Cases - 2002 term

Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson

Tue, 15 Oct 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-757

Petitioner

Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Henson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 28 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, October 15, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, November 5, 2002

Advocates

David J. Bederman (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Henry B. Alsobrook, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Hurley Henson filed suit in Louisiana state court against Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and sale of a chlordimeform-based insecticide. When Henson successfully intervened in a similar action, Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., in federal district court, the Louisiana court stayed his state court claim. Although the ensuing settlement in Price stipulated that his state-court action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson to proceed. Syngenta then removed the action to the federal District Court under the All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state-court action as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating the dismissal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act could not properly support removal of the state-court action.

Question

Does the All Writs Act give a federal district court the authority to remove a state-court case in order to prevent the frustration of orders the federal court has previously issued?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Henson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1651

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the All Writs Act does not provide removal jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that, because the general removal statute requires that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be removed from a state court, the All Writs Act, alone or in combination with the existence of ancillary jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute for that requirement. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred.

Woodford v. Garceau

Tue, 21 Jan 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1862

Petitioner

Woodford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Garceau

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 202 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, January 21, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

Advocates

Lynne S. Coffin (San Francisco, California, argued the cause for the respondent)

Janis S. McLean (Sacramento, California, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, the U.S. Supreme Court held that amendments to the criminal code made by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) do not apply to cases pending in federal court on the AEDPA's effective date, April 24, 1996. Robert Garceau was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After his petition for state postconviction relief was denied, Garceau moved for the appointment of federal habeas counsel and a stay of execution in Federal District Court on May 12, 1995. He filed a federal habeas application on July 2, 1996. The District Court concluded that Garceau's habeas application was not subject to AEDPA because his motions for counsel and a stay were filed prior to that date. The Court of Appeals agreed.

Question

Is a federal habeas petition, which was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 even though a stay and counsel were sought prior to that date, "pending" for the purposes of Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Woodford, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held, for purposes of Lindh, that a case does not become "pending" until an actual application for habeas corpus relief is filed in federal court. The Court reasoned that, because Garceau's federal habeas application was not filed until after AEDPA's effective date, it was subject to AEDPA's amendments. "If, on [the effective date of the AEDPA], the state prisoner had before a federal court an application for habeas relief seeking an adjudication on the merits of the petitioner's claims, then [the AEDPA] does not apply. Otherwise, an application filed after AEDPA's effective date should be reviewed under AEDPA, even if other filings by that same applicant...were presented to a federal court prior to AEDPA's effective date." Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented.

Pierce County v. Guillen

Mon, 04 Nov 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1229

Petitioner

Pierce County

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Guillen

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 129 (2003)

Argued

Monday, November 4, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, January 14, 2003

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Department of Justice, argued the cause as intervenor)

Salvador A. Mungia (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Daniel R. Hamilton (Tacoma, Washington, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Hazard Elimination Program provides state governments with funding to improve the most dangerous sections of their roads. To be eligible for funding, a state must undertake a thorough evaluation of its public roads. This led to concerns that the absence of confidentiality would increase the liability risk for accidents that took place at hazardous locations before improvements could be made. Ultimately, Congress provided that materials "compiled or collected" for purposes of the program "shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding." In 1996, Ignacio Guillen's wife died in an automobile accident in a Pierce County, Washington intersection. While Washington had previously been denied funding for the intersection where the accident occurred, its second request was granted after the accident. Guillen first sought information on the intersection and then asserted that the state had been negligent in failing to install proper traffic controls. Washington sought to protect itself under the Program. The Washington Supreme Court held that the Program exceeded Congress's power under the Constitution.

Question

Does the Hazard Elimination Program exceed Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Pierce County, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 23 U.S.C. 409

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Clarence Thomas, the Court held that both the original program and its subsequent amendments fall within Congress's Commerce Clause power to "'regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce'" and "'to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.'" The Court concluded that, because Congress could reasonably believe that adopting a measure eliminating an unforeseen side effect of the Program's information-gathering requirement would result in greater safety on the nation's roads, the legislation was aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce and increasing protections for the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.

Jinks v. Richland County

Wed, 05 Mar 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-258

Petitioner

Jinks

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Richland County

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 456 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, March 5, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, April 22, 2003

Advocates

Robert S. Peck (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as Intervenor)

Andrew F. Lindemann (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

If a federal court with jurisdiction over a civil action declines to exercise supplement jurisdiction over other related claims, the claims will be dismissed and must be refiled in state court. To prevent the limitations period on those claims from expiring, 28 USC section 1367(d) requires state courts to toll the period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court. In 1994, Susan Jinks filed a federal-court action against Richland County, South Carolina. The District Court granted the county summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over Jinks's state-law claims. Jinks then filed the supplemental claims in state court and won. In reversing, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found the state-law claims time-barred. Although they would not have been barred under section 1367(d)'s tolling rule, the court held section 1367(d) unconstitutional as applied to claims brought in state court against a State's political subdivisions.

Question

Is 28 USC section 1367(d), which requires state statute of limitations to be tolled for the period during which a plaintiff's cause of action had previously been pending in federal court, constitutional as applied to lawsuits brought against a State's political subdivisions?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jinks, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1367

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that section 1367(d)'s application to claims brought against a State's political subdivisions is constitutional. The Court reasoned that section 1367(d) is necessary and proper for carrying into execution Congress's power "to constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, as it provides a straightforward tolling rule, which promotes fair and efficient operation of the federal courts and is therefore conducive to the administration of justice. The Court also reiterated that, while Congress lacks Article I authority to override a State's immunity from suit in its own courts, it may subject a municipality to suit in state court if that is done pursuant to a valid exercise of its enumerated powers. Justice David H. Souter filed a concurring opinion, noting that he did not shift from his dissent in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706.

Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons

Tue, 22 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-950

Petitioner

Hillside Dairy Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lyons

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 01-1018

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 59 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 22, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2003

Advocates

Roy T. Englert, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Mark J. Urban (Sacramento, California, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

California regulates the minimum price paid to dairy farmers producing raw milk by establishing price minimums and requiring contributions to a price equalization pool. After it became profitable for some California processors to buy raw milk from out-of-state producers, the California Department of Food and Agriculture amended its regulations to require contributions to the price equalization pool on some out-of-state purchases. Four dairy farms in Nevada filed suit, alleging that the amendment unconstitutionally discriminated against them. Without reaching the merits, the District Court dismissed both cases. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 immunized California's milk pricing and pooling laws from Commerce Clause challenge. The appellate court also held that the individual petitioners' Privileges and Immunities Clause claims failed because the amendment did not create classifications based on any individual's residency or citizenship.

Question

Does the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 exempt California's milk pricing and pooling regulations from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause? Are individual claims under the Privileges and Immunities Clause against California's required contributions to the price equalization pool on some out-of-state purchases foreclosed because those regulations do not discriminate on their face on the basis of state citizenship or state residence?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Hillside Dairy Inc., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 7 U.S.C. 7254

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held, 8-1, that, because the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 did not clearly express an intent to insulate California's pricing and pooling laws from a Commerce Clause challenge, the Court of Appeals erred in relying on it to dismiss the case. The Court also held, 9-0, that the appellate court erred in rejecting the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim on the ground that the California laws did not, on their face, create classifications based on any individual's residency or citizenship. The Court reasoned that the absence of an express statement identifying out-of-state citizenship as a basis for disparate treatment was not a sufficient basis for rejecting the claim. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part.

Georgia v. Ashcroft

Tue, 29 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-182

Appellee

Ashcroft

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Georgia

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 461 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 29, 2003

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 2003

Advocates

E. Marshall Braden (Argued the cause for the private intervenors)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the federal repondent)

David F. Walbert (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Following the 2000 Census, the Democratic-controlled Georgia legislature passed a redistricting plan that was backed by many black leaders because it would have spread black voters and influence across several districts rather than concentrating them in a select few. Georgia's Republican governor objected to the plan because he said it violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which discourages the dilution of minority voting strength. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the legislature's plan.

Question

Did the redistricting plan violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by spreading minority voters across several districts rather than concentrating them in a few heavily minority ones?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Georgia, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that the District Court failed to consider all the relevant factors when it examined whether Georgia's Senate plan resulted in a retrogression of black voters' effective exercise of the electoral franchise. The Court reasoned that Georgia likely met its burden of showing nonretrogression under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because the District Court focused too narrowly on certain districts without examining the increases in the black voting age population that occurred in many of the other districts and improperly rejected evidence that the legislators representing the benchmark majority-minority districts support the plan. In his dissent, Justice David H. Souter argued that Georgia had failed to carry its burden.

Pharmaceutical Research v. Walsh

Wed, 22 Jan 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-188

Petitioner

Pharmaceutical Research

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Walsh

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 644 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, January 22, 2003

Decided

Monday, May 19, 2003

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Andrew S. Hagler (Augusta, Maine, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In order to achieve savings on Medicaid purchases above federal cost-saving measures, the "Maine Rx" Program reduces prescription drug prices for state residents. Under the program, Maine attempts negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers. If a company does not enter into a rebate agreement, its Medicaid sales are subjected to a prior authorization procedure that requires state agency approval to qualify a doctor's prescription for reimbursement. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of nonresident drug manufacturers, challenged the program, claiming that it is pre-empted by the Medicaid Act and violates the Commerce Clause. Without resolving any factual issues, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the statute's implementation, concluding that any obstacle to the federal program's administration is sufficient to establish pre-emption. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Is a Maine statute providing for affordable prescription drugs pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause? Does the statute violate the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Walsh, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held, 9-0, that the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America had not carried its burden of showing a probability of success on the merits of its Commerce Clause claims and, 6-3, that their showing was insufficient to support a finding that the Medicaid Act pre-empts Maine's Rx Program insofar as it threatens to coerce manufacturers into reducing their prices on non- Medicaid sales. The Court's decision upheld the Court of Appeal's reversal of the District Court's injunction. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented from the plurality's opinion. "By imposing prior authorization on Maine's Medicaid population to achieve wholly non-Medicaid related goals, Maine Rx 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives' of the federal Medicaid Act," argued Justice O'Connor.

Eldred v. Ashcroft

Wed, 09 Oct 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-618

Petitioner

Eldred

Respondent

Ashcroft

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 186 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, October 9, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, January 15, 2003

Advocates

Lawrence Lessig (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, Article 1, section 8, "Congress shall have Power...to promote the Progress of Science...by securing [to Authors] for limited Times...the exclusive Right to their...Writings." In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years, making copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have entered the public domain, argued that the CTEA violates both the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. They claimed Congress cannot extend the copyright term for published works with existing copyrights. The District Court and the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed.

Question

Does the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act's extension of existing copyrights exceed Congress's power under the Copyright Clause? Does the CTEA's extension of existing and future copyrights violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ashcroft, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 17 U.S.C. 302

No and no. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutional limitations in placing existing and future copyrights in parity in the CTEA. Disagreeing with the argument that a copyright once set is fixed, the majority found that the CTEA "continues the unbroken congressional practice of treating future and existing copyrights in parity for term extension purposes," and is a permissible exercise of Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. Moreover, the Court held that the CTEA's extension of existing and future copyrights does not violate the First Amendment. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the CTEA amounted to a grant of perpetual copyright that undermined public interests.

Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe

Wed, 13 Nov 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1231

Petitioner

Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 1 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, November 13, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, March 5, 2003

Advocates

Richard Blumenthal (Hartford, Connecticut, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Shelley R. Sadin (Argued on behalf of respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Connecticut's "Megan's Law" requires persons convicted of sexual offenses to register with the Department of Public Safety and requires the Department to post a sex offender registry containing registrants' names, addresses, photographs, and descriptions on the Internet. John Doe, a convicted sex offender who is subject to the law, filed suit, claiming that the law violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District Court enjoined the law's public disclosure provisions. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that such disclosure violated the Due Process Clause because officials did not afford registrants a predeprivation hearing.

Question

Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause require that persons convicted of sexual offenses subject to Connecticut's "Megan's Law" receive a hearing before the public disclosure of their registry?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme. The Court reasoned that, because the law was not based on an offender's dangerousnes, but rather only on convictions, disclosing an offender on the registry without a hearing did not violate due process. The Court did not answer whether the law violated the substantive component of due process. Justices Antonin Scalia and David H. Souter filed concurring opinions. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Boeing Co. v. United States

Mon, 09 Dec 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1209

Petitioner

Boeing Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 01-1382

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 437 (2003)

Argued

Monday, December 9, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Advocates

Kent L. Jones (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Kenneth S. Geller (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1971, Congress enacted tax provisions providing special tax treatment for export sales made by an American manufacturer through a subsidiary that qualified as a "domestic international sales corporation" (DISC). Regarding research and development (R&D;) expenses, Treasury Regulation 26 CFR section 1.861-8(e)(3) provides what must be treated as a cost when calculating combined taxable income (CTI), and how those costs should be allocated among different products and apportioned between the DISC and its parent. Under this regulation, the Internal Revenue Service reallocated Boeing's company sponsored R&D; costs for 1979 to 1987, thereby decreasing the untaxed profits of its export subsidiaries and increasing its taxable profits on export sales. Subsequently, Boeing filed suit, arguing that it had an unqualified right to allocate its company sponsored R&D; expenses to specific products and to exclude any allocated R&D; from being treated as a cost of another product. In granting Boeing summary judgment, the District Court found section 1.861-8(e)(3) invalid due to a specific DISC regulation giving the taxpayer the right to group and allocate income and costs by product or product line. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Was Boeing Co. required to take into account expenses incurred for R&D; in accordance with applicable Treasury regulations in calculating its "combined taxable income" for purposes of determining taxation with respect to its domestic international sales corporation and foreign sales corporation?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that section 1.861-8(e)(3) is a proper exercise of the Secretary of the Treasury's rulemaking authority. The Court reasoned that the general regulation classifying all R&D; as an indirect cost attributable to all export sales was not arbitrary as it provided consistent treatment for costs items used in computing domestic taxable income and combined taxable income. Justice Stevens wrote that the rule's "allocation of R&D; expenditures to all products in a category even when specifically intended to improve only one or a few of those products is no more tenuous than the allocation of a chief executive officer's salary to every product that a company sells even when he devotes virtually all of his time to the development of an Edsel." Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Antonin Scalia joined.

