Cases - 2004 term

American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n

Tue, 26 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1230

Petitioner

American Trucking Associations, Inc. and USF Holland, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan Public Service Commission, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 03-1234

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 14, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, April 26, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Henry J. Boynton (argued the cause for Respondents)

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondents)

James H. Hanson (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1234)

Robert Digges, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1230)

Facts of the Case

Michigan law required every truck engaged in intrastate commercial hauling to pay a flat $100 annual fee. Interstate trucking companies asked Michigan courts to invalidate the fee, claiming the flat fee discriminated against interstate carriers and imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate trade (in violation of the "dormant" commerce clause). They pointed to the fact that trucks carrying both interstate and intrastate loads engaged in intrastate business less than trucks that only haul within Michigan. State courts refused to invalidate the fee.

Question

Did a Michigan law requiring every truck engaged in intrastate commercial hauling to pay a fee violate burden interstate trade in violation of the dormant commerce clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Michigan's fee did not violate the dormant commerce clause because the fee was imposed only on intrastate transactions and did not facially discriminate against interstate or out-of-state activities or enterprises. The dormant commerce clause did not, Breyer wrote, ban such a "neutral" and "locally focused fee."

Brown v. Payton

Wed, 10 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1039

Petitioner

Jill L. Brown, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

William Charles Payton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 133 (2005)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, November 10, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Advocates

Andrea N. Cortina (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Dean R. Gits (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.

Question

Was the 9th Circuit correct to rule the California Supreme Court objectively unreasonable in holding that California's "catch-all" mitigation instruction in capital cases is constitutional as applied to post-crime evidence in mitigation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Brown, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the California Supreme Court was not unreasonable to decline to distinguish between pre-crime and postcrime mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court reasonably read the relevant precedent, Boyde v. California (1990), as establishing that the catch-all factor's text was broad enough to accommodate Payton's post-crime religious conversion.

Cutter v. Wilkinson

Mon, 21 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9877

Petitioner

Jon B. Cutter, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reginald Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 709 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 21, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondent United States, supporting petitioners)

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Respondent Wilkinson)

David A. Goldberger (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a "compelling government interest." Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their "nonmainstream" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws "respecting an establishment of religion"). The district court rejected that argument and ruled for the inmates. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Did a federal law prohibiting government from burdening prisoners' religious exercise violate the First Amendment's establishment clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cutter, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 2000

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, on its face, RLUIPA made an accommodation allowed by the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the law was an effort to alleviate the "government-created burden" on religious exercise that prisoners faced. Nor did section three discriminate between mainstream and non-mainstream religions. The Court did point out that constitutional problems could arise if RLUIPA were enforced improperly and religious prisoners received favored treatment, or if religious exercise and security concerns were not properly balanced.

San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco

Mon, 28 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-340

Petitioner

San Remo Hotel, L.P., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 28, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Paul F. Utrecht (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $567,000 conversion fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state-court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred litigants from suing in federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court (the rule of "issue preclusion"). The hoteliers asked the district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause.

Question

Should federal courts make an exception to the full faith and credit statute for Fifth Amendment takings clause claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for San Francisco, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 9-0 judgment delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court refused to create an exception to the full faith and credit statute in order to provide a federal forum for litigants seeking to advance federal takings claims. The Court rejected the argument that whenever plaintiffs reserved their federal takings claims in state court, federal courts should review the reserved federal claims, regardless of the issues decided by the state court. Moreover, federal courts were not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can sue in federal court.

Granholm v. Heald

Tue, 07 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1116

Petitioner

Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of Michigan, et al.

Respondent

Edward D. Kelly, Chairman, New York Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, State Liquor Authority, et al.

Consolidation

Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Association v. Eleanor Heald et al., No. 03-1120

Juanita Swedenburg, et al. v. Edward D. Kelly, Chairman, New York Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, State Liquor Authority, et al., No. 03-1274

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 460 (2005)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 16, 2005

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1116 & 03-1120)

Clint Bolick (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1274)

Kathleen M. Sullivan (argued the cause for Respondents in 03-1116 & 03-1120)

Caitlin J. Halligan (argued the cause for Respondents in 03-1274)

Facts of the Case

Michigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In separate cases groups sued the states and argued the laws violated the U.S. Constitution's "dormant" commerce clause. The dormant commerce clause prohibited states from passing laws affecting interstate commerce, particularly laws favoring in-state business over out-of-state business. The states argued the laws were valid exercises of state power under the 21st Amendment, which ended federal Prohibition and allowed states to regulate alcohol importation. A federal district court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Michigan law violated the dormant commerce clause and did not advance the core concerns of the 21st Amendment (such as temperance). A separate federal district court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the 21st Amendment allowed New York's law.

Question

Does a state law that allows in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so, violate the dormant commerce clause in light of the 21st Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Heald, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that both states' laws violated the commerce clause by favoring in-state wineries at the expense of out-of-state wineries and did so without the authorization of the 21st Amendment. State authority to engage in such economic discrimination was not the purpose the 21st Amendment. Moreover, in modern cases, that amendment did not save state laws violating other provisions of the Constitution.

Brosseau v. Haugen

Thu, 17 May 2012 12:09:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1261

Petitioner

Brosseau

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Haugen

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 194 (2004)

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Facts of the Case

Brosseau, a police officer in Washington state, shot Haugen in the back as he tried to flee in his vehicle from the police. Haugen sued Brosseau in federal district court, alleging Brosseau used excessive force in shooting him and violated his constitutional rights. The district court ruled for Brosseau, finding she was entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit reversed.

Question

Was a police officer who shot a fleeing suspect entitled to qualified immunity?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Brosseau, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In an 8-1 per curiam decision, the Court held that Brosseau was entitled to qualified immunity because the Court's previous cases did not clearly establish that shooting the fleeing Hogan would have violated his constitutional rights.

Kowalski v. Tesmer

Mon, 04 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-407

Petitioner

John F. Kowalski, Judge, 26th Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John C. Tesmer, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 125 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, January 20, 2004

Argued

Monday, October 4, 2004

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (argued the cause for Petitioners)

David A. Moran (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A 1994 amendment to the Michigan constitution said criminal defendants who pled guilty had no right to appeal and could appeal only with the permission of a state appellate court. Michigan then enacted a law that said in most cases judges could not appoint appellate lawyers for indigent defendants who pled guilty. Two criminal attorneys and three indigent defendants who were denied appointed appellate lawyers filed a single suit alleging the state law violated the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The district court ruled that the indigents had standing to sue and that the lawyers who sued with them had the right to sue as third-party representatives of the rights of indigents. A federal appellate court agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but based this only on the lawyers' claims. The court said the U.S. Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris required it to abstain from hearing the indigents' claims because the indigents were involved in related proceedings in state court.

Question

(1) Does the 14th Amendment guarantee an indigent criminal defendant convicted by a guilty plea the right to an appointed appellate attorney in a discretionary first appeal? (2) Do attorneys have third-party standing on behalf of potential indigent defendants to make a constitutional challenge to a state statute prohibiting appointment of appellate counsel in discretionary first appeals following convictions by guilty pleas?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kowalski, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the attorneys lacked third-party standing to sue on behalf of the Michigan indigent defendants. The attorneys did not have close relationships with the indigent defendants, nor was there a hindrance to these defendants' ability to advance their own constitutional rights against the Michigan scheme. In addition, under Younger, the indigents should have only turned to the federal courts after pursuing their claims in state court.

Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States

Wed, 27 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-368

Petitioner

Arthur Andersen LLP

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 696 (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, April 27, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Advocates

Maureen E. Mahoney (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

As Enron's financial difficulties became public in 2001, Arthur Andersen instructed its employees to destroy Enron-related documents. This was consistent with Andersen's document retention policy. The government later charged Andersen for violating federal law, which made it a crime to "knowingly...corruptly persuade another person" to "withold" or "alter" documents in an "offical proceeding." The federal jury found Andersen guilty. The company appealed, arguing the jury instructions failed to convey the elements of a "corrupt persuasion" conviction - specifically, that a "consciousness of wrongdoing" was required. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.

Question

Did the jury instructions in the Arthur Andersen trial properly convey the elements of a "corrupt persuasion" conviction under federal document-handling law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Arthur Andersen LLP, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1512

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the jury instructions failed to convey that the federal document law required a "consciousness of wrongdoing" for conviction. There was nothing inherently corrupt in ordering employees to destroy documents, even if the aim was to keep the documents from the government. Thus, contrary to what the jurors had been told, Andersen could be convicted only if the persuaders were shown to be conscious that they were behaving corruptly.

Orff v. United States

Wed, 23 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1566

Petitioner

Francis A. Orff, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (argued the cause for Respondent United States)

Stuart L. Somach (argued the cause for Respondent Westlands Water District)

William M. Smiland (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Westlands Water District received water from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under a 1963 contract. In 1993 Westlands sued the district for reducing their water supply. California farmers who had bought water from Westlands also sued the bureau, intervening as plaintiffs. After negotiations Westlands agreed to dismiss their suit. But the farmers refused to drop theirs, accusing the bureau of breach of contract. The farmers claimed that as third-party beneficiaries they could enforce the contract and that the United States had waived its sovereing immunity from such suits in the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. That act allowed parties "to join the United States as a necessary party defendant in any suit" over rights under a federal reclamation contract. The district court held that the farmers were not contracting parties or third-party beneficiaries and thus could not invoke the waiver. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision.

Question

Did the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 waive the United States' sovereign immunity from breach of contract suits?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 43 U.S.C. 390

In this case, no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the act merely permitted parties to join the United States in an action between other parties when the action required interpretation of a contract and joining the U.S. was necessary. The farmers suit was not an attempt to join the U.S. as a necessary party defendant.

Alaska v. United States

Mon, 10 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

128 ORIG

Plaintiff

Alaska

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

United States

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 6, 2005

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the defendant)

Jonathan S. Franklin (Argued the cause for the plaintiff)

Facts of the Case

Alaska and the United States disputed ownership of two areas of submerged lands - enclaves under the Alexander Archipelago, which are more than three miles from the coast of Alaska or any island, and lands beneath the inland waters of Glacier Bay. Alaska claimed the archipelago waters under the Submerged Lands Act, which entitled states to submerged lands three miles seaward of their coastline and to land beneath inland navigable waters. The dispute over the submerged lands under Glacier Bay centered on the United States' claim that, at the time Alaska gained statehood, those lands were intended for a national monument. A Special Master appointed to deal with the conflict, recommended to the U.S. Supreme Court that the Court side with the United States with respect to both areas. Alaska appealed that decision.

Question

Do specific submerged lands underlying the Alexander Archipelago and Glacier Bay belong to Alaska or the federal government?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Submerged Lands Acts

In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court unanimously concluded that the Alexander Archipelago waters were not inland waters and thus belonged to the federal government. The Court reasoned that the archipelago waters were neither historic inland waters nor inland waters under the juridical bay theory (the theory would work only if the islands formed a peninsula from the mainland that divided the archipelago's waters in two). Kennedy also delivered the Court's 6-3 opinion holding that the underlying waters of Glacier Bay National Park belong to the federal government. The majority wrote that, at the time Alaska gained statehood, the government intended those lands to be part of a national monument.

On January 23, 2006, the Court issued its final decree. On the issues of Alexander Archipelago and Glacier Bay, the Court declared: "judgment is granted to the United States, and the State of Alaska shall take nothing." Alaska's additional motion for judgment on the submerged lands within the Tongass National Forest was dismissed as moot (meaning "previously settled"), because the federal government had already disclaimed any interest in the lands. The newly appointed Chief Justice John Roberts took no part in the case.

Clark v. Martinez

Wed, 13 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-878

Petitioner

A. Neil Clark, Field Office Director, Seattle, Washington, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sergio Martinez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Daniel Benitez v. Michael Rozos, Field Office Director, Miami, No. 03-7434

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 371 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 1, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for United States)

John S. Mills (argued the cause for Benitez)

Christine S. Dahl (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The federal government deemed Daniel Benitez and Sergio Martinez inadmissible immigrants and detained them until they could be returned to Cuba.

Benitez and Martinez argued that because deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, they could not be detained longer than the 90 days allowed by federal law. They pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis that said the government can detain beyond 90 days immigrants who were admitted to the United States, but only so long as necessary to deport them. Immigrants must be released if deportation is unforeseeable, the Court said.

While separate district courts agreed deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, the Ninth Circuit and 11th Circuits disagreed over whether Zadvydas applied to inadmissible immigrants.

The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the two cases.

Question

In Zadvydas v. Davis (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court said admitted immigrants could be detained for deportation for more than 90 days, but no longer than reasonably necessary. Did this ruling apply to inadmissible aliens, such as Benitez and Martinez?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Martinez, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 8 U.S.C. 1231

Yes. In a 7-2 decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court said the requirement that immigrants be detained no longer than reasonably necessary for deportation applied to both admissible and inadmissible immigrants. Because readmission to Cuba was unforeseeable, the detentions of Martinez and Benitez were unreasonable. The Court refused to give the same immigration statute different interpretations based on immigrants' characteristics.

Van Orden v. Perry

Wed, 02 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Texas State Capitol

1100 Congress Avenue Austin TX 78701

Austin, TX 78701

United States

30° 16' 21.882" N, 97° 44' 28.0752" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1500

Petitioner

Thomas Van Orden

Respondent

Rick Perry, in his Official Capacity as Governor of Texas and Chairman, State Preservation Board, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. 677 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Erwin Chemerinsky (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondents, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting respondents)

Greg Abbott (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion.

Question

Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Perry, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A

Tue, 22 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-163

Petitioner

Linda Lingle, Governor of Hawaii, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 528 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

Mark J. Bennett (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Craig E. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Hawaii enacted a limit on the rent oil companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service stations. The rent cap was a response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on gasoline prices. Chevron, one of the state's largest oil companies, argued in federal district court that the the cap was an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court held that the cap amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it did not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling gas prices. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), where the Court declared that government regulation of private property is "a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests." The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a regulation amount to an unconstitutional taking "if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests?"

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lingle, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous opinion that the Court needed to "correct course" and make clear that the "substantially advances" formula put forth in Agins was inappropriate for determining whether a regulation amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking. Takings clause challenges to regulations had to be based on the severity of the burden that the regulation imposed upon property rights, not the effectivness of the regulation in furthering the governmental interest. The Court insisted that its ruling did not "disturb any of its prior holdings."

