Cases - 2004 term

American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n

Tue, 26 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1230

Petitioner

American Trucking Associations, Inc. and USF Holland, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan Public Service Commission, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 03-1234

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 14, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, April 26, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Henry J. Boynton (argued the cause for Respondents)

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondents)

James H. Hanson (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1234)

Robert Digges, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1230)

Facts of the Case

Michigan law required every truck engaged in intrastate commercial hauling to pay a flat $100 annual fee. Interstate trucking companies asked Michigan courts to invalidate the fee, claiming the flat fee discriminated against interstate carriers and imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate trade (in violation of the "dormant" commerce clause). They pointed to the fact that trucks carrying both interstate and intrastate loads engaged in intrastate business less than trucks that only haul within Michigan. State courts refused to invalidate the fee.

Question

Did a Michigan law requiring every truck engaged in intrastate commercial hauling to pay a fee violate burden interstate trade in violation of the dormant commerce clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Michigan's fee did not violate the dormant commerce clause because the fee was imposed only on intrastate transactions and did not facially discriminate against interstate or out-of-state activities or enterprises. The dormant commerce clause did not, Breyer wrote, ban such a "neutral" and "locally focused fee."

Brown v. Payton

Wed, 10 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1039

Petitioner

Jill L. Brown, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

William Charles Payton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 133 (2005)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, November 10, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Advocates

Andrea N. Cortina (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Dean R. Gits (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.

Question

Was the 9th Circuit correct to rule the California Supreme Court objectively unreasonable in holding that California's "catch-all" mitigation instruction in capital cases is constitutional as applied to post-crime evidence in mitigation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Brown, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the California Supreme Court was not unreasonable to decline to distinguish between pre-crime and postcrime mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court reasonably read the relevant precedent, Boyde v. California (1990), as establishing that the catch-all factor's text was broad enough to accommodate Payton's post-crime religious conversion.

Cutter v. Wilkinson

Mon, 21 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9877

Petitioner

Jon B. Cutter, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reginald Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 709 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 21, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondent United States, supporting petitioners)

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Respondent Wilkinson)

David A. Goldberger (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a "compelling government interest." Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their "nonmainstream" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws "respecting an establishment of religion"). The district court rejected that argument and ruled for the inmates. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Did a federal law prohibiting government from burdening prisoners' religious exercise violate the First Amendment's establishment clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cutter, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 2000

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, on its face, RLUIPA made an accommodation allowed by the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the law was an effort to alleviate the "government-created burden" on religious exercise that prisoners faced. Nor did section three discriminate between mainstream and non-mainstream religions. The Court did point out that constitutional problems could arise if RLUIPA were enforced improperly and religious prisoners received favored treatment, or if religious exercise and security concerns were not properly balanced.

San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco

Mon, 28 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-340

Petitioner

San Remo Hotel, L.P., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 28, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Paul F. Utrecht (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $567,000 conversion fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state-court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred litigants from suing in federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court (the rule of "issue preclusion"). The hoteliers asked the district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause.

Question

Should federal courts make an exception to the full faith and credit statute for Fifth Amendment takings clause claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for San Francisco, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 9-0 judgment delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court refused to create an exception to the full faith and credit statute in order to provide a federal forum for litigants seeking to advance federal takings claims. The Court rejected the argument that whenever plaintiffs reserved their federal takings claims in state court, federal courts should review the reserved federal claims, regardless of the issues decided by the state court. Moreover, federal courts were not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can sue in federal court.

Granholm v. Heald

Tue, 07 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1116

Petitioner

Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of Michigan, et al.

Respondent

Edward D. Kelly, Chairman, New York Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, State Liquor Authority, et al.

Consolidation

Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Association v. Eleanor Heald et al., No. 03-1120

Juanita Swedenburg, et al. v. Edward D. Kelly, Chairman, New York Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, State Liquor Authority, et al., No. 03-1274

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 460 (2005)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 16, 2005

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1116 & 03-1120)

Clint Bolick (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1274)

Kathleen M. Sullivan (argued the cause for Respondents in 03-1116 & 03-1120)

Caitlin J. Halligan (argued the cause for Respondents in 03-1274)

Facts of the Case

Michigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In separate cases groups sued the states and argued the laws violated the U.S. Constitution's "dormant" commerce clause. The dormant commerce clause prohibited states from passing laws affecting interstate commerce, particularly laws favoring in-state business over out-of-state business. The states argued the laws were valid exercises of state power under the 21st Amendment, which ended federal Prohibition and allowed states to regulate alcohol importation. A federal district court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Michigan law violated the dormant commerce clause and did not advance the core concerns of the 21st Amendment (such as temperance). A separate federal district court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the 21st Amendment allowed New York's law.

Question

Does a state law that allows in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so, violate the dormant commerce clause in light of the 21st Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Heald, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that both states' laws violated the commerce clause by favoring in-state wineries at the expense of out-of-state wineries and did so without the authorization of the 21st Amendment. State authority to engage in such economic discrimination was not the purpose the 21st Amendment. Moreover, in modern cases, that amendment did not save state laws violating other provisions of the Constitution.

Brosseau v. Haugen

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 07:58:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1261

Petitioner

Brosseau

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Haugen

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 194 (2004)

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Facts of the Case

Brosseau, a police officer in Washington state, shot Haugen in the back as he tried to flee in his vehicle from the police. Haugen sued Brosseau in federal district court, alleging Brosseau used excessive force in shooting him and violated his constitutional rights. The district court ruled for Brosseau, finding she was entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit reversed.

Question

Was a police officer who shot a fleeing suspect entitled to qualified immunity?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Brosseau, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In an 8-1 per curiam decision, the Court held that Brosseau was entitled to qualified immunity because the Court's previous cases did not clearly establish that shooting the fleeing Hogan would have violated his constitutional rights.

Kowalski v. Tesmer

Mon, 04 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-407

Petitioner

John F. Kowalski, Judge, 26th Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John C. Tesmer, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 125 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, January 20, 2004

Argued

Monday, October 4, 2004

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (argued the cause for Petitioners)

David A. Moran (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A 1994 amendment to the Michigan constitution said criminal defendants who pled guilty had no right to appeal and could appeal only with the permission of a state appellate court. Michigan then enacted a law that said in most cases judges could not appoint appellate lawyers for indigent defendants who pled guilty. Two criminal attorneys and three indigent defendants who were denied appointed appellate lawyers filed a single suit alleging the state law violated the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The district court ruled that the indigents had standing to sue and that the lawyers who sued with them had the right to sue as third-party representatives of the rights of indigents. A federal appellate court agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but based this only on the lawyers' claims. The court said the U.S. Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris required it to abstain from hearing the indigents' claims because the indigents were involved in related proceedings in state court.

Question

(1) Does the 14th Amendment guarantee an indigent criminal defendant convicted by a guilty plea the right to an appointed appellate attorney in a discretionary first appeal? (2) Do attorneys have third-party standing on behalf of potential indigent defendants to make a constitutional challenge to a state statute prohibiting appointment of appellate counsel in discretionary first appeals following convictions by guilty pleas?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kowalski, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the attorneys lacked third-party standing to sue on behalf of the Michigan indigent defendants. The attorneys did not have close relationships with the indigent defendants, nor was there a hindrance to these defendants' ability to advance their own constitutional rights against the Michigan scheme. In addition, under Younger, the indigents should have only turned to the federal courts after pursuing their claims in state court.

Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States

Wed, 27 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-368

Petitioner

Arthur Andersen LLP

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 696 (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, April 27, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Advocates

Maureen E. Mahoney (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

As Enron's financial difficulties became public in 2001, Arthur Andersen instructed its employees to destroy Enron-related documents. This was consistent with Andersen's document retention policy. The government later charged Andersen for violating federal law, which made it a crime to "knowingly...corruptly persuade another person" to "withold" or "alter" documents in an "offical proceeding." The federal jury found Andersen guilty. The company appealed, arguing the jury instructions failed to convey the elements of a "corrupt persuasion" conviction - specifically, that a "consciousness of wrongdoing" was required. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.

Question

Did the jury instructions in the Arthur Andersen trial properly convey the elements of a "corrupt persuasion" conviction under federal document-handling law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Arthur Andersen LLP, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1512

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the jury instructions failed to convey that the federal document law required a "consciousness of wrongdoing" for conviction. There was nothing inherently corrupt in ordering employees to destroy documents, even if the aim was to keep the documents from the government. Thus, contrary to what the jurors had been told, Andersen could be convicted only if the persuaders were shown to be conscious that they were behaving corruptly.

Orff v. United States

Wed, 23 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1566

Petitioner

Francis A. Orff, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (argued the cause for Respondent United States)

Stuart L. Somach (argued the cause for Respondent Westlands Water District)

William M. Smiland (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Westlands Water District received water from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under a 1963 contract. In 1993 Westlands sued the district for reducing their water supply. California farmers who had bought water from Westlands also sued the bureau, intervening as plaintiffs. After negotiations Westlands agreed to dismiss their suit. But the farmers refused to drop theirs, accusing the bureau of breach of contract. The farmers claimed that as third-party beneficiaries they could enforce the contract and that the United States had waived its sovereing immunity from such suits in the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. That act allowed parties "to join the United States as a necessary party defendant in any suit" over rights under a federal reclamation contract. The district court held that the farmers were not contracting parties or third-party beneficiaries and thus could not invoke the waiver. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision.

Question

Did the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 waive the United States' sovereign immunity from breach of contract suits?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 43 U.S.C. 390

In this case, no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the act merely permitted parties to join the United States in an action between other parties when the action required interpretation of a contract and joining the U.S. was necessary. The farmers suit was not an attempt to join the U.S. as a necessary party defendant.

Alaska v. United States

Mon, 10 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

128 ORIG

Plaintiff

Alaska

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

United States

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 6, 2005

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the defendant)

Jonathan S. Franklin (Argued the cause for the plaintiff)

Facts of the Case

Alaska and the United States disputed ownership of two areas of submerged lands - enclaves under the Alexander Archipelago, which are more than three miles from the coast of Alaska or any island, and lands beneath the inland waters of Glacier Bay. Alaska claimed the archipelago waters under the Submerged Lands Act, which entitled states to submerged lands three miles seaward of their coastline and to land beneath inland navigable waters. The dispute over the submerged lands under Glacier Bay centered on the United States' claim that, at the time Alaska gained statehood, those lands were intended for a national monument. A Special Master appointed to deal with the conflict, recommended to the U.S. Supreme Court that the Court side with the United States with respect to both areas. Alaska appealed that decision.

Question

Do specific submerged lands underlying the Alexander Archipelago and Glacier Bay belong to Alaska or the federal government?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Submerged Lands Acts

In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court unanimously concluded that the Alexander Archipelago waters were not inland waters and thus belonged to the federal government. The Court reasoned that the archipelago waters were neither historic inland waters nor inland waters under the juridical bay theory (the theory would work only if the islands formed a peninsula from the mainland that divided the archipelago's waters in two). Kennedy also delivered the Court's 6-3 opinion holding that the underlying waters of Glacier Bay National Park belong to the federal government. The majority wrote that, at the time Alaska gained statehood, the government intended those lands to be part of a national monument.

On January 23, 2006, the Court issued its final decree. On the issues of Alexander Archipelago and Glacier Bay, the Court declared: "judgment is granted to the United States, and the State of Alaska shall take nothing." Alaska's additional motion for judgment on the submerged lands within the Tongass National Forest was dismissed as moot (meaning "previously settled"), because the federal government had already disclaimed any interest in the lands. The newly appointed Chief Justice John Roberts took no part in the case.

Clark v. Martinez

Wed, 13 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-878

Petitioner

A. Neil Clark, Field Office Director, Seattle, Washington, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sergio Martinez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Daniel Benitez v. Michael Rozos, Field Office Director, Miami, No. 03-7434

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 371 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 1, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for United States)

John S. Mills (argued the cause for Benitez)

Christine S. Dahl (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The federal government deemed Daniel Benitez and Sergio Martinez inadmissible immigrants and detained them until they could be returned to Cuba.

Benitez and Martinez argued that because deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, they could not be detained longer than the 90 days allowed by federal law. They pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis that said the government can detain beyond 90 days immigrants who were admitted to the United States, but only so long as necessary to deport them. Immigrants must be released if deportation is unforeseeable, the Court said.

While separate district courts agreed deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, the Ninth Circuit and 11th Circuits disagreed over whether Zadvydas applied to inadmissible immigrants.

