The Oyez Project: 2006 Term Decisions

Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman (No. 05-11284)

What kind of "direct and independent" knowledge must an employee bringing suit under the False Claims Act have in order to qualify as an "original source"?

The Court ruled 6-2 that Stone did not qualify as an "original source" with "direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based" for purposes of the False Claims Act. Justice Antonin Scalia's opinion interpreted the word "information" as referring to information on which the relator's (in this case Stone's) claim is based and not to any information underlying publicly disclosed allegations. The Court further pinpointed the meaning of the ambiguous statute by holding that "allegations" means the allegations in the relator's amended complaint and not just those in the original complaint. The Court concluded that "[j]udged according to the principles set forth above, Stone's knowledge falls short." The government's investigation did turn up Rockwell's deceptions concerning the production of defective pondcrete, but the information provided by Stone was not directly related to the government's discoveries. In order for Stone to bring a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, he would have had to be the original source of information that was actually used to prosecute Rockwell. Since the claims involving Stone's information were ultimately dropped in the amended complaint, he could not bring the suit. The government, the Court ruled, would have to continue the action without Stone as co-plaintiff.

Altadis USA, Inc. v. Sea Star Line, LLC (No. 06-606)

No details yet.

Ayers v. Belmontes (No. 05-493)

1) Can government officials acting pursuant to their regulatory authority be guilty of extortion under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for attempting to obtain property for the benefit of the government? 2) Is a Bivens claim based on Fifth Amendment rights precluded by the availability of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act? 3) Does the Fifth Amendment protect against retaliation for exercising a "right to exclude" the government from one's property?

No, unanswered, and no. The Court ruled 7-2 that "neither Bivens nor RICO gives Robbins a cause of action," so he could not sue the government for retaliation. In an opinion by Justice David Souter, the Court declined to extend the availability of Bivens actions to cases of retaliation for the exercise of the right to exclude the government from one's property. The Court noted that Robbins had other administrative and judicial remedies for the government's various violations, though it acknowledged that these amounted to a difficult-to-use "patchwork." Because of the impossibly of devising a framework to separate constitutional violations from government actions that are merely borderline improper, the Court would not add a Bivens remedy to landowners' toolkit. The government can be expected to engage in some hardball tactics during land negotiations, the majority held, and inviting an "onslaught of Bivens actions" in an effort to counter the occasional overreach would be a "cure [...] worse than the disease." Robbins's RICO claim failed as well, because extortion has not normally been understood to encompass the actions of government officials seeking to obtain property for the government rather than for themselves. The Court called the cases that Robbins cited in favor of his claim obscure and off-point.

BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (No. 06-341)

No details yet.

Beck v. PACE International Union (No. 05-1448)

Does Section 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 create a private right of action for a payphone service provider to sue a long distance carrier for violations of the FCC's regulations concerning compensation for coinless payphone calls?

Yes. The Court ruled 7-2 that Section 201(b) allows PSPs to sue long distance carriers for "unjust and unreasonable practices." The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that the FCC's regulation on the subject was reasonable and therefore entitled to deference. Justice Breyer wrote that "The [FCC's] determination easily fits within the language of the statutory phrase." "[I]n ordinary English," a carrier's refusal to pay compensation for a benefit received from payphone service providers can be said to be an unreasonable practice, the Court ruled. The majority also emphasized the similarities between the FCC's payphone regulation and traditional regulations of transportation communications.

Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly (No. 05-1126)

When does the statute of limitations for a claim for damages arising out of a false arrest start running when the fruits of the search were introduced in a person's criminal trial and he was convicted?

By a 7-2 vote, the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia held that "the statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged false imprisonment ends." Since false imprisonment is detention without legal process, the Court ruled, the false imprisonment ends when legal processes begin. At that point, the clock begins to run on the time limit for filing a false imprisonment claim.

Bowles v. Russell (No. 06-5306)

No details yet.

BP America Production Company v. Burton (No. 05-669)

Can a preliminary injunction that is later reversed be the basis for awarding a party the status of the "prevailing party" and therefore entitling that party to attorney's fees?

No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's opinion for the unanimous Court held that a preliminary injunction that is later reversed or otherwise undone cannot be the basis for "prevailing party" status for purposes of awarding attorney's fees. Though Wyner had been able to perform the nude peace symbol display without interference after her victory at the preliminary hearing, her victory had been "transient," "fleeting," and "ephemeral." Because she eventually lost on the merits of her claim that the government's interference was unconstitutional, she failed to gain the enduring "chang[e] [in] the legal relationship" of the parties that is required for prevailing party status. The Court left open the possibility that a preliminary injunction could be the basis for awarding attorney's fees if it were not later superseded as was Wyner's.