Branch v. Smith

Tue, 10 Dec 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1437

Appellee

Smith

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Branch

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

Smith v. Branch, No. 01-1596

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 254 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, December 10, 2002

Decided

Monday, March 31, 2003

Advocates

Robert B. McDuff (Argued the cause for the Appellants/Cross-Appellees Branch, et al)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Michael B. Wallace (Argued the cause for the Appellees/Cross-Appellants Smith, et al)

Facts of the Case

After the 2000 census caused Mississippi to lose one congressional seat, the State legislature failed to pass a new redistricting plan. Subsequently, lawsuits were filed in both the Mississippi State Chancery Court and the Federal District Court, asking that each court issue its own redistricting plan. While the federal court stayed its hand, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction to issue a redistricting plan. The Chancery Court adopted such a plan, which was submitted for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Meanwhile, the Federal District Court promulgated a plan that would fix the State's congressional districts for the 2002 elections should the state-court plan not be precleared by the state-law deadline. Ultimately, the District Court enjoined the State from using the state-court plan and ordered that its own plan be used in 2002 until the State produced a precleared, constitutional plan. The State did not appeal and no determination was made on the preclearance submission because the District Court's injunction rendered the state-court plan incapable of administration.

Question

Did the District Court properly enjoin the Mississippi state court's proposed congressional redistricting plan and properly fashion its own congressional reapportionment plan?Did the District Court properly enjoin the Mississippi state court's proposed congressional redistricting plan and properly fashion its own congressional reapportionment plan?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Smith, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

Yes. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held, 9-0, that the District Court properly enjoined enforcement of the state- court plan that lacked the required timely preclearance. The Court also held, 7-2, that the federal court properly fashioned its own congressional reapportionment plan, which drew the requisite single-member districts rather than directing at-large elections, under 2 USC section 2c. Regarding the second holding, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, reasoned that the provision for at-large elections under 2 USC section 2a(c) was subject to the requirement under section 2c that single-member districts must be drawn whenever possible. Justice John Paul Stevens, with whom Justices David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer joined, concluded that section 2c impliedly repealed section 2a(c). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, with whom Justice Clarence Thomas joined, disagreed with the plurality's interpretations of section 2c.

Chavez v. Martinez

Wed, 04 Dec 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1444

Petitioner

Chavez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Martinez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 760 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, December 4, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Lawrence S. Robbins (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Richard S. Paz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Oliverio Martinez was stopped while riding his bicycle home from work by police investigating narcotics violations. When police attempted to handcuff him, a struggle ensued, but it is unclear who started it. During the struggle, Martinez was shot, resulting in permanent paralysis and loss of vision. A year later he sued the officers, saying the search and use of deadly force were unconstitutional. The officers introduced as evidence in their defense a taped confession obtained while Martinez was receiving medical treatment in the hospital, in which he admitted to grabbing the gun of one of the officers during the struggle. Martinez claimed that the tape could not be used as evidence because he had not been read his Miranda rights. The district court ruled with Martinez that the tape was inadmissible. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.

Question

Are a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from coercive questioning violated when he was subjected to coercive questioning while in police custody, even if his coerced statements were never used against him in a criminal case?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Chavez, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Self-Incrimination

No; the Court remanded the substantive due process portion of the question. In a 6-3 judgment delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Chavez did not deprive Martinez of his Fifth Amendment rights. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, joined Justice Thomas. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, reasoned that Martinez's claim that his questioning alone was a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments could be recognized if a "core guarantee" would be placed at risk; however, Martinez could not make the showing necessary to expand protection of the privilege against self- incrimination. Regarding substantive due process, Justice Souter delivered a 5-4 holding concluding that the issue whether Martinez may pursue a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation should be addressed on remand.

Dow Chemical Company v. Stephenson

Wed, 26 Feb 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-271

Petitioner

Dow Chemical Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Stephenson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 111 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, February 26, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2003

Advocates

Gerson H. Smoger (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1984 Dow Chemical Co. negotiated a settlement in a class action lawsuit filed by Vietnam War veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange and subsequently developed various injuries and illnesses. The settlement created a fund that would pay those who developed illnesses up until 1994. Daniel Stephenson, a Vietnam veteran, developed cancer in 1998 and could therefore not collect money from the fund. He sued, saying that he was not adequately represented in the original settlement, which made no provision for injuries that developed after 1994. Therefore, he claimed, he had the right to file a suit of his own. The district court ruled for Dow Chemical; the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, ruling for Stephenson.

Question

Does the 1984 Agent Orange settlement preclude plaintiffs, who allege that they were inadequately represented in the prior litigation, from asserting claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Dow Chemical Company, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Split Vote

An equally divided Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. In a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the judgment of Court of Appeals with respect to Stephenson and vacated and remanded the judgment of Court of Appeals with respect to Isaacson for further consideration in light of Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002). Justice John Paul Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Massaro v. United States

Tue, 25 Feb 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1559

Petitioner

Massaro

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 500 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, April 23, 2003

Advocates

Sri Srinivasan (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Herald P. Fahringer (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Joseph Massaro was indicted on federal racketeering charges, including murder in aid of racketeering. Though prosecutors found a bullet before the trial began and did not inform the defense until the trial was underway, defense counsel declined more than once the trial court's offer of a continuance so the bullet could be examined. Subsequently, Massaro was convicted. On direct appeal, Massaro but did not raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Massaro later moved to vacate his conviction, under 28 USC section 2255, based on an ineffective-assistance-of- trial-counsel claim. The District Court found his claim procedurally defaulted because he could have raised it on direct appeal. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that, when the defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the ineffective-assistance claim is based solely on the trial record, the claim must be raised on direct appeal.

Question

Must claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether or not there is new counsel on appeal and whether or not the basis for the claim is apparent from the trial record, be raised on direct appeal?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Massaro, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a collateral proceeding under section 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal. The Court reasoned that requiring a criminal defendant to bring ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal would create a risk that defendants would feel compelled to raise the issue before there has been an opportunity fully to develop it. Moreover, the Court noted its new rule would provide for ineffective-assistance claims to be litigated in the District Court, the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation during an entire trial.

Archer v. Warner

Mon, 13 Jan 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1418

Petitioner

Archer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Warner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 314 (2003)

Argued

Monday, January 13, 2003

Decided

Monday, March 31, 2003

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Craig Goldblatt (Argued on behalf of petitioners)

Donald B. Ayer (Argued on behalf of respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1991, Leonard and Arlene Warner sold the Warner Manufacturing Company to Elliott and Carol Archer. Subsequently, the Archers sued the Warners for fraud connected with the sale. In settling the lawsuit, the Archers executed releases except for obligations under a $100,000 promissory note and then voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit. After the Warners failed to make the first payment on the promissory note, the Archers sued in state court. The Warners filed for bankruptcy, and the Bankruptcy Court ordered liquidation under Chapter 7. The Archers then brought a claim asking the Bankruptcy Court to find the $100,000 debt nondischargeable and to order the Warners to pay the sum. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy "to the extent" it is "for money...obtained by...false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." The Bankruptcy Court denied the Archers' claim. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Bankruptcy Code cover a debt embodied in a settlement agreement that settled a creditor's earlier claim "for money...obtained by...fraud?"

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Archer, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a debt for money promised in a settlement agreement accompanied by the release of underlying tort claims can amount to a debt for money obtained by fraud, within the nondischargeability statute's terms. "We conclude that the Archers' settlement agreement and releases may have worked a kind of novation, but that fact does not bar the Archers from showing that the settlement debt arose out of 'false pretences, a false representation, or actual fraud,' and consequently is nondischargeable," wrote Justice Breyer. Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Justice John Paul Stevens joined, dissented.

Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord

Mon, 28 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-469

Petitioner

Black & Decker Disability Plan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nord

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 822 (2003)

Argued

Monday, April 28, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Lawrence D. Rohlfing (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lee T. Paterson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

With the recommendation of his doctor, Kenneth Nord filed for disability benefits with his employer of 25 years, Kwikset Corp., a company owned by Black & Decker Corp. After the company denied his claim, Nord asked for a review of the denial. A doctor hired by the company determined that Nord could in fact perform the duties required by his job and was therefore ineligible for benefits, despite determinations to the contrary by Nord's physician, his orthopedic surgeon and a Black & Decker human resource representative. Nord sued to have the decision reversed, claiming that the company's preference of its doctor's opinion over the opinions of the other physicians violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The district court ruled in favor of Black & Decker Corp. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Under ERISA, are companies required to defer to the decision of a disability claimant's personal physician?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Black & Decker Disability Plan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that plan administrators are not obliged to accord special deference to the opinions of treating physicians. The Court reasoned that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied a "treating physician rule" because nothing in ERISA gave rise to such a rule. Justice Ginsburg wrote, "courts have no warrant to require administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimant's physician; nor may courts impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of explanation when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician's evaluation."

Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.

Wed, 02 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-428

Petitioner

Dastar Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 23 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, April 2, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 2, 2003

Advocates

Dale M. Cendali (Argued the cause for the respondents)

David A. Gerber (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Gregory G. Garre (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Doubleday published the WWII book, Crusade in Europe, registered the work's copyright, and granted exclusive television rights to Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. In 1975, Doubleday renewed the book's copyright, but Fox never renewed the copyright on the television series, leaving the series in the public domain. In 1988, Fox reacquired the television rights. In 1995, Dastar Corporation released a video set, World War II Campaigns in Europe, which it made from tapes of the original version of the Crusade television series. Fox filed suit, alleged that Dastar's sale of Campaigns without proper credit to the Crusade television series constituted "reverse passing off" in violation of the Lanham Act. The District Court granted Fox summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that, because Dastar copied substantially the Crusade series, labeled it with a different name, and marketed it without attribution to Fox, Dastar had committed a "bodily appropriation" of Fox's series, which was sufficient to establish reverse passing off.

Question

Does the Lanham Act prevent the unaccredited copying of a work? If so, may a court double a profit award under the Act in order to deter future infringing conduct?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Dastar Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1125

No; the Court did not answer the question. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not prevent the unaccredited copying of an uncopyrighted work. Under the Lanham Act, the Court reasoned that no false designation of origin was shown since the phrase "origin of goods," as used in the Act, did not connote the person or entity that originated the ideas contained in the video, but instead referred only to the producer's tangible video product. Thus, Dastar was the "origin" of the products it sold as its own, without acknowledging the series, because it marketed a video that copied a public domain television series. Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

United States v. American Library Association

Wed, 05 Mar 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Location

White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington D.C. 20500

Washington 20500

United States

38° 53' 55.4928" N, 77° 2' 11.8536" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-361

Appellee

American Library Association

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 194 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, March 5, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2003

Advocates

Paul M. Smith (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Congress passed the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in 2000, requiring public libraries to install internet filtering software on their computers in order to qualify for federal funding. The American Library Association and others challenged the law, claiming that it improperly required them to restrict the First Amendment rights of their patrons. As stipulated by the law, a three judge panel heard the case, and ruled unanimously that the CIPA violated the First Amendment.

Question

Does Congress have the authority to require libraries to censor internet content in order to receive federal funding?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 6-3 judgment delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that, because public libraries' use of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons' First Amendment rights, CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution and is a valid exercise of Congress's spending power. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas joined the Chief Justice's opinion. Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Both noted that CIPA imposed a comparatively small burden on library Internet users that was not disproportionate to any potential speech-related harm, especially in light of the libraries' ability to unblock sites. Justices John Paul Stevens and David H. Souter dissented. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent.

Lawrence and Garner v. Texas

Wed, 26 Mar 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Apartment of John Lawrence Houston, TX 77006

United States

29° 45' 46.3824" N, 95° 22' 59.0232" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-102

Petitioner

Lawrence and Garner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Texas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 558 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, March 26, 2003

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 2003

Advocates

Charles A. Rosenthal (Harris County Houston, Texas, argued the cause for Texas)

Paul M. Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.

Question

Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Lawrence and Garner, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents.

Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

Wed, 09 Oct 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-800

Petitioner

Howsam

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 79 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, October 9, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, December 10, 2002

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (Argued the case as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Kenneth W. Starr (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Alan C. Friedberg (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

According to Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s standard client agreement, Karen Howsam chose to arbitrate her dispute with the company before the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure section 10304 states that no dispute "shall be eligible for submission...where six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the dispute." Dean Witter filed suit, asking the Federal District Court to declare the dispute ineligible for arbitration because it was more than six years old. The court dismissed the action, stating that the NASD arbitrator should interpret and apply the NASD rule. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the rule's application presented a question of the underlying dispute's arbitrability and the presumption is that a court will ordinarily decide an arbitrability question.