Castle Rock v. Gonzales

Mon, 21 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-278

Petitioner

Town of Castle Rock, Colorado

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jessica Gonzales, Individually and as Next Best Friend of Her Deceased Minor Children, Rebecca Gonzales, Katheryn Gonzales, and Leslie Gonzales

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, November 1, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 21, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

John C. Eastman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

John P. Elwood (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Brian J. Reichel (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Jessica Gonzales requested a restraining order against her estranged husband. A state trial court issued the order, which prohibited the husband from seeing Gonzales or their three daughters except during pre-arranged visits. A month later, Gonzales's husband abducted the three children. Gonzales repeatedly urged the police to search for and arrest her husband, but the police told her to wait until later that evening and see if her husband brought the children back. During the night Gonzales's husband murdered all three children and then opened fire inside a police station, where police returned fire and killed him. Gonzales brought a complaint in federal District Court, alleging that the Castle Rock police had violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by willfully or negligently refusing to enforce her restraining order. The Due Process Clause states: "No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that no principle of substantive or procedural due process allowed Gonzales to sue a local government for its failure to enforce a restraining order. On appeal, however, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had a legitimate procedural due process claim. A rehearing by the full appeals court agreed, ruling that Gonzales had a "protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining order," which the police had violated.

Question

Can the holder of a restraining order bring a procedural due process claim against a local government for its failure to actively enforce the order and protect the holder from violence?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Castle Rock, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that Gonzales had no constitutionally- protected property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order, and therefore could not claim that the police had violated her right to due process. In order to have a "property interest" in a benefit as abstract as enforcement of a restraining order, the Court ruled, Gonzales would have needed a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the benefit. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia found that state law did not entitle the holder of a restraining order to any specific mandatory action by the police. Instead, restraining orders only provide grounds for arresting the subject of the order. The specific action to be taken is up to the discretion of the police. The Court stated that "This is not the sort of 'entitlement' out of which a property interest is created." The Court concluded that since "Colorado has not created such an entitlement," Gonzales had no property interest and the Due Process Clause was therefore inapplicable. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented.

Internal Revenue Commissioner v. Banks

Mon, 01 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-892

Petitioner

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sigitas J. Banaitis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sigitas J. Banaitis, No. 03-907

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 426 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 29, 2004

Argued

Monday, November 1, 2004

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2005

Advocates

James R. Carty (argued the cause for Respondent Banks)

David B. Salmons (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Philip N. Jones (argued the cause for Respondent Banaitis)

Facts of the Case

Sigitas Banaitis and John Banks separately argued to the U.S. Tax Court that contingency fees paid to lawyers could be deducted from taxable gross income. The court disagreed and ruled for the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS said Banaitis and Banks owed taxes on contingency fees. Banaitis appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that under Oregon law contingency fees could not be taxed as income. Banks appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled contingency fees were never taxable income. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated Banaitis' and Banks' cases.

Question

Does a taxpayer's gross income from litigation proceeds include contingency fees paid to lawyers?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Internal Revenue Commissioner, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. In a unanimous, 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that if a litigant's recovery constituted income, the litigant's income included the contingency fee paid to his or her lawyer. The Court held that an economic gain assigned in advance to another party - as in a contingency-fee agreement - could not be excluded from gross income.

McCreary County v. ACLU

Wed, 02 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1693

Petitioner

McCreary County, Kentucky, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Mathew D. Staver (argued the cause for Petitioners)

David A. Friedman (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause.

Question

Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" 2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for ACLU, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses."

Florida v. Nixon

Tue, 02 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-931

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joe Elton Nixon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 175 (2004)

Granted

Monday, March 1, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 2004

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Advocates

Edward H. Tillinghast (argued the cause for Respondents)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

George S. Lemieux (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Florida court convicted Joe Elton Nixon of murder and sentenced him to death. During the trial Nixon's lawyer told the jury Nixon was guilty. Nixon appealed and argued he received ineffective counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Nixon said he did not agree to the lawyer's strategy. After several appeals the Florida Supreme Court granted Nixon a new trial. The court said Nixon's lawyer's comments were essentially a guilty plea and that because Nixon did not explicitly agree to the strategy, the lawyer was "per se ineffective."

Question

1.) Is a defense lawyer's use of a strategy that concedes the defendant's guilt ineffective assistance of counsel if the strategy was pursued without the explicit approval of the defendant? 2.) Should counsel be held to a standard that considers whether counsel's statements were deficient and prejudicial to the defendant, or should counsel be considered ineffective per se?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Florida, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In a unanimous 8-0 decision, the Court ruled that Nixon's lawyer's strategy - pursued without Nixon's express approval - did not automatically qualify the lawyer as ineffective. The Court reversed the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court, faulting that court for inappropriately applying presumptions of prejudice and deficient performance. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "When counsel informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant's best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel's strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant's explicit consent." Nixon's lawyer would have needed Nixon's consent for a formal guilty plea, but the Court ruled that the tactic of effectively conceding guilt in order to concentrate on the sentencing phase of the trial was legitimate as long as the defendant was informed of the strategy. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the decision of the case.

Graham County Water District v. United States

Wed, 20 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-169

Petitioner

Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, ex rel. Karen T. Wilson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, April 20, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Christopher G. Browning, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Mark T. Hurt (argued the cause for Respondent)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The False Claims Act (FCA) allows the government or an individual on the government's behalf to sue any person for "making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States." A 1986 amendment to the FCA allows individuas to sue their employer if the employer retaliates against them in any way for assisting in an investigation of such false claims. In 2001, Karen Wilson, a secretary for Graham County Water District, sued her employer for various false claims it allegedly made concerning a federal disaster relief program. She also brought a retaliation suit against her employer, alleging that after she had provided information on the false claims to federal officials in December 1995, she had been repeatedly harassed by Graham County District officials until she resigned in March 1997. The District Court dismissed Wilson's suit as untimely. The court accepted Graham County District's argument that the six-year statute of limitations in the 1986 amendment to the FCA was not intended to apply to retaliation suits. Therefore, the court held, the most closely analogous state limitation applies instead. The north Carolina limit for retaliation suits was three years, so Wilson's suit was brought too late. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and applied the six-year limitation to all retaliation suits under the FCA.

Question

Does the six-year statute of limitations in the False Claims Act apply to suits brought by individuals who were retaliated against by their employers for assisting an investigation of false or fraudulent claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Graham County Water District, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal False Claims

No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that the six-year statute of limitations did not apply to suits for retaliation. The majority opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas found the statute of limitations "ambiguous." The ambiguity arose from the fact that the six-year limitation in the FCA starts from the time the false claim was made. Yet in a retaliation suit, no actual false claim needs to be alleged. The plaintiff only has to allege that her employer retaliated against her in connection with a federal investigation. The Court found that the ambiguity could be resolved by interpreting the statute of limitations to apply only to suits for false claims, not to retaliation suits. The Court left to the lower courts the question of which state statute of limitations should apply in place of the six-year limitation. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. The dissent characterized the statute of limitations as "unusual" but "reasonably clear," and argued that it should be read to apply to retaliation actions.

Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering

Mon, 18 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-603

Petitioner

Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Darue Engineering & Manufacturing

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 18, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Eric H. Zagrans (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Respondent)

Michael C. Walton (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The IRS seized property owned by Grable and gave Grable notice by certified mail before selling the property to Darue. Grable sued in state court, claiming Darue's title was invalid because federal law required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by personal service, not certified mail. Darue removed the case to federal disctrict court, arguing that the case presented a federal question because Grable's claim depended on an interpretation of federal tax law. The district court agreed and ruled for Darue. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision.

Question

Did a case involving the interpretation of federal tax law belong in federal court and not the state court where it was filed?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Darue Engineering, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that the case involved a federal question and could thus be removed to federal court. Federal-questions jurisdiction, the Court reasoned, lay over some state-law claims that implicated significant federal issues. In this case, the national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation warranted moving the case to federal court.

