The Oyez Project: 2002 Term Decisions

Abdur'Rahman v. Bell (No. 01-9094)

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American Insurance Association v. Garamendi (No. 02-722)

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Archer v. Warner (No. 01-1418)

Does a federal district court, despite appropriation provisions barring the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms from acting on applications for relief from firearms disabilities from persons convicted of a felony, have the authority to grant such relief?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the absence of an actual denial of Bean's petition by ATF precludes judicial review. Because Bean's application for relief from the firearms disabilities was not considered due to appropriation provisions, Justice Thomas reasoned that the court could not grant relief since the statute only permitted judicial review of an affirmative denial of an application. "The text of [section 925(c)] and the procedure it lays out for seeking relief make clear that an actual decision by ATF on an application is a prerequisite for judicial review, and that mere inaction by ATF does not invest a district court with independent jurisdiction to act on an application," wrote Justice Thomas.

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co. (No. 01-705)

Must a plaintiff present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991?

No. In a unanimous opinion Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that direct evidence is not required. Given that Title VII, on its face, does not mention that a plaintiff must make a heightened showing through direct evidence, the Court reasoned that in order to obtain an instruction a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice." "Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury," wrote Justice Thomas. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion.

Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson (No. 02-306)

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Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord (No. 02-469)

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Boeing Co. v. United States (No. 01-1209)

Does the Bankruptcy Code cover a debt embodied in a settlement agreement that settled a creditor's earlier claim "for money...obtained by...fraud?"

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a debt for money promised in a settlement agreement accompanied by the release of underlying tort claims can amount to a debt for money obtained by fraud, within the nondischargeability statute's terms. "We conclude that the Archers' settlement agreement and releases may have worked a kind of novation, but that fact does not bar the Archers from showing that the settlement debt arose out of 'false pretences, a false representation, or actual fraud,' and consequently is nondischargeable," wrote Justice Breyer. Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Justice John Paul Stevens joined, dissented.

Borden Ranch v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (No. 01-1243)

Does a judgment become "final" for postconviction relief when the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the conviction where a defendant in a federal prosecution takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment of conviction but does not next petition for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, for the purpose of starting the clock on section 2255's one-year limitation period, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction. Under this rule, Clay's section 2255 motion was timely filed. After comparing the understanding of finality for collateral review purposes to the meaning of the phrase "becomes final" in 28 USC section 2255, the Court rejected the standard that the issuance of the appellate court mandate is the triggering date.

Branch v. Smith (No. 01-1437)

Must an inmate demonstrate that a state court's finding of the absence of purposeful discrimination was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence in order for a court of appeals to issue a certificate of appealability?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Court of Appeals should have issued a COA to review the District Court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The Court reasoned, "when a habeas applicant seeks permission to initiate appellate review of the dismissal of his petition, the court of appeals should limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of his claims." Thus, a prisoner seeking a COA need only demonstrate "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" and satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to proceed further. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

Breuer v. Jim's Concrete (No. 02-337)

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Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington (No. 01-1325)

Is a Maine statute providing for affordable prescription drugs pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause? Does the statute violate the Commerce Clause?

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held, 9-0, that the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America had not carried its burden of showing a probability of success on the merits of its Commerce Clause claims and, 6-3, that their showing was insufficient to support a finding that the Medicaid Act pre-empts Maine's Rx Program insofar as it threatens to coerce manufacturers into reducing their prices on non-Medicaid sales. The Court's decision upheld the Court of Appeal's reversal of the District Court's injunction. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented from the plurality's opinion. "By imposing prior authorization on Maine's Medicaid population to achieve wholly non-Medicaid related goals, Maine Rx 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives' of the federal Medicaid Act," argued Justice O'Connor.

California Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt (No. 02-42)

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Chavez v. Martinez (No. 01-1444)

Is the amount-in-controversy requirement of the federal diversity statute satisfied where a class representative seeks an injunction that would cost the defendant more than $75,000 to implement whether the injunction applies to one plaintiff or all class members?

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope (No. 01-1269)

Are local governments "persons" subject to qui tam actions under the False Claims Act?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the term "person" includes local governments. The Court noted that the County, as a recipient of federal funding, was clearly able to abuse federal spending and was thus subject to the FCA remedy that applied to prevent such abuse. Rejecting the Country's argument that is was not subject to punitive damages, the Court responded that the federal government amended the FCA to make it a more effective tool against fraud. "It is simply not plausible that Congress intended to repeal municipal liability sub silentio by the very Act it passed to strengthen the Government's hand in fighting false claims," wrote Justice Souter.

