The Oyez Project: 2005 Term Decisions

Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corporation (No. 04-433)

May a corporation be held liable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for actions in which only it and its non-employee agents were involved?

Not answered. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted. They sent it back to the Eleventh Circuit to be considered in light of Anza v. Ideal Steel Corporation, another RICO case decided while Mohawk was pending before the Court.

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. (No. 04-944)

No details yet.

Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Ahlborn (No. 04-1506)

Did the federal appeals court err in applying Schlup v. Delo to hold that House's new evidence, though presenting at the very least an arguable claim of innocence, was legally insufficient to excuse his failure to present that evidence in state court? What constitutes a "truly persuasive showing of actual innocence" under Herrera v. Collins, sufficient to warrant freestanding habeas relief?

Yes, and unanswered. In a 5-3 decision, the Court ruled that the Court of Appeals was wrong to deny House's habeas petition. The opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy held that though the standard in Schlup v. Delo was "demanding," House's case was so extraordinary that it could be granted review despite his failure to present his new evidence in state court. This was because House's new evidence, while not necessarily proving his innocence, was sufficiently compelling that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court sent the case back to the lower courts with instructions to hear House's new claims.

The Justices declined to clarify the "persuasive demonstration of actual innocence" standard in Herrera v. Collins, except to note that since House's evidence just barely met the high standard in Schlup, it did not meet the "extraordinarily high" threshold in Herrera.

Chief Justice John Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. The dissent argued that under Schlup it was not enough for new evidence to cast doubt on House's conviction; the totality of the evidence had to prove "that House was actually innocent." The dissenters also stressed that the Court should defer to the District Court and not simply take the new evidence "at face value." Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.

Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy (No. 05-18)

No details yet.

Ash v. Tyson Foods (No. 05-379)

No details yet.

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England (No. 04-1144)

Does South Carolina's rule governing the admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt violate a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and compulsory process (the ability to compel witnesses to testify)?

In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito - his first as a Supreme Court Justice - held that evidence of third-party guilt brought by the defense could not be excluded only on the basis of the strength of the prosecution's case. Although the Constitution is not violated by the exclusion of evidence based on "certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury," the Court held that exclusion of a defendant's evidence based on the strength of the prosecution's evidence denies the defendant his constitutional right to "'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'"

Bank of China v. NBM LLC (No. 03-1559)

Does the phrase "waters of the United States" in the Clean Water Act include a wetland that at least occasionally empties into a tributary of a traditionally navigable water?

Unanswered. The closely-divided Court split 4-1-4, with Justice Anthony Kennedy providing the crucial fifth vote to reject the Sixth Circuit's decision.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by three other Justices. The plurality rejected the argument that only actually-navigable waters can be regulated by the Clean Water Act, but also held that the word "navigable" in the Act cannot be divested of all meaning. The plurality held that the definitional term "waters of the United States" can only refer to "relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water," not "occasional," "intermittent," or "ephemeral" flows. Furthermore, A mere "hydrological connection" is not sufficient to qualify a wetland as covered by the CWA; it must have a "continuous surface connection" with a "water of the United States" that makes it "difficult to determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland' begins."

Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, which disagreed with much of the plurality's reasoning. In Justice Kennedy's view, wetlands need not have a continuous surface connection to a continuously flowing body of water to be covered under the CWA, but mere adjacency to a tributary of a navigable water is not sufficient. Instead, Wetlands that are not adjacent to a traditionally navigable water must have a "significant nexus" with a one. This requirement is satisfied if the wetland has a significant effect on the water quality of navigable waters. Justice Kennedy suggested that Rapanos's wetlands may be covered under the CWA if more evidence of a significant nexus were presented.

Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissent argued that the Corps's regulations should be upheld as a reasonable interpretation of the Act. The inclusion of all wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters was most consistent with the CWA's purpose of eliminating pollution in the nation's waters.

Though the Court failed to obtain a majority on most of the legal issues presented by the case, the plurality and Justice Kennedy agreed to send the case back to the Sixth Circuit for a new decision based on a different analysis.