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams

Wed, 19 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1601

Petitioner

City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mark J. Abrams

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 113 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Advocates

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Rancho Palos Verdes, a city in California, gave Mark Abrams a permit to construct an antenna on his property for amateur use. But when the city learned Abrams used the antenna for commercial purposes, the city forced Abrams to stop until he got a commercial use permit. Abrams applied and the city refused to give him the permit. Abrams then sued in federal district court, alleging the city violated his rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Abrams sought damages under a federal liability law that allowed people to sue for damages for federal rights violations.

The district court agreed with Abrams and ordered the city to give Abrams the permit. But the court refused Abrams' request for damages under the separate federal liability law. The court said Congress intended for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act to include only remedies specifically found in that act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that because the act did not contain a "comprehensive remedial scheme," Abrams could seek damages under other federal laws.

Question

May people whose rights guaranteed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are violated seek remedies other than those allowed by the act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Abrams could not enforce the limitations of the Telecommunications Act on local authorities through federal liability law, because the act provides its own judicial remedy. Congress could not have meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by the Telecommunications Act to co-exist with an alternative remedy.

Leocal v. Ashcroft

Tue, 12 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-583

Petitioner

Josue Leocal

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 1 (2004)

Granted

Monday, February 23, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, November 9, 2004

Advocates

Joseph S. Sollers, III (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A Florida court convicted Vietnam citizen Duan Le for driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged in federal immigration court that Le should be deported. The INS argued Le committed a crime of violence that was an aggravated felony under federal immigration laws - a deportable crime. The immigration court and an appellate immigration court ruled Le could be deported. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.

Question

Is a conviction of driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury a "crime of violence" under federal immigration law that allows the person to be deported as an aggravated felon?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Leocal, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets, National Firearms, Organized Crime Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or Gun Control Acts, except for RICO (q.v.) portion

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Chief Justice William Rhenquist, the Court held that state DUI offenses, except when involving purposeful intent, are accidental and not crimes of violence under federal law. Le therefore did not commit an aggravated felony for which he could be deported.

Rompilla v. Beard

Tue, 18 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5462

Petitioner

Ronald Rompilla

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Amy Zapp (argued the cause for Respondent)

Billy H. Nolas (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Pennsylvania court convicted Ronald Rompilla of murder. During the sentencing phase, the prosecution presented to the jury Rompilla's previous rape and assault conviction, as an aggravating factor to justify the death sentence. The jury sentenced Rompilla to death and the state supreme court affirmed. Rompilla's new lawyers filed an additional appeal, arguing that Rompilla's trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence about his various personal problems. The state courts found that Rompilla's counsel had sufficiently investigated mitigation possibilities. After Rompilla filed a federal habeas petition, a district court reversed the sentence and ruled the state supreme court had unreasonably applied the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington. Had the state court followed that case, the district court ruled, the court would have found Rompilla's trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate obvious signs of Rompilla's troubled childhood, mental illness and alcoholism. The Third Circuit reversed.

Question

Did the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel require counsel to try to obtain material counsel had known the prosecution would probably use at the trial's sentencing phase?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Rompilla, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Rompilla's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make reasonable efforts to examine the file on Rompilla's prior conviction for rape and assault. Moreover, counsel had known the prosecution would probably present the prior conviction to the jury during sentencing. In that file counsel would have found mitigating evidence about Rompilla's troubled childhood and mental health.

National Cable and Telecomm. Assn v. Brand X Internet Services

Tue, 29 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-277

Petitioner

National Cable & Telecommunications Association, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brand X Internet Services, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Federal Communications Commission and United States v. Brand X Internet Services et al., No. 04-281

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 3, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Paul T. Cappuccio (argued the cause for Petitioners in 04-277)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Petitioners in 04-281)

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, which was amended in 1996, subjected providers of "telecommunications service" to mandatory common- carrier regulation. The FCC concluded that this did not include broadband cable companies. The Ninth Circuit reversed and cited its own previous opinion that had held that cable modem service was a "telecommunications service."

Question

Did the FCC lawfully interpret the Communications Act of 1934 by deciding that broadband cable companies did not provide a "telecommunications service?"

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for National Cable and Telecomm. Assn, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Communication Act of 1934

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the FCC lawfully construed the Communications Act to not define cable broadband providers as "telecommunications services." The Court held that the Ninth Circuit should have followed the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. That decision required federal courts to defer to an agency's construction of a statute, if that statute was within the agency's jurisdiction to administer and the agency's interpretation was reasonable, even if it differed from the court's own interpretation. In this case, the Court held that the FCC's construction was reasonable.

Rousey v. Jacoway

Wed, 01 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1407

Petitioner

Richard Gerald Rousey, et ux.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jill R. Jacoway

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 320 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 7, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 2004

Decided

Monday, April 4, 2005

Advocates

Pamela S. Karlan (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Colli C. McKiever (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Richard and Betty Rousey filed bankruptcy and claimed their two Individual Retirement Accounts were exempt from the bankruptcy. Federal law exempted the following from bankruptcy: "a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract." The exemption had to be "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonable necessary for the support of the debtor...." The Rouseys said an IRA was a "similar plan or contract." The bankruptcy court and a bankruptcy appellate panel ruled an IRA not a "similar plan or contract." The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even if IRAs are "similar plans or contracts," the Rouseys' account withdrawals would not be "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service." The Eighth Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other circuits.

Question

Are individual retirement accounts (IRAs) exempt from bankruptcy estates?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Rousey, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

Yes. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Rouseys could exempt IRA assets from their bankruptcy estate. IRAs met both federal requirements dealing with exemptions from bankruptcy: They were "similar plans or contracts" to the exemptions enumerated and they "conferred a right to receive payment on account of age."

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC

Mon, 10 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-388

Petitioner

Dennis Bates, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dow Agrosciences LLC

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 431 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, January 10, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, April 27, 2005

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (argued the cause for Respondent, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A group of peanut farmers in Texas threatened to sue Dow Agrosciences in state court for damages caused by one of Dow's herbicides. The farmers alleged Dow violated Texas labeling requirements. Dow asked a federal district court to rule the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted and therefore prohibited the farmers' state law claims. The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled FIFRA expressly prohibited additional state labeling requirements such as Texas'.

Question

Does the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempt farmers' state tort claims alleging that Dow's herbicide damaged crops?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Bates, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the peanut farmers could sue Dow in state court. The Court reasoned that FIFRA preempts only state-law "requirements for labeling or packaging." The peanut farmers' defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of warranty claims were based on common-law and did not necessarily require that Dow label or package products in a particular way. The farmers' fraud and negligent-failure to warn claims, by contrast, were based on common-law rules that qualified as "requirements for labeling or packaging." However, FIFRA preempted only state-law labeling requirements" that were "in addition to or different from" FIFRA's labeling standards. The Court sent back to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals the question whether Texas law governing fraud and failure-to-warn claims was parallel to FIFRA.

Devenpeck v. Alford

Mon, 08 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-710

Petitioner

Gerald Devenpeck, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jerome Anthony Alford

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 146 (2004)

Granted

Monday, April 19, 2004

Argued

Monday, November 8, 2004

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Advocates

James B. Comey (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Randolph Stuart Phillips (argued the cause for Respondent)

Maureen A. Hart (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Tony Alford was driving when Washington state police, concerned Alford was impersonating a police officer, pulled him over. During a search of Alford's car, police found a tape recorder recording the traffic stop. The police arrested Alford and said he had made an illegal recording of a private conversation - a violation, they said, of the state's Privacy Act. A state court judge dismissed charges against Alford, ruling - as another state court already had - that the Privacy Act did not apply to public police work.

