Cases - 2000 term

Glover v. United States

Mon, 27 Nov 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-8576

Petitioner

Glover

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 198 (2001)

Argued

Monday, November 27, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, January 9, 2001

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Michael L. Waldman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In the 1980's and early 1990's, Paul Glover was the Vice President and General Counsel of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union. Ultimately, Glover was convicted of federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion, among other things, after using his control over the union's investments to enrich himself through kickbacks. Glover's probation officer, in his pre-sentence investigation report, recommended that Glover's federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion convictions be grouped under the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual section 3D1.2, which allows the grouping of counts involving substantially the same harm. The Federal Government objected to the grouping and the District Court agreed. Glover's offense level was thus increased by two levels, resulting in an increased sentence of between 6 and 21 months. Glover's counsel did not pursue the grouping issue on appeal. Glover then filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his counsel's failure to pursue the issue was ineffective assistance, without which his offense level would have been lower. The District Court denied Glover's motion, concluding that a 6 to 21 month sentencing increase was not significant enough to establish prejudice under the test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington. Thus, the court denied his ineffective-assistance claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is a significant increase on a prison sentence required in order to show prejudice in a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Glover, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Court of appeals erred in engrafting onto the prejudice branch of the Strickland test the requirement that any increase in sentence must meet a standard of significance. Thus, the denial of Glover's motion to correct his sentence was reversed and remanded. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the Court of Appeals erred "because there is no obvious dividing line by which to measure how much longer a sentence must be for the increase to constitute substantial prejudice. ... Although the amount by which a defendant's sentence is increased by a particular decision may be a factor to consider in determining whether counsel's performance in failing to argue the point constitutes ineffective assistance, ...it cannot serve as a bar to a showing of prejudice."

FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Cmte.

Wed, 28 Feb 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Location

White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington D.C. 20500

Washington 20500

United States

38° 53' 55.4928" N, 77° 2' 11.8536" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-191

Petitioner

FEC

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Cmte.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 431 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, February 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2001

Advocates

Jan W. Baran (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Barbara D. Underwood (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971's definition of "contribution" includes "expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents." The U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, held that the limitations on political campaign contributions in the Act were generally constitutional, but that the Act's limitations on election expenditures infringed political expression in violation of the First Amendment. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Act to "an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate." In the wake of this decision, the Committee's broader claim remained, that the congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties themselves are facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate. The District Court ruled in favor of the committee and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Are congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for FEC, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Election Campaign

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "a party's coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution limits." Justice Souter noted that "'there is little evidence to suggest that coordinated party spending limits adopted by Congress have frustrated the ability of political parties to exercise their First Amendment rights to support their candidates.'" Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy. Justice Thomas argued that the spending limit "sweeps too broadly, interferes with the party-candidate relationship, and has not been proved necessary to combat corruption."

INS v. St. Cyr

Tue, 24 Apr 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-767

Petitioner

INS

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

St. Cyr

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 289 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, April 24, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2001

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lucas Guttentag (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On March 8, 1996, Enrico St. Cyr, a lawful permanent resident, pled guilty in a Connecticut court to a charge of selling a controlled substance. That conviction made him deportable. Before the effective dates of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was interpreted to give the Attorney General broad discretion to waive deportation of resident aliens. The AEDPA and IIRIRA restricted the class of aliens depending on section 212(c) for relief. St. Cyr's removal proceedings commenced after AEDPA's and IIRIRA's effective dates. Subsequently, the Attorney General claimed that the AEDPA and IIRIRA withdrew his authority to grant St. Cyr a waiver. The District Court accepted St. Cyr's habeas corpus application and agreed that the new restrictions do not apply to removal proceedings brought against an alien who pleaded guilty to a deportable crime before their enactment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Do the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 strip district courts of their jurisdiction under the general habeas corpus statute to entertain St. Cyr's challenge? Do the AEDPA and IIRIRA deny relief under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to aliens who would have been eligible for such relief at the time of their convictions?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for St. Cyr, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that habeas jurisdiction was not repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA. Additionally, the Court held that "[section 212(c)] relief remains available for aliens, like [Enrico St. Cyr], whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for [section 212(c)] relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect." Justice Stevens wrote that "[w]e find nothing in IIRIRA unmistakably indicating that Congress considered the question whether to apply its repeal of [section 212(c)] retroactively to such aliens."

Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia

Tue, 27 Feb 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1848

Petitioner

Buckhannon Board & Care Home

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

West Virginia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 598 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, February 27, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 2001

Advocates

David P. Cleek (Charleston, West Virginia, argued the cause for the respondents)

Beth S. Brinkmann (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Webster J. Arceneaux, III (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. operates care homes that provide assisted living to their residents. Buckhannon filed an inspection by the West Virginia fire marshal's office because some residents were incapable of "self- preservation." Buckhannon brought suit against the State and others arguing that the "self-preservation" requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Afterwards the state legislature eliminated the requirement and the District Court dismissed the case as moot. Buckhannon then requested attorney's fees as the "prevailing party" under the FHAA and ADA. Buckhannon based its claim on the "catalyst theory," which posits that a plaintiff is a "prevailing party" if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the term "prevailing party" include a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for West Virginia, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the "catalyst theory" is not a permissible basis for the award of attorney's fees under the FHAA and ADA. "In the United States, parties are ordinarily required to bear their own attorney's fees -- the prevailing party is not entitled to collect from the loser," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "[u]nder this 'American Rule,' we follow 'a general practice of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority.'" Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that "Congress prescribed fee-shifting provisions like those included in the FHAA and ADA to encourage private enforcement of laws designed to advance civil rights. Fidelity to that purpose calls for court-awarded fees when a private party's lawsuit, whether or not its settlement is registered in court, vindicates rights Congress sought to secure."

Ferguson v. City of Charleston

Wed, 04 Oct 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Medical University of South Carolina

171 Ashley Avenue Charleston SC 29425

Charleston, SC 29425

United States

32° 47' 7.944" N, 79° 56' 47.9508" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-936

Petitioner

Ferguson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Charleston

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 67 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, October 4, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, March 21, 2001

Advocates

Priscilla J. Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Robert H. Hood (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

After an increase in the use of cocaine by patients receiving prenatal care, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) started to cooperate with Charleston to formulate a policy to prosecute mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. MUSC obstetrical patients were arrested after testing positive for cocaine. They filed suit challenging the policy's validity on the theory that warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches. Among the District Court's actions was an instruction to the jury to find for the patients unless they had consented to such searches. The jury found in favor of the city. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the searches were reasonable, reasoning that special needs may, in certain exceptional circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends.

Question

Is a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment if the patient has not consented to the procedure?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Ferguson, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the diagnostic tests constituted an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to the procedure. The interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine cannot justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant. Examining the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens wrote that a special need is "divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement," and that under the city's view "virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate...purpose."

Calcano-Martinez v. INS

Tue, 24 Apr 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1011

Petitioner

Calcano-Martinez et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

INS

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 348 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, April 24, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2001

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Lucas Guttentag (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) expressly precludes courts of appeals from exercising "jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against any alien who is removable by reason of "a conviction for certain criminal offenses, including any aggravated felony." Deboris Calcano-Martinez, Sergio Madrid, and Fazila Khan are all lawful permanent residents of the United States subject to administratively final orders of removal because they were convicted of aggravated felonies. Each filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals and a habeas corpus petition in the District Court to challenge the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that they were ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of deportation under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. The court also held that they could pursue their claims in a District Court habeas action.

Question

Does the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 remove the jurisdiction of federal appellate courts to review direct appeals of final deportation orders, but preserve federal district courts' habeas jurisdiction over challenges to those orders?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Calcano-Martinez, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions for direct but petitioners can proceed with their habeas petitions if they wish to obtain relief. "As petitioners in this case were convicted of 'aggravated felonies' within the meaning of the relevant statutes," wrote Justice Stevens, "the plain language of [IIRIRA] fairly explicitly strips the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to hear their claims on petitions for direct review." Justice Stevens continued that "Congress has not spoken with sufficient clarity to strip the district courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions raising identical claims."

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista

Mon, 04 Dec 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Travis County Jail

3614 Bill Price Road Del Valle TX 78617

Del Valle, TX 78617

United States

30° 11' 45.4992" N, 97° 38' 43.8936" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1408

Petitioner

Atwater

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Lago Vista

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 318 (2001)

Argued

Monday, December 4, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, April 24, 2001

Advocates

Andy Taylor (Et al., as amici curiae, supporting the respondent)

Robert C. De Carli (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Roger J. George, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Under Texas law, it is a misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine, either for a front-seat passenger in a car equipped with safety belts not to wear one or for the driver to fail to secure any small child riding in front. In 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her truck in Lago Vista. Neither of Atwater's children, who were sitting in the front seat, was wearing seatbelts. Lago Vista policeman Bart Turek observed the violations and pulled Atwater over. Ultimately, Atwater was handcuffed, placed in jail, and released on bond. Atwater then filed suit alleging that Turek's actions had violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In granting the city summary judgment, the District Court ruled the claim meritless. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the arrest was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes because no one disputed that Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater, and there was no evidence the arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to Atwater's privacy interests.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limit a police officer's authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for City of Lago Vista, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. "If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender," wrote Justice Souter for the Court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissenting opinion argued that the Court's decision "neglects the Fourth Amendment's express command in the name of administrative ease" and thus "cloaks the pointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the mantle of reasonableness."