The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the two cases.

Question

In Zadvydas v. Davis (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court said admitted immigrants could be detained for deportation for more than 90 days, but no longer than reasonably necessary. Did this ruling apply to inadmissible aliens, such as Benitez and Martinez?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Martinez, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 8 U.S.C. 1231

Yes. In a 7-2 decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court said the requirement that immigrants be detained no longer than reasonably necessary for deportation applied to both admissible and inadmissible immigrants. Because readmission to Cuba was unforeseeable, the detentions of Martinez and Benitez were unreasonable. The Court refused to give the same immigration statute different interpretations based on immigrants' characteristics.

Van Orden v. Perry

Wed, 02 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Texas State Capitol

1100 Congress Avenue Austin TX 78701

Austin, TX 78701

United States

30° 16' 21.882" N, 97° 44' 28.0752" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1500

Petitioner

Thomas Van Orden

Respondent

Rick Perry, in his Official Capacity as Governor of Texas and Chairman, State Preservation Board, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. 677 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Erwin Chemerinsky (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondents, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting respondents)

Greg Abbott (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion.

Question

Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Perry, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A

Tue, 22 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-163

Petitioner

Linda Lingle, Governor of Hawaii, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 528 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

Mark J. Bennett (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Craig E. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Hawaii enacted a limit on the rent oil companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service stations. The rent cap was a response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on gasoline prices. Chevron, one of the state's largest oil companies, argued in federal district court that the the cap was an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court held that the cap amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it did not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling gas prices. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), where the Court declared that government regulation of private property is "a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests." The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a regulation amount to an unconstitutional taking "if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests?"

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lingle, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous opinion that the Court needed to "correct course" and make clear that the "substantially advances" formula put forth in Agins was inappropriate for determining whether a regulation amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking. Takings clause challenges to regulations had to be based on the severity of the burden that the regulation imposed upon property rights, not the effectivness of the regulation in furthering the governmental interest. The Court insisted that its ruling did not "disturb any of its prior holdings."

Castle Rock v. Gonzales

Mon, 21 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-278

Petitioner

Town of Castle Rock, Colorado

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jessica Gonzales, Individually and as Next Best Friend of Her Deceased Minor Children, Rebecca Gonzales, Katheryn Gonzales, and Leslie Gonzales

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, November 1, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 21, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

John C. Eastman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

John P. Elwood (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Brian J. Reichel (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Jessica Gonzales requested a restraining order against her estranged husband. A state trial court issued the order, which prohibited the husband from seeing Gonzales or their three daughters except during pre-arranged visits. A month later, Gonzales's husband abducted the three children. Gonzales repeatedly urged the police to search for and arrest her husband, but the police told her to wait until later that evening and see if her husband brought the children back. During the night Gonzales's husband murdered all three children and then opened fire inside a police station, where police returned fire and killed him. Gonzales brought a complaint in federal District Court, alleging that the Castle Rock police had violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by willfully or negligently refusing to enforce her restraining order. The Due Process Clause states: "No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that no principle of substantive or procedural due process allowed Gonzales to sue a local government for its failure to enforce a restraining order. On appeal, however, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had a legitimate procedural due process claim. A rehearing by the full appeals court agreed, ruling that Gonzales had a "protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining order," which the police had violated.

Question

Can the holder of a restraining order bring a procedural due process claim against a local government for its failure to actively enforce the order and protect the holder from violence?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Castle Rock, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that Gonzales had no constitutionally- protected property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order, and therefore could not claim that the police had violated her right to due process. In order to have a "property interest" in a benefit as abstract as enforcement of a restraining order, the Court ruled, Gonzales would have needed a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the benefit. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia found that state law did not entitle the holder of a restraining order to any specific mandatory action by the police. Instead, restraining orders only provide grounds for arresting the subject of the order. The specific action to be taken is up to the discretion of the police. The Court stated that "This is not the sort of 'entitlement' out of which a property interest is created." The Court concluded that since "Colorado has not created such an entitlement," Gonzales had no property interest and the Due Process Clause was therefore inapplicable. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented.

Internal Revenue Commissioner v. Banks

Mon, 01 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-892

Petitioner

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sigitas J. Banaitis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sigitas J. Banaitis, No. 03-907

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 426 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 29, 2004

Argued

Monday, November 1, 2004

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2005

Advocates

James R. Carty (argued the cause for Respondent Banks)

David B. Salmons (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Philip N. Jones (argued the cause for Respondent Banaitis)

Facts of the Case

Sigitas Banaitis and John Banks separately argued to the U.S. Tax Court that contingency fees paid to lawyers could be deducted from taxable gross income. The court disagreed and ruled for the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS said Banaitis and Banks owed taxes on contingency fees. Banaitis appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that under Oregon law contingency fees could not be taxed as income. Banks appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled contingency fees were never taxable income. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated Banaitis' and Banks' cases.

Question

Does a taxpayer's gross income from litigation proceeds include contingency fees paid to lawyers?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Internal Revenue Commissioner, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. In a unanimous, 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that if a litigant's recovery constituted income, the litigant's income included the contingency fee paid to his or her lawyer. The Court held that an economic gain assigned in advance to another party - as in a contingency-fee agreement - could not be excluded from gross income.

McCreary County v. ACLU

Wed, 02 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1693

Petitioner

McCreary County, Kentucky, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Mathew D. Staver (argued the cause for Petitioners)

David A. Friedman (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause.

Question

Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" 2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for ACLU, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses."

Florida v. Nixon

Tue, 02 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-931

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joe Elton Nixon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 175 (2004)

Granted

Monday, March 1, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 2004

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Advocates

Edward H. Tillinghast (argued the cause for Respondents)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

George S. Lemieux (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Florida court convicted Joe Elton Nixon of murder and sentenced him to death. During the trial Nixon's lawyer told the jury Nixon was guilty. Nixon appealed and argued he received ineffective counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Nixon said he did not agree to the lawyer's strategy. After several appeals the Florida Supreme Court granted Nixon a new trial. The court said Nixon's lawyer's comments were essentially a guilty plea and that because Nixon did not explicitly agree to the strategy, the lawyer was "per se ineffective."

Question

1.) Is a defense lawyer's use of a strategy that concedes the defendant's guilt ineffective assistance of counsel if the strategy was pursued without the explicit approval of the defendant? 2.) Should counsel be held to a standard that considers whether counsel's statements were deficient and prejudicial to the defendant, or should counsel be considered ineffective per se?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Florida, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In a unanimous 8-0 decision, the Court ruled that Nixon's lawyer's strategy - pursued without Nixon's express approval - did not automatically qualify the lawyer as ineffective. The Court reversed the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court, faulting that court for inappropriately applying presumptions of prejudice and deficient performance. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "When counsel informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant's best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel's strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant's explicit consent." Nixon's lawyer would have needed Nixon's consent for a formal guilty plea, but the Court ruled that the tactic of effectively conceding guilt in order to concentrate on the sentencing phase of the trial was legitimate as long as the defendant was informed of the strategy. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the decision of the case.

Graham County Water District v. United States

Wed, 20 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-169

Petitioner

Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, ex rel. Karen T. Wilson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, April 20, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Christopher G. Browning, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Mark T. Hurt (argued the cause for Respondent)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The False Claims Act (FCA) allows the government or an individual on the government's behalf to sue any person for "making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States." A 1986 amendment to the FCA allows individuas to sue their employer if the employer retaliates against them in any way for assisting in an investigation of such false claims. In 2001, Karen Wilson, a secretary for Graham County Water District, sued her employer for various false claims it allegedly made concerning a federal disaster relief program. She also brought a retaliation suit against her employer, alleging that after she had provided information on the false claims to federal officials in December 1995, she had been repeatedly harassed by Graham County District officials until she resigned in March 1997. The District Court dismissed Wilson's suit as untimely. The court accepted Graham County District's argument that the six-year statute of limitations in the 1986 amendment to the FCA was not intended to apply to retaliation suits. Therefore, the court held, the most closely analogous state limitation applies instead. The north Carolina limit for retaliation suits was three years, so Wilson's suit was brought too late. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and applied the six-year limitation to all retaliation suits under the FCA.

Question

Does the six-year statute of limitations in the False Claims Act apply to suits brought by individuals who were retaliated against by their employers for assisting an investigation of false or fraudulent claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Graham County Water District, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal False Claims

No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that the six-year statute of limitations did not apply to suits for retaliation. The majority opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas found the statute of limitations "ambiguous." The ambiguity arose from the fact that the six-year limitation in the FCA starts from the time the false claim was made. Yet in a retaliation suit, no actual false claim needs to be alleged. The plaintiff only has to allege that her employer retaliated against her in connection with a federal investigation. The Court found that the ambiguity could be resolved by interpreting the statute of limitations to apply only to suits for false claims, not to retaliation suits. The Court left to the lower courts the question of which state statute of limitations should apply in place of the six-year limitation. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. The dissent characterized the statute of limitations as "unusual" but "reasonably clear," and argued that it should be read to apply to retaliation actions.

Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering

Mon, 18 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-603

Petitioner

Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Darue Engineering & Manufacturing

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 18, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Eric H. Zagrans (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Respondent)

Michael C. Walton (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The IRS seized property owned by Grable and gave Grable notice by certified mail before selling the property to Darue. Grable sued in state court, claiming Darue's title was invalid because federal law required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by personal service, not certified mail. Darue removed the case to federal disctrict court, arguing that the case presented a federal question because Grable's claim depended on an interpretation of federal tax law. The district court agreed and ruled for Darue. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision.

Question

Did a case involving the interpretation of federal tax law belong in federal court and not the state court where it was filed?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Darue Engineering, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that the case involved a federal question and could thus be removed to federal court. Federal-questions jurisdiction, the Court reasoned, lay over some state-law claims that implicated significant federal issues. In this case, the national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation warranted moving the case to federal court.

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams

Wed, 19 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1601

Petitioner

City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mark J. Abrams

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 113 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Advocates

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Rancho Palos Verdes, a city in California, gave Mark Abrams a permit to construct an antenna on his property for amateur use. But when the city learned Abrams used the antenna for commercial purposes, the city forced Abrams to stop until he got a commercial use permit. Abrams applied and the city refused to give him the permit. Abrams then sued in federal district court, alleging the city violated his rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Abrams sought damages under a federal liability law that allowed people to sue for damages for federal rights violations.

The district court agreed with Abrams and ordered the city to give Abrams the permit. But the court refused Abrams' request for damages under the separate federal liability law. The court said Congress intended for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act to include only remedies specifically found in that act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that because the act did not contain a "comprehensive remedial scheme," Abrams could seek damages under other federal laws.

Question

May people whose rights guaranteed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are violated seek remedies other than those allowed by the act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Abrams could not enforce the limitations of the Telecommunications Act on local authorities through federal liability law, because the act provides its own judicial remedy. Congress could not have meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by the Telecommunications Act to co-exist with an alternative remedy.

Leocal v. Ashcroft

Tue, 12 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-583

Petitioner

Josue Leocal

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 1 (2004)

Granted

Monday, February 23, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, November 9, 2004

Advocates

Joseph S. Sollers, III (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A Florida court convicted Vietnam citizen Duan Le for driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged in federal immigration court that Le should be deported. The INS argued Le committed a crime of violence that was an aggravated felony under federal immigration laws - a deportable crime. The immigration court and an appellate immigration court ruled Le could be deported. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.

Question

Is a conviction of driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury a "crime of violence" under federal immigration law that allows the person to be deported as an aggravated felon?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Leocal, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets, National Firearms, Organized Crime Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or Gun Control Acts, except for RICO (q.v.) portion

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Chief Justice William Rhenquist, the Court held that state DUI offenses, except when involving purposeful intent, are accidental and not crimes of violence under federal law. Le therefore did not commit an aggravated felony for which he could be deported.

Rompilla v. Beard

Tue, 18 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5462

Petitioner

Ronald Rompilla

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Amy Zapp (argued the cause for Respondent)

Billy H. Nolas (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Pennsylvania court convicted Ronald Rompilla of murder. During the sentencing phase, the prosecution presented to the jury Rompilla's previous rape and assault conviction, as an aggravating factor to justify the death sentence. The jury sentenced Rompilla to death and the state supreme court affirmed. Rompilla's new lawyers filed an additional appeal, arguing that Rompilla's trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence about his various personal problems. The state courts found that Rompilla's counsel had sufficiently investigated mitigation possibilities. After Rompilla filed a federal habeas petition, a district court reversed the sentence and ruled the state supreme court had unreasonably applied the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington. Had the state court followed that case, the district court ruled, the court would have found Rompilla's trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate obvious signs of Rompilla's troubled childhood, mental illness and alcoholism. The Third Circuit reversed.

