The Oyez Project: 2004 Term Decisions

Alaska v. United States (No. 128 ORIG)

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American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n (No. 03-1230)

Does the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801) exceed Congress' power under the commerce clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical use?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the commerce clause gave Congress authority to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, despite state law to the contrary. Stevens argued that the Court's precedent "firmly established" Congress' commerce clause power to regulate purely local activities that are part of a "class of activities" with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority argued that Congress could ban local marijuana use because it was part of such a "class of activities": the national marijuana market. Local use affected supply and demand in the national marijuana market, making the regulation of intrastate use "essential" to regulating the drug's national market. The majority distinguished the case from Lopez and Morrison. In those cases, statutes regulated non-economic activity and fell entirely outside Congress' commerce power; in this case, the Court was asked to strike down a particular application of a valid statutory scheme.

Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States (No. 04-368)

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Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (No. 03-184)

Is the vacating of a state conviction a "fact" as that term is used in the federal law setting out a statute of limitations on federal sentence modification motions, thus commencing the statute's 1-year limitations period?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court that the vacating of a state sentence that underlay a federal sentence enhancement was a "fact" within the meaning of the law, but that fact had to have been discovered with due diligence: that is, the prisoner must have promptly sought to have the state judgment vacated. The Court held that by waiting until more than three years after his federal sentence, Johnson failed to show due diligence in seeking to have his original state convictions vacated.

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (No. 03-388)

Did the FCC lawfully interpret the Communications Act of 1934 by deciding that broadband cable companies did not provide a "telecommunications service?"

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the FCC lawfully construed the Communications Act to not define cable broadband providers as "telecommunications services." The Court held that the Ninth Circuit should have followed the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. That decision required federal courts to defer to an agency's construction of a statute, if that statute was within the agency's jurisdiction to administer and the agency's interpretation was reasonable, even if it differed from the court's own interpretation. In this case, the Court held that the FCC's construction was reasonable.

Bell v. Cone (No. 04-394)

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Bell v. Thompson (No. 04-514)

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Bradshaw v. Stumpf (No. 04-637)

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Brosseau v. Haugen (No. 03-1261)

1. Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" 2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation?

Yes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses."

Brown v. Payton (No. 03-1039)

Did federal law establishing for trucks the Single State Registration System (SSRS) preempt a separate Michigan registration fee?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that "reference to text, historical context, and purpose" proved that the words "state registration requirement" in the federal law applied only to state requirements concerning SSRS registration. The Michigan statute, the majority reasoned, had nothing to do with SSRS.

Castle Rock v. Gonzales (No. 04-278)

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Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma & Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation v. Leavitt (No. 02-1472)

Did the due process and equal protection clauses require the appointment of counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas, who sought access to a Michigan appellate court?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses required Michigan to provide counsel for defendants who wanted to appeal to the state appellate court. The Court reasoned that if indigent defendants convicted on their pleas did not have counsel to guide them through Michigan's complex appellate process, their right to appeal would not be meaningful.

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams (No. 03-1601)

May a federal court stay a habeas petition that included exhausted and unexhausted claims, when the stay was necessary to allow a petitioner to exhaust claims in state court without having the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) bar the right to a federal petition?

Yes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that a district court could stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present unexhausted claims in state court and then return to federal court. The Court recognized that its decision in Rose, combined with the one-year statute of limitations required by the AEDPA (enacted 14 years after Rose) could have permanently deprived petitioners like Rhines of the opportunity to seek federal review for unexhausted claims. As a result, federal district courts could grant a stay on a mixed petition if (1) there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims in state court, (2) the unexhausted claims had merit, and (3) the petitioner was not engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.

Clark v. Martinez (No. 03-878)

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Clingman v. Beaver (No. 04-37)

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Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. (No. 02-1192)

Did the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to pay "contract support costs," even if the government contends funds were not available?

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the government was legally bound to pay the contract support costs. Only in a "special" instance could the government break its promise to pay the costs. In this case, the government had access to sufficient unrestricted funds appropriated by Congress. Moreover, nothing in the act's language suggested it was non-binding.

Cutter v. Wilkinson (No. 03-9877)

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Deck v. Missouri (No. 04-5293)

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Devenpeck v. Alford (No. 03-710)

1. Is a federal court bound by the International Court of Justice's ruling that U.S. courts must reconsider a Mexican citizen's claim for relief under the Vienna Convention? 2. Should a federal court enforce an ICJ ruling?