Nevada v. Hicks

Wed, 21 Mar 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1994

Petitioner

Nevada

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hicks

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 353 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, March 21, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2001

Advocates

Barbara B. McDowell (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting affirmance)

C. Wayne Howle (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

S. James Anaya (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Floyd Hicks is a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes of western Nevada. After tribal police observed that Hicks was in possession of two California bighorn sheep heads, state game wardens obtained search warrants from state court and from the tribal court. After the warrants were executed, Hicks filed suit in Tribal Court, alleging trespass to land and chattels, abuse of process, and violation of civil rights, specifically denial of equal protection, denial of due process, and unreasonable search and seizure. The Tribal Court held that it had jurisdiction over the claims and the Tribal Appeals Court affirmed. Agreeing, the District Court held that the wardens would have to exhaust their qualified immunity claims in Tribal Court. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fact that Hicks's home is on tribe-owned reservation land is sufficient to support tribal jurisdiction over civil claims against nonmembers arising from their activities on that land.

Question

May a tribal court assert jurisdiction over civil claims against state officials who entered tribal land to execute a search warrant against a tribe member suspected of having violated state law outside the reservation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nevada, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, a unanimous Court held that "[b]ecause the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes lacked legislative authority to restrict, condition, or otherwise regulate the ability of state officials to investigate off-reservation violations of state law, they also lacked adjudicative authority to hear respondent's claim that those officials violated tribal law in the performance of their duties. "[S]ince the lack of authority is clear," continued Scalia, "there is no need to exhaust the jurisdictional dispute in tribal court. State officials operating on a reservation to investigate off-reservation violations of state law are properly held accountable for tortious conduct and civil rights violations in either state or federal court, but not in tribal court."

Dept of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protect. Assoc.

Wed, 10 Jan 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1871

Petitioner

Dept of Interior

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Klamath Water Users Protect. Assoc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 1 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, January 10, 2001

Decided

Monday, March 5, 2001

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Andrew Hitchings (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) administers the Klamath Irrigation Project (Project), which uses water from the Klamath River Basin to irrigate parts of Oregon and California. In order for the Department to provide water allocations among competing uses and users, it asked the Klamath and other Indian Tribes (Basin Tribes or Tribes) to consult with Reclamation. A memorandum of understanding solidified this relationship. When the Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs (Bureau) filed claims on behalf of the Klamath Tribe in Oregon to allocate water rights, the two exchanged written memorandums on the appropriate scope of the claims submitted by the Government for the benefit of the Tribe. Afterwards, the Klamath Water Users Protective Association (Association), a nonprofit group, whose members receive water from the Project and, generally, have interests adverse to the tribal interest because of the scarcity of water, filed requests with the Bureau under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to gain access to communications between the Bureau and the Basin Tribes. Some documents were turned over, but the Bureau held other documents under the deliberative process privileges incorporated in FOIA Exemption 5, which exempts from disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." The Association sued to compel release of the documents. The District Court granted the government summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled out any application of Exemption 5 on the ground that the Tribes with whom the Department has a consulting relationship have a direct interest in the subject matter of the consultations.

Question

Are documents shared between the Klamath and other Indian Tribes and the Department of the Interior, which address tribal interests subject to state and federal proceedings to determine water allocations, exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, as " inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters?"

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Klamath Water Users Protect. Assoc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court that there is no exemption under FOIA for the correspondence between the Tribes and the Bureau. Because the Klamath Tribe advocated its own positions in the water allocation proceedings, the communications between it and the Bureau did not equate to the role that personnel fulfils, in that personnel do not represent their own interests. Therefore, the documents were not exempt from public disclosure as inter-agency or intra-agency communications. "All of this boils down to requesting that we read an 'Indian trust' exemption into the statute, a reading that is out of the question," wrote Justice Souter for the Court.

Idaho v. United States

Mon, 23 Apr 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-189

Petitioner

Idaho

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 262 (2001)

Argued

Monday, April 23, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 18, 2001

Advocates

Steven W. Strack (Boise, Idaho, argued the cause for the petitioner)

David C. Frederick (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent United States)

Raymond C. Givens (Argued the cause for the respondent Coeur d'Alene Tribe)

Facts of the Case

In 1873, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe agreed to relinquish all claims to its aboriginal lands outside the bounds of a more substantial reservation that U.S. negotiators agreed to set apart for the tribe's exclusive use. The reservation included part of the St. Joe River and virtually all of the Lake Coeur d'Alene. President Grant set the land aside in an 1873 Executive Order. In 1891, Congress ratified agreements in which the Tribe agreed to cede its rights to all land except that within the Executive Order reservation, and the Government promised to compensate the Tribe and agreed to hold the land forever as Indian land and the Tribe agreed to cede the reservation's northern portion, including two-thirds of the lake, for compensation. The United States initiated an action against Idaho to quiet title in the United States, in trust for the Tribe, to the submerged lands within the current reservation. The District Court quieted title in the United States as trustee, and the Tribe as beneficiary, to the bed and banks of the lake and the river within the reservation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the National Government hold title, in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, to lands underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the National Government holds title, in trust for the Tribe, to lands underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that "Congress recognized the full extent of the Executive Order reservation lying within the stated boundaries it ultimately confirmed, and intended to bar passage to Idaho of title to the submerged lands at issue here." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, with whom Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas joined, dissented. "Congress' desire to divest an entering State of its sovereign interest in submerged lands must be 'definitely declared or otherwise made very plain,'" argued Chief Justice Rehnquist, "That standard has not been met here."

Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine

Wed, 29 Nov 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1331

Petitioner

Lewis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lewis & Clark Marine

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 438 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, November 29, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, February 21, 2001

Advocates

James V. O'Brien (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Roy C. Dripps, III (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1998, James F. Lewis, a deckhand aboard the M/V Karen Michelle owned by Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., claimed that he was injured when he tripped over a wire on the boat. Lewis then sued Lewis & Clark in Illinois County Court, for personal injuries claiming negligence under the Jones Act. Lewis & Clark had already filed a complaint for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in the District Court under the Limitation of Liability Act (Act). Subsequently, the court approved a surety bond of $450,000, representing Lewis & Clark's interest in the vessel, ordered that any claim related to the incident be filed with the court within a specified period, and enjoined the filing or prosecution of any suits related to the incident. The injunction prevented Lewis from litigating his personal injury claims in state court and he moved to dissolve it. The District Court noted that federal courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a vessel owner is entitled to limited liability, but also recognized that the statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime suits to federal courts saves to suitors "all other remedies to which they are other wise entitled." Ultimately, the court dissolved the injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Did a District Court abuse its discretion when it dissolved an injunction under the Limitation of Liability Act, which prevented a seaman from suing a vessel owner in state court for personal injuries sustained aboard the vessel?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lewis, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 46 U.S.C. 181

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because state courts may adjudicate claims like Lewis' against vessel owners so long as the owner's right to seek limitation of liability is protected, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the District Court's decision to dissolve the injunction. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Conner rejected the respondent's proposal to make "run of the mill personal injury actions involving vessels a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction except where the claimant happens to seek a jury trial."

Artuz v. Bennett

Tue, 10 Oct 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1238

Petitioner

Artuz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bennett

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 4 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, November 7, 2000

Advocates

John M. Castellano (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Dan Schweitzer (As amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, for petitioner)

Alan S. Futerfas (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1984, after firing two bullets at police during a car chase, Tony Bruce Bennett was convicted of attempted murder, among other crimes. Bennett moved pro se to vacate his judgment of conviction in 1995. A New York trial court orally denied Bennett's motion. Bennett claimed that he never received a copy of a written order reflecting the denial. In 1998, Bennett filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging violations of his rights to present witnesses in his defense and to a fair trial, to be present at all material stages of the trial, and to the effective assistance of counsel. The Federal District Court dismissed Bennett's federal habeas corpus petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which set a 1-year period of limitation on federal habeas corpus applications by state prisoners. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Bennett's habeas petition was not time-barred because his 1995 motion was still pending, under the AEDPA's tolling provision, since he had never received notification of the state's decision regarding it. Thus, the time for appealing the denial of that motion had not yet expired. Additionally, the court found that the 1995 motion was a "properly filed" application, even though the claims contained in the motion were procedurally barred under two New York statutory provisions.

Question

Is an application for state postconviction relief containing procedurally barred claims properly filed within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bennett, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 8 U.S.C. 2244

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that an application for state postconviction relief containing procedurally barred claims is properly filed within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Antonin Scalia said that "[o]nly individual claims, and not the application containing those claims, can be procedurally defaulted under state law." "An application is 'filed,' as that term is commonly understood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record," noted Justice Scalia. "By construing 'properly filed application' to mean 'application raising claims that are not mandatorily procedurally barred,' [the Federal Government] elides the difference between an 'application' and a 'claim,'" argued Justice Scalia.

Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Grp.

Mon, 26 Feb 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-2035

Petitioner

Cooper Industries

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Leatherman Tool Grp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 424 (2001)

Argued

Monday, February 26, 2001

Decided

Monday, May 14, 2001

Advocates

Jonathan S. Massey (Argued the cause for the respondent)

William Bradford Reynolds (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., manufactures a multifunction pocket tool, the Pocket Survival Tool (PST). In 1996, Cooper Industries, Inc. used photographs of a modified PST to introduce a competing tool, the ToolZall. The photographs were used in posters, packaging, and advertising materials. Subsequently, Leatherman filed an action asserting claims of trade-dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising under the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). Ultimately, a trial jury awarded Leatherman $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages. The District Court then entered judgment, rejecting Cooper's argument that the punitive damages were grossly excessive. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, using an "abuse of discretion" standard, concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce the award.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals review the constitutionality of the punitive damages award against Cooper Industries, Inc. under the correct standard?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Cooper Industries, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Courts of Appeals should apply a de novo standard when reviewing district court determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards. Because the Court of Appeals applied an "abuse of discretion" standard, a less demanding standard, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a determination on whether the award was grossly excessive under the correct standard.

United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co.

Tue, 27 Feb 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-203

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cleveland Indians Baseball Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 200 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, February 27, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, April 17, 2001

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the respondent)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Under a grievance settlement agreement, the Cleveland Indians Baseball Company owed 8 players backpay for wages due in 1986 and 14 players backpay for wages due in 1987. The Company paid all of the back wages in 1994. No award recipient was a Company employee in that year. The Company also paid its share of employment taxes on the back wages according to 1994 tax rates and wage bases. The payments were subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and taxes on wages to fund unemployment benefits under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). Both tax rates and the amount of the wages subject to tax have risen over time. After the Internal Revenue Service denied the Company's claims for a refund of the payments, the Company initiated suit in Federal District Court. The court, bound by precedent, ordered the Government to refund FICA and FUTA taxes. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is backpay subject to federal taxes, under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, based on the year the money should have been paid out?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that back wages are subject to FICA and FUTA taxes by reference to the year the wages are in fact paid. "Although the regulations, like the statute, do not specifically address backpay, the Internal Revenue Service has consistently interpreted them to require taxation of back wages according to the year the wages are actually paid, regardless of when those wages were earned or should have been paid," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Central Green Co. v. United States

Mon, 30 Oct 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-859

Petitioner

Central Green Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 425 (2001)

Argued

Monday, October 30, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, February 21, 2001

Advocates

Timothy Jones (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David C. Frederick (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Madera Canal, a federal facility leased to the Madera Irrigation District (MID), flows through Central Green Co.'s 1,000 acres of pistachio orchards in California. Central Green filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States and the MID alleging that their negligence in the canal's design, construction, and maintenance caused subsurface flooding resulting in damage to the orchards and increased operating costs. The Federal Government moved for judgment on the pleadings based on immunity granted by the Flood Control Act of 1928, which states that "no liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place." The complaint was then dismissed because the canal was a part of the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project, whose purpose was flood control. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that although the canal serves no flood control purpose, immunity is attached solely because it is a branch of the larger project.

Question

Do the words "floods or flood waters" encompass all the water that flows through federal facilities, such that the Federal Government has immunity under the Flood Control Act of 1928 for damages such water may cause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Central Green Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 33 U.S.C. 702

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that in determining whether, under the Flood Control Act of 1928, immunity attaches, courts should consider the character of the waters that caused the relevant damage and the purposes behind their release rather than the relation between that damage and a flood control project. Thus, the Federal Government's immunity from liability for flood damage required a determination of whether actual flows through the Federal Government's canal constituted flood waters, regardless of the canal's flood control purpose.

Shaw v. Murphy

Tue, 16 Jan 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1613

Petitioner

Shaw

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Murphy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 223 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 2001

Decided

Wednesday, April 18, 2001

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioners)

Jeffrey T. Renz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David L. Ohler (Helena, Montana, argued the cause for petitioners)

Facts of the Case

While incarcerated in Montana State Prison, Kevin Murphy sent a letter to an inmate to assist him with his defense after he assaulted a correctional officer. In accordance with prison policy, the letter was intercepted. Based on the letter's content, the prison sanctioned Murphy for violating prison rules prohibiting insolence and interfering with due process hearings. Murphy sought relief, alleging that the disciplinary action violated his First Amendment rights, including the right to provide legal assistance to other inmates. Ruling against Murphy, the District Court, based on precedent, found that reasonably related penological interests allowed the prison regulations to impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that an inmate's First Amendment right to give legal assistance to other inmates outweighed the government's interests.

Question

Do prison inmates have a constitutional right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Shaw, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that inmates do not possess a special First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates that enhances the protections otherwise available. "Augmenting First Amendment protection for inmate legal advice would undermine prison officials' ability to address the 'complex and intractable' problems of prison administration," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Thomas added that "[p]risoners have used legal correspondence as a means for passing contraband and communicating instructions on how to manufacture drugs or weapons." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also wrote a concurring opinion.

Buford v. United States

Mon, 08 Jan 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-9073

Petitioner

Buford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 59 (2001)

Argued

Monday, January 8, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, March 20, 2001

Advocates

Dean A. Strang (Milwaukee, Wisconsin, argued the cause for petitioner)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Argued the cause for respondent)

Facts of the Case

The United States Sentencing Guidelines define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provides that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all "related" convictions. Convictions may also be functionally related, if they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. After Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, the sentencing judge had to determine whether her five prior state convictions were "related" or whether they should count as more than one. At sentencing, the government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related. The government did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court concluded that Buford's drug and robbery cases had not been either formally or functionally consolidated. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision deferentially rather than de novo, giving deference to the District Court.

Question

Does a de novo standard of review apply when a court of appeals reviews a trial court's sentencing guideline determination as to whether an offender's prior convictions were consolidated, and thus related, for sentencing purposes?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Court of Appeals properly reviewed the District Court's "''functional consolidation'" decision deferentially "[i]n light of the fact- bound nature of the legal decision, the comparatively greater expertise of the District Court, and the limited value of uniform court of appeals precedent." Rejecting Buford's arguments for de novo review, Justice Breyer wrote that "the district court is in a better position than the appellate court to decide whether a particular set of individual circumstances demonstrates 'functional consolidation.'"

Brentwood Acad. v. TN Sec. School Ath. Assn.

Wed, 11 Oct 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-901

Petitioner

Brentwood Acad.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

TN Sec. School Ath. Assn.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 288 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, October 11, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, February 20, 2001

Advocates

Richard L. Colbert (Argued the case for the respondents)

James F. Blumstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued the cause, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (Association) is a not- for-profit membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sports among its members, a large portion of the public and private high schools in Tennessee. The Association's role in regulating interscholastic competition in public schools has been long acknowledged by the State Board of Education. Brentwood Academy sued the Association after it penalized the academy for placing "undue influence" on football recruits. At the time, all the voting members of the Association were public school administrators. Brentwood claimed that the rule's enforcement was state action that violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court agreed and enjoined the rule's enforcement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no state action.

Question

May a statewide association, incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary schools, be regarded as engaging in state action when it enforces a rule against a member school?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Brentwood Acad., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the ostensibly private organization, which regulated school sports, and the state education board's acknowledgment of the organization, indicated that the organization is a state actor for civil rights purposes. "The nominally private character of the Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and there is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards to it," wrote Justice Souter for the majority. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined Justice Clarence Thomas' dissent.

Zadvydas v. Davis

Wed, 21 Feb 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Office of Attorney General

"950 Pennsylvania Avenue**** NW" Washington D.C. 20530

Washington 20530

United States

38° 53' 31.8084" N, 77° 1' 30.2196" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-7791

Petitioner

Zadvydas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Davis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 00-38

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 678 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, February 21, 2001

Decided

Thursday, June 28, 2001

Advocates

Robert F. Barnard (New Orleans, Louisiana, argued the cause for the petitioner Zadvydas)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondents in 99-7791 and the petitioners in 00-38)

Jay W. Stansell (Seattle, Washington, argued the cause for the respondent Ma)

Facts of the Case

After a final removal order is entered, an alien ordered removed is held in custody during a 90-day removal period. If the alien is not removed in those 90 days, the post-removal-period detention statute authorizes further detention or supervised release. After being ordered deported based on is criminal record, efforts to deport Kestutis Zadvydas failed. When he remained in custody after the removal period expired, Zadvydas filed a habeas action. In granting the writ, the District Court reasoned that his confinement would be permanent and thus violate the Constitution. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Zadvydas' detention did not violate the Constitution because eventual deportation was not impossible. Conversely, in ordering Kim Ho Ma's release, the District Court held that the Constitution forbids post- removal-period detention unless there is a realistic chance that an alien will be removed, and that no such chance existed here because Cambodia has no repatriation treaty with the United States. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that detention was not authorized for more than a reasonable time beyond the 90-day period.

