The Oyez Project: 2007 Term Decisions

Ali v. Achim (No. 06-1346)

May the government deny certain forms of protection to an immigrant because he has committed a crime that does not rise to the level of an aggravated felony?

The Court dismissed the case under Supreme Court Rule 46 after the government agreed to grant protection to the defendant immigrant. Because the case settled, the Court issued no written opinion.

Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons (No. 06-9130)

In the detention of goods exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act, is the phrase "other law enforcement officer" limited to officers acting in a tax, excise, or customs capacity?

The Court agreed with the 11th Circuit and, in a 5-4 majority opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, held that the use of the word "any" should be given its normal interpretation, encompassing all federal officers whether or not they were involved in enforcing customs or excise laws. Justices Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Samuel A. Alito, along with Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., joined in the opinion.

Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented in the judgment, arguing that if Congress intended to include officials other than customs or excise officials it would have listed them in the law. Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent, jointed by Justice Stevens, suggesting that the context of the statute made clear that Congress intended it only to refer to federal officials likely to deal with property loss or damage, a group that, according to Breyer, did not include police officers.

Allen v. Siebert (No. 06-1680)

No details yet.

Allison Engine Co. v. Sanders (No. 07-214)

Must whistleblower claimants prove that a private company directly presented a fraudulent bill to the government in order to prevail in a False Claims Act case?

Yes. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Samuel A. Alito made clear that a plaintiff must prove more than that the false statement's use resulted in payment or approval or that Government money was used to pay the claim. Instead, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intended the false statement to be "material" to the Government's decision to pay or approve the false claim.

Arave v. Hoffman (No. 07-110)

Has an attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel if he advises a client to turn down a guilty plea based on erroneous legal analysis, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy?

After the Court granted certiorari, Hoffman filed a motion to vacate the Ninth Circuit's decision and dismiss the case, abandoning his claim for ineffective assistance during plea bargaining. Hoffman no longer sought the relief ordered by the Ninth Circuit and instead wished to proceed with the resentencing ordered by the district court. The Court, in a per curiam opinion, granted Hoffman's motion and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit with the instructions that the district court should dismiss the ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining claim with prejudice.

Baze and Bowling v. Rees (No. 07-5439)

Is the use of a four-drug lethal injection process to carry out death sentences a violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment?

In a 7-2 decision with four concurrences and a dissent, the Court held that Kentucky's lethal injection scheme did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Noting that the inmates had conceded the "humane nature" of the procedure when performed correctly, the divided Court inmates had failed to prove that incorrect administration of the drugs would amount to cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Court also suggested that a state may violate the ban on cruel and unusual punishment if it continues to use a method without sufficient justification in the face of superior alternative procedures. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. announced the judgment and issued an opinion joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion supporting the judgment but for the first time stated his opposition to the death penalty. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a separate concurring opinion in support of the judgment. Justice Alito also issued a separate concurring opinion. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice David Souter, dissented.

Begay v. United States (No. 06-11543)

Does driving while intoxicated qualify as a violent felony for purposes of the federal career criminal law?

In a 6-3 vote, the Court held that Begay's DWI convictions did not qualify as "violent felonies" because they were too different from the violent felony examples provided by Congress in the Armed Career Criminal Act (such as burglary, arson and extortion). Therefore, Begay should not have been subject to the mandatory sentencing hike. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the majority opinion with Justice Antonin Scalia concurring and Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and David Souter, dissenting

Boulware v. United States (No. 06-1509)

Does the return of capital rule apply automatically when a company without earnings or profits distributes money to a shareholder, or must the taxpayer produce contemporaneous evidence that the money was treated as a return of capital when distributed?

A unanimous Court reversed Boulware's conviction for tax evasion. In an opinion written by Justice David Souter, the Court held that a defendant in a criminal tax case does not need to show a contemporaneous intent to treat diversions as returns of capital to demonstrate no taxes were owed. All that mattered, according to the Court, was whether the corporation had earnings or profits and the taxpayer's basis for his stock. Based on these considerations, the Court determined that there had been no improper action on Boulware's part.

Boumediene v. Bush (No. 06-1195)

1. Should the Military Commissions Act of 2006 be interpreted to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by foreign citizens detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?

2. If so, is the Military Commissions Act of 2006 a violation of the Suspension Clause of the Constitution?

3. Are the detainees at Guantanamo Bay entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law and of the Geneva Conventions?

4. Can the detainees challenge the adequacy of judicial review provisions of the MCA before they have sought to invoke that review?

A five-justice majority answered yes to each of these questions. The opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, stated that if the MCA is considered valid its legislative history requires that the detainees' cases be dismissed. However, the Court went on to state that because the procedures laid out in the Detainee Treatment Act are not adequate substitutes for the habeas writ, the MCA operates as an unconstitutional suspension of that writ. The detainees were not barred from seeking habeas or invoking the Suspension Clause merely because they had been designated as enemy combatants or held at Guantanamo Bay. The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's ruling and found in favor of the detainees. Justice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia filed separate dissenting opinions.

Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity (No. 07-210)

May individuals and companies bring RICO lawsuits against defendants whose false statements directly harmed them, even if the defendants made these statements to a neutral third party?

Yes, they may. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held in favor of Phoenix, stating that a plaintiff bringing a RICO claim based on mail fraud does not need to show that it actually relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. Plaintiffs do not lack standing merely because the false statements were made to a third party.

