Cases - 2001 term

New York v. FERC

Wed, 03 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-568

Petitioner

New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

FERC

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Enron Power Marketing, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, No. 00-809

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 1 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, October 3, 2001

Decided

Monday, March 4, 2002

Advocates

Louis R. Cohen (Argued the cause for the petitioner in No. 00-809)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Lawrence G. Malone (New York State Public Service Commission, argued the cause for the petitioners in No. 00-568)

Facts of the Case

In 1935, when the Federal Power Act (FPA) became law, most electric utilities operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation and their sales were bundled, meaning that consumers paid a single charge for both the cost of the electricity and the cost of its delivery. Section 201(b) of the FPA provides the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with jurisdiction over "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce" and section 205 prohibits unreasonable rates and undue discrimination "with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the [Commission's] jurisdiction." Currently, public utilities still retain ownership of the transmission lines that their competitors must use to deliver electricity to wholesale and retail customers and thus can refuse to deliver their competitors' energy or deliver that power on terms and conditions less favorable than those they apply to their own transmissions. In Order No. 888, FERC found such practices discriminatory under section 205. FERC then ordered the unbundling of wholesale generation and transmission services, which means that each utility must state separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services; imposed a similar open access requirement on unbundled retail transmissions in interstate commerce; and declined to extend the open access requirement to the transmission component of bundled retail sales. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals upheld the order.

Question

May the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission require a public utility to transmit competitors' electricity over its lines on the same terms that the utility applies to its own energy transmissions, if the utility unbundles, or separates, the cost of transmission from the cost of electrical energy when billing its retail customers? Must FERC impose that requirement on utilities that continue to offer only bundled retail sales?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for FERC, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Power

Yes and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that FERC properly construed its statutory authority. The Court's 9-0 decision affirmed that FERC had the jurisdiction to require nondiscriminatory access to electrical transmission by utilities, which unbundled their costs, regardless of state regulation of retail sales, and, by a 6-3 vote, was not required to impose requirements on bundled retail sales. "Because the FPA authorizes FERC's jurisdiction over interstate transmissions, without regard to whether the transmissions are sold to a reseller or directly to a consumer, FERC's exercise of this power is valid," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.

Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc.

Wed, 31 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-927

Petitioner

Chao

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 235 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, October 31, 2001

Decided

Wednesday, January 9, 2002

Advocates

Patrick J. Veters (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Matthew D. Roberts (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, an explosion on board Mallard Bay Drilling Rig 52, a oil and gas exploration barge, killed or injured several workers while the barge was drilling a well in Louisiana's territorial waters. The Coast Guard's subsequent investigation did not accuse Mallard of anything, but did note that the barge was not an "inspected vessel" subject to comprehensive Coast Guard regulation. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) then cited Mallard for violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act) of 1970. Mallard challenged OSHA's jurisdiction to issue the citations on the grounds that Rig 52 was not a "workplace" under section 4(a) of the Act and that section 4(b)(1) of the Act pre-empted OSHA jurisdiction because the Coast Guard had exclusive authority to prescribe and enforce occupational safety and health standards on vessels such as Rig 52. Rejecting both arguments, an Administrative Law Judge found that Rig 52 was a "workplace" under the Act and held that the Coast Guard had not pre-empted OSHA's jurisdiction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Coast Guard's exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of seamen's working conditions aboard vessels such as Rig 52 precluded OSHA's regulation under section 4(b)(1), and that this pre-emption encompassed both inspected and uninspected vessels.

Question

Does the Occupational Safety and Health Administration have jurisdiction under the Occupational Safety and Health Act to issue citations to uninspected vessels, which are subject to minimal Coast Guard regulation?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Chao, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Occupational Safety and Health

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that OSHA had jurisdiction under the Act to issue the citations. The Court reasoned that section 4(b)(1) did not pre-empt, in favor of Coast Guard jurisdiction, OSHA jurisdiction over the barge, as the Coast Guard had not exercised its authority over the barge because the Guard has neither affirmatively regulated the working conditions at issue, nor asserted comprehensive regulatory jurisdiction over working conditions on uninspected vessels. "Mere possession by another federal agency of unexercised authority to regulate certain working conditions is insufficient to displace OSHA's jurisdiction," wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Antonin Scalia took no part in the decision of this case.

United States v. Knights

Tue, 06 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1260

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Knights

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 112 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 2001

Decided

Monday, December 10, 2001

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (Argued the cause for the petitioner, on behalf of the Petitioner)

Hilary A. Fox (Oakland, California, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A California court sentenced Mark James Knights to probation for a drug offense. The probation order included the following condition: that Knights would "submit his...person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer." In the aftermath of arson at the site of a Pacific Gas and Electric (PGE) power transformer, a sheriff's detective, with reasonable suspicion, searched Knights's apartment. Based in part on items recovered, including a PGE padlock, a federal grand jury indicted Knights for conspiracy to commit arson, for possession of an unregistered destructive device, and for being a felon in possession of ammunition. In granting Knights's motion to suppress, the District Court held that, although the detective had reasonable suspicion to believe that Knights was involved with incendiary materials, the search was for "investigatory" rather than "probationary" purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does a search pursuant to a common California probation condition, supported by reasonable suspicion, satisfy the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the warrantless search of Knights, which was supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation, was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Noting that nothing in Knight's probation condition limits searches to those with a "probationary" purpose, the Court examined whether the Fourth Amendment imposed such a limitation. The Court then concluded that, based on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis, reasonable suspicion is constitutionally sufficient to render a warrant requirement unnecessary. Justice David H. Souter filed a concurring opinion.

Stewart v. Smith

Sat, 19 May 2012 01:29:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-339

Appellee

Smith

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Stewart

Respondent Type

Appellant

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 157 (2001)

Decided

Wednesday, December 12, 2001

Facts of the Case

Robert Smith was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Smith filed a series of petitions for state postconviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The Superior Court denied Smith's claims, finding them waived under Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) because he failed to raise them in his previous Rule 32 petitions. The court rejected Smith's argument that his failure to raise these claims was also due to ineffective assistance because his prior appellate and Rule 32 counsel, who are members of the Arizona Public Defender's office, refused to file ineffective assistance of counsel claims because his trial counsel was also a member of the Public Defender's office. The Federal District Court held that Smith's claim was barred by the lower court's procedural ruling. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the state procedural default was not independent of federal law and thus did not bar federal review of the merits of Smith's claim. The appellate court reasoned that Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) applies a different standard for waiver depending on whether the claim asserted in a Rule 32 petition was of sufficient constitutional magnitude and that determination whether a claim is of sufficient magnitude required consideration of the merits of the claim.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals err in interpreting Arizona law concerning its postconviction-relief rule?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Stewart, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a per curiam opinion, the Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals holding. The Court reasoned that in order to determine whether the District Court may review Smith's claims, it first had to know whether the Court of Appeals properly interpreted Arizona law concerning Rule 32.2(a)(3) and, therefore, certified the following question to the Arizona Supreme Court: "At the time of respondent's third Rule 32 petition in 1995, did the question whether an asserted claim was of 'sufficient constitutional magnitude' to require a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver for purposes of Rule 32.2(a)(3) depend upon the merits of the particular claim or merely upon the particular right alleged to have been violated?"

Chickasaw Nation v. United States

Tue, 02 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-507

Petitioner

Chickasaw Nation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 84 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, November 27, 2001

Advocates

Edward C. DuMont (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Graydon D. Luthey, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Indian Regulatory Gaming Act provides that Internal Revenue Code provisions "(including sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and chapter 35() concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes" with respect to gambling operations shall apply to Indian tribes in the same way as they apply to States. Chapter 35 imposes taxes from which it exempts certain state- controlled gambling activities, but says nothing about tax reporting or withholding. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, in a lawsuit, claimed that the Gaming Act subsection's explicit parenthetical reference exempts them from paying those chapter 35 taxes from which the States are exempt. Rejecting that claim, the Court of Appeals ultimately held that the subsection applies only to Code provisions concerning tax withholding and reporting.

Question

Does the Indian Regulatory Gaming Act exempt tribes from paying the gambling- related taxes, which State need not pay, imposed by chapter 35 of the Internal Revenue Code?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 2719

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Indian Regulatory Gaming Act does not create such an exemption. The Court reasoned that despite its parenthetical reference, the language outside the parenthetical was unambiguous and the subsection applied only to Internal Revenue Code provisions that concerned the reporting and withholding of taxes. The language inside the parenthetical was meant simply to be illustrative. Moreover, the Court noted that when Congress enacts a tax exemption, it ordinarily does so explicitly. "We can find no comparable instance in which Congress legislated an exemption through an inexplicit numerical cross- reference -- especially a cross-reference that might easily escape notice," wrote Justice Breyer.