Beard v. Banks (No. 04-1739)

If a trial court judge wrongly denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney of his own choosing, is the defendant automatically entitled to have his conviction overturned?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court held that a denial of the Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of one's own choosing is "structural" error. Unlike some other kinds of errors in which a defendant must also prove that the result would likely have been different had his rights not been violated, structural errors must result in automatic reversal of the conviction. "[T]he erroneous denial of counsel bears directly on the 'framework within which the trial proceeds,'" Justice Scalia wrote. "It is impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings. ... Harmless error analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe."

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart (No. 05-502)

No details yet.

Brown v. Sanders (No. 04-980)

No details yet.

Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna (No. 04-1264)

(1) What is the scope of the "probate exception" to federal jurisdiction? (2) Does the exception apply to cases that do not directly involve the administration of a will or estate?

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the probate exception did not apply. The Court's opinion stressed the "distinctly limited scope" of the exception. The Justices explained that while the probate exception was intended to preserve state-court control over wills and estates, it does not remove from federal jurisdiction every suit arising out of probate matters. In Ms. Marshall's case, her claim did not directly involve the validation of J. Howard Marshall's will or the administration of his estate, so the exception did not apply and the federal courts had jurisdiction.

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White (No. 05-259)

No details yet.

Central VA Comm. College v. Katz (No. 04-885)

No details yet.

Clark v. Arizona (No. 05-5966)

No details yet.

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno (No. 04-1704)

Did Sheila White suffer retaliatory discrimination for which her employer may be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Yes. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that White suffered retaliatory discrimination when she was reassigned to less desirable duties and suspended without pay. Though the duties were within the same classification and the pay was eventually reinstated, the action was nevertheless sufficiently harsh to constitute retaliatory discrimination. In a decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and six other justices, the Court held that in order to prevail on a claim of retaliatory discrimination, "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." (internal citations omitted) Justice Samuel Alito wrote separately, agreeing with the result but arguing that the test adopted by the other members of the Court would eventually prove problematic.

Davis v. Washington (No. 05-5224)

No details yet.

Day v. McDonough (No. 04-1324)

May a county claim sovereign immunity under common law, even if the county is not acting as an "arm of the state"?

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled that Chatham County was not entitled to immunity from suit. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas held that since the county was not acting as an "arm of the state," it could not claim 11th Amendment immunity. The Court also refused to recognize a less expansive form of "residual" immunity for counties under common law.

Dixon v. United States (No. 05-7053)

No details yet.

Dolan v. United States Postal Service (No. 04-848)

No details yet.

Domino's Pizza v. McDonald (No. 04-593)

(1) May a defendant waive his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974? (2) May Zedner, who had previously signed a waiver of his rights under the Act, later base an appeal on the fact that such a waiver was invalid? (3) And was the judge's failure to exempt the 91-day period on the record harmless error?

No, yes, and no. In an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a defendant may not simply waive his right to a speedy trial under the Act. The list of acceptable reasons for an "ends-of-justice" order by the judge includes specific mention of the defendant's need for time to obtain counsel and prepare his case. If the defendant could simply waive his rights under the Act in order to meet these needs, the judge would not need to give them special consideration.

eBay v. MercExchange (No. 05-130)

No details yet.

Empire HealthChoice Assurance v. McVeigh (No. 05-200)

No details yet.

Evans v. Chavis (No. 04-721)

No details yet.

Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales (No. 04-1376)

Do the parents or school system bear the burden of proof in disputes over a child's individualized education program under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?

In a 6 to 2 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the party bringing the suit bears the burden of proof, whether that party is the parents or the school system. In the majority opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that "absent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise, ... we will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief."

Garcetti v. Ceballos (No. 04-473)

Under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in Crawford v. Washington, may statements made to police during investigation of a crime, though not made with the intent to preserve evidence, be admitted in court without allowing defendants to cross-examine the person who made the original statements?

Yes. In a 9-0 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, does not apply to "non-testimonial" statements not intended to be preserved as evidence at trial. Although McCottry identified her attacker to the 911 operator, she provided the information intending to help the police resolve an "ongoing emergency," not to testify to a past crime. The Court reasoned that under the circumstances, McCottry was not acting as a "witness," and the 911 transcript was not "testimony." Therefore, the Sixth Amendment did not require her to appear at trial and be cross-examined. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that though McCottry's statements were not testimonial, the Court should not "guess" at the primary motive behind the statements. This case was decided with Hammon v. Indiana.