Burgess v. United States (No. 06-11429)

Did the Fourth Circuit err in determining that Burgess' sentencing hike for a drug distribution charge was sufficiently mandated by 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A), which requires such a hike for individuals with prior felony drug convictions regardless of length of imprisonment, when another federal statute, 21 U.S.C. Section 802, requires that a felony drug offense be "punishable by imprisonment for more than a year"?

The Court upheld the sentencing hike, stating that the definition of a felony drug offense in 12 U.S.C. 841 as punishable by imprisonment for more than one year was controlling regardless of whether South Carolina classified the offense as a felony or a misdemeanor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that the definition of "felony drug offense" in the statute does not incorporate any other definition of "felony" under federal or state law.

CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries (No. 06-1431)

May a worker sue his employer for retaliation under the Civil Rights Act of 1866?

Yes, Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. The 7-2 decision, written by Justice Stephen Breyer, relied heavily on the concept of stare decisis, or adherence to prior Court decisions, in reaching its conclusion. Justice Breyer maintained that the historical interpretation of Section 1981 by the Court, as well as the legislative history leading up to the enactment of the law, placed a heavy burden on anyone arguing against including retaliation claims within the scope of Section 1981, and the burden was not met in this case. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Antonin Scalia joined.

Chamber of Commerce v. Brown (No. 06-939)

Does the National Labor Relations Act, which states that companies' anti-labor speech can only be considered unfair labor practice if it threatens or coerces workers, preempt state laws prohibiting the use of state funds to "assist, promote, or deter union organizing," even if the public funds are transparently segregated?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held the California laws preempted by the National Labor Relations Act because the state laws regulated within "a zone protected and reserved for market freedom." Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court, viewed the Act as showing a "congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management." Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the California laws dealt with funding, not regulation, and did not impermissibly discourage labor-related speech. Employers are still free under the laws to spend their own money on such speech.

Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (No. 07-21)

Does a law that requires voters to present either a state or federal photo identification unduly burden citizens’ right to vote?

By a vote of 6 to 3, the Court upheld the law, concluding that the photo I.D. requirement was closely related to Indiana's legitimate state interests in preventing voter fraud. The slight burden the law imposed on voters' rights did not outweigh these interests, which the Court characterized as "neutral and nondiscriminatory." Although there was no majority opinion, the Court's decision included concurring opinions written by Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia. Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent.

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Georgia State Board of Equalization (No. 06-1287)

Does the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 require a federal district court determining the "true market value" of railroad property to accept the valuation method chosen by the State?

The Court reversed the 11th Circuit in a unanimous decision. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. stated that courts cannot blindly accept the states' market valuations without potentially endorsing the type of discriminatory tax practices that the 4-R Act was designed to thwart. The Court also rejected Georgia's state sovereignty argument, holding that tax valuation methods are technical tools utilized by state employees, not expressions of state policy.

Cuellar v. United States (No. 06-1456)

Does the federal money laundering statute require the government to prove that the defendant was trying to portray ill-gotten gains as legitimate wealth, or must prosecutors show only that the defendant was attempting to conceal criminal proceeds?

Neither. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court answered this question by taking the middle ground, holding that the statute contains no "legitimate wealth" requirement but also holding that mere proof that the defendant was attempting to conceal the money is not enough to uphold a conviction. In reversing Cuellar's conviction, the Court relied on the language of the statute providing that the transportation's purpose must have been to conceal not just the money itself but its nature, location, source, ownership, or control. The Court found that prosecutors had failed to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Dada v. Mukasey (No. 06-1181)

When an illegal resident agrees to voluntarily depart the United States and then files a motion to reopen removal proceedings, does the filing suspend the time period by which the illegal resident must depart the United States under the voluntary departure order?

No. Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by four other Justices, stated that an alien has two options in such a case: he may abide by the terms of the voluntary departure and leave the country on time, maintaining the re-entry perks, or withdraw the voluntary departure request and remain in the country to pursue the motion to reopen. If the alien chooses the second option, he may become subject to deportation proceedings. While the Court acknowledged that the opinion still leaves a difficult decision for aliens, it prevents them from reaping the benefits of the voluntary departure option while evading its terms to pursue continuing legal action against the government. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, arguing that once an alien agrees to depart voluntarily he should have no right to withdraw that agreement. Justice Samuel A. Alito also filed a separate dissent suggesting that it should be within the discretion of the Board of Immigration Appeals, not the Court, to permit or deny the withdrawal of an alien's voluntary departure agreement.

Danforth v. Minnesota (No. 06-8273)

When determining whether Supreme Court decisions on constitutional rules of criminal procedure apply retroactively, may state supreme courts use state-law retroactivity standards that are broader than the standard in Teague v. Lane?

In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the federal case law precedent, including Teague did not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than was required by the precedent. The precedent applied only to federal habeas corpus petitions and had no bearing on state post-conviction proceedings. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice John G. Roberts joined.

Davis v. Federal Election Commission (No. 07-320)

Does the Millionaire’s Amendment to the 2002 campaign finance law, which raises the contribution limit for those running against a self-financed candidate, violate free speech clause of the First Amendment and the equal protection principle of the Fifth Amendment?

Yes. Although all nine Justices agreed that Davis had standing to argue his case before the Court, only a 5-4 majority held that the contribution limits violated the First Amendment. In his majority opinion, Justice Samuel Alito noted that the Court had never upheld the constitutionality of a law imposing different contribution limits for candidates competing against one another. Because the Court found the laws in violation of the First Amendment, it did not reach the question of whether the Fifth Amendment was also violated. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreeing with the majority that Davis had standing but citing the reasoning of the district court to argue that the contribution cap did not violated the First or Fifth Amendment. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreeing with Justice Stevens's argument but basing it on slightly different grounds.

Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis (No. 06-666)

Does a state violate the dormant Commerce Clause by providing an income tax exemption for interest on bonds issued by the state, while denying the exemption to interest on bonds issued by other states?

No. The Court held 7-2 that Kentucky's differential tax scheme does not offend the Commerce Clause. No single opinion commanded a majority. Bond proceeds are a "quintessentially public function," the Court noted, and are therefore likely motivated by legitimate state objectives other than simple economic protectionism. These objectives outweigh any negative effect the tax may have on interstate commerce.

District of Columbia v. Heller (No. 07-290)

Whether provisions of the D.C. Code generally barring the registration of handguns, prohibiting carrying a pistol without a license, and requiring all lawful firearms to be kept unloaded and either disassembled or trigger locked violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their homes?

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. The Court based its holding on the text of the Second Amendment, as well as applicable language in state constitutions adopted soon after the Second Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer filed dissenting opinions, each joined by the other as well as Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Stevens argued that the Second Amendment only protects the rights of individuals to bear arms as part of a well-regulated state militia, not for other purposes even if they are lawful. Justice Breyer agreed with Stevens' argument but also stated that even if possession were to be allowed for other reasons, any law regulating the use of firearms would have to be "unreasonable or inappropriate" to violate the Second Amendment. In Breyer's view, the D.C. laws at issue in this case were both reasonable and appropriate.

Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture (No. 07-474)

Does the Court's ruling in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), allow so-called "class of one" equal protection claims against government bodies in the context of employment discrimination?

No, it does not. The Court ruled 6-3 that the "class-of-one" theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context. The government enjoys significantly greater leeway in dealing with employees than it does with the public at large in its capacity as a regulator. Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote the majority opinion.Justice John Paul Stevens authored a dissent.

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (No. 07-219)

Does maritime law permit judges to award punitive damages for employee misdeeds and does maritime law allow judge-made remedies when Congress has not authorized them?

Maybe and yes. With Justice Samuel Alito taking no part in the decision because he owns Exxon stock, the Court split evenly 4-4 on the issue of whether judges may award punitive damages against a company for employee misdeeds. Therefore, the Court left the Ninth Circuit's ruling that they can undisturbed, but noted that this affirmation could not be used as precedent because it merely reflected an even split in the Court. On the second issue, a 5-4 majority held that judges are free to create remedies in maritime cases where Congress has not legislated in the area. However, this freedom can be lost if Congress passes legislation restraining such judicial activism. Justice David Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing with the Court's application of punitive damages precedent but arguing that those prior holdings were in error. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, stating that Congress, not the courts, should be the sole body entrusted with determining the permissibility of punitive damages. Justice Stephen Breyer also concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the punitive damages in this case should have been reduced.

Federal Express Corporation v. Holowecki (No. 06-1322)

Does an intake questionnaire submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission qualify as the charge of discrimination required by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, even if the EEOC did not treat the questionnaire as a charge?

The Court, in a 7-2 opinion, upheld the Second Circuit, stating that the procedure used to file the document was consistent with the design and purpose of the ADEA. In his majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy accepted the EEOC's position that a filing would be considered a "charge" if it could be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee's rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee. Kennedy felt that Holowecki's charge met these requirements. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia dissented from the Court's judgment.

Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (No. 07-312)

Does 11 U.S.C. Section 1146(c), a provision of the Bankruptcy Code stating that certain asset transfers "under a [confirmed Chapter 11] plan may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax," prohibit states from imposing taxes on pre-confirmation asset sales that are essential to the completion of a reorganization plan?

No. The Court held 7-2 that the plain meaning of the statute indicates that it only applies to confirmed asset sales, not "pre-confirmation" sales. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas noted Congress' use of the phrase "plan confirmed" in Sec. 1146(c), as well as the statute's placement in a sub-chapter titled "Postconfirmation Matters," to hold that the tax exemption should only be applied after a plan has been confirmed. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented, interpreting this same language to mean that the tax break should apply to asset sales that are subsequently confirmed, even if they were not confirmed at the time the sales were made.

Gall v. United States (No. 06-7949)

May Courts of Appeals apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences that fall outside the range in the federal sentencing guidelines, so that district courts must justify below-guidelines sentences with a finding of extraordinary circumstances?

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 ruling, reversed the appellate court and held that, under Booker, federal courts have the authority to set any reasonable sentence as long as they explain their reasoning. The Court made clear that Booker had removed the Guidelines from their earlier status as the primary determinate of a defendant's punishment, reaffirming the Guidelines' advisory status. The opinion was penned by Justice Stevens, with Justices David Souter and Antonin Scalia filing opinions concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito were the sole dissenters.

Giles v. California (No. 07-6053)

Are a criminal defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment violated when the common law "forfeiture by wrongdoing" doctrine is applied to allow out-of-court statements made by a witness, absent due to the defendant's own conduct, into evidence without giving defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the absent witness?

Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception only applies to situations where the defendant causes the witness' absence with the intention of preventing that witness from testifying at trial. Without this intention, any act by the defendant making the witness unavailable does not waive that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witness, and therefore any out-of-court statements made by the witness are inadmissible as evidence. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion stressing his belief that statements such as those made by the witness in this case should not implicate the Confrontation Clause at all because the police questioning was not a "formalized dialogue." Justice Samuel Alito also wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that the witness' statements, in his view, did not fall within the Confrontation Clause but noting that neither party had made this argument before the Court. Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred in all parts of the majority opinion except one section denouncing the dissenting argument. Justice Souter stated that he did not find the dissent as wrongheaded as the majority suggested.