Thomas v. Chicago Park District

Mon, 03 Dec 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1249

Petitioner

Thomas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chicago Park District

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 316 (2002)

Argued

Monday, December 3, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 2002

Advocates

David A. Strauss (Argued the cause for the respondent)

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Richard L. Wilson (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Chicago Park District is responsible for operating public parks and other public property in Chicago. Pursuant to its authority, the Park District adopted an ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events in public parks. The ordinance provides that the Park District may deny a permit on any of 13 specified grounds, must process applications within 28 days, and must explain its reasons for a denial. An unsuccessful applicant may appeal, first, to the Park District's general superintendent and then to state court. The Windy City Hemp Development Board applied on several occasions for permits to hold rallies advocating the legalization of marijuana. Some permits were granted and others were denied. Ultimately, the Board filed suit, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. The District Court granted the Park District summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Must a municipal park ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events must, consistent with the First Amendment, contain certain procedural safeguards?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Chicago Park District, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the First Amendment free speech guarantee does not require the Park District to initiate litigation every time the agency denied a permit for an event or specify a deadline for judicial review of a challenge to the denial of a permit. The Court reasoned that the licensing scheme was not based on subject-matter censorship, but rather content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of the use of a public forum thus making the ordinance constitutional. "On balance, we think the permissive nature of the ordinance furthers, rather than constricts, free speech," wrote Justice Scalia for the Court.

Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia

Mon, 25 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-298

Petitioner

Lapides

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Board of Regents of University System of Georgia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 613 (2002)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 2002

Decided

Monday, May 13, 2002

Advocates

David J. Bederman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Julie C. Parsley (Austin, Texas, argued the cause for the Texas, e al., as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Devon Orland (Atlanta, Georgia, argued the cause for the respondents)

Irving L. Gornstein (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, filed a state-court lawsuit against the system?s board of regents and other university officials, alleging that the officials had violated state tort law and 42 USC section 1983 when they placed sexual harassment allegations in his personnel files. The defendants removed the case to Federal District Court and then sought a dismissal. Conceding that a state statute had waived Georgia's sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, the State claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal court. The District Court held that Georgia had waived such immunity when it removed the case to federal court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because state law was unclear as to whether the state attorney general had the legal authority to waive Georgia's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State retained the legal right to assert immunity, even after the removal.

Question

Does a State's act of removing a lawsuit from state court to federal court waive the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other States?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lapides, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court. The Court concluded that that the university officials' voluntary removal of the action expressly invoked the jurisdiction of the federal courts and thus constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to state law claims for which immunity was waived in state court. Under the general principle that a State's voluntary appearance in federal court amounts to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court reasoned that Georgia was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in state court, but it then voluntarily removed the case to federal court, thus voluntarily invoking that court's jurisdiction.

SEC v. Zandford

Mon, 18 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-147

Petitioner

SEC

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Zandford

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 813 (2002)

Argued

Monday, March 18, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 3, 2002

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (Agued the cause for the petitioner)

Steven H. Goldblatt (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1987, Charles Zandford, a securities broker, persuaded William Wood to open a joint investment account for himself and his mentally retarded daughter. The Woods gave Zandford discretion to manage the account and a general power of attorney to engage in securities transactions without their prior approval. After Wood died, all of the money that he had invested was gone. Subsequently, Zandford was indicted on federal wire fraud charges for selling securities in the Woods' account and making personal use of the proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also filed a civil complaint, alleging that Zandford had violated section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC's Rule 10b-5 by engaging in a scheme to defraud the Woods and misappropriating their securities without their knowledge or consent. After Zandford's conviction in the criminal case, the District Court granted the SEC summary judgment in the civil case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint, holding that neither the criminal conviction nor the allegations in the complaint established that Zandford's fraud was in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

Question

Is the alleged fraudulent conduct of a securities broker, who sells his customer's securities and using the proceeds for his own benefit without the customer's knowledge or consent, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for SEC, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that assuming that the complaint's allegations were true, the securities broker's conduct was in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Noting that Zandford's practices were not independent events, the Court found that each sale was made to further his fraudulent scheme and that each was deceptive because it was neither authorized by, nor disclosed to, the Woods. Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded, the stockbroker's breaches of fiduciary duty were in connection with the securities sales, within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, because the securities transactions and breaches of fiduciary duty coincided.

United States v. Ruiz

Wed, 24 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-595

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ruiz

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 622 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, April 24, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 24, 2002

Advocates

Steven F. Hubachek (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her a "fast track" plea bargain in which she would waive indictment, trial, and an appeal in exchange for a reduced sentence recommendation. The prosecutors' offer requires that the defendant waive the right to receive impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses, as well as information supporting any affirmative defense she raises if the case goes to trial. When Ruiz rejected the waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their offer, indicted her for unlawful drug possession, and she pleaded guilty. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same reduced sentence that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the plea bargain. The Government opposed her request, and the District Court denied it. In vacating the sentence, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Constitution prohibits defendants from waiving their right to certain impeachment information.

Question

Do the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require federal prosecutors, before entering into a binding plea agreement with a criminal defendant, to disclose impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant. Although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide that defendants have the right to receive exculpatory impeachment material from prosecutors, the Court reasoned that a criminal defendant's guilty plea under the plea agreement, with its accompanying waiver of constitutional rights, could have been accepted as knowing and voluntary despite any misapprehension by Ruiz concerning the specific extent or nature of the impeachment evidence. Furthermore, Justice Breyer noted that requiring disclosure of the evidence would improperly force the Government to engage in substantial trial preparation prior to plea bargaining.

Dusenbery v. United States

Mon, 29 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-6567

Petitioner

Dusenbery

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 161 (2002)

Argued

Monday, October 29, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, January 8, 2002

Advocates

Allison M. Zieve (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

While Larry Dean Dusenbery was in prison on federal drug charges, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began an administrative process to forfeit cash that officers seized when they executed a search warrant for the residence where he was arrested. The FBI sought to notify Dusenbery by sending certified mail addressed to him care of the federal correctional institution where he was incarcerated; to the address of the residence where he was arrested; and to an address in the town where his mother lived. The FBI received no response in the time allotted and turned over the cash to the United States Marshals Service. When Dusenbery moved for the return of all the property and funds seized in his criminal case, the District Court denied the motion. On remand, the District Court ruled that the Government's sending of notice by certified mail to Dusenbery's place of incarceration satisfied his due process rights as to the cash. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the FBI's notice of intended forfeiture by sending certified letters to inmates while incarcerated satisfy due process?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the FBI's notice of the cash forfeiture satisfied due process. The Court reasoned that the means employed to provide notice to the prisoner were reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the prisoner of the forfeiture. The prisoner did not actually have to receive the notice, noted Chief Justice Rehnquist. "The Government could, for example, have allowed [Dusenbery] to make an escorted visit to the post office himself in order to sign for his letter. But the Due Process Clause does not require such heroic efforts by the Government; it requires only that the Government's effort be 'reasonably calculated' to apprise a party of the pendency of the action." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the Court was condoning a procedure that was too lax to reliably insure that a prisoner would receive a legal notice.

Board of Education v. Earls

Tue, 19 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Oklahoma School District

1301 East Highland Street Tecumseh OK 74873

Tecumseh, OK 74873

United States

35° 15' 12.762" N, 96° 55' 20.3088" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-332

Petitioner

Board of Education

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Earls

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 822 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, March 19, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 2002

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Graham A. Boyd (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Linda M. Meoli (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. Two Tecumseh High School students and their parents brought suit, alleging that the policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted the School District summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such that testing that group will actually redress its drug problem, which the School District had failed to demonstrate.

Question

Is the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy, which requires all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing, consistent with the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Board of Education, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, because the policy reasonably serves the School District's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students, it is constitutional. The Court reasoned that the Board of Education's general regulation of extracurricular activities diminished the expectation of privacy among students and that the Board's method of obtaining urine samples and maintaining test results was minimally intrusive on the students' limited privacy interest. "Within the limits of the Fourth Amendment, local school boards must assess the desirability of drug testing schoolchildren. In upholding the constitutionality of the Policy, we express no opinion as to its wisdom. Rather, we hold only that Tecumseh's Policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren," wrote Justice Thomas.

Harris v. United States

Mon, 25 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-10666

Petitioner

Harris

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 545 (2002)

Argued

Monday, March 25, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 24, 2002

Advocates

William C. Ingram (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.

Question

Is McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, valid after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that section 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single offense, in which brandishing a firearm is a sentencing factor to be found by the judge, not an offense element to be found by the jury. Reaffirming McMillan, the Court also concluded that section 924(c)(1)(A) is constitutional because basing a 2-year increase in the defendant's minimum sentence on a judicial finding of brandishing does not evade the requirements of neither the Fifth and Sixth Amendments nor Apprendi. "Apprendi's conclusions do not undermine McMillan's. There was no comparable historical practice of submitting facts increasing the mandatory minimum to the jury, so the Apprendi rule did not extend to those facts," wrote Justice Kennedy.

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White

Tue, 26 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-521

Petitioner

Republican Party of Minnesota

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

White

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 765 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, March 26, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 2002

Advocates

James Bopp, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Alan I. Gilbert (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Minnesota's Constitution provides for the selection of all state judges by popular election. The announcement clause of the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibits a candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. While running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gregory Wersal filed suit, seeking a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. Wersal alleged that he was forced to refrain from announcing his views on disputed issues during the 1998 campaign, to the point where he declined response to questions put to him by the press and public, out of concern that he might run afoul of the announce clause. The District Court found that the announcement clause did not violate the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the First Amendment permit the Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Republican Party of Minnesota, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the announce clause violates the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the announce clause prohibits speech based on its content and burdens a category of speech that is at the core of First Amendment freedoms - speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office. Moreover, the Court concluded that the clause did not serve to preserve the state judiciary's impartiality, its argued compelling state interest. "There is an obvious tension between the article of Minnesota's popularly approved Constitution which provides that judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's announce clause which places most subjects of interest to the voters off limits," wrote Justice Scalia.