Alford then sued the officers in federal district court, alleging his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for the officers.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the officers violated Alford's Fourth Amendment rights. The facts and law were so clearly established that no reasonable officer could believe Alford violated the Privacy Act. Therefore the officers lacked probable cause for the arrest and were not protected by qualified immunity. The court rejected the officers' argument that the arrest was constitutional because there was probable cause Alford committed the crime of impersonating a police officer. That was not the reason police gave during the arrest. The Ninth Circuit said there was only one instance when an arrest for a reason the police did not articulate was constitutional: if that reason was closely related to the stated reason for the arrest. Impersonating a police officer was not closely related to violating the state Privacy Act. Other circuit courts disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's "closely related offense doctrine."

Question

(1) Does an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment when a police officer has probable cause to make an arrest for one offense, if that offense is not closely related to the offense articulated by the officer at the time of the arrest? (2) For the purposes of qualified immunity, was "closely related offense doctrine" clearly established given that different circuit courts disagreed on its application?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Devenpeck, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that police had probable cause to arrest Alford for impersonating a police officer, despite the fact that this was not closely related to the offense police identified during the arrest. A warrantless arrest by a police officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if, given the facts known to the officer, there is probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed. The offense establishing probable cause need not be closely related to the offense the arresting officer identifies at the time of arrest. An arresting officer's state of mind, except for facts he knows, is irrelevant to probable cause.

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma & Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation v. Leavitt

Tue, 09 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1472

Petitioner

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, No. 03-853

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 631 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 22, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 1, 2005

Advocates

Lloyd B. Miller (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) allows tribes to administer health care programs previously run by the federal government. Tribes can opt to do this by entering into contracts with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is obligated to fund tribe-run health services as if they were still federally run. The Secretary must also fund "contract support costs" associated with carrying out the contract. However, ISDA requires the federal government to fund contract support costs only to the extent money is available. ISDA also does not require the federal government to reduce funding for some tribe programs to make funds available for other tribes. In two separate cases tribes claimed the federal government under-funded contract support costs. The Secretary argued the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act made it clear the government lacked the funds to pay the full contract support costs. In one case a federal appellate court ruled that the federal government did not adequately fund contract support costs and that funds were available. In another case a federal appellate court ruled for the federal government.

Question

Did the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to pay "contract support costs," even if the government contends funds were not available?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma & Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 450

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the government was legally bound to pay the contract support costs. Only in a "special" instance could the government break its promise to pay the costs. In this case, the government had access to sufficient unrestricted funds appropriated by Congress. Moreover, nothing in the act's language suggested it was non-binding.

Illinois v. Caballes

Wed, 10 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-923

Petitioner

Illinois

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Roy I. Caballes

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 405 (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 5, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, November 10, 2004

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2005

Advocates

Ralph E. Meczyk (argued the cause for Respondent)

Lisa Madigan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Christopher A. Wray (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

During a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable facts to support its use, "unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation."

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure clause require a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a canine sniff during a routine traffic stop?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Illinois, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the Court's 7-2 opinion that Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The Constitution did not require police to have reasonable suspicion to use a drug-detection dog on a car during a legal traffic stop. No legitimate privacy was at risk, the Court argued, because the dog only alerted to an illegal drug.

Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education

Tue, 30 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1672

Petitioner

Roderick Jackson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Birmingham Board of Education

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 167 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 14, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Advocates

Kenneth L. Thomas (argued the cause for Respondent)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Roderick Jackson, a high school basketball coach, claimed he was fired for complaining that the girls' basketball team he coached was denied equal treatment by the school. Jackson sued the Birmingham Board of Education in federal court, claiming his firing violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Title IX bans sex discrimination in federally-funded schools. Jackson claimed Title IX gave him the right to sue - a "private right of action" - because he suffered for reporting sex discrimination against others, despite the fact the he did not suffer from sex discrimination. The federal district court and appellate court ruled against Jackson.

Question

Does Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 allow suits for retaliation for complaints about unlawful sex discrimination?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Jackson, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Education Amendments of 1972

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Title IX allowed suits alleging retaliation for reporting sex discrimination. Such retaliation, the majority reasoned, constituted intentional discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. Jackson therefore had the right under Title IX to pursue his claim in court.

Wilkinson v. Dotson

Mon, 06 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-287

Petitioner

Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

William Dwight Dotson, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 74 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 22, 2004

Argued

Monday, December 6, 2004

Decided

Monday, March 7, 2005

Advocates

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Alan Edward Untereiner (argued the cause for Respondent Dotson)

John Q. Lewis (argued the cause for Respondent Johnson)

Facts of the Case

Ohio state prisoners Rogerico Johnson and William Dwight Dotson separately alleged their parole proceedings violated due process. Each sued the Ohio prison system under a section of the U.S. Code - section 1983 - which allows prisoners to challenge conditions of confinement. The district courts dismissed the prisoners' claims. The courts ruled their claims challenging parole decisions actually challenged their sentences and that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey (1994) barred prisoners from using section 1983 to do this. The prisoners could make their claims only under the section of the U.S. Code that allows prisoners to petition for habeas corpus. A federal appellate court reversed the district courts' decisions.

Question

(1) May a prisoner bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that his parole proceedings violate due process, even though success on the merits of the claim would result only in a new parole hearing and would not necessarily guarantee earlier release from prison? (2) Does a federal court judgment ordering a new parole hearing "necessarily imply the invalidity of" the decision at the previous parole hearing and therefore challenge the sentence itself?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Dotson, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

Yes and No. In an 8-1 decision, the Court affirmed the appellate court and ruled that prisoners could use Section 1983 to challenge a state's parole procedures. The majority opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that though prisoners cannot use Section 1983 to directly challenge their sentences, they can bring suit under the Section when a successful suit "would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner." Though a successful constitutional challenge to Ohio's parole procedures might make it more likely that the prisoners would be released from prison sooner, the Court called the connection "too tenuous" for the prisoners' suit to be considered a challenge of the sentences themselves. The Court ruled that since the prisoners sought only new parole hearings, not reduced sentences, a favorable ruling would not necessarily imply the invalidity of their sentences. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a lone dissent arguing that challenges to parole proceedings can only be brought by a petition for habeas corpus.

Howell v. Mississippi

Mon, 29 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9560

Petitioner

Marlon Latodd Howell, aka Marlon Cox

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mississippi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 440 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, November 29, 2004

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2005

Advocates

Ronnie M. Mitchell (argued the cause for Petitioner)

James M. Hood, III (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Mississippi court convicted Marlon Howell of capital murder - murder committed during a felony - and sentenced him to death. Howell appealed and argued the trial court was wrong to deny the jury the option of finding Howell guilty of the lesser offenses of non-capital murder or manslaughter, for which the death penalty would not have been an option. The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled against Howell and said there was no evidence to support lesser charges.

Question

1.) In death penalty cases can a state court refuse to give a jury the option of finding a defendant guilty of at least one lesser offense if it is recognized by state law and supported by evidence? 2.) Was Howell's federal constitutional claim properly raised before the Mississippi Supreme Court?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mississippi, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1257

In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the case because Howell had not first raised his federal constitutional claims in state court.

