonald brought suit under a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. Section 1981). McDonald claimed that Domino's had ended its contract because he was black, and that he therefore had a right to sue under the Civil Rights Act, which gives all citizens, regardless of race, the right to make and enforce contracts. Domino's moved to dismiss the case, arguing that McDonald had not been a party to the contract (it had been between Domino's and JWM) and therefore did not have standing to sue. The district court sided with Domino's, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that McDonald had suffered injuries separate from those of JWM and therefore had standing to sue.

Question

May a person who is not a party to a contract but suffers personal injuries from its termination sue under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, claiming that the contract was terminated because of race?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Domino's Pizza, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1981)

No. The Court ruled in a unanimous decision (Justice Alito not participating) that only an actual or would-be party to a contract may sue under Section 1981. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, explained that if Section 1981 were not limited to the party to the contract, it "would become a strange remedial provision designed to fight racial animus in all of its noxious forms, but only if the animus and the hurt it produced were somehow connected to somebody's contract. We have never read the statute in this unbounded--or rather, peculiarly bounded--way."

Davis v. Washington

Mon, 20 Mar 2006 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-5224

Petitioner

Adrian Martell Davis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Washington

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, October 31, 2005

Argued

Monday, March 20, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 19, 2006

Advocates

Jeffrey L. Fisher (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Respondent)

James M. Whisman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Davis was arrested after Michelle McCottry called 911 and told the operator that he had beaten her with his fists and then left. At trial, McCottry did not testify, but the 911 call was offered as evidence of the connection between Davis and McCottry's injuries. Davis objected, arguing that presenting the recording without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine McCottry violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the call was not "testimonial" and was therefore different from the statements at issue in Crawford.

Question

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Washington, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Confront and Cross-Examine, Compulsory Process

Yes. In a 9-0 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, does not apply to "non-testimonial" statements not intended to be preserved as evidence at trial. Although McCottry identified her attacker to the 911 operator, she provided the information intending to help the police resolve an "ongoing emergency," not to testify to a past crime. The Court reasoned that under the circumstances, McCottry was not acting as a "witness," and the 911 transcript was not "testimony." Therefore, the Sixth Amendment did not require her to appear at trial and be cross- examined. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that though McCottry's statements were not testimonial, the Court should not "guess" at the primary motive behind the statements. This case was decided with Hammon v. Indiana.