Question

Should a federal district court decide whether to interpret and apply the National Association of Securities Dealers' time-limit rule regarding disputes where six years have elapsed since the event that gives rise to the dispute?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the applicability of the NASD time-limit rule is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator. Justice Breyer reasoned that the issue did not raise a substantive question of arbitrability requiring judicial resolution. The NASD's time-limit rule "falls within the class of gateway procedural disputes that do not present what our cases have called 'questions of arbitrability.' And the strong pro-court presumption as to the parties' likely intent does not apply," concluded Justice Breyer. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Breuer v. Jim's Concrete

Wed, 02 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-337

Petitioner

Breuer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jim's Concrete

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 691 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, April 2, 2003

Decided

Monday, May 19, 2003

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Donald E. Pinaud, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Andrew S. Hament (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Philip Breuer sued in state court to resolve an overtime dispute under the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Attorneys for Breuer's employer, Jim's Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved to federal court by citing the federal removal statute. According to the statute, defendants in state court cases dealing with federal laws may have the case moved to federal court "unless otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress." Breuer's attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits under the FLSA to be heard in state court and that the case should therefore be returned to state court; attorneys for Jim's Concrete disagreed. The district court refused to send the case back to state court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

In providing for suits under the FLSA, did Congress bar removal of such actions from state to federal court?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jim's Concrete, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered David H. Souter, the Court held that the FLSA does not bar removal of a suit from state to federal court, thus Breuer's case was properly removed under section 1441. The Court reasoned that nothing on the face of the FLSA looked like an express prohibition of removal, there being no mention of removal, let alone of prohibition, given that word "maintain" and its bearing on removal was ambiguous at best. Rejecting all of Breuer's arguments, the Court noted that numerous other statutes provided indisputable prohibitions of removal, which demonstrated Congress's intent to give plaintiffs an absolute choice of forum in unmistakable terms.

Ford Motor Co. v. Romo

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 09:05:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1097

Petitioner

Ford Motor Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ramon Romo

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 1028 (2003)

Decided

Monday, May 19, 2003

Facts of the Case

When Romo's Ford Bronco swerved to avoid another vehicle, it rolled over, killing three of the Romo family and injuring three more. A California jury found that the rollover was caused by a dangerous flaw in the design of the Bronco, which Ford had willfully ignored. The jury awarded Romo $5 million in compensatory damages (which are intended to compensate the plaintiff for a loss) and $290 million in punitive damages (which are intended to punish the defendant for wrongdoing.) Ford argued that the very large award of punitive damages was excessive. Nevertheless, the California Fifth Appellate District Court of Appeal upheld the verdict, comparing the level of Ford's negligence to involuntary manslaughter. After the California Supreme Court declined to hear the case, Ford appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the punitive damages awarded by the jury were so excessive as to be prohibited by the Constitution's Due Process Clause.

Question

Is an award of $290 million in punitive damages, when full compensatory damages are $5 million, excessive and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

In a short, anonymous order, the Court voided the California Appellate Court's decision and sent the case back for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell. In that case, the Supreme Court struck down an award of $145 million in punitive damages which accompanied an award of only $1 million in compensatory damages. See State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell [01-1289]. Upon reconsideration, the California court reduced the punitive damages to $23.7 million.

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.

Tue, 12 Nov 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1015

Petitioner

Moseley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

V Secret Catalogue, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 418 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, November 12, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Advocates

James R. Higgins, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

V Secret Catalogue, Inc., the affiliated corporations that own the Victoria's Secret trademarks, filed suit, alleging that the name Victor's Little Secret contributed to "the dilution of famous marks" under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). The law defines "dilution" as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services." The District Court granted V Secret summary judgment on the FTDA claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that V Secret's mark was distinctive and that the evidence established dilution even though no actual harm had been proved.

Question

Does the Federal Trademark Dilution Act require objective proof of actual injury to the economic value of a famous mark for relief?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Moseley, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1125

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to parts I, II, and IV of the opinion, which held that the FTDA requires proof of actual dilution. The Court reasoned this standard, as opposed to a presumption of harm arising from a subjective "likelihood of dilution" standard, controlled. "There is a complete absence of evidence of any lessening of the capacity of the Victoria's Secret mark to identify and distinguish goods or services sold in Victoria's Secret stores or advertised in its catalogs," wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Antonin Scalia did not join the portion of the Court's opinion that discussed legislative intent. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy filed a concurring opinion.

City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope

Tue, 21 Jan 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1269

Petitioner

City of Cuyahoga Falls

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Buckeye Community Hope

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 188 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, January 21, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

Advocates

Edward Kramer (Argued on behalf of respondents)

Glen D. Nager (Argued the case for the petitioners)

David B. Salmons (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of petitioners)

Facts of the Case

After the City Council of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio passed an ordinance authorizing construction of a low-income housing complex by the Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, a group of citizens filed a formal petition requesting that the ordinance be repealed or submitted to a popular vote. The voters passed the referendum repealing the ordinance. The Foundation filed suit, claiming that by submitting the site plan to voters, the City violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act. After the Ohio Supreme Court declared the referendum invalid under Ohio's Constitution, the District Court granted the City summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the Foundation had stated a valid Fair Housing Act claim and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City had engaged in arbitrary and irrational government conduct in violation of substantive due process.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that a low-income housing foundation's suit against a city for violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act could proceed to trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City of Cuyahoga Falls, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals with regard to the Foundation's equal protection and substantive due process claims and vacated the appellate court's Fair Housing Act holding. Noting that the Foundation claimed injury from the referendum petitioning process and not from the referendum itself, the Court reasoned that statements made by private individuals during a citizen-driven petition drive do not, in and of themselves, constitute state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.

Washington Dept. of Social & Health Services v. Guardianship of Keffeler

Tue, 03 Dec 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1420

Petitioner

Washington Dept. of Social & Health Services

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Guardianship of Keffeler

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 371 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, December 3, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Teresa W. Roseborough (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Christine O. Gregoire (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The State of Washington, through its Department of Social and Health Services, provides foster care to certain children. It also receives and manages Social Security benefits, which it uses to cover its costs, for many of those children. Such beneficiary children filed suit, alleging that the Department's use of their benefits to reimburse itself for the foster care costs violated the "anti-attachment" provision of Title II of the Social Security Act, which protects certain benefits from "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process." The trial court enjoined the Department from continuing to charge its foster care costs against Social Security benefits and ordered restitution of previous reimbursement transfers. The Washington Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court's holding that the Department's practices violated the anti-attachment provision.

Question

Does the State of Washington's use of foster childrens' Social Security benefits to reimburse itself for some of its expenditures violate the provision of the Social Security Act that protects benefits from "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process?"

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Washington Dept. of Social & Health Services, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Social Security, as amended, including Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, but excluding Medicare, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the state's use of the Social Security benefits to reimburse itself does not violate the Social Security Act's anti-attachment provision. The Court reasoned that the Department's effort to become a representative payee and its use of Social Security benefits did not amount to employing an "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process" within the meaning of the provision. The Court also noted that a ruing adverse to the state could disadvantage children in foster care.

Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler

Tue, 14 Jan 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1572

Petitioner

Cook County

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States ex rel. Chandler

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 119 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, January 14, 2003

Decided

Monday, March 10, 2003

Advocates

Judson H. Miner (Argued on behalf of respondent)

Malcolm L. Stewart (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Donnal M. Lach (Argued on behalf of petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Under the False Claims Act (FCA), "any person" who "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" is liable to the federal government. A private person may bring a qui tam action "in the name of the Government" under the FCA. After the National Institute of Drug Abuse gave Cook County Hospital a $5 million research grant, Janet Chandler, who ran the study for a nonprofit research institute affiliated with the hospital, filed a qui tam action, claiming that Cook County and the institute had submitted false statements to obtain grant funds. Based on precedent, which held that States are not "persons" subject to FCA qui tam actions, the District Court granted the County's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Are local governments "persons" subject to qui tam actions under the False Claims Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States ex rel. Chandler, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal False Claims

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the term "person" includes local governments. The Court noted that the County, as a recipient of federal funding, was clearly able to abuse federal spending and was thus subject to the FCA remedy that applied to prevent such abuse. Rejecting the Country's argument that is was not subject to punitive damages, the Court responded that the federal government amended the FCA to make it a more effective tool against fraud. "It is simply not plausible that Congress intended to repeal municipal liability sub silentio by the very Act it passed to strengthen the Government's hand in fighting false claims," wrote Justice Souter.

Entergy Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm.

Mon, 28 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-299

Petitioner

Entergy Louisiana, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Louisiana Public Service Comm.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 39 (2003)

Argued

Monday, April 28, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 2, 2003

Advocates

David W. Carpenter (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Austin C. Schlick (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Michael R. Fontham (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Several Louisiana cotton gins sued Entergy, an electric utility company, because it had over-billed them for electricity between 1988 and 1994. The gins claimed that Entergy had failed to notify them of a lower rate that would have saved them more than $2 million over the six-year period. Louisiana law requires that utility companies notify customers when they are eligible for a lower rate. Furthermore, the gins claimed that Entergy had discriminated against them by notifying several other gins in the state of the lower rate. Deferring to the decision of the Louisiana Public Service Commission, the state's utility regulatory agency, a state district court ruled against Entergy. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the decision on appeal.

Question

Does a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved tariff that delegates discretion to the regulated entity to determine the precise cost allocation similarly preempt a state order that adjudges those costs imprudent?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Entergy Louisiana, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Power

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the LPSC's order was preempted by the filed rate doctrine articulated in Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, and Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354. Applying Nantahala and MP&L;, the Court reasoned that the LPSC's order impermissibly "traps" costs that have been allocated in a FERC tariff. The Court noted that it did not matter whether the FERC has spoken to the precise classification of ERS units, but only whether the FERC tariff dictates how and by whom that classification should be made. "The amended system agreement clearly does so, and therefore the LPSC's second-guessing of the classification of ERS units is pre-empted," wrote Justice Thomas.

United States v. Navajo Nation

Mon, 02 Dec 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1375

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Navajo Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 488 (2003)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul E. Frye (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) allows Indian tribes, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to lease the mining rights on their tribal lands to private companies. In 1964, Navajo Nation (tribe) entered into a lease with the predecessor of Peabody Coal Company, allowing Peabody to mine on the tribe's land in return for a royalty of 37.5 cents for every ton of coal mined. The agreement was subject to renegotiation after 20 years. By 1984, the tribe's royalty was only worth 2% of Peabody's gross proceeds. In 1977 Congress had required a minimum of 12.5%. The tribe requested that the Secretary set a new rate, and the Director of Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Area, as the Secretary's representative, made a preliminary decision to set the rate at 20%. Peabody's representatives urged the Secretary to reverse or delay the decision. The Secretary agreed, and urged the parties to resume negotiations. The tribe and Peabody agreed on a rate of 12.5%. In 1993, however, the tribe sued the government in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging a breach of trust and claiming $600 million in damages. The court ruled for the government, explaining that though the government may have betrayed the tribe's trust by acting in Peabody’s interest rather than the tribe’s, it had not violated any specific statutory or regulatory obligation. The tribe was therefore not entitled to monetary relief. On appeal, the tribe argued that the entirety of the IMLA imposes on the government a broad obligation to look after the wellbeing of the tribe. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court, finding that "the Secretary must act in the best interests of the Indian tribes."

Question

Can the U.S. be held liable for a breach of trust with an Indian Tribe in connection with the negotiation of a mining lease, even when the U.S. has violated no specific statutory or regulatory duty established in the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 396

No. In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled that an Indian Tribe must "identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties." The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the IMLA could not be interpreted to require the Secretary to exercise broad authority to manage the tribe's resources for the tribe's benefit. Instead, the tribe itself controls negotiations and the Secretary has a more limited role in approving the agreements. The Court concluded that no provision of the IMLA entitled the tribe to monetary damages as a result of the government's role in the negotiations. Justice Souter, joined by justices Stevens and O’Connor, wrote a dissent arguing that the Secretary's approval power must be exercised for the tribe's benefit, and monetary damages may be awarded if the power is misused.

Borden Ranch v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

Tue, 10 Dec 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1243

Petitioner

Borden Ranch

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States Army Corps of Engineers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 99 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, December 10, 2002

Decided

Monday, December 16, 2002

Advocates

Timothy S. Bishop (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, Angelo Tsakopoulos purchased the Borden Ranch, an 8348-acre ranch in California. Tsakopoulos planned to subdivide the land into parcels for cultivation as vineyards and orchards. Because a dense layer of material prevented water from reaching the depths necessary to cultivate vineyards or orchards, Tsakopoulos intended to "deep rip" the soil. Deep ripping has a dramatic effect on the character of a wetland area. The Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency informed Tsakopoulos that he was not to deep rip protected waters without a permit. Ultimately, the District Court found that Tsakopoulos had violated the Clean Water Act multiple times and imposed a substantial fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part.

Question

Does deep plowing ranchland to plant deep-rooted crops constitute the "addition" of a "pollutant" from a "point source" so as to fall within the regulation of the Clean Water Act? Is deep plowing ranchland which is farmable in its natural state to plant deep-rooted crops statutorily exempt from regulation under the Act's exemption for any discharge from "normal farming...activities such as plowing?" Does the Act's civil penalty section authorize assessing the maximum daily penalty for each time a plow crosses a seasonal drainage feature, without regard to the number of days when such activity occurred?

