http://www.oyez.org/cases/2004/podcast U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en The Oyez Project at Chicago-Kent http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_368/argument As Enron's financial difficulties became public in 2001, Arthur Andersen instructed its employees to destroy Enron-related documents. This was consistent with Andersen's document retention policy. The government later charged Andersen for violating federal law, which made it a crime to "knowingly...corruptly persuade another person" to "withold" or "alter" documents in an "offical proceeding." The federal jury found Andersen guilty. The company appealed, arguing the jury instructions failed to convey the elements of a "corrupt persuasion" conviction - specifically, that a "consciousness of wrongdoing" was required. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction. Wed, 27 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56597 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1230/argument Michigan law required every truck engaged in intrastate commercial hauling to pay a flat $100 annual fee. Interstate trucking companies asked Michigan courts to invalidate the fee, claiming the flat fee discriminated against interstate carriers and imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate trade (in violation of the "dormant" commerce clause). They pointed to the fact that trucks carrying both interstate and intrastate loads engaged in intrastate business less than trucks that only haul within Michigan. State courts refused to invalidate the fee. Tue, 26 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56585 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_514/argument A Tennessee trial court sentenced Thompson to death for murder. Thompson made unsuccesful appeals in state court based on the claim that his counsel had failed to adequately investigate his mental health. A federal district court also rejected Thompson's petition based on that claim. However, Thompson's habeas counsel had failed to include in the record the deposition and report of a psychologist who argued Thompson had suffered from serious mental illness. The counsel included the documents when Thompson appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which nevertheless dismissed Thompson's claim. Thompson then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate until the Court decided whether to hear the case. The Court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate again, pending the Supreme Court's decision on Thompson's petition for rehearing, which the Court denied. The Sixth Circuit still did not issue its mandate. Five months later, Tennessee had set Thompson's execution date. The Sixth Circuit suddenly issued an amended opinion on Thompson's habeas petition, overturning the district court's dismissal of his ineffective counsel claim and ordering hearings based on that claim. The Sixth Circuit included in the appeal record the initially ommitted psychologist deposition. The circuit court argued its authority to issue an amended opinion five months after the Supreme Court denied Thompson's petition was based on its inherent power to reconsider an opinion before issuance of the the mandate. Tue, 26 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56729 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1234/argument A Michigan law imposed an annual $100 fee on each Michigan license-plated truck that operated entirely in interstate commerce. A group of interstate trucking companies sought unsuccesfully to have Michigan courts invalidate the law. The companies claimed that the federal law that had created the Single State Registration System (SSRS) preempted and prohibited such state fees. Under the federal law a trucking company could obtain a permit applicable in every state by registering once in a single state. While the initial state could demand a fee equal to the sum of its individual state fee, the law prohibited a state from imposing an additional "state registration requirement." Tue, 26 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56715 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_10198/argument Halbert pleaded no contest in a Michigan court to two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The day after Halbert's sentence was imposed, Halbert moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and told Halbert the property remedy for his complaint was the state appellate court. Michigan required a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea to apply for leave of appeal to the state appellate court. Halbert asked the trial court twice to appoint counsel to help him with his application. The trial court refused. Without counsel, Halbert still applied for leave to appeal, which the court of appeals denied. The state supreme court also denied Halbert's application for leave to appeal to that court. Mon, 25 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56657 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_6432/argument In Artuz v. Bennett (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court held that state petitions for postconviction relief could toll the federal statute of limitations even if those petitions were ultimately dismissed as procedurally barred. Gonzalez, whose federal habeas petition had been dismissed as time barred, filed a new petition (a Rule 60[b] petition) in light of the Artuz ruling. The district court denied Gonzalez's new motion. The 11th Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that Gonzalez's latest motion amounted to a second or succcessive habeas petition which could not be filed without precertification by the court of appeals. Mon, 25 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56655 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1237/argument Integra Lifesciences sued Merck for supplying an Integra patented compound to other drug companies for use in preclinical research. In response, Merck claimed its actions were allowed under the federal law that said it was not an act of patent infringement to use or import a patented invention into the United States, if the invention was used only in ways related to the development and submission of information under a federal drug law (such as the law governing submission of data to the FDA). The district court ruled against Merck and awarded Integra damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment but ordered a modification of damages. Wed, 20 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56723 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_169/argument The False Claims Act (FCA) allows the government or an individual on the government's behalf to sue any person for "making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States." A 1986 amendment to the FCA allows individuas to sue their employer if the employer retaliates against them in any way for assisting in an investigation of such false claims. In 2001, Karen Wilson, a secretary for Graham County Water District, sued her employer for various false claims it allegedly made concerning a federal disaster relief program. She also brought a retaliation suit against her employer, alleging that after she had provided information on the false claims to federal officials in December 1995, she had been repeatedly harassed by Graham County District officials until she resigned in March 1997. The District Court dismissed Wilson's suit as untimely. The court accepted Graham County District's argument that the six-year statute of limitations in the 1986 amendment to the FCA was not intended to apply to retaliation suits. Therefore, the court held, the most closely analogous state limitation applies instead. The north Carolina limit for retaliation suits was three years, so Wilson's suit was brought too late. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and applied the six-year limitation to all retaliation suits under the FCA. Wed, 20 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56617 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_637/argument In Ohio state court proceedings, Stumpf pled guilty in to aggravated murder committed in an armed robbery. That robbery had left Mr. Stout wounded and Mrs. Stout dead. While Stumpf admitted to shooting Mr. Stout, he insisted his accomplice Wesley had shot Mrs. Stout. A three-judge panel ruled Stumpf the principal offender in Mrs. Stout's murder and sentenced him to death. Following this, in Wesley's trial, the state presented evidence that Wesley had admitted to shooting Mrs. Stout. After Wesley's trial, Stumpf moved to withdraw his plea or reverse his death sentence, arguing that the evidence presented by the prosecution in Wesley's trial was inconsistent with what it had presented in his own. This, Stumpf argued, cast doubt on his conviction and sentence. Stumpf's motion was unscucessful in Ohio courts. A federal district court denied Stumpf habeas relief, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. Tue, 19 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56691 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_563/argument A California state court sentenced Felix to life in prison for murder. Felix's conviction became final on August 12, 1997. Federal habeas law gave Felix one year to file a habeas petition in federal court. On May 8, 1998, Felix filed a habeas petition and asserted a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission into his trial of videotaped prosecution witness testimony. On January 28, 1999, more than five months after the one-year habeas time limit, Felix filed an amended petition arguing that the admission into his trial of pretrial statements had violated the Fifth Amendment. Felix argued that the one-year limit did not bar this amended petition, citing the rule under federal habeas law that amended petitions relate back to the filing date of the original petition if both arise out of the original's "conduct, transaction or occurrence." Because his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims challenged the same criminal conviction, Felix argued, they arose out of the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence." The district court disagreed and ruled the amended petition time barred; the court rejected the Sixth Amendment claim on its merits. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Sixth Amendment ruling, but agreed with Felix that his amended petition was not time barred because they both arose out of the same trial and conviction. Tue, 19 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56727 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_6964/argument NonJay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a "strong likelihood" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show "strong likelihood" that the challenges were race- based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder. Johnson appealed and argued that the "strong likelihood" standard in Wheeler was at odds with the 'reasonable inference" standard the U.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the same. The U.S. Supreme Court at first dismissed Johnson's appeal because the case was not finalized (see Johnson v. California 2004, No. 03-6539). After another round of appeals, however, the Court agreed to decide the case. Mon, 18 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56653 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_603/argument The IRS seized property owned by Grable and gave Grable notice by certified mail before selling the property to Darue. Grable sued in state court, claiming Darue's title was invalid because federal law required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by personal service, not certified mail. Darue removed the case to federal disctrict court, arguing that the case presented a federal question because Grable's claim depended on an interpretation of federal tax law. The district court agreed and ruled for Darue. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision. Mon, 18 Apr 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56619 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_495/argument When Ohio's highest security prison first opened, no official policy governed placement there, resulting in haphazard and erroneous placements. Ohio ultimately issued the "New Policy," which required formal procedures for evaluating whether prisoners classified for placement into the facility. The New Policy also required a three-tier review process after a recommendation for Supermax placement was made. For instance, the state had to explain a placement recommendation to an inmate and that inmate had to have an opportunity for rebuttal at a hearing. Prisoners in the facility sued in federal district court, alleging the prison placement policy violated the 14th Amendment's due process clause. The court agreed that the New Policy violated due process and ordered elaborate and far-reaching modifications to the policy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but set aside the substantive modifications on the ground they exceeded the court's authority. Wed, 30 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56645 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_480/argument Grokster and other companies distributed free software that allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. In such networks, users can share digital files directly between their computers, without the use of a central server. Users employed the software primarily to download copyrighted files, file-sharing which the software companies knew about and encouraged. The companies profited from advertising revenue, since they streamed ads to the software users. A group of movie studios and other copyright holders sued and alleged that Grokster and the other companies violated the Copyright Act by intentionally distributing software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works. The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning that the software distribution companies were not liable for copyright violations stemming from their software, which could have been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Tue, 29 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56669 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_277/argument Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, which was amended in 1996, subjected providers of "telecommunications service" to mandatory common- carrier regulation. The FCC concluded that this did not include broadband cable companies. The Ninth Circuit reversed and cited its own previous opinion that had held that cable modem service was a "telecommunications service." Tue, 29 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56627 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_5928/argument A Texas trial court sentenced Medellin, a Mexican citizen, to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two girls in 1993. A state appeals court affirmed the conviction. Medellin then filed a state habeas corpus action, claiming that Texas failed to notify him of his right to counsel under the Vienna Convention. The state trial court and the appellate court rejected this claim. Medellin then filed a federal habeas petition, raising the Vienna Convention claim. The district court denied the petition. Medellin next appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Before the Fifth Circuit could rule, the International Court of Justice issued its decision in a case where Mexico had alleged the United States violated the Vienna Convention with respect to Medellin and other Mexican citizens facing the death penalty in the United States. The ICJ held that the United States had violated the individually enforceable rights guaranteed by Vienna and must reconsider the convictions. The Fifth Circuit rejected Medellin's appeal, citing its previous holdings that the Vienna Convention did not create an individually enforceable right. More than two months after the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, President George W. Bush issued a memo requiring the United States to follow the ICJ's ruling by having state courts review the Mexicans' cases. Citing the memo and the ICJ ruling, Medellin filed a new appeal in a Texas state court. Mon, 28 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56671 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_340/argument The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $567,000 conversion fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state-court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred litigants from suing in federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court (the rule of "issue preclusion"). The hoteliers asked the district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause. Mon, 28 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56591 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1488/argument Johnnie Cochran sued his former client Ulysses Tory in a California court for making defaming statements. Tory had tried to force Cochran to pay him money in exchange for desisting, Cochran argued. A judge agreed and ordered Tory to never talk about Cochran again. Tory appealed unsuccessfully in state court, arguing the order violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Cochran died one week after oral argument. Tue, 22 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56649 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_5286/argument In 1997, Dodd was convicted under federal law for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On April 4, 2001 he filed a motion that the conviction should be set aside because it was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1999 in Richardson v. U.S. In that case, the Court held that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The district court rejected Dodd's motion, because it was filed more than a year after the Court decided Richardson. Under federal law, the one-year limitation period in which a prisoner may file a motion to change his sentence, begins "on the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." The 11th Circuit affirmed. Tue, 22 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56651 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_278/argument Jessica Gonzales requested a restraining order against her estranged husband. A state trial court issued the order, which prohibited the husband from seeing Gonzales or their three daughters except during pre-arranged visits. A month later, Gonzales's husband abducted the three children. Gonzales repeatedly urged the police to search for and arrest her husband, but the police told her to wait until later that evening and see if her husband brought the children back. During the night Gonzales's husband murdered all three children and then opened fire inside a police station, where police returned fire and killed him. Gonzales brought a complaint in federal District Court, alleging that the Castle Rock police had violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by willfully or negligently refusing to enforce her restraining order. The Due Process Clause states: "No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that no principle of substantive or procedural due process allowed Gonzales to sue a local government for its failure to enforce a restraining order. On appeal, however, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had a legitimate procedural due process claim. A rehearing by the full appeals court agreed, ruling that Gonzales had a "protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining order," which the police had violated. Mon, 21 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56609 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_9877/argument The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a "compelling government interest." Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their "nonmainstream" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws "respecting an establishment of religion"). The district court rejected that argument and ruled for the inmates. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Mon, 21 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56589 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1500/argument Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion. Wed, 02 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56605 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1693/argument The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause. Wed, 02 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56613 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_5293/argument After the Missouri Supreme Court set aside Carman Deck's death sentence, Deck was presented at his new sentence hearing shackled with leg irons, handcuffs and a belly chain. Deck was again sentenced to death. The state supreme court rejected Deck's claim that his shackling violated the U.S. Constitution. Tue, 01 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56679 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_70/argument In 1991 about 10,000 Exxon dealers sued Exxon Corporation in federal court, alleging that the corporation had engaged in an extensive scheme to overcharge them for fuel. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, but the District Court judge certified the case for review on the question of supplemental jurisdiction. Some of the multiple plaintiffs in the case had claims that did not meet the minimum amount necessary to qualify for federal diversity jurisdiction (currently $75,000). In 1990 Congress had enacted 28 U.S.C. Section 1367, overturning Finley v. United States, which had narrowly interpreted federal courts' power to confer supplementary jurisdiction on related claims. The question for the District Court was whether Section 1367 also overturned Zahn v. International Paper Co., which ruled that each plaintiff had to separately meet the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. The District Court accepted the plaintiffs' argument that Section 1367 gave federal courts power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs with related claims, even if some plaintiffs' claims did not meet the required amount. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling on supplemental jurisdiction. However, this ruling conflicted with the ruling of another Circuit, which had taken the opposite view of Section 1367's scope (see Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, No. 04-79). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument. Tue, 01 Mar 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56709 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_9627/argument In 1986 John Pace was convicted for murder in a Pennsylvania court. His post- conviction appeal was rejected by the state courts as untimely. In 1999 he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. While federal law provides a one-year statute of limitations on filing habeas petitions, that period is tolled while "a properly filed" state appeal is pending. The district court found Pace entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling, effectively discounting the period of time when Pace pursued appeals in state courts. Pennsylvania appealed and argued the court had no basis for the extension. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and ruled Pace could not file a federal habeas petition. Mon, 28 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56675 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1388/argument A group of disabled people who travelled on Norwegian Cruise Line ships sued the company in federal district court and alleged two of its ships did not conform with Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The company argued the ADA did not apply to the two ships because, though the ships sailed out of Texas, they sailed under the Bahamian flag. The district court dismissed the group's claims and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled foreign-flagged cruise ships are not subject to Title III of the ADA. Mon, 28 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56705 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1696/argument Two subsidiaries of ExxonMobil formed joint ventures with Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. When a dispute arose over the royalties SABIC had charged, SABIC sued the two subsidiaries in a Delaware state court, seeking a ruling that the royalties were proper. ExxonMobil countersued in federal district court, alleging SABIC had overcharged. Before the state-court trial, the district court denied SABIC's motion to dismiss the federal suit. As SABIC appealed, the Delaware court ruled for ExxonMobil. The Third Circuit held that as a result of of the state court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the suit. That doctrine was an offshoot of the federal law giving the U.S. Supreme Court sole authority to modify and prohibiting a federal district court from exercising appellate jurisdiction. Wed, 23 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56697 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1566/argument The Westlands Water District received water from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under a 1963 contract. In 1993 Westlands sued the district for reducing their water supply. California farmers who had bought water from Westlands also sued the bureau, intervening as plaintiffs. After negotiations Westlands agreed to dismiss their suit. But the farmers refused to drop theirs, accusing the bureau of breach of contract. The farmers claimed that as third-party beneficiaries they could enforce the contract and that the United States had waived its sovereing immunity from such suits in the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. That act allowed parties "to join the United States as a necessary party defendant in any suit" over rights under a federal reclamation contract. The district court held that the farmers were not contracting parties or third-party beneficiaries and thus could not invoke the waiver. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision. Wed, 23 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56599 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_108/argument New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Kelo Susette and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation. Specifically the property owners argued taking private property to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled for New London. Tue, 22 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56685 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_163/argument Hawaii enacted a limit on the rent oil companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service stations. The rent cap was a response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on gasoline prices. Chevron, one of the state's largest oil companies, argued in federal district court that the the cap was an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court held that the cap amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it did not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling gas prices. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), where the Court declared that government regulation of private property is "a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests." The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Tue, 22 Feb 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56607 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1601/argument Rancho Palos Verdes, a city in California, gave Mark Abrams a permit to construct an antenna on his property for amateur use. But when the city learned Abrams used the antenna for commercial purposes, the city forced Abrams to stop until he got a commercial use permit. Abrams applied and the city refused to give him the permit. Abrams then sued in federal district court, alleging the city violated his rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Abrams sought damages under a federal liability law that allowed people to sue for damages for federal rights violations. The district court agreed with Abrams and ordered the city to give Abrams the permit. But the court refused Abrams' request for damages under the separate federal liability law. The court said Congress intended for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act to include only remedies specifically found in that act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that because the act did not contain a "comprehensive remedial scheme," Abrams could seek damages under other federal laws. Wed, 19 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56621 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_37/argument Oklahoma's election laws created a primary system in which a party could invite only its own members and Independents to vote in its primary. The Libertarian Party and voters registered in other parties argued the laws violated the First Amendment freedoms of expression and association by preventing the Libertarian Party from inviting members of other parties to vote in its primary elections. The district court ruled for Oklahoma. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled Oklahoma's election laws violated the First Amendment. Wed, 19 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56719 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_9685/argument In 1998 a Georgia court reversed all of Johnson's seven prior convictions. One of these had been the basis for the enhanced federal sentence Johnson had received in 1994. In light of the reversals, Johnson filed a motion to vacate his enhanced federal sentence. Federal law, however, set out a one-year statute of limitations on motions by prisoners seeking to modify their sentences. That one-year period ran from the latest of four dates, the last of which was "the date on which the facts supporting the claim...could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." Johnson argued his motion was timely because the reversals constituted previously undiscoverable "facts supporting the claim" and thus triggered a renewed limitation period. The district court and the 11th Circuit denied Johnson's motion as untimely. Tue, 18 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56687 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_5462/argument A Pennsylvania court convicted Ronald Rompilla of murder. During the sentencing phase, the prosecution presented to the jury Rompilla's previous rape and assault conviction, as an aggravating factor to justify the death sentence. The jury sentenced Rompilla to death and the state supreme court affirmed. Rompilla's new lawyers filed an additional appeal, arguing that Rompilla's trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence about his various personal problems. The state courts found that Rompilla's counsel had sufficiently investigated mitigation possibilities. After Rompilla filed a federal habeas petition, a district court reversed the sentence and ruled the state supreme court had unreasonably applied the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington. Had the state court followed that case, the district court ruled, the court would have found Rompilla's trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate obvious signs of Rompilla's troubled childhood, mental illness and alcoholism. The Third Circuit reversed. Tue, 18 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56625 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_9046/argument A South Dakota court convicted Charles Rhines of murder. Rhines filed a habeas corpus petition with a federal district court, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights in the trial and conviction. The district court ruled Rhines failed to exhaust all of his claims in state court. The court stayed Rhines' habeas petition so that Rhines could finish his claims in state court. The stay prevented the one-year statute of limitations in the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act from barring Rhines from appealing to a federal court once he exhausted state remedies. The state penitentiary warden appealed. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Lundy (1982) required the dismissal of a habeas petition that included unexhausted claims. Wed, 12 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56713 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_932/argument Michael Broudo and a group of shareholders sued Dura Pharmaceuticals under the Securities and Exchange Act after the price of the company's stock dropped sharply. The shareholders alleged the company's misleading statements about its antibiotic sales and about the possibility of FDA approval of an asthma device caused the price drop. The district court ruled the investors failed to prove "loss causation" because they could not prove a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the drop in price. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the investors proved loss causation because they proved the stock price on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation. Wed, 12 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56673 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_855/argument In the late 18th century, Congress set aside most of the tribal land of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York as a reservation. The tribe later sold off much of the reservation. In the 1990s members of the tribe began to buy back pieces of the land. The tribe said the reacquired land was part of a reservation and therefore exempt from state and municipal taxes. The City of Sherrill - which encompassed some of the tribe's property - argued the land was not tax-exempt. The Oneidas sued Sherrill in federal district court and alleged the land was recognized by the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua as part of their historic reservation. The Oneidas also pointed to the 1790 Non- Intercourse Act that required federal consent for Indian land to lose its reservation status. Sherrill argued the land lost its reservation status after leaving the Oneidas' ownership originally. The district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for the Oneidas. Tue, 11 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56731 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1395/argument Jane and John Doe said they performed espionage activities abroad for the United States. The Does sued the CIA in federal district court for not paying financial support allegedly promised to the Does and for allegedly violating the Does' due process rights. The CIA argued the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Totten v. U.S. (1875) prohibited the district court from hearing the case. In Totten the Court dismissed a spy's claim against the government for damages for breach of contract. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Totten did not prevent the district court from hearing the Does' case. The courts reasoned that the Does' case, unlike Totten's, was mainly about the denial of due process rights. The Ninth Circuit said the CIA could prohibit the district court from hearing the Does' case only if the CIA could show that state secrets would be in jeopardy were the case to proceed. The Ninth Circuit sent the case back to the district court for that court to determine the CIA's potential state secrets claim. Tue, 11 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56663 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_128_orig/argument Alaska and the United States disputed ownership of two areas of submerged lands - enclaves under the Alexander Archipelago, which are more than three miles from the coast of Alaska or any island, and lands beneath the inland waters of Glacier Bay. Alaska claimed the archipelago waters under the Submerged Lands Act, which entitled states to submerged lands three miles seaward of their coastline and to land beneath inland navigable waters. The dispute over the submerged lands under Glacier Bay centered on the United States' claim that, at the time Alaska gained statehood, those lands were intended for a national monument. A Special Master appointed to deal with the conflict, recommended to the U.S. Supreme Court that the Court side with the United States with respect to both areas. Alaska appealed that decision. Mon, 10 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56601 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_388/argument A group of peanut farmers in Texas threatened to sue Dow Agrosciences in state court for damages caused by one of Dow's herbicides. The farmers alleged Dow violated Texas labeling requirements. Dow asked a federal district court to rule the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted and therefore prohibited the farmers' state law claims. The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled FIFRA expressly prohibited additional state labeling requirements such as Texas'. Mon, 10 Jan 2005 13:00:00 +0000 56631 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1164/argument The Beef Promotion and Research Act (1985) required cattle producers to pay a fee for generic beef advertisements done on behalf of the cattle industry. Some cattle producers disagreed with the advertisements. The Livestock Marketing Association sued the Department of Agriculture (DEA) in federal district court and alleged a government-required fee for advertising with which some cattle producers disagreed violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The DEA argued the advertising was government speech immune from First Amendment challenge. Another group of cattle producers, the Nebraska Cattlemen, sided with the DEA and sued the Livestock Marketing Association. The two cases were consolidated. The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the program violated the First Amendment and that the advertising was compelled and not government speech. Wed, 08 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56735 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1423/argument Police detained Mena and others in handcuffs while they searched the house they occupied. During the detention they asked Mena about her immigration status. The police had a search warrant to search the premises for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena sued the officers in federal district court for violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for Mena. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that using handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status also violated the Fourth Amendment. Wed, 08 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56689 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1116/argument Michigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In separate cases groups sued the states and argued the laws violated the U.S. Constitution's "dormant" commerce clause. The dormant commerce clause prohibited states from passing laws affecting interstate commerce, particularly laws favoring in-state business over out-of-state business. The states argued the laws were valid exercises of state power under the 21st Amendment, which ended federal Prohibition and allowed states to regulate alcohol importation. A federal district court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Michigan law violated the dormant commerce clause and did not advance the core concerns of the 21st Amendment (such as temperance). A separate federal district court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the 21st Amendment allowed New York's law. Tue, 07 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56593 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_184/argument Under federal law, the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges to hear certain cases and to make recommendations to the Tax Court. The Tax Court judge, under Tax Rule 183(b), had to presume the special judge's fact findings to be correct, but could make the ultimate decision in the case. The special trail judge reports were made public and included in the record on appeal. Only after a rule revision in 1983 did the Tax Court stop making such reports public and exclude them from the appellate record. Whether the final Tax Court's decision deviated from the special judge's recommendations was kept secret. Tax Court Judge Howard Dawson ruled that Kanter was guilty of tax fraud and of illegally diverting money to Claude Ballard, a business associate. In his opinion, Dawson claimed to have adopted the opinion of the special trial judge. Ballard and Kanter separately appealed, objecting to the absence of the special trial judge's report from the appellate record. Two federal appellate courts ruled against Kanter and Ballard. Tue, 07 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56665 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_9659/argument Miller-El alleged the prosecution in his capital murder trial violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause by excluding 10 of 11 blacks from the jury. The jury convicted Miller-El and he was sentenced to death. State courts rejected Miller-El's appeals and ruled Miller-El failed to meet the requirements for proving jury-selection discrimination outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky(1986). Miller-El then appealed to a federal district court. The district court rejected Miller-El's appeal and ruled the court must defer to the state courts' acceptance of prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking potential jurors. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and ruled a federal court could only grant an appeal if the applicant made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Miller-El appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and in Miller-El v. Cockrell(2003) the Court ruled the Fifth Circuit should have accepted Miller- El's appeal to review the district court's ruling. The Supreme Court said an appeal should have been granted if the petitioner could demonstrate reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court's decision. The Court said the district court did not give full consideration to the substantial evidence Miller-El presented. The Fifth Circuit reconsidered Miller-El's appeal and ruled Miller-El failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the state court was wrong to find no purposeful discrimination. Mon, 06 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56647 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_287/argument Ohio state prisoners Rogerico Johnson and William Dwight Dotson separately alleged their parole proceedings violated due process. Each sued the Ohio prison system under a section of the U.S. Code - section 1983 - which allows prisoners to challenge conditions of confinement. The district courts dismissed the prisoners' claims. The courts ruled their claims challenging parole decisions actually challenged their sentences and that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey (1994) barred prisoners from using section 1983 to do this. The prisoners could make their claims only under the section of the U.S. Code that allows prisoners to petition for habeas corpus. A federal appellate court reversed the district courts' decisions. Mon, 06 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56641 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1407/argument Richard and Betty Rousey filed bankruptcy and claimed their two Individual Retirement Accounts were exempt from the bankruptcy. Federal law exempted the following from bankruptcy: "a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract." The exemption had to be "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonable necessary for the support of the debtor...." The Rouseys said an IRA was a "similar plan or contract." The bankruptcy court and a bankruptcy appellate panel ruled an IRA not a "similar plan or contract." The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even if IRAs are "similar plans or contracts," the Rouseys' account withdrawals would not be "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service." The Eighth Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other circuits. Wed, 01 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56629 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_8661/argument Melvin T. Smith was tried in for illegal possession of a firearm, among other offenses. During the trial the judge ruled Smith was not guilty because the state failed to introduce direct evidence of the gun's length - therefore not proving the gun Smith possessed met the statutory definition of a firearm. The state later pointed to the state supreme court's ruling that testimony that a gun was a pistol or revolver was sufficient evidence to allow a firearm charge to go to the jury. Because a witness had testified that Smith's gun was a pistol, the judge reversed and sent the possession charge to the jury. Smith appealed and argued the judge's reversal of the not guilty ruling on the possession charge violated the Fifth Amendment's doubly jeopardy clause, which prohibited successive prosecutions. The state court of appeals rejected Smith's argument and ruled no Fifth Amendment violation occurred because the judge's reversal did not require a second proceeding. Wed, 01 Dec 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56725 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_02_1672/argument Roderick Jackson, a high school basketball coach, claimed he was fired for complaining that the girls' basketball team he coached was denied equal treatment by the school. Jackson sued the Birmingham Board of Education in federal court, claiming his firing violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Title IX bans sex discrimination in federally-funded schools. Jackson claimed Title IX gave him the right to sue - a "private right of action" - because he suffered for reporting sex discrimination against others, despite the fact the he did not suffer from sex discrimination. The federal district court and appellate court ruled against Jackson. Tue, 30 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56639 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1293/argument Federal district courts convicted David Whitfield and Haywood Hall of conspiracy to commit money laundering. They appealed and argued the federal money laundering law required the jury to have found proof of an "overt act" furthering the conspiracy. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that the law lacked any language requiring proof of an overt act. Other federal appeals courts had ruled the law did require an overt act. Tue, 30 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56661 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_9560/argument A Mississippi court convicted Marlon Howell of capital murder - murder committed during a felony - and sentenced him to death. Howell appealed and argued the trial court was wrong to deny the jury the option of finding Howell guilty of the lesser offenses of non-capital murder or manslaughter, for which the death penalty would not have been an option. The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled against Howell and said there was no evidence to support lesser charges. Mon, 29 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56643 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1454/argument In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court. The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress. Mon, 29 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56733 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1039/argument A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence. Wed, 10 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56587 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_923/argument During a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable facts to support its use, "unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation." Wed, 10 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56637 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_02_1472/argument The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) allows tribes to administer health care programs previously run by the federal government. Tribes can opt to do this by entering into contracts with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is obligated to fund tribe-run health services as if they were still federally run. The Secretary must also fund "contract support costs" associated with carrying out the contract. However, ISDA requires the federal government to fund contract support costs only to the extent money is available. ISDA also does not require the federal government to reduce funding for some tribe programs to make funds available for other tribes. In two separate cases tribes claimed the federal government under-funded contract support costs. The Secretary argued the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act made it clear the government lacked the funds to pay the full contract support costs. In one case a federal appellate court ruled that the federal government did not adequately fund contract support costs and that funds were available. In another case a federal appellate court ruled for the federal government. Tue, 09 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56635 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_725/argument Carl J. Pasquantino, David B. Pasquantino and Arthur Hilts smuggled large quantities of liquor from the United States into Canada to evade that country's heavy alcohol import taxes. A federal district court convicted them for violating the federal wire fraud statute, which prohibited the use of interstate wires for "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses." The Fourth Circuit affirmed their convictions, rejecting the petitioners' argument that they could not be prosecuted because of the common-law revenue, which rule barred courts from enforcing foreign tax laws. Tue, 09 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56717 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_9168/argument Reginald Shepard pled guilty to violating the federal statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a gun. The government argued Shepard's sentence should be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The act added at least a 15-year sentence for any felon with three or more "violent felony" convictions who then possessed a gun. The government argued at least five of the 11 breaking and entering convictions on Shepard's record were violent felonies. The ACCA listed "burglary" as a violent felony and in Taylor v. U.S.