Question

Did the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel require counsel to try to obtain material counsel had known the prosecution would probably use at the trial's sentencing phase?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Rompilla, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Rompilla's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make reasonable efforts to examine the file on Rompilla's prior conviction for rape and assault. Moreover, counsel had known the prosecution would probably present the prior conviction to the jury during sentencing. In that file counsel would have found mitigating evidence about Rompilla's troubled childhood and mental health.

National Cable and Telecomm. Assn v. Brand X Internet Services

Tue, 29 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-277

Petitioner

National Cable & Telecommunications Association, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brand X Internet Services, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Federal Communications Commission and United States v. Brand X Internet Services et al., No. 04-281

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 3, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Paul T. Cappuccio (argued the cause for Petitioners in 04-277)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Petitioners in 04-281)

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, which was amended in 1996, subjected providers of "telecommunications service" to mandatory common- carrier regulation. The FCC concluded that this did not include broadband cable companies. The Ninth Circuit reversed and cited its own previous opinion that had held that cable modem service was a "telecommunications service."

Question

Did the FCC lawfully interpret the Communications Act of 1934 by deciding that broadband cable companies did not provide a "telecommunications service?"

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for National Cable and Telecomm. Assn, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Communication Act of 1934

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the FCC lawfully construed the Communications Act to not define cable broadband providers as "telecommunications services." The Court held that the Ninth Circuit should have followed the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. That decision required federal courts to defer to an agency's construction of a statute, if that statute was within the agency's jurisdiction to administer and the agency's interpretation was reasonable, even if it differed from the court's own interpretation. In this case, the Court held that the FCC's construction was reasonable.

Rousey v. Jacoway

Wed, 01 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1407

Petitioner

Richard Gerald Rousey, et ux.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jill R. Jacoway

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 320 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 7, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 2004

Decided

Monday, April 4, 2005

Advocates

Pamela S. Karlan (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Colli C. McKiever (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Richard and Betty Rousey filed bankruptcy and claimed their two Individual Retirement Accounts were exempt from the bankruptcy. Federal law exempted the following from bankruptcy: "a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract." The exemption had to be "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonable necessary for the support of the debtor...." The Rouseys said an IRA was a "similar plan or contract." The bankruptcy court and a bankruptcy appellate panel ruled an IRA not a "similar plan or contract." The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even if IRAs are "similar plans or contracts," the Rouseys' account withdrawals would not be "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service." The Eighth Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other circuits.

Question

Are individual retirement accounts (IRAs) exempt from bankruptcy estates?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Rousey, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

Yes. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Rouseys could exempt IRA assets from their bankruptcy estate. IRAs met both federal requirements dealing with exemptions from bankruptcy: They were "similar plans or contracts" to the exemptions enumerated and they "conferred a right to receive payment on account of age."

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC

Mon, 10 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-388

Petitioner

Dennis Bates, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dow Agrosciences LLC

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 431 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, January 10, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, April 27, 2005

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (argued the cause for Respondent, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A group of peanut farmers in Texas threatened to sue Dow Agrosciences in state court for damages caused by one of Dow's herbicides. The farmers alleged Dow violated Texas labeling requirements. Dow asked a federal district court to rule the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted and therefore prohibited the farmers' state law claims. The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled FIFRA expressly prohibited additional state labeling requirements such as Texas'.

Question

Does the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempt farmers' state tort claims alleging that Dow's herbicide damaged crops?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Bates, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the peanut farmers could sue Dow in state court. The Court reasoned that FIFRA preempts only state-law "requirements for labeling or packaging." The peanut farmers' defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of warranty claims were based on common-law and did not necessarily require that Dow label or package products in a particular way. The farmers' fraud and negligent-failure to warn claims, by contrast, were based on common-law rules that qualified as "requirements for labeling or packaging." However, FIFRA preempted only state-law labeling requirements" that were "in addition to or different from" FIFRA's labeling standards. The Court sent back to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals the question whether Texas law governing fraud and failure-to-warn claims was parallel to FIFRA.

Devenpeck v. Alford

Mon, 08 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-710

Petitioner

Gerald Devenpeck, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jerome Anthony Alford

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 146 (2004)

Granted

Monday, April 19, 2004

Argued

Monday, November 8, 2004

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Advocates

James B. Comey (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Randolph Stuart Phillips (argued the cause for Respondent)

Maureen A. Hart (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Tony Alford was driving when Washington state police, concerned Alford was impersonating a police officer, pulled him over. During a search of Alford's car, police found a tape recorder recording the traffic stop. The police arrested Alford and said he had made an illegal recording of a private conversation - a violation, they said, of the state's Privacy Act. A state court judge dismissed charges against Alford, ruling - as another state court already had - that the Privacy Act did not apply to public police work.

Alford then sued the officers in federal district court, alleging his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for the officers.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the officers violated Alford's Fourth Amendment rights. The facts and law were so clearly established that no reasonable officer could believe Alford violated the Privacy Act. Therefore the officers lacked probable cause for the arrest and were not protected by qualified immunity. The court rejected the officers' argument that the arrest was constitutional because there was probable cause Alford committed the crime of impersonating a police officer. That was not the reason police gave during the arrest. The Ninth Circuit said there was only one instance when an arrest for a reason the police did not articulate was constitutional: if that reason was closely related to the stated reason for the arrest. Impersonating a police officer was not closely related to violating the state Privacy Act. Other circuit courts disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's "closely related offense doctrine."

Question

(1) Does an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment when a police officer has probable cause to make an arrest for one offense, if that offense is not closely related to the offense articulated by the officer at the time of the arrest? (2) For the purposes of qualified immunity, was "closely related offense doctrine" clearly established given that different circuit courts disagreed on its application?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Devenpeck, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that police had probable cause to arrest Alford for impersonating a police officer, despite the fact that this was not closely related to the offense police identified during the arrest. A warrantless arrest by a police officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if, given the facts known to the officer, there is probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed. The offense establishing probable cause need not be closely related to the offense the arresting officer identifies at the time of arrest. An arresting officer's state of mind, except for facts he knows, is irrelevant to probable cause.

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma & Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation v. Leavitt

Tue, 09 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1472

Petitioner

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, No. 03-853

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 631 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 22, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 1, 2005

Advocates

Lloyd B. Miller (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) allows tribes to administer health care programs previously run by the federal government. Tribes can opt to do this by entering into contracts with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is obligated to fund tribe-run health services as if they were still federally run. The Secretary must also fund "contract support costs" associated with carrying out the contract. However, ISDA requires the federal government to fund contract support costs only to the extent money is available. ISDA also does not require the federal government to reduce funding for some tribe programs to make funds available for other tribes. In two separate cases tribes claimed the federal government under-funded contract support costs. The Secretary argued the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act made it clear the government lacked the funds to pay the full contract support costs. In one case a federal appellate court ruled that the federal government did not adequately fund contract support costs and that funds were available. In another case a federal appellate court ruled for the federal government.

Question

Did the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to pay "contract support costs," even if the government contends funds were not available?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma & Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 450

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the government was legally bound to pay the contract support costs. Only in a "special" instance could the government break its promise to pay the costs. In this case, the government had access to sufficient unrestricted funds appropriated by Congress. Moreover, nothing in the act's language suggested it was non-binding.

Illinois v. Caballes

Wed, 10 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-923

Petitioner

Illinois

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Roy I. Caballes

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 405 (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 5, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, November 10, 2004

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2005

Advocates

Ralph E. Meczyk (argued the cause for Respondent)

Lisa Madigan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Christopher A. Wray (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

During a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable facts to support its use, "unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation."

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure clause require a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a canine sniff during a routine traffic stop?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Illinois, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the Court's 7-2 opinion that Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The Constitution did not require police to have reasonable suspicion to use a drug-detection dog on a car during a legal traffic stop. No legitimate privacy was at risk, the Court argued, because the dog only alerted to an illegal drug.

Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education

Tue, 30 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1672

Petitioner

Roderick Jackson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Birmingham Board of Education

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 167 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 14, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Advocates

Kenneth L. Thomas (argued the cause for Respondent)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Roderick Jackson, a high school basketball coach, claimed he was fired for complaining that the girls' basketball team he coached was denied equal treatment by the school. Jackson sued the Birmingham Board of Education in federal court, claiming his firing violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Title IX bans sex discrimination in federally-funded schools. Jackson claimed Title IX gave him the right to sue - a "private right of action" - because he suffered for reporting sex discrimination against others, despite the fact the he did not suffer from sex discrimination. The federal district court and appellate court ruled against Jackson.

Question

Does Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 allow suits for retaliation for complaints about unlawful sex discrimination?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Jackson, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Education Amendments of 1972

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Title IX allowed suits alleging retaliation for reporting sex discrimination. Such retaliation, the majority reasoned, constituted intentional discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. Jackson therefore had the right under Title IX to pursue his claim in court.

Wilkinson v. Dotson

Mon, 06 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-287

Petitioner

Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

William Dwight Dotson, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 74 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 22, 2004

Argued

Monday, December 6, 2004

Decided

Monday, March 7, 2005

Advocates

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Alan Edward Untereiner (argued the cause for Respondent Dotson)

John Q. Lewis (argued the cause for Respondent Johnson)

Facts of the Case

Ohio state prisoners Rogerico Johnson and William Dwight Dotson separately alleged their parole proceedings violated due process. Each sued the Ohio prison system under a section of the U.S. Code - section 1983 - which allows prisoners to challenge conditions of confinement. The district courts dismissed the prisoners' claims. The courts ruled their claims challenging parole decisions actually challenged their sentences and that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey (1994) barred prisoners from using section 1983 to do this. The prisoners could make their claims only under the section of the U.S. Code that allows prisoners to petition for habeas corpus. A federal appellate court reversed the district courts' decisions.

Question

(1) May a prisoner bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that his parole proceedings violate due process, even though success on the merits of the claim would result only in a new parole hearing and would not necessarily guarantee earlier release from prison? (2) Does a federal court judgment ordering a new parole hearing "necessarily imply the invalidity of" the decision at the previous parole hearing and therefore challenge the sentence itself?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Dotson, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

Yes and No. In an 8-1 decision, the Court affirmed the appellate court and ruled that prisoners could use Section 1983 to challenge a state's parole procedures. The majority opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that though prisoners cannot use Section 1983 to directly challenge their sentences, they can bring suit under the Section when a successful suit "would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner." Though a successful constitutional challenge to Ohio's parole procedures might make it more likely that the prisoners would be released from prison sooner, the Court called the connection "too tenuous" for the prisoners' suit to be considered a challenge of the sentences themselves. The Court ruled that since the prisoners sought only new parole hearings, not reduced sentences, a favorable ruling would not necessarily imply the invalidity of their sentences. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a lone dissent arguing that challenges to parole proceedings can only be brought by a petition for habeas corpus.

Howell v. Mississippi

Mon, 29 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9560

Petitioner

Marlon Latodd Howell, aka Marlon Cox

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mississippi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 440 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, November 29, 2004

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2005

Advocates

Ronnie M. Mitchell (argued the cause for Petitioner)

James M. Hood, III (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Mississippi court convicted Marlon Howell of capital murder - murder committed during a felony - and sentenced him to death. Howell appealed and argued the trial court was wrong to deny the jury the option of finding Howell guilty of the lesser offenses of non-capital murder or manslaughter, for which the death penalty would not have been an option. The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled against Howell and said there was no evidence to support lesser charges.

Question

1.) In death penalty cases can a state court refuse to give a jury the option of finding a defendant guilty of at least one lesser offense if it is recognized by state law and supported by evidence? 2.) Was Howell's federal constitutional claim properly raised before the Mississippi Supreme Court?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mississippi, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1257

In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the case because Howell had not first raised his federal constitutional claims in state court.