In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that Medellin had not exhausted his state court appeals and sent the case back to Texas state court.

Dodd v. United States (No. 04-5286)

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Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo (No. 03-932)

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Exxon Corp v. Allapattah Services (No. 04-70)

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Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Industries (No. 03-1696)

If a state court rejected Pace's post-conviction appeal as untimely, could his federal habeas petition still be "properly filed" within the context of the federal law establishing a one-year statute of limitations for such petitions?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the federal statute of limitations barred Pace's petition, as it was filed beyond the deadline. Pace was not entitled to statutory tolling because a petition filed after a time limit, which does meet any exceptions to that limit, was no more "properly filed" than a petition filed after a time limit permitting no exception. Moreover, because Pace did not pursue claims in a "diligent" and timely fashion, he was not entitled equitable tolling for any of the time period during which he pursued his state appeals.

Florida v. Nixon (No. 03-931)

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Gonzales v. Raich (No. 03-1454)

(1) Does an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment when a police officer has probable cause to make an arrest for one offense, if that offense is not closely related to the offense articulated by the officer at the time of the arrest? (2) For the purposes of qualified immunity, was "closely related offense doctrine" clearly established given that different circuit courts disagreed on its application?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that police had probable cause to arrest Alford for impersonating a police officer, despite the fact that this was not closely related to the offense police identified during the arrest. A warrantless arrest by a police officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if, given the facts known to the officer, there is probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed. The offense establishing probable cause need not be closely related to the offense the arresting officer identifies at the time of arrest. An arresting officer's state of mind, except for facts he knows, is irrelevant to probable cause.

Gonzalez v. Crosby (No. 04-6432)

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Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering (No. 04-603)

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Graham County Water District v. United States (No. 04-169)

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Granholm v. Heald (No. 03-1116)

Was a police officer who shot a fleeing suspect entitled to qualified immunity?

Yes. In an 8-1 per curiam decision, the Court held that Brosseau was entitled to qualified immunity because the Court's previous cases did not clearly establish that shooting the fleeing Hogan would have violated his constitutional rights.

Halbert v. Michigan (No. 03-10198)

Does the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act) violate the First Amendment by requiring cattle producers to pay to fund advertising with which they disagree?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the fund was for government speech and that therefore the government could not be sued under the First Amendment. The Court pointed to the rule that while compelled funding of private speech raises First Amendment concerns, compelled funding of government speech generally does not.

Howell v. Mississippi (No. 03-9560)

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Illinois v. Caballes (No. 03-923)

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Internal Revenue Commissioner v. Banks (No. 03-892)

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Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education (No. 02-1672)

Does a state law that allows in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so, violate the dormant commerce clause in light of the 21st Amendment?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that both states' laws violated the commerce clause by favoring in-state wineries at the expense of out-of-state wineries and did so without the authorization of the 21st Amendment. State authority to engage in such economic discrimination was not the purpose the 21st Amendment. Moreover, in modern cases, that amendment did not save state laws violating other provisions of the Constitution.

Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (No. 03-674)

Did the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel require counsel to try to obtain material counsel had known the prosecution would probably use at the trial's sentencing phase?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Rompilla's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make reasonable efforts to examine the file on Rompilla's prior conviction for rape and assault. Moreover, counsel had known the prosecution would probably present the prior conviction to the jury during sentencing. In that file counsel would have found mitigating evidence about Rompilla's troubled childhood and mental health.

Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association (No. 03-1164)

Are individual retirement accounts (IRAs) exempt from bankruptcy estates?

Yes. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Rouseys could exempt IRA assets from their bankruptcy estate. IRAs met both federal requirements dealing with exemptions from bankruptcy: They were "similar plans or contracts" to the exemptions enumerated and they "conferred a right to receive payment on account of age."

Johnson v. California (No. 04-6964)

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Johnson v. California (No. 03-636)

Does shackling a convicted offender during the penalty phase of a capital case violate the due process clauses of the Fifth and 14th Amendment?

Yes. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the Court's 7-2 holding that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during both a capital trial's guilt and penalty phases, unless such shackling is justified by an essential state interest specific to the defendant on trial (such as courtroom security). The majority argued that the law has long forbidden use of visible shackles during a capital trial's guilt phase, and that the reasons underlying this prohibition (like the possibility shackles will bias the jury) extend this rule to the penalty phase.

Johnson v. U.S. (No. 03-9685)

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Kansas v. Colorado (No. 105 ORIG)

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Kelo v. City of New London (No. 04-108)

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Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, Bradley (No. 03-377)

Does a regulation amount to an unconstitutional taking "if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests?"