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for United States Army Corps of Engineers, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

In a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the judgment of the appeals court by an equally divided vote. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates

Mon, 03 Mar 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1806

Petitioner

Madigan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Telemarketing Associates

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 600 (2003)

Argued

Monday, March 3, 2003

Decided

Monday, May 5, 2003

Advocates

M. Errol Copilevitz (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Paul D. Clement (Department of Justice, Washington, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Richard S. Huszagh (Chicago, Illinois, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

VietNow National Headquarters, a charitable nonprofit corporation, retained for-profit fundraising telemarketing corporations to solicit donations to aid Vietnam veterans. The contracts provided that the telemarketers would retain 85 percent of the gross receipts from Illinois donors. The Illinois Attorney General filed a complaint in state court, alleging that the telemarketers represented to donors that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be paid over to VietNow for charitable endeavors and that such representations were knowingly deceptive and materially false and constituted a fraud. The trial court granted the telemarketers' motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. In affirming, the Illinois Supreme Courts relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that held that certain regulations of charitable solicitation barring fees in excess of a prescribed level effectively imposed prior restraints on fundraising and were therefore incompatible with the First Amendment.

Question

Does the First Amendment permit a State to maintain fraud actions alleging that fundraisers made false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Madigan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, consistent with the Court's precedent and the First Amendment, States may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used. The Court reasoned that, while bare failure to disclose that information directly to potential donors does not suffice to establish fraud, when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive the listener, the First Amendment does not preclude a fraud claim. Because the state's action was on misrepresentations that were not protected by freedom of speech, rather than the high percentage of donations retained, the Court concluded that the allegations against the telemarketers therefore state a claim for relief that can survive a motion to dismiss.

Stogner v. California

Mon, 31 Mar 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1757

Petitioner

Stogner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 607 (2003)

Argued

Monday, March 31, 2003

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 2003

Advocates

Roberto Najera (Martinez, California, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Janet Gaard (Sacramento, California, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, California enacted a new criminal statute of limitations permitting prosecution for sex-related child abuse where the prior limitations period has expired if the prosecution is begun within one year of a victim's report to police. In 1998, Marion Stogner was indicted for sex-related child abuse committed between 1955 and 1973. Without the new statute allowing revival of the State's cause of action, California could not have prosecuted Stogner. Stogner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids revival of a previously time-barred prosecution. The trial court agreed, but the California Court of Appeal reversed. The trial court denied Stogner's subsequent dismissal motion, in which he argued that his prosecution violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

Question

Does the Ex Post Facto Clause bar the application of California's retroactive extension of the statutes of limitations for sexual offenses committed against minors?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Stogner, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10: Ex Post Facto

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution. The Court reasoned that the features of the law produce the kind of retroactivity that the Constitution forbids by inflicting punishment where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment. "After...the original statute of limitations had expired,...Stogner was not 'liable to any punishment,'" wrote Justice Breyer. "California's new statute therefore 'aggravated' Stogner's alleged crime, or made it 'greater than it was, when committed,' in the sense that...it 'inflicted punishment' for past criminal conduct that...did not trigger any such liability." In his dissent, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy argued, "A law which does not alter the definition of the crime but only revives prosecution does not make the crime 'greater than it was, when committed.'"

Clay v. United States

Mon, 13 Jan 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1500

Petitioner

Clay

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 522 (2003)

Argued

Monday, January 13, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

David W. DeBruin (Argued the cause as amicus curiae; invited to brief and argue as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below)

Thomas C. Goldstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Erick Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in federal District Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions on November 23, 1998, the court's mandate issued on December 15, 1998, and Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. One year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate, and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expired, Clay filed a motion for postconviction relief under 28 USC section 2255. Section 2255 provides that such motions are subject to a one- year time limitation that runs from "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." The District Court stated that when a federal prisoner does not seek certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for section 2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals's mandate. Because Clay filed his motion more than one year after that date, the court denied it as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does a judgment become "final" for postconviction relief when the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the conviction where a defendant in a federal prosecution takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment of conviction but does not next petition for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Clay, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, for the purpose of starting the clock on section 2255's one-year limitation period, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction. Under this rule, Clay's section 2255 motion was timely filed. After comparing the understanding of finality for collateral review purposes to the meaning of the phrase "becomes final" in 28 USC section 2255, the Court rejected the standard that the issuance of the appellate court mandate is the triggering date.

Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania

Mon, 04 Nov 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-7574

Petitioner

Sattazahn

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pennsylvania

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 101 (2003)

Argued

Monday, November 4, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, January 14, 2003

Advocates

Sri Srinivasan (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Iva C. Dougherty (Reading, Pennsylvania, argued the cause for the respondent)

Robert B. Dunham (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

When David Sattazahn's penalty-phase jury reported to the trial judge that it was hopelessly deadlocked 9-to-3 for life imprisonment, the court discharged the jury and entered a life sentence, as required under Pennsylvania law. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed Sattazahn's first-degree murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. At the second trial, Pennsylvania again sought the death penalty and the jury again convicted Sattazahn, but this time the jury imposed a death sentence. In affirming, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty at the retrial.

Question

Does either the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause bar a state from seeking the death penalty upon retrial where a statutory life sentence for murder was imposed after the jury was unable to agree on a sentence?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Pennsylvania, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Double Jeopardy

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that there was neither a Double Jeopardy Clause nor a Due Process Clause bar to Pennsylvania's seeking the death penalty on retrial. The Court reasoned that the death sentence on retrial did not implicate a double jeopardy bar because the life sentence at issue did not amount to an acquittal based on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence or that the government failed to prove one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also refused to hold that the Due Process Clause provides greater double-jeopardy protection than does the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer, joined.

Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson

Wed, 22 Jan 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-593

Petitioner

Dole Food Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Patrickson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 01-594

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 468 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, January 22, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, April 22, 2003

Advocates

Jonathan S. Massey (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Peter R. Paden (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, a group of farm workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama, who alleged injury from chemical exposure, filed a state-court action against Dole Food Company and others. Subsequently, Dole impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Co. and Bromine Compounds, Ltd., or the Dead Sea Companies. Dole successfully removed the action to federal court, arguing that the federal common law of foreign relations provided federal-question jurisdiction. The District Court rejected the argument that the Dead Sea Companies were instrumentalities of a foreign state, Israel, as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) and thus entitled to removal. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Dole could not base removal on the federal common law of foreign relations and that the Dead Sea Companies were not instrumentalities of Israel because they did not meet the FSIA's instrumentality definition.

Question

May a corporate subsidiary claim instrumentality status where the foreign state does not own a majority of its shares but does own a majority of the shares of a corporate parent one or more tiers above the subsidiary? Is a corporation's instrumentality status defined as of the time an alleged tort or other actionable wrong occurred?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Patrickson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1603

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held, 7-2, that a foreign state must itself own a majority of the shares of a corporation if the corporation is to be deemed an instrumentality of the state under the provisions of the FSIA and, 9-0, that instrumentality status is determined at the time of the filing of the complaint. The Court reasoned that, as indirect subsidiaries of Israel, the Dead Sea Companies cannot come within the statutory language granting instrumentality status and that only direct ownership satisfies the statutory requirement. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, argued that the language "other ownership interest...owned by a foreign state," covers a foreign state's legal interest in a corporate subsidiary, where that interest consists of the foreign state's ownership of a corporate parent that owns the shares of the subsidiary. As Dole did not seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision, the writ of certiorari in 01-593 was dismissed.

FCC v. Nextwave Communications, Inc.

Tue, 08 Oct 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-653

Petitioner

Federal Communications Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nextwave Communications, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 01-657

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 293 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, October 8, 2002

Decided

Monday, January 27, 2003

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Argued the cause on behalf of petitioner Federal Communications Commission)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause on behalf of Creditors NextWave Communications, Inc., as amicus curiae)

Jonathan S. Franklin (Argued the cause on behalf of the petitioners Arctic Slope Regional Corp., et al)

Facts of the Case

After the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auctioned off certain broadband personal communications services licenses to NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., Nextwave filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and suspended payments to all creditors, including the FCC. The FCC asserted that NextWave's licenses had been canceled automatically when the company missed its first payment-deadline and announced that NextWave's licenses were available for auction. Ultimately, when the FCC denied NextWave's petition for reconsideration of the license cancellation, the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit held that the cancellation violated 11 USC section 525(a), which provides that a "governmental unit may not...revoke...a license...to...a debtor...solely because such...debtor...has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case." (Together with No. 01-657, Arctic Slope Regional Corp. et al. v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc. et al.)

Question

Does section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibit the Federal Communications Commission from revoking licenses held by a debtor in bankruptcy upon the debtor's failure to make timely payments owed to the FCC for purchase of the licenses?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Nextwave Communications, Inc., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the FCC's cancellations of the licenses violated section 525(a) as revocations of government licenses solely for nonpayment of the debtors' dischargeable debts. The Court rejected the FCC's argument that it did not revoke NextWave's licenses solely because of nonpayment and noted that the fact that the FCC had a valid regulatory motive for its action was irrelevant. Justice Scalia reasoned that, because the statute refers to failure to pay a debt as the sole cause of cancellation, it cannot reasonably be understood to include the governmental unit's motive in effecting the cancellation, since such a reading would deprive section 525 of force. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Stephen G. Breyer authored a dissenting opinion.

Fitzgerald v. Racing Association of Central Iowa

Tue, 29 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-695

Petitioner

Fitzgerald

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Racing Association of Central Iowa

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 103 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 29, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2003

Advocates

Mark McCormick (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Thomas J. Miller (Iowa, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kent L. Jones (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A group of racetracks that earn revenue from gambling sued the state of Iowa, claiming that the state's practice of taxing racetrack gambling at a higher rate than riverboat gambling violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The group asserted that gambling at racetracks and riverboat casinos is is not substantially different, and that the state should therefore charge the same tax rate for both activities. A state district court sided with the state, ruling that important differences did exist between riverboat and racetrack gambling; the Iowa Supreme Court reversed in a 4-3 decision.

Question

Do different tax rates levied against racetrack and casino gambling violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fitzgerald, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Iowa's differential tax rate, which distinguishes between adjusted revenues from slot machines at racetracks and revenues from riverboat slot machines, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the facts did not preclude an inference that the reason for the different tax rates was to help the riverboat industry or the river communities. Thus, the Court reasoned there was a rational basis for the law.

Demore v. Kim

Wed, 15 Jan 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1491

Petitioner

Demore

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kim

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 510 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, January 15, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, April 29, 2003

Advocates

Judy Rabinovitz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC section 1226(c), the Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who is removable from this country because he has been convicted of one of a specified set of crimes, including an aggravated felony. After Hyung Joon Kim, a lawful permanent resident alien, was convicted in state court of first-degree burglary and petty theft with priors, the Immigration and Naturalization Service charged him with being deportable and detained him pending his removal hearing. Kim filed a habeas corpus action challenging section 1226(c) on the ground that his detention violated due process because the INS had made no determination that he posed either a danger to society or a flight risk. The District Court granted Kim's petition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the INS had not provided a justification for no-bail civil detention sufficient to overcome a permanent resident alien's liberty interest.

Question

Does the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides for no-bail, civil detention, violate a lawful permanent resident alien's liberty interest?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Demore, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held, 6-3, that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to aliens challenging their detention under section 1226(c) and, 5-4, that detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that Congress, concerned that deportable criminal aliens may fail to appear for their removal hearings, has the authority to require that persons be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, dissented from the first holding, reasoning that the Act deprives federal courts of jurisdiction in such a case. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented from the Court's second holding. The minority argued against the Court's approval of lengthy mandatory detention.

Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle

Tue, 22 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-634

Petitioner

Green Tree Financial Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bazzle

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 444 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 22, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2003

Advocates

Cornelia T. L. Pillard (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In an attempt to solve a contract dispute, Lynn and Burt Bazzle filed suit against Green Tree Financial Corporation. After they filed the suit, the Bazzles learned that other Green Tree customers were dealing with the same sort of dispute. As a result, they asked for and received permission to file a class action suit. However, Green Tree contracts had a clause requiring that any contract disputes be settled by an arbitrator. Green Tree asked the court to revoke the class certification because the Federal Arbitration Act, it argued, did not permit class-wide arbitration. Instead, the arbitration would have to be conducted on a case-by-case basis. The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that, unless specifically banned in the contract, class-wide arbitration could be permitted by the courts.

Question

Does the Federal Arbitration Act permit class-wide arbitration hearings?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bazzle, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 1

Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, delivered an opinion concluding that an arbitrator must determine whether the contracts forbid class arbitration. Justice Breyer reasoned that, because the question of what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to did not concern a state statute or judicial procedure, was well suited to be answered by an arbitrators, and was situated in sweeping language, the matter of contract interpretation should be for an arbitrator, not the courts, to decide. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part in order to establish a controlling judgment. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented.