The dissent, written by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Anthony Kennedy, argued that a defendant loses his right to confrontation when he makes a witness unavailable due to his own wrongdoing, even if he did not act with the specific intention of preventing her from testifying at trial.

Gomez-Perez v. Potter (No. 06-1321)

Does the ADEA prohibit retaliation against federal employees?

Yes, the ADEA prohibits retaliation against federal employees. Writing for a six-Justice majority, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. relied on prior Court rulings holding that retaliation is covered by similar language in other antidiscrimination statutes. Noting the similarity between these statutes and the ADEA, Alito concluded that Congress had intended to include a retaliation prohibition in the ADEA. Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas filed dissenting opinions each joined in part by Justice Antonin Scalia.

Gonzalez v. United States (No. 06-11612)

May a magistrate judge conduct voir dire if she has received approval from attorneys for both sides, but has not directly sought or received approval from the defendant?

The Court held 8-1 that express consent by counsel suffices to permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial, stating that such "scheduling matters" are among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. Seven Justices formed the majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy with Justice Antonin Scalia concurring in the judgment and Justice Clarence Thomas dissenting.

Greenlaw v. United States (No. 07-330)

Do federal appellate courts have the authority to hike a criminal defendant's sentence in the absence of a government request to do so?

No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court stated that the Eighth Circuit could not order the district court to increase Greenlaw's sentence without a request from the government to do so. The Court pointed to several of its precedents for the rule that a remedy in favor the appellee, in this case the government, can only be justified if the appellee brings a cross-appeal. Because the government did not cross-appeal in this case, the Eight Circuit overstepped its bounds by ordering the sentencing hike. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens and in part by Justice Stephen Breyer, dissented, arguing that the cross-appeal rule was merely a rule of practice for the appellate courts, not a limitation on their power. Although Breyer joined parts of the dissent, he ultimately sided with the majority in a concurring opinion, recognizing that the cross-appeal rule is merely one of practice but finding no grounds on which to make an exception to that rule in this case.

Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. (No. 06-989)

Can a federal court enforce an arbitration agreement that provides for more expansive judicial review of an arbitration award than the narrow standard of review provided for in the Federal Arbitration Act?

In a 6-3 opinion, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit ruling and held that the provisions of the FAA are exclusive and cannot be expanded through contractual agreement. Writing for the majority, Justice David Souter pointed to words such as "must" and "unless" in the FAA as evidence that its provisions were intended to be mandatory and incapable of modification by the parties. Therefore, the Court upheld the arbitrator's award in favor of Mattel.

Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the FAA's central purpose-ensuring the enforcement of arbitration agreements-made judicial review necessary in this case. Justice Stephen Breyer also filed a separate dissent.

Indiana v. Edwards (No. 07-208)

Does the Court's prior ruling that a criminal defendant need only be "literate, competent, and understanding" to represent himself at trial set an appropriate standard for defining that defendant's mental competence to invoke his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation when he is otherwise unable to conduct a coherent defense?

No. In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not forbid states from insisting upon representation for those competent to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. The Court noted that Faretta only affirmed the right to self representation when the individual "voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so," and therefore does not apply when that individual's mental competency is called into question. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, stating that in his view the Constitution does not permit a state to substitute its own perception of fairness for the defendant’s right to make his own case before the jury, even if the defendant does have questionable mental competence.

Irizarry v. United States (No. 06-7517)

Is a judge required to give both parties advance notice before imposing a criminal sentence that departs from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?

No. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the five-justice majority, held that advance warning of a sentence departing from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is unnecessary after Booker, which made the guidelines advisory. If the guidelines were still mandatory, Stevens argued, advance warning might be required. Justice Stephen J. Breyer, joined by three other Justices, dissented.

John R. Sand & Gravel Company v. United States (No. 06-1164)

Is the six-year statute of limitations in the Tucker Act a jurisdictional requirement?

In a seven-member majority opinion written by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court upheld the Federal Circuit ruling that the statute of limitations was "jurisdictional," or a predicate for court authority. Breyer referred to roughly five decades of the Court's case law to determine that the doctrine of stare decisis required it to follow the time limit and dismiss John R. Sand's claim. Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed separate dissenting opinions, each essentially reading the case law in a different light and determining that it had established a more flexible standard for applying statutes of limitation to suits against the government.

Kennedy v. Louisiana (No. 07-343)

Do states violate the Eight Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment by imposing the death sentence for the crime of child rape?

Yes. In a 5-4 decision the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars states from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the child's death. Applying the death penalty in such a case would be an exercise of "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of a national consensus on the issue. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, dissented. In his view, no national consensus existed prohibiting the death penalty in this case, and he vehemently opposed the majority's application of a "blanket rule" barring the death penalty in child rape cases regardless of the facts of the case, including the age of the child, the sadistic nature of the crime, and the number of times the child has been raped.

Kentucky Retirement Systems, et al. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (No. 06-1037)

Is the use of age as a factor in a retirement plan "arbitrary" rendering the plan discriminatory on its face in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act?

No. Writing for a slim 5-4 majority, Justice Stephen Breyer held that the Kentucky system does not discriminate against workers who become disabled after becoming eligible for retirement based on age. According to Breyer, the circumstances of the case indicated that differences in treatment were not "actually motivated" by age but rather by pension status. He also noted that the ADEA treats system-wide rules involving pensions more flexibly than individual employment decisions. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that age is in fact the deciding factor in determining disability benefits and that, therefore, the Kentucky plan violates the ADEA.