Question

Does the post-removal-period statute authorize the Attorney General to detain a removable alien indefinitely beyond the 90-day removal period?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Zadvydas, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the statute, read in light of the Constitution's demands, limits an alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States" and "does not permit indefinite detention." "Based on our conclusion that indefinite detention of aliens in the former category would raise serious constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an implicit 'reasonable time' limitation, the application of which is subject to federal court review," wrote Justice Breyer.

Bush v. Gore

Mon, 11 Dec 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Florida Supreme Court

500 South Duval Street Tallahassee FL 32399

Tallahassee, FL 32399

United States

30° 26' 17.214" N, 84° 16' 59.1672" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-949

Petitioner

George W. Bush

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Albert Gore

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 98 (2000)

Argued

Monday, December 11, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, December 12, 2000

Advocates

David Boies (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Joseph P. Klock (Argued the cause for petitioner Harris)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for petitioner Bush)

Facts of the Case

Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later.

Question

Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bush, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment," the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. Because of those and other procedural difficulties, the court held that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in the time remaining (which was short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provided by 3 USC Section 5). Loathe to make broad precedents, the per curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case. Rehnquist (in a concurring opinion joined by Scalia and Thomas) argued that the recount scheme was also unconstitutional because the Florida Supreme Court's decision made new election law, which only the state legislature may do. Breyer and Souter (writing separately) agreed with the per curiam holding that the Florida Court's recount scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause, but they dissented with respect to the remedy, believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. Time is insubstantial when constitutional rights are at stake. Ginsburg and Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism, the Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. Moreover, the Florida decision was fundamentally right; the Constitution requires that every vote be counted.

Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly

Wed, 25 Apr 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Attorney General's Office of MA

1 Ashburton Pl. Boston MA 02114

Boston, MA 02114

United States

42° 21' 33.6996" N, 71° 3' 44.5428" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-596

Petitioner

Lorillard Tobacco

Respondent

Thomas F. Reilly

Consolidation

No. 00-597

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 525 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, April 25, 2001

Decided

Thursday, June 28, 2001

Advocates

Barbara D. Underwood (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

William W. Porter (Boston, Massachusetts, argued the cause for the respondents)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. Members of the tobacco industry filed suit challenging the regulations. Lorillard Tobacco Company and others asserted that under the Supremacy Clause the cigarette advertising regulations were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which prescribes mandatory health warnings for cigarette packaging and advertising and that the regulations violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings that the cigarette advertising regulations are not pre-empted by the FCLAA and that neither the regulations prohibiting outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground nor the sales practices regulations restricting the location and distribution of tobacco products violated the First Amendment. Reversing the lower court's finding, the appellate court found that the point-of-sale advertising regulations requiring that indoor advertising be placed no lower than five feet from the floor were valid.

Question

Does the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempt portions of the Attorney General of Massachusetts' cigarette advertising regulations? Do portions of the Attorney General's regulations governing the advertising and sale of tobacco products violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lorillard Tobacco, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1334

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the highly fractured Court held that the FCLAA preempts Massachusetts' regulations governing outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising and that Massachusetts' outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations related to smokeless tobacco and cigars violate the First Amendment, but that the sales practices regulations related to all three tobacco products are constitutional. "We conclude that the Attorney General has failed to show that the outdoor advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars are not more extensive than necessary to advance the State's substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use," wrote Justice O'Connor.

Cook v. Gralike

Mon, 06 Nov 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-929

Petitioner

Cook

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gralike

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 510 (2001)

Argued

Monday, November 6, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, February 28, 2001

Advocates

James R. McAdams (Office of the Attorney General, Jefferson City, Missouri argued the cause for the petitioner)

Barbara D. Underwood (Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Jonathan S. Franklin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In the wake of U.S Term Limits v. Thornton, Missouri voters adopted an amendment to Article VIII of their State Constitution, which "instructs" each Member of Missouri's congressional delegation "to use all of his or her delegated powers to pass the Congressional Term Limits Amendment" set forth in section 16 of the Article. The Article also directs the Missouri Secretary of State to determine whether a statement reflecting a candidate's position on term limits should be placed by his or her name on the general election ballot. Don Gralike, a non-incumbent House of Representatives candidate, brought suit to enjoin the Secretary from implementing the Article. The District Court, granting Gralike summary judgment, found that Article VIII infringed upon the Qualifications Clauses of Article I of the Federal Constitution by creating additional qualifications for Congress and that the Article burdened a candidate's First Amendment right to speak freely on the issue of term limits. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is Article VIII of the Missouri Constitution, as amended in 1996 to prompt the adoption of a "Congressional Term Limits Amendment" to the Federal Constitution, consistent with the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Art. I, Section 4, Clause 1)?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gralike, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 10: Tenth Amendment

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Article VIII of the Missouri Constitution, which required the placement of negative labels next to state candidates for federal office, who failed to comply with voter-mandated support of federal term limits, was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate electoral outcomes, rather than a permissible regulation of state elections. Justice Stevens explained for the Court that Article VIII is designed to favor candidates who are willing to support a term-limits amendment and, "[t]hus, far from regulating the procedural mechanisms of elections, Article VIII attempts to 'dictate electoral outcomes.' Such 'regulation' of congressional elections simply is not authorized by the Elections Clause."

PGA Tour v. Martin

Wed, 17 Jan 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-24

Petitioner

PGA Tour

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Martin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 661 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, January 17, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 2001

Advocates

Roy L. Reardon (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Barbara D. Underwood (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

H. Bartow Farr, III (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Casey Martin is afflicted with a degenerative circulatory disorder that prevents him from walking golf courses. His disorder constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). When Casey made a request to use a golf cart for the duration of the qualification tournament onto the professional tours sponsored by PGA Tour, Inc., PGA refused. Martin then filed suit under Title III of the ADA, which requires an entity operating "public accommodations" to make "reasonable modifications" in its policies "when... necessary to afford such...accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such...accommodations." Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against PGA, requiring it to allow Martin to use a cart. The court found that the purpose of the PGA's walking rule was to insert fatigue into the skill of shot-making, and that Martin suffered significant fatigue due to his disability, even with the use of a cart. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that golf courses are places of public accommodation during professional tournaments and that permitting Martin to use a cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of those tournaments.

Question

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 provide access to professional golf tournaments by a qualified entrant with a disability? May a disabled contestant be denied the use of a golf cart because it would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the tournaments to allow him to ride when all other contestants must walk?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Martin, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes and no. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Title III of the ADA, by its plain terms, prohibits the PGA from denying Martin equal access to its tours on the basis of his disability and that allowing Martin to use a cart, despite the walking rule, is not a modification that would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the game. "The purpose of the walking rule is... not compromised in the slightest by allowing Martin to use a cart," wrote Justice Stevens, noting Martin's fatiguing disability. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Sinkfield v. Kelley

Sat, 19 May 2012 10:11:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-132

Appellee

Kelley

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Sinkfield

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 00-133

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 28 (2000)

Decided

Monday, November 27, 2000

Facts of the Case

With the acknowledged purpose of maximizing the number of majority-minority districts -- i.e., districts in which a majority of voters belong to a minority group -- Alabama implemented a redistricting plan for its state legislative districts. White Alabama voters, who are residents of various majority-white districts (the appellees), brought suit in District Court challenging their own districts as the products of racial gerrymandering in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, a three-judge court held that seven of the challenged majority- white districts were the product of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering and enjoined their use in any election. The judicial panel found that the group had standing on the ground that injury-in-fact could be conclusively presumed from the mere fact of residence in a gerrymandered district, independent of the plaintiff's subjective assessment of harm, because of the bizarre shapes of their districts. On direct appeal, Alabama state officials and a group of African-American voters argued that the appellees lacked standing to maintain the suit.

Question

Do white Alabama voters, who are residents of various majority-white districts, have standing to challenge Alabama's re-districting plan, which had an acknowledged purpose of maximizing the number of majority-minority districts?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sinkfield, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that the appellees lacked standing to maintain their challenge. The opinion stated that the appellees "have neither alleged nor produced any evidence that any of them was assigned to his or her district as a direct result of having 'personally been subjected to a racial classification.'" Consequently, the appellees lacked standing.

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond

Tue, 03 Oct 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Roadblock Indianapolis, IN

United States

39° 46' 1.2576" N, 86° 9' 22.518" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1030

Petitioner

City of Indianapolis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Edmond

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 32 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, October 3, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, November 28, 2000

Advocates

A. Scott Chinn (Argued the cause for petitioners)

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for petitioners)

Kenneth Falk (Argued the cause for respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Are highway checkpoint programs, whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics, consistent with the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Edmond, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because the checkpoint program's primary purpose was indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment. "We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime," wrote Justice O'Connor. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the reasonableness of the city's roadblocks depended on whether they served a "significant state interest with minimal intrusion on motorists."

