The Oyez Project: 2003 Term Decisions

Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila (No. 02-1845)

Do United States courts have jurisdiction to consider legal appeals filed on behalf of foreign citizens held by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that the degree of control exercised by the United States over the Guantanamo Bay base was sufficient to trigger the application of habeas corpus rights. Stevens, using a list of precedents stretching back to mid-17th Century English Common Law cases, found that the right to habeas corpus can be exercised in "all ... dominions under the sovereign's control." Because the United States exercised "complete jurisdiction and control" over the base, the fact that ultimate sovereignty remained with Cuba was irrelevant. Further, Stevens wrote that the right to habeas corpus is not dependent on citizenship status. The detainees were therefore free to bring suit challenging their detention as unconstitutional.

al Odah v. United States (No. 03-343)

No details yet.

Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conserv. v. EPA (No. 02-658)

No details yet.

Arizona v. Gant (No. 02-1019)

Does the Eighth Amendment permit a death row inmate - who is legally insane unless taking medication - to be forcibly medicated to the point where he is eligible for execution?

Unanswered. The Court denied Singleton's petition for certiorari, letting the Eighth Circuit's ruling stand. Singleton was executed by the state of Arkansas in 2004.

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (No. 03-218)

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Austria v. Altmann (No. 03-13)

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Baldwin v. Reese (No. 02-964)

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Banks v. Dretke (No. 02-8286)

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Barnhart v. Thomas (No. 02-763)

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Beard v. Banks (No. 02-1603)

Under the Clean Air Act, does the Environmental Protection Agency have the authority to overrule a state agency's decision that a company is using the "best available controlling technology" to prevent pollution?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the Clean Air Act authorized the EPA to bar the construction of the polluting facility in Alaska. Though Alaska determined the facility's use of "Low NOx" met the act's requirement that facilities use "best available control technology," the EPA was reasonable to reject this claim. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered a dissent joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia and Chief Justice William Rehnquist.

Bedroc Limited v. United States (No. 02-1593)

Does Section 1782 of Title 28 of U.S. Code authorize a federal district court to compel the release of material for use in a "foreign tribunal" when the foreign tribunal itself is unwilling to demand production of the material? Does Section 1782 authorize a federal district court to compel the release of material for a fact-finding investigation by the directorate general of the European Commission on the theory that the information may eventually lead to an investigation by a foreign tribunal?

Yes and Yes. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court ruled that just because a foreign tribunal was unwilling to demand certain documents did not mean that it would be unwilling to accept them if provided to them by other means. By permitting, but not forcing, American judges to allow discovery of certain documents, Congress allowed judges to exercise their discretion to decide whether a foreign tribunal would be receptive to the the documents at question. The Court also ruled that it would be impractical to limit the fact-finding to only the actual trial before a foreign tribunal because, in cases like this one, the foreign tribunal does not gather evidence itself but instead relies on the evidence presented to the investigatory commission (in this case the directorate general). In order to make the evidence available for the tribunal, therefore, it would be necessary to present it first to the commission.

Blakely v. Washington (No. 02-1632)

Are the deadlines established by Bankruptcy Rule 4004 "jurisdictional" - that is, do they trump other considerations no matter when they are raised?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Kontrick lost the right to invoke Rule 4004's time limitation because he did so after the bankruptcy court reached the merits of Ryan's objection. The Court rejected Kontrick's claim that Rule 4004 is "jurisdictional" and that it trumps other considerations whenever raised in proceedings.

Castro v. United States (No. 02-6683)

No details yet.

Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz (No. 02-891)

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Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 03-475)

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City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C. (No. 02-1609)

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act permit employers to refuse to rehire job applicants because of prior workplace rule infractions related to drug or alcohol addiction?

Yes. The Court unanimously held that an employer may refuse to rehire an employee who was terminated in connection with drug or alcohol-related incidents as long as the refusal is based on a policy of not rehiring employees who previously violated workplace rules rather than on the worker's addiction. That is, an employer may refuse to hire someone who was terminated for coming to work under the influence, but may not refuse to hire someone whose previous addiction did not result in any workplace rule infractions. Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer took no part in this case.

Crawford v. Washington (No. 02-9410)

No details yet.

Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen (No. 03-358)

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Doe v. Chao (No. 02-1377)

When deciding whether a suspect is "in custody" and therefore entitled to his Miranda warnings, must an officer consider the suspect's age and previous history with law enforcement?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the purpose of the Court's Miranda decision was to provide an objective rule readily understandable by police officers: when interrogating a suspect who is "in custody," an officer must first read the suspect his Miranda rights. Determining whether a suspect is actually in custody has always been based on objective criterion like whether he had been brought to the police station by police or had come of his own accord. Requiring officers to consider individual characteristics of a suspect when determining whether he is "in custody," such as the suspect's age or previous history with law enforcement, would make the test a subjective one that would be more difficult for officers to understand and abide by. Justice Kennedy wrote that the Miranda decision "states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect's individual characteristics - including his age - could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry."

Dretke v. Haley (No. 02-1824)

Do United States courts have jurisdiction to consider legal appeals filed on behalf of foreign citizens held by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba?

Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (No. 02-1624)

Does an arrest of a front-seat passenger in a car driven by its owner, after police find cocaine in the car's back armrest, lack probable cause and violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court ruled that because the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle, the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that "a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine."

Engine Mfrs. Assoc. v. South Coast Air Quality (No. 02-1343)

1. Does the Supreme Court's decision in Mills v. Maryland (1988) create a new rule of law that cannot be applied retroactively to award sentencing relief to a prisoner whose conviction became final before Mills was announced? 2. If Mills applies retroactively and a state supreme court rejects a Mills challenge because the jury was not told that it must unanimously agree on mitigating factors, is that decision consistent with Supreme Court precedent?

Ruling yes on the first question, the Court did not need to reach the second question. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court found that the rule announced in Mills - that sentencing schemes could not prevent jurors from considering mitigating evidence that had not been accepted unanimously when deciding whether to apply the death penalty - was a new rule, because it was not compelled by previous Court decisions. As a new rule, it could only be applied retroactively if it was a "watershed rule[] of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Finding that it was not a watershed rule, the Court found that it could not be applied retroactively and that Beards' conviction was therefore constitutional.

F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (No. 03-724)

No details yet.

Fellers v. United States (No. 02-6320)

When a supervisor makes a workplace environment so hostile (through sexual harassment) that an employee has no choice but to quit, may the employee bring suit even if she did not use the internal procedures established by the employer to report sexual harassment claims?

Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that an employee faced with a situation in which a "reasonable person ... would have felt compelled to resign" could bring suit even if she had not filed a report with the employer before resigning. Her employer, however, could use her failure to file a report, along with evidence of the safeguards it had in place to prevent harassment, in its defense. If it could prove that she had not attempted to prevent the harassment, and that the safeguards in place would have prevented it if she had, the employer would not be liable.

Frew v. Hawkins (No. 02-628)

Is a prisoner's appeal of the proposed procedure for his execution functionally equivalent to a habeas corpus petition and therefore barred by Title 28, Section 2254 of U.S. Code?

No. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled unanimously that Nelson's suit dealt only with the proposed method of execution, not with his conviction or sentence, and was therefore different from a habeas corpus appeal. Nelson had a right to challenge the necessity of the procedure for his execution using the same legal approach he would have used to challenge the conditions of his prison. However, the Court declined to rule on whether the execution would be constitutional if the district court found that cutting through was indeed necessary, leaving that question for a case in which necessity had already been determined.

General Dynamics Land Systems Inc. v. Cline (No. 02-1080)

Does the United States Code's four-year statute of limitations for suits brought under acts of Congress passed after 1990 apply only to new laws, or does it also apply to amendments of previously existing laws?

It also applies to amendments of previously existing laws. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens stated "[a]n amendment to an existing statute is no less an 'Act of Congress' than a new, stand-alone statute." The four-year statute of limitations therefore applies to any act or amendment to an act passed by Congress after 1990.

Groh v. Ramirez (No. 02-811)

No details yet.

Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P. (No. 02-1689)

Were the instructions given to the jury in McNeil's trial sufficiently misleading to warrant the reversal of her sentence?

No. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court ruled that the judge had provided correct instructions for three other parts of the instruction that were closely related to the error, and that, given the clarity of those instructions, the jury was unlikely to have been mislead by the four words erroneously inserted at the end. "Given three correct instructions and one contrary one, the state court did not unreasonably apply federal law when it found that there was no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled."

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (No. 03-6696)

No details yet.

Hibbs v. Winn (No. 02-1809)

Is the Child Online Protection Act's requirement that online publishers prevent children from accessing "material that is harmful to minors" likely to violate the First Amendment by restricting too much protected speech and using a method that is not the least restrictive one available?