Kimbrough v. United States (No. 06-6330)

1. When imposing a sentence for distributing crack cocaine, may a District Court judge consider the impact of the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio and the Sentencing Commission's view that the ratio leads to exaggerated sentences for crimes involving crack cocaine?

2. May a District Court judge, in an effort to avoid a sentencing disparity, impose a sentence that is below the range recommended by the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio in the Guidelines?

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the Court's 7-2 majority opinion reversing the Fourth Circuit and affirming the sentence handed down by the trial judge. Ginsburg noted that the drug trafficking statute still had some minimum sentencing requirements, and expressed the Court's confidence that district courts could maintain reasonably uniform approaches to cocaine sentencing. She also referred to the Court's assertion in Booker that, by making the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory, the Court was willing to accept some non-uniformity in sentencing. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito dissented in the opinion.

Klein & Co. Futures, Inc. v. Board of Trade of the City of New York (No. 06-1265)

No details yet.

Knight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (No. 06-1286)

Does 26 U.S.C. 67(e) allow trusts and estates to fully deduct the cost of investment management and advisory services on their income tax returns?

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling, holding that if an expense incurred by a trust is the type that would also be incurred by an individual taxpayer, the expense is subject to the same limits on deduction applied to individual expenses. Roberts reasoned that the tax statute at issue required a court to decide whether an individual customarily would spend money on the type of service at issue; if so, the expense would not be fully deductible by a trust. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc. (No. 06-856)

No details yet.

Logan v. United States (No. 06-6911)

Are convictions that do not result in loss of civil rights excluded from the three convictions necessary to activate the Armed Career Criminal Act's sentence enhancement?

The Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, affirmed the Seventh Circuit and held that the ACCA amendment should be read literally and should apply only when civil rights had been rescinded and later restored. Although Ginsburg admitted the amendment might result in disparate treatment of criminals under the Act, she declined to offer a clarifying interpretation of the ACCA, stating that it was unclear what subset of criminals Congress intended to treat leniently by using the "civil rights restored" language.

Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab. (No. 06-1505)

Under the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, must the employer or the employee prove the reasonableness of adverse employment decisions occurring as part of a claim for age discrimination under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act?

Yes. Writing for a 7-1 majority on the issue of burden of proof, Justice David Souter stated that the text and structure of the ADEA indicated that it is the employer, not the employee, who must bear both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion for the use of "reasonable factors other than age" in the decision to terminate employment. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in the judgment, suggesting that the Congress left the determination of these issues in the hands of the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part. In his brief dissent, Thomas noted his belief that "disparate-impact claims" such as this one, which allege a discriminatory result rather than discriminatory intent, should not be allowed under the ADEA. Justice Stephen Breyer took no part in the decision because he is a significant shareholder in Knolls' parent company.

MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue (No. 06-1413)

Under the governing Supreme Court precedent, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992), may a parent company use a division as a non-taxable investment when the division is involved in a substantially different business segment but the parent provides cash infusions, investment advice and oversight?

The Court sent the case back to the state appellate court holding that the court had previously applied the wrong test in defining the relationship between Lexis/Nexis and Meadwestvaco. Writing for seven of his colleagues, Justice Samuel A. Alito said that the appellate court, rather than applying an "operational function" test, should have looked for the existence of "functional integration, centralized management and economies of scale" between the two companies to determine whether or not they were a unitary business for tax purposes. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion arguing that the Court should refuse jurisdiction over such state tax cases.

Medellin v. Texas (No. 06-984)

1. Did the President act within his constitutional and statutory foreign affairs authority when he determined that states must comply with the U.S. treaty obligation under the Vienna Convention by enforcing a decision of the International Court of Justice?

2. Does the Constitution require state courts to honor the treaty obligation of the U.S. by enforcing a decision of the International Court of Justice?

The Court upheld the rulings of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in a 6-3 opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts. The Court held that the signed Protocol of the Vienna Convention did not make the treaty self-executing and, therefore, the treaty is not binding upon state courts until it is enacted into law by Congress. Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts characterized the presidential memorandum as an attempt by the executive branch to enforce a non-self executing treaty without the necessary Congressional action, giving it no binding authority on state courts. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the opinion and Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, authored a dissent.

Metlife v. Glenn (No. 06-923)

Does an insurance carrier, acting both as the entity determining when awards are to be paid and actually funding those awards, have the right to represent to a court that an individual is disabled when the insurance carrier separately determines for other purposes that the individual is in fact not disabled?

Maybe. The Court, in a 7-2 opinion, relied on its prior ruling in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch to hold that a possible conflict of interest such as MetLife's should be taken into account in determining the legality of a claim denial. The significance and severity of the conflict must be determined by the facts of each individual case. Here, the Court found that the evidence was sufficient to prove that a strong conflict of interest existed. Based on the principle of deference to lower court decisions, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice John G. Roberts concurred in part and dissented in part, framing his dissent around his view that conflicts should be taken into account only where there is evidence that the benefits denial was motivated or affected by the administrator’s conflict. Justice Anthony Kennedy also concurred in part and dissented in part, suggesting that the case should be remanded to the Sixth Circuit where it could apply the majority opinion to the facts of the case on its own. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, finding the mere fact that an entity both determines claims and funds those claims insufficient to prove a conflict of interest.

Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington (No. 06-1457)

May the government permit utility companies to renegotiate long-term contracts with wholesale energy suppliers and, if so, what circumstances justify renegotiation?

Renegotiation is allowed only if the contract poses "serious harm to the public interest." In this case, the Court decided 5-2 (Justices John G. Roberts and Stephen Breyer took no part in the decision) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had failed to make sufficient factual findings in order to determine whether such serious harm could in fact occur. Therefore, the Court sent the case back down to the Ninth Circuit in order to provide an opportunity to revisit these factual findings. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion stating that she believed the Court should have waited to hear the case until all the facts had been uncovered. However, because the case was heard when it was, she felt obliged to agree with the majority's reasoning. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice David Souter, dissented, arguing that Congress, not the courts, should set the standards regarding the reasonableness of public contracts.

Munaf v. Geren (No. 06-1666)

Do U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions brought on behalf of U.S. citizens detained overseas by American military authorities working as part of a multinational force?

Yes they do. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the habeas corpus statute extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an American chain of command even if part of a larger multinational force. The Court pointed specifically to the statute's application to individuals held in custody "under color of the authority of the United States" to hold that actual Government custody is sufficient for jurisdiction in federal courts.

New Jersey v. Delaware (No. 134 ORIG)

Does Delaware, under a 1905 compact with New Jersey settling boundary disputes, have the right to refuse to grant a permit for a construction project occurring mainly on New Jersey land but involving underwater land within Delaware's coastal zone?

The Court held 6-2 that the 1905 compact between the States did not give New Jersey exclusive control over the construction project. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the Court, stated that Delaware acted within its authority in denying unreasonable uses of the river and soil within the lands it controls under the compact. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in, and Justice Antonin Scalia dissented from, the majority's opinion.Justice Stephen G. Breyer recused himself.

New York City Board of Education v. Tom F. (No. 06-637)

Does the Individuals with Disabilities Act provide for public tuition reimbursement for private school when a child has not previously received special education from a public school?

The Court's role in the case proved to be anticlimactic. Justice Anthony Kennedy took no part in consideration of the case, leaving the eight remaining Justices to split evenly 4-4, affirming the judgment of the Second Circuit. This result leaves open the issue of reimbursements for private school placements under the IDEA when parents reject a public school placement and the child has not received special education services in the public school.

New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres (No. 06-766)

Does a state judicial appointment system in which appointments are made by political party delegates elected by party members violate the First Amendment association rights of voters and candidates?

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court reversed the Second Circuit, finding that the election scheme did not implicate Lopez Torres' rights under the First Amendment. What constituted a "fair shot" at obtaining the nomination, according to the Court, was a reasonable enough question for legislative judgment, which the Court would accept so long as it did not too much infringe upon a party's associational rights. The Court maintained that the First Amendment did not compel any substantive change in New York's practice of electing judicial officials.

Philippines v. Pimentel (No. 06-1204)

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit err in approving the award of assets to creditors of former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos when the Philippine government, claiming rightful ownership of the assets, excluded itself from the proceedings based on sovereign immunity?

Yes it did. The Court's opinion was unanimous in finding that the Philippine government was a required party to the case under Rule 19(b). Such a required party must be joined to the suit if it is "feasible," and the Court ruled that the government's inclusion was feasible in this case. The Court sent the case back to the district court with instructions to dismiss the interpleader action. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter concurred in part and dissented in part.

Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle (No. 07-411)

Under the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Montana v. U.S. and Nevada v. Hicks, do tribal courts have jurisdiction to hear claims based on civil suits against non-members who voluntarily did business with members?

Generally yes, but not in cases such as this one where the conflict arises over the sale of a piece of land. On this issue, the Court held unanimously that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning non-Indian banks' sales of their own lands. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts stated that although tribal courts have jurisdiction to regulate conduct occurring on tribal lands, that jurisdiction is lost once title to the land passes into the hands of non-Indians. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer, wrote an opinion concurring and dissenting in part, agreeing that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction to disturb the bank's land sale but suggesting that certain damages for discrimination, awarded based on the bank's mistreatment of the Longs due to their Indian heritage, should not have been overturned.

Preston v. Ferrer (No. 06-1463)

Must a contract dispute to go arbitration pursuant to the document’s arbitration clause when an administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction over the disputed issue?

The Court disagreed with the California Labor Commissioner's assessment and allowed the arbitration to continue. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for an 8-1 majority, stated that the California law granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Commission was superseded by the Federal Arbitration Act because the parties to this case had agreed to arbitrate any contractual disputes. Therefore, it was the function of an arbitrator, not the Labor Commission, to determine the legality of the management contract. Justice Clarence Thomas issued the sole dissent.

Quanta Computer, Inc., et al. v. LG Electronics, Inc. (No. 06-937)

May a patent holder seek royalties from companies other than its direct purchaser as the patented product is integrated into larger components during the manufacturing process?

The Court concluded unanimously that it could not. Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas relied on the theory of "patent exhaustion," which provides that a patented item's initial authorized sale terminates all patent rights to that item, denying LGE royalties from companies down the line of commerce.

Richlin Security Service v. Chertoff (No. 06-1717)

Is a plaintiff who has successfully sued the federal government entitled to reimbursement of paralegal fees at market rates or as an expense compensable at cost to the firm under the Equal Access to Justice Act, which allows for recovery of "fees and other expenses" incurred in the proceedings?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court held that such paralegal fees are recoverable at market rates. Justice Samuel A. Alito stated that because Richlin incurred fees for paralegal services in connection with its case, a straightforward reading of the statute demonstrates that Richlin was entitled to recover fees for the paralegal services it purchased at the market rate. The Court found the government's argument that only "reasonable costs" should be recovered unpersuasive.