Clackamas Gastroenterology v. Wells (No. 01-1435)

Does the All Writs Act give a federal district court the authority to remove a state-court case in order to prevent the frustration of orders the federal court has previously issued?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the All Writs Act does not provide removal jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that, because the general removal statute requires that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be removed from a state court, the All Writs Act, alone or in combination with the existence of ancillary jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute for that requirement. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred.

Clay v. United States (No. 01-1500)

Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?

No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents.

Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe (No. 01-1231)

Are a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from coercive questioning violated when he was subjected to coercive questioning while in police custody, even if his coerced statements were never used against him in a criminal case?

No; the Court remanded the substantive due process portion of the question. In a 6-3 judgment delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Chavez did not deprive Martinez of his Fifth Amendment rights. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, joined Justice Thomas. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, reasoned that Martinez's claim that his questioning alone was a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments could be recognized if a "core guarantee" would be placed at risk; however, Martinez could not make the showing necessary to expand protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. Regarding substantive due process, Justice Souter delivered a 5-4 holding concluding that the issue whether Martinez may pursue a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation should be addressed on remand.

Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler (No. 01-1572)

Can a group of physicians be compelled to arbitrate claims arising under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, even though the parties' arbitration agreements may be construed to limit the arbitrator's authority to award damages?

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the proper course in this case was to compel arbitration. The Court reasoned that since it did not know how the arbitrator would construe the remedial limitations, given the Court's prior decisions, the questions whether they render the parties' agreement unenforceable was unusually abstract and thus it would be premature for the Court to address them. Justice Clarence Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. (No. 02-428)

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Demore v. Kim (No. 01-1491)

Does the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 exempt California's milk pricing and pooling regulations from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause? Are individual claims under the Privileges and Immunities Clause against California's required contributions to the price equalization pool on some out-of-state purchases foreclosed because those regulations do not discriminate on their face on the basis of state citizenship or state residence?

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held, 8-1, that, because the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 did not clearly express an intent to insulate California's pricing and pooling laws from a Commerce Clause challenge, the Court of Appeals erred in relying on it to dismiss the case. The Court also held, 9-0, that the appellate court erred in rejecting the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim on the ground that the California laws did not, on their face, create classifications based on any individual's residency or citizenship. The Court reasoned that the absence of an express statement identifying out-of-state citizenship as a basis for disparate treatment was not a sufficient basis for rejecting the claim. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part.

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa (No. 02-679)

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Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson (No. 01-593)

Does the Nevada Supreme Court's refusal to extend full faith and credit to California's statute immunizing its tax collection agency from suit violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Nevada to give full faith and credit to California's statutes providing its tax agency with immunity from suit. Noting that Nevada did not grant immunity to its agencies for intentional torts, the Court reasoned that Nevada's interest in redressing intentional tortious conduct was sufficient to decline to accord full faith and credit to California's immunity of its tax agency to bar intentional tort claims. Accordingly, the Court refused to adopt a new rule mandating that a state court extend full faith and credit to a sister State's statutorily recaptured sovereign immunity from suit when a refusal to do so would interfere with the State's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities.

Dow Chemical Company v. Stephenson (No. 02-271)

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Eldred v. Ashcroft (No. 01-618)

Under ERISA, are companies required to defer to the decision of a disability claimant's personal physician?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that plan administrators are not obliged to accord special deference to the opinions of treating physicians. The Court reasoned that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied a "treating physician rule" because nothing in ERISA gave rise to such a rule. Justice Ginsburg wrote, "courts have no warrant to require administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimant's physician; nor may courts impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of explanation when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician's evaluation."

Entergy Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm. (No. 02-299)

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Ewing v. California (No. 01-6978)

Is a defendant's right against double jeopardy violated when a trial judge grants a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder, but does not direct such a verdict to the jury that subsequently convicts the defendant of first-degree murder?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the defendant did not meet the requirements for habeas relief. The Court stated that Vincent was entitled to relief only if he can demonstrate that the state court's adjudication of his claim was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" the Court's clearly established precedents. Finding that the state court's adjudication of his claim was not, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals because "Even if we agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Double Jeopardy Clause should be read to prevent continued prosecution of a defendant under these circumstances, it was at least reasonable for the state court to conclude otherwise."

FCC v. Nextwave Communications, Inc. (No. 01-653)

Does the 11th Amendment's grant of sovereign immunity bar suit under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act for denial of a medical license based on an applicant's mental illness?