Yes. In an interesting 5-to-4 vote, with Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg on one side and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Breyer and O'Connor on the other, the Court found that Congress had not yet met its burden to show that the COPA requirements were more effective than other methods of preventing minors. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in the majority opinion, wrote that the district court's injunction "was not an abuse of discretion, because on this record there are a number of plausible, less restrictive alternatives to the statute." The majority also emphasized that barring the statute's enforcement during the trial would be less harmful than allowing it, because allowing it would be likely to prevent online publishers from publishing certain material.

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County (No. 03-5554)

No details yet.

Household Credit Services v. Pfennig (No. 02-857)

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Illinois v. Fisher (No. 03-374)

No details yet.

Illinois v. Lidster (No. 02-1060)

Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967) prohibit "reverse discrimination" against workers over 40 (e.g., providing more favorable employer benefits to workers over 50 than to younger workers who are still over 40)?

No. Justice David H. Souter delivered the Court's 6-3 opinion that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's "text, structure, purpose, history, and relationship to other federal statutes show that the statute does not mean to stop an employer from favoring an older employee over a younger one." The Court cited a long-held understanding of the "ADEA as a remedy for unfair preference based on relative youth, leaving complaints of the relatively young outside the statutory concern." The Court also noted the findings section of the act included no evidence of younger workers being discriminated against in favor of older workers. Further "[i]f Congress had been worrying about protection the younger against the older, it would not likely have ignored everyone under 40."

Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (No. 02-572)

Was the change announced by the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona substantive in nature and therefore retroactively applicable?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the changed announced in Ring v. Arizona was merely procedural and therefore not retroactively applicable. Justice Scalia wrote, "[W]e give retroactive effect to only a small set of 'watershed rules of criminal procedure implementing the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.' That a new procedural rule is 'fundamental' in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one 'without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." (Italics Scalia's, citation omitted). Because the Court could not confidently say that fact-finding by a judge rather than a jury seriously diminished accuracy, it could not apply its Ring ruling retroactively.

Iowa v. Tovar (No. 02-1541)

Does the actual-innocence exception to the procedural-default doctrine apply to both capital and non-capital cases?

The Court declined to answer the question presented, ruling instead that the district court should have first considered the ineffective assistance of counsel claim before reaching the question of whether the "actual innocence" exception applies to non-capital cases. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for a seven-member majority, wrote that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim would accomplish the same thing - the reduction of the sentence - without burdening the state with the need to prove the existence of all prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.

Johnson v. California (No. 03-6539)

No details yet.

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley and Sons Co. (No. 02-1205)

Did the Ohio Appeals Court violate "clearly established Federal law" by deciding that the prosecution's failure to charge Esparza as the "principle offender" in a murder was harmless and therefore not grounds for overturning his death sentence?

No. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court held that the Ohio Appeals Court had not acted unreasonably or violated "clearly established Federal law" when it decided that the prosecutor's error was harmless. The federal courts, therefore, did not have authority to overturn the death sentence.

Kontrick v. Ryan (No. 02-819)

No details yet.

Lamie v. United States Trustee (No. 02-693)

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Locke v. Davey (No. 02-1315)

Does the reservation to the United States of all "coal and other valuable minerals" in patents issued under the Pittman Act (1919) include commercially valuable sand and gravel?

No. In an plurality opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and joined by three other Justices, the Court ruled that because sand and gravel were not commercially valuable in 1919 when the Pittman Act was passed, they were not "valuable minerals" covered under the Act. Although the Court had interpreted "minerals" expansively in the past, the Court held that the adjective "valuable" limited the term sufficiently to exclude sand and gravel. The Court emphasized that since the plain text of the statute was clear, there was no need to delve into the legislative history of the Act. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he agreed that sand and gravel were not "valuable minerals" under the Act, but disputed the plurality's reliance on the word "valuable." Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented. The dissent argued that the legislative history of the Pittman Act indicated that "valuable minerals" should be interpreted broadly to include sand and gravel.

Maryland v. Pringle (No. 02-809)

No details yet.

McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (No. 02-1674)

Do family members of a man who apparently committed suicide have a privacy right that justifies the government's withholding autopsy photos from a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Foster family's interest in privacy outweighed the public interest in seeing pictures from Vincent Foster's death scene. The public interest could only trump privacy interests if Favish could present evidence that the government might have acted improperly. Favish failed to do so. The Court acknowledged that citizens seeking access to documents under the Freedom of Information Act normally need not explain why they seek the information. The act, however, exempts from disclosure records that would present an unwarranted invasion of privacy. In ruling that the act protected the privacy of the Foster family, the Court rejected Favish's argument that the act only protected Vincent Foster's privacy (an interest that Favish argued died with Foster).

Middleton v. McNeil (No. 03-1028)

No details yet.

Missouri v. Seibert (No. 02-1371)

Did the Americans with Disabilities Act violate the sovereign immunity doctrine of the 11th Amendment when, based on Congress's 14th Amendment enforcement powers of the Due Process clause, it allowed individuals to sue states for denying them services based on their disabilities?

No. In a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Congress had sufficiently demonstrated the problems faced by disabled persons who sought to exercise fundamental rights protected by the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (such as access to a court). The Court also emphasized that the remedies required from the states were not unreasonable - they just had to make reasonable accommodations to allow disabled persons to exercise their fundamental rights. Because Title II was a "reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end," and because Congress had the authority under the 14th Amendment to regulate the actions of the states to accomplish that end, the law was constitutional.

Mitchell v. Esparza (No. 02-1369)

Does a fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to increase a sentence beyond the statutory standard range need to be proved by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt?

In a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that an exceptional sentence increase based on the judge's determination that Blakely had acted with "deliberate cruelty" violated Blakely's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Citing its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court ruled that facts increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Dissents by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy and Justice Stephen Breyer argued the ruling will diminish legislatures' ability to set uniform sentencing guidelines.

Muhammad v. Close (No. 02-9065)

No details yet.

National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish (No. 02-954)

No details yet.

Nelson v. Campbell (No. 03-6821)

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Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League (No. 02-1238)

Does the federal Privacy Act require that people prove they suffered "actual damage" stemming from the government's violation of their privacy rights in order to win damages in a suit against the government?

Yes. Justice David Hackett Souter delivered the Court's 6-3 opinion that the Privacy Act requires plaintiffs prove actual damages to qualify for the minimum statutory award of $1000. The Court reasoned that "a straightforward textual analysis" of the Privacy Act shows that the statute guarantees the $1000 minimum for victims of willful Privacy Act violations only in relation to "actual damages sustained." Individuals subjected to an adverse effect - like the miners in this case - have "injury enough to open the courthouse door, but without more" have "no cause of action for damages under the Privacy Act."

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (No. 03-101)

No details yet.

Olympic Airways v. Husain (No. 02-1348)

Did Littleton's adult business licensing ordinance violate the First Amendment protection of Free Speech because it did not guarantee a prompt judicial decision when a business appeals the denial of a license?

No. In an opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Colorado did not have to explicitly provide for a "prompt judicial determination" to make the law constitutional. As long as Colorado courts did not unnecessarily delay such claims, the normal judicial review process could be expected to provide a decision quickly enough to satisfy the constitutional demands. If the courts failed to make a prompt decision in a specific case, the business in that particular case could sue, but the absence of explicit "prompt judicial determination" language in the statute did not make it unconstitutional.

Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders (No. 03-95)

No details yet.

Pliler v. Ford (No. 03-221)

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Rasul v. Bush (No. 03-334)

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Raytheon v. Hernandez (No. 02-749)

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Rumsfeld v. Padilla (No. 03-1027)

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Sabri v. United States (No. 03-44)

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Scarborough v. Principi (No. 02-1657)

Was the Federal Reserve Board's exclusion of over-limit fees from the definition of "finance charges" a reasonable interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act?

Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court found that the Board's definition of "finance charge" was reasonable under the language of TILA. Because neither side challenged the authority of the Board to interpret the act (Pfennig just challenged its end result as unreasonable), under Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, the Court would have to find that the Board's regulation was clearly contrary to the unambiguous intent of Congress in order to overturn it. Finding that Congress's intent with respect to over-limit fees was ambiguous, Justice Thomas wrote that the regulation was entitled to deference and the credit company's reliance on it could therefore not be punished.

Schriro v. Summerlin (No. 03-526)

No details yet.

SEC v. Edwards (No. 02-1196)

Does the Clean Air Act preempt local government regulations prohibiting the purchase of new motor vehicles with specified emission characteristics?