PacifiCare Health System v. Book

Mon, 24 Feb 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-215

Petitioner

PacifiCare Health System

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Book

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 401 (2003)

Argued

Monday, February 24, 2003

Decided

Monday, April 7, 2003

Advocates

William E. Grauer (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Joe R. Whatley, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

A group of physicians filed suit against a number of managed-health-care organizations, alleging they violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by failing to reimburse them for health-care services that they had provided to patients covered by the organizations' plans. The District Court refused to compel arbitration of the RICO claims on the ground that the arbitration clauses in the parties' agreements prohibited awards of punitive damages. Subsequently, the court found the arbitration agreements unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Can a group of physicians be compelled to arbitrate claims arising under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, even though the parties' arbitration agreements may be construed to limit the arbitrator's authority to award damages?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for PacifiCare Health System, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the proper course in this case was to compel arbitration. The Court reasoned that since it did not know how the arbitrator would construe the remedial limitations, given the Court's prior decisions, the questions whether they render the parties' agreement unenforceable was unusually abstract and thus it would be premature for the Court to address them. Justice Clarence Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Yellow Transportation, Inc. v. Michigan

Mon, 07 Oct 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-270

Petitioner

Yellow Transportation, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 36 (2002)

Argued

Monday, October 7, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, November 5, 2002

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (On behalf of the respondents)

Charles A. Rothfeld (On behalf of the petitioner)

Austin C. Schlick (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Before 1994, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) allowed States to charge interstate motor carriers annual registration fees of up to $10 per vehicle. Under this system, some States discounted or waived registration fees for carriers from other States in exchange for reciprocal treatment. Under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), the ICC implemented a new registration system. ISTEA also capped state registration fees by establishing a fee system that "will result in a fee for each participating State that is equal to the fee?that such State collected or charged as of?1991." In 1991, the Michigan Public Service Commission did not levy a fee for Yellow Transportation, Inc.'s trucks pursuant to a reciprocal agreement. However, in 1992, the commission changed how it computed fees and, ultimately, levied a fee of $10 per vehicle on Yellow Transportation's entire fleet. Yellow Transportation sued, alleging that, because Michigan had not collected or charged a 1991 registration fee for those trucks, ISTEA's fee-cap provision prohibits Michigan from levying a fee for them. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that reciprocity agreements are not relevant in determining what fee a State charged or collected as of 1991. The court reasoned that the new fee system is not based on the fees collected from one company, but at the generic fee Michigan charged or collected from carriers as of 1991.

Question

Did the Michigan Supreme Court err in holding that, under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, only a State's generic fee is relevant to determining the fee that was collected or charged as of November 15, 1991?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Yellow Transportation, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 14504

Yes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that, because the ICC's interpretation of ISTEA's fee-cap provision that States may not renounce or modify a reciprocity agreement so as to alter any fee charged or collected as of that date was permissible reading, the Michigan Supreme Court erred in declining to enforce it. "Under the ICC's rule, where a State waives its registration fee, its 'fee?collected or charged' is zero and must remain zero," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice O'Connor concluded," to allow States to disavow their reciprocity agreements so as to alter any fee charged or collected as of November 15, 1991, would potentially permit States to increase their revenues substantially under the new system, a result that the ICC quite reasonably believed Congress did not intend." Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment.

United States v. Bean

Wed, 16 Oct 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-704

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bean

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 71 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, December 10, 2002

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Thomas C. Goldstein (Argued the case for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After attending a gun show in Texas, Thomas Bean drove to Mexico. When Mexican officials stopped his vehicle at the border, they found ammunition, and Bean was subsequently convicted in a Mexican court of importing ammunition. Because of his felony conviction, 18 USC section 922(g)(1) prohibited Bean from possessing, distributing, or receiving firearms or ammunition. Bean applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for relief from his firearms disabilities, but the ATF returned the application unprocessed, explaining that its annual appropriations law forbade it from expending any funds to investigate or act upon applications such as Bean's. Bean then filed suit, asking the District Court to conduct its own inquiry into his fitness to possess a gun and grant relief from his inability to possess, distribute, or receive firearms or ammunition. The court granted the requested relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does a federal district court, despite appropriation provisions barring the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms from acting on applications for relief from firearms disabilities from persons convicted of a felony, have the authority to grant such relief?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets, National Firearms, Organized Crime Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or Gun Control Acts, except for RICO (q.v.) portion

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the absence of an actual denial of Bean's petition by ATF precludes judicial review. Because Bean's application for relief from the firearms disabilities was not considered due to appropriation provisions, Justice Thomas reasoned that the court could not grant relief since the statute only permitted judicial review of an affirmative denial of an application. "The text of [section 925(c)] and the procedure it lays out for seeking relief make clear that an actual decision by ATF on an application is a prerequisite for judicial review, and that mere inaction by ATF does not invest a district court with independent jurisdiction to act on an application," wrote Justice Thomas.

California Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt

Mon, 24 Feb 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-42

Petitioner

California Franchise Tax Board

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hyatt

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 488 (2003)

Argued

Monday, February 24, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, April 23, 2003

Advocates

H. Bartow Farr, III (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Felix Leatherwood (Los Angeles, California, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Gilbert Hyatt filed a part-year resident income-tax return in California for 1991, which represented that he had become a Nevada resident in October 1991, shortly before he received substantial licensing fees. The California Franchise Tax Board (CFTB) determined that Hyatt was a California resident until April 1992 and issued notices of proposed assessments and imposed substantial civil fraud penalties. Hyatt filed suit against CFTB in a Nevada state court, alleging that CFTB had committed negligence and intentional torts during the course of its audit. CFTB argued that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because full faith and credit required that the court apply California law immunizing CFTB from suit. Ultimately, the Nevada Supreme Court allowed the intentional tort claims to proceed to trial. The court held that affording CFTB statutory immunity with respect to intentional torts would contravene Nevada's interest in protecting its citizens from injurious intentional torts and bad faith acts committed by sister States' government employees.

Question

Does the Nevada Supreme Court's refusal to extend full faith and credit to California's statute immunizing its tax collection agency from suit violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hyatt, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 4, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit Clause

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Nevada to give full faith and credit to California's statutes providing its tax agency with immunity from suit. Noting that Nevada did not grant immunity to its agencies for intentional torts, the Court reasoned that Nevada's interest in redressing intentional tortious conduct was sufficient to decline to accord full faith and credit to California's immunity of its tax agency to bar intentional tort claims. Accordingly, the Court refused to adopt a new rule mandating that a state court extend full faith and credit to a sister State's statutorily recaptured sovereign immunity from suit when a refusal to do so would interfere with the State's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities.

State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell

Wed, 11 Dec 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1289

Petitioner

State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Campbell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 408 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, December 11, 2002

Decided

Monday, April 7, 2003

Advocates

Sheila L. Birnbaum (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Although investigators concluded that Curtis Campbell caused an accident in which one person was killed and another permanently disabled, his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contested liability and took the case to trial. State Farm assured the Campbells that they would represent their interests. After losing in court, the Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the first part of the trial, the jury found State Farm's decision not to settle unreasonable. In the second part, the trial court denied State Farm's renewed motion to exclude dissimilar out-of-state conduct evidence, ruling such evidence was admissible to determine whether State Farm's conduct in the Campbell case was indeed intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages. The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively. The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award.

Question

Is an award of $145 million in punitive damages, when full compensatory damages are $1 million, excessive and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the punitive award of $145 million was neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was thus an irrational, arbitrary, and unconstitutional deprivation of the property of the insurer. The Court reasoned that evidence of dissimilar out-of-state misconduct was an improper basis for punishing the insurer for the limited harm and noted, "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. Justices Scalia and Thomas argued that the Due Process Clause provides no substantive protections against excessive or unreasonable awards of punitive damages. Justice Ginsburg noted that the decision overstepped states' traditional territory to regulate punitive damages.

Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine

Tue, 15 Oct 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-706

Petitioner

Sprietsma

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mercury Marine

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 51 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, October 15, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, December 3, 2002

Advocates

Leslie A. Brueckner (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Stephen M. Shapiro (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Rex Sprietsma's wife was killed in a boating accident when she was struck by the propeller of a motor made by Mercury Marine. Sprietsma sued Mercury Marine under Illinois common law, alleging that his wife's injuries were caused by an unreasonably dangerous motor. The trial court, the intermediate court, and the Illinois Supreme Court all dismissed the complaint, finding the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) preempted such state common-law claims.

Question

Does the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 preempt state common-law claims related to propeller safety?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sprietsma, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 46 U.S.C. 4301

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held 8-0 that neither the text nor the intent of the FBSA preempts Sprietsma's common law claims, either explicitly or implicitly. Justice Stevens wrote, "Absent a contrary decision by the Coast Guard" - the agency in charge of propeller- safety regulations - "the concern with uniformity does not justify the displacement of state common-law remedies that compensate accident victims..."

National Park Hospitality Assn. v. Dept. of the Interior

Tue, 04 Mar 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-196

Petitioner

National Park Hospitality Assn.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dept. of the Interior

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 803 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

Advocates

John P. Elwood (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Kenneth S. Geller (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) established rules governing disputes arising out of certain federal government contracts. After Congress enacted the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, which established a comprehensive concession management program for national parks, the National Park Service (NPS) issued 36 CFR section 51.3, which purported to render the CDA inapplicable to concession contracts. The National Park Hospitality Association challenged 51.3's validity. Upholding the regulation, the District Court concluded that the CDA is ambiguous as to whether it applies to concession contracts and found the NPS's interpretation reasonable. In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the NPS's reading of the CDA consistent with both the CDA and the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998.

Question

Does the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 apply to contracts between the National Park Service and concessioners in the national parks?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Dept. of the Interior, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The Court did not answer the question. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the controversy was not yet ripe for judicial resolution. The Court reasoned that, because the NPS has no delegated rulemaking authority under the CDA, 51.3 is nothing more than a general policy statement designed to inform the public of NPS's views on the CDA's proper application and thus the National Park Hospitality Association's challenge was a facial one. Given the absence of a concrete dispute, the Court asked the parties provide supplemental briefing on whether the case was ripe for judicial action. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, dissented.

Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington

Mon, 09 Dec 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1325

Petitioner

Brown

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Legal Foundation of Washington

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 216 (2003)

Argued

Monday, December 9, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, March 26, 2003

Advocates

David J. Burman (Argued the cause for the respondent Legal Foundation of Washington)

Charles Fried (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the respondents, Justices of the Supreme Court of Washington)

Facts of the Case

Every state uses interest on lawyers' trust accounts (IOLTA) to pay for legal services for the needy. Among it rules, Washington's program requires that funds that cannot earn net interest for the client be deposited in an IOLTA account. The Supreme Court of Washington extended its IOLTA rules to cover Limited Practice Officers (LPOs), nonlawyers who are licensed to act as escrowees in real estate closings. Allen Brown and Greg Hayes alleged that they regularly purchase and sell real estate, in the course of such transactions they deliver funds to LPOs who are required to deposit them in IOLTA accounts, and the taking of the interest earned on their funds in IOLTA accounts violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court found, among other things, that Brown and Hayes had lost nothing. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reasoned that there was no taking because Brown and Hayes had suffered neither an actual loss nor an interference with any investment-backed expectations.

Question

Does the use of interest on lawyers' trust accounts to pay for legal services provided to the needy constitute a state taking in violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Legal Foundation of Washington, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that state law that requires client funds that could not otherwise generate net earnings for the client to be deposited in an IOLTA account is not a regulatory taking. Moreover, the Court reasoned that, because compensation is measured by the owner's pecuniary loss, which is zero whenever the Washington law is obeyed, there is no violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court's decision created an exception to its general rule that the just compensation owed to former owners of confiscated property is the fair market value of the property taken. Justice Kennedy also filed a separate dissent.

Gratz v. Bollinger

Tue, 01 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Location

1220 Student Activities Building - Undergraduate Admissions

515 E. Jefferson Ann Arbor MI 48109

Ann Arbor, MI 48109

United States

42° 16' 55.1172" N, 83° 43' 28.4268" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-516

Petitioner

Gratz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bollinger

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 244 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 1, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2003

Advocates

Kirk O. Kolbo (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

John A. Payton (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Jennifer Gratz applied to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science and the Arts with an adjusted GPA of 3.8 and ACT score of 25. In 1997, Patrick Hamacher applied to the University with an adjusted GPA of 3.0, and an ACT score of 28. Both were denied admission and attended other schools. The University admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." In addition, the University has a policy to admit virtually all qualified applicants who are members of one of three select racial minority groups - African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans - that are considered to be "underrepresented" on the campus. Concluding that diversity was a compelling interest, the District Court held that the admissions policies for years 1995-1998 were not narrowly tailored, but that the policies in effect in 1999 and 2000 were narrowly tailored. After the decision in Grutter, Gratz and Hamacher petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 for a writ of certiorari before judgment, which was granted.

Question

Does the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Gratz, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violates both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI. While rejecting the argument that diversity cannot constitute a compelling state interest, the Court reasoned that the automatic distribution of 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single "underrepresented minority" applicant solely because of race was not narrowly tailored and did not provide the individualized consideration Justice Powell contemplated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause."

Nike, Inc. v. Kasky

Wed, 23 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-575

Petitioner

Nike, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kasky

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 654 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, April 23, 2003

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 2003

Advocates

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Paul R. Hoeber (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Beginning in 1996, a number of allegations arose that Nike was mistreating and underpaying workers at foreign facilities. Nike responded to the charges in numerous ways, such as by issuing press releases. In 1998, Marc Kasky, a California resident, sued Nike for unfair and deceptive practices under California's Unfair Competition Law. Kasky alleged that Nike made "false statements and/or material omissions of fact" concerning the working conditions under which its products are manufactured. Nike filed a demurrer, contending that Kasky's suit was absolutely barred by the First Amendment. The trial court dismissed the case and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. In reversing, the California Supreme Court found that Nike's messages were commercial speech, but that the suit was at such a preliminary stage that the issue whether any false representations had been made had yet to be resolved.

Question

May a corporation participating in a public debate be subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the theory that its statements are commercial speech because they might affect consumers' opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing decisions?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kasky, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The Court did not answer the question dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy dissented. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, dissented. Justice Breyer argued that no jurisdictional rule prevented the Court from decided the case and that "delay itself may inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of free speech without making the issue significantly easier to decide later on."

