Marshall v. Marshall - Opinion Announcement

Argument of Speaker

Mr. Speaker: Justice Ginsburg has the opinion in 04-1544, Marshall versus Marshall.

Argument of Justice Ginsburg

Mr. Ginsburg: This case concerns the claim of petitioner Vickie Lynn Marshall to share in the large fortune of her deceased husband, J. Howard Marshall.

Petitioner alleges that J. Howard intended to provide for her well-being after his death by placing in trust for her benefit one-half of the appreciation of his assets from the date of their marriage in June 1994 until the date of his death in August 1995.

Vickie centrally asserts that J. Howard’s son, E. Pierce Marshall, respondent in this case and ultimate beneficiary of J. Howard’s estate plan, tortiously impeded her receipt of the precisely described gift she anticipated.

The contest between Vickie and Pierce played out on two fronts, in a Texas probate court and in federal bankruptcy and district courts.

Pierce was the victor in the state probate court; Vickie prevailed in the federal trial-court proceedings.

Asserting that the only the Texas probate court had authority to deal with the dispute, Pierce invoked the so-called probate exception to the exercise of federal-court jurisdiction.

The U.S. District Court rejected that plea, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit agreed with Pierce that the probate exception applied, rendering the Texas probate court exclusively competent to resolve the dispute.

We reverse that determination.

Our opinion discusses two limitations on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, the so-called domestic relations and probate exceptions.

Neither is compelled by the text of the Constitution or Federal Statute.

Both are judicially created doctrines stemming, in large measure, from misty understandings of English legal history.

In a 1992 decision, Ankenbrandt v. Richards, this Court reigned in the domestic-relations exception, confining it to divorce, alimony and child-custody decrees and rejecting more expansive interpretations.

Earlier, in a 1946 decision, Malcolm against Allen, the Court endeavored similarly to contain the probate exception.

That decision upheld federal-court jurisdiction in the case than before the courts.

But Malcolm caused confusion because of its less than meticulously crafted language.

Malcolm stated that federal jurisdiction, otherwise proper, could be exercised in matters relating to a decedent’s fortune, so long as the federal court does not interfere with the probate proceedings.

Some lower federal courts, including the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, read the words “interfere with” expansively to block federal jurisdiction over a range of matters well beyond the admission of a will to probate or the administration of a decedent’s estate.

We hold today that the probate exception reserves to state courts the probate or annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent’s estate.

It also, and most importantly, precludes federal courts from disposing of property that is in the custody of a state court.

But that is the sum and substance of it.

The probate exception does not bar federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those confines and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.

Vickie Marshall’s claim, we explain, falls entirely outside the tight bounds of the probate exception and, as the District Court held, qualifies for adjudication in federal court.

While we reverse the 9th Circuit’s judgment, we note issues remaining open for that court’s consideration on remand.

Justice Stevens has filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.