Probably. In an 8-to-1 opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that distinguishing between rules governing the standards to which engines must be made and the standards at which they may be sold was unreasonable. Justice Scalia wrote, "A command ... that certain purchasers may buy only vehicles with particular emission characteristics is as much an 'attempt to enforce' a 'standard' as a command ... that a certain percentage of a manufacturer's sales volume must consist of such vehicles." Justice Scalia reserved judgment on the specific regulations at issue in the case, however, sending the case back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the holding that regulating the standards engines must meet to be sold is no different from regulating the standards at which they must be manufactured.

Singleton v. Norris (No. 02-10605)

Does the Securities Exchange Act's (1934) term "investment contract" include an investment scheme in which the promoter promises a fixed return or the investor is entitled to a particular rate of return?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that an investment scheme promising a fixed rate of return can be an "investment contract" and thus a "security" subject to federal securities laws. The test the Court uses for determining whether a scheme is an "investment contract" is "whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." Because the test does not distinguish between promises of fixed returns and promises of variable returns, the scheme at issue here can be defined as an "investment contract."

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (No. 03-339)

No details yet.

South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe (No. 02-626)

In order to establish a prima facie case under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), must the objector show that it is more likely than not that the other party's peremptory challenges were based on impermissible group bias?

In a per curiam opinion, the Court ruled it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the case.

Tennard v. Dretke (No. 02-10038)

Does the Supreme Court's prohibition of executing mentally retarded people in Atkins v. Virginia apply if the crime cannot be attributed to mental retardation?

In a fairly narrow ruling 6-to-3 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Tennard's mental retardation could reasonably be understood as relevant to his crime. Especially given the fact that the prosecutor emphasized Tennard's retardation when discussing the likelihood that he would be dangerous in the future, the Court found that the jury instructions did not sufficiently permit the jury to weigh Tennard's mental retardation in his favor.

Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood (No. 02-1606)

When a company fails to meet its duty to share its network with competitors under the Telecommunications Act, can it be sued under the Sherman Act?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the complaint alleging breach of Verizon's Telecommunication Act duties to share its network with competitors did not state a claim under the Sherman Act. The Court reasoned that the 1996 act did not alter antitrust law or add new claims and that Verizon did not violate preexisting antitrust standards. The justices declined to add a new claim by making an exception to the rule that businesses need not aid competitors.

Tennessee v. Lane (No. 02-1667)

Does the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey (1994) require that prisoners who challenge prison disciplinary proceedings - but whose suits do not question their sentences' validity - first successfully challenge their sentences?

No. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court ruled that prisoners - whose suits do not question their sentences - do not need to successfully challenge those sentences before challenging prison disciplinary proceedings. The Court rejected the argument that Heck necessarily requires successful sentence appeals before any challenges can be made to prison disciplinary proceedings. Muhammad's suit sought damages for prison disciplinary proceedings but in no way challenged his sentence.

Thornton v. United States (No. 03-5165)

No details yet.

Till v. SCS Credit Corp. (No. 02-1016)

When police arrest the recent occupant of a vehicle who got out voluntarily, can they search the vehicle without a warrant?

On October 20, 2003, without issuing a decision in the case, the Court sent it back to Arizona state court for further consideration in light of the Arizona case State v. Dean. The issue raised in this case, however, was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court later in the same term. On May 24, 2004, the Court issued a decision in the case of Thornton v. U.S., finding that police could constitutionally search a vehicle even after its occupant has left it voluntarily.

United States v. Banks (No. 02-473)

Does the Federal Advisory Committee Act authorize judicial review of executive branch deliberations through a broad discovery process that allows a private organization to review internal documents of high-level advisors to the President? If such review is authorized by FACA, does it violate the Constitutional doctrine of separation of powers?

In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court sent the case back to the D.C. Court of Appeals, arguing that the appellate court should have considered separation-of-powers claims and was wrong to conclude it lacked authority to order District Court discovery to stop. Such an order (mandamus) to stop discovery proceedings should be considered because those proceedings, "by virtue of their overbreadth," could interfere with presidential activity. Further, the appellate court misinterpreted U.S. v. Nixon to mean that the government needed to assert executive privilege for separation-of-powers objections to be considered.

United States v. Dominguez Benitez (No. 03-167)

No details yet.