Wilkinson v. Austin

Wed, 30 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-495

Petitioner

Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Charles E. Austin, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Deanne E. Maynard (argued the cause for Petitioners)

James M. Petro (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Jules Lobel (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

When Ohio's highest security prison first opened, no official policy governed placement there, resulting in haphazard and erroneous placements. Ohio ultimately issued the "New Policy," which required formal procedures for evaluating whether prisoners classified for placement into the facility. The New Policy also required a three-tier review process after a recommendation for Supermax placement was made. For instance, the state had to explain a placement recommendation to an inmate and that inmate had to have an opportunity for rebuttal at a hearing. Prisoners in the facility sued in federal district court, alleging the prison placement policy violated the 14th Amendment's due process clause. The court agreed that the New Policy violated due process and ordered elaborate and far-reaching modifications to the policy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but set aside the substantive modifications on the ground they exceeded the court's authority.

Question

Did the placement policies for Ohio's highest security prison violate the 14th Amendment's due process clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wilkinson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the procedures by which the New Policy classified prisoners for placement at the facility provided sufficient protection to comply with the due process clause. The Court reasoned that procedural protections afforded to prisoners were necessarily limited, and that the New Policy sufficiently minimized risk of erroneous placement. The Court also cited Ohio's interests in prison security against gangs and in preserving scarce resources.

San Diego v. Roe

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 07:58:43 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1669

Petitioner

City of San Diego, California

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John Roe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 77 (2004)

Decided

Monday, December 6, 2004

Facts of the Case

John Roe, a San Diego police officer, was fired for selling a video on eBay that showed him stripping off a police uniform and masturbating. He then sued the city in federal district court and alleged his firing violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court ruled against the officer; the Ninth Circuit reversed.

Question

San Diego fired John Roe from the city police force after he made and sold online a video showing him engaging in sexually explicit acts. Did this violate John Roe's First Amendment right to free speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for San Diego, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that firing Roe for his behavior and "speech" did not violate the First Amendment. Government employers, the Court wrote, could restrict their employees' speech in ways that would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public. But government employees had the right to speak on matters of public concern, such as on government policies of interest to the public. In this case, however, Roe's activities did not inform the public about the police department and were also detrimental to the force.

Miller-El v. Dretke

Mon, 06 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9659

Petitioner

Thomas Joe Miller-El

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, December 6, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Gena A. Bunn (argued the cause for Respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Miller-El alleged the prosecution in his capital murder trial violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause by excluding 10 of 11 blacks from the jury. The jury convicted Miller-El and he was sentenced to death. State courts rejected Miller-El's appeals and ruled Miller-El failed to meet the requirements for proving jury-selection discrimination outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky(1986). Miller-El then appealed to a federal district court. The district court rejected Miller-El's appeal and ruled the court must defer to the state courts' acceptance of prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking potential jurors. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and ruled a federal court could only grant an appeal if the applicant made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

Miller-El appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and in Miller-El v. Cockrell(2003) the Court ruled the Fifth Circuit should have accepted Miller- El's appeal to review the district court's ruling. The Supreme Court said an appeal should have been granted if the petitioner could demonstrate reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court's decision. The Court said the district court did not give full consideration to the substantial evidence Miller-El presented. The Fifth Circuit reconsidered Miller-El's appeal and ruled Miller-El failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the state court was wrong to find no purposeful discrimination.

Question

Did the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, by rejecting Miller-El's claim the prosecution purposefully excluded blacks from his jury, violate the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003)? 2. Did the Texas jury selection manual encourage unconstitutional disparate questioning based on race?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Miller-El, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that Miller-El deserved to win his appeal because the jury selection in his case violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The Court began by noting that the prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 91 percent of the eligible black prospective jurors, "a disparity unlikely to have been produced by happenstance." After comparing two eliminated black prospective jurors with similar white jurors who were not eliminated, the Court concluded that the "selection process was replete with evidence that prosecutors were selecting and rejecting potential jurors because of race." The Court further concluded that Texas' jury selection manual, both in this case and generally, tended to allow prosecutors to read disparate questions to prospective jurors depending on whether they were black or white.

Tory v. Cochran

Tue, 22 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1488

Petitioner

Ulysses Tory, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 734 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Advocates

Erwin Chemerinsky (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Jonathan B. Cole (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Johnnie Cochran sued his former client Ulysses Tory in a California court for making defaming statements. Tory had tried to force Cochran to pay him money in exchange for desisting, Cochran argued. A judge agreed and ordered Tory to never talk about Cochran again. Tory appealed unsuccessfully in state court, arguing the order violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Cochran died one week after oral argument.

Question

Did a judge's order that someone stop making defaming statements about a public figure, even after that figure's death, violate the First Amendment right to free speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Tory, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Cochran's death diminished the grounds for the judge's order and that the order therefore amounted to an overly broad prior restraint on speech. Tory could no longer try to force Cochran to pay him in exchange for desisting, the Court reasoned, ending the order's underlying justification.

Dodd v. United States

Tue, 22 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5286

Petitioner

Michael Donald Dodd

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, November 29, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Janice L. Bergmann (argued the cause for Petitioner)

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Dodd was convicted under federal law for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On April 4, 2001 he filed a motion that the conviction should be set aside because it was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1999 in Richardson v. U.S. In that case, the Court held that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The district court rejected Dodd's motion, because it was filed more than a year after the Court decided Richardson. Under federal law, the one-year limitation period in which a prisoner may file a motion to change his sentence, begins "on the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." The 11th Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is the start date for a federal prisoner's one-year limitation period the date on which the Court "initially recongized" the right asserted in an applicant's motion, or the date on which the right is "made retroactive?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the text of the federal law "unequivocally" stated that the one-year limitation period begins to run on the date on which the Court "initially recongized" the right, not the date on which that right was made retroactive. O'Connor wrote that Dodd's reliance on the statute's second clause was misplaced, because that clause merely limited the subsection's applicability to cases where applicants assert rights both "newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made applicable to cases on collateral reviiew." Thus, the date the right was asserted does not apply at all unless the second clause's conditions are met. The Court noted that this would make it difficult for applicants filing second or successive motions to obtain relief, since the Court rarely announces a new rule and makes it retroactive within a year.

Johnson v. California

Mon, 18 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-6964

Petitioner

Jay Shawn Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 18, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Stephen B. Bedrick (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Seth K. Schalit (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

NonJay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a "strong likelihood" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show "strong likelihood" that the challenges were race- based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder.

Johnson appealed and argued that the "strong likelihood" standard in Wheeler was at odds with the 'reasonable inference" standard the U.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the same. The U.S. Supreme Court at first dismissed Johnson's appeal because the case was not finalized (see Johnson v. California 2004, No. 03-6539). After another round of appeals, however, the Court agreed to decide the case.

Question

In order to establish a prima facie case under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), must the objector show that it is more likely than not that the other party's peremptory challenges were based on impermissible group bias?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Johnson, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the California Supreme Court and ruled that California's standard for objections to peremptory challenges was incompatible with the standard set forth in Batson. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens explained that the Court had not intended that the objector would have to prove that a peremptory challenge was "more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination." The Court ruled that in the first step of the Batson procedure, the objector only needs to "produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred." The objector ultimately has to prove that the peremptory challenge was motivated by purposeful racial discrimination, but not until the third step of the Batson procedure, after the State has offered "permissible race-neutral justifications" for the challenges. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that California's standard was within the procedural leeway provided to States by Batson.

Gonzalez v. Crosby

Mon, 25 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-6432

Petitioner

Aurelio O. Gonzalez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James V. Crosby, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 14, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 25, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Christopher M. Kise (argued the cause for Respondent)

Patricia A. Millett (argued the cause for Respondent)

Paul M. Rashkind (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In Artuz v. Bennett (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court held that state petitions for postconviction relief could toll the federal statute of limitations even if those petitions were ultimately dismissed as procedurally barred. Gonzalez, whose federal habeas petition had been dismissed as time barred, filed a new petition (a Rule 60[b] petition) in light of the Artuz ruling. The district court denied Gonzalez's new motion. The 11th Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that Gonzalez's latest motion amounted to a second or succcessive habeas petition which could not be filed without precertification by the court of appeals.

Question

Did Gonzalez's Rule 60(b) motion constitute a second or successive habeas petition?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Crosby, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Gonzalez's Rule 60(b) motion challenged only the district court's previous ruling on the federal statute of limitations. That motion was therefore not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition and could be ruled on by the district court without the 11th Circuit's precertification.

Halbert v. Michigan

Mon, 25 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-10198

Petitioner

Antonio Dwayne Halbert

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 25, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

David A. Moran (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Bernard E. Restuccia (argued the cause for Respondent)

Gene C. Schaerr (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Halbert pleaded no contest in a Michigan court to two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The day after Halbert's sentence was imposed, Halbert moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and told Halbert the property remedy for his complaint was the state appellate court. Michigan required a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea to apply for leave of appeal to the state appellate court. Halbert asked the trial court twice to appoint counsel to help him with his application. The trial court refused. Without counsel, Halbert still applied for leave to appeal, which the court of appeals denied. The state supreme court also denied Halbert's application for leave to appeal to that court.

Question

Did the due process and equal protection clauses require the appointment of counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas, who sought access to a Michigan appellate court?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Halbert, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses required Michigan to provide counsel for defendants who wanted to appeal to the state appellate court. The Court reasoned that if indigent defendants convicted on their pleas did not have counsel to guide them through Michigan's complex appellate process, their right to appeal would not be meaningful.

United States v. Booker

Mon, 04 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-104

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Freddie J. Booker

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

United States v. Ducan Fanfan, No. 04-105

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 220 (2005)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

T. Christopher Kelly (argued the cause for Respondent Booker)

Rosemary Curran Scapicchio (argued the cause for Respondent Fanfan)

Facts of the Case

In Blakely v. Washington (2004) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase a sentence beyond the standard range.

Following U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge.

In another case, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188-235 months in prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases.

Question

1.) Does an enhanced sentence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on the judge's determination of a fact violate the Sixth Amendment? 2.) If so, are the Sentencing Guidelines altogether unconstitutional?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Booker, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines, where they allow judges to enhance sentences using facts not reviewed by juries, violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The sentences of Booker and Fanfan, based partly on facts determined only by judges, were therefore unconstitutional. In a separate 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court said the guidelines would now be advisory and invalidated the provisions that made them mandatory.

Whitfield v. U.S.

Tue, 30 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1293

Petitioner

David Whitfield

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Haywood Eudon Hall, aka Don Hall v. United States, No. 03-1294

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 209 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 21, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, January 11, 2005

Advocates

Jonathan L. Marcus (argued the cause for Respondent)

Sharon C. Samek (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Federal district courts convicted David Whitfield and Haywood Hall of conspiracy to commit money laundering. They appealed and argued the federal money laundering law required the jury to have found proof of an "overt act" furthering the conspiracy. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that the law lacked any language requiring proof of an overt act. Other federal appeals courts had ruled the law did require an overt act.

Question

Did a conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), require proof of an overt act furthering the conspiracy?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for U.S., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1956

No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous ruling that because the federal money laundering law's text did not expressly make committing an overt act an element of the conspiracy offense, the government did not need to prove such an act.

Bell v. Cone

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 07:58:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-394

Petitioner

Bell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cone

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 447 (2005)

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2005

Facts of the Case

In 1984 a Tennessee court sentenced Cone to death for murder. The jury had found four aggravating circumstances, one of which was that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Cone's state appeals were unsuccessful. A federal district court then rejected Cone's habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Bell v. Cone (2002). On remand, the Sixth Circuit again reversed Cone's sentence on the ground that the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator was unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth Amendment.

Question

A Tennessee law made it an aggravating circumstance during sentencing if a murder had been "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Did the state supreme court interpret that sufficiently narrowly, so that it did not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bell, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Tennessee Supreme Court had in several previous cases narrowly interpreted the "especially heinous" aggravator. The state supreme court had thus made what may have been facially unconstitutional constitutional. Moreover, the court did not need to explicitly narrow the statute once more in its Cone opinion. The Court chastised the Sixth Circuit for presuming "so lightly that a state court failed to apply its own law" and rearticulated the principle that federal law demanded a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings."

Tenet v. Doe

Tue, 11 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1395

Petitioner

George J. Tenet, Individually, Porter J. Goss, Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John Doe, et ux.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 1 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

David J. Burman (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Jane and John Doe said they performed espionage activities abroad for the United States. The Does sued the CIA in federal district court for not paying financial support allegedly promised to the Does and for allegedly violating the Does' due process rights. The CIA argued the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Totten v. U.S. (1875) prohibited the district court from hearing the case. In Totten the Court dismissed a spy's claim against the government for damages for breach of contract. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Totten did not prevent the district court from hearing the Does' case. The courts reasoned that the Does' case, unlike Totten's, was mainly about the denial of due process rights. The Ninth Circuit said the CIA could prohibit the district court from hearing the Does' case only if the CIA could show that state secrets would be in jeopardy were the case to proceed. The Ninth Circuit sent the case back to the district court for that court to determine the CIA's potential state secrets claim.