Thompson v. Western States Medical Center

Tue, 26 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Western States Medical Center (Now Kronos Compounding Pharmacy)

3675 S. Rainbow Blvd. Las Vegas NV 89147

Las Vegas, NV 89147

United States

36° 7' 20.8416" N, 115° 14' 35.1384" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-344

Petitioner

Thompson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Western States Medical Center

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 357 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 2002

Decided

Monday, April 29, 2002

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Howard M. Hoffman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) exempts "compounded drugs," or drugs in which a pharmacist or doctor has combined, mixed, or altered ingredients to create a medication tailored to an individual patient's needs, from the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) standard drug approval requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), so long as the providers of the compounded drugs abide by several restrictions. The restrictions included that the prescription be unsolicited and that the providers not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug. A group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in compounding drugs sought to enjoin enforcement of the advertising and solicitation provisions, arguing that they violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Agreeing, the District Court held that the provisions constituted unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Government had not demonstrated that the restrictions would directly advance its interests or that alternatives less restrictive of speech were unavailable.

Question

Do the prohibitions in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 with regard to soliciting prescriptions for, and advertising, compounded drugs violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Western States Medical Center, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the FDAMA's provisions amounted to unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Among other findings, the Court reasoned that, although the speech restrictions allegedly served governmental interests in permitting drug compounding while guaranteeing that compounding was not conducted on such a scale as to undermine the drug approval process, it had not been demonstrated that the speech restrictions were not more extensive than necessary to serve such interests. Justice Thomas Clarence filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, filed a dissenting opinion.

Devlin v. Scardelletti

Tue, 26 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-417

Petitioner

Devlin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scardelletti

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 1 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, March 26, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 10, 2002

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Thomas C. Goldstein (Argued the case for the petitioner)

Laurence E. Gold (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Robert Devlin, a retired worker represented by the Transportation Communications International Union, participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan) administered by the Union. In 1991, the Plan was amended to add a cost of living increase (COLA). In 1997, the Plan's trustees eliminated the COLA because the Plan could not support such a large benefits increase. The trustees also filed a class action in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1997 elimination was binding on all Plan members or that the 1991 COLA was void. After the District Court conditionally certified a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and the trustees asked the court to approve their settlement with the class representatives, Devlin moved to intervene. The court denied his motion as untimely. The court then heard objections to the settlement, including those advanced by Devlin, and approved the settlement. In affirming the District Court's denial of Devlins's intervention, the Court of Appeals held that, because Devlin was not a named class representative and because he had been properly denied the right to intervene, he lacked standing to challenge the settlement.

Question

Does a nonnamed member of a class certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) have the power to appeal the approval of a settlement over objections he stated at the fairness hearing?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Devlin, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that nonnamed class members like Devlin, who have objected in a timely manner to approval of the settlement at the fairness hearing, have the power to bring an appeal without first intervening. The Court reasoned that the District Court's approval of the settlement, which bound the nonnamed class member as a member of the class, amounted to a final decision of the nonnamed class member's right or claim sufficient to trigger his right to appeal. Moreover, the Court concluded, appealing the approval of the settlement was the nonnamed class member's only means of protecting himself from being bound by a disposition of his rights he found unacceptable, given that the nonnamed class member had no ability to opt out of the settlement. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissent, in which Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined.

Alabama v. Shelton

Tue, 19 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1214

Petitioner

Alabama

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shelton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 654 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 2002

Decided

Monday, May 20, 2002

Advocates

William H. Mills (Argued the cause for the respondent)

William H. Pryor, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Charles Fried (on behalf of amicus curiae in opposition to the judgment below)

Steven B. Duke (on behalf of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.

Question

Does the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel, as defined in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, apply to a defendant who was sentenced to a suspended sentence?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Shelton, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held, according to Argersinger, that a suspended sentence that may "end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty" may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded "the guiding hand of counsel" in the prosecution for the crime charged. The Court reasoned that, because the invocation of the suspended incarceration would constitute a prison term imposed for the assault offense of which defendant was convicted without the assistance of counsel, the Constitution required the provision of counsel. Justice Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that the Court's prior decisions emphasized actual imprisonment as the touchstone of entitlement to appointed counsel.

Edelman v. Lynchburg College

Tue, 08 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1072

Petitioner

Edelman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lynchburg College

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 106 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, March 19, 2002

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Alexander L. Bell (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Eric Schnapper (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that a charge of employment discrimination be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) "within [a specified number of] days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." An EEOC regulation permits an otherwise timely filer to verify a charge after the time for filing has expired. In November 1997, Leonard Edelman faxed a letter to the EEOC, claiming that Lynchburg College had subjected him to gender-based, national origin, and religious discrimination after it denied him tenure. The EEOC informed Edelman of the 300-day time limit and sent him a Form 5 Charge of Discrimination, which he returned 313 days after he was denied tenure. The District Court dismissed the Title VII complaint, finding that the letter was not a charge under Title VII because neither Edelman nor the EEOC treated it as one. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that because a charge requires verification and must be filed within the limitations period, it follows that a charge must be verified within that period.

Question

Is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulation, which permits the verification of a timely filed discrimination charge after the limitations period, valid?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Edelman, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the EEOC's relation-back regulation was an unassailable interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court noted that where a statute or supplemental rule required an oath, which the charge in question did, courts had shown a high degree of consistency in accepting later verification as reaching back to an earlier, unverified filing. Moreover, by amending the law without repudiating the regulation, the Court reasoned that Congress had suggested its consent to the EEOC's practice. "This background law not only persuades by its regularity over time but points to tacit congressional approval of the EEOC's position, Congress being presumed to have known of this settled judicial treatment of oath requirements when it enacted and later amended Title VII," wrote Justice Souter.

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide

Mon, 07 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-6029

Petitioner

Ragsdale

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wolverine World Wide

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 81 (2002)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, March 19, 2002

Advocates

Richard D. Bennett (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the court, supporting the petitioner)

Luther O. Sutter (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) guarantees qualifying employees 12 weeks of unpaid leave each year and encourages businesses to adopt more generous policies. In 1996, Wolverine World Wide, Inc. granted Tracy Ragsdale 30 weeks of medical leave after she was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. Wolverine did not notify Ragsdale that 12 weeks of the absence would count as her FMLA leave. After Ragsdale sought another 30-day extension, Wolverine refused her request and terminated her when she did not return to work. Ragsdale filed suit, alleging under Labor Department regulation 29 CFR section 825.700(a), which provides that if an employee takes medical leave "and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement," that Wolverine was required to grant her 12 additional weeks of leave. The District Court granted Wolverine summary judgment, finding that the regulation was in conflict with the statute and invalid because it required Wolverine to grant Ragsdale more than 12 weeks of FMLA-compliant leave in one year. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does Labor Department regulation 29 CFR section 825.700(a) require employers to grant an employee additional leave after granting more than 12 weeks of leave, if the employer failed to notify the employee that the original leave counted against the employee's Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 entitlement?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Wolverine World Wide, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 29 U.S.C. 2612

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the regulation is contrary to the FMLA and beyond the Secretary of Labor's authority. Among other findings, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the regulation amended the FMLA's most fundamental substantive guarantee, the 12-week leave entitlement, and thus undermined Congress's balance of the needs of families and the interests of employers. Arguing that the regulation was incompatible with the regulation, Justice Kennedy wrote that, it "imposes a high price for a good-faith but erroneous characterization of an absence as non-FMLA leave, and employers like Wolverine might well conclude that the simpler, less generous route is the preferable one." Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.

Young v. United States

Wed, 09 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1567

Petitioner

Young

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 43 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, January 9, 2002

Decided

Monday, March 4, 2002

Advocates

Grenville Clark, III (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

Cornelius and Suzanne Young failed to include payment with their 1992 income tax return, which was due and filed on October 15, 1993. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed a tax liability against them. After filing a Chapter 13 petition, the Youngs ultimately filed a Chapter 7 petition and were granted a discharge, meaning that Youngs had no assets available to satisfy unsecured creditors, including the IRS. If the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a claim for certain taxes for which the return was due within three years before the individual taxpayer files a bankruptcy petition, its claim enjoys eighth priority under 11 USC section 507(a)(8)(A)(i), and is nondischargeable in bankruptcy under section 523(a)(1)(A). When the IRS subsequently demanded that they pay the tax debt, the Youngs asked the Bankruptcy Court to reopen the Chapter 7 case and declare the debt discharged under section 523(a)(1)(A), claiming that it fell outside section 507(a)(8)(A)(i)'s "three-year lookback period" because it pertained to a tax return due more than three years before their Chapter 7 filing. The District Court held that the "lookback period" is tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition and concluded that the 1992 debt had not been discharged when the Youngs were granted a discharge under Chapter 7. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is the Bankruptcy Code's "three-year lookback period," under which a discharge does not extinguish certain tax liabilities for which a return was due within three years before the filing of an individual debtor's petition, tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held section 507(a)(8)(A)(i)'s lookback period is tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition. The Court reasoned that the three-year lookback period is a limitations period subject to traditional principles of equitable tolling and that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code precluded the equitable tolling of the lookback period. The Court reject the Youngs' argument that the Bankruptcy Code permitted the filing of a Chapter 13 petition and the subsequent filing of a Chapter 7 petition after the lookback period has expired. Under such a loophole, certain unpaid taxes would be dischargeable.