(1990) the U.S. Supreme Court said the act meant "generic burglary" of a "building or other structure." However the Massachusetts burglary law Shepard pled guilty to breaking gave burglary a nongeneric definition - including entry into non-structures like cars. Shepard argued he had not pled guilty to generic robbery. The federal district court refused to sentence Shepard under the ACCA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and said the district court must consider evidence that showed it was obvious to Shepard that he pled guilty to generic robbery. The district court refused. The First Circuit reversed and sentenced Shepard under the ACCA. Mon, 08 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56701 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_710/argument Tony Alford was driving when Washington state police, concerned Alford was impersonating a police officer, pulled him over. During a search of Alford's car, police found a tape recorder recording the traffic stop. The police arrested Alford and said he had made an illegal recording of a private conversation - a violation, they said, of the state's Privacy Act. A state court judge dismissed charges against Alford, ruling - as another state court already had - that the Privacy Act did not apply to public police work. Alford then sued the officers in federal district court, alleging his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for the officers. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the officers violated Alford's Fourth Amendment rights. The facts and law were so clearly established that no reasonable officer could believe Alford violated the Privacy Act. Therefore the officers lacked probable cause for the arrest and were not protected by qualified immunity. The court rejected the officers' argument that the arrest was constitutional because there was probable cause Alford committed the crime of impersonating a police officer. That was not the reason police gave during the arrest. The Ninth Circuit said there was only one instance when an arrest for a reason the police did not articulate was constitutional: if that reason was closely related to the stated reason for the arrest. Impersonating a police officer was not closely related to violating the state Privacy Act. Other circuit courts disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's "closely related offense doctrine." Mon, 08 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56633 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_750/argument Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. A Japanese court convicted Gary Sherwood Small for crimes punishable by a prison term longer than one year. Years later a U.S. District Court convicted Small, because of his prior conviction, of illegally possessing a gun. Small appealed and argued the term "convicted in any court" did not include convictions in foreign courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Small. Wed, 03 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56703 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1160/argument Azel Smith and group of other police department employees over the age of 40 sued Jackson, Mississippi, and the city police department in federal district court. The group alleged the department salary plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which banned employers from engaging in age discrimination. The department plan gave officers with five or fewer years of tenure with the department larger raises than those with more than five years of tenure. The group made a "disparate impact" claim under the ADEA, arguing the department and city unintentionally engaged in age discrimination. The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled disparate impact claims could not be made under the ADEA. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary. Wed, 03 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56677 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_636/argument California prisoner Garrison Johnson alleged in federal district court that the California Department of Corrections used race to assign temporary cell mates for new prisoners. Johnson alleged this violated the U.S. Constitution's equal protection clause. The district court and a federal appellate court ruled against Johnson. The appellate court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Turner v. Safley, which said a relaxed standard - as opposed to a "strict scrutiny" standard - should be used to determine whether prison regulations are constitutional. The prison's policies were "reasonably related to the administrators' concern for racial violence and thus must be upheld," the appellate court wrote. Tue, 02 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56721 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_931/argument A Florida court convicted Joe Elton Nixon of murder and sentenced him to death. During the trial Nixon's lawyer told the jury Nixon was guilty. Nixon appealed and argued he received ineffective counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Nixon said he did not agree to the lawyer's strategy. After several appeals the Florida Supreme Court granted Nixon a new trial. The court said Nixon's lawyer's comments were essentially a guilty plea and that because Nixon did not explicitly agree to the strategy, the lawyer was "per se ineffective." Tue, 02 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56615 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_814/argument Willard Stewart was injured while working on a dredge (a machine for underwater digging) for Dutra, a dredging company. Stewart alleged Dutra was negligent and sued the company in federal district court under the Jones Act. The district court ruled a dredge is not a "vessel in navigation" as defined by the Jones Act and therefore Stewart could not sue under the act. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Mon, 01 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56695 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_892/argument Sigitas Banaitis and John Banks separately argued to the U.S. Tax Court that contingency fees paid to lawyers could be deducted from taxable gross income. The court disagreed and ruled for the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS said Banaitis and Banks owed taxes on contingency fees. Banaitis appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that under Oregon law contingency fees could not be taxed as income. Banks appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled contingency fees were never taxable income. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated Banaitis' and Banks' cases. Mon, 01 Nov 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56611 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_878/argument The federal government deemed Daniel Benitez and Sergio Martinez inadmissible immigrants and detained them until they could be returned to Cuba. Benitez and Martinez argued that because deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, they could not be detained longer than the 90 days allowed by federal law. They pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis that said the government can detain beyond 90 days immigrants who were admitted to the United States, but only so long as necessary to deport them. Immigrants must be released if deportation is unforeseeable, the Court said. While separate district courts agreed deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, the Ninth Circuit and 11th Circuits disagreed over whether Zadvydas applied to inadmissible immigrants. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the two cases. Wed, 13 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56603 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_633/argument Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally ill. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally ill violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case. Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at "evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people. Wed, 13 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56667 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_674/argument A Minnesota state court convicted Somalian refugee Keyse Jama of assault. As a result the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) argued in immigration court that Jama should be deported to Somalia. The court agreed and an immigration appeals court also agreed. Jama then appealed to a federal district court and argued the part of the U.S. Code dealing with deporting an alien to his country of birth required that country to first accept the alien. Because Somalia lacked a functioning central government, this was impossible. The district court ruled for Jama. A federal appellate court reversed and said Jama and the district court misinterpreted the law. Tue, 12 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56699 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_583/argument A Florida court convicted Vietnam citizen Duan Le for driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged in federal immigration court that Le should be deported. The INS argued Le committed a crime of violence that was an aggravated felony under federal immigration laws - a deportable crime. The immigration court and an appellate immigration court ruled Le could be deported. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. Tue, 12 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56623 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_02_1028/argument James Kirby hired International Cargo Control (ICC) as a shipping intermediary to arrange a shipment of goods from Australia to Alabama. ICC issued Kirby a bill of lading (a contract that set shipping terms). The bill invoked liability limitations provided by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). The bill also included a Himalaya Clause, which extended ICC's limitations of liability to companies ICC hired. ICC hired Hamburg Sud to transport the goods. Hamburg Sud issued ICC a bill of lading that also invoked COGSA protections and included a Himalaya Clause. Hamburg Sud carried the goods on a ship to Georgia and subcontracted Norfolk Southern Railroad to transport the goods inland to Alabama. The train derailed and Kirby sued Norfolk Southern to recover the $1.5 million in damages he claimed the derailment caused his goods. The district court ruled Norfolk Southern could limit its liability to Kirby on the basis of the Himalaya clause in the Hamburg Sud contract. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Hamburg Sud bill did not limit Norfolk Southern's liability to Kirby because Kirby was not bound by its terms. Wed, 06 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56681 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_02_1192/argument Texas prodded Aviall Services to clean up contaminated property bought from Cooper Industries. Aviall sued in federal district court to force Cooper to pay some of the clean up costs. Aviall claimed it could sue Cooper under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Cooper admitted to being a potentially responsible party (PRP), but claimed it was not liable because Aviall was never sued to clean up the land and had no federal requirement to do so. The district court and a panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Aviall. The entire appellate court reversed and ruled CERCLA does not require a PRP to first be sued before seeking clean up funds from other PRPs. Wed, 06 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56711 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_409/argument Cosmetics company Lasting Impression trademarked the term "micro colors." Lasting Impression sued K.P. Permanent Make-Up in federal district court for using the term. K.P. used the "classic fair use defense" and argued it used the term only to describe K.P. products. The district court sided with K.P. Lasting appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Unlike other federal appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit required companies that used the fair use defense to prove there was no likelihood of confusion in use of the term. The Ninth Circuit ruled there was likelihood of confusion and reversed the district court's ruling. Tue, 05 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56707 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_377/argument Bradley Nigh bought a car from Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Nigh later sued the dealership for intentionally charging him for a car feature for which he did not agree to pay. Nigh sued under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). A federal district court awarded Nigh about $24,000. Koons Buick appealed and argued the district court ignored TILA's cap on damages to $1,000. A Fourth Circuit held that a 1995 amendment to the act removed the $1,000 cap on recoveries involving loans secured by personal property. Tue, 05 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56693 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_407/argument A 1994 amendment to the Michigan constitution said criminal defendants who pled guilty had no right to appeal and could appeal only with the permission of a state appellate court. Michigan then enacted a law that said in most cases judges could not appoint appellate lawyers for indigent defendants who pled guilty. Two criminal attorneys and three indigent defendants who were denied appointed appellate lawyers filed a single suit alleging the state law violated the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The district court ruled that the indigents had standing to sue and that the lawyers who sued with them had the right to sue as third-party representatives of the rights of indigents. A federal appellate court agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but based this only on the lawyers' claims. The court said the U.S. Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris required it to abstain from hearing the indigents' claims because the indigents were involved in related proceedings in state court. Mon, 04 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56595 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_104/argument In Blakely v. Washington (2004) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase a sentence beyond the standard range. Following U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge. In another case, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188-235 months in prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases. Mon, 04 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56659 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_105_orig/argument Kansas and Colorado disputed ownership of the Arkansas River. In 1949 Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact, which set out to resolve the states' dispute. In 1986 Kansas alleged Colorado violated the Compact. The U.S. Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to investigate the dispute and in 1994 the Special Master said Colorado violated the Compact. The Court agreed with the Special Master. Kansas later took issue with the Special Master's fourth set of recommendations. Kansas said it was entitled to interest from 1985 onward - before the Court's ruling against Colorado - for damages from Colorado's violations of the Compact from 1950 to 1985. Kansas also requested a "river master" to resolve a dispute over computer modeling of the river. Mon, 04 Oct 2004 13:00:00 +0000 56683 at http://www.oyez.org