Question

Does Totten v. U.S. prevent a district court from considering Jane and John Does' due process and tort claims that the CIA refused to keep its alleged promise to provide them with life-time financial assistance in exchange for their alleged espionage services to the CIA?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Tenet, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 9-0 decision delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Totten barred the Does' suit. Totten, the Court ruled, prohibited judicial review in any case where success depended on the existence of a secret espionage relationship with the government. To risk revealing that relationship would endanger the essence of a spy's contract with the government - secrecy.

Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Tue, 07 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-184

Petitioner

Estate of Burton W. Kanter, Deceased, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Estate of Burton W. Kanter, Deceased, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 03-1034

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 40 (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 26, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 2004

Decided

Monday, March 7, 2005

Advocates

Stephen M. Shapiro (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under federal law, the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges to hear certain cases and to make recommendations to the Tax Court. The Tax Court judge, under Tax Rule 183(b), had to presume the special judge's fact findings to be correct, but could make the ultimate decision in the case. The special trail judge reports were made public and included in the record on appeal. Only after a rule revision in 1983 did the Tax Court stop making such reports public and exclude them from the appellate record. Whether the final Tax Court's decision deviated from the special judge's recommendations was kept secret. Tax Court Judge Howard Dawson ruled that Kanter was guilty of tax fraud and of illegally diverting money to Claude Ballard, a business associate. In his opinion, Dawson claimed to have adopted the opinion of the special trial judge. Ballard and Kanter separately appealed, objecting to the absence of the special trial judge's report from the appellate record. Two federal appellate courts ruled against Kanter and Ballard.

Question

Could the Tax Court exclude from the record on appeal Rule 183(b) reports submitted by special trial judges?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ballard, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that no statute authorized, and Rule 183's text did not warrant, the concealment of the special report. Rule 183 did not allow the "novel practice" of treating the trial judge's opinion as an "in-house draft to be worked over collaboratively by the regular Tax Court judge and the special trial judge." The rules allowed only one trial judge opinion to be issued and before a separate Tax Court ruling, Ginsburg wrote. It would be impossible for a Tax Court judge to give deference to an opinion he himself collaborated in producing. Moreover, the Tax Court's refusal to disclose the trial judge's original report did not allow fully informed appellate review of the court's decision.

Roper v. Simmons

Wed, 13 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Meramec River Fenton, MO

United States

38° 30' 47.1924" N, 90° 26' 9.4308" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-633

Petitioner

Donald P. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center

Respondent

Christopher Simmons

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 551 (2005)

Granted

Monday, January 26, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 1, 2005

Advocates

James R. Layton (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally ill. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally ill violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case.

Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional.

On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at "evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.

Question

Does the execution of minors violate the prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" found in the Eighth Amendment and applied to the states through the incorporation doctrine of the 14th Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Simmons, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that standards of decency have evolved so that executing minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death penalty among state legislatures, and its own determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the Court pointed to "overwhelming" international opinion against the juvenile death penalty. Chief Justice William Rhenquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas all dissented.

MGM Studios v. Grokster

Tue, 29 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-480

Petitioner

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Grokster, Ltd., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Richard G. Taranto (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Grokster and other companies distributed free software that allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. In such networks, users can share digital files directly between their computers, without the use of a central server. Users employed the software primarily to download copyrighted files, file-sharing which the software companies knew about and encouraged. The companies profited from advertising revenue, since they streamed ads to the software users. A group of movie studios and other copyright holders sued and alleged that Grokster and the other companies violated the Copyright Act by intentionally distributing software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works. The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning that the software distribution companies were not liable for copyright violations stemming from their software, which could have been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Were companies that distributed file-sharing software, and encouraged and profited from direct copyright infringement using such software, liable for the infringement?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for MGM Studios, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 17 U.S.C. 101

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that companies that distributed software, and promoted that software to infringe copyrights, were liable for the resulting acts of infringement. The Court argued that although the Copyright Act did not expressly make anyone liable for another's infringement, secondary liability doctrines applied here. The software in this case was used so widely to infringe copyrights that it would have been immensely difficult to deal with each individual infringer. The "only practical alternative" was to go against the software distributor for secondary liability. Here the software companies were liable for encouraging and profiting from direct infringement.

Medellin v. Dretke

Mon, 28 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5928

Petitioner

Jose Ernesto Medellin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 660 (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 28, 2005

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

R. Ted Cruz (argued the cause for Respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Respondent)

Donald Francis Donovan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Texas trial court sentenced Medellin, a Mexican citizen, to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two girls in 1993. A state appeals court affirmed the conviction. Medellin then filed a state habeas corpus action, claiming that Texas failed to notify him of his right to counsel under the Vienna Convention. The state trial court and the appellate court rejected this claim. Medellin then filed a federal habeas petition, raising the Vienna Convention claim. The district court denied the petition. Medellin next appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Before the Fifth Circuit could rule, the International Court of Justice issued its decision in a case where Mexico had alleged the United States violated the Vienna Convention with respect to Medellin and other Mexican citizens facing the death penalty in the United States. The ICJ held that the United States had violated the individually enforceable rights guaranteed by Vienna and must reconsider the convictions. The Fifth Circuit rejected Medellin's appeal, citing its previous holdings that the Vienna Convention did not create an individually enforceable right. More than two months after the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, President George W. Bush issued a memo requiring the United States to follow the ICJ's ruling by having state courts review the Mexicans' cases. Citing the memo and the ICJ ruling, Medellin filed a new appeal in a Texas state court.

Question

Is a federal court bound by the International Court of Justice's ruling that U.S. courts must reconsider a Mexican citizen's claim for relief under the Vienna Convention? 2. Should a federal court enforce an ICJ ruling?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Dretke, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that Medellin had not exhausted his state court appeals and sent the case back to Texas state court.

Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo

Wed, 12 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-932

Petitioner

Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Broudo, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 336 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, April 19, 2005

Advocates

Patrick J. Coughlin (argued the cause for Respondents)

William F. Sullivan (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Michael Broudo and a group of shareholders sued Dura Pharmaceuticals under the Securities and Exchange Act after the price of the company's stock dropped sharply. The shareholders alleged the company's misleading statements about its antibiotic sales and about the possibility of FDA approval of an asthma device caused the price drop. The district court ruled the investors failed to prove "loss causation" because they could not prove a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the drop in price. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the investors proved loss causation because they proved the stock price on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation.

Question

To prove "loss causation" in a securities fraud case, is it sufficient to show that the price of the security on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that an inflated purchase price did not by itself prove "loss causation." At most, an inflated purchase price suggested that misrepresentation "touched upon" a later economic loss, but did not necessarily cause it. The Court reasoned that at the moment the transaction took place, the plaintiff had not suffered a loss because the inflated purchase price was offset by ownership of a share that possessed equivalent value at that instant. Further, the logical link between the inflated purchase price and any later economic loss was not invariably strong, because other factors may have affected the price.

Pace v. DiGuglielmo

Mon, 28 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9627

Petitioner

John A. Pace

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

David DiGuglielmo, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 408 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, February 28, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, April 27, 2005

Advocates

Ronald Eisenberg (argued the cause for Respondents)

David Wycoff (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1986 John Pace was convicted for murder in a Pennsylvania court. His post- conviction appeal was rejected by the state courts as untimely. In 1999 he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. While federal law provides a one-year statute of limitations on filing habeas petitions, that period is tolled while "a properly filed" state appeal is pending. The district court found Pace entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling, effectively discounting the period of time when Pace pursued appeals in state courts. Pennsylvania appealed and argued the court had no basis for the extension. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and ruled Pace could not file a federal habeas petition.

Question

If a state court rejected Pace's post-conviction appeal as untimely, could his federal habeas petition still be "properly filed" within the context of the federal law establishing a one-year statute of limitations for such petitions?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for DiGuglielmo, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the federal statute of limitations barred Pace's petition, as it was filed beyond the deadline. Pace was not entitled to statutory tolling because a petition filed after a time limit, which does meet any exceptions to that limit, was no more "properly filed" than a petition filed after a time limit permitting no exception. Moreover, because Pace did not pursue claims in a "diligent" and timely fashion, he was not entitled equitable tolling for any of the time period during which he pursued his state appeals.

Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss.

Wed, 03 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1160

Petitioner

Azel P. Smith, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Jackson, Mississippi, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 228 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 29, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Advocates

Glen D. Nager (argued the cause for Respondents)

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Azel Smith and group of other police department employees over the age of 40 sued Jackson, Mississippi, and the city police department in federal district court. The group alleged the department salary plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which banned employers from engaging in age discrimination. The department plan gave officers with five or fewer years of tenure with the department larger raises than those with more than five years of tenure. The group made a "disparate impact" claim under the ADEA, arguing the department and city unintentionally engaged in age discrimination. The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled disparate impact claims could not be made under the ADEA. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary.

Question

Can a disparate impact claim - a claim alleging unintentional discrimination - be made under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for City of Jackson, Miss., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that ADEA authorized recovery in disparate-impact cases, but that in this case petitioners failed to set forth a valid claim. The Court relied on its 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power, where the Court first authorized disparate- impact claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court reasoned that the ADEA authorized disparate-impact claims in cases similar to Griggs, because the language of Title VII and ADEA was virtually identical. However, ADEA was narrower than Title VII and allowed an otherwise prohibited action where the discrimination was based on reasonable factors other than age. The employees in this case failed to identify any specific practice within the pay plan that had an adverse impact on older workers. Further, the city's plan was based on reasonable factors other than age.

Deck v. Missouri

Tue, 01 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5293

Petitioner

Carman L. Deck

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Missouri

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 622 (2005)

Granted

Monday, October 18, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 2005

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

Cheryl C. Nield (argued the cause for Respondent)

Rosemary E. Percival (Attorneys for Petitioner, Counsel of Record)

Facts of the Case

After the Missouri Supreme Court set aside Carman Deck's death sentence, Deck was presented at his new sentence hearing shackled with leg irons, handcuffs and a belly chain. Deck was again sentenced to death. The state supreme court rejected Deck's claim that his shackling violated the U.S. Constitution.

Question

Does shackling a convicted offender during the penalty phase of a capital case violate the due process clauses of the Fifth and 14th Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Deck, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the Court's 7-2 holding that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during both a capital trial's guilt and penalty phases, unless such shackling is justified by an essential state interest specific to the defendant on trial (such as courtroom security). The majority argued that the law has long forbidden use of visible shackles during a capital trial's guilt phase, and that the reasons underlying this prohibition (like the possibility shackles will bias the jury) extend this rule to the penalty phase.

Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby

Wed, 06 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1028

Petitioner

Norfolk Southern Railway Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., dba Kirby Engineering, and Allianz Australia Insurance Limited

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 14 (2004)

Granted

Friday, January 9, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, October 6, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, November 9, 2004

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

James Kirby hired International Cargo Control (ICC) as a shipping intermediary to arrange a shipment of goods from Australia to Alabama. ICC issued Kirby a bill of lading (a contract that set shipping terms). The bill invoked liability limitations provided by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). The bill also included a Himalaya Clause, which extended ICC's limitations of liability to companies ICC hired. ICC hired Hamburg Sud to transport the goods. Hamburg Sud issued ICC a bill of lading that also invoked COGSA protections and included a Himalaya Clause. Hamburg Sud carried the goods on a ship to Georgia and subcontracted Norfolk Southern Railroad to transport the goods inland to Alabama.

The train derailed and Kirby sued Norfolk Southern to recover the $1.5 million in damages he claimed the derailment caused his goods. The district court ruled Norfolk Southern could limit its liability to Kirby on the basis of the Himalaya clause in the Hamburg Sud contract. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Hamburg Sud bill did not limit Norfolk Southern's liability to Kirby because Kirby was not bound by its terms.

Question

Did federal law govern the interpretation of the ICC and Hamburg Sud bills of lading (contracts)? 2. Was Norfolk entitled to the protection of the liability limitations in both bills?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes and yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that federal law controlled the interpretation of both bills, because they were maritime contracts and the dispute was not inherently local. The Court also held that the 11th Circuit misinterpreted the bills as not protecting Norfolk.