Gonzaga University v. Doe

Wed, 24 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-679

Petitioner

Gonzaga University

Respondent

Doe

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 273 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, April 24, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 2002

Advocates

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Beth S. Brinkmann (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A student at Gonzaga University planned to become a public elementary school teacher in Washington, which required all new teachers to obtain an affidavit of good moral character from their graduating colleges. Gonzaga's teacher certification specialist overheard one student tell another that the student had engaged in sexual misconduct, contacted the state agency responsible for teacher certification, and discussed the allegations, identifying the student by name. Ultimately, the student was told that he would not receive his certification affidavit. The student sued Gonzaga in state court, alleging a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), which prohibits the federal funding of schools that have a policy or practice of permitting the release of students' education records without their parents' written consent. A jury awarded the student compensatory and punitive damages. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court acknowledged that FERPA does not give rise to a private cause of action, but reasoned that the nondisclosure provision creates a federal right that is enforceable.

Question

May a student sue a private university for damages to enforce provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Gonzaga University, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Family Educational Rights and Privacy (Buckley Amendment)

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that such an action is foreclosed because the relevant provisions of FERPA create no personal rights to enforce. The Court reasoned that the creation of individual rights required clear and unambiguous terms, which FERPA's confidentiality provisions did not contain. "FERPA's nondisclosure provisions contain no rights-creating language, they have an aggregate, not individual, focus, and they serve primarily to direct the Secretary of Education's distribution of public funds to educational institutions," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the Court's opinion "may be read as accepting the proposition that FERPA does indeed create both parental rights of access to student records and student rights of privacy in such records, but that those federal rights are of a lesser value because Congress did not intend them to be enforceable by their owners."

Kelly v. South Carolina

Mon, 26 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-9280

Petitioner

Kelly

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

South Carolina

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 246 (2002)

Argued

Monday, November 26, 2001

Decided

Wednesday, January 9, 2002

Advocates

David I. Bruck (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

S. Creighton Waters (South Carolina, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After convicting William Kelly for murder, a South Carolina jury was asked to determine whether any aggravating factors had been shown and, if so, to recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment. During sentencing, the prosecutor presented testimony that Kelly had taken part in an escape attempt with plans to hold a female guard hostage; provided evidence of Kelly's sadism and his desires to kill anyone who irritated him; and spoke of Kelly as a "butcher," "bloody," and "dangerous." Relying on the holding of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, that when "a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death...is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant 'to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility,'" Kelly's counsel requested a jury instruction stating that Kelly would be ineligible for parole if he received a life sentence. In refusing, the trial court said that the State's evidence went to Kelly's character and characteristics, not to future dangerousness. The jury recommended a death sentence. In affirming the sentence, the State Supreme Court held Simmons inapposite because state law provided the jury with a third sentencing alternative and future dangerousness was not at issue.

Question

Did the state trial court err in holding Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 inapposite in the death sentence proceeding of William Kelly?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kelly, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Kelly was entitled to a jury instruction that he would be ineligible for parole under a life sentence. The Court reasoned that the Simons rule was applicable because under South Carolina's sentencing scheme, although a defendant charged with murder carrying the possibility of a death sentence could receive a sentence less than life imprisonment, a jury's only alternatives were to recommend death or life without parole, if the jury found the existence of an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, the Court found that the assertion that the defendant's future dangerousness was not at issue was unsupportable on the record.

Utah v. Evans

Wed, 27 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-714

Appellee

Evans

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Utah

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 452 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, March 27, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 2002

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (for the Federal Appellees)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the North Carolina Appellees)

Thomas R. Lee (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

In conducting the 2000 census, the Census Bureau used "hot-deck imputation" to fill in certain gaps in its information and resolved certain conflicts in the data. Under this methodology, the Bureau imputes the relevant information by inferring that the address or unit about which it is uncertain has the same population characteristics as those of its geographically closest neighbor of the same type. Hot-deck Imputation increased North Carolina's population by 0.4% while increasing Utah's population by only 0.2% such that North Carolina will receive one more Representative and Utah one less than if the Bureau had simply filled relevant informational gaps by counting the related number of individuals as zero. Utah brought suit against the officials charged with conducting the census, claiming that the Bureau's use of hot-deck imputation violates 13 USC section 195, which prohibits use of "the statistical method known as 'sampling,'" and is inconsistent with Article 1, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution, which states that an "actual Enumeration be made." Utah sought an injunction compelling a change of the official census results. The District Court found for the Bureau.

Question

Does the Census Bureau's use of "hot-deck imputation," in the 2000 census, violate the statutory provision forbidding use of the statistical method known as sampling? Is this methodology inconsistent with the Constitution's statement that an "actual Enumeration be made?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Evans, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 13 U.S.C. 195

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the use of hot-deck imputation violates neither the statute nor the Constitution. The Court reasoned that, whereas sampling seeks to extrapolate the features of a large population from a small one, the Bureau's imputation process simply sought to fill in missing data as part of an effort to count individuals one by one and that these differences placed imputation outside the scope of the prohibitive statute. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that Article 1's wording that the "actual Enumeration" shall take place "in such Manner as" Congress itself "shall by Law direct," suggested a breadth of congressional methodological authority, rather than a limitation.

Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota

Mon, 26 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1514

Petitioner

Raygor

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Regents of the University of Minnesota

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 533 (2002)

Argued

Monday, November 26, 2001

Decided

Wednesday, February 27, 2002

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Howard L. Bolter (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Mark B. Rotenberg (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1996, Lance Raygor and James Goodchild filed complaints in Federal District Court against the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, stemming from an alleged incident in which the university attempted to compel them to accept early retirement. They refused. Subsequently, their jobs were reclassified to reduce their salaries. The complaints alleged a federal cause of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and a state law discrimination action under the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, which purports to toll the limitations period for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they are dismissed. The District Court ultimately dismissed their cases on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Before the dismissal, Raygor and Goodrich refilled their state law claims in state court. The university contended that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute did not toll the limitations period on those claims because the Federal District Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the ADEA claims. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court held the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute unconstitutional when applied to claims against nonconsenting state defendants, such as the university.

Question

Does the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute's tolling provision apply to claims filed in federal court against nonconsenting States?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Regents of the University of Minnesota, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1367

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota never consented to suit in federal court on Raygor and Goodrich's state law claims and that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute does not toll the period of limitations for state law claims asserted against nonconsenting state defendants that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Therefore, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute did not operate to toll the period of limitations for Raygor and Goodrich's claims. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Joined by Justices David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer, Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Barnes v. Gorman

Tue, 23 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-682

Petitioner

Barnes

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gorman

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 181 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, April 23, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 17, 2002

Advocates

Lawrence S. Robbins (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Scott L. Nelson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Gregory G. Garre (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Jeffrey Gorman is a paraplegic. After being arrested, he was transported to a Kansas City police station in a van that was not equipped to accommodate the disabled. Gorman was removed from his wheelchair and seatbelted to a bench in the van. During the ride, Gorman fell to the floor, suffering serious injuries that left him unable to work full time. Gorman sued certain Kansas police officials for discriminating against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, by failing to maintain appropriate policies for the arrest and transportation of persons with spinal cord injuries. A jury awarded him compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court vacated as to punitive damages, holding that they are unavailable in private suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found punitive damages available under a general rule that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief for violation of a federal right.

Question

May punitive damages be awarded in a private cause of action brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Barnes, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that, because punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it follows that they may not be awarded in suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The Court noted that the remedies of the sections of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act Gorman sued under are coextensive with those available in a private action under Title VI. Under a contract-law analogy, the Court reasoned because Title VI- funding recipients did not, merely by accepting funds, implicitly consent to liability for punitive damages, it followed that they could not be awarded in suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Mon, 07 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Lake Tahoe Basin

United States

38° 58' 40.6668" N, 119° 51' 43.6464" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1167

Petitioner

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council

Respondent

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 302 (2002)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, April 23, 2002

Advocates

Michael M. Berger (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposed two moratoria from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983 and from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Real estate owners affected by the moratoria and an association representing such owners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., filed suits, claiming that TRPA's actions constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. The District Court found that TRPA had not effected a partial taking; however, it concluded that the moratoria did constitute a categorical taking because TRPA temporarily deprived real estate owners of all economically viable use of their land. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that because the regulations had only a temporary impact, no categorical taking had occurred.

Question

Does a moratorium on development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that that the mere enactment of the regulations implementing the moratoria did not constitute a per se taking of the landowners' property. The Court reasoned that whether a taking occurred depended upon the considerations of landowners' expectations, actual impact, public interest, and reasons for the moratoria. Moreover, the Court concluded that the adoption of a categorical rule that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constituted a compensable taking would impose unreasonable financial obligations upon governments for the normal delays involved in processing land use applications. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia.