Ewing v. California

Tue, 05 Nov 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Location

El Segundo Golf Course

400 South Sepulveda Boulevard El Segundo CA 90245

El Segundo, CA 90245

United States

33° 54' 40.878" N, 118° 23' 37.8744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-6978

Petitioner

Gary Ewing

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 11 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, November 5, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, March 5, 2003

Advocates

Michael Chertoff (for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Quin Denvir (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Donald E. De Nicola (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing, a serial offender with a long history of criminal convictions, was arrested for stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399, from a Los Angeles-area golf course. At the time of his arrest, Ewing was on parole from a 9-year prison term for convictions in three burglaries and one robbery. Under California's three strikes law, another felony conviction would require a sentence of 25 years to life. Ewing was charged with and convicted of one count of felony grand theft for the incident at the golf course. During sentencing, Ewing requested the judge in the case exercise discretion permitted under California law and reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judge declined and sentenced Ewing in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, Ewing argued the sentence of 25 years to life was grossly disproportionate to the crime and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. The court, reasoning that the three strikes law served the state's legitimate interests, rejected this claim. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case.

Question

Did Ewing's sentence of 25 years to life, in accordance with California's three strikes law, violate the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for California, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No. In a 5-4 plurality decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court, relying heavily on its decision in Rummel v. Estelle (1980), concluded that Ewing's long history of legal offenses justified his conviction. In Rummel, the Court had ruled that a sentence of life with the possibility of parole was valid for three convictions of fraud, check forgery, and theft. In that case, the Court gave great deference to legislatures in mandating sentences for repeat offenders. Justice O'Connor writes that, as in Rummel, Ewing's conviction reflects "rational legislative judgment" and "is justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons."

Overton v. Bazzetta

Wed, 26 Mar 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-94

Petitioner

Overton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bazzetta

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 126 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, March 26, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 16, 2003

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (Lansing, Michigan, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioners)

Deborah LaBelle (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, after the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) banned visits to inmates by little brothers and sisters, nieces, nephews and other minors, a group of prisoners sued. They claimed that the ban violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and that it restricted their First Amendment right to association. The district court agreed, ruling against the ban. On appeal, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court's ruling.

Question

Did the Department of Corrections ban on visits by minors violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the freedom of association of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Overton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Association

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the MDOC's regulations were valid. The Court reasoned that the fact that the regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests suffices to sustain them regardless of whether the prisoners have a constitutional right of association that has survived incarceration. The Court also concluded that the visitation restriction for inmates with two substance- abuse violations is not a cruel and unusual confinement condition violating the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned that withdrawing visitation privileges for a limited period is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for confinement conditions. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Wiggins v. Smith

Mon, 24 Mar 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-311

Petitioner

Wiggins

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Smith

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 510 (2003)

Argued

Monday, March 24, 2003

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 2003

Advocates

Gary E. Bair (Baltimore, Maryland, argued the cause for the respondents)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (On behalf of the petitioner)

Dan Himmelfarb (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Kevin Wiggins was convicted and sentenced to death for a 1988 murder. He appealed, claiming that his attorney's decision not to tell jurors about Wiggins' troubled childhood amounted to ineffective counsel because it resulted in a harsher sentence. Prosecutors countered that the attorney's decision had been carefully considered, and that a different decision would not necessarily have resulted in a different outcome. Therefore, they said, it was not ineffective counsel. A Maryland district court sided with Wiggins; the Maryland Supreme Court reversed, siding with the state. On appeal to federal court, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling for Maryland.

Question

Does a criminal defendant's attorneys' failure to investigate his background and present mitigating evidence of his unfortunate life history at his capital sentencing proceedings constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Wiggins, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the performance of Wiggins's attorneys at sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court reasoned that Wiggins's counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation because, among other things, standard practice in Maryland in 1989 included the preparation of a social history report, which his attorneys did not commission even though the necessary funds were available. The Court concluded that Wiggins's counsels' failures prejudiced his defense. "Had the jury been able to place [Wiggins's] excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.

American Insurance Association v. Garamendi

Wed, 23 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-722

Petitioner

American Insurance Association

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Garamendi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 396 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, April 23, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2003

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Frank Kaplan (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Kenneth S. Geller (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1999 the California legislature enacted the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) in an attempt to facilitate Holocaust-era insurance claims by California residents. The Act required all insurance companies doing business in California that sold policies to people in Europe between 1920 and 1945 to make public all of those policies, including the names of policy owners and the status of the policies. A group of insurance companies and a trade organization sued, saying that only the federal government, with its jurisdiction over commerce and foreign affairs, had the right to enact such legislation. They also said the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution because the companies, if they failed to comply, could lose their insurance licenses. The District Court ruled for the insurance companies; the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Did California's passage of the HVIRA interfere with the federal government's sovereignty over foreign affairs established by Article I of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for American Insurance Association, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 2, Section 1: Executive Power

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that California's HVIRA interferes with the president's ability to conduct the nation's foreign policy and is therefore preempted. The Court reasoned that an exercise of state power that concerns foreign relations must yield to the Federal Government's policy or that generally there is executive authority to decide what policy should be implemented. Based on an account of related international negotiations, the Court found sufficiently clear conflict between HVIRA and the President's foreign policy. "The basic fact is that California seeks to use an iron fist where the President has consistently chosen kid gloves," wrote Justice Souter. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that no executive agreement or other formal expression of foreign policy expressly disapproved of state disclosure laws like California's HVIRA.

United States v. Recio

Tue, 12 Nov 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1184

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Recio

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 270 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, November 12, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, January 21, 2003

Advocates

M. Karl Shurtliff (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada and seized the illegal drugs that it was carrying. With the help of the truck drivers, the police set up a sting. Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza came for the truck and were subsequently arrested. A jury convicted Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza of conspiracy, but the trial judge ordered a new trial under Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent that held a conspiracy terminates when "'there is affirmative evidence of...defeat of the object of the conspiracy.'" In other words, the federal government could not prosecute the drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the government seized the drugs. The new jury convicted the two men once again. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence presented at the second trial was insufficient to show that Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza had joined the conspiracy before the drug seizure.

Question

Is the Ninth Circuit rule -- that a conspiracy ends automatically when the object of the conspiracy becomes impossible to achieve -- valid?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because the federal government has defeated its object, such that Ninth Circuit's conspiracy- termination law is erroneous. Justice Breyer stated that the Ninth Circuit's rule is inconsistent with basic conspiracy law and that the agreement to commit an unlawful act is "'a distinct evil,'" which "'may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues.'" Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Price v. Vincent

Mon, 21 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-524

Petitioner

Price

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Vincent

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 634 (2003)

Argued

Monday, April 21, 2003

Decided

Monday, May 19, 2003

Advocates

Arthur A. Busch (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David A. Moran (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

During Duyonn Vincent's trial, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder. Subsequently, when the prosecution made a statement on first-degree murder, defense counsel objected, arguing that the court had granted its directed verdict motion and that further prosecution on first-degree murder would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judge responded that he had granted the motion but had not directed a verdict. The judge then submitted the first-degree murder charge to the jury, which convicted Vincent on that charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. In reversing, the State Supreme Court determined that the trial judge's comments were not sufficiently final to terminate jeopardy. Subsequently, the Federal District Court granted Vincent's federal habeas corpus petition after concluding that continued prosecution for first-degree murder had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is a defendant's right against double jeopardy violated when a trial judge grants a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder, but does not direct such a verdict to the jury that subsequently convicts the defendant of first-degree murder?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Price, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the defendant did not meet the requirements for habeas relief. The Court stated that Vincent was entitled to relief only if he can demonstrate that the state court's adjudication of his claim was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" the Court's clearly established precedents. Finding that the state court's adjudication of his claim was not, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals because "Even if we agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Double Jeopardy Clause should be read to prevent continued prosecution of a defendant under these circumstances, it was at least reasonable for the state court to conclude otherwise."

Meyer v. Holley

Tue, 03 Dec 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1120

Petitioner

Meyer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Holley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 280 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, December 3, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, January 22, 2003

Advocates

Douglas G. Benedon (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Robert G. Schwemm (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Fair Housing Act (FHA) forbids racial discrimination in respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. The Holleys, an interracial couple, alleged that a Triad real-estate corporation sales representative prevented them from buying a Triad-listed house for racially discriminatory reasons. The Holleys filed suit against the sales representative and David Meyer, Triad's president, sole shareholder, and licensed "officer/broker," claiming that he was vicariously liable for the sales representative's unlawful actions. The District Court dismissed the claims, stating that the FHA did not impose personal vicarious liability upon a corporate officer or a "designated officer/broker." In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled that the FHA imposes strict liability principles beyond those traditionally associated with agent/principal or employee/employer relationships.

Question

Does the Fair Housing Act impose personal liability without fault upon an officer or owner of a residential real estate corporation for the unlawful activity of the corporation's employee or agent?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Meyer, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Housing

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the FHA does not impose liability without fault upon the employer in accordance with traditional agency principles. In other words, the FHA normally imposes vicarious liability upon the corporation, but not upon its officers or owners. In the absence of a clear indication of congressional intent to abrogate the common law principles of vicarious liability, the Court reasoned that neither the right of the officer to control the salesperson nor the overriding societal priority of the FHA's objectives warranted extending tort-related vicarious liability rules to include the officer. The Court also reasoned that nothing in the FHA supported imposing a non-delegable duty upon the officer to ensure that its salesperson did not discriminate.

Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson

Wed, 30 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-306

Petitioner

Beneficial National Bank

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Anderson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 1 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, April 30, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 2, 2003

Advocates

Brian M. Clark (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Matthew D. Roberts (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Several H&R; Block customers, who took out loans from Beneficial National Bank in anticipation of their tax refunds, sued the bank in state court. The customers alleged that the bank charged excessive interest in violation of Alabama law. The bank asked that the case be heard in federal, rather than state, court, because the issues were covered under the National Bank Act (NBA), a federal law. The district court ruled in favor of the bank; the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the NBA did not completely preempt state laws governing lending rates and that the case could therefore be heard in state court.

Question

Does the NBA require that any suits involving charges of excessive interest be heard in federal rather than state court?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Beneficial National Bank, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1441

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the National Bank Act preempted the state-law claim and provided the exclusive cause of action for usury claims against national banks. Thus, the claim arose under federal law. The Court reasoned that the provisions of the Act create a federal remedy for overcharges that is exclusive, even when a state complainant relies entirely on state law. "Because [sections of the Act] provide the exclusive cause of action for such claims, there is, in short, no such thing as a state-law claim of usury against a national bank," wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers

Wed, 06 Nov 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-963

Petitioner

Norfolk & Western Railway Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ayers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 135 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, November 6, 2002

Decided

Monday, March 10, 2003

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David B. Salmons (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Richard J. Lazarus (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Six employees of the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company contracted asbestosis, a disease caused by exposure to asbestos. The employees brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), including a damages request for pain and suffering caused by a fear of cancer (which they had not yet contracted). The district court ruled for the plaintiffs. The court of appeals denied discretionary review.

Question

Can an employer be held liable for pain and suffering caused by a disease that has not yet been contracted? And are railroad companies liable for full damages under FELA even if the actions or negligence of other parties contributed to the damage inflicted?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Ayers, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Employers' Liability

Yes and yes. The court ruled that an employee who has developed asbestosis as a result of the actions or negligence of his employer has a reasonable fear of cancer and may collect damages for the emotional distress caused by this fear. Furthermore, under FELA the railroad is liable for damage caused "in whole or in part" by its negligence. It is the responsibility of the railroad to seek contribution from other parties involved in causing the damage.

Smith v. Doe

Wed, 13 Nov 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-729

Petitioner

Smith

Respondent

Doe

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 84 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, November 13, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, March 5, 2003

Advocates

Darryl L. Thompson (On behalf of the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Under the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, any sex offender or child kidnaper incarcerated in Alaska must register with the Department of Public Safety, which maintains a central registry of sex offenders. While some of the data is kept confidential, some, such as the offender's name, photograph, and physical description, is published on the Internet. The Act's requirements are retroactive. John Doe I and John Doe II were convicted of aggravated sex offenses before the Act's passage are thus covered by it. Both brought suit, seeking to declare the Act void as applied to them under the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I Section 10 of the United States Constitution. The District Court ruled against them and the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that, because its effects were punitive, the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Question

Does the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I Section 10 prohibit the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act's registration requirement as a retroactive punishment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Smith, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10: Ex Post Facto

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act's retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the act is nonpunitive. The Court reasoned that the act was clearly intended as a civil, non-punitive means of identifying previous offenders for the protection of the public. The Court also found that the stigma, which could result from registration, did not render the act effectively punitive, since the dissemination of the registration information did not constitute the imposition of any significant affirmative disability or restraint. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the act could only cover those convicted of offenses committed after the effective date of the act without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the act was "ambiguous in intent and punitive in effect" and that its retroactive application was incompatible with the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Miller-El v. Cockrell

Wed, 16 Oct 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-7662

Petitioner

Miller-El

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cockrell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 322 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

Advocates

Gena A. Bunn (Capital Litigation Division, Assistant Attorney General, Austin, Texas, argued the cause for the respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

When Dallas County prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 10 of the 11 African-Americans eligible to serve on the jury at Thomas Miller-El's capital murder trial, he moved to strike the jury on the ground that the exclusions violated equal protection. The trial judge denied relief, finding no evidence indicating a systematic exclusion of African-Americans. Subsequently, the jury found Miller-El guilty, and he was sentenced to death. After Miller-El's direct appeal and state habeas corpus petitions were denied, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The Federal District Court denied Miller-El's application for a certificate of appealability (COA) in deference to the state courts' acceptance of the prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking the potential jurors. The Court of Appeals also denied the COA, finding that Miller-El failed to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Question

Must an inmate demonstrate that a state court's finding of the absence of purposeful discrimination was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence in order for a court of appeals to issue a certificate of appealability?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Miller-El, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Court of Appeals should have issued a COA to review the District Court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The Court reasoned, "when a habeas applicant seeks permission to initiate appellate review of the dismissal of his petition, the court of appeals should limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of his claims." Thus, a prisoner seeking a COA need only demonstrate "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" and satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to proceed further. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

Virginia v. Black

Wed, 11 Dec 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1107

Petitioner

Virginia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Black

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 343 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, December 11, 2002

Decided

Monday, April 7, 2003

Advocates

Rodney A. Smolla (Argued the cause for the respondents)

William H. Hurd (Richmond, Virginia, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Barry Black, Richard Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted separately of violating a Virginia statute that makes it a felony "for any person..., with the intent of intimidating any person or group..., to burn...a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place," and specifies that "any such burning...shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group." At trial, Black objected on First Amendment grounds to a jury instruction that cross burning by itself is sufficient evidence from which the required "intent to intimidate" could be inferred. He was found guilty. O'Mara pleaded guilty to charges of violating the statute, but reserved the right to challenge its constitutionality. In Elliott's trial, the judge did not give an instruction on the statute's prima facie evidence provision. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court held, among other things, that the cross-burning statute is unconstitutional on its face and that the prima facie evidence provision renders the statute overbroad because the probability of prosecution under the statute chills the expression of protected speech.