Wilkinson v. Austin

Wed, 30 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-495

Petitioner

Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Charles E. Austin, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Deanne E. Maynard (argued the cause for Petitioners)

James M. Petro (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Jules Lobel (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

When Ohio's highest security prison first opened, no official policy governed placement there, resulting in haphazard and erroneous placements. Ohio ultimately issued the "New Policy," which required formal procedures for evaluating whether prisoners classified for placement into the facility. The New Policy also required a three-tier review process after a recommendation for Supermax placement was made. For instance, the state had to explain a placement recommendation to an inmate and that inmate had to have an opportunity for rebuttal at a hearing. Prisoners in the facility sued in federal district court, alleging the prison placement policy violated the 14th Amendment's due process clause. The court agreed that the New Policy violated due process and ordered elaborate and far-reaching modifications to the policy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but set aside the substantive modifications on the ground they exceeded the court's authority.

Question

Did the placement policies for Ohio's highest security prison violate the 14th Amendment's due process clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wilkinson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the procedures by which the New Policy classified prisoners for placement at the facility provided sufficient protection to comply with the due process clause. The Court reasoned that procedural protections afforded to prisoners were necessarily limited, and that the New Policy sufficiently minimized risk of erroneous placement. The Court also cited Ohio's interests in prison security against gangs and in preserving scarce resources.

San Diego v. Roe

Thu, 17 May 2012 12:09:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1669

Petitioner

City of San Diego, California

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John Roe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 77 (2004)

Decided

Monday, December 6, 2004

Facts of the Case

John Roe, a San Diego police officer, was fired for selling a video on eBay that showed him stripping off a police uniform and masturbating. He then sued the city in federal district court and alleged his firing violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court ruled against the officer; the Ninth Circuit reversed.

Question

San Diego fired John Roe from the city police force after he made and sold online a video showing him engaging in sexually explicit acts. Did this violate John Roe's First Amendment right to free speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for San Diego, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that firing Roe for his behavior and "speech" did not violate the First Amendment. Government employers, the Court wrote, could restrict their employees' speech in ways that would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public. But government employees had the right to speak on matters of public concern, such as on government policies of interest to the public. In this case, however, Roe's activities did not inform the public about the police department and were also detrimental to the force.

Miller-El v. Dretke

Mon, 06 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9659

Petitioner

Thomas Joe Miller-El

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, December 6, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Gena A. Bunn (argued the cause for Respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Miller-El alleged the prosecution in his capital murder trial violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause by excluding 10 of 11 blacks from the jury. The jury convicted Miller-El and he was sentenced to death. State courts rejected Miller-El's appeals and ruled Miller-El failed to meet the requirements for proving jury-selection discrimination outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky(1986). Miller-El then appealed to a federal district court. The district court rejected Miller-El's appeal and ruled the court must defer to the state courts' acceptance of prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking potential jurors. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and ruled a federal court could only grant an appeal if the applicant made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

Miller-El appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and in Miller-El v. Cockrell(2003) the Court ruled the Fifth Circuit should have accepted Miller- El's appeal to review the district court's ruling. The Supreme Court said an appeal should have been granted if the petitioner could demonstrate reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court's decision. The Court said the district court did not give full consideration to the substantial evidence Miller-El presented. The Fifth Circuit reconsidered Miller-El's appeal and ruled Miller-El failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the state court was wrong to find no purposeful discrimination.

Question

Did the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, by rejecting Miller-El's claim the prosecution purposefully excluded blacks from his jury, violate the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003)? 2. Did the Texas jury selection manual encourage unconstitutional disparate questioning based on race?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Miller-El, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that Miller-El deserved to win his appeal because the jury selection in his case violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The Court began by noting that the prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 91 percent of the eligible black prospective jurors, "a disparity unlikely to have been produced by happenstance." After comparing two eliminated black prospective jurors with similar white jurors who were not eliminated, the Court concluded that the "selection process was replete with evidence that prosecutors were selecting and rejecting potential jurors because of race." The Court further concluded that Texas' jury selection manual, both in this case and generally, tended to allow prosecutors to read disparate questions to prospective jurors depending on whether they were black or white.

Tory v. Cochran

Tue, 22 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1488

Petitioner

Ulysses Tory, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 734 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Advocates

Erwin Chemerinsky (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Jonathan B. Cole (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Johnnie Cochran sued his former client Ulysses Tory in a California court for making defaming statements. Tory had tried to force Cochran to pay him money in exchange for desisting, Cochran argued. A judge agreed and ordered Tory to never talk about Cochran again. Tory appealed unsuccessfully in state court, arguing the order violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Cochran died one week after oral argument.

Question

Did a judge's order that someone stop making defaming statements about a public figure, even after that figure's death, violate the First Amendment right to free speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Tory, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Cochran's death diminished the grounds for the judge's order and that the order therefore amounted to an overly broad prior restraint on speech. Tory could no longer try to force Cochran to pay him in exchange for desisting, the Court reasoned, ending the order's underlying justification.

Dodd v. United States

Tue, 22 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5286

Petitioner

Michael Donald Dodd

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, November 29, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Janice L. Bergmann (argued the cause for Petitioner)

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Dodd was convicted under federal law for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On April 4, 2001 he filed a motion that the conviction should be set aside because it was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1999 in Richardson v. U.S. In that case, the Court held that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The district court rejected Dodd's motion, because it was filed more than a year after the Court decided Richardson. Under federal law, the one-year limitation period in which a prisoner may file a motion to change his sentence, begins "on the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." The 11th Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is the start date for a federal prisoner's one-year limitation period the date on which the Court "initially recongized" the right asserted in an applicant's motion, or the date on which the right is "made retroactive?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the text of the federal law "unequivocally" stated that the one-year limitation period begins to run on the date on which the Court "initially recongized" the right, not the date on which that right was made retroactive. O'Connor wrote that Dodd's reliance on the statute's second clause was misplaced, because that clause merely limited the subsection's applicability to cases where applicants assert rights both "newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made applicable to cases on collateral reviiew." Thus, the date the right was asserted does not apply at all unless the second clause's conditions are met. The Court noted that this would make it difficult for applicants filing second or successive motions to obtain relief, since the Court rarely announces a new rule and makes it retroactive within a year.

Johnson v. California

Mon, 18 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-6964

Petitioner

Jay Shawn Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 18, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Stephen B. Bedrick (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Seth K. Schalit (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

NonJay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a "strong likelihood" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show "strong likelihood" that the challenges were race- based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder.

Johnson appealed and argued that the "strong likelihood" standard in Wheeler was at odds with the 'reasonable inference" standard the U.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the same. The U.S. Supreme Court at first dismissed Johnson's appeal because the case was not finalized (see Johnson v. California 2004, No. 03-6539). After another round of appeals, however, the Court agreed to decide the case.

Question

In order to establish a prima facie case under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), must the objector show that it is more likely than not that the other party's peremptory challenges were based on impermissible group bias?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Johnson, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the California Supreme Court and ruled that California's standard for objections to peremptory challenges was incompatible with the standard set forth in Batson. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens explained that the Court had not intended that the objector would have to prove that a peremptory challenge was "more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination." The Court ruled that in the first step of the Batson procedure, the objector only needs to "produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred." The objector ultimately has to prove that the peremptory challenge was motivated by purposeful racial discrimination, but not until the third step of the Batson procedure, after the State has offered "permissible race-neutral justifications" for the challenges. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that California's standard was within the procedural leeway provided to States by Batson.