Georgia v. Randolph (No. 04-1067)

Does the Civil Service Reform Act prevent a federal employee from bringing suit against his employer in federal district court to challenge alleged constitutional and statutory violations?

No. In an anonymous 8-0 opinion, the Court reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court explained that while the Civil Service Reform Act does not itself enable federal courts to hear civil suits, neither does it remove the jurisdiction over civil suits that federal courts have under other statutes. The Justices declined to rule on whether the District Court should have taken Whitman's case, because lower courts had not determined exactly "where Whitman's claims fit within the statutory scheme." The Court sent the case back to the Court of Appeals with instructions to rule on this question. (Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.)

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal (No. 04-1084)

May Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenge the constitutionality of the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act in federal court before it is put into effect? Does the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act, through the judicial bypass procedure or other safeguards, adequately protect the health of minors seeking abortions?

In a rare unanimous decision regarding abortion, the Supreme Court sidestepped the most contentious questions of the case and focused instead on the proper remedy when a portion of a statute is found unconstitutional. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that the statute would be unconstitutional when applied to the very small percentage of minors for whom an emergency abortion would be necessary to avert serious damage to their health. The lower court's decision to invalidate the entire statute based on its unconstitutional results in this small percentage of cases, however, was unnecessary. Instead, O'Connor wrote, "in this case the lower courts can issue a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting [only] the statute's unconstitutional application."

O'Connor warned, however, that a court should be wary of upholding an act while strike down some of its applications when it was obvious that a legislature would prefer the entire act be declared unconstitutional. Because of some disagreement about which course the legislature would have preferred - wholesale nullification or narrower individual rulings - the Court remanded the case to lower court to determine legislative intent.

Gonzales v. Oregon (No. 04-623)

No details yet.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (No. 05-184)

No details yet.

Hammon v. Indiana (No. 05-5705)

No details yet.

Hartman v. Moore (No. 04-1495)

Could the United States offset Social Security benefits to collect a student loan debt that had been outstanding for over 10 years?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Debt Collection Improvement Act made Social Security benefits subject to offset and that the Higher Education Technical Amendments removed the 10-year limit that would otherwise bar the offset.

Hill v. McDonough (No. 05-8794)

No details yet.

Holmes v. South Carolina (No. 04-1327)

Does a prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines, and photographs to the worst-behaved prisoners violate the First Amendment?

No. In a 6-2 decision, the Court reversed the Third Circuit and upheld the prison's policy. The plurality opinion by Justice Breyer held that Banks had failed to present sufficient evidence that the prison had acted unreasonably in denying newspapers, magazines, and photographs to its most troublesome inmates. The Court found that the policy met the four-part test established in Turner v. Safley: (1) it was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of motivating good behavior; (2) though prisoners had no alternate means of exercising their rights, they could potentially graduate to the less-restrictive level 1; (3) accommodating prisoners' rights could result in negative consequences (worse behavior); and (4) there was no alternate means of accomplishing the prison's goals without restricting the prisoners' rights. Justice Thomas concurred separately in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, arguing that "This case reveals the shortcomings of the Turner framework." Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both wrote dissents. Justice Stevens called the policy "perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control," while Justice Ginsburg criticized the high evidentiary burden the plurality placed on the prisoners. Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.

House v. Bell (No. 04-8990)

No details yet.

Howard Delivery Service v. Zurich American Insurance Company (No. 05-128)

No details yet.

Hudson v. Michigan (No. 04-1360)

May a court of appeals review the sufficiency of evidence supporting a jury's verdict if the appellant failed to renew the motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) or move for a new trial under Rule 59?

No. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that a party must renew its motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) if the motion is to be the basis for an appeal. The District Court's denial of the initial Rule 50(a) motion could not itself form the basis of an appeal, because the denial was within the District Court's discretion. "The only error here," Justice Thomas noted, "was counsel's failure to file a postverdict motion pursuant to Rule 50(b)." Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Kennedy, arguing that in exceptional cases courts of appeals can consider substantive issues even when procedural oversights by appellants would normally preclude them.

IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez (No. 03-1238)

Did the Fair Labor Standards Act require employers to pay employees for time spent walking to and from stations that distributed required safety equipment?

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, for a unanimous Court, wrote that putting on required safety equipment qualified as a "principal activity" under the FLSA. The workday began when employees started that activity and therefore included the subsequent time spent walking to the worksite. The time spent waiting to put on safety equipment before that, however, was not included in the workday because it was a "preliminary" activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act.

Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink (No. 04-1329)

Can a competitor be "injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when the competitor is not the party defrauded and did not rely on the fraudulent behavior, but claims to have lost a competitive advantage because of the fraud?

No. Eight members of the Supreme Court agreed that Ideal did not have standing to bring the suit because the relationship between its injuries and the fraudulent conduct of National was too remote. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a seven-member majority, wrote that "[w]hen a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries. In the instance case, the answer is no." Justice Stephen Breyer wrote separately to say that the decisive factor in this case was not just the indirectness of the injury but also the fact that legitimate business practices (the lowering of prices) had actually caused it, even though those practices were made possible by the fraud. The ninth member - Justice Clarence Thomas - wrote that while he disagreed with the other justices' concern about directness, he too would have ruled in National's favor because the case had nothing to do with organized crime, RICO's original target.

Jones v. Flowers (No. 04-1477)

Does Section 1 of the Sherman Act always prohibit a lawful joint venture from setting the prices at which its goods will be sold?

No. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court ruled that the per se rule against price-fixing should not be applied to price-setting by joint ventures. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas held that "though Equilon's pricing policy may be price fixing in a literal sense, it is not price fixing in the antitrust sense." The Court distinguished 'horizontal' price-fixing schemes between competitors, which are per se illegal, from the "internal pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture," which are not.

Kansas v. Marsh (No. 04-1170)

Are class action securities fraud suits brought under state law pre-empted by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 if the suits allege that misleading statements or omissions induced brokers to hold, not sell or purchase, securities?

Yes. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court held that "holder" class actions such as Dabit's are "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a security and therefore are pre-empted by SLUSA. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens reasoned that Congress must have been aware of the broad interpretation the Court had given that phrase when it passed SLUSA, and that a broad interpretation of SLUSA is more consistent with the law's stated purpose. "For purposes of SLUSA pre-emption, that distinction [between sellers/purchasers and holders] is irrelevant," Justice Stevens wrote.

Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust (No. 05-409)

No details yet.

Lab Corp. v. Metabolite (No. 04-607)

No details yet.

Lance v. Dennis (No. 05-555)

No details yet.

League of Latin American Citizens v. Perry (No. 05-204)

No details yet.

Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche (No. 04-712)

No details yet.

Lockhart v. United States (No. 04-881)

No details yet.

Marshall v. Marshall (No. 04-1544)

May a creditor seek priority status in a bankruptcy case to recover unpaid premiums owed for legally-required workers' compensation insurance?

No. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that the workers' compensation insurance was different from the sort of employee benefit programs for which creditors could be given priority under Chapter 11. The programs for which preferred status was authorized were those whose main beneficiaries were the employees, and which could be offered as an alternative to wage increases. The workers' compensation insurance mandated in this case, however, benefited the employer as much as the employees (because it protected them from liability) and were legally required, not given as part of employment negotiations. Justice Ginsburg wrote that, though the question was a close one, "we are guided in reaching our decision by the equal distribution objective underlying the Bankruptcy Code, and the corollary principle that provisions allowing preferences must be tightly construed."

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp. (No. 04-1140)

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, may a party avoid arbitration by arguing that the contract in which the arbitration clause is contained is illegal?

No. The 7-1 majority (Justice Samuel Alito not participating) ruled that challenges to the legality of a contract as a whole must be argued before the arbitrator rather than a court. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia explained that "unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance." The Court held that the Florida Supreme Court had been wrong to rely on a distinction between void and merely voidable contracts, because the word "contract" in the Federal Arbitration Act includes contracts later found to be void. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented due to his long-held view that the FAA does not apply in state courts.

Maryland v. Blake (No. 04-373)

Can a federal district court's decision to send a case back to state court because its removal to federal court was not required by the Security Litigation Uniform Standards Act be reviewed by a circuit court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. 1447(d)?

No. In an opinion by Justice David Souter, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the district court's decision had been jurisdictional and that the appeals court's review was therefore barred by 1447(d). Quoting Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, Justice Souter wrote that "where the order is based on one of the [grounds enumerated in 28 U.S.C. 1447(c)], review is unavailable no matter how plain the legal error in ordering the remand."

Merrill Lynch v. Dabit (No. 04-1371)

Did the Controlled Substances Act authorize the attorney general to ban the use of controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide in Oregon?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Congress intended the CSA to prevent doctors only from engaging in illicit drug dealing, not to define general standards of state medical practice. Moreover, the CSA did not authorize Attorney General John Ashcroft to declare a medical practice authorized under state law to be illegitimate.

Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi (No. 04-1095)

(1) Does a statute that provides for the death penalty when mitigating and aggravating factors are in equipoise violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment? (2) Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review the Kansas Supreme Court's judgment?

No and Yes. By a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court and upheld the Kansas death penalty statute. The Court found that the Kansas Supreme Court's decision had necessarily rested on a federal constitutional issue, so the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The opinion by Justice Thomas drew a comparison with a similar death penalty statute in Arizona that was upheld in Walton v. Arizona. The Court decided to let the Walton precedent stand and uphold the Kansas statute as well. Even apart from the Walton precedent, however, the Court would have upheld the statute as "consistent with Eighth Amendment requirements." As long as juries are allowed to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence, states are allowed to require the death penalty when aggravating and mitigating factors are equally balanced. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented from the Court's opinion. Justice Souter wrote that various death penalty precedents suggested that the statute could not stand up to "reasoned moral judgment." He called the Kansas death penalty statute "morally absurd," "a moral irrationality," and "obtuse by any moral or social measure." Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent arguing that the Court should never have agreed to hear the case.

Mohawk Industries v. Williams (No. 05-465)

No details yet.

Northern Insurance Company of New York v. Chatham County, GA (No. 04-1618)

Under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959, are suits brought by insurers against beneficiaries to recoup medical expenses heard in federal or state court?

In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that jurisdiction for this case lay in state court. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that while FEHBA stated that any claims against the United States would be heard in federal district court, it made no provisions for suits brought by insurers seeking to recoup medical expenses from private beneficiaries. Absent that specific provision, a significant conflict with an identifiable federal interest, or the need to resolve a substantial question of federal law in order to establish the insurer's right to recovery, there was no reason to depart from the ordinarily-governing state law. Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Souter and Alito dissented.

Oregon v. Guzek (No. 04-928)

No details yet.

Randall v. Sorrell (No. 04-1528)

Did the Fourth Amendment prohibit police from conducting a warrantless search of a person who was subject to a parole search condition, where there was no suspicion of criminal wrongdoing and the sole reason for the search was because the person was on parole?

No. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Samson "did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate." Parole allows convicted criminals out of prison before their sentence is completed. An inmate who chooses to complete his sentence outside of direct physical custody, however, remains in the Department of Correction's legal custody until the conclusion of his sentence, and therefore has significantly reduced privacy rights. In this case, Samson had also been required, as a condition of his parole, to sign an agreement that he would be "subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer..., with or without a search warrant and with or without cause." This written consent to suspicionless searches, along with his already reduced privacy interests as a parolee, combined to make the search constitutional. Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer dissented, arguing that parolees have an expectation of privacy greater than that of prisoners, which was violated by the search at issue in this case.

Rapanos v. United States (No. 04-1034)

(1) Does Article 36 of the Vienna Convention create individual, substantive rights? (2) Must evidence obtained after a violation of Article 36 be excluded from trial? (3) May a state refuse to consider a claim of a violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention because of a procedural bar under state law?

Unanswered, and no. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Oregon Supreme Court and ruled that evidence obtained in violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention need not be excluded from trial. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts held that it would be "startling" if the Vienna Convention required suppression of evidence as a penalty for its violation, since the United States is the only country to have the "exclusionary rule" for illegaly-obtained evidence. Absent any language in the Convention requiring suppression, the Court could not impose it on states. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an Article 36 violation was not the type of evidence-related violation that normally requires the exclusionary rule. The Court declined to decide the larger issue of whether the Vienna Convention creates individual rights that are enforcable in court. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissenters would have decided that the Convention did create individual rights. Justice Breyer also thought that "suppression may sometimes provide an appropriate remedy" for Article 36 violations.

With respect to state law, the Court ruled that states are allowed to have procedural rules that require courts to deny Article 36 claims if they are not raised at the proper time. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts noted that the Convention provides that Article 36 "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State." In an adversarial system like that of the United States, the Court ruled, this means that states must be allowed to decide when claims need to be raised. The Justices also ruled that rulings of the International Court of Justice are not binding on U.S. courts. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissent took exception to the absolute language of the majority opinion, arguing that "sometimes state procedural default rules must yield" to the Convention's requirement that domestic laws give it "full effect."

Rice v. Collins (No. 04-52)

Yes. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, does not apply to "non-testimonial" statements not intended to be preserved as evidence at trial. In Hammon's case, however, the Court ruled that Mrs. Hammon's statements to the police were testimonial. At the time of her questioning, Hammon faced "no emergency in progress" and "no immediate threat to her person." Instead, the relative safety of the conversation between Mrs. Hammon and the officer made it "formal enough" to qualify as a "testimonial" statement intended as evidence of the past crime. The Court left open the possibility that Hershel Hammon could have forfeited his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him by coercively preventing his wife from testifying. Otherwise, however, the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment did not allow Mrs. Hammon's testimony to be used against Mr. Hammon without her presence at the trial. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent criticizing the Court's test as unworkable. In Justice Thomas's view, Hammon's statement was not testimonial, because the conversation was not a "formalized dialogue." This case was decided along with Davis v. Washington.

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR) (No. 04-1152)

1) If a claim under the FTCA is dismissed on the grounds that it is covered by one of the Act's exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity, is the dismissal a final judgment that bars a subsequent suit against the individual federal employees who were involved? 2) Did the Circuit Court have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to hear an appeal of the District Court's order?

Unanswered, and no. In a unanimous opinion, the Court ruled that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Writing for the Court, Justice David Souter stressed the narrow scope of the doctrine. The Court reiterated that only orders that cannot be "effectively" reviewed after a final judgment can be appealed before the close of the trial. Essential to this determination is the importance of the interest at stake. In this case, the Court ruled that the agents' interest in appealing the District Court's order had no "greater importance than the typical defense of claim preclusion" and it therefore warranted "no immediate appeal of right as a collateral order."

S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection (No. 04-1527)

Is there a constitutional right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to introduce evidence of innocence during the sentencing phase of a trial?

No. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the Court: "We can find nothing in the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments that provides a capital defendant a right to introduce new evidence of this kind at sentencing." States are free "to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted." This can include excluding the introduction of evidence of innocence from the sentencing phase.

Samson v. California (No. 04-9728)

No details yet.

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (No. 04-10566)

Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 require the government to permit the importation, distribution, possession and use of an otherwise illegal drug by a religious organization when Congress has found that the drug has a high potential for abuse, is unsafe for use even under medical supervision, and violates an international treaty when imported or distributed?

Yes. In a unanimous 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court held that the government had failed to prove a compelling interest in regulating the UDV's use of drugs for religious purposes. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the government's argument that the Controlled Substances Act could accommodate no exceptions. On the contrary, Justice Roberts wrote, the Court is required by the RFRA to examine individual religious freedom claims and grant exceptions to generally-applicable laws where no compelling government interest can be shown.

The Court also rejected the argument that an exception for UDV was precluded by international treaty. The government failed to submit "evidence addressing the international consequences of granting an exemption for the UDV," instead citing "the general importance of honoring international obligations and of maintaining the leadership position of the United States in the international war on drugs." The Court held that such general government interests were not sufficient to satisfy the compelling interest standard.

Schaffer v. Weast (No. 04-698)

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Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (NOW) (No. 04-1244)

Do hydroelectric dams result in "discharge" under the meaning of Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the term "discharge" in section 401 had historically been given a broad meaning by FERC, the Environmental Protection Agency, and even the Supreme Court. Justice David Souter, in the Opinion of the Court, wrote that "[w]hen it applies to water, 'discharge' commonly means a 'flowing or issuing out.' ... In fact, this understanding of the word was accepted by all Members of the Court sitting in our only other case focused on Section 401 of the Clean Water Act." The discharge from hydroelectric dams fit this definition perfectly, and Section 401 therefore mandated state approval.

Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. (No. 05-260)

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Texaco Inc. v. Dagher (No. 04-805)

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United States v. Georgia (No. 04-1203)

Are law enforcement agents liable for retaliatory prosecution in violation of a defendant's First Amendment free speech rights when the prosecution was supported by probable cause?

No. In a 5-2 decision, the Court ruled in favor of the postal inspectors, overruling the Court of Appeals. The opinion by Justice David Souter held that plaintiffs alleging retaliatory prosecution must prove that the law enforcement agents lacked probable cause. Probable cause, the Court ruled, is a crucial component of the "chain of causation" needed to evaluate retaliatory prosecution charges. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justice Breyer joined. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito took no part in the decision.

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (No. 05-352)

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United States v. Grubbs (No. 04-1414)

When a state court denies a habeas petition summarily, without explanation, does the time that a defendant spent filing that petition count toward the one-year statute of limitations in federal habeas appeals under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act?

Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the California Supreme Court's summary denial was not necessarily an indication that the petition was timely under state law. The petition was in fact untimely because the three-year delay could not be considered a "reasonable time," which is the timeliness standard for filing a petition under California law. If the state petition was untimely, it could not be considered "pending" between the time of the lower court's denial and the filing of the state habeas petition. Therefore, the Court held that the three-year filing delay did count towards the AEDPA's one-year limitation, meaning the federal habeas petition was also untimely.

United States v. Olson (No. 04-759)

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Unitherm Food Systems v. Swift Eckrich (No. 04-597)

Can a violation of Blakely v. Washington's rule that all factors used in sentencing enhancements must be found by a jury, not a judge, be found legally harmless?

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Blakely violations do not "necessarily render[] a criminal trial unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence." (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1) As such, the defendant is not entitled to an automatic reversal and the prosecution may attempt to argue that the jury would have returned the same result if the error had not occurred.

Volvo Trucks North America v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. (No. 04-905)

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Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt (No. 04-1186)

Did the Fourth Amendment require suppression of evidence seized during a search that had been authorized by an anticipatory warrant, when the warrant's triggering events were not shown to the person searched?

No. Justice Antonin Scalia, in the majority opinion, wrote that under the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement a warrant need not set out the conditions that trigger it, only the place to be searched and the persons or things to be searched for. The fact that the triggering conditions were included in the affidavit, even if they were never showed to Grubbs, was therefore sufficient.

Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation (No. 04-631)

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Washington v. Recuenco (No. 05-83)

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Whitman v. Dept. of Transportation (No. 04-1131)

Did Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 validly abrogate state sovereign immunity for suits by prisoners with disabilities challenging discrimination by state prisons? Was Title II a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to the administration of prison systems?

Yes and yes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that Title II abrogates sovereign immunity in cases where violations of the 8th Amendment are alleged. The 14th Amendment incorporates the 8th Amendment (that is, applies it to the states). Congress can enforce the 14th Amendment against the states "by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations" of its provisions, which can involve abrogating state sovereign immunity. However, the Court did not address the question of whether Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity when the 8th Amendment is not involved.

Will v. Hallock (No. 04-1332)

Does the AEDPA allow a federal court to reject the presumption of correctness for a state-court finding of fact as an "unreasonable determination of the facts," even when a rational fact finder could have determined the facts as the state court did?

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. The Court ruled that the state court did not act unreasonably when it determined that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations were credible. Although there might have been some evidence that could be interpreted as undermining the prosecutor's credibility, the trial court was in a better position to determine those facts. The Court faulted the Ninth Circuit for substituting "its own debatable interpretation of the record" for the trial courts findings, and for "misapplying settled rules that limit [the Circuit Court's] role and authority."

Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission (FEC) (No. 04-1581)

Does the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act permit parents to recover fees they pay to experts during legal actions against school districts?

No. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court held that IDEA did not authorize reimbursement of expert fees. "While authorizing the award of reasonable attorney's fees, the Act contains detailed provisions that are designed to ensure that such awards are indeed reasonable," Justice Alito wrote. "The absence of any comparable provisions relating to expert fees strongly suggests that recovery of expert fees is not authorized." Justice Alito went on to write that the case was made even simpler by the fact that, as an exercise of Congress's Spending Clause power, any provision requiring reimbursement of expert fees would have had to be "unambiguous," which it clearly was not. Justice Ginsburg, who joined the majority in finding that expert fees were not covered, wrote separately to disagree with that portion of the opinion.

Woodford v. Ngo (No. 05-416)

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Zedner v. United States (No. 05-5992)

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