Brendlin v. California (No. 06-8120)

No details yet.

Burton v. Waddington (No. 05-9222)

No details yet.

Carey v. Musladin (No. 05-785)

When a vehicle is subject to a traffic stop, is a passenger in the vehicle "detained" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice David Souter, the Court held that when a vehicle is stopped at a traffic stop, the passenger as well as the driver is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The justices said, "We resolve this question by asking whether a reasonable person in Brendlin's position when the car stopped would have believed himself free to 'terminate the encounter' between the police and himself." The Court held that Brendlin would have reasonably believed himself to be intentionally detained and subject to the authority of the police. Thus, he was justified in asserting his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizure. The Court noted that its ruling would not extend to more incidental restrictions on freedom of movement, such as when motorists are forced to slow down or stop because other vehicles are being detained. To accept the state's arguments, however, would be to "invite police officers to stop cars with passengers regardless of probable cause or reasonable suspicion of anything illegal."

Claiborne v. United States (No. 06-5618)

No details yet.

Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd. v. Billing (No. 05-1157)

Is the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it lacks an exception for partial-birth abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother or because it is unconstitutionally vague?

No. The Court ruled by a 5-4 vote that Congress's ban on partial-birth abortion was not unconstitutionally vague and did not impose an undue burden on the right to an abortion. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority. The Court held that, under the most reasonable interpretation, the Act applies only to the intact D&E method (also known as "partial-birth abortion") and not to the more common D&E procedure. The Act's application was limited by provisions that restrict enforcement to cases where the physician intends to perform an intact D&E and delivers the still-living fetus past specific "anatomical landmarks." Because the majority found that the Act applies only to a specific method of abortion, it held that the ban was not unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, or an undue burden on the decision to obtain an abortion. The Court also held that Congress, after finding intact D&E never to be medically necessary, could validly omit a health exception from the ban, even when "some part of the medical community" considers the procedure necessary. To require the exception whenever "medical uncertainty" exists would be "too exacting a standard to impose on the legislative power [...] to regulate the medical profession." The Court left open the possibility that an as-applied challenge could be brought against the Act if it were ever applied in a situation in which an intact D&E was necessary to preserve a woman's health. Justice Ginsburg's dissent disputed the majority's claim that the opinion was consistent with the Casey and Stenberg precedents and said "The Court's hostility to the right Roe and Casey secured is not concealed."

Cunningham v. California (No. 05-6551)

1) What standard for determining harmless error applies to habeas cases where the constitutional error is not recognized until the case is appealed to federal court? 2) If the Brecht standard applies, does the defense or the prosecution bear the burden of persuasion on the question of injurious influence?

The Court held unanimously that a federal court "must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the 'substantial and injurious effect' standard set forth in Brecht, [...] whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard set forth in Chapman." The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia ruled that neither the Court's previous precedents nor the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 required courts to use the more stringent Chapman standard in such cases. As the government conceded during the proceedings, the State would bear the burden of persuasion on the question of injurious influence. A 5-4 majority declined to decide the question of whether the exclusion of the witness in Fry's trial was harmless error under the Brecht standard. This question was deemed to be not included in the petitioner's question presented. The dissenting opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens would have held the exclusion prejudicial to the fairness of the trial and reversed the Ninth Circuit.

Davenport v. Washington Education Association (No. 05-1589)

1) Do Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger allow a school district to use race as the sole factor to assign high school students to public schools?

2) Can a student enrollment plan that requires each school's student population to be between 15% and 50% African-American meet the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that racial classifications be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest?

No and no. By a 5-4 vote, the Court applied a "strict scrutiny" framework and found Jefferson County's enrollment plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in the plurality opinion that "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." The Court acknowledged that it had previously held that racial diversity can be a compelling government interest in university admissions, but it ruled that "[t]he present cases are not governed by Grutter." Unlike the cases pertaining to higher education, Jefferson County's plan involved no individualized consideration of students, and it employed a very limited notion of diversity ("black" and "other"). Jefferson County's goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the Court's standards for a constitutionally legitimate use of race: "Racial balancing is not transformed from 'patently unconstitutional' to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it 'racial diversity.'" The plans also lacked the narrow tailoring that is necessary for race-conscious programs. The Court held that Jefferson County's enrollment plan was actually targeted toward demographic goals and not toward any demonstrable educational benefit from racial diversity. Jefferson County also failed to show that its objectives could not have been met with non-race-conscious means. In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy agreed that Jefferson County's use of race was unconstitutional but stressed that public schools may sometimes consider race to ensure equal educational opportunity.