United States v. Flores-Montano (No. 02-1794)

Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 apply to actions that took place before its passage?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that, while the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 does not explicitly state that it should be applied to actions that took place before its passage, there are strong indications in the text of the statute that Congress intended it to apply retroactively. Justice Stevens wrote that, under the Act, immunity "claims are 'henceforth' to be decided by the courts. ... [T]his language suggests Congress intended courts to resolve all such claims 'in conformity with the principles set forth' in the Act, regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred."

United States v. Galletti (No. 02-1389)

Does the Fourth Amendment require customs officers at the international border to have reasonable suspicion in order to remove, disassemble, and search a vehicle's gas tank for illegal material?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that the government had authority to inspect a vehicle's fuel tank at the border without suspicion. Though the Fourth Amendment "'protects property as well as privacy,'" interference with a vehicle owner's gas tank "is justified by the Government's paramount interest in protecting the border." The Court rejected the argument that the requirement of suspicion for highly intrusive searches of people be carried over to cars (especially at the border): "Complex balancing tests...have no place in border searches of vehicles."

United States v. Lara (No. 03-107)

No details yet.

United States v. Patane (No. 02-1183)

Can the U.S. Postal Service be sued under federal antitrust laws?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the U.S. Postal Service cannot be sued under antitrust laws. The Court acknowledged the Postal Reorganization Act may waive the Postal Service's immunity from suit. However, federal antitrust laws (the Sherman Act, for example) do not allow the federal government - of which the Postal Service is a part - to be sued.

USPS v. Flamingo Industries (No. 02-1290)

Given the 6th Amendment's right to counsel, to what extent must a defendant be informed of the consequences of pleading guilty while waiving the right to an attorney?

In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Tovar's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated. In a case like Tovar's, the Sixth Amendment requires the judge to inform the accused of the charges against him, of his right to counsel regarding his plea, and of the range of punishments he faces if he pleads guilty. The Court decided Tovar's trial court judge satisfied these requirements and that Tovar's waiver of his right to counsel was "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent."

Verizon v. Trinko, LLP (No. 02-682)

No details yet.

Vieth v. Jubelirer (No. 02-1580)

Is the owner of a business a "participant" in a profit sharing/pension plan established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)?

Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the Court's unanimous opinion holding that a business owner, such as Yates, qualifies as a "participant" in an ERISA pension plan. The Court reasoned that this was the intent of Congress and that the act's text verifies this. In a business in which an ERISA plan covers employees, the employer can essentially qualify as an employee and receive the plan's protections. In light of this, the Court sent Yates' bankruptcy issues to a lower court for resolution.

Virginia v. Maryland (No. 129 ORIG)

No details yet.

Yarborough v. Alvarado (No. 02-1684)

Does section 706 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act authorize federal courts to review the management of public lands under statutory standards and the land use plans of the Bureau of Land Management?

Yes, but only to a limited extent. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the APA only allows courts to examine government agencies' failures to meet specific statutory requirements. A general complaint based on policy differences - like SUWA's view that the off-road vehicles made the Wilderness Study Areas unsuitable for preservation as wilderness - could not be heard under the APA. Justice Scalia wrote, "If courts were empowered to enter general orders compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates ... it would ultimately become the task of the supervising court, rather than the agency, to work out compliance with the broad statutory mandate, injecting the judge into day-to-day agency management."

Yarborough v. Gentry (No. 02-1597)

Do states forfeit 11th Amendment protection when they enter into a consent decree under federal law in federal court? And must states violate federal law, not just the consent agreement, in order to be subject to suit in federal court?

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that enforcement of the consent decree does not violate the 11th Amendment. The state officials waived 11th Amendment immunity when they asked the court to approve the consent decree. The Court rejected the argument that a federal court cannot enforce a consent decree unless it finds a violation of federal law. "The decree here is a federal court order that springs from a federal dispute and furthers the objectives of federal law," Justice Kennedy wrote.

Yates v. Hendon (No. 02-458)

Did Illinois police (acting in good faith) violate Fisher's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights by destroying evidence after he filed a motion for discovery?

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the simple fact that Fisher had filed a motion for discovery did not distinguish the case from Youngblood. The Court also rejected Fisher's contention that the substance was "material exculpatory evidence," which would have made the good faith/bad faith distinction irrelevant (whenever the state destroys or refuses to disclose "material exculpatory evidence" it violates Due Process, regardless of its intent). Instead, the Court held that the evidence was at the most "potentially useful evidence" (as it was in Youngblood) because the police had already determined, in good faith, that the material was cocaine. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in this case.