Question

Does the Commonwealth of Virginia's cross-burning statute, which prohibits the burning of a cross with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Virginia, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes, but in a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that while a State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, in which four other justices joined, the provision in the Virginia statute treating any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate renders the statute unconstitutional in its current form, in which three other justices joined. Justice Antonin Scalia left the latter portion of the Court's conclusion to argue that the Court should vacate and remand the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court with respect to Elliott and O'Mara, so that that court could have an opportunity to construe the cross-burning statute's prima-facie- evidence provision. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concluded that the Virginia statute is unconstitutional and therefore concurred in the Court's judgment insofar as it affirmed the invalidation of Black's conviction. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa

Mon, 21 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-679

Petitioner

Desert Palace, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Costa

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 90 (2003)

Argued

Monday, April 21, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2003

Advocates

Mark J. Ricciardi (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Robert N. Peccole (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Catharina Costa was fired from her job as a heavy equipment operator at Desert Palace Casino. She filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit, charging that the firing was the culmination of discrimination that had occurred during her employment. Jurors during the trial were instructed by the judge to rule for Costa if they determined that sex was a motivating factor in the firing, even if other (legal) factors were present as well. The jury ruled for Costa. Desert Palace appealed, saying that the instructions incorrectly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in the case. A three judge panel from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling for the casino, but a subsequent review of the case by all 11 judges of the 11th Circuit reversed the panel's decision.

Question

Must a plaintiff present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Costa, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964

No. In a unanimous opinion Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that direct evidence is not required. Given that Title VII, on its face, does not mention that a plaintiff must make a heightened showing through direct evidence, the Court reasoned that in order to obtain an instruction a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice." "Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury," wrote Justice Thomas. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion.

Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont

Tue, 25 Mar 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-403

Petitioner

Federal Election Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Beaumont

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 146 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 16, 2003

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

James Bopp, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1971 Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act, banning direct corporate donations to federal election campaigns. In 2000, Christine Beaumont and the North Carolina Right to Life (NCRL), an anti-abortion advocacy group, challenged the act, saying it violated their right to free speech. The group is an incorporated non-profit that lobbies and backs political candidates friendly to its cause, but under the act it cannot make political donations. The district court ruled in favor of NCRL. The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Federal Election Campaign Act's ban on corporate political donations violate the freedom of speech for incorporated, non-profit advocacy groups?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Federal Election Commission, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Election Campaign

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that applying the direct contribution prohibition to nonprofit advocacy corporations is consistent with the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that it could not hold for NCRL "without recasting our understanding of the risks of harm posed by corporate political contributions, of the expressive significance of contributions, and of the consequent deference owed to legislative judgments on what to do about them." Justice Anthony M. Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissented, arguing that section 441b should have been subject to strict scrutiny and, under this standard, it could not stand.

Medical Board of California v. Hason

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 09:05:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-479

Petitioner

Medical Board of California

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hason

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 835 (2003)

Granted

Monday, November 18, 2002

Decided

Monday, April 7, 2003

Facts of the Case

The California Medical Board denied Hason a license to practice medicine because of his mental illness. Hason sued in federal district court, alleging that his rights were violated under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed the suit, holding that his claims were barred by the 11th Amendment's guarantee of sovereign immunity, which prohibits a private party from suing a non-consenting state or its agencies in federal court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Congress abrogated 11th Amendment sovereign immunity by enacting Title II of the ADA "and thus states and their agencies may be sued pursuant to Title II."

Question

Does the 11th Amendment's grant of sovereign immunity bar suit under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act for denial of a medical license based on an applicant's mental illness?

Conclusion

Unanswered. Due to concerns over the litigation's possible effect on the scope of the ADA, the California Medical Board voted to drop its petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the case with a unanimous opinion stating: "The writ of certiorari is dismissed without award of damages and costs."

Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller

Tue, 14 Jan 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1471

Petitioner

Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Miller

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 329 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, January 14, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, April 2, 2003

Advocates

Robert N. Eccles (On behalf of the petitioners)

Elizabeth A. Johnson (On behalf of the respondent)

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Kentucky's two "Any Willing Provider" (AWP) statutes prohibit "[a] health insurer [from] discriminating against any provider who is...willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established by the?insurer," and require a "health benefit plan that includes chiropractic benefits [to]...permit any licensed chiropractor who agrees to abide by the terms [and] conditions?of the?plan to serve as a participating primary chiropractic provider." Certain health maintenance organizations (HMOs) filed suit asserting that Kentucky's AWP laws are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which preempts all state laws "insofar as they?relate to any employee benefit plan," but saves from preemption state "laws...which regulate insurance." The District Court concluded that although both AWP statutes "relate to" employee benefit plans each law "regulates insurance" and is therefore saved from preemption. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempt any of Kentucky's "Any Willing Provider" statutes?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Miller, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security Act

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Kentucky's AWP statutes are "laws...which regulate insurance" under ERISA. The Court reasoned that the statutes were specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance, regardless of the fact that the statutes also had the effect of prohibiting providers from entering into limited network contracts with the HMOs. Moreover, the Court concluded that, by expanding the number of providers from whom an insured may receive health services, AWP laws alter the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds thus affecting the type of risk pooling arrangements that the HMOs could offer, thereby constituting regulation of the business of insurance.

Virginia v. Hicks

Wed, 30 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-371

Petitioner

Virginia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hicks

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 113 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, April 30, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 16, 2003

Advocates

Steven D. Benjamin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

William H. Hurd (Richmond, Virginia, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA), a political subdivision of Virginia, owns and operates Whitcomb Court, a low-income housing development. In 1997, the Richmond City Council conveyed Whitcomb Court's streets to the RRHA. Subsequently, the RRHA enacted a policy authorizing the Richmond police to serve notice on any person lacking "a legitimate business or social purpose" for being on the premises and to arrest for trespassing any person who remains or returns after having been notified. After the RRHA gave Kevin Hicks, a nonresident, written notice barring him from Whitcomb Court, he trespassed there and was arrested and convicted. At trial, Hicks claimed that RRHA's policy was unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. The Virginia en banc Court of Appeals vacated his conviction. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found the policy unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.

Question

Is the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority's trespass policy, which provides for arrest after being served notice for being on the premises without "a legitimate business or social purpose," facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Virginia, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the RRHA's trespass policy is not facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine. Noting that he was not in Whitcomb Court to engage in constitutionally protected speech, the Court reasoned that Hicks had not shown that the RRHA policy prohibited a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applications. Justice Scalia wrote, "both the notice-barment rule and the 'legitimate business or social purpose' rule apply to all persons who enter the streets of Whitcomb Court, not just to those who seek to engage in expression."

Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs

Wed, 15 Jan 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1368

Petitioner

Nevada Dept. of Human Resources

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hibbs

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 721 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, January 15, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

Advocates

Paul G. Taggart (Carson City, Nevada, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Cornelia T. L. Pillard (Argued the cause for the respondent Hibbs)

Viet D. Dinh (Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent United States)

Facts of the Case

William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a "serious health condition" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action "against any employer" that "interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

May an individual sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Hibbs, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. The Court reasoned that Congress both clearly stated its intention to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under the FMLA and acted within its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting prophylactic, rather than substantively redefining, legislation. "In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [section] 5 legislation," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy, who was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Scalia, filed dissents.

Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley

Mon, 07 Oct 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-896

Petitioner

Ford Motor Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

McCauley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 1 (2002)

Argued

Monday, October 7, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, October 15, 2002

Advocates

Steve W. Berman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

When Ford Motor Company and Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. canceled a credit card rebate program that enabled cardholders to accrue and redeem rebates towards the purchase of a new Ford, cardholders filed multiple state-based class actions. Ford and Citibank removed the cases to federal court. The cardholder plaintiffs consolidated their actions, seeking reinstitution of the program. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that each class member was asserting a separate and distinct claim and that the individual claims did not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. The appellate court also concluded that premising jurisdiction on the cost of complying with an injunction in favor of a single plaintiff would conflict with the principle of the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Question

Is the amount-in-controversy requirement of the federal diversity statute satisfied where a class representative seeks an injunction that would cost the defendant more than $75,000 to implement whether the injunction applies to one plaintiff or all class members?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for McCauley, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

Sell v. United States

Mon, 03 Mar 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-5664

Petitioner

Sell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 166 (2003)

Argued

Monday, March 3, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 16, 2003

Advocates

Barry A. Short (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, the Federal Government charged Charles Sell with submitting fictitious insurance claims for payment. Although Sell has a long history of mental illness and was initially found competent to stand trial for fraud and attempted murder, a Federal Magistrate Judge ordered his hospitalization to determine whether he would attain the capacity to allow his trial to proceed. Subsequently, the Magistrate authorized forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. In affirming, the District Court concluded that medication was the only viable hope of rendering Sell competent to stand trial and was necessary to serve the Federal Government's interest in obtaining an adjudication of his guilt or innocence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On the fraud charges, the appellate court found that the Federal Government had an essential interest in bringing Sell to trial, that the treatment was medically appropriate, and that the medical evidence indicated that Sell would fairly be able to participate in his trial.

Question

May the Federal Government administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial for serious, but nonviolent, crimes?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Sell, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Constitution allows the Federal Government to administer antipsychotic drugs, even against the defendant's will, in limited circumstances. The Court reasoned that such conditions include if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the trial's fairness, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests. Finding that the District Court and Court of Appeals's findings did not satisfy these conditions, the Court vacated the appellate court's judgment. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case.

Grutter v. Bollinger

Tue, 01 Apr 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The University of Michigan Law School Graduate Admissions

726 Oakland Avenue Ann Arbor MI 48104

Ann Arbor, MI 48104

United States

42° 16' 22.6524" N, 83° 44' 22.1352" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-241

Petitioner

Grutter

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bollinger

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 306 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 1, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2003

Advocates

Kirk O. Kolbo (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Maureen E. Mahoney (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota.

Question

Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bollinger, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor wrote, "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race- conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants."

Abdur'Rahman v. Bell

Wed, 06 Nov 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-9094

Petitioner

Abdur'Rahman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 88 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, November 6, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, December 10, 2002

Advocates

Paul J. Zidlicky (Argued the cause for the amici curiae, State of Alabama, et al)

Paul G. Summers (Nashville, Tennessee, argued the cause for the respondent)

James S. Liebman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1987, Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman was convicted of first-degree murder and related charges. In state post-conviction proceedings, Abdur'Rahman presented claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Presenting all of his claims to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Abdur'Rahman was denied leave to appeal, and then he only presented some of his claims, on which he ultimately lost, to the federal District Court. While Abdur'Rahman's certiorari petition was pending, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted Rule 39, which expressly states that Tennessee litigants do not need to seek discretionary review from the court in order to exhaust their claims. Abdur'Rahman then filed a federal motion for relief of judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, re-presenting claims that the district court had previously determined to be unexhausted and procedurally barred. The District Court construed the Rule 60(b) motion as a second, or successive, habeas corpus petition and denied relief. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals denied all of Abdur'Rahman's motions.

Question

Does a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion, filed in a habeas corpus proceeding to inform the federal courts of a state court's interpretation of state procedural laws, constitute a "successive" habeas corpus petition?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Bell, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

In a per curiam opinion, the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. Justice Stevens argued that the Court of Appeals plainly erred when it characterized Abdur'Rahman's Rule 60(b) motion as an application for a second or successive habeas petition and denied relief for that reason.

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.

Tue, 08 Oct 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-705

Petitioner

Barnhart

Respondent

Peabody Coal Co.

Consolidation

No. 01-715

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 149 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, October 8, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, January 15, 2003

Advocates

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents Peabody Coal Company et al.)