No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous opinion that the Court needed to "correct course" and make clear that the "substantially advances" formula put forth in Agins was inappropriate for determining whether a regulation amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking. Takings clause challenges to regulations had to be based on the severity of the burden that the regulation imposed upon property rights, not the effectivness of the regulation in furthering the governmental interest. The Court insisted that its ruling did not "disturb any of its prior holdings."

Kowalski v. Tesmer (No. 03-407)

Should federal courts make an exception to the full faith and credit statute for Fifth Amendment takings clause claims?

No. In a 9-0 judgment delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court refused to create an exception to the full faith and credit statute in order to provide a federal forum for litigants seeking to advance federal takings claims. The Court rejected the argument that whenever plaintiffs reserved their federal takings claims in state court, federal courts should review the reserved federal claims, regardless of the issues decided by the state court. Moreover, federal courts were not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can sue in federal court.

KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc. (No. 03-409)

Do state election laws that restrict the voters a party may invite to vote in its primary election violate the First Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system did not violate the right to freedom of association and that any burden it imposed was minor and justified by legitimate state interests. The Court noted that not every electoral law burdening associational rights was subject to strict scrutiny. Requiring voters to register with a party before participating in its primary minimally burdened voters' associational rights. Moreover, Oklahoma's primary advanced a number of state interests, including the preservation of parties as viable and identifiable interest groups.

Leocal v. Ashcroft (No. 03-583)

Were companies that distributed file-sharing software, and encouraged and profited from direct copyright infringement using such software, liable for the infringement?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that companies that distributed software, and promoted that software to infringe copyrights, were liable for the resulting acts of infringement. The Court argued that although the Copyright Act did not expressly make anyone liable for another's infringement, secondary liability doctrines applied here. The software in this case was used so widely to infringe copyrights that it would have been immensely difficult to deal with each individual infringer. The "only practical alternative" was to go against the software distributor for secondary liability. Here the software companies were liable for encouraging and profiting from direct infringement.

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A (No. 04-163)

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Mayle v. Felix (No. 04-563)

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McCreary County v. ACLU (No. 03-1693)

To prove "loss causation" in a securities fraud case, is it sufficient to show that the price of the security on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that an inflated purchase price did not by itself prove "loss causation." At most, an inflated purchase price suggested that misrepresentation "touched upon" a later economic loss, but did not necessarily cause it. The Court reasoned that at the moment the transaction took place, the plaintiff had not suffered a loss because the inflated purchase price was offset by ownership of a share that possessed equivalent value at that instant. Further, the logical link between the inflated purchase price and any later economic loss was not invariably strong, because other factors may have affected the price.

Medellin v. Dretke (No. 04-5928)

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Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (No. 03-1237)

May people whose rights guaranteed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are violated seek remedies other than those allowed by the act?

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Abrams could not enforce the limitations of the Telecommunications Act on local authorities through federal liability law, because the act provides its own judicial remedy. Congress could not have meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by the Telecommunications Act to co-exist with an alternative remedy.

MGM Studios v. Grokster (No. 04-480)

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Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n (No. 03-1234)

Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?"

No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."

Miller-El v. Dretke (No. 03-9659)

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Muehler v. Mena (No. 03-1423)

Is a state's practice of temporary racial segregation of state prisoners subject to strict scrutiny?

Yes. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that prison racial-segregation policies are subject to strict scrutiny. The Court rejected the claim that because the policy was "neutral" - because all prisoners were "equally" segregated - the policy was not subject to strict scrutiny. Racial classifications must receive strict scrutiny even when they may be said to affect the races equally. The Court remanded the case so that the Ninth Circuit could use strict scrutiny to review the policy. Justices John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas, and Antonin Scalia dissented.

National Cable and Telecomm. Assn v. Brand X Internet Services (No. 04-277)

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Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby (No. 02-1028)

1. Did federal law govern the interpretation of the ICC and Hamburg Sud bills of lading (contracts)? 2. Was Norfolk entitled to the protection of the liability limitations in both bills?

Yes and yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that federal law controlled the interpretation of both bills, because they were maritime contracts and the dispute was not inherently local. The Court also held that the 11th Circuit misinterpreted the bills as not protecting Norfolk.

Orff v. United States (No. 03-1566)

In Zadvydas v. Davis (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court said admitted immigrants could be detained for deportation for more than 90 days, but no longer than reasonably necessary. Did this ruling apply to inadmissible aliens, such as Benitez and Martinez?