Gonzalez v. Crosby

Mon, 25 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-6432

Petitioner

Aurelio O. Gonzalez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James V. Crosby, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 14, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 25, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Christopher M. Kise (argued the cause for Respondent)

Patricia A. Millett (argued the cause for Respondent)

Paul M. Rashkind (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In Artuz v. Bennett (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court held that state petitions for postconviction relief could toll the federal statute of limitations even if those petitions were ultimately dismissed as procedurally barred. Gonzalez, whose federal habeas petition had been dismissed as time barred, filed a new petition (a Rule 60[b] petition) in light of the Artuz ruling. The district court denied Gonzalez's new motion. The 11th Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that Gonzalez's latest motion amounted to a second or succcessive habeas petition which could not be filed without precertification by the court of appeals.

Question

Did Gonzalez's Rule 60(b) motion constitute a second or successive habeas petition?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Crosby, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Gonzalez's Rule 60(b) motion challenged only the district court's previous ruling on the federal statute of limitations. That motion was therefore not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition and could be ruled on by the district court without the 11th Circuit's precertification.

Halbert v. Michigan

Mon, 25 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-10198

Petitioner

Antonio Dwayne Halbert

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 25, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

David A. Moran (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Bernard E. Restuccia (argued the cause for Respondent)

Gene C. Schaerr (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Halbert pleaded no contest in a Michigan court to two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The day after Halbert's sentence was imposed, Halbert moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and told Halbert the property remedy for his complaint was the state appellate court. Michigan required a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea to apply for leave of appeal to the state appellate court. Halbert asked the trial court twice to appoint counsel to help him with his application. The trial court refused. Without counsel, Halbert still applied for leave to appeal, which the court of appeals denied. The state supreme court also denied Halbert's application for leave to appeal to that court.

Question

Did the due process and equal protection clauses require the appointment of counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas, who sought access to a Michigan appellate court?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Halbert, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses required Michigan to provide counsel for defendants who wanted to appeal to the state appellate court. The Court reasoned that if indigent defendants convicted on their pleas did not have counsel to guide them through Michigan's complex appellate process, their right to appeal would not be meaningful.

United States v. Booker

Mon, 04 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-104

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Freddie J. Booker

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

United States v. Ducan Fanfan, No. 04-105

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 220 (2005)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

T. Christopher Kelly (argued the cause for Respondent Booker)

Rosemary Curran Scapicchio (argued the cause for Respondent Fanfan)

Facts of the Case

In Blakely v. Washington (2004) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase a sentence beyond the standard range.

Following U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge.

In another case, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188-235 months in prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases.

Question

1.) Does an enhanced sentence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on the judge's determination of a fact violate the Sixth Amendment? 2.) If so, are the Sentencing Guidelines altogether unconstitutional?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Booker, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines, where they allow judges to enhance sentences using facts not reviewed by juries, violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The sentences of Booker and Fanfan, based partly on facts determined only by judges, were therefore unconstitutional. In a separate 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court said the guidelines would now be advisory and invalidated the provisions that made them mandatory.

Whitfield v. U.S.

Tue, 30 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1293

Petitioner

David Whitfield

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Haywood Eudon Hall, aka Don Hall v. United States, No. 03-1294

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 209 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 21, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, January 11, 2005

Advocates

Jonathan L. Marcus (argued the cause for Respondent)

Sharon C. Samek (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Federal district courts convicted David Whitfield and Haywood Hall of conspiracy to commit money laundering. They appealed and argued the federal money laundering law required the jury to have found proof of an "overt act" furthering the conspiracy. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that the law lacked any language requiring proof of an overt act. Other federal appeals courts had ruled the law did require an overt act.

Question

Did a conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), require proof of an overt act furthering the conspiracy?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for U.S., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1956

No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous ruling that because the federal money laundering law's text did not expressly make committing an overt act an element of the conspiracy offense, the government did not need to prove such an act.

Bell v. Cone

Thu, 17 May 2012 12:09:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-394

Petitioner

Bell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cone

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 447 (2005)

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2005

Facts of the Case

In 1984 a Tennessee court sentenced Cone to death for murder. The jury had found four aggravating circumstances, one of which was that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Cone's state appeals were unsuccessful. A federal district court then rejected Cone's habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Bell v. Cone (2002). On remand, the Sixth Circuit again reversed Cone's sentence on the ground that the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator was unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth Amendment.

Question

A Tennessee law made it an aggravating circumstance during sentencing if a murder had been "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Did the state supreme court interpret that sufficiently narrowly, so that it did not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bell, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Tennessee Supreme Court had in several previous cases narrowly interpreted the "especially heinous" aggravator. The state supreme court had thus made what may have been facially unconstitutional constitutional. Moreover, the court did not need to explicitly narrow the statute once more in its Cone opinion. The Court chastised the Sixth Circuit for presuming "so lightly that a state court failed to apply its own law" and rearticulated the principle that federal law demanded a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings."

Tenet v. Doe

Tue, 11 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1395

Petitioner

George J. Tenet, Individually, Porter J. Goss, Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John Doe, et ux.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 1 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

David J. Burman (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Jane and John Doe said they performed espionage activities abroad for the United States. The Does sued the CIA in federal district court for not paying financial support allegedly promised to the Does and for allegedly violating the Does' due process rights. The CIA argued the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Totten v. U.S. (1875) prohibited the district court from hearing the case. In Totten the Court dismissed a spy's claim against the government for damages for breach of contract. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Totten did not prevent the district court from hearing the Does' case. The courts reasoned that the Does' case, unlike Totten's, was mainly about the denial of due process rights. The Ninth Circuit said the CIA could prohibit the district court from hearing the Does' case only if the CIA could show that state secrets would be in jeopardy were the case to proceed. The Ninth Circuit sent the case back to the district court for that court to determine the CIA's potential state secrets claim.

Question

Does Totten v. U.S. prevent a district court from considering Jane and John Does' due process and tort claims that the CIA refused to keep its alleged promise to provide them with life-time financial assistance in exchange for their alleged espionage services to the CIA?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Tenet, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 9-0 decision delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Totten barred the Does' suit. Totten, the Court ruled, prohibited judicial review in any case where success depended on the existence of a secret espionage relationship with the government. To risk revealing that relationship would endanger the essence of a spy's contract with the government - secrecy.

Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Tue, 07 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-184

Petitioner

Estate of Burton W. Kanter, Deceased, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Estate of Burton W. Kanter, Deceased, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 03-1034

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 40 (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 26, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 2004

Decided

Monday, March 7, 2005

Advocates

Stephen M. Shapiro (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under federal law, the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges to hear certain cases and to make recommendations to the Tax Court. The Tax Court judge, under Tax Rule 183(b), had to presume the special judge's fact findings to be correct, but could make the ultimate decision in the case. The special trail judge reports were made public and included in the record on appeal. Only after a rule revision in 1983 did the Tax Court stop making such reports public and exclude them from the appellate record. Whether the final Tax Court's decision deviated from the special judge's recommendations was kept secret. Tax Court Judge Howard Dawson ruled that Kanter was guilty of tax fraud and of illegally diverting money to Claude Ballard, a business associate. In his opinion, Dawson claimed to have adopted the opinion of the special trial judge. Ballard and Kanter separately appealed, objecting to the absence of the special trial judge's report from the appellate record. Two federal appellate courts ruled against Kanter and Ballard.

Question

Could the Tax Court exclude from the record on appeal Rule 183(b) reports submitted by special trial judges?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ballard, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that no statute authorized, and Rule 183's text did not warrant, the concealment of the special report. Rule 183 did not allow the "novel practice" of treating the trial judge's opinion as an "in-house draft to be worked over collaboratively by the regular Tax Court judge and the special trial judge." The rules allowed only one trial judge opinion to be issued and before a separate Tax Court ruling, Ginsburg wrote. It would be impossible for a Tax Court judge to give deference to an opinion he himself collaborated in producing. Moreover, the Tax Court's refusal to disclose the trial judge's original report did not allow fully informed appellate review of the court's decision.