Kansas v. Colorado

Mon, 04 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

105 ORIG

Petitioner

Kansas

Respondent

Colorado

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 105 (2004)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, December 7, 2004

Advocates

David W. Robbins (Argued the cause for the defendant)

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the United States)

John B. Draper (Argued the cause for the plaintiff)

Facts of the Case

Kansas and Colorado disputed ownership of the Arkansas River. In 1949 Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact, which set out to resolve the states' dispute. In 1986 Kansas alleged Colorado violated the Compact. The U.S. Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to investigate the dispute and in 1994 the Special Master said Colorado violated the Compact. The Court agreed with the Special Master. Kansas later took issue with the Special Master's fourth set of recommendations. Kansas said it was entitled to interest from 1985 onward - before the Court's ruling against Colorado - for damages from Colorado's violations of the Compact from 1950 to 1985. Kansas also requested a "river master" to resolve a dispute over computer modeling of the river.

Question

1.) Should the U.S. Supreme Court appoint a "river master" to resolve disputes over computer modeling of the Arkansas River? 2.) Is Kansas entitled to interest, from 1985 forward, for damages resulting from Compact violations from 1950 to 1985?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Colorado, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 63 Stat. 145

No and no. In an 8-1 judgment delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court denied Kansas' request to appoint a river master to decide various technical disputes between the states. A river master was inappropriate because the nature of the disputes was legal, not purely technical, and the appointment of a river master would make it easier to continue litigation. The Court also rejected Kansas' claim to all interest from 1985 forward for damages, because that would contradict the Court's ruling in an earlier dispute between the states (Kansas III). In that ruling, the Court had endorsed an equitable approach that yielded a post-1985 interest calculation based on late damages only.

Kelo v. City of New London

Tue, 22 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Location

City of New London Town Hall

181 State Street

New London, CT 06320

United States

41° 21' 14.4" N, 72° 5' 45.6" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-108

Petitioner

Susette Kelo, et al.

Respondent

City of New London, Connecticut, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. 469 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Scott G. Bullock (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Wesley W. Horton (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Kelo Susette and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation. Specifically the property owners argued taking private property to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled for New London.

Question

Does a city violate the Fifth Amendment's takings clause if the city takes private property and sells it for private development, with the hopes the development will help the city's bad economy?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for City of New London, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the majority held that the city's taking of private property to sell for private development qualified as a "public use" within the meaning of the takings clause. The city was not taking the land simply to benefit a certain group of private individuals, but was following an economic development plan. Such justifications for land takings, the majority argued, should be given deference. The takings here qualified as "public use" despite the fact that the land was not going to be used by the public. The Fifth Amendment did not require "literal" public use, the majority said, but the "broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose.'"

Johnson v. U.S.

Tue, 18 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9685

Petitioner

Robert Johnson, Jr.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 295 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 2005

Decided

Monday, April 4, 2005

Advocates

Courtland L. Reichman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1998 a Georgia court reversed all of Johnson's seven prior convictions. One of these had been the basis for the enhanced federal sentence Johnson had received in 1994. In light of the reversals, Johnson filed a motion to vacate his enhanced federal sentence. Federal law, however, set out a one-year statute of limitations on motions by prisoners seeking to modify their sentences. That one-year period ran from the latest of four dates, the last of which was "the date on which the facts supporting the claim...could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." Johnson argued his motion was timely because the reversals constituted previously undiscoverable "facts supporting the claim" and thus triggered a renewed limitation period. The district court and the 11th Circuit denied Johnson's motion as untimely.

Question

Is the vacating of a state conviction a "fact" as that term is used in the federal law setting out a statute of limitations on federal sentence modification motions, thus commencing the statute's 1-year limitations period?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for U.S., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court that the vacating of a state sentence that underlay a federal sentence enhancement was a "fact" within the meaning of the law, but that fact had to have been discovered with due diligence: that is, the prisoner must have promptly sought to have the state judgment vacated. The Court held that by waiting until more than three years after his federal sentence, Johnson failed to show due diligence in seeking to have his original state convictions vacated.

Muehler v. Mena

Wed, 08 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1423

Petitioner

Darin L. Muehler, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Iris Mena

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 93 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 14, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Kannon K. Shanmugam (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Paul L. Hoffman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Police detained Mena and others in handcuffs while they searched the house they occupied. During the detention they asked Mena about her immigration status. The police had a search warrant to search the premises for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena sued the officers in federal district court for violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for Mena. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that using handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status also violated the Fourth Amendment.

Question

(1) Did police violate the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure by detaining Mena in handcuffs for 2-3 they executed a search warrant for contraband on the premises she occupied? (2) Did police violate the Fourth Amendment by questioning Mena about her immigration status during the detention?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Muehler, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No and no. In a 9-0 judgment delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Mena's detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Officers with a search warrant for contraband had authority to detain occupants of the premisses during the search, in order to minimize any risk to officers. Handcuffing Mena while police searched for weapons and a wanted gang member was also justified by officer safety concerns and because officers had to deal with detaining multiple occupants. The Court further held that the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status during her detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The officers did not need to have reasonable suspicion to question Mena. Moreover, the Court had held repeatedly that mere police questioning did not constitute a seizure.

Bradshaw v. Stumpf

Tue, 19 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-637

Petitioner

Margaret Bradshaw, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John David Stumpf

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, April 19, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Alan M. Freedman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In Ohio state court proceedings, Stumpf pled guilty in to aggravated murder committed in an armed robbery. That robbery had left Mr. Stout wounded and Mrs. Stout dead. While Stumpf admitted to shooting Mr. Stout, he insisted his accomplice Wesley had shot Mrs. Stout. A three-judge panel ruled Stumpf the principal offender in Mrs. Stout's murder and sentenced him to death. Following this, in Wesley's trial, the state presented evidence that Wesley had admitted to shooting Mrs. Stout. After Wesley's trial, Stumpf moved to withdraw his plea or reverse his death sentence, arguing that the evidence presented by the prosecution in Wesley's trial was inconsistent with what it had presented in his own. This, Stumpf argued, cast doubt on his conviction and sentence. Stumpf's motion was unscucessful in Ohio courts. A federal district court denied Stumpf habeas relief, but the Sixth Circuit reversed.

Question

(1) Was Stumpf's guilty plea to aggravated murder knowing, voluntary and intelligent? (2) Was his conviction valid, despite the state's use of a theory in the trial of Stumpf's accomplice that was inconsistent with its argument in Stumpf's trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bradshaw, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes and possibly not. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Stumpf's plea was knowing and therefore valid, because his attorneys at the plea hearing had represented that they had explained the elements to Stumpf, who then confirmed this. The Court articulated the broad rule that constitutional requirements were satisfied when a defendant's competent counsel explained to him the charge's nature and the crime's elements. As for the prosecution's use of inconsistent theories in Stumpf's and Wesley's trials, the Court held that Stumpf's sentence may have been invalid, depending on the relationship between the prosecutor's conduct and Stumpf's death sentence.. The Court sent the question of that relationship back to the Sixth Circuit.

Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, Bradley

Tue, 05 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-377

Petitioner

Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nigh, Bradley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 50 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, January 20, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, October 5, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, November 30, 2004

Advocates

A. Hugo Blankingship (argued the cause for Respondent)

Donald B. Ayer (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Bradley Nigh bought a car from Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Nigh later sued the dealership for intentionally charging him for a car feature for which he did not agree to pay. Nigh sued under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). A federal district court awarded Nigh about $24,000. Koons Buick appealed and argued the district court ignored TILA's cap on damages to $1,000. A Fourth Circuit held that a 1995 amendment to the act removed the $1,000 cap on recoveries involving loans secured by personal property.

Question

Could parties who suffered no actual damages recover more than the Truth in Lending Act's original $1,000 cap because of subsequent amendments to the act?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Truth in Lending

No. In an 8-1 judgment delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a 1995 TILA amendment did not change the original limit on violations involving personal-property loans. Congress intended the amendment to raise the minimum and maximum recoveries for closed-end loans secured by real property. Congress had not sought to remove the $1,000 cap on loans secured by personal property.

Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company

Mon, 01 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-814

Petitioner

Willard Stewart

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dutra Construction Company

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 481 (2005)

Granted

Monday, February 23, 2004

Argued

Monday, November 1, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Advocates

Frederick E. Connelly, Jr. (argued the cause for Respondent)

Lisa S. Blatt (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

David B. Kaplan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Willard Stewart was injured while working on a dredge (a machine for underwater digging) for Dutra, a dredging company. Stewart alleged Dutra was negligent and sued the company in federal district court under the Jones Act. The district court ruled a dredge is not a "vessel in navigation" as defined by the Jones Act and therefore Stewart could not sue under the act. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is a dredge a "vessel" under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Stewart, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Revised Statutes of 1873 specified that in any act passed after 1871, "vessel" included any watercraft capable of transportation. The requirement that a worker be on a vessel "in navigation," required by the LHWCA, simply meant that the vessel be capable of transportation. This included dredges which, both then and now, transported equipment and a crew over water.

Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Industries

Wed, 23 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1696

Petitioner

Exxon Mobil Corporation, Exxon Chemical Arabia, Inc., and Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Saudi Basic Industries Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 280 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Advocates

Gregory S. Coleman (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Two subsidiaries of ExxonMobil formed joint ventures with Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. When a dispute arose over the royalties SABIC had charged, SABIC sued the two subsidiaries in a Delaware state court, seeking a ruling that the royalties were proper. ExxonMobil countersued in federal district court, alleging SABIC had overcharged. Before the state-court trial, the district court denied SABIC's motion to dismiss the federal suit. As SABIC appealed, the Delaware court ruled for ExxonMobil. The Third Circuit held that as a result of of the state court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the suit. That doctrine was an offshoot of the federal law giving the U.S. Supreme Court sole authority to modify and prohibiting a federal district court from exercising appellate jurisdiction.

Question

Did the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar a suit that was filed in federal district court before a state court ruled on the petitioner's related claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Exxon Mobil, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the the Third Circuit "misperceived the narrow ground occupied by Rooker-Feldman." That doctrine was confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of state-court judgments made before the federal district court proceedings began and inviting district court rejection of those judgments. In this case, ExxonMobil's federal suit was filed before any state- court judgment and had not sought the review of any such judgment. Rather, the company had sought to protect itself in the event it lost in state court on grounds that might not have precluded relief in federal court. Moreover, in cases of parallel state and federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman was not triggered simply by the entry of a state court judgment. Properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction did not vanish if a state court reached judgment on the same or a related question while the case remained before a federal district court. Rooker-Feldman did not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or add to the circumscribed doctrines allowing federal courts to dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions.

Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Tue, 12 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-674

Petitioner

Keyse G. Jama

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 335 (2005)

Granted

Monday, February 23, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Advocates

Jeffrey J. Keyes (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Minnesota state court convicted Somalian refugee Keyse Jama of assault. As a result the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) argued in immigration court that Jama should be deported to Somalia. The court agreed and an immigration appeals court also agreed. Jama then appealed to a federal district court and argued the part of the U.S. Code dealing with deporting an alien to his country of birth required that country to first accept the alien. Because Somalia lacked a functioning central government, this was impossible. The district court ruled for Jama. A federal appellate court reversed and said Jama and the district court misinterpreted the law.

Question

May immigration officials deport a person to his country of birth under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(2)(E)(iv), if that country lacks a functioning central government that is able to accept the person's return?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 8 U.S.C. 1231

Yes. Federal immigration law permitted an alien to be removed to a country without the advance consent of that country's government. Of the four removal options federal immigration law listed, an acceptance requirement appeared in only one clause: "...he shall be removed to another country whose government will accept him." That clause only applied after the attorney general attempted the prior deportation option. The grammatical "rule of the last antecedent," prevented "another" from applying to the earlier options. Nor did the law's structure impose an acceptance requirement. Moreover, contrary to Jama's argument, the acceptance requirement was hardly settled judicial interpretation.

Shepard v. U.S.