Unanswered. Due to concerns over the litigation's possible effect on the scope of the ADA, the California Medical Board voted to drop its petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the case with a unanimous opinion stating: "The writ of certiorari is dismissed without award of damages and costs."

Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont (No. 02-403)

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Fitzgerald v. Racing Association of Central Iowa (No. 02-695)

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Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley (No. 01-896)

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Ford Motor Co. v. Romo (No. 02-1097)

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Georgia v. Ashcroft (No. 02-182)

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Gratz v. Bollinger (No. 02-516)

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Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle (No. 02-634)

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Grutter v. Bollinger (No. 02-241)

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Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons (No. 01-950)

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Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (No. 01-800)

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Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians (No. 02-281)

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Jinks v. Richland County (No. 02-258)

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Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller (No. 00-1471)

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempt any of Kentucky's "Any Willing Provider" statutes?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Kentucky's AWP statutes are "laws...which regulate insurance" under ERISA. The Court reasoned that the statutes were specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance, regardless of the fact that the statutes also had the effect of prohibiting providers from entering into limited network contracts with the HMOs. Moreover, the Court concluded that, by expanding the number of providers from whom an insured may receive health services, AWP laws alter the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds thus affecting the type of risk pooling arrangements that the HMOs could offer, thereby constituting regulation of the business of insurance.

Lawrence and Garner v. Texas (No. 02-102)

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Lockyer v. Andrade (No. 01-1127)

Is an award of $145 million in punitive damages, when full compensatory damages are $1 million, excessive and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the punitive award of $145 million was neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was thus an irrational, arbitrary, and unconstitutional deprivation of the property of the insurer. The Court reasoned that evidence of dissimilar out-of-state misconduct was an improper basis for punishing the insurer for the limited harm and noted, "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. Justices Scalia and Thomas argued that the Due Process Clause provides no substantive protections against excessive or unreasonable awards of punitive damages. Justice Ginsburg noted that the decision overstepped states' traditional territory to regulate punitive damages.

Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates (No. 01-1806)

Does a federally recognized tribe qualify as a "person" who may sue under 42 USC section 1983? Does a tribe's suit qualify for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than section 1983?

No; the Court did not answer the second question. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, in the situation presented, the Tribe does not qualify as a "person" who may sue under section 1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims. The Court reasoned that section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment, not to advance a sovereign's prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. Regarding the second question, the Court concluded that whether the Tribe's suit qualifies for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than section 1983 was an issue that required additional addressing and remanded the question. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Massaro v. United States (No. 01-1559)

Did the redistricting plan violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by spreading minority voters across several districts rather than concentrating them in a few heavily minority ones?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that the District Court failed to consider all the relevant factors when it examined whether Georgia's Senate plan resulted in a retrogression of black voters' effective exercise of the electoral franchise. The Court reasoned that Georgia likely met its burden of showing nonretrogression under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because the District Court focused too narrowly on certain districts without examining the increases in the black voting age population that occurred in many of the other districts and improperly rejected evidence that the legislators representing the benchmark majority-minority districts support the plan. In his dissent, Justice David H. Souter argued that Georgia had failed to carry its burden.

Medical Board of California v. Hason (No. 02-479)

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Meyer v. Holley (No. 01-1120)

Does deep plowing ranchland to plant deep-rooted crops constitute the "addition" of a "pollutant" from a "point source" so as to fall within the regulation of the Clean Water Act? Is deep plowing ranchland which is farmable in its natural state to plant deep-rooted crops statutorily exempt from regulation under the Act's exemption for any discharge from "normal farming...activities such as plowing?" Does the Act's civil penalty section authorize assessing the maximum daily penalty for each time a plow crosses a seasonal drainage feature, without regard to the number of days when such activity occurred?

In a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the judgment of the appeals court by an equally divided vote. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Miller-El v. Cockrell (No. 01-7662)

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Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. (No. 01-1015)

Does the Court of Federal Claims, under the Indian Tucker Act, have jurisdiction over the White Mountain Apache Tribe's suit against the United States for breach of fiduciary duty to manage land and improvements held in trust for the Tribe but occupied by the federal government?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Public Law 86-392 gives rise to Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over the Tribe's suit. The Court reasoned that, although the statute providing for the land to be held in trust imposed no duties on the United States to maintain the land, the occupation of such land by the United States raised a duty to preserve trust assets and that it naturally followed that the United States was liable in damages for the breach of such duties. Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that the majority's opinion "radically alters the relevant inquiry from one focused on the actual fiduciary duties created by statute or regulation to one divining fiduciary duties out of the use of the word 'trust' and notions of factual control."