Missouri Director of Revenue v. CoBank ACB

Tue, 28 Nov 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1792

Petitioner

Missouri Director of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

CoBank ACB

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 316 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, November 28, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, February 20, 2001

Advocates

Richard A. Hanson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David C. Frederick (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

James R. Layton (Jefferson City, Missouri, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Farm Credit Act of 1933 created various lending institutions, including banks for cooperatives, which are designated as federally chartered instrumentalities of the United States. CoBank ACB is the successor to all rights and obligations of the National Bank for Cooperatives. In 1996, CoBank filed amended returns on behalf of that bank, requesting an exemption from all Missouri corporate income taxes and refunds on the taxes it paid for 1991 through 1994. CoBank asserted that the Supremacy Clause accords federal instrumentalities immunity from state taxation unless Congress has expressly waived this immunity, which the Act did not expressly do. The state of Missouri denied the request, but the State Supreme Court reversed, stating that because the Act's current version is silent as to the banks' tax immunity, Congress cannot be said to have expressly consented to state income taxation and, thus, the banks are exempt.

Question

Is the National Bank for Cooperatives, which Congress has designated as a federally chartered instrumentality of the United States, exempt from state income taxation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Missouri Director of Revenue, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 12 U.S.C. 2134

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that banks for cooperatives are subject to taxation. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that nothing in the 1985 amendments to the Farm Credit Act indicated a repeal of the previous express approval of state taxation and that the structure of the Act indicated by negative implication that banks for cooperatives were not entitled to immunity.

Egelhoff v. Egelhoff

Wed, 08 Nov 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1529

Petitioner

Egelhoff

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Egelhoff

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 141 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, November 8, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, March 21, 2001

Advocates

William J. Kilberg (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Barbara B. McDowell (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Thomas C. Goldstein (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

David A. Egelhoff designated his wife, Donna Rae Egelhoff, as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy and a pension plan provided by his employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Two months after the Egelhoffs divorced, Mr. Egelhoff died. His children then sued Donna Rae to recover the insurance proceeds and the pension plan benefits. The children relied on a Washington state statue that provides that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset - defined to include a life insurance policy or employee benefit plan - is revoked automatically upon divorce. Subsequently, the proceeds would pass to the children as Mr. Egelhoff's statutory heirs under state law. Under ERISA, the state trial courts granted Donna Rae summary judgment. In reversing, the Washington Court of Appeals found that the statute was not pre-empted by ERISA. In affirming, the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute does not "refer to" ERISA plans to an extent that would require pre-emption.

Question

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 pre-empt a Washington statute provides that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset is revoked automatically upon divorce?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Egelhoff, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security Act

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that that the Washington statute has a "connection with" ERISA plans and is therefore pre-empted. "Differing state regulations affecting an ERISA plan's 'system for processing claims and paying benefits' impose 'precisely the burden that ERISA pre-emption was intended to avoid,'" wrote Justice Thomas. He continued: "The statute at issue here directly conflicts with ERISA's requirements that plans be administered, and benefits be paid, in accordance with plan documents." Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice John Paul Stevens joined.

Cedric Kushner Promotions v. King

Wed, 18 Apr 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-549

Petitioner

Cedric Kushner Promotions

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

King

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 158 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, April 18, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2001

Advocates

Richard A. Edlin (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Austin C. Schlick (Department of Justice, for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner)

Peter Fleming, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., a corporate promoter of boxing matches, sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of a rival corporation, alleging that King had conducted his corporation's affairs in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise...to conduct or participate...in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." The District Court dismissed the complaint. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that RICO applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a "person" and a distinct "enterprise," the affairs of which that "person" improperly conducts. The court concluded that King was part of the corporation, not a "person," distinct from the "enterprise," who allegedly improperly conducted the "enterprise's affairs."

Question

Are Don King and his corporation a distinct "person" and "enterprise," such that RICO applies?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for King, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the need for two distinct entities is satisfied; hence, the RICO provision...applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole owner -- whether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority." "The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity," wrote Justice Breyer. "A corporate employee who conducts the corporation's affairs through an unlawful RICO 'pattern...of activity,' uses that corporation as a 'vehicle' whether he is, or is not, its sole owner."

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations

Tue, 07 Nov 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Environmental Protection Agency

"1200 Pennsylvania Avenue**** N.W." Washington DC 20460

Washington, DC 20460

United States

38° 53' 41.154" N, 77° 1' 43.9968" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1257

Petitioner

Whitman

Respondent

American Trucking Associations

Consolidation

No. 99-1426

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 457 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, November 7, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, February 27, 2001

Advocates

Judith L. French (Columbus, Ohio, argued the case for the respondents)

Edward W. Warren (Argued the cause for the respondents, on behalf of the Respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of the Petitioners, on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Section 109(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for each air pollutant for which "air quality criteria" have been issued under section 108. In 1997, Carol Browner, the Administrator of the EPA, revised the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. Afterwards, her revised NAAQS were challenged in court. The District of Columbia Circuit found that section 109(b)(1), which instructs the EPA to set standards, delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Federal Constitution because the court found that the EPA had interpreted the statute to provide no "intelligible principle" to guide the agency's exercise of authority. The court remanded the NAAQS to the EPA. The courts also held to its rule that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting the NAAQS. Additionally, the court rejected the EPA's position that the implementation provisions for ozone found in Part D, Subpart 2, of Title I of the CAA, were so tied to the existing ozone standard that the EPA lacked the power to revise the standard.

Question

Does section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency? May the Administrator of the EPA consider the costs of implementation in setting national ambient air quality standards under section 109(b)(1)? Does the Court of Appeals have the jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA, with respect to implementing the revised ozone NAAQS?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Whitman, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clean Air

No, no, and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the CAA properly delegated legislative power to the EPA, but that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting primary and secondary NAAQS. Moreover, the Court held that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA related to the implementation of the revised ozone NAAQS; however, the EPA's interpretation of Part D was unreasonable.

New York Times v. Tasini

Wed, 28 Mar 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-201

Petitioner

New York Times

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tasini

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 483 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, March 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2001

Advocates

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Laurence E. Gold (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Various freelance authors wrote articles for various print publishers. The publishers treated the authors as independent contractors under contracts. The publishers each licensed rights to copy and sell articles to LEXIS/NEXIS, owner and operator of a computerized database containing articles in text-only format. NEXIS does not reproduce the print publication's formatting. The authors filed suit alleging that their copyrights were infringed when the print publishers placed their articles in the electronic publishers' databases, such as LEXIS/NEXIS. In response, the print and electronic publishers raised the privilege accorded collective work copyright owners by section 201(c) of the Copyright Act. In granting the publishers summary judgment, the District Court held that the electronic databases reproduced and distributed the authors' works, under section 201(c), "as part of...[a] revision of that collective work" to which the authors had first contributed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the databases were not among the collective works covered by section 201(c), and specifically, were not "revisions" of the periodicals in which the Articles first appeared.

Question

Do print and electronic publishers violate the copyrights of freelance authors when they include the freelancers' already-published articles in computer databases without the author's permission?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Tasini, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 17 U.S.C. 201

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that section 201(c) does not authorize the copying at issue. "The publishers are not sheltered by [section 201(c)], we conclude, because the databases reproduce and distribute articles standing alone and not in context, not 'as part of that particular collective work' to which the author contributed, 'as part of...any revision' thereof, or 'as part of...any later collective work in the same series.' Both the print publishers and the electronic publishers, we rule, have infringed the copyrights of the freelance authors," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, argued that "[e]ach individual file still reminds the reader that he is viewing 'part of' a particular collective work. And the entire editorial content of that work still exists at the reader's fingertips."

Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Engineers

Tue, 31 Oct 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1178

Petitioner

Solid Waste Agency

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Army Corps of Engineers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 159 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, October 31, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, January 9, 2001

Advocates

Timothy S. Bishop (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) selected an abandoned sand and gravel pit as a solid waste disposal site. Excavation trenches on the site had previously become ponds for migrating birds. Because some trenches would have to be filled in, the SWANCC contacted the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to determine if a landfill permit was required under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes the Corps to issue permits allowing the discharge of dredged or fill material into "navigable waters." Under the CWA, "navigable waters" are defined as "the waters of the United States" and the Corps regulations define such waters to include intrastate waters, of which damage could affect interstate commerce. Subsequently, the Corps denied the SWANCC a permit. The District Court ruled in SWANCC's favor. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate waters.

Question

May the provisions of the Clean Water Act be extended to intrastate waters? Does Congress have the authority under the Commerce Clause to exercise such power?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Solid Waste Agency, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 33 U.S.C. 1334

No and unanswered. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the provision of the CWA, which requires those discharging fill material into navigable waters to obtain a permit from the Corps, does not extend to isolated, abandoned sand and gravel pits with seasonal ponds, which provide migratory bird habitats. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that "[t]he term 'navigable' has...the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made." In answering the first question no, the Court did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent was joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.