United States v. Craft

Mon, 14 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1831

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Craft

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 274 (2002)

Argued

Monday, January 14, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, April 17, 2002

Advocates

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Kent L. Jones (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

When Don Craft failed to pay federal income tax liabilities for the failure to file federal income tax returns for the years 1979 through 1986, a federal tax lien attached to "all [of his] property and rights to property," pursuant to 26 USC section 6321. After the notice of the lien was filed, Dan and his wife Sandra L. Craft jointly executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer to her his interest in a piece of real property in Michigan that they owned as tenants by the entirety. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agreed to release the lien and allow the Crafts to sell the property with half the net proceeds to be held in escrow pending determination of the Government's interest in the property. After Sandra brought an action to quiet title to the escrowed proceeds, the Government claimed that its lien had attached to the husband's interest in the tenancy by the entirety. The District Court granted the Government summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, however, held that no lien attached because the husband had no separate interest in the entireties property under Michigan law.

Question

Does a tenant by the entirety possess property or rights to property to which a federal lien may attach?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that each tenant possesses individual rights in the estate sufficient to constitute "property" or "rights to property" for the purposes of the lien. By determining that Michigan law granted the husband the right to use the property, the right to receive income produced by it, the right to exclude others from it, the non-unilateral right to alienate the property, and the right of survivorship, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the rights Michigan law granted to the husband as a tenant by the entirety qualified as "property" or "rights to property" under section 6321 and, therefore, the federal tax lien could attach to the husband's property. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Scalia and John Paul Stevens joined.

USPS v. Gregory

Tue, 09 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-758

Petitioner

USPS

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gregory

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 1 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, October 9, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, November 13, 2001

Advocates

Henk Brands (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Gregory G. Garre (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Maria Gregory worked for the United States Postal Service as a letter technician with responsibility for overseeing letter carriers on five mail routes and serving as a replacement carrier on those routes. In 1997, while three disciplinary actions that the Postal Service took against Gregory were pending in grievance proceedings pursuant to the Postal Service's collective bargaining agreement with her union, the Postal Service terminated Gregory's employment after a fourth violation. Gregory then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, where an agency must prove its charge by a preponderance of the evidence, proving not only that the misconduct occurred, but also that the penalty assessed is reasonable in relation to it. Analyzing her three prior disciplinary actions independently, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that Gregory's termination was reasonable in light of her four violations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that prior disciplinary actions subject to ongoing proceedings may not be used to support a penalty's reasonableness.

Question

Must the Merit Systems Protection Board adopt the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruling that, when assessing a penalty's reasonableness, the Board may not consider prior disciplinary actions that are pending in collectively bargained grievance proceedings?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for USPS, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 1101

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that that the Federal Circuit's ruling was vacated because the Board has broad discretion in determining how to review prior disciplinary actions and need not adopt the Federal Circuit's rule. The Court reasoned that the Board had broad discretion under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of 5 USC section 7703(c) to review prior disciplinary actions and that the role of the judiciary was only to ascertain whether the Board had met this minimum standard. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer

Mon, 03 Dec 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-952

Petitioner

Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Blumer

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 473 (2002)

Argued

Monday, December 3, 2001

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 2002

Advocates

Mitchell Hagopian (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Maureen M. Flanagan (Madison, Wisconsin, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The spousal impoverishment provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA) permit a spouse living at home to reserve certain income and assets to meet the minimum monthly maintenance needs he or she will have when the other spouse is institutionalized, usually in a nursing home, and becomes eligible for Medicaid. The MCCA's resource allocation rules provide that, in determining the institutionalized spouse's Medicaid eligibility, a portion of the couple's resources, called the "community spouse resource allowance" (CSRA), shall be reserved for the benefit of the community spouse. The MCCA allows an increase in the standard allowance if either spouse shows, at a state-administered hearing, that the community spouse will not be able to maintain the statutorily defined minimum level of income on which to live after the institutionalized spouse gains Medicaid eligibility. In 1996, after entering a Wisconsin nursing home, Irene Blumer applied for Medicaid through her husband Burnett and ultimately sought a higher CSRA. Under the "income- first" method for determining whether the community spouse is entitled to a higher CSRA, which Wisconsin uses, the State considers first whether potential income transfers from the institutionalized spouse will suffice to enable the community spouse to meet monthly needs once the institutionalized spouse qualifies for Medicaid. Subsequently, an examiner denied Blumer's request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State's income-first statute conflicted with the MCCA, which, the appeals court held, unambiguously mandates the resources-first method.

Question

Is the income-first method of determining whether a community spouse is entitled to a higher community spouse resource allowance consistent with the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1396

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the income-first method qualified as a permissible interpretation of the MCCA. The Court reasoned that neither the text not the structure of the MCCA barred Wisconsin's use of the income-first method. Among the Court's findings were that that income-first method did not render meaningless the MCCA's key prohibition against deeming income of the community spouse available to the institutionalized spouse and that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who possessed the authority to prescribe standards relevant to the issue at hand, had declared in a proposed rule that the Federal Government ought to leave to states the decision whether to use the income-first method or the resources-first method. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, dissented.

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta

Wed, 31 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-730

Petitioner

Adarand Constructors, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mineta

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 103 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, October 31, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, November 27, 2001

Advocates

William Perry Pendley (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, held that strict scrutiny governs whether race-based classifications violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (Adarand I). The Court then remanded the case for a determination whether the race-based components of the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program could withstand this standard of review. Ultimately, the Court remanded Adarand for a second time for a determination on the merits consistent with Adarand I. When the Court of Appeals held, that by virtue of a new regulatory framework under which the DOT's state and local DBE program now operated, that program passed constitutional muster, the Court again certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny standard announced in Adarand I.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals misapply the strict scrutiny standard in determining if Congress had a compelling interest to enact legislation designed to remedy the effects of racial discrimination? Is the U.S. Department of Transportation's current Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mineta, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. After Adarand asserted that it was only challenging the rules pertaining to the direct procurement of DOT funds for highway construction on federal lands rather than any part of the DOT's DBE program as it pertained to state and local procurement, the Court concluded that the posture of the case had changed. The Court reasoned that such a shift required dismissal as it had not been addressed whether the various race-based programs applicable to such direct procurement could satisfy strict scrutiny and that reaching the merits of such a challenge would require a threshold examination whether the company had standing to challenge such direct-procurement provisions, which was not in the writ of certiorari.

Ring v. Arizona

Mon, 22 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-488

Petitioner

Ring

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arizona

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 584 (2002)

Argued

Monday, April 22, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 24, 2002

Advocates

Janet Napolitano (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Andrew D. Hurwitz (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

At Timothy Ring's trial for murder, the jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but found Ring guilty of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, unless further findings were made by a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing and only if the judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Because the jury had convicted Ring of felony murder, not premeditated murder, Ring would be eligible for the death penalty only if he was the victim's actual killer. Citing accomplice testimony at the sentencing hearing, the judge found that Ring was the killer. The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of them being that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, as well as one mitigating factor, Ring's minimal criminal record, and ruled that the latter did not call for leniency.

Question

Does Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violate the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee by entrusting to a judge the finding of facts sufficient to impose the death penalty?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ring, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Trial By Jury

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operates as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be "exposed...to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone," the Court overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, insofar it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. "The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death," wrote Justice Ginsburg.

McKune v. Lile

Wed, 28 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1187

Petitioner

McKune

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lile

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 24 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 10, 2002

Advocates

Stephen R. McAllister (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Gregory G. Garre (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Matthew J. Wiltanger (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A few years before his release, prison officials ordered Robert Lile, who was convicted of rape, to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program, participating inmates are required to complete and sign an "Admission of Responsibility" form, in which they accept responsibility for the crimes for which they have been sentenced, and complete a sexual history form detailing all prior sexual activities, regardless of whether the activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. The information obtained from SATP participants is not privileged. By refusing to participate, a prisoner's privileges are reduced. Lile refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The District Court granted Lile summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the compelled self-incrimination can be established by penalties that do not constitute deprivations of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. The appellate court concluded that the SATP could treat inmate admissions as privileged.

Question

Does the Kansas Sexual Abuse Treatment Program violate inmates' Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for McKune, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Self-Incrimination

No. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the SATP serves a vital penological purpose, and that offering inmates minimal incentives to participate does not amount to compelled self- incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Filing an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, while noting that the Court was divided over the standard for evaluating compulsion for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a prison setting, agreed that Lile's argument was unpersuasive. Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Fifth Amendment's text does not prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person's refusal to incriminate himself; it prohibits only the compulsion of such testimony. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined, arguing that the Court's decision "characterized a threatened harm as 'a minimal incentive.'"

US Airways v. Barnett

Tue, 04 Dec 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1250

Petitioner

US Airways

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Barnett

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 391 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, December 4, 2001

Decided

Monday, April 29, 2002

Advocates

Claudia Center (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1990, Robert Barnett injured his back while working in a cargo-handling position at US Airways. Invoking his seniority rights, Barnett transferred to a less physically demanding position in the mailroom. Subsequently, Barnett's new position became open to seniority-based employee bidding under US Airways' seniority system and, ultimately, he lost his job. Barnett then filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against "an individual with a disability" who with "reasonable accommodation" can perform a job's essential functions unless the employer "can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business." In granting US Airways summary judgment, the District Court found that altering a seniority system would result in an "undue hardship" to both US Airways and its nondisabled employees. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the seniority system was merely a factor in the undue hardship analysis and that a case-by-case, fact intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular assignment would constitute an undue hardship.