Yes. In a 7-2 decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court said the requirement that immigrants be detained no longer than reasonably necessary for deportation applied to both admissible and inadmissible immigrants. Because readmission to Cuba was unforeseeable, the detentions of Martinez and Benitez were unreasonable. The Court refused to give the same immigration statute different interpretations based on immigrants' characteristics.

Pace v. DiGuglielmo (No. 03-9627)

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Pasquantino v. United States (No. 03-725)

(1) Was Stumpf's guilty plea to aggravated murder knowing, voluntary and intelligent? (2) Was his conviction valid, despite the state's use of a theory in the trial of Stumpf's accomplice that was inconsistent with its argument in Stumpf's trial?

Yes and possibly not. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Stumpf's plea was knowing and therefore valid, because his attorneys at the plea hearing had represented that they had explained the elements to Stumpf, who then confirmed this. The Court articulated the broad rule that constitutional requirements were satisfied when a defendant's competent counsel explained to him the charge's nature and the crime's elements. As for the prosecution's use of inconsistent theories in Stumpf's and Wesley's trials, the Court held that Stumpf's sentence may have been invalid, depending on the relationship between the prosecutor's conduct and Stumpf's death sentence.. The Court sent the question of that relationship back to the Sixth Circuit.

Rhines v. Weber (No. 03-9046)

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Rompilla v. Beard (No. 04-5462)

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Roper v. Simmons (No. 03-633)

After the U.S. Supreme Court had denied certiorari and a petition for rehearing to a death-row prisoner's case, did the Sixth Circuit abuse its discretion by withholding its mandate in the case for more than five months without entering a formal order?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit abused its discretion by withholding its mandate and not releasing its amended opinion for more than five months after the Supreme Court's final say in the case. The Sixth Circuit cost the state and the parties significant time and resources by not providing notification that it was reconsidering its decision. Further, the Sixth Circuit had the opportunity at the rehearing stage to consider the same mental health arguments it later adopted. Moreover, the evidence and its ommission did not warrant the court's "extraordinary departure from standard procedures." By withholding its mandate for months, the Court said, the Sixth Circuit failed to give the "appropriate level of respect" to Tennessee's judgment that Thompson deserved death. Notably, the Court declined to consider the scope of the appellate courts' Federal Appellate Procedure 41 authority to stay a mandate following a denial of certioarari.

Rousey v. Jacoway (No. 03-1407)

Is a conviction of driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury a "crime of violence" under federal immigration law that allows the person to be deported as an aggravated felon?

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Chief Justice William Rhenquist, the Court held that state DUI offenses, except when involving purposeful intent, are accidental and not crimes of violence under federal law. Le therefore did not commit an aggravated felony for which he could be deported.

San Diego v. Roe (No. 03-1669)

Does the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure clause require a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a canine sniff during a routine traffic stop?

Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the Court's 7-2 opinion that Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The Constitution did not require police to have reasonable suspicion to use a drug-detection dog on a car during a legal traffic stop. No legitimate privacy was at risk, the Court argued, because the dog only alerted to an illegal drug.

San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco (No. 04-340)

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Shepard v. U.S. (No. 03-9168)

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Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York (No. 03-855)

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Small v. United States (No. 03-750)

In order to establish a prima facie case under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), must the objector show that it is more likely than not that the other party's peremptory challenges were based on impermissible group bias?

No. In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the California Supreme Court and ruled that California's standard for objections to peremptory challenges was incompatible with the standard set forth in Batson. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens explained that the Court had not intended that the objector would have to prove that a peremptory challenge was "more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination." The Court ruled that in the first step of the Batson procedure, the objector only needs to "produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred." The objector ultimately has to prove that the peremptory challenge was motivated by purposeful racial discrimination, but not until the third step of the Batson procedure, after the State has offered "permissible race-neutral justifications" for the challenges. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that California's standard was within the procedural leeway provided to States by Batson.

Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss. (No. 03-1160)

Does Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act apply to foreign-flagged cruise ships in U.S. waters?

Yes. The Court held 6-3 that Title III applied to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S. waters. Justice Kennedy delivered the Court's controlling opinion, which held that Title III did not apply to foreign ships' internal affairs, because there was no "clear congressional statement" showing an intent to do so. A clear statement was necessary before a general law could interfere with a foreign-vessel's internal affairs. Title III's own limitations, however, prevented the statute from imposing requirements that would have threatened safety on the ship or conflicted with international obligations. If Title III were to impose certain requirements, such as major structural modifications, the clear statement rule could bar such an interference.

