Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain - Opinion Announcement

Argument of Speaker

Mr. Speaker: The opinion of the Court in No. 03-339, Sosa versus Alvarez-Machain and a companion case will be announced by Justice Souter.

Argument of Justice Souter

Mr. Souter: These cases come to us on writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

In 1990, a federal grand jury indicted the respondent Alvarez, a Mexican national, to his role in the torture of an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

After failing to negotiate, Alvarez’s extradition from Mexico, DEA official hatched a plan for his abduction by Mexican nationals and his forceable removable of the United States.

The plan was followed and Alvarez was brought to this country for trial.

This Court found that jurisdiction was proper not withstanding the circumstances of his capture, but at the ensuing trial the District Court granted Alvarez’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.

He then began the civil actions which are before us now seeking damages for his abduction from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act and from another Mexican national, Sosa, under the Alien Tort Statute.

A panel of the Ninth Circuit determined that Alvarez had a claim for relief under both statutes and a divided en banc court agreed.

In an opinion filed with the Clerk of the Court today, we reverse as to withholding.

The basis for Alvarez’s claim under the Tort Claims Act is his seizure in one-day detention in Mexico constituted a tortuous false arrest.

Although the Tort Claims Act exempts the United States from liability for “any claim arising in a foreign country” the Ninth Circuit avoided application of this foreign country exception by relying on the so-called headquarters doctrine according to which torts even if committed abroad maybe actionable under the Tort Claims Act if they were planned and orchestrated domestically.

We reject that analysis and reverse on that basis.

We have previously held the language and legislative history of the foreign country exception demonstrate that Congress meant to avoid exposing the United States to Tort liability based on the application of foreign law.

At the time the Tort Claims Act was passed, the courts would have applied foreign law in any tort case where the injury or harm occurred in a foreign country.

We thus, read the exception to apply when the injury complained or took place abroad.

Applying the headquarters doctrine in a case under the Tort Claims Act is a judge made attempt to avoid the consequences of the statutory directive and we reject it.

Alvarez, as I said, also sued Sosa under the Alien Tort Statute which was originally passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.

This Act vests Federal District Courts with jurisdiction over tort suits by aliens alleging violation of the laws of nations.

And although it was effectively dormant for about 200 years, the statute has enjoyed somewhat of a renaissance since the Second Circuit's Filartiga case in 1980.

The parties and the friends of the Court take vastly disparate positions on the historic and present significance of the statute.

With Sosa and the United States on one side arguing that it is no more than a jurisdictional grant unable to support a cause of action in the absence of further legislation, and with Alvarez believing that the Act itself is the source of a substantive cause of action.

Although we agree with Sosa that the statute is jurisdictional, we recognize that at the time of its enactment, a modest set of private claims under the law of nations would have been actionable as part of the general common law.

Taking our cue from history, we believe that the Alien Tort Statute is still properly understood to furnish jurisdiction for a narrow band of international law acclaims.

We say narrow because there are many reasons for judicial caution in recognizing such claims.

These reasons include a reluctance on the part of the Federal Courts to make common law, judicial hesitation to infer causes of action where they are not expressly provided by statute, and a healthy skepticism about the judicial role in foreign affairs.

The stringent statute set out in the opinion is fatal to Alvarez’s claim here.

Justice Scalia has filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas have joined; Justice Ginsburg has filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which Justice Breyer has joined; and Justice Breyer has filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.