Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (NOW) - Opinion Announcement

Argument of Speaker

Mr. Speaker: Justice Breyer has the opinion in No. 04-1244, Scheidler versus National Organization for Women, and 04-1352, Operation Rescue versus National Organization for Women.

Argument of Justice Breyer

Mr. Breyer: The respondents in this litigation, which has been going on for a long time, the respondents are a pro-choice organization.

They have sued the petitioners.

The petitioners engage in pro-life demonstrations at clinics that provide abortions.

Now, the respondents are seeking an injunction issued by the Court, which would prohibit acts of violence at the clinics.

They are basing their legal claim not on a specific statute which exists about abortion clinics, but rather on a general criminal statute, the Hobbs Act, an Act that prohibits robbery and extortion that affects interstate commerce.

We previously decided that respondents failed to show that the petitioners were involved in robbery or extortion, so the Act doesn’t apply; but the petitioners have shown acts of violence not related to extortion or robbery; and that has come back to us and they want to base their injunction on those acts, and so we have to decide whether the Hobbs Act forbids violence, plain and simple.

Well, the Hobbs Act says that an individual commits a federal crime if he or she, “obstructs, delays or affects commerce”, by, “robbery” or, “extortion” or -- and these are the key words -- “committing or threatening physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section".

The question in the case concerns the meaning of the words "in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section".

Does that phrase refer to violence committed pursuant to the plans or purposes that affect interstate commerce through robbery or extortion, or does it refer to violence committed pursuant to the plans or purposes that affect interstate commerce, plain and simple?

If the former, the statute governs only a limited subset of violent behavior; namely, violent behavior connected to robbery and extortion.

If it’s the latter, the statute governs a much broader range of human activity; namely, all violent actions against persons or property that affect interstate commerce.

Well, we think that the former, the more restrictive reading of the Act.

It’s an important federal criminal statute.

We think that former limited interpretation is the correct interpretation.

First, the language of the statute makes the more restrictive reading the more natural reading.

The text that precedes the physical violence clause does not forbid obstructing or delaying or affecting commerce; what it forbids is obstructing, delaying or affecting commerce by robbery or extortion.

The phrase in question speaks of an earlier violation, and robbery and extortion are the only earlier violations that are mentioned.

Second, the history makes very clear that this more restrictive reading is correct.

In an earlier 1946 version of the Act, Congress put its prohibitions against robbery and extortion in Section 2.

It then put the prohibition against violence in Section 5, and what it said in Section 5 was the kind of violence that were it prohibiting is the kind of violence that is connected with a purpose to violate Section 2, which was where robbery and extortion was referred to.

The present language of the Hobbs Act is not that clear, but the changes from the earlier Act reflect nothing more than a re-codification of the statute, not an effort to change the crime.

Third, the broad interpretation that respondents advocate would federalize an enormous amount of ordinary criminal behavior ranging from simple assault to murder, behavior that is typically the subject of state, not federal, prosecutions.

Not surprisingly, decisions of this Court and other Courts of Appeals have assumed that Congress did not intend the Hobbs Act to have so broad a reach.

That perhaps is why Congress thought it necessary to enact, and in 1994 did enact, a specific statute aimed indirectly at clinic violence, a statute, as I have said, that is not an issue in this case.

We conclude that Congress did not intend to create a freestanding physical-violence offense in the Hobbs Act.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for entry of judgment for petitioners.

Our decision is unanimous; Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.