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (No. 06-179)

Does Section 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempt state-law claims seeking damages for injuries caused by medical devices that received premarket approval from the Food and Drug Administration.

The Court, in an 8-1 decision, affirmed the Second Circuit and granted summary judgment in favor of Medtronic. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, noted that the MDA pre-empted state common law claims for defective devices such as this one. Riegel's negligence and strict liability claims relating to the safety and effectiveness of the catheter were based on New York's requirements and were therefore "different from, or in addition to" the federal requirements. Only Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented.

Riley v. Kennedy (No. 07-77)

Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, was the State of Alabama required to preclear two Alabama Supreme Court decisions invalidating state and local laws creating a special election for local officials in an action against the Governor of Alabama challenging the legality of those elections?

No. The Court characterized the Alabama law permitting the local elections as a "temporary misapplication of state law" and held that such a law was not in "force or effect" even if actually implemented by state election officials. Because the law never gained force or effect, it did not represent a change from the baseline and therefore Alabama's reinstatement of its prior practice did not require preclearance. The 7-2 opinion was written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg with a dissent by Justice John Paul Stevens in which Justice David Souter joined.

Rothgery v. Gillespie County TX (No. 07-440)

Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that Rothgery's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was not implicated when he was denied counsel at the time of his initial hearing for being a felon in possession of a firearm but the hearing was conducted without the involvement of a prosecutor?

Yes. In an 8-1 ruling, the Court held that a criminal defendant's initial appearance before a judge marks the beginning of the proceedings against him and triggers the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel whether or not a prosecutor is aware of or involved in that appearance. This right to counsel applies whenever a defendant learns of the charges against him and has his liberty subject to restriction. The opinion was penned by Justice David Souter. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the only dissent, arguing that the phrase "criminal prosecution" as used in the Sixth Amendment should not include a defendant's initial appearance in the absence of a prosecutor. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, chose to write a concurring opinion pointing out the validity of Thomas' argument but reasoning that Court precedent required him to agree with the majority. Justice Samuel Alito also filed a concurring opinion, stating that Rothgery's right to counsel certainly arose at the time of his appearance but reserving judgment on whether the County's actions infringed on that right in this case.

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association (No. 06-457)

Does the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 preempt a state law that uses the state's police power to require that air and motor carriers take steps to ensure that tobacco is not sold to minors?

The Court affirmed both lower courts, holding that the FAAAA preempted the state laws. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court asserted that the state laws were directly connected with motor carrier services and therefore had a significant and adverse impact on the congressional goal of precluding state regulation in lieu of competitive market forces. The Court further stated that the FAAAA did not allow any exceptions for police powers or public health concerns of the State.

Snyder v. Louisiana (No. 06-10119)

Did the state's dismissal by peremptory challenge of all of the black potential jurors, combined with the prosecution's comparisons of the case to the O.J. Simpson trial, amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause?

The Court reversed the Louisiana Supreme Court in a 7-2 majority opinion written by Justice Samuel A. Alito. Alito concluded that the trial judge had acted improperly in allowing the peremptory strikes of the black jurors, pointing out that the reasons given by the prosecution for striking the jurors applied equally well to the white jurors the prosecution chose to keep. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that Batson does not require the exacting scrutiny imposed on the trial judge by the majority.

Sprint Communications v. APCC Services Inc. (No. 07-552)

Do third-party companies hired by pay-phone operators to collect compensation for coinless long-distance calls have standing to sue telecommunication companies over the amount of the fees?

Yes. In a close 5-4 ruling, the Court held that third-party companies like APCC have standing to pursue legal claims that have been assigned to them, even when they must then pass along any proceeds from the litigation to the pay-phone operators who hired them. The Court based its ruling on the "history and precedent" of assignees brining legal claims on behalf of others, and found that Sprint had not made any convincing arguments for departing from that history in this case. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, filed a dissenting opinion. Roberts referred to the historical precedent relied on by the majority as "at best, equivocal." Because APCC was required to pass the proceeds from the lawsuit onto the pay-phone operators, it had "nothing to gain" from the suit. Roberts therefore argued that the case should be dismissed.

Sprint/United Management Company v. Mendelsohn (No. 06-1221)

In employment discrimination cases, must a court admit "me, too" evidence - testimony by other employees who are not parties to the case and who were allegedly discriminated against by persons who had no role in the employment decision being challenged by the plaintiff?

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Tenth Circuit, according to the Court, acted incorrectly when it engaged in its own assessment of the relevance and prejudicial effect of the witness testimony. Instead, the Court said, because the district court's basis for ruling on the evidence was unclear, the Tenth Circuit should have remanded the case for clarification before finding that a per se rule of exclusion had been applied. The Court sent the case back to the Tenth Circuit and instructed it to follow this procedure.

Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. (No. 06-43)

Are claims for deceptive conduct under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 barred by the Court's decision in Central Bank v. First International Bank when the defendant engaged in fraudulent transactions designed to inflate a corporation's financial statements, but made no public statements concerning those transactions?

The Court held that, under Central Bank and Section 10(b), securities fraud plaintiffs cannot sue "aiders and abettors" like Scientific-Atlanta. The Court noted Congress' subsequent failure to create a right of private action against aiders and abettors in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act for support of its position that no such right should be allowed in the present case. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, reading Central Bank as allowing the claim against Scientific-Atlanta because, in this case, it had actually undertaken plainly deceptive acts.

Taylor v. Sturgell (No. 07-371)

Does the dismissal of a claim based on a Freedom of Information Act request preclude a second individual, based on the concept of "virtual representation," from bringing a similar claim when both claims involve the same project and the parties to each suit are represented by the same attorney?

No. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that such "nonparty preclusion" runs up against the "deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court." Virtual representation should only be applied rarely and under certain exceptions to the general rule, none of which the Court found applicable in this case. The D.C. Circuit's decision was vacated and the case sent back to the district court for a new trial.

United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining (No. 07-308)

Whether the claims of taxpayers seeking refunds for unconstitutionally levied taxes under the Export Clause of the Tucker Act, which applies a six-year statute of limitations, are preempted by the United States Tax Code's three-year statute of limitations for such claims?

In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the Court refused to pay Clintwood refunds for the unconstitutionally levied taxes. The Court stated that the remedy for taxes imposed in violation of the Export Clause is the same as for any other unlawful tax: filing a timely administrative refund claim. Until taxpayers exhaust this avenue, they are prohibited from bringing a direct suit against the government.

United States v. Ressam (No. 07-455)

Does 18 U.S.C. Section 844(h)(2), which prohibits carrying explosives "during the commission of any felony", apply to a defendant convicted of lying to a customs agent because the explosives were not carried "in relation to" the underlying felony?

Yes. The Court determined 8-1 that because Ressam was in possession of the explosives at the time he made the false statement to the customs agent he was therefore carrying them during the commission of that felony. Justice John Paul Stevens, in his majority opinion, refused to over-analyze the language of the statute and applied the word "during" in its most obvious sense. Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, reading the statute to mean that the explosives must have facilitated or aided the false statements and suggesting that merely possessing the weapons at the time of the statements would not suffice for a conviction.

United States v. Rodriquez (No. 06-1646)

Does a crime qualify as “serious” for purposes of the federal career criminal law when the underlying offense is not considered grave, but carries a high prison sentence because it was not the first?

Yes. The Court held 6-3 that although the elements of a particular crime may not be considered "serious," a defendant's prior record will have a considerable bearing on making the determination. A crime's seriousness may be greatly enhanced when its maximum sentence is increased due to the defendant's prior convictions for similar or related crimes.

United States v. Santos and Diaz (No. 06-1005)

In the federal money laundering statute 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), which makes it a crime to use the proceeds of an illegal activity to promote the activity or conceal the proceeds, does the word "proceeds" refer to the gross income received from the illegal activity or to the net income (profits, or gross income minus expenses)?

Splitting 5 to 4, the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, answering that "proceeds" refers to "net income" or profits and not to "gross income." Because the statute nowhere defines the term "proceeds", the plurality applied the so-called rule of lenity which requires such ambiguous statutes to be interpreted in favor of defendants. Justice Antonin Scalia announced the judgment and wrote a plurality opinion for himself and three other justices. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justices Anthony Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer.

United States v. Williams (No. 06-694)

Does the PROTECT Act abridge First Amendment freedom of speech by outlawing the pandering of material that is believed to be, or claimed to be, illegal child pornography?

No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a seven-Justice majority, held that the statute was not overly broad as written. Justice Scalia noted specifically that offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection, and he characterized the speech of an individual claiming to be in possession of child pornography in this category of unprotected speech. He also stated that the law did not violate Due Process because its requirements were clear and could be understood by courts, juries and potential violators. Justice David Souter filed the only dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined.

Virginia v. Moore (No. 06-1082)

Does the Fourth Amendment require the suppression of evidence obtained incident to an arrest when the arrest violates a
provision of state law?

The Court held unanimously that the search did not violate Moore's constitutional rights. Writing for an eight justice majority (with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurring), Justice Antonin Scalia stated that the existence of probable cause gives an arresting officer the right to perform a reasonable search of the accused to ensure the officer's safety and to safeguard evidence. States may impose stricter search and seizure requirements, Scalia wrote, but "when states go above the Fourth Amendment minimum, the Constitution’s protections concerning search and seizure remain the same."

Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent (No. 06-1498)

Does a federal law prohibiting fraudulent communications to government agencies preempt a state law permitting plaintiffs to sue for faulty products that would not have reached the market absent the fraud?

The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was affirmed by an equally divided Court without issuing a written opinion. Chief Justice John G. Roberts took no part in the decision.

Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party (No. 06-713)

Does Washington's "modified blanket primary" system violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of association by denying political parties control over which candidates to endorse?

In a 7-2 opinion, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and held the party affiliation provision constitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas explained that the state law never referred to the candidates as nominees of any particular party. Rather, the nominees were simply asserting which party they preferred to be associated with, and the Court found no convincing evidence that this association would lead voters to believe that the particular party actually endorsed the nominee. Chief Justice John G. Roberts concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy.

Watson v. United States (No. 06-571)

No details yet.

Wright v. Van Patten (No. 07-212)

Does a lawyer's representation of his client via speakerphone at a plea hearing for first-degree reckless homicide constitute a violation of that client's Sixth Amendment right to counsel?

Unfortunately for Van Patten, the Court felt that there was no concrete prohibition of representation by speakerphone in the federal case law and therefore determined that "no clearly established law contrary to the state court's conclusion justifies collateral relief." Therefore, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision granting Van Patten relief and remanded the case to the lower courts for further proceedings. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the otherwise unanimous decision, applying an "objectively unreasonable" standard to the Wisconsin trial court's determination and finding that it passed the test.