http://www.oyez.org/cases/2001/podcast U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en The Oyez Project at Chicago-Kent http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_595/argument After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her a "fast track" plea bargain in which she would waive indictment, trial, and an appeal in exchange for a reduced sentence recommendation. The prosecutors' offer requires that the defendant waive the right to receive impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses, as well as information supporting any affirmative defense she raises if the case goes to trial. When Ruiz rejected the waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their offer, indicted her for unlawful drug possession, and she pleaded guilty. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same reduced sentence that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the plea bargain. The Government opposed her request, and the District Court denied it. In vacating the sentence, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Constitution prohibits defendants from waiving their right to certain impeachment information. Wed, 24 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58782 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_679/argument A student at Gonzaga University planned to become a public elementary school teacher in Washington, which required all new teachers to obtain an affidavit of good moral character from their graduating colleges. Gonzaga's teacher certification specialist overheard one student tell another that the student had engaged in sexual misconduct, contacted the state agency responsible for teacher certification, and discussed the allegations, identifying the student by name. Ultimately, the student was told that he would not receive his certification affidavit. The student sued Gonzaga in state court, alleging a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), which prohibits the federal funding of schools that have a policy or practice of permitting the release of students' education records without their parents' written consent. A jury awarded the student compensatory and punitive damages. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court acknowledged that FERPA does not give rise to a private cause of action, but reasoned that the nondisclosure provision creates a federal right that is enforceable. Wed, 24 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58804 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_419/argument Pursuant to 49 USC section 14501(c)(2)(A), federal preemption prescriptions relating to motor carriers "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles." Columbus, Ohio, extensively regulates the operation of tow trucks seeking to pick up vehicles within city limits. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., a tow-truck operator and a trade association of such operators, sought to enjoin enforcement of the City's tow-truck regulations on the ground that they were preempted. The District Court granted Ours Garage summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent that section 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule explicitly applies to "a State [or] political subdivision of a State," while the exception for safety regulations, section 14501(c)(2)(A), refers only to the "authority of a State." The appellate court also noted that precedent determined that the contrast in statutory language indicated that Congress meant to limit the safety exception to States alone. Tue, 23 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58890 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_682/argument Jeffrey Gorman is a paraplegic. After being arrested, he was transported to a Kansas City police station in a van that was not equipped to accommodate the disabled. Gorman was removed from his wheelchair and seatbelted to a bench in the van. During the ride, Gorman fell to the floor, suffering serious injuries that left him unable to work full time. Gorman sued certain Kansas police officials for discriminating against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, by failing to maintain appropriate policies for the arrest and transportation of persons with spinal cord injuries. A jury awarded him compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court vacated as to punitive damages, holding that they are unavailable in private suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found punitive damages available under a general rule that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief for violation of a federal right. Tue, 23 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58812 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_488/argument At Timothy Ring's trial for murder, the jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but found Ring guilty of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, unless further findings were made by a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing and only if the judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Because the jury had convicted Ring of felony murder, not premeditated murder, Ring would be eligible for the death penalty only if he was the victim's actual killer. Citing accomplice testimony at the sentencing hearing, the judge found that Ring was the killer. The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of them being that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, as well as one mitigating factor, Ring's minimal criminal record, and ruled that the latter did not call for leniency. Mon, 22 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58824 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_463/argument Employers must pay Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes, calculated as a percentage of the wages, including tips, that their employees receive. In 1991 and 1992, Fior D'Italia restaurant paid FICA taxes based on the tip amount its employees reported, but the reports also showed that the tips listed on customers' credit card slips far exceeded the reported amount. The IRS made a compliance check and assessed additional FICA taxes using an "aggregate estimation" method, under which it examined the credit card slips; found the average percentage tip paid by those customers; assumed that cash- paying customers paid at same rate; calculated total tips by multiplying the tip rates by Fior D'Italia's total receipts; subtracted the tips already reported; applied the FICA tax rate to the remainder; and assessed additional taxes owed. Fior D'Italia filed a refund suit, claiming that the tax statutes did not authorize the IRS to use the aggregate estimation method. The District Court ruled for Fior D'Italia, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Mon, 22 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58910 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_309/argument As an Alabama prison inmate, Larry Hope was twice handcuffed to a hitching post for disruptive conduct. Both times prison guards handcuffed Hope above shoulder height, and when he tried moving his arms to improve circulation, the handcuffs cut into his wrists. During the second incident, guards order Hope to remove his shirt and he spent seven hours on the hitching post in the sun. While there, he was given one or two water breaks, but no bathroom breaks. Hope filed a civil suit against the guards. Subsequently, a Magistrate Judge found that the guards were entitled to qualified immunity. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals, while finding that the hitching post's use for punitive purposes violated the Eighth Amendment, concluded that the guards nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity. Wed, 17 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58862 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_651/argument Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd. is a corporation organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands (BVI), an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom. In 1998, Chase Manhattan Bank, now JPMorgan Chase Bank, agreed to finance certain Traffic Stream ventures, with the contract to be governed by New York law and with Traffic Stream agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of federal courts in Manhattan. Subsequently, Chase sued Traffic Stream for defaulting on its obligations. The District Court found subject-matter jurisdiction under the alienage diversity statute, 28 USC section 1332(a)(2), which gives district courts jurisdiction over civil actions where the controversy is "between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state," and granted Chase summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because Traffic Stream was a citizen of an Overseas Territory and not an independent foreign state, jurisdiction was lacking. Wed, 17 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58866 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_518/argument In filing suit against a group of unions, BE&K; Construction Company alleged that the unions had engaged in lobbying, litigation, and other concerted activities in order to delay a project it had been hired for because it employed nonunion workers. After BE&K; lost on or withdrew each of its claims, the National Labor Relations Board issued an administrative complaint, alleging that BE&K;, by filing and maintaining its lawsuit, had violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which prohibits employers from restraining, coercing, or interfering with employees' exercise of rights related to self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities. Finding that the lawsuit was filed to retaliate against the unions, whose conduct was protected under the NLRA, the Board ordered BE&K; to cease and desist from prosecuting such suits. In granting the Board's enforcement petition, the Court of Appeals held that because the Judiciary had already found BE&K;'s claims against the unions unmeritorious or dismissed, evidence of a simple retaliatory motive sufficed to adjudge BE&K; of committing an unfair labor practice. Tue, 16 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58900 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_631/argument Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown were traveling on a Greyhound bus. In Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded the bus as part of a routine interdiction effort. One of the officers worked his way from back to front, speaking with individual passengers as he went. The officer did not inform the passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate. As the officer approached Drayton and Brown, he identified himself, declared that the police were looking for drugs and weapons, and asked if the two had any bags. Subsequently, the officer asked Brown whether he minded if he checked his person. Brown agreed and a pat-down revealed hard objects similar to drug packages in both thigh areas. When Drayton agreed, a pat-down revealed similar objects. Both were arrested. A further search revealed that Drayton and Brown had taped cocaine to their legs. Charged with federal drug crimes, Drayton and Brown moved to suppress the cocaine on the ground that their consent to the pat-down searches was invalid. In denying the motions, the District Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and Drayton and Brown's consent to the search was voluntary. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard officers' requests to search absent some positive indication that consent may be refused. Tue, 16 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58894 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_455/argument Under the Housing Act of 1949, the Farmers Home Administration makes direct loans to private, nonprofit entities to develop and/or construct rural housing for the elderly and low- or middle-income individuals and families. Franconia Associates is a property owner that entered into such loans before December 21, 1979. The promissory notes Franconia executed authorized "prepaymen[t] of scheduled installments, or any portion thereof...at any time at the option of Borrower." In 1988, Congress enacted the Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 (ELIHPA), which amended the Housing Act of 1949 to impose permanent restrictions upon prepayment of mortgages entered into before December 21, 1979. In 1997, Franconia filed suit, charging that ELIHPA abridged the absolute prepayment right set forth in their promissory notes and thereby effected a repudiation of their contracts. In dismissing Franconia's contract claims as untimely, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the claims first accrued on the ELIHPA regulations' effective date. In affirming on statute of limitations grounds, the Federal Circuit ruled that, if the Government's continuing duty to allow Franconia to prepay their loans was breached, the breach occurred immediately upon ELIHPA's enactment date. Mon, 15 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58870 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_687/argument A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Leonard Cotton and others with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a detectable amount of cocaine and cocaine base. After a jury convicted them, Cotton and the others received a sentence based on the District Court's finding of drug quantity of at least 50 grams of cocaine base, which implicated certain enhanced penalties. They did not object in the District Court to the fact that the sentences were based on a quantity not alleged in the indictment. While their appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." In federal prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the indictment. Cotton and others then argued before the Court of Appeals that their sentences were invalid under Apprendi, because the drug quantity issue was neither alleged in the indictment nor submitted to the petit jury. The appellate court vacated the sentences on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to impose a sentence for an offense not charged in the indictment. Mon, 15 Apr 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58832 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_714/argument In conducting the 2000 census, the Census Bureau used "hot-deck imputation" to fill in certain gaps in its information and resolved certain conflicts in the data. Under this methodology, the Bureau imputes the relevant information by inferring that the address or unit about which it is uncertain has the same population characteristics as those of its geographically closest neighbor of the same type. Hot-deck Imputation increased North Carolina's population by 0.4% while increasing Utah's population by only 0.2% such that North Carolina will receive one more Representative and Utah one less than if the Bureau had simply filled relevant informational gaps by counting the related number of individuals as zero. Utah brought suit against the officials charged with conducting the census, claiming that the Bureau's use of hot-deck imputation violates 13 USC section 195, which prohibits use of "the statistical method known as 'sampling,'" and is inconsistent with Article 1, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution, which states that an "actual Enumeration be made." Utah sought an injunction compelling a change of the official census results. The District Court found for the Bureau. Wed, 27 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58808 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_417/argument Robert Devlin, a retired worker represented by the Transportation Communications International Union, participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan) administered by the Union. In 1991, the Plan was amended to add a cost of living increase (COLA). In 1997, the Plan's trustees eliminated the COLA because the Plan could not support such a large benefits increase. The trustees also filed a class action in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1997 elimination was binding on all Plan members or that the 1991 COLA was void. After the District Court conditionally certified a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and the trustees asked the court to approve their settlement with the class representatives, Devlin moved to intervene. The court denied his motion as untimely. The court then heard objections to the settlement, including those advanced by Devlin, and approved the settlement. In affirming the District Court's denial of Devlins's intervention, the Court of Appeals held that, because Devlin was not a named class representative and because he had been properly denied the right to intervene, he lacked standing to challenge the settlement. Tue, 26 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58794 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_521/argument Minnesota's Constitution provides for the selection of all state judges by popular election. The announcement clause of the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibits a candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. While running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gregory Wersal filed suit, seeking a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. Wersal alleged that he was forced to refrain from announcing his views on disputed issues during the 1998 campaign, to the point where he declined response to questions put to him by the press and public, out of concern that he might run afoul of the announce clause. The District Court found that the announcement clause did not violate the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Tue, 26 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58790 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_400/argument Gary Cone was tried in a Tennessee court for a 2-day crime spree that ended with the killing of an elderly couple. In response to the overwhelming evidence that he perpetrated the crimes, Cone's defense asserted that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury found him guilty. During the sentencing hearing, Cone's counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses, but called no witnesses. After the prosecutor closed, the defense counsel waived final argument. Ultimately, Cone was sentenced to death. The State Criminal Court denied Cone's petition for post-conviction relief, rejecting his contention that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase by failing to present mitigating evidence and waiving final argument. Subsequently, the Federal District Court denied Cone's federal habeas petition, ruling that he did not meet 28 USC section 2254(d)(1)'s requirement that a state decision be "contrary to" or involve "an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law." In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Cone suffered a Sixth Amendment violation for which prejudice should be presumed because his counsel, by not asking for mercy after the prosecutor's final argument, did not subject the State's death penalty call to meaningful adversarial testing. Mon, 25 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58922 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_10666/argument William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466. Mon, 25 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58788 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_584/argument The Florida Power Corporation (FPC) operated as a publicly-regulated electric utility monopoly until 1992, when Congress opened the industry to competition through the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Between 1992 and 1996, FPR terminated Wanda Adams and others during a series of reorganizations the company stated were necessary to maintain its competitiveness. Members of the Adams class sued FPC, claiming that FPC discriminated against them because of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In 1996, the District Court conditionally certified a class of former FPC employees claiming age discrimination. In 1999, the court decertified the class and ruled as a matter of law that a disparate impact theory of liability is not available to plaintiffs bringing suit under the ADEA. Wed, 20 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58840 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_131/argument Under 42 USC section 406(b), an attorney who successfully represents a Social Security benefits claimant in court may be awarded a reasonable fee not in excess of 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimant, payable out of the amount of the past-due benefits. After three individuals prevailed on their claims for Social Security disability benefits and successfully sought attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, their attorneys were to collect 25 percent of all past-due benefits recovered from each claimant, pursuant to contingent-fee agreements. In each case, the District Court declined to give effect to the attorney-client fee agreement, instead employing a "lodestar" method, under which the number of hours reasonably devoted to each case was multiplied by the reasonable hourly fee. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Wed, 20 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58872 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_332/argument The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. Two Tecumseh High School students and their parents brought suit, alleging that the policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted the School District summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such that testing that group will actually redress its drug problem, which the School District had failed to demonstrate. Tue, 19 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58786 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_408/argument Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., is a manufacturer of patented fans and heaters. In 1992, Vornado sued Duracraft Corp., claiming that Duracraft's use of a spiral grill design in its fans infringed Vornado's trade dress. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that Vornado had no protectible trade- dress rights in the grill design. Later, Vornado filed a complaint with the U.S. International Trade Commission, claiming that Holmes Group, Inc.'s sale of fans and heaters with a spiral grill design infringed Vornado's trade dress. Subsequently, Holmes filed a federal-court action, seeking a declaratory judgment that its products did not infringe Vornado's trade dress and an injunction restraining Vornado from accusing it of such infringement. In response, Vornado asserted a compulsory patent-infringement counterclaim. The District Court ruled in Holmes's favor. Vornado appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which, notwithstanding Holmes's challenge to its jurisdiction, vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case. Tue, 19 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58860 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_147/argument In 1987, Charles Zandford, a securities broker, persuaded William Wood to open a joint investment account for himself and his mentally retarded daughter. The Woods gave Zandford discretion to manage the account and a general power of attorney to engage in securities transactions without their prior approval. After Wood died, all of the money that he had invested was gone. Subsequently, Zandford was indicted on federal wire fraud charges for selling securities in the Woods' account and making personal use of the proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also filed a civil complaint, alleging that Zandford had violated section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC's Rule 10b-5 by engaging in a scheme to defraud the Woods and misappropriating their securities without their knowledge or consent. After Zandford's conviction in the criminal case, the District Court granted the SEC summary judgment in the civil case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint, holding that neither the criminal conviction nor the allegations in the complaint established that Zandford's fraud was in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Mon, 18 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58780 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_394/argument Jennifer Harbury, a United States citizen, is the widow of Efrain Bamaca- Velasquez, a Guatemalan rebel leader. Harbury alleged that Government officials intentionally deceived her in concealing information that her husband had been executed by Guatemalan army officers paid by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Harbury also alleged that this deception denied her access to the courts by leaving her without information, or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit that might have saved her husband's life. Harbury filed suit, listing 28 causes of action, for the violation of her constitutional right of access to courts. With respect to the access-to-courts counts, the District Court held that Harbury had not stated a valid cause of action. Given that she had not filed a prior suit, the court reasoned that she could only guess how the alleged cover-up might have prejudiced her rights to bring a separate action and that the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed only the dismissal of one of Harbury's claims for denial of access to courts. Mon, 18 Mar 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58852 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_301/argument The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to file his petition within one year after his state conviction becomes final, but excludes from that period the time during which an application for state collateral review is pending. In 1990, Tony Saffold was convicted and sentenced in California state court for murder, assault with a firearm, and robbery. Saffold filed a state habeas petition in California seven days before the federal deadline. Five days after the state trial court denied his petition, Saffold filed a further petition in the State Court of Appeal. Four and one-half months after that petition was denied, Saffold filed a further petition in the State Supreme Court, which denied the petition on the merits and for lack of diligence. The Federal District Court dismissed Saffold's subsequent federal habeas petition as untimely, finding that the federal statute of limitations was not tolled during the intervals between the denial of one state petition and the filing of the next because no application was pending during that time. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Saffold's petition was timely because the State Supreme Court based its decision not only on lack of diligence, but also on the merits. Wed, 27 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58916 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1406/argument Beginning in 1972, Mario Echazabal worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. When Echazabal applied for a job directly with Chevron, the company's physical examination revealed he had a liver condition, the cause identified as Hepatitis C. Chevron's doctors said that the condition would be exacerbated by continued exposure to toxins at the refinery. In response to Chevron's request that the refinery reassign Echazabal to a job without exposure to toxins or remove him, the contractor employing him laid him off. Echazabal filed suit, claiming that Chevron's action violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Under an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation that permits the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health, Chevron defended its action. The District Court granted Chevron summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the regulation exceeded the scope of permissible rulemaking under the ADA. Wed, 27 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58846 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_344/argument The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) exempts "compounded drugs," or drugs in which a pharmacist or doctor has combined, mixed, or altered ingredients to create a medication tailored to an individual patient's needs, from the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) standard drug approval requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), so long as the providers of the compounded drugs abide by several restrictions. The restrictions included that the prescription be unsolicited and that the providers not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug. A group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in compounding drugs sought to enjoin enforcement of the advertising and solicitation provisions, arguing that they violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Agreeing, the District Court held that the provisions constituted unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Government had not demonstrated that the restrictions would directly advance its interests or that alternatives less restrictive of speech were unavailable. Tue, 26 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58792 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1737/argument The Village of Stratton promulgated an ordinance that prohibits canvassers from entering private residential property to promote any cause without first obtaining a permit from the mayor's office. The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought an action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Village's interests in protecting its residents from fraud and its desire to prevent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation. Tue, 26 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58914 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_46/argument South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. (Maritime Services), asked the South Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA) five times for permission to berth a cruise ship, the M/V Tropic Sea, at the SCSPA's port facilities in Charleston, South Carolina. Some cruises offered by Maritime Services would allow passengers to participate in gambling activities while on board. The SCSPA repeatedly denied Maritime Services' requests, contending that it had an established policy of denying berths in the Port of Charleston to vessels whose primary purpose was gambling. Maritime Services file a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), arguing that SCSPA violated the Shipping Act by its denials. The complaint was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found that the SCSPA, as an arm of the State of South Carolina, was entitled to sovereign immunity and thus dismissed the complaint. Reversing on its own motion, the FMC concluded that state sovereign immunity covers proceedings before judicial tribunals, not Executive Branch agencies. In reversing, Court of Appeals fund that the proceedings were an adjudication and thus subject to state sovereign immunity. Mon, 25 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58848 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_298/argument Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, filed a state-court lawsuit against the system?s board of regents and other university officials, alleging that the officials had violated state tort law and 42 USC section 1983 when they placed sexual harassment allegations in his personnel files. The defendants removed the case to Federal District Court and then sought a dismissal. Conceding that a state statute had waived Georgia's sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, the State claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal court. The District Court held that Georgia had waived such immunity when it removed the case to federal court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because state law was unclear as to whether the state attorney general had the legal authority to waive Georgia's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State retained the legal right to assert immunity, even after the removal. Mon, 25 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58778 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1751/argument Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. In the 1999-2000 school year 82 percent of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation and 96 percent of the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. A group of Ohio taxpayers sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Wed, 20 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58904 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_8452/argument Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded. The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded. Wed, 20 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58834 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1770/argument The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, provides that each "public housing agency shall utilize leases...providing that...any drug-related criminal activity on or off [federally assisted low-income housing] premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy." Paragraph 9(m) of the leases of the tenants of the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) obligates them to "assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant's control, shall not engage in?any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises." After the relations of four tenants were linked to drug activity, OHA instituted state-court eviction proceedings against respondents, alleging violations of lease paragraph 9(m) by a member of each tenant's household or a guest. The tenants filed an action, arguing that the Act does not require lease terms authorizing the eviction of the "innocent" tenants. The District Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction against OHA was affirmed by an en banc Court of Appeals. Tue, 19 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58836 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1214/argument Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid. Tue, 19 Feb 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58796 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1021/argument Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., a health maintenance organization that provides medical services for employee welfare benefits plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), denied Debra Moran's request to have surgery by an unaffiliated specialist. Under the Illinois HMO Act (Act), which provides that "in the event that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to be medically necessary," the HMO "shall provide" the service, Moran made a written demand for an independent medical review of her claim. After Rush refused her demand, Moran sued in state court to compel compliance with the Act. The court ordered the review, which found the treatment necessary. While the suit was pending, Moran had the surgery and amended her complaint to seek reimbursement. Rush removed the case to federal court, arguing that the amended complaint stated a claim for ERISA benefits. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found Moran's reimbursement claim preempted by ERISA so as to place the case in federal court, but it concluded that the Act was not preempted as a state law that "relates to" an employee benefit plan because it also "regulates insurance" under ERISA's saving clause. Wed, 16 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58920 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1937/argument The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income to individuals who have an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable...impairment...which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." After developing a serious mental illness, Cleveland Walton lost his job as a teacher in October 1994. Eleven moths later, Walton was working as a cashier. When Walton applied for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income, the Social Security Administration denied him benefits, reasoning that his "inability" to engage in substantial gainful activity lasted only 11 months. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the 12-month duration requirement modifies "impairment" not "inability," that no similar duration requirement relates to an "inability," and that, therefore, Walton was entitled to benefits despite regulations restricting them to those unable to work for 12 months. Further, the appellate court concluded that Walton qualified for benefits since, prior to his return to work, his "inability" would have been "expected" to last 12 months. Wed, 16 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58874 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1595/argument Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. hired Jose Castro on the basis of documents appearing to verify his authorization to work in the United States. After Castro engaged in union-organizing activities, Hoffman laid him off. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the layoff violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and ordered backpay for Castro. At a compliance hearing, Castor testified before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that he was born in Mexico, that he had never been legally admitted to, or authorized to work in, this country, and that he gained employment with Hoffman only after tendering a birth certificate that was not his. The ALJ found that Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which makes it unlawful for employers knowingly to hire undocumented workers or for employees to use fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility, precluded Castro's award. In reversing, the Board noted that the most effective way to further the immigration policies embodied in IRCA is to provide the NLRA's protections and remedies to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order. Tue, 15 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58892 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1853/argument Akos Swierkiewicz, a 53-year-old native of Hungary, began working for Sorema N. A., a reinsurance company principally owned and controlled by a French parent corporation, in 1989. Six years later, the Chief Executive Officer, a French national, demoted Swierkiewicz from the position of senior vice president and chief underwriting officer to a marketing and services position with fewer responsibilities. A younger French national was promoted to Swierkiewicz's old position. Swierkiewicz filed suit, alleging that he had been fired on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,and on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In dismissing the case, the District Court found that Swierkiewicz had not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in that he had not adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent requiring an employment discrimination complaint to allege facts constituting a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792. Tue, 15 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58850 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_853/argument In 1999, Ronald Nussle, an inmate at the Cheshire Correctional Institution in Connecticut, filed a federal action under 42 USC section 1983, charging that certain correction officers had subjected him to a sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation and had singled him out for a severe beating in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, Nussle did not file a grievance under the applicable Connecticut Department of Correction procedures. Based on the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that PLRA directs that "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983...or any other Federal law, by a prisoner...until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for a claim of the kind Nussle asserted. Citing legislative history, the appellate court found that the phrase "prisons conditions" covers only conditions affecting prisoners generally, not single incidents that immediately affect only particular prisoners. Mon, 14 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58886 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1831/argument When Don Craft failed to pay federal income tax liabilities for the failure to file federal income tax returns for the years 1979 through 1986, a federal tax lien attached to "all [of his] property and rights to property," pursuant to 26 USC section 6321. After the notice of the lien was filed, Dan and his wife Sandra L. Craft jointly executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer to her his interest in a piece of real property in Michigan that they owned as tenants by the entirety. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agreed to release the lien and allow the Crafts to sell the property with half the net proceeds to be held in escrow pending determination of the Government's interest in the property. After Sandra brought an action to quiet title to the escrowed proceeds, the Government claimed that its lien had attached to the husband's interest in the tenancy by the entirety. The District Court granted the Government summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, however, held that no lien attached because the husband had no separate interest in the entireties property under Michigan law. Mon, 14 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58816 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1614/argument Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plaintiff shall file an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300 days after an alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. Abner Morgan filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC against National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), alleging that he had been subjected to discrete discriminatory and retaliatory acts and had experienced a racially hostile work environment throughout his employment. The EEOC issued a "Notice of Right to Sue." While some of the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred within 300 days of the time that Morgan filed his EEOC charge, many took place prior to that period. The District Court granted Amtrak summary judgment in part, holding that the company could not be liable for conduct occurring outside of the 300-day filing period. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff may sue on claims that would ordinarily be time-barred so long as they either are sufficiently related to incidents that fall within the statutory period or are part of a systematic policy or practice of discrimination that took place, at least in part, within the period. Wed, 09 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58898 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1567/argument Cornelius and Suzanne Young failed to include payment with their 1992 income tax return, which was due and filed on October 15, 1993. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed a tax liability against them. After filing a Chapter 13 petition, the Youngs ultimately filed a Chapter 7 petition and were granted a discharge, meaning that Youngs had no assets available to satisfy unsecured creditors, including the IRS. If the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a claim for certain taxes for which the return was due within three years before the individual taxpayer files a bankruptcy petition, its claim enjoys eighth priority under 11 USC section 507(a)(8)(A)(i), and is nondischargeable in bankruptcy under section 523(a)(1)(A). When the IRS subsequently demanded that they pay the tax debt, the Youngs asked the Bankruptcy Court to reopen the Chapter 7 case and declare the debt discharged under section 523(a)(1)(A), claiming that it fell outside section 507(a)(8)(A)(i)'s "three-year lookback period" because it pertained to a tax return due more than three years before their Chapter 7 filing. The District Court held that the "lookback period" is tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition and concluded that the 1992 debt had not been discharged when the Youngs were granted a discharge under Chapter 7. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Wed, 09 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58802 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1072/argument Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that a charge of employment discrimination be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) "within [a specified number of] days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." An EEOC regulation permits an otherwise timely filer to verify a charge after the time for filing has expired. In November 1997, Leonard Edelman faxed a letter to the EEOC, claiming that Lynchburg College had subjected him to gender-based, national origin, and religious discrimination after it denied him tenure. The EEOC informed Edelman of the 300-day time limit and sent him a Form 5 Charge of Discrimination, which he returned 313 days after he was denied tenure. The District Court dismissed the Title VII complaint, finding that the letter was not a charge under Title VII because neither Edelman nor the EEOC treated it as one. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that because a charge requires verification and must be filed within the limitations period, it follows that a charge must be verified within that period. Tue, 08 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58798 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1543/argument Festo Corporation owns two patents for an improved magnetic rodless cylinder, a piston-driven device that relies on magnets to move objects in a conveying system. When the patent examiner rejected the initial application for the first patent because of defects in description, the application was amended to add the new limitations that the device would contain a pair of one-way sealing rings and that its outer sleeve would be made of a magnetizable material. The second patent was also amended during a reexamination proceeding to add the sealing rings limitation. After Festo began selling its device, SMC entered the market with a similar device that uses one two-way sealing ring and a nonmagnetizable sleeve. Festo filed suit, claiming that SMC's device is so similar that it infringes Festo's patents under the doctrine of equivalents. Rejecting SMC's argument that the prosecution history, or the public record of the patent proceedings, estopped Festo from saying that SMC's device was similar, the District Court ruled in Festo's favor. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the prosecution history estoppel applied, ruling that estoppel arises from any amendment that narrows a claim to comply with the Patent Act. The Court of Appeals also held that, when estoppel applies, it bars any claim of equivalence for the element that was amended. Tue, 08 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58888 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1167/argument The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposed two moratoria from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983 and from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Real estate owners affected by the moratoria and an association representing such owners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., filed suits, claiming that TRPA's actions constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. The District Court found that TRPA had not effected a partial taking; however, it concluded that the moratoria did constitute a categorical taking because TRPA temporarily deprived real estate owners of all economically viable use of their land. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that because the regulations had only a temporary impact, no categorical taking had occurred. Mon, 07 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58814 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_6029/argument The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) guarantees qualifying employees 12 weeks of unpaid leave each year and encourages businesses to adopt more generous policies. In 1996, Wolverine World Wide, Inc. granted Tracy Ragsdale 30 weeks of medical leave after she was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. Wolverine did not notify Ragsdale that 12 weeks of the absence would count as her FMLA leave. After Ragsdale sought another 30-day extension, Wolverine refused her request and terminated her when she did not return to work. Ragsdale filed suit, alleging under Labor Department regulation 29 CFR section 825.700(a), which provides that if an employee takes medical leave "and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement," that Wolverine was required to grant her 12 additional weeks of leave. The District Court granted Wolverine summary judgment, finding that the regulation was in conflict with the statute and invalid because it required Wolverine to grant Ragsdale more than 12 weeks of FMLA-compliant leave in one year. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Mon, 07 Jan 2002 13:00:00 +0000 58800 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_878/argument The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that incumbent local-exchange carriers (LECs) provide interconnection with their existing networks; that the carriers then establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transporting and terminating the calls of each others' customers; and that their interconnection agreements be approved by a state utility commission. The local LEC, Illinois Bell Telephone Company, doing business as Ameritech Illinois, refused to pay reciprocal compensation for calls made by its competitors' customers to the local access numbers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Ameritech argued that ISP traffic was not local traffic subject to the reciprocal compensation agreement. The competitors filed complaints and the Illinois Commerce Commission ruled in their favor. In affirming, the District Court concluded that the Commission's decision did not violate the Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Wed, 05 Dec 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58878 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1531/argument The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that incumbent local-exchange carriers (LECs) provide interconnection with their existing networks; that the carriers then establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transporting and terminating the calls of each others' customers; and that their interconnection agreements be approved by a state utility commission. Verizon Maryland Inc., the incumbent LEC in Maryland, negotiated an interconnection agreement with MCI WorldCom, Inc. After the Maryland Public Service Commission approved the agreement, Verizon informed WorldCom that it would no longer pay reciprocal compensation for calls made by Verizon's customers to the local access numbers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) because ISP traffic was not local traffic subject to the reciprocal compensation agreement. WorldCom filed a complaint with the Commission, which ordered Verizon to make the payments for past and future ISP-bound calls. Verizon then filed an action in federal district court, seeking an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, alleging that the determination that Verizon must pay reciprocal compensation for ISP traffic violated the Act. The District Court dismissed the action. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Commission had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the Act did not provide a basis for jurisdiction over Verizon's claims. Wed, 05 Dec 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58854 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_799/argument Based on its 1977 study concluding that concentrations of adult entertainment establishments are associated with higher crime rates in surrounding communities, the city of Los Angeles enacted Municipal Code section 12.70(C), which prohibited such enterprises within 1,000 feet of each other. The city later amended the ordinance to prohibit more than one adult entertainment business in the same building. Alameda Books, Inc. and Highland Books, Inc., two adult establishments that openly operate combined bookstores/video arcades, sued, alleging that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. Finding that the ordinance was not a content-neutral regulation of speech, the District Court reasoned that the 1977 study did not support a reasonable belief that multiple-use adult establishments produce the secondary effects the city asserted as content-neutral justifications for its prohibition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that, even if the ordinance were content neutral, the city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments was designed to serve its substantial interest in reducing crime. Tue, 04 Dec 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58912 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1250/argument In 1990, Robert Barnett injured his back while working in a cargo-handling position at US Airways. Invoking his seniority rights, Barnett transferred to a less physically demanding position in the mailroom. Subsequently, Barnett's new position became open to seniority-based employee bidding under US Airways' seniority system and, ultimately, he lost his job. Barnett then filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against "an individual with a disability" who with "reasonable accommodation" can perform a job's essential functions unless the employer "can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business." In granting US Airways summary judgment, the District Court found that altering a seniority system would result in an "undue hardship" to both US Airways and its nondisabled employees. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the seniority system was merely a factor in the undue hardship analysis and that a case-by-case, fact intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular assignment would constitute an undue hardship. Tue, 04 Dec 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58828 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1249/argument The Chicago Park District is responsible for operating public parks and other public property in Chicago. Pursuant to its authority, the Park District adopted an ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events in public parks. The ordinance provides that the Park District may deny a permit on any of 13 specified grounds, must process applications within 28 days, and must explain its reasons for a denial. An unsuccessful applicant may appeal, first, to the Park District's general superintendent and then to state court. The Windy City Hemp Development Board applied on several occasions for permits to hold rallies advocating the legalization of marijuana. Some permits were granted and others were denied. Ultimately, the Board filed suit, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. The District Court granted the Park District summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Mon, 03 Dec 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58776 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_952/argument The spousal impoverishment provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA) permit a spouse living at home to reserve certain income and assets to meet the minimum monthly maintenance needs he or she will have when the other spouse is institutionalized, usually in a nursing home, and becomes eligible for Medicaid. The MCCA's resource allocation rules provide that, in determining the institutionalized spouse's Medicaid eligibility, a portion of the couple's resources, called the "community spouse resource allowance" (CSRA), shall be reserved for the benefit of the community spouse. The MCCA allows an increase in the standard allowance if either spouse shows, at a state-administered hearing, that the community spouse will not be able to maintain the statutorily defined minimum level of income on which to live after the institutionalized spouse gains Medicaid eligibility. In 1996, after entering a Wisconsin nursing home, Irene Blumer applied for Medicaid through her husband Burnett and ultimately sought a higher CSRA. Under the "income- first" method for determining whether the community spouse is entitled to a higher CSRA, which Wisconsin uses, the State considers first whether potential income transfers from the institutionalized