Smith v. Massachusetts (No. 03-8661)

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Smith v. Texas (No. 04-5323)

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Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. (No. 03-1388)

Could parties who suffered no actual damages recover more than the Truth in Lending Act's original $1,000 cap because of subsequent amendments to the act?

No. In an 8-1 judgment delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a 1995 TILA amendment did not change the original limit on violations involving personal-property loans. Congress intended the amendment to raise the minimum and maximum recoveries for closed-end loans secured by real property. Congress had not sought to remove the $1,000 cap on loans secured by personal property.

Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company (No. 03-814)

1.) Should the U.S. Supreme Court appoint a "river master" to resolve disputes over computer modeling of the Arkansas River? 2.) Is Kansas entitled to interest, from 1985 forward, for damages resulting from Compact violations from 1950 to 1985?

No and no. In an 8-1 judgment delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court denied Kansas' request to appoint a river master to decide various technical disputes between the states. A river master was inappropriate because the nature of the disputes was legal, not purely technical, and the appointment of a river master would make it easier to continue litigation. The Court also rejected Kansas' claim to all interest from 1985 forward for damages, because that would contradict the Court's ruling in an earlier dispute between the states (Kansas III). In that ruling, the Court had endorsed an equitable approach that yielded a post-1985 interest calculation based on late damages only.

Tenet v. Doe (No. 03-1395)

(1) Does the 14th Amendment guarantee an indigent criminal defendant convicted by a guilty plea the right to an appointed appellate attorney in a discretionary first appeal? (2) Do attorneys have third-party standing on behalf of potential indigent defendants to make a constitutional challenge to a state statute prohibiting appointment of appellate counsel in discretionary first appeals following convictions by guilty pleas?

In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the attorneys lacked third-party standing to sue on behalf of the Michigan indigent defendants. The attorneys did not have close relationships with the indigent defendants, nor was there a hindrance to these defendants' ability to advance their own constitutional rights against the Michigan scheme. In addition, under Younger, the indigents should have only turned to the federal courts after pursuing their claims in state court.

Tory v. Cochran (No. 03-1488)

Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. Does "convicted in any court" include convictions in foreign courts?

No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the federal law's phrase, "convicted in any court," encompassed only domestic, not foreign, convictions. The majority reasoned that in determining the scope of the phrase, it was appropriate to assume Congress had domestic concerns in mind. Moreover, the statute's overall language suggested no intent to reach beyond domestic convictions.

United States v. Booker (No. 04-104)

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Van Orden v. Perry (No. 03-1500)

Were land parcels once owned by the Oneida Nation, sold in 1807 but repurchased in the 1990s by the Nation's descedant tribe, part of an Indian Reservation and thus exempt from local taxes?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that standards of federal Indian law and federal equity precluded the Tribe from unilaterally reviving its ancient sovereignty over the land at issue. The Court pointed to the "longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of central New York and its inhabitants"and the fact that regulatory authority over the land had been exercised by state and local government for 200 years. By giving up the land in the early 19th century, the Oneidas had "relinquished governmental reins and could not regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders."

Whitfield v. U.S. (No. 03-1293)

Could the Tax Court exclude from the record on appeal Rule 183(b) reports submitted by special trial judges?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that no statute authorized, and Rule 183's text did not warrant, the concealment of the special report. Rule 183 did not allow the "novel practice" of treating the trial judge's opinion as an "in-house draft to be worked over collaboratively by the regular Tax Court judge and the special trial judge." The rules allowed only one trial judge opinion to be issued and before a separate Tax Court ruling, Ginsburg wrote. It would be impossible for a Tax Court judge to give deference to an opinion he himself collaborated in producing. Moreover, the Tax Court's refusal to disclose the trial judge's original report did not allow fully informed appellate review of the court's decision.

Wilkinson v. Austin (No. 04-495)

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Wilkinson v. Dotson (No. 03-287)

1.) Does an enhanced sentence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on the judge's determination of a fact violate the Sixth Amendment? 2.) If so, are the Sentencing Guidelines altogether unconstitutional?

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines, where they allow judges to enhance sentences using facts not reviewed by juries, violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The sentences of Booker and Fanfan, based partly on facts determined only by judges, were therefore unconstitutional. In a separate 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court said the guidelines would now be advisory and invalidated the provisions that made them mandatory.