Question

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a position as a reasonable accommodation even though another employee is entitled to hold the position under the employer's seniority system?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for US Airways, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Split Vote

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the ADA did not require the employer to assign the employee to the mailroom position in violation of the established seniority system. The Court reasoned that an employer's showing that a requested accommodation conflicts with seniority rules is ordinarily sufficient to show that an accommodation is not reasonable. However, the Court added, an employee remains free to present evidence of special circumstances that makes a seniority rule exception reasonable in the particular case. Justice Antonin Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, argued that the accommodation provision of the ADA requires the suspension, within reason, of employment rules and practices that an employee's disability prevents him from observing. Also dissenting, Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that US Airways failed to establish any burden brought on by accommodating Barnett.

Kansas v. Crane

Tue, 30 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-957

Petitioner

Kansas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Crane

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 407 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, January 22, 2002

Advocates

Carla J. Stovall (Topeka, Kansas, argued the cause for the petitioner)

John C. Donham (Kansas, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. In doing so, the Court characterized a dangerous sexual offender's confinement as civil rather than criminal and held that the confinement criterion embodied in the statute's words -- "mental abnormality or personality disorder" -- satisfied substantive due process. When the state of Kansas filed a petition in a Kansas district court to have Michael T. Crane, a previously convicted sexual offender, committed, the Kansas District Court ordered his civil commitment. In reversing, the State Supreme Court concluded that Hendricks requires a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior even if, as provided by Kansas law, problems of emotional, and not volitional, capacity prove the source of behavior warranting commitment. The trial court had made no such finding.

Question

Did the Kansas Supreme Court interpret Kansas v. Hendricks in an overly restrictive manner by ruling that it requires a finding that a sexual offender, who has only an emotional or personality disorder, rather than a volitional impairment, has an inability to control dangerous behavior?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Kansas, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Hendricks set forth no requirement of total or complete lack of control, but that the Constitution does not permit commitment of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination. Such required proof, the Court continued, had to be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjected the offender to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case. The Court concluded that an absolute finding of lack of control since this approach would risk barring the civil commitment of some highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities.

United States v. Cotton

Mon, 15 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-687

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cotton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 625 (2002)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 2002

Decided

Monday, May 20, 2002

Advocates

Timothy J. Sullivan (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Leonard Cotton and others with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a detectable amount of cocaine and cocaine base. After a jury convicted them, Cotton and the others received a sentence based on the District Court's finding of drug quantity of at least 50 grams of cocaine base, which implicated certain enhanced penalties. They did not object in the District Court to the fact that the sentences were based on a quantity not alleged in the indictment. While their appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." In federal prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the indictment. Cotton and others then argued before the Court of Appeals that their sentences were invalid under Apprendi, because the drug quantity issue was neither alleged in the indictment nor submitted to the petit jury. The appellate court vacated the sentences on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to impose a sentence for an offense not charged in the indictment.

Question

Does the omission from a federal indictment of a fact that enhances the statutory maximum sentence justify a Court of Appeals' vacating the enhanced sentence, even though the defendant did not object in the trial court?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the omission from a federal indictment of a fact that enhances the statutory maximum sentence does not justify a Court of Appeals' vacating the enhanced sentence, even though the defendant did not object in the trial court. The Court reasoned that, even if the error affected the defendants' substantive rights, it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The Court noted that the evidence that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted.

Atkins v. Virginia

Wed, 20 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Location

York County Court

300 Ballard Street Yorktown VA 23690

Yorktown, VA 23690

United States

37° 13' 57.4248" N, 76° 30' 42.3648" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-8452

Petitioner

Atkins

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Virginia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 304 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 2002

Advocates

James W. Ellis (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Pamela A. Rumpz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded. The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded.

Question

Is the execution of mentally retarded persons "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Atkins, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Since it last confronted the issue, the Court reasoned that a significant number of States have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. Moreover, the Court concluded that there was serious concern whether either justification underpinning the death penalty - retribution and deterrence of capital crimes - applies to mentally retarded offenders, due to their lessened culpability. "Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender," wrote Justice Stevens. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia filed dissenting opinions. Justice Clarence Thomas joined both. "This newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the others in turning the process of capital trial into a game," argued Justice Scalia.

Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker

Tue, 19 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1770

Petitioner

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rucker

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Oakland Housing Authority v. Pearlie Rucker, No. 00-1781

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 125 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, March 26, 2002

Advocates

Paul A. Renne (Argued the cause for the respondents)

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the petitioner in No. 00-1770)

Gary T. LaFayette (Argued the cause for the petitioners in No. 00-1781)

Facts of the Case

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, provides that each "public housing agency shall utilize leases...providing that...any drug-related criminal activity on or off [federally assisted low-income housing] premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy." Paragraph 9(m) of the leases of the tenants of the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) obligates them to "assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant's control, shall not engage in?any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises." After the relations of four tenants were linked to drug activity, OHA instituted state-court eviction proceedings against respondents, alleging violations of lease paragraph 9(m) by a member of each tenant's household or a guest. The tenants filed an action, arguing that the Act does not require lease terms authorizing the eviction of the "innocent" tenants. The District Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction against OHA was affirmed by an en banc Court of Appeals.

Question

Does the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, allow local public housing agencies to evict tenants for drug-related activity of non-tenant relatives or guests regardless of whether tenants knew, or should have known, about the activity?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Department of Housing and Urban Development, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1437

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "Congress' decision not to impose any qualification in the statute, combined with its use of the term 'any' to modify 'drug- related criminal activity,' precludes any knowledge requirement." The Chief Justice also noted that it was reasonable for Congress to permit no-fault evictions in order to provide public housing that was decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the case.

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union

Wed, 28 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Location

ACLU Headquarters

125 Broad Street New York NY 10004

New York, NY 10004

United States

40° 42' 8.2548" N, 74° 0' 38.088" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1293

Petitioner

Ashcroft

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Civil Liberties Union

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 564 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, May 13, 2002

Advocates

Ann E. Beeson (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Unlike the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only "material that is harmful to minors." Moreover, COPA requires jurors to apply "contemporary community standards" in assessing material. Before it was scheduled to go into effect, a number of organizations affected by COPA filed suit, alleging that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, reasoning that COPA's use of contemporary community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad.

Question

Does the Child Online Protection Act's use of "community standards" to identify "material that is harmful to minors" violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Ashcroft, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 231

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that COPA's reliance on community standards to identify what material is harmful to minors does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for First Amendment purposes. The Court expressed no view as to whether COPA was overbroad for other reasons or was unconstitutionally vague and did not vacate the preliminary injunction because it could not do so without addressing matters yet to be considered. "In its original form, the community standard provided a shield for communications that are offensive only to the least tolerant members of society," argued Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissent. "In the context of the Internet, however, community standards become a sword, rather than a shield. If a prurient appeal is offensive in a puritan village, it may be a crime to post it on the World Wide Web."

Adams v. Florida Power Corp.

Wed, 20 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-584

Petitioner

Adams

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida Power Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 228 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, March 20, 2002

Decided

Monday, April 1, 2002

Advocates

John Crabtree (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Glen D. Nager (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Florida Power Corporation (FPC) operated as a publicly-regulated electric utility monopoly until 1992, when Congress opened the industry to competition through the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Between 1992 and 1996, FPR terminated Wanda Adams and others during a series of reorganizations the company stated were necessary to maintain its competitiveness. Members of the Adams class sued FPC, claiming that FPC discriminated against them because of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In 1996, the District Court conditionally certified a class of former FPC employees claiming age discrimination. In 1999, the court decertified the class and ruled as a matter of law that a disparate impact theory of liability is not available to plaintiffs bringing suit under the ADEA.

Question

May disparate impact claims be brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Florida Power Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The Court did not answer the question. In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

Great-West Life and Annuity Ins. v. Knudson

Mon, 01 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1786

Petitioner

Great-West Life and Annuity Ins.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Knudson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 204 (2002)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, January 8, 2002

Advocates

Richard G. Taranto (Argued the cause for the respondents)

James F. Jorden (On behalf of the petitioners)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1992, a car accident rendered Janette Knudson a quadriplegic. At that time, Knudson was covered by the Health and Welfare Plan for Employees and Dependents of Earth Systems, Inc. (the Plan), which covered $411,157.11 of her medical expenses, most of which were paid by Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. The Plan contains a reimbursement provision, which gives it the right to recover from a beneficiary any payment for benefits paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third party. After Knudson filed a state-court tort action to recover from the manufacturer of her car and others, she negotiated a settlement that earmarked $13,828.70 to satisfy Great-West's reimbursement claim. Great-West then filed an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to enforce the Plan's reimbursement provision by requiring Knudson to pay the Plan $411,157.11 of any proceeds recovered from third parties. The District Court granted Knudson summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that that judicially decreed reimbursement for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third party is not equitable relief authorized by ERISA.