Board of Trustees v. Garrett

Wed, 11 Oct 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

University of Alabama Tuscaloosa, AL 35487

United States

33° 12' 33.84" N, 87° 34' 10.2" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1240

Petitioner

Board of Trustees

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Garrett

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 356 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, October 11, 2000

Decided

Thursday, February 1, 2001

Advocates

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Michael H. Gottesman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

After Patricia Garrett, Director of Nursing for the University of Alabama, was diagnosed with breast cancer, her treatment forced her to take a substantial leave from work. Upon her return, her supervisor informed her she would have to give up her position. Milton Ash, a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services, who suffers from chronic asthma, requested that his employer modify his duties to accommodate him. Ultimately, none of Ash's requested relief was granted and his job performance evaluations fell. Both Garrett and Ash filed discrimination suits against their Alabama state employers, seeking money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits the States and other employers from "discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of that disability... in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." The District Court disposed of both cases by ruling that the ADA exceeds Congress' authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

May an individual sue a state for damages in federal court under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Board of Trustees, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the state's failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Chief Justice wrote for the majority that "in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation." Rehnquist added that none of these requirements had been met. Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Stephen G. Breyer's dissent.

Illinois v. McArthur

Wed, 01 Nov 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1132

Petitioner

Illinois

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

McArthur

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 326 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, November 1, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, February 20, 2001

Advocates

Joel D. Bertocchi (Chicago, Illinois, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Matthew D. Roberts (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Deanne F. Jones (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Tera McArthur asked two police officers to accompany her to her trailer, where she lived with her husband, Charles McArthur, so that they could keep the peace while she removed her belongings. While at the trailer, Tera alerted the officers, Assistant Chief John Love and Officer Richard Skidis, that her husband had marijuana hidden under the couch. Love then asked Charles for permission to search the trailer. Permission was denied and Love sent Officer Skidis with Tera to get a search warrant. Love told Charles he could not reenter his trailer, unless a police officer accompanied him. Afterwards, Love stood just inside the door to observe Charles when he went into the trailer. About two hours later, a search warrant was obtained. Subsequently, a search of the trailer transpired and officers found drug paraphernalia and marijuana. Charles McArthur was arrested. At trial, McArthur moved to suppress the drug paraphernalia and marijuana on the ground that they were the "fruit" of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter the trailer unaccompanied, which would have permitted him, he said, to "have destroyed the marijuana." The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Illinois Supreme Court denied the state's petition for leave to appeal.

Question

Do officers, with probable cause to believe that a man had hidden marijuana in his home, who subsequently prevent that man from entering the home for about two hours while they obtain a search warrant, violate the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Illinois, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that given the nature of the intrusion and the law enforcement interest at stake, the brief seizure of the premises was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. "We have found no case in which this Court has held unlawful a temporary seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence while the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period of time," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens noted he would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph

Tue, 03 Oct 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1235

Petitioner

Green Tree Fin. Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Randolph

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 79 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, October 3, 2000

Decided

Monday, December 11, 2000

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Joseph M. Sellers (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Larketta Randolph financed the purchase of a mobile home through Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama. Randolph's financing agreement with Green Tree required that she buy insurance against default and provided that disputes under the contract would be resolved by binding arbitration. Randolph sued Green Tree, alleging that it violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) by failing to disclose the insurance requirement as a finance charge and that it violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by requiring her to arbitrate her statutory causes of action. The District Court granted Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration and denied her request for reconsideration, which stated that she lacked the resources to arbitrate and, therefore, would have to forgo her claims. The Court of Appeals, under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which allows appeals from "a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title," held that it had jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court concluded that because the agreement was silent with respect to payment of arbitration expenses, it was unenforceable.

Question

Is an order compelling arbitration a "final decision with respect to an arbitration" within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act? Is an arbitration agreement that does not mention arbitration costs and fees unenforceable because it fails to protect a party from potentially expensive arbitration costs?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Green Tree Fin. Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 16

Yes and no. In a opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that an order compelling arbitration pursuant to the parties' agreement is a "final decision with respect to an arbitration" within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act making it immediately appealable pursuant to the FAA. In a 5-4 split, the Court held that an arbitration agreement that is silent on arbitration costs and fees is not unenforceable. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "[a]lthough the existence of large arbitration costs may well preclude a litigant...from effectively vindicating [her statutory rights], the record does not show that Randolph will bear such costs if she goes to arbitration." Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer dissented.

United States v. Hatter

Tue, 20 Feb 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1978

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hatter

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 557 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, February 20, 2001

Decided

Monday, May 21, 2001

Advocates

Steven S. Rosenthal (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1982, when Congress extended Medicare to federal employees, then-sitting federal judges began to have Medicare taxes withheld from their salaries. In 1983, Congress then required federal judges to participate in Social Security, except for those who contributed to a "covered" retirement program. A "covered" program was defined to include any retirement system to which an employee had to contribute, which did not encompass the noncontributory pension system for federal judges, whose financial obligations and payroll deductions therefore had to increase. A group of federal judges, who were appointed before 1983, filed suit arguing that the 1983 law violated the Constitution's Compensation Clause, which guarantees federal judges a "Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." Ultimately, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that a 1984 judicial salary increase cured any violation. In reversing, the Federal Circuit held that the Compensation Clause prevented the government from collecting Medicare and Social Security taxes from the judges and that the violation was not cured by the 1984 pay increase.

Question

Did Congress violate the Compensation Clause when it extended the Medicare and Social Security taxes to the salaries of sitting federal judges? If so, was the violation cured when Congress increased the salaries of all federal judges by an amount greater than the new taxes?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 1, Paragraph 2: Good Behavior and Compensation Clause of Federal Judges

In a 6-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Compensation Clause prevents the government from collecting Social Security taxes from federal judges who held office before Congress extended those taxes to federal employees and that the Compensation Clause violation was not cured by the 1984 pay increase for federal judges. In a 5-2 split, the Court held that the Government could collect Medicare taxes from the same class of judges. On the Medicare question, Justice Breyer, wrote that "this Court has held that the Legislature cannot directly reduce judicial salaries even as part of an equitable effort to reduce all Government salaries. But a tax law, unlike a law mandating a salary reduction, affects compensation indirectly, not directly. And those prophylactic considerations that may justify an absolute rule forbidding direct salary reductions are absent here, where indirect taxation is at issue."

Lujan v. G&G Fire Sprinklers

Mon, 26 Feb 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-152

Petitioner

Lujan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

G&G Fire Sprinklers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 189 (2001)

Argued

Monday, February 26, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, April 17, 2001

Advocates

Thomas S. Kerrigan (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Stephen A. Seideman (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The California Labor Code requires that contractors and subcontractors on public works project pay their workers a prevailing wage that is determined by the state. The Code authorizes the state to withhold payments from contractors who fail to pay the prevailing wage. The contractor can, in turn, withhold payments to subcontractors who fail to pay the wage. To recover the wages or penalties withheld, the Code permits the contractor to sue for breach of contract. After the State Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) determined that G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., a public works subcontractor, had violated the Code, it withheld from the contractors an amount equal to the wages and penalties forfeited due to G & G's violations. After its payment was withheld, G & G filed suit against DLSE, claiming that the lacking of a hearing deprived it of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Granting G & G summary judgment, the District Court declared the relevant Code sections unconstitutional. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that G & G's rights were violated not because it was deprived of immediate payment, but because the state statutory scheme afforded no hearing at all.

Question

Must states provide contractors and subcontractors a hearing to challenge a decision to withhold wage payments from contractors and subcontractors who fail to pay prevailing wages to satisfy due process?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lujan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that because California state law affords G & G sufficient opportunity to pursue its claim for payment under its contracts in state court, the statutory scheme does not deprive it of due process. A contractor's claim for payment is "an interest...that can be fully protected by an ordinary breach-of-contract suit," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. The Chief Justice continued that "if California makes ordinary judicial process available to [G & G] for resolving its contractual dispute, that process is due process."

Alexander v. Sandoval

Tue, 16 Jan 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1908

Petitioner

Alexander

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sandoval

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 275 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, April 24, 2001

Advocates

Eric Schnapper (Argued the cause for the private respondents)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent United States)

Facts of the Case

Because it is a recipient of federal financial assistance, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department) is subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. Under section 602, the Department of Justice issued a regulation forbidding funding recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods having the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on the prohibited grounds. Martha Sandoval brought a class action suit to enjoin the Department from administering state driver's license examinations only in English. Sandoval argued that the English-only policy violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. Ordering the Department to accommodate non-English speakers, the District Court enjoined the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. James Alexander, the Director of the Department, unsuccessfully argued before both courts that Title VI did not provide a cause of action to enforce the regulation.

Question

Does Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provide a cause of action to enforce the Department of Justice's regulation forbidding federal financial assistance recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods that have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on race, color, or national origin?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Alexander, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that there is no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI. "Title VI itself directly reaches only instances of intentional discrimination," wrote Justice Scalia, "[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under [section 602]." Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, which was join by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer.