spouse will suffice to enable the community spouse to meet monthly needs once the institutionalized spouse qualifies for Medicaid. Subsequently, an examiner denied Blumer's request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State's income-first statute conflicted with the MCCA, which, the appeals court held, unambiguously mandates the resources-first method. Mon, 03 Dec 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58820 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1187/argument A few years before his release, prison officials ordered Robert Lile, who was convicted of rape, to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program, participating inmates are required to complete and sign an "Admission of Responsibility" form, in which they accept responsibility for the crimes for which they have been sentenced, and complete a sexual history form detailing all prior sexual activities, regardless of whether the activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. The information obtained from SATP participants is not privileged. By refusing to participate, a prisoner's privileges are reduced. Lile refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The District Court granted Lile summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the compelled self-incrimination can be established by penalties that do not constitute deprivations of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. The appellate court concluded that the SATP could treat inmate admissions as privileged. Wed, 28 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58826 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1293/argument Unlike the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only "material that is harmful to minors." Moreover, COPA requires jurors to apply "contemporary community standards" in assessing material. Before it was scheduled to go into effect, a number of organizations affected by COPA filed suit, alleging that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, reasoning that COPA's use of contemporary community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad. Wed, 28 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58838 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1519/argument In 1998, Ralph Arvizu was stopped by Border Patrol Agent Clinton Stoddard while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona. A number of factors prompted Stoddard to stop Arvizu, including his slowing down, his failure to acknowledge the agent, the raised position of the children's knees, and their odd waving. After receiving permission to search the vehicle, Stoddard found more than 100 pounds of marijuana. Arvizu was charged with possession with intent to distribute. Arvizu moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing among other things that Stoddard did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle as required by the Fourth Amendment. Denying the motion, the District Court cited a number of facts that gave Stoddard reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, including its location. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court relied on factors that carried little or no weight in reasonable-suspicion calculus and that the remaining factors were not enough to render the stop permissible. In the appellate court's view, fact-specific weighing of circumstances or other multifactor tests introduced uncertainty and unpredictability into the Fourth Amendment analysis, making it necessary to clearly delimit the factors that an officer may consider in making stops such as this one. Tue, 27 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58864 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1073/argument Kristja J. Falvo asked the Owasso Independent School District to ban peer grading, or the practice of allowing students to score each other's tests, papers, and assignments as the teachers explain the correct answers to the entire class, because it embarrassed her children. When the school district declined, Falvo filed an action against the school district, claming that such peer grading violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). FERPA authorizes federal funds to be withheld from school districts that permit students' "education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein)" to be released without their parents' written consent and defines education records as "records, files, documents, and other materials" containing information directly related to a student, which "are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution." Disagreeing with Falvo, the District Court held that grades put on papers by another student are not "education records." In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that grades marked by students on each other's work are "education records," such that the very act of grading is an impermissible release of information to the student grader. Tue, 27 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58868 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_9280/argument After convicting William Kelly for murder, a South Carolina jury was asked to determine whether any aggravating factors had been shown and, if so, to recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment. During sentencing, the prosecutor presented testimony that Kelly had taken part in an escape attempt with plans to hold a female guard hostage; provided evidence of Kelly's sadism and his desires to kill anyone who irritated him; and spoke of Kelly as a "butcher," "bloody," and "dangerous." Relying on the holding of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, that when "a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death...is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant 'to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility,'" Kelly's counsel requested a jury instruction stating that Kelly would be ineligible for parole if he received a life sentence. In refusing, the trial court said that the State's evidence went to Kelly's character and characteristics, not to future dangerousness. The jury recommended a death sentence. In affirming the sentence, the State Supreme Court held Simmons inapposite because state law provided the jury with a third sentencing alternative and future dangerousness was not at issue. Mon, 26 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58806 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1514/argument In 1996, Lance Raygor and James Goodchild filed complaints in Federal District Court against the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, stemming from an alleged incident in which the university attempted to compel them to accept early retirement. They refused. Subsequently, their jobs were reclassified to reduce their salaries. The complaints alleged a federal cause of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and a state law discrimination action under the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, which purports to toll the limitations period for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they are dismissed. The District Court ultimately dismissed their cases on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Before the dismissal, Raygor and Goodrich refilled their state law claims in state court. The university contended that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute did not toll the limitations period on those claims because the Federal District Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the ADEA claims. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court held the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute unconstitutional when applied to claims against nonconsenting state defendants, such as the university. Mon, 26 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58810 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1089/argument In 1997, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. terminated Ella Williams, citing her poor attendance record. Subsequently, claiming to be disabled from performing her automobile assembly line job by carpal tunnel syndrome and related impairments, Williams sued Toyota for failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Granting Toyota summary judgment, the District Court held that Williams's impairment did not qualify as a disability under the ADA because it had not substantially limited any major life activity and that there was no evidence that Williams had had a record of a substantially limiting impairment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the impairments substantially limited Williams in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. Because her ailments prevented her from doing the tasks associated with certain types of manual jobs that require the gripping of tools and repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time, the appellate court concluded that Williams demonstrated that her manual disability involved a class of manual activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at work. Wed, 07 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58884 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1307/argument The Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 restructured the system for providing private health care benefits to coal industry retirees by merging two previous benefits plans into the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund. The fund is financed by annual premiums assessed against signatory coal operators, or those who signed any agreement requiring contributions to the plans that were merged into the Fund. If the signatory is no longer in business, the Act assigns liability for beneficiaries to a defined group of "related persons" based on the Commissioner of Social Security assignments. Shortly after Jericol Mining Co. was formed in 1973 as Irdell Mining, Inc., Irdell purchased the coal mining operating assets of Shackleford Coal Co., which was a signatory to a coal wage agreement while it was in business. Between 1993 and 1997, the Commissioner assigned responsibility for 86 retired miners to Jericol, determining that as a successor in interest to Shackleford, Jericol qualified as a related person. All of these retirees had worked for Shackleford, but none of them had actually worked for Jericol. Jericol filed suit against the Commissioner. The District Court granted Jericol summary judgment, concluding that the Act's classification regime does not provide for the liability of successors of defunct signatory operators. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that Jericol was not a related person to Shackleford and thus could not be held responsible for Shackleford's miners. Wed, 07 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58902 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1260/argument A California court sentenced Mark James Knights to probation for a drug offense. The probation order included the following condition: that Knights would "submit his...person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer." In the aftermath of arson at the site of a Pacific Gas and Electric (PGE) power transformer, a sheriff's detective, with reasonable suspicion, searched Knights's apartment. Based in part on items recovered, including a PGE padlock, a federal grand jury indicted Knights for conspiracy to commit arson, for possession of an unregistered destructive device, and for being a felon in possession of ammunition. In granting Knights's motion to suppress, the District Court held that, although the detective had reasonable suspicion to believe that Knights was involved with incendiary materials, the search was for "investigatory" rather than "probationary" purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Tue, 06 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58772 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_973/argument Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 lays out steps that a judge must take to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Rule 11(h)'s requirement that any variance from those procedures "which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded" is similar to the general harmless-error rule in Rule 52(a). On February 28, 1997, Alphonso Vonn was charged with federal bank robbery and firearm crimes. That day a Magistrate Judge twice advised him of his constitutional rights. Vonn also signed a statement saying that he had read and understood his rights and he answered yes to the court's questions whether he had understood the court's explanation of his rights and whether he had read and signed the statement. When Vonn later pleaded guilty to robbery, the court advised him of the constitutional rights he was relinquishing, but skipped the advice required by Rule (11)(c)(3) that he would have the right to assistance of counsel at trial. Subsequently, Vonn pleaded guilty to the firearm charge and to a later-charged conspiracy count. Again, the court advised him of the rights he was waiving, but did not mention the right to counsel. Appealing his convictions, Vonn raised Rule 11 for the first time. The Court of Appeals agreed that there had been error and vacated the convictions. Tue, 06 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58918 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_9285/argument A Virginia jury convicted Walter Mickens, Jr., of the premeditated murder of Timothy Hall during or following the commission of an attempted forcible sodomy and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, Mickens filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of his court-appointed attorneys had a conflict of interest at trial - his lead attorney, Bryan Saunders, had represented Hall on criminal charges at the time of the murder. Saunders had not disclosed to the court, his co-counsel, or Mickens that he had represented Hall. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals rejected MIckens's argument that the juvenile court judge's failure to inquire into a potential conflict either mandated automatic reversal of his conviction or relieved him of the burden of showing that a conflict of interest adversely affected his representation. Subsequently, the appellate court concluded that Mickens had not demonstrated adverse effect. Mon, 05 Nov 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58876 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_927/argument In 1997, an explosion on board Mallard Bay Drilling Rig 52, a oil and gas exploration barge, killed or injured several workers while the barge was drilling a well in Louisiana's territorial waters. The Coast Guard's subsequent investigation did not accuse Mallard of anything, but did note that the barge was not an "inspected vessel" subject to comprehensive Coast Guard regulation. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) then cited Mallard for violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act) of 1970. Mallard challenged OSHA's jurisdiction to issue the citations on the grounds that Rig 52 was not a "workplace" under section 4(a) of the Act and that section 4(b)(1) of the Act pre-empted OSHA jurisdiction because the Coast Guard had exclusive authority to prescribe and enforce occupational safety and health standards on vessels such as Rig 52. Rejecting both arguments, an Administrative Law Judge found that Rig 52 was a "workplace" under the Act and held that the Coast Guard had not pre-empted OSHA's jurisdiction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Coast Guard's exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of seamen's working conditions aboard vessels such as Rig 52 precluded OSHA's regulation under section 4(b)(1), and that this pre-emption encompassed both inspected and uninspected vessels. Wed, 31 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58770 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_730/argument In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, held that strict scrutiny governs whether race-based classifications violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (Adarand I). The Court then remanded the case for a determination whether the race-based components of the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program could withstand this standard of review. Ultimately, the Court remanded Adarand for a second time for a determination on the merits consistent with Adarand I. When the Court of Appeals held, that by virtue of a new regulatory framework under which the DOT's state and local DBE program now operated, that program passed constitutional muster, the Court again certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny standard announced in Adarand I. Wed, 31 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58822 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_957/argument In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. In doing so, the Court characterized a dangerous sexual offender's confinement as civil rather than criminal and held that the confinement criterion embodied in the statute's words -- "mental abnormality or personality disorder" -- satisfied substantive due process. When the state of Kansas filed a petition in a Kansas district court to have Michael T. Crane, a previously convicted sexual offender, committed, the Kansas District Court ordered his civil commitment. In reversing, the State Supreme Court concluded that Hendricks requires a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior even if, as provided by Kansas law, problems of emotional, and not volitional, capacity prove the source of behavior warranting commitment. The trial court had made no such finding. Tue, 30 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58830 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_795/argument The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) prohibits "any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture" that "is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and any sexually explicit image that is "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression" it depicts "a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." The Free Speech Coalition, an adult-entertainment trade association, and others filed suit, alleging that the "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" provisions are overbroad and vague and, thus, restrain works otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held the CPPA invalid on its face, finding it to be substantially overbroad because it bans materials that are neither obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, nor produced by the exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747. Tue, 30 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58880 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_6567/argument While Larry Dean Dusenbery was in prison on federal drug charges, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began an administrative process to forfeit cash that officers seized when they executed a search warrant for the residence where he was arrested. The FBI sought to notify Dusenbery by sending certified mail addressed to him care of the federal correctional institution where he was incarcerated; to the address of the residence where he was arrested; and to an address in the town where his mother lived. The FBI received no response in the time allotted and turned over the cash to the United States Marshals Service. When Dusenbery moved for the return of all the property and funds seized in his criminal case, the District Court denied the motion. On remand, the District Court ruled that the Government's sending of notice by certified mail to Dusenbery's place of incarceration satisfied his due process rights as to the cash. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Mon, 29 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58784 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_6933/argument While on trial for first-degree murder, Remon Lee planned an alibi defense. His mother, stepfather, and sister were to voluntarily testify that he was in California at the time of the murder. The day the defense was to begin its case, the three could not be found. Lee's counsel moved for an overnight continuance to gain time to find the witnesses. The trial judge denied the motion. Subsequently, no alibi witnesses testified, the jury found Lee guilty, and he was sentenced to prison for life without possibility of parole. The Missouri Court of Appeals eventually disposed of the case on state procedural grounds. The appeals court held that the denial of the continuance motion was proper because Lee's counsel had failed to comply with Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.09, which requires that such motions be in writing and accompanied by an affidavit, and with Rule 24.10, which sets out the showings a movant must make to gain a continuance grounded on witnesses' absence. Ultimately, the Federal Court of Appeals ruled that federal review of Lee's claim, that the refusal to grant his continuance motion deprived him of his federal due process right to a defense, was unavailable because the state court's rejection of that claim rested on state-law grounds, independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment. Mon, 29 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58896 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_511/argument The Telecommunications Act of 1996 entitles new companies seeking to enter local telephone service markets to lease elements of the incumbent carriers' local exchange networks and directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to prescribe methods for state utility commissions to use in setting rates for the sharing of those elements. The FCC provided for the rates to be set based upon the forward-looking economic cost of an element as the sum of the total element long-run incremental cost of the element (TELRIC) and a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs incurred in providing a group of elements that cannot be attributed directly to individual elements and specified that the TELRIC should be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration. FCC regulations also contain combination rules, requiring an incumbent to perform the functions necessary to combine network elements for an entrant, unless the combination is not technically feasible. In five separate cases, a range of parties challenged the FCC regulations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that the use of the TELRIC methodology was foreclosed because the Act plainly required rates based on the actual cost of providing the network element and invalidated certain combination rules. Wed, 10 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58906 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_99_1823/argument Waffle House, Inc.'s employees must each sign an agreement requiring employment disputes to be settled by binding arbitration. After he suffered a seizure and was fired by Waffle House, Eric Baker filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that his discharge violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The EEOC then filed suit, alleging that Baker?s discharge violated the ADA, and sought injunctive relief and specific relief for Baker, including backpay, reinstatement, and compensatory damages, and punitive damages for malicious and reckless conduct. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Waffle House petitioned to stay the EEOC's suit and compel arbitration. The District Court did not stay the action. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House did not foreclose the enforcement action because the EEOC was not a party to the contract, but had independent statutory authority to bring suit in any federal district court where venue was proper. The appellate court also held that the EEOC was limited to injunctive relief. Wed, 10 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58844 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1045/argument In 1993, while at a doctor's office in California, Adelaide Andrews filled out a form listing her name, Social Security number, and other basic information. An office receptionist named Andrea Andrews copied the data and later moved to Las Vegas, where she attempted to open credit accounts using Adelaide's Social Security number and her own last name and address. Thereafter, TRW Inc. furnished copies of Adelaide's credit report to companies from which Andrea sought credit. In 1996, Adelaide filed suit, alleging that TRW had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to verify predisclosure of her credit report to third parties. TRW moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the FCRA's statute of limitations had expired on Adelaide's claims stemming from TRW's first two disclosures because both occurred more than two years before she brought suit. Adelaide countered that the limitations period on those claims did not commence until she discovered the disclosures. The District Court held the two claims time-barred. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied what it considered to be a general federal rule that a statute of limitations starts running when a party knows or has reason to know she was injured, unless Congress expressly legislates otherwise. Tue, 09 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58856 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_758/argument Maria Gregory worked for the United States Postal Service as a letter technician with responsibility for overseeing letter carriers on five mail routes and serving as a replacement carrier on those routes. In 1997, while three disciplinary actions that the Postal Service took against Gregory were pending in grievance proceedings pursuant to the Postal Service's collective bargaining agreement with her union, the Postal Service terminated Gregory's employment after a fourth violation. Gregory then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, where an agency must prove its charge by a preponderance of the evidence, proving not only that the misconduct occurred, but also that the penalty assessed is reasonable in relation to it. Analyzing her three prior disciplinary actions independently, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that Gregory's termination was reasonable in light of her four violations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that prior disciplinary actions subject to ongoing proceedings may not be used to support a penalty's reasonableness. Tue, 09 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58818 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_99_1996/argument Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. holds 17 utility patents issued under 35 USC section 101 that cover the manufacture, use, sale, and offer for sale of its hybrid corn seed products. Pioneer sells its patented hybrid seeds under a limited label license that allows only the production of grain and/or forage. J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., doing business as Farm Advantage, Inc., bought patented seeds from Pioneer in bags bearing the license agreement and then resold the bags. Subsequently, Pioneer filed a patent infringement suit. In response, Farm Advantage filed a patent invalidity counterclaim, arguing that sexually reproducing plants, such as Pioneer's corn plants, are not patentable subject matter within section 101. Farm Advantage maintained that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) set forth the exclusive statutory means for protecting plant life. The District Court granted Pioneer summary judgment. The court held that section 101 clearly covers plant life and that in enacting the PPA and the PVPA, Congress neither expressly nor implicitly removed plants from section 101's subject matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Wed, 03 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58908 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_568/argument In 1935, when the Federal Power Act (FPA) became law, most electric utilities operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation and their sales were bundled, meaning that consumers paid a single charge for both the cost of the electricity and the cost of its delivery. Section 201(b) of the FPA provides the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with jurisdiction over "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce" and section 205 prohibits unreasonable rates and undue discrimination "with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the [Commission's] jurisdiction." Currently, public utilities still retain ownership of the transmission lines that their competitors must use to deliver electricity to wholesale and retail customers and thus can refuse to deliver their competitors' energy or deliver that power on terms and conditions less favorable than those they apply to their own transmissions. In Order No. 888, FERC found such practices discriminatory under section 205. FERC then ordered the unbundling of wholesale generation and transmission services, which means that each utility must state separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services; imposed a similar open access requirement on unbundled retail transmissions in interstate commerce; and declined to extend the open access requirement to the transmission component of bundled retail sales. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals upheld the order. Wed, 03 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58768 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_507/argument The Indian Regulatory Gaming Act provides that Internal Revenue Code provisions "(including sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and chapter 35() concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes" with respect to gambling operations shall apply to Indian tribes in the same way as they apply to States. Chapter 35 imposes taxes from which it exempts certain state- controlled gambling activities, but says nothing about tax reporting or withholding. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, in a lawsuit, claimed that the Gaming Act subsection's explicit parenthetical reference exempts them from paying those chapter 35 taxes from which the States are exempt. Rejecting that claim, the Court of Appeals ultimately held that the subsection applies only to Code provisions concerning tax withholding and reporting. Tue, 02 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58774 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_832/argument The Pole Attachments Act requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to set reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for certain attachments to telephone and electric poles. A pole attachment includes "any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service to a [utility's] pole, conduit, or right-of-way." After the FCC issued an order that interpreted the Act to cover pole attachments for commingled high-speed Internet and traditional cable television services and attachments by wireless telecommunications providers, pole-owning utilities challenged the order. Reversing both of the FCC's positions, the Court of Appeals held that commingled services are not covered by either of the Act's two specific rate formulas and, thus, were not covered by the Act. Additionally, the appellate court held that the Act does not give the FCC authority to regulate wireless communications. Tue, 02 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58882 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_99_1786/argument In 1992, a car accident rendered Janette Knudson a quadriplegic. At that time, Knudson was covered by the Health and Welfare Plan for Employees and Dependents of Earth Systems, Inc. (the Plan), which covered $411,157.11 of her medical expenses, most of which were paid by Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. The Plan contains a reimbursement provision, which gives it the right to recover from a beneficiary any payment for benefits paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third party. After Knudson filed a state-court tort action to recover from the manufacturer of her car and others, she negotiated a settlement that earmarked $13,828.70 to satisfy Great-West's reimbursement claim. Great-West then filed an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to enforce the Plan's reimbursement provision by requiring Knudson to pay the Plan $411,157.11 of any proceeds recovered from third parties. The District Court granted Knudson summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that that judicially decreed reimbursement for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third party is not equitable relief authorized by ERISA. Mon, 01 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58842 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_860/argument In 1993, John E. Malesko was assigned to a bedroom on the fifth floor of the Le Marquis Community Correctional Center, a facility that houses federal inmates run by the Correctional Services Corporation (CSC) under contract with the Bureau of Prisons. After CSC instituted a policy requiring inmates residing below the sixth floor to use the stairs rather than the elevator, Malesko, who was afflicted with a heart condition limiting his ability to climb stairs, was exempted form the policy. When a CSC employee did not let Malesko use the elevator, he climbed the stairs, suffered a heart attack, and fell. Subsequently, Malesko filed a suit, alleging that CSC was negligence in refusing him the use of the elevator. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, in which the U.S. Supreme Court recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights, the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that such an action may only be maintained against individuals. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reasoned that such private entities should be held liable under Bivens to accomplish Bivens' goal of providing a remedy for constitutional violations. Mon, 01 Oct 2001 13:00:00 +0000 58858 at http://www.oyez.org