Question

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 authorize a suit to enforce a reimbursement provision by a health plan to recover from a beneficiary any proceeds paid by a third party?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Knudson, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that because Great-West is seeking legal relief - the imposition of personal liability on Knudson for a contractual obligation to pay money - ERISA does not authorize this action. The Court reasoned that the suit, which sought relief under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, was not authorized under ERISA's catch-all provision authorizing equitable relief because the claim was for a legal remedy, or monetary damages. Justice Scalia wrote that "an injunction to compel the payment of money past due under a contract, or specific performance of a past due monetary obligation, was not typically available in equity." Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed dissents. Justices David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer joined in Justice Ginsburg's dissent.

EEOC v. Waffle House

Wed, 10 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1823

Petitioner

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Waffle House

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 279 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 2002

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (On behalf of the petitioner)

David L. Gordon (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Waffle House, Inc.'s employees must each sign an agreement requiring employment disputes to be settled by binding arbitration. After he suffered a seizure and was fired by Waffle House, Eric Baker filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that his discharge violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The EEOC then filed suit, alleging that Baker?s discharge violated the ADA, and sought injunctive relief and specific relief for Baker, including backpay, reinstatement, and compensatory damages, and punitive damages for malicious and reckless conduct. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Waffle House petitioned to stay the EEOC's suit and compel arbitration. The District Court did not stay the action. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House did not foreclose the enforcement action because the EEOC was not a party to the contract, but had independent statutory authority to bring suit in any federal district court where venue was proper. The appellate court also held that the EEOC was limited to injunctive relief.

Question

Does an agreement between an employer and an employee to arbitrate employment- related disputes bar the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief in an enforcement action alleging that the employer has violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for EEOC, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 1

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the arbitration agreement did not bar the EEOC from pursuing victim- specific judicial relief in an ADA enforcement action. The Court reasoned that the EECO's statutory enforcement powers unambiguously authorized the EEOC to obtain the relief that it sought in its complaint, if it could prove its case against the employer. The Court further noted that no language existed to suggest that an arbitration agreement between private parties materially changed the EEOC's statutory function or the remedies otherwise available. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia joined.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal

Wed, 27 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1406

Petitioner

Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Echazabal

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 73 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, February 27, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 10, 2002

Advocates

Samuel R. Bagenstos (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lisa S. Blatt (Department of Justice, argued the cause, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Stephen M. Shapiro (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Beginning in 1972, Mario Echazabal worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. When Echazabal applied for a job directly with Chevron, the company's physical examination revealed he had a liver condition, the cause identified as Hepatitis C. Chevron's doctors said that the condition would be exacerbated by continued exposure to toxins at the refinery. In response to Chevron's request that the refinery reassign Echazabal to a job without exposure to toxins or remove him, the contractor employing him laid him off. Echazabal filed suit, claiming that Chevron's action violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Under an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation that permits the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health, Chevron defended its action. The District Court granted Chevron summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the regulation exceeded the scope of permissible rulemaking under the ADA.

Question

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 permit the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulation that allows the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the ADA did not preclude the EEOC's regulation allowing the harm-to- self defense. The Court reasoned that deference applied to the regulation because it made sense of the statutory defense for qualification standards that are job-related and consistent with business necessity. The Court also found that the risk of violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) was enough to show that the regulation was permissible. "Although there may be an open question whether an employer would actually be liable under OSHA for hiring an individual who knowingly consented to the particular dangers the job would pose to him, there is no denying that the employer would be asking for trouble: his decision to hire would put Congress's policy in the ADA, a disabled individual's right to operate on equal terms within the workplace, at loggerheads with the competing policy of OSHA, to ensure the safety of 'each and 'every worker," wrote Justice Souter.

Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority

Mon, 25 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Location

South Carolina State Ports Authority

176 Concord Street Charleston SC 29401

Charleston, SC 29401

United States

32° 47' 9.2256" N, 79° 55' 36.7788" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-46

Petitioner

Federal Maritime Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

South Carolina Ports Authority

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 743 (2002)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, May 28, 2002

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Argued the cause for the United States, supporting the petitioner)

Phillip C. Hughey (Argued the cause for the petitioner Federal Maritime Commission)

Warren L. Dean, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. (Maritime Services), asked the South Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA) five times for permission to berth a cruise ship, the M/V Tropic Sea, at the SCSPA's port facilities in Charleston, South Carolina. Some cruises offered by Maritime Services would allow passengers to participate in gambling activities while on board. The SCSPA repeatedly denied Maritime Services' requests, contending that it had an established policy of denying berths in the Port of Charleston to vessels whose primary purpose was gambling. Maritime Services file a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), arguing that SCSPA violated the Shipping Act by its denials. The complaint was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found that the SCSPA, as an arm of the State of South Carolina, was entitled to sovereign immunity and thus dismissed the complaint. Reversing on its own motion, the FMC concluded that state sovereign immunity covers proceedings before judicial tribunals, not Executive Branch agencies. In reversing, Court of Appeals fund that the proceedings were an adjudication and thus subject to state sovereign immunity.

Question

Does a State's sovereign immunity preclude the Federal Maritime Commission from adjudicating a private party's complaint that a state-run port has violated the Shipping Act of 1984?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for South Carolina Ports Authority, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that state sovereign immunity bars the FMC from adjudicating a private party's complaint against a nonconsenting State. Historically, the Court noted, states were not subject to private suits in administrative adjudications when the Constitution was adopted, and states were thus presumptively immune from such actions. Moreover, the Court pointed to the similarities between the FMC's proceedings and civil litigation to conclude that there was no basis for distinguishing between the actions for purposes of sovereign immunity. "Although the Framers likely did not envision the intrusion on state sovereignty at issue in today's case, we are nonetheless confident that it is contrary to their constitutional design," wrote Justice Thomas.

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.

Tue, 15 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1853

Petitioner

Swierkiewicz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sorema N.A.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 506 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, January 15, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, February 26, 2002

Advocates

Lauren R. Brody (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Harold I. Goodman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Akos Swierkiewicz, a 53-year-old native of Hungary, began working for Sorema N. A., a reinsurance company principally owned and controlled by a French parent corporation, in 1989. Six years later, the Chief Executive Officer, a French national, demoted Swierkiewicz from the position of senior vice president and chief underwriting officer to a marketing and services position with fewer responsibilities. A younger French national was promoted to Swierkiewicz's old position. Swierkiewicz filed suit, alleging that he had been fired on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,and on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In dismissing the case, the District Court found that Swierkiewicz had not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in that he had not adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent requiring an employment discrimination complaint to allege facts constituting a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792.

Question

Must a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Swierkiewicz, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an employment discrimination complaint need not include specific facts establishing a prima facie case under the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and instead must contain only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Thomas noted that the prima facie case operates as a flexible evidentiary standard and not a pleading requirement for discrimination cases. "Under the Second Circuit's heightened pleading standard, a plaintiff without direct evidence of discrimination at the time of his complaint must plead a prima facie case of discrimination, even though discovery might uncover such direct evidence," wrote Justice Thomas. "It thus seems incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may ultimately need to prove to succeed on the merits if direct evidence of discrimination is discovered."

Christopher v. Harbury

Mon, 18 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-394

Petitioner

Christopher

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harbury

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 403 (2002)

Argued

Monday, March 18, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 2002

Advocates

Richard A. Cordray (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jennifer K. Harbury (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Jennifer Harbury, a United States citizen, is the widow of Efrain Bamaca- Velasquez, a Guatemalan rebel leader. Harbury alleged that Government officials intentionally deceived her in concealing information that her husband had been executed by Guatemalan army officers paid by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Harbury also alleged that this deception denied her access to the courts by leaving her without information, or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit that might have saved her husband's life. Harbury filed suit, listing 28 causes of action, for the violation of her constitutional right of access to courts. With respect to the access-to-courts counts, the District Court held that Harbury had not stated a valid cause of action. Given that she had not filed a prior suit, the court reasoned that she could only guess how the alleged cover-up might have prejudiced her rights to bring a separate action and that the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed only the dismissal of one of Harbury's claims for denial of access to courts.

Question

Does the charge that an official deception denied a plaintiff access to the courts by leaving her without information or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit, state an actionable claim?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Christopher, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Harbury had not stated a claim for denial of judicial access. The Court reasoned that Harbury's complaint failed to identify the underlying cause of action for relief that she would have raised had it not been for the alleged deception. Moreover, the Court noted that Harbury's informal amendment accepted by the Court of Appeals failed to seek any relief presently available for denial of access to courts that would be unavailable otherwise. "It is true that [Harbury] cannot obtain in any present tort action the order she would have sought before her husband's death, the order that might have saved her husband's life. But neither can she obtain any such order on her access claim, which therefore cannot recompense Harbury for the unique loss she claims as a consequence of her inability to bring an intentional-infliction action earlier," wrote Justice Souter. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment.

Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland

Wed, 05 Dec 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1531

Petitioner

Verizon Maryland Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Public Service Commission of Maryland

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 00-1711

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 635 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, December 5, 2001

Decided

Monday, May 20, 2002

Advocates

Mark L. Evans (Argued the cause for the petitioner in No. 00-1531)

Barbara B. McDowell (Argued the cause for the petitioner United States)

Susan S. Miller (Public Service Commission, Baltimore, Maryland, argued the cause for the State Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that incumbent local-exchange carriers (LECs) provide interconnection with their existing networks; that the carriers then establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transporting and terminating the calls of each others' customers; and that their interconnection agreements be approved by a state utility commission. Verizon Maryland Inc., the incumbent LEC in Maryland, negotiated an interconnection agreement with MCI WorldCom, Inc. After the Maryland Public Service Commission approved the agreement, Verizon informed WorldCom that it would no longer pay reciprocal compensation for calls made by Verizon's customers to the local access numbers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) because ISP traffic was not local traffic subject to the reciprocal compensation agreement. WorldCom filed a complaint with the Commission, which ordered Verizon to make the payments for past and future ISP-bound calls. Verizon then filed an action in federal district court, seeking an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, alleging that the determination that Verizon must pay reciprocal compensation for ISP traffic violated the Act. The District Court dismissed the action. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Commission had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the Act did not provide a basis for jurisdiction over Verizon's claims.

Question

Do federal district courts have jurisdiction over a telecommunication carrier's claim that the order of a state utility commission requiring reciprocal compensation for telephone calls to Internet Service Providers violates the Telecommunications Act of 1996?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Verizon Maryland Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 251

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the district court had jurisdiction, so as to review the Commission's order for compliance with federal law, to entertain the suit because resolution of the LEC's claim turned on whether the Act, or an FCC ruling issued thereunder, precluded the state commission from ordering payment of reciprocal compensation. Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Court also reasoned that Verizon's request for injunctive relief to restrain state officials from enforcing an order allegedly in contravention of controlling federal law avoided an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.

Horn v. Banks

Sat, 19 May 2012 01:29:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1385

Petitioner

Horn

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Banks

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 266 (2002)

Decided

Monday, June 17, 2002

Facts of the Case

George Banks was convicted of 12 counts of first-degree murder. After Banks' direct appeal was denied, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, that the Constitution prohibits a state from requiring jurors unanimously to agree that a particular mitigating circumstance exists before they are permitted to consider that circumstance in their sentencing determination. Under this new case law, Mills argued that the jurors in his trial were instructed improperly. Custodial officials argued that the law was not applicable retroactively on habeas corpus review. Ultimately, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not rule on retroactivity, the Federal Court of Appeals concluded that the State Supreme Court had unreasonably applied federal law in evaluating Banks' claim that his penalty phase jury instructions and verdict forms were improper under Mills without evaluating retroactivity.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals err by failing to perform an analysis of whether Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, applied retroactively to cases on federal habeas corpus review under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Horn, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals committed a clear error by failing to perform a Teague analysis. The Court reasoned that, since the officials raised the retroactivity issue in both the district court and the appellate court, it was clear error for the appellate court to refuse to determine the retroactive applicability of the new case law, even though the highest state court did not consider the issue in determining the inmate's direct appeal. The Court concluded that the retroactivity question was a threshold issue which required resolution prior to any consideration of the merits of Banks' claims.

TRW v. Andrews

Tue, 09 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1045

Petitioner

TRW

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Andrews

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 19 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, October 9, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, November 13, 2001

Advocates

Glen D. Nager (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Andrew R. Henderson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Kent L. Jones (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, while at a doctor's office in California, Adelaide Andrews filled out a form listing her name, Social Security number, and other basic information. An office receptionist named Andrea Andrews copied the data and later moved to Las Vegas, where she attempted to open credit accounts using Adelaide's Social Security number and her own last name and address. Thereafter, TRW Inc. furnished copies of Adelaide's credit report to companies from which Andrea sought credit. In 1996, Adelaide filed suit, alleging that TRW had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to verify predisclosure of her credit report to third parties. TRW moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the FCRA's statute of limitations had expired on Adelaide's claims stemming from TRW's first two disclosures because both occurred more than two years before she brought suit. Adelaide countered that the limitations period on those claims did not commence until she discovered the disclosures. The District Court held the two claims time-barred. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied what it considered to be a general federal rule that a statute of limitations starts running when a party knows or has reason to know she was injured, unless Congress expressly legislates otherwise.

Question

Does the Fair Credit Reporting Act's two-year statute of limitations governing actions to enforce any liability created by the act commence to run only upon a party's discovery of alleged violations of the act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for TRW, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1681

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a discovery rule does not govern section 1681p of FCRA, as that section explicitly delineated the exceptional case in which discovery triggered the two-year limitation and Adelaide's case does not fall within the exceptional category. The Court reasoned that it was not at liberty to make Congress' explicit exception the general rule. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.

Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko

Mon, 01 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-860

Petitioner

Correctional Services Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Malesko

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 61 (2001)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, November 27, 2001

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Steven Pasternak (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, John E. Malesko was assigned to a bedroom on the fifth floor of the Le Marquis Community Correctional Center, a facility that houses federal inmates run by the Correctional Services Corporation (CSC) under contract with the Bureau of Prisons. After CSC instituted a policy requiring inmates residing below the sixth floor to use the stairs rather than the elevator, Malesko, who was afflicted with a heart condition limiting his ability to climb stairs, was exempted form the policy. When a CSC employee did not let Malesko use the elevator, he climbed the stairs, suffered a heart attack, and fell. Subsequently, Malesko filed a suit, alleging that CSC was negligence in refusing him the use of the elevator. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, in which the U.S. Supreme Court recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights, the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that such an action may only be maintained against individuals. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reasoned that such private entities should be held liable under Bivens to accomplish Bivens' goal of providing a remedy for constitutional violations.

Question

Should the implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights, first recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, be extended to allow recovery against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Correctional Services Corp., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Bivens' limited holding may not be extended to confer a right of action for damages against private entities acting under color of federal law. The Court reasoned that the threat of suit against an individual's employer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated by the Bivens decision. The Court also noted that the purpose of the Bivens decision was to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations. "In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice, to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer's unconstitutional conduct. Where such circumstances are not present, we have consistently rejected invitations to extend Bivens,"wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.

Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation System

Tue, 19 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-408

Petitioner

Holmes Group, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Vornado Air Circulation System

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 826 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, March 19, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 3, 2002

Advocates

James W. Dabney (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Peter W. Gowdey (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., is a manufacturer of patented fans and heaters. In 1992, Vornado sued Duracraft Corp., claiming that Duracraft's use of a spiral grill design in its fans infringed Vornado's trade dress. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that Vornado had no protectible trade- dress rights in the grill design. Later, Vornado filed a complaint with the U.S. International Trade Commission, claiming that Holmes Group, Inc.'s sale of fans and heaters with a spiral grill design infringed Vornado's trade dress. Subsequently, Holmes filed a federal-court action, seeking a declaratory judgment that its products did not infringe Vornado's trade dress and an injunction restraining Vornado from accusing it of such infringement. In response, Vornado asserted a compulsory patent-infringement counterclaim. The District Court ruled in Holmes's favor. Vornado appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which, notwithstanding Holmes's challenge to its jurisdiction, vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case.

Question

Does the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have appellate jurisdiction over a case in which the complaint does not allege a claim arising under federal patent law, but the answer contains a patent-law counterclaim?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Holmes Group, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1331

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the appellate could not assert jurisdiction over such a case. Noting that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is fixed and turns on whether an action is one arising under federal patent law, the Court reasoned that because the complaint asserted no claim arising under patent law, the court erred in asserting jurisdiction over the appeal. "By limiting the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to cases in which district courts would have jurisdiction...Congress referred to a well-established body of law that requires courts to consider whether a patent-law claim appears on the face of the plaintiff's...complaint. Because [Holmes's] complaint did not include any claim based on patent law, we vacate the judgment of the Federal Circuit," wrote Justice Scalia.

Hope v. Pelzer

Wed, 17 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-309

Petitioner

Hope

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pelzer

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 730 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, April 17, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 2002

Advocates

Gene C. Schaerr (Argued the cause as amici curiae, supporting the respondents)

Austin C. Schlick (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Craig T. Jones (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Nathan A. Forrester (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

As an Alabama prison inmate, Larry Hope was twice handcuffed to a hitching post for disruptive conduct. Both times prison guards handcuffed Hope above shoulder height, and when he tried moving his arms to improve circulation, the handcuffs cut into his wrists. During the second incident, guards order Hope to remove his shirt and he spent seven hours on the hitching post in the sun. While there, he was given one or two water breaks, but no bathroom breaks. Hope filed a civil suit against the guards. Subsequently, a Magistrate Judge found that the guards were entitled to qualified immunity. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals, while finding that the hitching post's use for punitive purposes violated the Eighth Amendment, concluded that the guards nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity.

Question

Does the Court of Appeals holding of qualified immunity where prison guards' conduct violated the Eighth Amendment comport with United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Hope, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the defense of qualified immunity was precluded at the summary judgment phase of Hope's trial. The Court reasoned that, although Hope's allegations if true established an Eighth Amendment violation, prison guards could be shielded from liability for their constitutionally impermissible conduct if their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Noting that United States v. Lanier makes clear that officials can be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual situations, the Court concluded that a reasonable officer would have known that using a hitching post as Hope alleged was unlawful.