Roper v. Simmons

Wed, 13 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Meramec River Fenton, MO

United States

38° 30' 47.1924" N, 90° 26' 9.4308" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-633

Petitioner

Donald P. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center

Respondent

Christopher Simmons

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 551 (2005)

Granted

Monday, January 26, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 1, 2005

Advocates

James R. Layton (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally ill. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally ill violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case.

Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional.

On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at "evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.

Question

Does the execution of minors violate the prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" found in the Eighth Amendment and applied to the states through the incorporation doctrine of the 14th Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Simmons, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that standards of decency have evolved so that executing minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death penalty among state legislatures, and its own determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the Court pointed to "overwhelming" international opinion against the juvenile death penalty. Chief Justice William Rhenquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas all dissented.

MGM Studios v. Grokster

Tue, 29 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-480

Petitioner

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Grokster, Ltd., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Richard G. Taranto (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Grokster and other companies distributed free software that allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. In such networks, users can share digital files directly between their computers, without the use of a central server. Users employed the software primarily to download copyrighted files, file-sharing which the software companies knew about and encouraged. The companies profited from advertising revenue, since they streamed ads to the software users. A group of movie studios and other copyright holders sued and alleged that Grokster and the other companies violated the Copyright Act by intentionally distributing software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works. The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning that the software distribution companies were not liable for copyright violations stemming from their software, which could have been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Were companies that distributed file-sharing software, and encouraged and profited from direct copyright infringement using such software, liable for the infringement?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for MGM Studios, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 17 U.S.C. 101

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that companies that distributed software, and promoted that software to infringe copyrights, were liable for the resulting acts of infringement. The Court argued that although the Copyright Act did not expressly make anyone liable for another's infringement, secondary liability doctrines applied here. The software in this case was used so widely to infringe copyrights that it would have been immensely difficult to deal with each individual infringer. The "only practical alternative" was to go against the software distributor for secondary liability. Here the software companies were liable for encouraging and profiting from direct infringement.

Medellin v. Dretke

Mon, 28 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5928

Petitioner

Jose Ernesto Medellin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 660 (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 28, 2005

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

R. Ted Cruz (argued the cause for Respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Respondent)

Donald Francis Donovan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Texas trial court sentenced Medellin, a Mexican citizen, to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two girls in 1993. A state appeals court affirmed the conviction. Medellin then filed a state habeas corpus action, claiming that Texas failed to notify him of his right to counsel under the Vienna Convention. The state trial court and the appellate court rejected this claim. Medellin then filed a federal habeas petition, raising the Vienna Convention claim. The district court denied the petition. Medellin next appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Before the Fifth Circuit could rule, the International Court of Justice issued its decision in a case where Mexico had alleged the United States violated the Vienna Convention with respect to Medellin and other Mexican citizens facing the death penalty in the United States. The ICJ held that the United States had violated the individually enforceable rights guaranteed by Vienna and must reconsider the convictions. The Fifth Circuit rejected Medellin's appeal, citing its previous holdings that the Vienna Convention did not create an individually enforceable right. More than two months after the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, President George W. Bush issued a memo requiring the United States to follow the ICJ's ruling by having state courts review the Mexicans' cases. Citing the memo and the ICJ ruling, Medellin filed a new appeal in a Texas state court.

Question

Is a federal court bound by the International Court of Justice's ruling that U.S. courts must reconsider a Mexican citizen's claim for relief under the Vienna Convention? 2. Should a federal court enforce an ICJ ruling?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Dretke, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that Medellin had not exhausted his state court appeals and sent the case back to Texas state court.

Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo

Wed, 12 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-932

Petitioner

Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Broudo, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 336 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, April 19, 2005

Advocates

Patrick J. Coughlin (argued the cause for Respondents)

William F. Sullivan (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Michael Broudo and a group of shareholders sued Dura Pharmaceuticals under the Securities and Exchange Act after the price of the company's stock dropped sharply. The shareholders alleged the company's misleading statements about its antibiotic sales and about the possibility of FDA approval of an asthma device caused the price drop. The district court ruled the investors failed to prove "loss causation" because they could not prove a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the drop in price. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the investors proved loss causation because they proved the stock price on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation.

Question

To prove "loss causation" in a securities fraud case, is it sufficient to show that the price of the security on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that an inflated purchase price did not by itself prove "loss causation." At most, an inflated purchase price suggested that misrepresentation "touched upon" a later economic loss, but did not necessarily cause it. The Court reasoned that at the moment the transaction took place, the plaintiff had not suffered a loss because the inflated purchase price was offset by ownership of a share that possessed equivalent value at that instant. Further, the logical link between the inflated purchase price and any later economic loss was not invariably strong, because other factors may have affected the price.

Pace v. DiGuglielmo

Mon, 28 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9627

Petitioner

John A. Pace

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

David DiGuglielmo, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 408 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, February 28, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, April 27, 2005

Advocates

Ronald Eisenberg (argued the cause for Respondents)

David Wycoff (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1986 John Pace was convicted for murder in a Pennsylvania court. His post- conviction appeal was rejected by the state courts as untimely. In 1999 he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. While federal law provides a one-year statute of limitations on filing habeas petitions, that period is tolled while "a properly filed" state appeal is pending. The district court found Pace entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling, effectively discounting the period of time when Pace pursued appeals in state courts. Pennsylvania appealed and argued the court had no basis for the extension. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and ruled Pace could not file a federal habeas petition.

Question

If a state court rejected Pace's post-conviction appeal as untimely, could his federal habeas petition still be "properly filed" within the context of the federal law establishing a one-year statute of limitations for such petitions?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for DiGuglielmo, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the federal statute of limitations barred Pace's petition, as it was filed beyond the deadline. Pace was not entitled to statutory tolling because a petition filed after a time limit, which does meet any exceptions to that limit, was no more "properly filed" than a petition filed after a time limit permitting no exception. Moreover, because Pace did not pursue claims in a "diligent" and timely fashion, he was not entitled equitable tolling for any of the time period during which he pursued his state appeals.

Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss.

Wed, 03 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1160

Petitioner

Azel P. Smith, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Jackson, Mississippi, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 228 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 29, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Advocates

Glen D. Nager (argued the cause for Respondents)

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Azel Smith and group of other police department employees over the age of 40 sued Jackson, Mississippi, and the city police department in federal district court. The group alleged the department salary plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which banned employers from engaging in age discrimination. The department plan gave officers with five or fewer years of tenure with the department larger raises than those with more than five years of tenure. The group made a "disparate impact" claim under the ADEA, arguing the department and city unintentionally engaged in age discrimination. The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled disparate impact claims could not be made under the ADEA. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary.

Question

Can a disparate impact claim - a claim alleging unintentional discrimination - be made under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for City of Jackson, Miss., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that ADEA authorized recovery in disparate-impact cases, but that in this case petitioners failed to set forth a valid claim. The Court relied on its 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power, where the Court first authorized disparate- impact claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court reasoned that the ADEA authorized disparate-impact claims in cases similar to Griggs, because the language of Title VII and ADEA was virtually identical. However, ADEA was narrower than Title VII and allowed an otherwise prohibited action where the discrimination was based on reasonable factors other than age. The employees in this case failed to identify any specific practice within the pay plan that had an adverse impact on older workers. Further, the city's plan was based on reasonable factors other than age.