Mon, 08 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9168

Petitioner

Reginald Shepard

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 13 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 21, 2004

Argued

Monday, November 8, 2004

Decided

Monday, March 7, 2005

Advocates

John P. Elwood (argued the cause for Respondent)

Linda J. Thompson (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Reginald Shepard pled guilty to violating the federal statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a gun. The government argued Shepard's sentence should be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The act added at least a 15-year sentence for any felon with three or more "violent felony" convictions who then possessed a gun. The government argued at least five of the 11 breaking and entering convictions on Shepard's record were violent felonies. The ACCA listed "burglary" as a violent felony and in Taylor v. U.S.(1990) the U.S. Supreme Court said the act meant "generic burglary" of a "building or other structure." However the Massachusetts burglary law Shepard pled guilty to breaking gave burglary a nongeneric definition - including entry into non-structures like cars. Shepard argued he had not pled guilty to generic robbery. The federal district court refused to sentence Shepard under the ACCA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and said the district court must consider evidence that showed it was obvious to Shepard that he pled guilty to generic robbery. The district court refused. The First Circuit reversed and sentenced Shepard under the ACCA.

Question

May a court sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act look to police reports or complaint applications to determine whether an earlier guilty plea necessarily admitted, and supported a conviction for, generic burglary?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Shepard, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that while a guilty plea could qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA, courts may only look to the following when determining if that plea admitted to generic burglary: the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement, or a judicial record in which the defendant confirmed the factual basis for the plea (such as conversation between defendant and judge).

Small v. United States

Wed, 03 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-750

Petitioner

Gary Sherwood Small

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 385 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 29, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, April 26, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Boas (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Patricia A. Millett (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. A Japanese court convicted Gary Sherwood Small for crimes punishable by a prison term longer than one year. Years later a U.S. District Court convicted Small, because of his prior conviction, of illegally possessing a gun. Small appealed and argued the term "convicted in any court" did not include convictions in foreign courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Small.

Question

Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. Does "convicted in any court" include convictions in foreign courts?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Small, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 922

No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the federal law's phrase, "convicted in any court," encompassed only domestic, not foreign, convictions. The majority reasoned that in determining the scope of the phrase, it was appropriate to assume Congress had domestic concerns in mind. Moreover, the statute's overall language suggested no intent to reach beyond domestic convictions.

Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.

Mon, 28 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1388

Petitioner

Douglas Spector, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, February 28, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 6, 2005

Advocates

David B. Salmons (argued the cause for Petitioners)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for Respondent)

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A group of disabled people who travelled on Norwegian Cruise Line ships sued the company in federal district court and alleged two of its ships did not conform with Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The company argued the ADA did not apply to the two ships because, though the ships sailed out of Texas, they sailed under the Bahamian flag. The district court dismissed the group's claims and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled foreign-flagged cruise ships are not subject to Title III of the ADA.

Question

Does Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act apply to foreign-flagged cruise ships in U.S. waters?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Spector, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes. The Court held 6-3 that Title III applied to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S. waters. Justice Kennedy delivered the Court's controlling opinion, which held that Title III did not apply to foreign ships' internal affairs, because there was no "clear congressional statement" showing an intent to do so. A clear statement was necessary before a general law could interfere with a foreign-vessel's internal affairs. Title III's own limitations, however, prevented the statute from imposing requirements that would have threatened safety on the ship or conflicted with international obligations. If Title III were to impose certain requirements, such as major structural modifications, the clear statement rule could bar such an interference.

KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc.

Tue, 05 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-409

Petitioner

KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lasting Impression I, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 111 (2004)

Granted

Friday, January 9, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, October 5, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, December 8, 2004

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (argued the cause for Respondents)

Michael Machat (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Patricia A. Millett (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Cosmetics company Lasting Impression trademarked the term "micro colors." Lasting Impression sued K.P. Permanent Make-Up in federal district court for using the term. K.P. used the "classic fair use defense" and argued it used the term only to describe K.P. products. The district court sided with K.P. Lasting appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Unlike other federal appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit required companies that used the fair use defense to prove there was no likelihood of confusion in use of the term. The Ninth Circuit ruled there was likelihood of confusion and reversed the district court's ruling.

Question

Did the classic fair use defense to trademark infringement require the party asserting the defense to demonstrate an absence or likelihood of confusion?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1115

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a party raising the classic defense of fair use did not need to negate any likelihood that the practice under question would confuse consumers about the origin of the goods. The Court interpreted federal trademark law as placing the burden of showing likelihood of confusion on the party charging infringement. Moreover, Congress "said nothing about likelihood of confusion in setting out the elements of the fair use defense."

Exxon Corp v. Allapattah Services

Tue, 01 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-70

Petitioner

Exxon Mobil Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Allapattah Services, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Maria del Rosario Ortega, et al. v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., No. 04-79

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Petitioner in 04-70)

Eugene E. Stearns (argued the cause for Respondents in 04-70)

Robert A. Long, Jr. (argued the cause for Respondent in 04-79)

Donald B. Ayer (argued the cause for Petitioner in 04-79)

Facts of the Case

In 1991 about 10,000 Exxon dealers sued Exxon Corporation in federal court, alleging that the corporation had engaged in an extensive scheme to overcharge them for fuel. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, but the District Court judge certified the case for review on the question of supplemental jurisdiction. Some of the multiple plaintiffs in the case had claims that did not meet the minimum amount necessary to qualify for federal diversity jurisdiction (currently $75,000). In 1990 Congress had enacted 28 U.S.C. Section 1367, overturning Finley v. United States, which had narrowly interpreted federal courts' power to confer supplementary jurisdiction on related claims. The question for the District Court was whether Section 1367 also overturned Zahn v. International Paper Co., which ruled that each plaintiff had to separately meet the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. The District Court accepted the plaintiffs' argument that Section 1367 gave federal courts power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs with related claims, even if some plaintiffs' claims did not meet the required amount. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling on supplemental jurisdiction. However, this ruling conflicted with the ruling of another Circuit, which had taken the opposite view of Section 1367's scope (see Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, No. 04-79). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument.

Question

In a civil action where one plaintiff's claim satisfies the minimum amount-in- controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction, and another plaintiff's related claim does not, does 28 U.S.C. Section 1367 allow federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim that is less than the required amount?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Allapattah Services, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1367

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that as long one plaintiff meets the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction, Section 1367 authorizes federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related claims even if they do not meet the requirement. The majority opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy held that courts only need to determine whether they have original jurisdiction over one of the claims in a case. If they do, courts can then decide to extend supplemental jurisdiction to the other related claims. The Justices ruled that to require each claim in a civil action to meet the requirement would be "inconsistent with the whole notion of supplemental jurisdiction." The Court based its ruling on the "unambiguous[]" text of the statute, saying "the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material." Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court should have consulted the legislative history of Section 1367. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer, wrote a dissent arguing for a narrower interpretation of Section 1367 that would not overturn Zahn.

Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.

Wed, 06 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1192

Petitioner

Cooper Industries, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Aviall Services, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 157 (2004)

Granted

Friday, January 9, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, October 6, 2004

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

William Bradford Reynolds (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Richard O. Faulk (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Texas prodded Aviall Services to clean up contaminated property bought from Cooper Industries. Aviall sued in federal district court to force Cooper to pay some of the clean up costs. Aviall claimed it could sue Cooper under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Cooper admitted to being a potentially responsible party (PRP), but claimed it was not liable because Aviall was never sued to clean up the land and had no federal requirement to do so. The district court and a panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Aviall. The entire appellate court reversed and ruled CERCLA does not require a PRP to first be sued before seeking clean up funds from other PRPs.

Question

Does the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) require that a party liable for pollution be sued under CERCLA before seeking clean up funds from other liable parties?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Cooper Industries, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 9613

In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a private party, who, like Aviall, had not been sued under CERCLA could not obtain cleanup contributions from other liable parties. The Court reasoned that CERCLA's language made clear that parties could seek cleanup contribution only during or following a civil action.

Rhines v. Weber

Wed, 12 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9046

Petitioner

Charles Russell Rhines

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Douglas Weber, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 269 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Advocates

Roberto A. Lange (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Lawrence E. Long (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A South Dakota court convicted Charles Rhines of murder. Rhines filed a habeas corpus petition with a federal district court, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights in the trial and conviction. The district court ruled Rhines failed to exhaust all of his claims in state court. The court stayed Rhines' habeas petition so that Rhines could finish his claims in state court. The stay prevented the one-year statute of limitations in the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act from barring Rhines from appealing to a federal court once he exhausted state remedies. The state penitentiary warden appealed. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Lundy (1982) required the dismissal of a habeas petition that included unexhausted claims.

Question

May a federal court stay a habeas petition that included exhausted and unexhausted claims, when the stay was necessary to allow a petitioner to exhaust claims in state court without having the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) bar the right to a federal petition?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Rhines, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that a district court could stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present unexhausted claims in state court and then return to federal court. The Court recognized that its decision in Rose, combined with the one-year statute of limitations required by the AEDPA (enacted 14 years after Rose) could have permanently deprived petitioners like Rhines of the opportunity to seek federal review for unexhausted claims. As a result, federal district courts could grant a stay on a mixed petition if (1) there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims in state court, (2) the unexhausted claims had merit, and (3) the petitioner was not engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.

Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n

Tue, 26 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1234

Petitioner

Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan Public Service Commission, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 03-1230

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 14, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, April 26, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Henry J. Boynton (argued the cause for Respondents)

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondents)

James H. Hanson (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1234)

Robert Digges, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1230)

Facts of the Case

A Michigan law imposed an annual $100 fee on each Michigan license-plated truck that operated entirely in interstate commerce. A group of interstate trucking companies sought unsuccesfully to have Michigan courts invalidate the law. The companies claimed that the federal law that had created the Single State Registration System (SSRS) preempted and prohibited such state fees. Under the federal law a trucking company could obtain a permit applicable in every state by registering once in a single state. While the initial state could demand a fee equal to the sum of its individual state fee, the law prohibited a state from imposing an additional "state registration requirement."

Question

Did federal law establishing for trucks the Single State Registration System (SSRS) preempt a separate Michigan registration fee?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 14504

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that "reference to text, historical context, and purpose" proved that the words "state registration requirement" in the federal law applied only to state requirements concerning SSRS registration. The Michigan statute, the majority reasoned, had nothing to do with SSRS.

Pasquantino v. United States

Tue, 09 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-725

Petitioner

David B. Pasquantino, Carl J. Pasquantino, and Arthur Hilts

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 349 (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 5, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, April 26, 2005

Advocates

Laura W. Brill (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Carl J. Pasquantino, David B. Pasquantino and Arthur Hilts smuggled large quantities of liquor from the United States into Canada to evade that country's heavy alcohol import taxes. A federal district court convicted them for violating the federal wire fraud statute, which prohibited the use of interstate wires for "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses." The Fourth Circuit affirmed their convictions, rejecting the petitioners' argument that they could not be prosecuted because of the common-law revenue, which rule barred courts from enforcing foreign tax laws.

Question

Did a plot to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violate the federal wire fraud statute?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1343

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the law's plain language criminalized the smuggling scheme in this case. The common-law revenue rule did not bar the prosecution of the scheme, because no common-law case as of 1952 clearly established that the rule barred the U.S. from prosecuting a fraudulent scheme to evade foreign taxes.

Clingman v. Beaver

Wed, 19 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-37

Petitioner

Michael Clingman, Secretary, Oklahoma State Election Board, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Andrea L. Beaver, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 581 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2005

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

Wellon B. Poe, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners)

James C. Linger (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Oklahoma's election laws created a primary system in which a party could invite only its own members and Independents to vote in its primary. The Libertarian Party and voters registered in other parties argued the laws violated the First Amendment freedoms of expression and association by preventing the Libertarian Party from inviting members of other parties to vote in its primary elections. The district court ruled for Oklahoma. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled Oklahoma's election laws violated the First Amendment.

Question

Do state election laws that restrict the voters a party may invite to vote in its primary election violate the First Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Clingman, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system did not violate the right to freedom of association and that any burden it imposed was minor and justified by legitimate state interests. The Court noted that not every electoral law burdening associational rights was subject to strict scrutiny. Requiring voters to register with a party before participating in its primary minimally burdened voters' associational rights. Moreover, Oklahoma's primary advanced a number of state interests, including the preservation of parties as viable and identifiable interest groups.

Johnson v. California

Tue, 02 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-636

Petitioner

Garrison S. Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 499 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 1, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Bert H. Deixler (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Frances T. Grunder (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

California prisoner Garrison Johnson alleged in federal district court that the California Department of Corrections used race to assign temporary cell mates for new prisoners. Johnson alleged this violated the U.S. Constitution's equal protection clause. The district court and a federal appellate court ruled against Johnson. The appellate court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Turner v. Safley, which said a relaxed standard - as opposed to a "strict scrutiny" standard - should be used to determine whether prison regulations are constitutional. The prison's policies were "reasonably related to the administrators' concern for racial violence and thus must be upheld," the appellate court wrote.