Peter Buscemi (Argued the cause for the petitioners Holland, et al)

Barbara B. McDowell (Argued the cause for the petitioner Barnhart)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for the respondents Bellaire Corporation, et al)

Facts of the Case

Under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, the Commissioner of Social Security "shall, before October 1, 1993," assign each coal industry retiree eligible for benefits under the Act to a company, which shall then be responsible for funding the beneficiary's benefits. After October 1, 1993, the Commissioner assigned 600 hundred beneficiaries to various coal companies. The companies challenged the assignments, claiming that the statutory date sets a time limit on the Commissioner's power to assign such that a beneficiary not assigned on October 1, 1993 must be left unassigned for life. Under the companies' argument, the challenged assignments are void and the corresponding benefits must be financed by other pension plans and funds. The companies obtained summary judgments, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is the assignment of beneficiaries, under Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, valid if the assignment was made after the Act's October 1, 1993 deadline?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Barnhart, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 26 U.S.C. 9701

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Commissioner's initial assignments made after October 1, 1993, are valid despite their untimeliness. The Court reasoned that a statute directing official action needed more than a mandatory "shall" before the grant of power would be read to expire when the job was supposed to be completed. Moreover, Justice Souter noted that the Act was designed to assign the greatest number of beneficiaries and read the statutory date as a spur to prompt action. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissenting opinion. Both read the Act has establishing a clear deadline for the expiration of the Commissioner's authority.

Clackamas Gastroenterology v. Wells

Tue, 25 Feb 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1435

Petitioner

Clackamas Gastroenterology

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wells

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 440 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, April 22, 2003

Advocates

Craig A. Crispin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Steven W. Seymour (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Deborah Wells worked for Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. from 1986 until 1997. Wells filed suit, alleging that Clackamas Gastroenterology violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) when it terminated her employment. Clackamas moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not covered by the Act because it did not have 15 or more employees for the 20 weeks required by the ADA. This argument depended on the four physician- shareholders, who own the professional corporation and constitute its board of directors, not being counted as employees. In granting the motion, the District Court concluded that the physicians were more analogous to partners in a partnership than to shareholders in a corporation and therefore were not employees under the ADA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found no reasoned to permit the professional corporation to argue it was a partnership so as to avoid employment discrimination liability.

Question

Should four physicians actively engaged in medical practice as shareholders and directors of a professional corporation be counted as employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Clackamas Gastroenterology, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the common-law element of control is the principal guidepost to be followed in deciding whether the four director-shareholder physicians in this case should be counted as employees and listed six factors that are relevant to such a decision. "Because the District Court's findings appear to weigh in favor of concluding that the four physicians are not clinic employees, but evidence in the record may contradict those findings or support a contrary conclusion," the Court remanded the case for a determination under the new standard. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the physician-shareholders function in several respects as common-law employees in their capacity as doctors performing everyday functions.

Nguyen v. United States

Mon, 24 Mar 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Dr. Nguyen's Office

308 North Main Street Trenton FL 32693

Trenton, FL 32693

United States

29° 36' 53.8488" N, 82° 49' 6.042" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-10873

Petitioner

Nguyen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 02-5034

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 69 (2003)

Argued

Monday, March 24, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2003

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey T. Green (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Khanh Phuong Nguyen and Tuyet Mai Thi Phan were tried, convicted, and sentenced on federal narcotics charges in the District Court of Guam, a territorial court with subject-matter jurisdiction over both federal-law and local-law causes. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit panel that convened to hear their appeals included two judges from that court, both of whom are life-tenured Article III judges, and the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, an Article IV territorial-court judge appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a 10-year term. Neither Nguyen nor Phan objected to the panel's composition before the cases were submitted for decision and neither sought rehearing to challenge the panel's authority to decide their appeals immediately after it affirmed their convictions.

Question

Did a panel of the Court of Appeals consisting of two Article III judges and one Article IV judge have the authority to decide the appeals of two defendants convicted on federal narcotics charges in the District Court of Guam?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Nguyen, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 292

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals panel did not have the authority to decide Nguyen and Phan's appeals. The Court reasoned that the territorial judge was precluded from designation to the panel and thus the defendants' appeals required reconsideration by a properly constituted panel. The Court found that the statutory and constitutional provisions governing the creation and tenure of territorial judges were distinct from those for district court judges and that the territorial district court was not constituted pursuant to the chapter required to meet the definition of a district court. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that neither Nguyen nor Phan showed that the error seriously affected the judicial proceedings.

Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians

Mon, 31 Mar 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-281

Petitioner

Inyo County

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Paiute-Shoshone Indians

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 701 (2003)

Argued

Monday, March 31, 2003

Decided

Monday, May 19, 2003

Advocates

Reid Peyton Chambers (Argued the cause for the respondents)

John D. Kirby (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, argued the cause, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners in part and the respondents in part)

Facts of the Case

During an investigation of welfare fraud, the Inyo County Sheriff's office requested personnel files from a casino owned by the Paiute-Shoshone Indian tribe. When the request was denied, the Sheriff's office obtained a warrant to search for the records at the casino. After the search, the tribe sued, claiming that it was a violation of their sovereign immunity. The district court ruled for Inyo County; a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, ruling for the Paiute-Shoshone tribe.

Question

Does a federally recognized tribe qualify as a "person" who may sue under 42 USC section 1983? Does a tribe's suit qualify for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than section 1983?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Inyo County, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No; the Court did not answer the second question. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, in the situation presented, the Tribe does not qualify as a "person" who may sue under section 1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims. The Court reasoned that section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment, not to advance a sovereign's prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. Regarding the second question, the Court concluded that whether the Tribe's suit qualifies for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than section 1983 was an issue that required additional addressing and remanded the question. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Roell v. Withrow

Wed, 26 Feb 2003 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-69

Petitioner

Roell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Withrow

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 580 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, February 26, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, April 29, 2003

Advocates

Lisa R. Eskow (Austin, Texas, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Amanda Frost (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 authorizes magistrate judges to conduct "any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case" with "the consent of the parties." When Jon Withrow, a state prisoner, brought suit against members of the prison's medical staff, he gave written consent for the magistrate judge to preside over the entire case. Only one of the three staff members gave written consent. The other two members voluntarily participated. When the medical staff won, Withrow appealed and the Court of Appeals sua sponte remanded the case to determine whether the parties had consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. Ultimately, the magistrate judge reported that she had lacked jurisdiction because such consent had to be expressly given. The District Court adopted the report and recommendation. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that consent must be express and that the staffs' postjudgment consent was inadequate.

Question

Can consent, under the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, be inferred from a party's conduct during litigation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Roell, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 636

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that consent to a magistrate judge's designation can be inferred from a party's conduct during litigation. Distinguishing between full and part-time magistrate judges, the Court reasoned that the "unadorned references" regarding the consent of the parties and full-time magistrate judges provided for jurisdiction as long as the parties voluntarily consented. "[The two staff members'] general appearances before the Magistrate Judge, after they had been told of their right to be tried by a district judge, supply the consent necessary for the Magistrate Judge's 'civil jurisdiction,'" wrote Justice Souter.

United States v. White Mt. Apache Tribe

Mon, 02 Dec 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1067

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

White Mt. Apache Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 465 (2003)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Advocates

Robert C. Brauchli (On behalf of the respondent)

Gregory G. Garre (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Under Public Law 86-392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate the property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to dismiss, the federal government argued that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation could be read to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone authorize compensation for breach. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the federal government's property use triggered a common-law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of the Interior chose to utilize, which also supported a money damages claim.

Question

Does the Court of Federal Claims, under the Indian Tucker Act, have jurisdiction over the White Mountain Apache Tribe's suit against the United States for breach of fiduciary duty to manage land and improvements held in trust for the Tribe but occupied by the federal government?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for White Mt. Apache Tribe, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1505

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Public Law 86-392 gives rise to Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over the Tribe's suit. The Court reasoned that, although the statute providing for the land to be held in trust imposed no duties on the United States to maintain the land, the occupation of such land by the United States raised a duty to preserve trust assets and that it naturally followed that the United States was liable in damages for the breach of such duties. Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that the majority's opinion "radically alters the relevant inquiry from one focused on the actual fiduciary duties created by statute or regulation to one divining fiduciary duties out of the use of the word 'trust' and notions of factual control."

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (NOW)

Wed, 04 Dec 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1118

Petitioner

Scheidler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Organization for Women (NOW)

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women (NOW), No. 01-1119

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 393 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, December 4, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, February 26, 2003

Advocates

Roy T. Englert, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Fay Clayton (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

The National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) filed a class action alleging that certain individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through "a pattern of racketeering activity" that included acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent nationwide injunction against the abortion opponents. Upholding the injunction, the Court of Appeals held, in part, that the things abortion supporters claimed were extorted from them, such as women's right to seek medical services from the clinics and the clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs, constituted "property" that was "obtained" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. (Together with No. 01-1119, Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women.)

Question

Do abortion opponents, who protest at abortion clinics, commit extortion within the meaning of the Hobbs Act? May abortion supporters obtain injunctive relief in a civil action pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Scheidler, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1951

In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that abortion opponents did not commit extortion because they did not "obtain" property from the abortion supporters as required by the Hobbs Act. The Court further held that is first holding renders insufficient the other bases or predicate acts of racketeering supporting the jury's conclusion that the abortion opponents violated RICO. While the opponents' conduct constituted the separate offense of coercion, reasoned Chief Justice Rehnquist, the opponents neither pursued nor received something of value from the supporters that the opponents could exercise, transfer, or sell, and thus did not commit extortion. Without an underlying RICO violation, the Court vacated the District Court's injunction and did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Lockyer v. Andrade

Tue, 05 Nov 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1127

Petitioner

Lockyer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Andrade

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 63 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, November 5, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, March 5, 2003

Advocates

Erwin Chemerinsky (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Douglas P. Danzig (San Diego, California, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Leandro Andrade was found guilty of two felony counts of petty theft with a prior conviction after he stole approximately $150 worth of videotapes. Under California's three strikes regime, a judge sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life. In affirming, the California Court of Appeal rejected his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. After the Supreme Court of California denied discretionary review, Andrade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The District Court denied his petition. In reversing, the Court of Appeals granted Andrade a certificate of appealability as to his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.

Question

Did the Federal Court of Appeals err in holding that California Court of Appeal's affirmation of a sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison for a "third strike" conviction was "grossly disproportionate" to the crime and thus violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment"?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lockyer, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the California Court of Appeal's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Court's clearly established law within the meaning of 28 USC section 2254(d)(1). The Court reasoned that, because the "precise contours" of the proportionality principle were unclear, it was not objectively unreasonable for the state appellate court to conclude that the "contours" permitted an affirmance of the sentence. The gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case, wrote Justice O'Connor. "This is the rare sentence of demonstrable gross disproportionality," argued Justice David H. Souter in his dissent, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined.

Alabama v. North Carolina

jgoldman — Mon, 11 Jan 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

35° 46' 19.5456" N, 78° 38' 19.014" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

132 ORG

Plaintiff

Alabama

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

North Carolina

Respondent Type

Defendant

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010)

Opinion

560 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 16, 2003

Argued

Monday, January 11, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (for the plaintiffs)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, as amicus curiae)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (for the defendant)

Facts of the Case

Several states belonging to the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact ("Compact") and the commission created by the compact ("Commission") filed suit against North Carolina. The plaintiffs allege that North Carolina was designated as a host state for a waste management facility, accepted $80 million to build the facility, but then declined to fund, license, build, and operate it. The plaintiffs seek to recover the $80 million, a $10 million sanction, and attorneys' fees.

The Supreme Court assigned the case to a Special Master who conducted proceedings and filed two reports. The Preliminary Report recommended denying North Carolina's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds; denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to Count I which sought enforcement of sanctions against North Carolina; granting North Carolina's motion to dismiss Count I; and denying North Carolina's motion to dismiss Counts II-V. The Special Master's Second Report recommended denying Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting North Carolina's motion for summary judgment on Count II; and denying North Carolina's motion for summary judgment on Counts III-V. The parties then filed a total of nine exceptions to the Special Master's Reports.

Question

1) Do sovereign immunity principles require the dismissal of the commission as a plaintiff in this original action brought jointly by the commission and four states against North Carolina?

2) Does the compact authorize the commission to impose monetary sanctions against North Carolina in response to North Carolina's alleged breach of its obligations?

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' seven exceptions are overruled. With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the Compact does not authorize the Commission to impose monetary sanctions against North Carolina. Moreover, the Court reasoned that North Carolina did not breach its contractual obligation. The Court further held that North Carolina's two exceptions are overruled. The Court reasoned that the Special Master acted reasonably in denying North Carolina's motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts III-V.

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Sonia Sotamayor, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He stated that, despite some reservations, the majority was correct to reject the plaintiffs' final exception to the Special Master's Reports. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that Arizona v. California, relied on heavily by the majority, was a case "built on sand," and thus, not sufficient to support the majority's conclusions. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that North Carolina did breach the Compact when it suspended its efforts to build a waste disposal facility.

Alabama v. North Carolina

jgoldman — Mon, 11 Jan 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

35° 46' 19.5456" N, 78° 38' 19.014" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

132ORIG

Plaintiff

Alabama

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

North Carolina

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010)

Opinion

560 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 16, 2003

Argued

Monday, January 11, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (For the plaintiffs on exceptions to the report of the Special Master)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (For the defendants on exceptions to the report of the Special Master)

Facts of the Case

Question

1) Do sovereign immunity principles require the dismissal of the commission as a plaintiff in this original action brought jointly by the commission and four states against North Carolina?

2) Does the compact authorize the commission to impose monetary sanctions against North Carolina in response to North Carolina's alleged breach of its obligations?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for , 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: