Argument of Speaker
Mr. Speaker: Justice Alito has the opinion in 05-18, Arlington Central School District Board of Education versus Murphy.
Argument of Justice Alito
Mr. Alito: This case comes to us on writ of certiorari to the Untied States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit.
Respondents prevailed in an action on behalf of their son under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, or IDEA.
They then sought reimbursement for expert fees.
The District Court granted their request in part, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Noting two of our decisions, the Court of Appeals recognized that a fee-shifting provision will not be read to permit the recovery of expert fees without, “explicit statutory authority indicating that Congress intended for that sort of fee-shifting”.
Ultimately, though, the Court of Appeals was persuaded by a conference committee report and concluded that the IDEA authorized the award of expert fees.
In an opinion filed with the Clerk today, we reverse.
Our decision is guided by the fact that Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant to the spending clause.
Although Congress has broad power to set the terms on which it disperses federal money to the states, those conditions must be set out unambiguously.
The text of the IDEA provides that, “in any action or proceeding brought under this Section, the Court in its discursion may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party”.
While the Act provides for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, it does not even hint that acceptance of IDEA funds makes the state responsible for reimbursing expert fees.
Other provisions of the IDEA point in the same direction, and apart from the text, perhaps the strongest support for our interpretation is supplied by our decisions in the two cases I mentioned previously, Crawford Fitting Company versus J. T. Gibbons, Inc., and West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey.
The reasoning of Crawford Fitting strongly supports the conclusion that the term “costs” here is defined by the categories of expenses enumerated in the cost statute, 28 USC Section 1920, which is strictly limited by Section 1821; and in Casey, we interpreted language in a fee-shifting provision that was virtually identical to the language here and concluded that it did not authorize the award of expert fees.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals’ reliance on a footnote in West Virginia University Hospital v. Casey, which commented on the conference committee report, suggesting that the IDEA provision here contemplated reimbursement for exert fees, is misplaced.
The footnote did not state that the conference committee report set out the correct interpretation of the provision here, much less that the report was sufficient, despite the language of the statute to provide the clear notice required.
Justice Ginsburg has filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment; Justice Souter has filed a dissenting opinion; Justice Breyer has filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens and Souter have joined.