Dayton v. Hanson (No. 06-618)

No details yet.

EC Term of Years Trust v. United States (No. 05-1541)

1) Did the Fourth Circuit's decision violate the section of the Clean Air Act that provides that national Clean Air Act regulations are subject to challenge only in the D.C. Circuit?

2) Does the Clean Air Act require the EPA to interpret the term "modification" consistently in its Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) provisions and New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) regulations?

Unanswered and No. In a unanimous opinion by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the EPA need not interpret "modification" in PSD regulations the same way the term is interpreted in NSPS regulations. The Court's opinion acknowledged that two occurrences of the same term - sharing the same definition - are normally given the same meaning. However, the word "modification" and its definition appear in the context of two broad, open-ended grants of regulatory authority to the EPA. The Court held that "EPA's construction need do no more than fall within the limits of what is reasonable, as set by the Act's common definition." The Court concluded that differing circumstances involved in regulating under the PSD provisions as opposed to the NSPS provisions may well necessitate giving a different meaning to the term "modification" as it appears in each.

Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corporation (No. 05-848)

Is the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's ban on the use of corporate treasury funds for political advertisements in the 60 days before an election unconstitutional as applied to advertisements that do not explicitly endorse or oppose a candidate?

Yes. By a 5-4 vote the Court ruled that BCRA's limitations on political advertising were unconstitutional as they applied to issue ads like WRTL's. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that the ads were genuine issue ads, not express political advocacy or its functional equivalent (which Congress can concededly regulate). The Court held that McConnell v. FEC did not establish the test that any ad intended to influence an election and having that effect is express advocacy. Such a test would be open-ended and burdensome, would lead to bizarre results, and would "unquestionably chill a substantial amount of political speech." Instead, the Court adopted the test that "an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." The Court further held that the compelling state interests invoked by the government to regulate advocacy did not apply with equal force to genuine issue ads. Neither the interest in preventing corruption nor the goal of limiting the distorting effects of corporate wealth was sufficient to override the right of a corporation to speak through ads on public issues. This conclusion, the Court held, was necessary in order to "give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship." The dissent by Justice Souter called WRTL's ads indistinguishable from political advocacy ads and accused the majority of implicitly overruling McConnell v. FEC.

Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (No. 06-969)

No details yet.

Fry v. Pliler (No. 06-5247)

No details yet.

Global Crossing Telecommunications v. Metrophones Telecommunications (No. 05-705)

Can a party that is potentially responsible for the cost of cleaning up contaminated property under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) bring an action against another potentially responsible party under Section 107(a), even if the party does not satisfy the requirements for bringing an action for contribution under Section 113(f) of CERCLA?

Yes. The Court ruled unanimously that Section 107(a) of CERCLA allows potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to sue other PRPs for cost recovery. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas affirmed the Eighth Circuit and ruled for Atlantic Research. The government had claimed that the phrase "any other person" in Section 107(a) was meant to include only non-PRPs, but the Court, relying on the plain language of the statute, held that "the Governmentís interpretation makes little textual sense." Since almost any party likely to incur clean-up costs could be designated a PRP, the government's interpretation risked rendering Section 107(a) functionless. The Court explained that its interpretation would not result in improper overlap between Section 113(f) and Section 107(a). A party can sue another PRP for contribution under 113(f), but the party can only sue under Section 107(a) for reimbursement of its own clean-up costs. Therefore, parties cannot take advantage of Section 107(a)'s longer limitations period by bringing contribution claims under 107(a).

Gonzales v. Carhart (No. 05-380)

Does a district court have to establish its jurisdiction over a case before dismissing the suit on the ground that it should be argued in another court that is more convenient for the parties ("forum non conveniens")?

No. The Court ruled 9-0 that "a court need not resolve whether it has [...] personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines that [...] a foreign tribunal is plainly the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the case." The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that while the first step of a court is normally to determine whether it has jurisdiction, a court can dismiss a case for forum non conveniens without establishing subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. The Court held that determination of jurisdiction is only important when there is a chance that the court will rule on the merits of the case. When it is clear that the case would be more conveniently tried in a foreign court, a court should immediately dismiss for forum non conveniens rather than undergo a burdensome and unnecessary determination of jurisdiction before dismissing the case anyway.

Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez (No. 05-1629)

Does a conviction for attempted burglary qualify as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

Yes. The Court ruled 5-3 that attempted burglary is a "violent felony" for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito held that attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, is included in the residual provision of the ACCA governing "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." The Court rejected James's argument that attempted burglary should be excluded because the example crimes listed before the residual provision included only completed - as opposed to attempted - crimes. Instead, the Court held that the common element in the list was that "these offenses, while not technically crimes against the person, nevertheless create significant risks of bodily injury or confrontation that might result in bodily injury." Since the risk associated with attempted burglary was comparable to the risks caused by the listed crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives, attempted burglary was included in the definition of "violent felony."

Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood (No. 05-1382)

Is the Court's decision on the admissibility of hearsay testimony in Crawford v. Washington a watershed rule that applies retroactively?

No. The Court ruled unanimously "that Crawford announced a 'new rule' of criminal procedure and that this rule does not fall within the Teague exception for watershed rules." Justice Samuel Alito's opinion called the Crawford ruling "flatly inconsistent" with the prior precedents that it overruled. It was therefore a new rule of criminal procedure. However, the ruling failed to meet the Court's two criteria for a watershed rule. Although Crawford was aimed at increasing the accuracy of criminal convictions, it was not absolutely necessary to prevent an "impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction," as was the archetypal watershed ruling Gideon v. Wainwright. The Court acknowledged that the Crawford's holding was "important," but it was not as "profound," "sweeping," or "central[]" as the Gideon watershed rule, which had been "essential to the fairness" of the judicial system. Since the Crawford ruling did not meet the criteria for a watershed rule, the Court ruled that the decision's restrictions on hearsay testimony did not apply retroactively.

Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation (No. 06-157)

No details yet.

Hinck v. United States (No. 06-376)

No details yet.

James v. United States (No. 05-9264)

No details yet.

Jones v. Bock (No. 05-7058)

1) Is a regulation found under a subpart headed "Interpretations" still entitled to be given Chevron deference by the courts?

2) Did the Second Circuit err in holding a Department of Labor regulation unpersuasive and thus undeserving of Skidmore deference?

Yes and yes. A unanimous Court ruled that the Department of Labor's regulation was "valid and binding" and therefore entitled to all of the deference courts normally give to administrative regulations. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer considered the regulation a normal instance of an agency "filling a statutory gap," and rejected each of the lower court's arguments that it was unlawful. The regulation was intended to be legally binding even though it was under a section titled "Interpretations." This was evidenced by the importance of the regulation and the fact that the Department went through full public notice-and-comment procedures. The "Interpretations" heading may have simply referred to that section's more detailed focus, which interpreted the more general regulations of the previous section. Since the regulation was valid and proper, the Court held, the FLSA's "companionship services" exemption continues to apply to workers paid by third-party agencies.

KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. (No. 04-1350)

Was the Federal Circuit correct in holding that an invention cannot be held "obvious", and thus unpatentable, without a finding of some "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" that would have led a "person of ordinary skill in the art" to the invention by combining previously-existing ideas?

No. The Court ruled unanimously that the Federal Circuit "analyzed the issue in a narrow, rigid manner inconsistent with [Section 103(a)] and our precedents." Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, which ruled in favor of KSR and reversed the Court of Appeals. The opinion acknowledged that a patent is not necessarily obvious by virtue of being a combination of two previously existing components and that it can be helpful in such cases for a court to identify a reason that would have motivated a knowledgeable person to combine the components. However, the Court held that Federal Circuit's "teaching-suggestion-motivation test" was not to be applied as a mandatory rule. This test for determining obviousness was too narrow, because it only took into account teachings on the specific problem the patentee was attempting to solve. Teleflex's gas pedal patent was inspired by previous inventions aimed at different problems. Even though no one had combined the pre-existing adjustable gas pedal and electronic sensor technology in the precise way Teleflex's patent did, the Court held that the existence of the technology would have caused any person of ordinary skill to see the obvious benefit of combining the two. Consequently, Teleflex's patent was obvious and therefore invalid.

Lawrence v. Florida (No. 05-8820)

No details yet.

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (No. 05-1074)

Can a plaintiff claim a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act by alleging parallel conduct by defendants amounting to a conspiracy?

No. The Court ruled 7-2 that a plaintiff claiming a Section 1 violation must also allege facts that, if true, would suggest a conspiratorial agreement. The opinion by Justice David Souter held that "Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy [...]" and "A statement of parallel conduct [...] needs some setting suggesting the [conspiratorial] agreement [...]" The Court laid out a "plausibility standard" for the pleading stage of Section 1 suits. Claims are valid only if they allege facts that plausibly suggest a conspiracy. To allege facts that are merely consistent with a conspiracy is not sufficient. The suggestive facts need only be alleged; a suit can go forward even if the facts are unlikely to be proven by the plaintiff. The Court held that Twombly's claim should be dismissed, because he had failed to identify any facts that suggested illegal conspiracy over the alternative: a concurrent appraisal of the economic situation by several telecomm companies. The dissenting Justices accused the majority of acting on the basis of practical concerns over "enormously expensive" antitrust lawsuits with the potential to confuse juries.

Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (No. 06-480)

No details yet.

Limtiaco v. Camacho (No. 06-116)

No details yet.

Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke (No. 06-593)

No details yet.

Lopez v. Gonzales (No. 05-547)

Does a federal Court of Appeals exceed its authority under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 by overturning a death sentence on the ground that the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument was "unfairly inflammatory"?

Unanswered. By a 6-3 vote, the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted, citing elements of the case's "unusual procedural history." Weaver had filed a habeas petition before AEDPA went into effect, but the district court had ruled that he must abandon his habeas petition if he wanted to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court made it clear in 2007 that the district court's decision had been incorrect (see Lawrence v. Florida). After the Court denied his petition for certiorari, Weaver refiled the habeas petition - but by then AEDPA was in effect, with its stricter requirements for habeas petitions. Rather than risk allowing Weaver's fate to hinge on the district court's mistake, the majority decided to dismiss the case. The dissenters argued that these considerations should not prevent the Court from correcting the Eighth Circuit's mistreatment of AEDPA. Justice Scalia suggested in dissent that other Circuit Courts should "do unto the Eighth Circuitís decision just what it did unto AEDPA: ignore it."

Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts (No. 05-996)

No details yet.

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (No. 05-1120)

1) Was the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals correct in holding that the improper instruction given to Smith's jury was harmless error and not sufficient to invalidate his death sentence?

2) Was the Texas court correct to require a standard of "egregious harm" when evaluating whether an unconstitutional jury instruction should invalidate a death sentence?

Unanswered and no. The Court ruled 5-4 that the jury instructions did not give meaningful effect to Smith's mitigating evidence, and that a subsequent corrective instruction was not sufficient to correct the error. The Texas court had ruled that because Smith had abandoned his objection to the instructions in the course of the proceedings, he must show that "egregious harm" had been done to his trial. The Court criticized the Fifth Circuit for misreading the record and the Court's instructions: "The requirement that Smith show egregious harm was predicated, [...] on a misunderstanding of the federal right Smith asserts [...]" Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority.

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. (No. 05-608)

Is it per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to set mandatory minimum prices for its products?

No. The Court ruled 5-4 that "Dr. Miles should be overruled and that vertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason." Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion held that Dr. Miles had erred by treating vertical minimum price agreements between manufacturers and retailers as analogous to horizontal price-fixing agreements between sellers. The Court cited evidence from the economic literature that vertical minimum price agreements are rarely anticompetitive and can often function to increase interbrand competition. The Court acknowledged that in some cases vertical price minimums might facilitate manufacturer cartels, but it held that instances where the price agreements are abused for illegal anticompetitive purposes can be determined on a case-by-case basis under the rule of reason. The mere fact that vertical price minimums may lead to higher prices for goods cannot reflect negatively on its legality under the Sherman Act, because there are many legitimate business decisions that may ultimately result in higher prices. The majority also acknowledged that the principle of stare decisis would weigh against overruling the nearly 100-year-old precedent in Dr. Miles, but it held that the Sherman Act is to be treated as a "common-law statute," which must be allowed to evolve in the courts as economic knowledge and circumstances change. The dissenters, in an opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, saw no change in circumstances that would justify overruling Dr. Miles, and they argued that the reliance of the business community on that decision supported adherence to stare decisis.

Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education (No. 05-915)

No details yet.

Microsoft Corporation v. AT&T Corp. (No. 05-1056)

Can a plaintiff bring a salary discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when the disparate pay is received during the 180-day statutory limitations period, but is the result of discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations period?

No. By a 5-4 vote the Court ruled that Ledbetter's claim was time-barred by Title VII's limitations period. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito held that "current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination." For a timely claim, Ledbetter would have needed to file within 180 days of a discriminatory salary decision; the Court did not consider it significant that paychecks she received during the 180 days prior to her claim were affected by the past discrimination. Discriminatory intent is a crucial element of a Title VII disparate-treatment claim, the Court held, but each instance of Goodyear's discriminatory intent fell outside the limitations period. The majority noted that the short time limit was enacted to ensure quick resolution of pay discrimination disputes, which can become more difficult to defend against as time passes. To adopt Ledbetter's argument would be to allow even "discriminatory pay decision[s] made 20 years ago" to be the subject of Title VII claims. In dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg called the majority's ruling out of tune with the realities of wage discrimination and "a cramped interpretation of Title VII, incompatible with the statute's broad remedial purpose." She suggested that "the Legislature may act to correct this Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII."

Morse v. Frederick (No. 06-278)

No details yet.

National Association of Home Builders, et al. v. Defenders of Wildlife (No. 06-340)

No details yet.

Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Sorrell (No. 05-746)

1) Does the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution bar federal court jurisdiction of suits under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 by congressional employees whose job duties are part of the due functioning of the legislative process?

2) Was the Office of Senator Mark Dayton entitled to appeal the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit directly to the Supreme Court?

3) Was the case rendered moot by the expiration of Senator Dayton's term of office?

Unanswered, no, and unanswered. The Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to hear Senator Dayton's appeal and dismissed the case without reaching the merits. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion for the 8-0 Court. The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 only authorizes direct Supreme Court appeal of rulings "upon the constitutionality" of the statute. The Justices held that the decisions of the lower courts (holding that Hanson's suit should not be dismissed under the Speech or Debate Clause) did not qualify as rulings on the constitutional validity of the Act. They were better characterized as rulings on the Act's scope. Direct appeal was therefore not authorized by the Act, and the Court declined to grant certiorari.

Osborn v. Haley (No. 05-593)

If an employer with no discriminatory motive fires a subordinate based in part on the influence of another employee with a discriminatory motive, can the employer be held liable for discrimination under Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Unanswered. Prior to oral argument, BCI Coca-Cola moved to have the case dismissed. The government raised no objection, and the Court granted the motion.

Panetti v. Quarterman (No. 06-6407)

No details yet.

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (No. 05-908)

No details yet.

Philip Morris USA v. Williams (No. 05-1256)

Can a party challenge, under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), an Internal Revenue Service tax levy on its property intended to collect taxes owed by another party, even if the party could have sued under 26 U.S.C. 7426 but failed to file the suit before the time limit expired?

No. In a unanimous decision written by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that "Resisting the force of the better-fitted statute [28 U.S.C. 7426] requires a good countervailing reason, and none appears here." The Court held that Section 7426 is the exclusive legal vehicle for challenging a wrongful tax levy, so after having missed the deadline EC Term of Years Trust could not bring its suit as a tax refund claim under 1346(a)(1). The Court acknowledged that in United States v. Williams it had allowed liens to be challenged under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), but the Court held that the principle in Williams was limited to cases in which there is no other remedy available. The Justices ruled that it would not make sense to allow claims under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), which has a 9-month limitations period, to be duplicated under 26 U.S.C. 7426, which has a time limit of four years.

PowerEx Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc. (No. 05-85)

No details yet.

Rita v. United States (No. 06-5754)

No details yet.

Rockwell International Corp. v. United States ex rel Stone (No. 05-1272)

Does a state law requiring labor unions to obtain permission from non-union members before using the non-members' fees for political purposes violate unions' First Amendment rights?

No. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the First Amendment allows a state to require public-sector unions collecting "agency-shop" fees from non-union employees to obtain permission from the employees before using the money for political purposes. The Court's opinion held that "[...] unions have no constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees." It would be constitutional for a state to eliminate agency-shop fees altogether, and it is likewise constitutional for a state to take the lesser step of requiring permission from non-union employees before their fees are used for political purposes. The Court faulted the Washington Supreme Court for misinterpreting the Court's precedents as requiring that the burden always be on the objecting employee. The Court concluded that the law was viewpoint-neutral and that it did not suppress any political ideas, since it involved a limitation on how unions can obtain money from non-members and not a limitation how they can choose spend it once they have it. Thus, the Court held that the union's First Amendment right was not abridged by the permission requirement.

Roper v. Weaver (No. 06-313)

No details yet.

Safeco Insurance Company of America, et al. v. Charles Burr (No. 06-84)

No details yet.

Schriro v. Landrigan (No. 05-1575)

1) When a defendant facing death has a certiorari petition pending before the United States Supreme Court, does the time the petition is pending count toward the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act?

2) Does the division in the Circuit Courts over the statute of limitations constitute an extraordinary circumstance that would allow the Court to set aside the time limit?

3) Does the ineffectiveness of a defendant's counsel constitute an extraordinary circumstance that would allow the Court to set aside the time limit?

Yes, no, and no. The Court ruled 5-4 that the time a habeas petition is pending before the Supreme Court counts toward the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Section 2244(d)(2) of the Act stops the clock on the time limit while the prisoner appeals in state courts, but the Court ruled that appeals to the Supreme Court are not part of the process referred to in the Act. Justice Clarence Thomas's opinion held that "Read naturally, the text of the statute must mean that the statute of limitations is tolled only while state courts review the application." The Court noted that suspending the statute of limitations for certiorari petitions might cause prisoners to file petitions "as a delay tactic." Finally, the Court rejected Lawrence's equitable tolling claims, holding that attorney miscalculation is not a credible reason for the Court to set aside a deadline.

Scott v. Harris (No. 05-1631)

Can the right in Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to convert a Chapter 7 bankruptcy to another chapter be denied because of bad faith?

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that there is a "bad faith" exception to the right of conversion in Section 706(a). The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens held that although the vast majority of Chapter 7 debtors can convert to Chapter 13, a Chapter 7 debtor who engages in bad faith conduct does not qualify as a "debtor" under Chapter 13 and thus cannot convert his petition. The majority also wrote that courts have the inherent power to deny the motions of litigants who act in bad faith. The Court concluded that "Nothing in the text of [...] 706 [...] limits the authority of the court to take appropriate action in response to fraudulent conduct by the atypical litigant who has demonstrated that he is not entitled to the relief available to the typical debtor."

Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (No. 06-102)

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Smith v. Texas (No. 05-11304)

1) Is the decision of the Comptroller of Currency that federal authority over national banks extends to state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks entitled to judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council?

2) Does 12 CFR 7.4006 violate the Tenth Amendment by treating a state-chartered operating subsidiary the same as a national bank for purposes of federal regulation?

Unanswered and no. The Court ruled 5-3 that state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks are subject to regulation by the federal Office of the Comptroller of Currency and not by the states in which they are located. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "[...] the level of deference owed to the regulation is an academic question," because "Section 7.4006 merely clarifies and confirms what the [National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a)] already conveys: A national bank has the power to engage in real estate lending through an operating subsidiary, subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the national bank itself; that power cannot be significantly impaired or impeded by state law." The Court interpreted the statute broadly, as a shield against burdensome state regulation of national banks and their subsidiaries, so the OCC's regulation preempting Michigan's regulatory laws was firmly grounded in the statute. The Court briefly and definitively disposed of Watters's Tenth Amendment argument, holding that the regulation of subsidiaries of national banks is a legitimate application of Congress's Commerce Power and therefore is not reserved to the states.

Sole v. Wyner (No. 06-531)

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Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights (No. 06-484)

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Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v. Brentwood Academy (No. 06-427)

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The Permanent Mission of India v. City of New York (No. 06-134)

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Travelers Casualty v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (No. 05-1429)

Does California's Determinate Sentencing Law violate the 6th Amendment right to a jury trial by permitting judges to impose enhanced sentences based on their determination of facts not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant?

Yes. The Court ruled 6-3 that California's Determinate Sentencing Law was inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "[...] under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence." Because the maximum sentence could not be given unless aggravating circumstances were found, and because the aggravating circumstances "depend[ed] on facts found discretely and solely by the judge," the Court found that California's sentencing system circumvented the process of trial by jury. In his dissent, Justice Alito argued that the California system was similar to the advisory federal sentencing guidelines which were upheld in United States v. Booker.

United Haulers Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority (No. 05-1345)

Does a drug crime constitute an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Naturalization Act if the crime is a felony under state law but only a misdemeanor under federal law?

No. The Court ruled 8-1 that a drug crime must be a felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in order to count as an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA. The opinion by Justice David Souter rejected as unnatural the government's interpretation of the term "aggravated felony" in the INA as encompassing any state-law felony punishable under the CSA, whether as a felony or not. Instead, the Court looked to the crimes classified as felonies in the CSA in order to define INA aggravated felonies. Illicit trafficking is a felony drug crime under the CSA, but the Court ruled that Lopez's drug-possession crime could not be considered "trafficking." The Court's approach avoided state-by-state disparities in the types of crimes that can be used to justify deportation.

United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (No. 06-562)

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United States v. Resendiz-Ponce (No. 05-998)

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Uttecht v. Brown (No. 06-413)

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Wallace v. Kato (No. 05-1240)

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 require an employer to consider merging an employee pension plan into a multiemployer pension plan prior to terminating the plan?

No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "merger is not a permissible method of terminating a single-employer defined-benefit pension plan." Therefore, PACE's argument that Crown was required by ERISA to consider merger as a method of terminating the pension plan was rejected. Since ERISA does not expressly list merger as a method of termination, the Court relied on the view of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) that merger is not covered under the statute's residual clause. This interpretation was supported by the structure of ERISA, which deals with mergers in a separate section.

Watson v. Philip Morris (No. 05-1284)

1) Does a police officer who stops a high-speed chase by ramming a fleeing suspect's car violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizure?

2) Was it "clearly established" in federal law that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment by using deadly force during a high-speed chase?

No. The Court ruled 8-1 that Scott's actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia relied heavily on a videotape of the car chase, which it said contradicted the plaintiff's claim that he was driving responsibly even while being pursued by the police. The majority held that "[...] it is clear from the videotape that [Harris] posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase." The opinion weighed the need to prevent the harm Harris could have caused against the high probability that Harris himself would be harmed by Scott's use of force. It also took into account Harris's culpability for starting the chase in the first place. The Court concluded that it is reasonable for a police officer to use deadly force to prevent harm to innocent bystanders, even to the point of putting the fleeing motorist at serious risk of injury or death. Justice Stevens's lone dissent argued that the videotape was not as definitive as the majority made it out to be and that a jury should make the determination on the justifiability of deadly force.

Watters v. Wachovia Bank (No. 05-1342)

Does a plaintiff alleging predatory buying in violation of the Sherman Act need to establish that the defendant paid so much for raw materials that it operated at a loss and the defendant had a "dangerous probability" of recouping its losses?

Yes. The Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit decision and ruled that the Brooke Group standard applies to predatory bidding as well as predatory pricing. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas noted the economic similarity between the monopoly conditions created by predatory pricing and the monopsony or "buyer's monopoly" conditions created by predatory bidding. The Court held that the "theoretical and practical similarities of predatory pricing and predatory bidding convince us that our two-pronged Brooke Group test should apply to predatory-bidding claims." Since Ross-Simmons had not met the Court's test, the jury's verdict against Weyerhaeuser was invalid.

Weyerhaeuser Company v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc. (No. 05-381)

1) Does a suit to recover property taxes imposed on property owned by a foreign state fall within the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act's "immovable property" exception to sovereign immunity?

2) Did the court of appeals err in relying on two international agreements to which the United States is not a party in the course of interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act?

Yes and unanswered. The Court held 7-2 that the "immovable property" exception to sovereign immunity in the FSIA covers disputes over tax liens on the property as well as disputes over ownership and possession. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas ruled that a tax lien, by both its dictionary definition and its practical effect, is an interest or right in property. This broad interpretation of the exception was consistent with Congress's purpose in passing FSIA to adopt a much more restrictive theory of sovereign immunity than the previous, virtually absolute one. The Court found some of the evidence from contemporaneous international agreements to be ambiguous and equivocal, but it held that its interpretation was consistent with Congress's intention to codify the state of international law at the time of FSIA's enactment. Justice Stevens's dissent argued that "[s]uch a broad exception to sovereign immunity threatens [...] to swallow the rule."

Whorton v. Bockting (No. 05-595)

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit fail to give proper deference to a trial judge's dismissal of a juror on the grounds that he could not carry out the duties of a juror in a capital sentencing case?

Yes. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled that appellate courts "owe deference to the trial court, which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror." Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The substance of the potential juror's comments had indicated confusion over the proper application of Washington's death penalty law, so the trial court had acted reasonably when it found the juror substantially impaired and excused him. The Court held that the trial judge was especially entitled to deference because the trial judge, unlike appellate judges, has access to contextual information that is not reflected in the transcript of the jury selection questioning. The Court also considered it significant that, although the defense counsel vigorously objected to other juror dismissals, he originally made no objection to the dismissal of the juror at issue in the subsequent appeal. Justice John Paul Stevens argued in dissent that "the Court has fundamentally redefined--or maybe just misunderstood--the meaning of 'substantially impaired,' and, in doing so, has gotten it horribly backwards."

Wilkie v. Robbins (No. 06-219)

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Winkelman v. Parma City School District (No. 05-983)

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Zuni Public School District v. U.S. Department of Education (No. 05-1508)

Is the causation standard for employee negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act different from the causation standard for railroad negligence?

No. The Court ruled unanimously that the causation standard for employee negligence is the same as the standard for railroad negligence. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts held that "the common law applied the same causation standard to defendant and plaintiff negligence, and FELA did not expressly depart from that approach." In the absence of any explicit indication from the text of FELA, the Court relied on common law principles of negligence. The Court held that Congress had most likely intended for juries to compare each party's contribution under the same standard - a simple "apples to apples" comparison. The Court ruled only that the causation standards were the same; it declined to rule on the question of what the standard of causation should be.