Question

Is a state's practice of temporary racial segregation of state prisoners subject to strict scrutiny?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Johnson, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that prison racial-segregation policies are subject to strict scrutiny. The Court rejected the claim that because the policy was "neutral" - because all prisoners were "equally" segregated - the policy was not subject to strict scrutiny. Racial classifications must receive strict scrutiny even when they may be said to affect the races equally. The Court remanded the case so that the Ninth Circuit could use strict scrutiny to review the policy. Justices John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas, and Antonin Scalia dissented.

Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.

Wed, 20 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1237

Petitioner

Merck KGaA

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, April 20, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

E. Joshua Rosenkranz (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Daryl Joseffer (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Mauricio A. Flores (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Integra Lifesciences sued Merck for supplying an Integra patented compound to other drug companies for use in preclinical research. In response, Merck claimed its actions were allowed under the federal law that said it was not an act of patent infringement to use or import a patented invention into the United States, if the invention was used only in ways related to the development and submission of information under a federal drug law (such as the law governing submission of data to the FDA). The district court ruled against Merck and awarded Integra damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment but ordered a modification of damages.

Question

Did federal law allow the use of patented inventions in preclinical research, the results of which were not ultimately included in a submission to the FDA?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Merck KGaA, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 35 U.S.C. 271

Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the Court's unanimous opinion that federal law allowed the use of patented compounds in preclinical studies, as long as there was a reasonable basis to believe the compound could be the subject of an FDA submission. The Court reasoned that federal law provided "a wide berth for the use of patented drugs in activities related to the federal regulatiory process" and that "this necessarily included preclinical studies." Because federal law required only a "reasonable relation" to FDA submission, information gathered on the patented invention (a compound in this case) did not necessarily need to be submitted to the FDA to be exempt from patent protection.

Smith v. Massachusetts

Wed, 01 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-8661

Petitioner

Melvin T. Smith

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Massachusetts

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 462 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 14, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Advocates

Cathryn A. Neaves (argued the cause for Respondent)

David J. Nathanson (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Respondent, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Melvin T. Smith was tried in for illegal possession of a firearm, among other offenses. During the trial the judge ruled Smith was not guilty because the state failed to introduce direct evidence of the gun's length - therefore not proving the gun Smith possessed met the statutory definition of a firearm. The state later pointed to the state supreme court's ruling that testimony that a gun was a pistol or revolver was sufficient evidence to allow a firearm charge to go to the jury. Because a witness had testified that Smith's gun was a pistol, the judge reversed and sent the possession charge to the jury.

Smith appealed and argued the judge's reversal of the not guilty ruling on the possession charge violated the Fifth Amendment's doubly jeopardy clause, which prohibited successive prosecutions. The state court of appeals rejected Smith's argument and ruled no Fifth Amendment violation occurred because the judge's reversal did not require a second proceeding.

Question

Is the double jeopardy clause's prohibition against successive prosecutions, found in the Fifth Amendment, violated when a judge rules that the defendant is not guilty because the government's evidence is insufficient but later in the trial reverses her finding of not guilty?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Smith, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Double Jeopardy

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause barred the judge from reconsidering the acquittal on the firearm charge later in the trial. Smith was subjected to successive prosecutions because, according to Court precedent, the midtrial ruling was an acquittal and the submission of the count to the jury was a further proceeding dealing with guilt or innocence. While the double jeopardy clause did allow states to create a procedure for reconsidering a midtrial determination of insufficiency of proof, Massachusetts had no such procedure at the time of Smith's trial.

Mayle v. Felix

Tue, 19 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-563

Petitioner

Deneice A. Mayle, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jacoby Lee Felix

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, April 19, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Matthew K.M. Chan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Lisa S. Blatt (argued the cause for Petitioner)

David M. Porter (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A California state court sentenced Felix to life in prison for murder. Felix's conviction became final on August 12, 1997. Federal habeas law gave Felix one year to file a habeas petition in federal court. On May 8, 1998, Felix filed a habeas petition and asserted a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission into his trial of videotaped prosecution witness testimony. On January 28, 1999, more than five months after the one-year habeas time limit, Felix filed an amended petition arguing that the admission into his trial of pretrial statements had violated the Fifth Amendment. Felix argued that the one-year limit did not bar this amended petition, citing the rule under federal habeas law that amended petitions relate back to the filing date of the original petition if both arise out of the original's "conduct, transaction or occurrence." Because his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims challenged the same criminal conviction, Felix argued, they arose out of the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence." The district court disagreed and ruled the amended petition time barred; the court rejected the Sixth Amendment claim on its merits. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Sixth Amendment ruling, but agreed with Felix that his amended petition was not time barred because they both arose out of the same trial and conviction.

Question

Federal habeas law allowed an amended petition to relate back to the filing date of the original petition if both arose out out of the same "conduct, transaction or occurrence" the original set forth. Did the trial and conviction qualify as a "conduct, transaction or occurrence?"

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Mayle, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court rejected the argument that the trial itself was the "transaction" or "occurrence" under federal habeas law. The Court said that such a definition would have allowed virtually any new claim introduced in an amended petition to relate back, gutting the one-year time limit on petitions. Felix's amended habeas petition thus did not relate back because the issue of his pretrial statements differed in time and type from the videotaped witness testimony.

Smith v. Texas

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 07:58:49 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5323

Petitioner

Smith

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Texas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 37 (2004)

Decided

Monday, November 15, 2004

Facts of the Case

Before the Texas jury in Smith's murder trial reached its sentence, the judge issued a "nullification instruction." The judge told the jury to consider mitigating evidence when filling out the verdict form. That form consisted of two "yes" or "no" questions: whether Smith acted deliberately and whether he posed a future danger. The judge told jurors that even if they believed the state had proved that the answer to both questions was "yes," jurors should answer "no" to at least one of them if they believed the death sentence should not be imposed because of the mitigating evidence. The jury answered "yes" to both questions and sentenced Smith to death. Smith lost his appeal in state court.

Question

Was the Eighth Amendment violated by jury instructions that told jurors to give effect to mitigating evidence only by voting "no" on what would otherwise be affirmative responses to two special issues relating to deliberateness and future dangerousness?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Smith, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In a 7-2 per curiam opinion, the Court held that instructing the jury to return a false answer to a special issue to avoid a death sentence did not allow the jury to fully consider Smith's relevant mitigating circumstances. The Court cited its decision in Penny v. Johnson (2001), which held a similar instruction unconstitutional.

Bell v. Thompson

Tue, 26 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-514

Petitioner

Ricky Bell, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gregory Thompson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, April 26, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Matthew M. Shors (argued the cause for Respondent)

Jennifer L. Smith (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Tennessee trial court sentenced Thompson to death for murder. Thompson made unsuccesful appeals in state court based on the claim that his counsel had failed to adequately investigate his mental health. A federal district court also rejected Thompson's petition based on that claim. However, Thompson's habeas counsel had failed to include in the record the deposition and report of a psychologist who argued Thompson had suffered from serious mental illness. The counsel included the documents when Thompson appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which nevertheless dismissed Thompson's claim. Thompson then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate until the Court decided whether to hear the case. The Court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate again, pending the Supreme Court's decision on Thompson's petition for rehearing, which the Court denied. The Sixth Circuit still did not issue its mandate. Five months later, Tennessee had set Thompson's execution date. The Sixth Circuit suddenly issued an amended opinion on Thompson's habeas petition, overturning the district court's dismissal of his ineffective counsel claim and ordering hearings based on that claim. The Sixth Circuit included in the appeal record the initially ommitted psychologist deposition. The circuit court argued its authority to issue an amended opinion five months after the Supreme Court denied Thompson's petition was based on its inherent power to reconsider an opinion before issuance of the the mandate.

Question

After the U.S. Supreme Court had denied certiorari and a petition for rehearing to a death-row prisoner's case, did the Sixth Circuit abuse its discretion by withholding its mandate in the case for more than five months without entering a formal order?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bell, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit abused its discretion by withholding its mandate and not releasing its amended opinion for more than five months after the Supreme Court's final say in the case. The Sixth Circuit cost the state and the parties significant time and resources by not providing notification that it was reconsidering its decision. Further, the Sixth Circuit had the opportunity at the rehearing stage to consider the same mental health arguments it later adopted. Moreover, the evidence and its ommission did not warrant the court's "extraordinary departure from standard procedures." By withholding its mandate for months, the Court said, the Sixth Circuit failed to give the "appropriate level of respect" to Tennessee's judgment that Thompson deserved death. Notably, the Court declined to consider the scope of the appellate courts' Federal Appellate Procedure 41 authority to stay a mandate following a denial of certioarari.

Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York

Tue, 11 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-855

Petitioner

City of Sherrill, New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oneida Indian Nation of New York, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 197 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondents, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Michael R. Smith (argued the cause for Respondents)

Ira S. Sacks (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Caitlin J. Halligan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In the late 18th century, Congress set aside most of the tribal land of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York as a reservation. The tribe later sold off much of the reservation. In the 1990s members of the tribe began to buy back pieces of the land. The tribe said the reacquired land was part of a reservation and therefore exempt from state and municipal taxes. The City of Sherrill - which encompassed some of the tribe's property - argued the land was not tax-exempt. The Oneidas sued Sherrill in federal district court and alleged the land was recognized by the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua as part of their historic reservation. The Oneidas also pointed to the 1790 Non- Intercourse Act that required federal consent for Indian land to lose its reservation status. Sherrill argued the land lost its reservation status after leaving the Oneidas' ownership originally. The district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for the Oneidas.

Question

Were land parcels once owned by the Oneida Nation, sold in 1807 but repurchased in the 1990s by the Nation's descedant tribe, part of an Indian Reservation and thus exempt from local taxes?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Sherrill, N.Y., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that standards of federal Indian law and federal equity precluded the Tribe from unilaterally reviving its ancient sovereignty over the land at issue. The Court pointed to the "longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of central New York and its inhabitants"and the fact that regulatory authority over the land had been exercised by state and local government for 200 years. By giving up the land in the early 19th century, the Oneidas had "relinquished governmental reins and could not regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders."

Gonzales v. Raich

Mon, 29 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1454

Petitioner

Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Angel McClary Raich, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. 1 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, November 29, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 6, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Randy E. Barnett (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court.

The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress.

Question

Does the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801) exceed Congress' power under the commerce clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical use?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Gonzales, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 801

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the commerce clause gave Congress authority to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, despite state law to the contrary. Stevens argued that the Court's precedent "firmly established" Congress' commerce clause power to regulate purely local activities that are part of a "class of activities" with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority argued that Congress could ban local marijuana use because it was part of such a "class of activities": the national marijuana market. Local use affected supply and demand in the national marijuana market, making the regulation of intrastate use "essential" to regulating the drug's national market. The majority distinguished the case from Lopez and Morrison. In those cases, statutes regulated non-economic activity and fell entirely outside Congress' commerce power; in this case, the Court was asked to strike down a particular application of a valid statutory scheme.

Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association

Wed, 08 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1164

Petitioner

Mike Johanns, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Livestock Marketing Association; Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc. v. Livestock Marketing Association

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc. et al. v. Livestock Marketing Association, et al., No. 03-1165

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 550 (2005)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners in 10-1164)

Laurence H. Tribe (argued the cause for Respondents)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1165)

Facts of the Case

The Beef Promotion and Research Act (1985) required cattle producers to pay a fee for generic beef advertisements done on behalf of the cattle industry. Some cattle producers disagreed with the advertisements. The Livestock Marketing Association sued the Department of Agriculture (DEA) in federal district court and alleged a government-required fee for advertising with which some cattle producers disagreed violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The DEA argued the advertising was government speech immune from First Amendment challenge. Another group of cattle producers, the Nebraska Cattlemen, sided with the DEA and sued the Livestock Marketing Association. The two cases were consolidated. The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the program violated the First Amendment and that the advertising was compelled and not government speech.

Question

Does the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act) violate the First Amendment by requiring cattle producers to pay to fund advertising with which they disagree?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Johanns, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the fund was for government speech and that therefore the government could not be sued under the First Amendment. The Court pointed to the rule that while compelled funding of private speech raises First Amendment concerns, compelled funding of government speech generally does not.