Rogers v. Tennessee

Wed, 01 Nov 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-6218

Petitioner

Rogers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tennessee

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 451 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, November 1, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 14, 2001

Advocates

Michael E. Moore (Nashville, Tennessee, argued the cause for the respondent)

W. Mark Ward (Memphis, Tennessee, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Wilbert K. Rogers was convicted in Tennessee of second degree murder. The victim, James Bowdery, died 15 months after Rogers stabbed him. On appeal, Rogers argued that the Tennessee common law "year and a day rule," under which no defendant could be convicted of murder unless his victim died by the defendant's act within a year and a day of the act, persisted and precluded his conviction. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. In affirming, the Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately abolished the rule and upheld Rogers' conviction. The court rejected Rogers' contention that abolishing the rule would violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Tennessee and Federal Constitutions. The court reasoned that those provisions referred only to legislative acts. Additionally, the court concluded its decision would not offend due process.

Question

Did the Supreme Court of Tennessee deny a defendant due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when it retroactively applied a decision to abolish the state's common law "year-and-a-day rule?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Tennessee, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Tennessee Supreme Court's retroactive application to a defendant of its decision abolishing the year-and-a-day rule did not deny Rogers due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. "The Tennessee court's abolition of the year and a day rule was not unexpected and indefensible," wrote Justice O'Connor. "Far from a marked and unpredictable departure from prior precedent, the court's decision was a routine exercise of common law decisionmaking in which the court brought the law into conformity with reason and common sense," continued O'Connor. Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia and Stephen G. Breyer wrote separate dissents. Justices Clarence Thomas, Stevens and Breyer joined Justice Scalia's dissent.

Tyler v. Cain

Mon, 16 Apr 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-5961

Petitioner

Tyler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cain

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 656 (2001)

Argued

Monday, April 16, 2001

Decided

Thursday, June 28, 2001

Advocates

Charles E. F. Heuer (New Orleans, Louisiana, argued the cause for the respondent)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Herbert V. Larson, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Melvin Tyler was convicted of second-degree murder. Ultimately, Tyler filed his sixth state habeas petition after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cage v. Louisiana, which held that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Tyler claimed that that a jury instruction in his trial was similar to the one ruled unconstitutional in Cage. Ultimately, Tyler filed a second federal habeas petition pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The District Court denied relief. In affirming, the Court of Appeals stated the District Court had failed to determine whether Tyler had satisfied the AEDPA's successive habeas standard, which requires a district court to dismiss a claim in a second or successive application unless the applicant "shows" that the "claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." The court concluded that Tyler did not meet this standard because he "could not show that any Supreme Court decision renders the Cage decision retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review."

Question

Was the ruled established under Cage v. Louisiana, that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt, "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," such that an inmate is entitled to submit successive a habeas petition based on that new rule?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Cain, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Cage rule was not "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that "[b]ecause 'made' means 'held'...it is clear that the Cage rule has not been 'made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.' Cage itself does not hold that it is retroactive. The only holding in Cage is that the particular jury instruction violated the Due Process Clause." Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined.

NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care

Wed, 21 Feb 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1815

Petitioner

National Labor Relations Board

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ky. River Cmty. Care

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 706 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, February 21, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 2001

Advocates

Michael W. Hawkins (Argued the case for the respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, a labor union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to represent a unit of all the employees at the Caney Creek Developmental Complex, which is operated by Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. Kentucky River objected to the inclusion of its registered nurses in the unit because they were "supervisors" under National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Under the NLRA, employees are deemed to be "supervisors" and thereby excluded from the NLRA if they exercise "independent judgment" in "responsibly...directing" other employees "in the interest of the employer." At the ensuing representation hearing, the NLRB placed the burden of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River and found that it had not carried its burden. The NLRB rejected Kentucky River's proof of supervisory status on the ground that employees do not use "independent judgment" under the NLRA when they exercise "ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with employer-specified standards." Kentucky River then refused to bargain with the union. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals refused to enforce a bargaining order issued by the NLRB at an unfair labor practice proceeding. The court rejected the NLRB's interpretation of "independent judgment" under the NLRA's test for supervisory status and held that NLRB had erred in placing the burden of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River.

Question

Does the party claiming that an employee is a supervisor bear the burden of proving supervisor status in a representation hearing and unfair labor practice proceeding under the National Labor Relations Act? Under the National Labor Relations Act, is judgment "independent judgment" when it is informed by professional or technical training or experience?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Ky. River Cmty. Care, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the burden of proving the applicability of the supervisory exception of the Act falls on the party asserting it. Justice Scalia wrote that the "Act does not...expressly allocate the burden of proving or disproving a challenged employee's supervisory status. The Board therefore has filled the statutory gap with the consistent rule that the burden is borne by the party claiming that the employee is a supervisor." Additionally, in a 5-4 split, the Court held that the NLRB's application of its interpretation of "independent judgment" to create categorical exclusion for nurses who exercised ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less- skilled employees to deliver services was unlawful under the NLRA.

United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop

Wed, 28 Mar 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-151

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 483 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, March 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, May 14, 2001

Advocates

Barbara D. Underwood (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Gerald F. Uelmen (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Under California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative was organized to distribute marijuana to qualified patients for medical purposes. In 1998, the United States sued to enjoin the Cooperative and its executive director. The government argued that the Cooperative's activities violated the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with the intent to distribute or manufacture a controlled substance. Although the District Court enjoined it, the Cooperative continued to distribute marijuana. Rejecting the Cooperative's medical necessity defense, the court found the Cooperative in contempt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the medical necessity defense was a legally cognizable defense. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court modified its injunction to incorporate a medical necessity defense, under which medically necessary distributions were to be permitted.

Question

Does a medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibition on the manufacture and distribution of various drugs, including marijuana, exist?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 801

No. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that there is no medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing marijuana. "The statute reflects a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception, " wrote Justice Thomas, therefore, "medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana." Justice John Paul Stevens' concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that "[b]ecause necessity was raised in this case as a defense to distribution, the Court need not venture an opinion on whether the defense is available to anyone other than distributors." Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Ohio v. Reiner

Sat, 19 May 2012 10:11:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1028

Petitioner

Ohio

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reiner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 17 (2001)

Decided

Monday, March 19, 2001

Facts of the Case

Matthew Reiner was charged with involuntary manslaughter in connection with the death of his 2-month-old son Alex. The defense planned to argue that Susan Batt, the family's babysitter, was the culpable party. The trial court granted Batt transactional immunity from prosecution, at the state's request, after she informed the court she intended to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Ultimately, Batt denied any involvement in the death. Reiner was convicted. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed. In affirming, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that "Susan Batt's [trial] testimony did not incriminate her because she denied any involvement in the abuse. Thus, she did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege." The court noted that the defense's theory of Batt's guilt was not grounds for a grant of immunity, "when the witness continues to deny any self-incriminating conduct." The court also found that the wrongful grant of immunity prejudiced Reiner, because it effectively told the jury that Batt did not cause Alex's injuries.

Question

May a witness who claims no involvement in a crime assert a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ohio, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Self-Incrimination

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that, while the self- incrimination privilege's protection only extended to witnesses who had reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer, the babysitter's expression of innocence did not by itself eliminate the babysitter's privilege and that the grant of immunity was thus not an error. The opinion stated that the "defense's theory of the case was that Batt, not [Reiner], was responsible for Alex's death... . In this setting, it was reasonable for Batt to fear that answers to possible questions might tend to incriminate her. Batt therefore had a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."

Atkinson Trading v. Shirley

Tue, 27 Mar 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-454

Petitioner

Atkinson Trading

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shirley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 645 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, March 27, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 2001

Advocates

Charles G. Cole (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Beth S. Brinkmann (Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Marcelino R. Gomez (Navajo Nation, Department of Justice, Window Rock, Arizona; argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Atkinson Trading Company, Inc. owns the Cameron Trading Post, which is located on non-Indian fee land within the Navajo Nation Reservation. The Cameron Trading Post consists of a hotel, restaurant, cafeteria, gallery, curio shop, retail store, and recreational vehicle facility. In 1992, the Navajo Nation enacted a hotel occupancy tax, which imposed an 8 percent tax upon any hotel room located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. Atkinson challenged the tax under Montana v. United States. Under Montana, with two limited exceptions, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation. The District Court upheld that tax. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the tax fell under Montana's first exception because a "consensual relationship exists in that the nonmember guests could refrain from the privilege of lodging within the confines of the Navajo Reservation and therefore remain free from liability for the [tax]."

Question

Does the rule in Montana v. United States, that, with limited exceptions, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non- Indian fee land within a reservation, apply to tribal attempts to tax nonmember activity occurring on non-Indian fee land?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Atkinson Trading, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 261

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Navajo Nation's imposition of a hotel occupancy tax upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within its reservation is invalid. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "Indian tribes are 'unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,' but their dependent status generally precludes extension of tribal civil authority beyond these limits. The Navajo Nation's imposition of a tax upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within the reservation is, therefore, presumptively invalid. Because respondents have failed to establish that the hotel occupancy tax is commensurately related to any consensual relationship with [Atkinson] or is necessary to vindicate the Navajo Nation's political integrity, the presumption ripens into a holding."

Kansas v. Colorado

Mon, 19 Mar 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

105 ORIG

Plaintiff

Kansas

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

Colorado

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 1 (2001)

Argued

Monday, March 19, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2001

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the United States, as Intervenor)

David W. Robbins (on behalf of the Defendant)

John B. Draper (on behalf of the Plaintiff)

Facts of the Case

In 1949, Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact. Article IV-D provided that future development of the river basin could not materially deplete the usable quantity or availability to other users of the river's waters. In 1986, Kansas filed suit alleging that Colorado had violated the Compact. Ultimately, the Special Master found that post-Compact increases in groundwater well pumping in Colorado had materially depleted the waters in violation of Article IV-D. The Special Master, in his second report, recommended that damages be awarded to Kansas. In his third report, the Special Master recommended that such damages be measured by Kansas' losses attributable to Compact violations since 1950, be paid in money not water, and include prejudgment interest from 1969 to the date of judgment. Colorado filed four objections to the third report, Kansas filed one, and the United States submitted that all objections should be overruled.

Question

Does the Eleventh Amendment preclude the recommended award of damages based on losses sustained by individual water users in Kansas? Should the damages include prejudgment interest? Is the amount of interest excessive? Should the prejudgment interest be paid from 1950 rather than 1969? Did the Special Master improperly calculate the value of the crop losses attributable to the Compact violations?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kansas, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No, yes, no, no, and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court remanded the case to the Special Master for preparation of a final judgment consistent with its opinion. The Court unanimously concluded that the recommended damages award does not violate the Eleventh Amendment and that the Special Master properly determined the value of the crop losses attributable to Compact violations. In a 6-3 split, the Court ruled that the unliquidated nature of Kansas' money damages does not bar an award of prejudgment interest and that the Special Master determined the appropriate rate for the prejudgment interest award, which should begin running in 1969.

Circuit City v. Adams

Mon, 06 Nov 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1379

Petitioner

Circuit City

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Adams

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 105 (2001)

Argued

Monday, November 6, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, March 21, 2001

Advocates

Michael Rubin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David E. Nagle (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Saint Clair Adams, who was hired as a sales counselor, signed an employment application with Circuit City. A provision in Adams' application required all employment disputes to be settled by arbitration. In 1997, Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit City in California state court. Circuit City then filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the state-court action and to compel arbitration of Adams' claims under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The District Court entered the requested order. The court concluded that Adams was obligated by the arbitration agreement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the arbitration agreement between Adams and Circuit City was contained in a "contract of employment," and thus not subject to the FAA under section 1 of the Act. Section 1 of the FAA excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" from the Act's coverage.

Question

Does the Federal Arbitration Act, which excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" from the Act's coverage, apply to employment contracts?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Circuit City, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 1

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that section 1 exemption is confined to transportation workers. "The wording of [section 1] calls for the application of the maxim ejusdem generis, the statutory canon that 'where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words,'" wrote Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy continued that "[u]nder this rule of construction the residual clause should be read to give effect to the terms 'seamen' and 'railroad employees,' and should itself be controlled and defined by reference to the enumerated categories of workers which are recited just before it; the interpretation of the clause pressed by respondent fails to produce these results." Therefore, section 1 "exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers."

Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board

Fri, 01 Dec 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-836

Petitioner

Bush

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Palm Beach County Canvassing Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 70 (2000)

Argued

Friday, December 1, 2000

Decided

Monday, December 4, 2000

Advocates

Joseph P. Klock (Argued the cause for petitioner Harris)

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Paul Hancock (Argued the cause for petitioner Florida Attorney General)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for petitioner Bush)

Facts of the Case

The 2000 presidential election remained in limbo with the outcome dependent on the winner of the popular vote in Florida. Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush held a slim lead in the tally. Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore challenged the decision of Florida's Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, to certify the results of the presidential election on November 14, the deadline provided by Florida's election law. Gore also challenged Harris's decision to ignore the outcome of manual recounts his campaign had requested in four Florida counties, recounts available under another provision of Florida's election code. The Florida Supreme Court heard Gore's challenges and held that Harris could not certify the outcome until November 26. The Florida Supreme Court also held that Harris must include the results of manual recounts in the certified results. Governor Bush intervened. Harris and Bush appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Question

Do post-election court decisions that limit legislators' or executive officials' discretion to certify election results violate the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution or 3 USC Section 5? Did the Florida Supreme Court's decision change the manner in which Florida's electoral votes were chosen, thereby violating Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the US Constitution, which confers plenary power in federal election matters on state legislatures?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bush, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a per curiam opinion, a unanimous court held that there was "considerable uncertainty" as to the reasons for the Florida Supreme Court's decision. Accordingly the court did not review the federal questions presented by the case. Instead it vacated the Florida Supreme Court's decision and remanded the case for clarification of two questions. One, did the Florida Supreme Court think that the Florida Constitution circumscribed the plenary power of the Florida Legislature in election matters conferred by the US Constitution? And two, how much weight did the Florida Supreme Court give to 3 USC Section 5?

Texas v. Cobb

Tue, 16 Jan 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1702

Petitioner

Texas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cobb

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 162 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 2001

Decided

Monday, April 2, 2001

Advocates

Gregory S. Coleman (Austin, Texas, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lisa S. Blatt (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the court, supporting the petitioner)

Roy E. Greenwood (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, while under arrest for an unrelated offense, Raymond Levi Cobb confessed to a home burglary. Cobb, however, denied knowledge of the disappearance of a woman and child from the home. In 1995, after counsel was appointed to represent him in the burglary case, Cobb confessed to killing the woman and child to his father, who contacted the police. Cobb, now in custody, waived his rights under Miranda and confessed to the murders. Cobb was then indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Cobb argued that his confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which he claimed attached when counsel was appointed in the burglary case. In reversing, the court held that once the right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any other offense that is very closely factually related to the offense charged.

Question

Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extend to crimes that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Texas, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 6: Other Sixth Amendment Provisions

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "offense specific," it does not necessarily extend to offenses that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged. Since the right to counsel was offense specific, and the offenses were separate, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar police from interrogating [Cobb] regarding the murders, and [Cobb's] confession was therefore admissible." Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Wharf Holdings Ltd. v. United International Holdings

Wed, 21 Mar 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-347

Petitioner

Wharf Holdings Ltd.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United International Holdings

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 588 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, March 21, 2001

Decided

Monday, May 21, 2001

Advocates

Louis R. Cohen (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Matthew D. Roberts (As amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Paul M. Dodyk (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In return for United International Holdings, Inc.'s assistance in preparing its application, contracts, system, and financing for a cable television system in Hong Kong, Wharf Holdings Ltd. orally granted United an option to buy 10% of stock in the system. The parties never reduced the agreement to writing. Ultimately, Wharf refused to allow United to exercise its option. United then sued Wharf in Federal District Court, claiming that Wharf violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits using "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance...in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Wharf's internal documents, which suggested that Wharf never intended to carry out its promise, supported United's claim. A jury found in United's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does an oral agreement to grant an option to buy stock, while secretly intending not to honor the option, violate the Securities Exchange Act of 1934?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United International Holdings, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that an oral agreement to give an option to buy stock while secretly intending never to honor that option violates the Securities Exchange Act of 1934's prohibition of deceptive devices. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that there was no "convincing reason to interpret the Act to exclude oral contracts as a class. The Act itself says that it applies to 'any contract' for the purchase or sale of a security."

Good News Club v. Milford Central School

Wed, 28 Feb 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Milford Central School

42 West Main Street Milford NY 13807

Milford, NY 13807

United States

42° 35' 27.3948" N, 74° 56' 54.816" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-2036

Petitioner

Good News Club

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Milford Central School

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 98 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, February 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2001

Advocates

Thomas Marcelle (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Frank W. Miller (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The Club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the District Court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the subject matter of the Club's was "quintessentially religious", and the activities "fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'" Milford's policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.

Question

Did Milford Central School violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school? If a violation occurred, was it justified by Milford's concern that permitting the Club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Good News Club, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation." "When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment," wrote Justice Thomas.

Becker v. Montgomery

Mon, 16 Apr 2001 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-6374

Petitioner

Becker

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Montgomery

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 757 (2001)

Argued

Monday, April 16, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 2001

Advocates

Stewart A. Baker (Was invited to brief and argue as amicus curiae in support of judgment below)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Dale G. Becker, an Ohio prisoner, instituted a pro se civil rights action to contest the conditions of his confinement. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Becker's complaint. In appealing, Becker, still pro se, filed his notice of appeal using a government-printed form, on which he filled in all of the required information. On the line labeled "Counsel for Appellant" Becker typed, but did not sign, his name. The form contained no indication of a signature requirement. The District Court docketed the notice, sent a copy to the Court of Appeals, and granted Becker leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, after notifying Becker that the court would not hold him to the same standards it required of attorneys in stating his case, dismissed the appeal on its own motion. The court held that the notice of appeal was fatally defective because it was not signed.

Question

When a party files a timely notice of appeal in district court, does the failure to sign the notice of appeal require the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Becker, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that when a party files a timely notice of appeal in district court, the failure to sign the notice does not require the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "if the notice is timely filed and adequate in other respects, jurisdiction will vest in the court of appeals, where the case may proceed so long as the appellant promptly supplies the signature once the omission is called to his attention."