National Park Hospitality Assn. v. Dept. of the Interior (No. 02-196)

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Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs (No. 01-1368)

May a corporate subsidiary claim instrumentality status where the foreign state does not own a majority of its shares but does own a majority of the shares of a corporate parent one or more tiers above the subsidiary? Is a corporation's instrumentality status defined as of the time an alleged tort or other actionable wrong occurred?

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held, 7-2, that a foreign state must itself own a majority of the shares of a corporation if the corporation is to be deemed an instrumentality of the state under the provisions of the FSIA and, 9-0, that instrumentality status is determined at the time of the filing of the complaint. The Court reasoned that, as indirect subsidiaries of Israel, the Dead Sea Companies cannot come within the statutory language granting instrumentality status and that only direct ownership satisfies the statutory requirement. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, argued that the language "other ownership interest...owned by a foreign state," covers a foreign state's legal interest in a corporate subsidiary, where that interest consists of the foreign state's ownership of a corporate parent that owns the shares of the subsidiary. As Dole did not seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision, the writ of certiorari in 01-593 was dismissed.

Nguyen v. United States (No. 01-10873)

Does the Fair Housing Act impose personal liability without fault upon an officer or owner of a residential real estate corporation for the unlawful activity of the corporation's employee or agent?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the FHA does not impose liability without fault upon the employer in accordance with traditional agency principles. In other words, the FHA normally imposes vicarious liability upon the corporation, but not upon its officers or owners. In the absence of a clear indication of congressional intent to abrogate the common law principles of vicarious liability, the Court reasoned that neither the right of the officer to control the salesperson nor the overriding societal priority of the FHA's objectives warranted extending tort-related vicarious liability rules to include the officer. The Court also reasoned that nothing in the FHA supported imposing a non-delegable duty upon the officer to ensure that its salesperson did not discriminate.

Nike, Inc. v. Kasky (No. 02-575)

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Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers (No. 01-963)

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Overton v. Bazzetta (No. 02-94)

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PacifiCare Health System v. Book (No. 02-215)

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Pharmaceutical Research v. Walsh (No. 01-188)

In providing for suits under the FLSA, did Congress bar removal of such actions from state to federal court?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered David H. Souter, the Court held that the FLSA does not bar removal of a suit from state to federal court, thus Breuer's case was properly removed under section 1441. The Court reasoned that nothing on the face of the FLSA looked like an express prohibition of removal, there being no mention of removal, let alone of prohibition, given that word "maintain" and its bearing on removal was ambiguous at best. Rejecting all of Breuer's arguments, the Court noted that numerous other statutes provided indisputable prohibitions of removal, which demonstrated Congress's intent to give plaintiffs an absolute choice of forum in unmistakable terms.

Pierce County v. Guillen (No. 01-1229)

Should four physicians actively engaged in medical practice as shareholders and directors of a professional corporation be counted as employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?

In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the common-law element of control is the principal guidepost to be followed in deciding whether the four director-shareholder physicians in this case should be counted as employees and listed six factors that are relevant to such a decision. "Because the District Court's findings appear to weigh in favor of concluding that the four physicians are not clinic employees, but evidence in the record may contradict those findings or support a contrary conclusion," the Court remanded the case for a determination under the new standard. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the physician-shareholders function in several respects as common-law employees in their capacity as doctors performing everyday functions.

Price v. Vincent (No. 02-524)

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Roell v. Withrow (No. 02-69)

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Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania (No. 01-7574)

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Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (NOW) (No. 01-1118)

Does the Hazard Elimination Program exceed Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Clarence Thomas, the Court held that both the original program and its subsequent amendments fall within Congress's Commerce Clause power to "'regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce'" and "'to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.'" The Court concluded that, because Congress could reasonably believe that adopting a measure eliminating an unforeseen side effect of the Program's information-gathering requirement would result in greater safety on the nation's roads, the legislation was aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce and increasing protections for the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.

Sell v. United States (No. 02-5664)

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Smith v. Doe (No. 01-729)

Did the Department of Corrections ban on visits by minors violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the freedom of association of the First Amendment?

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the MDOC's regulations were valid. The Court reasoned that the fact that the regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests suffices to sustain them regardless of whether the prisoners have a constitutional right of association that has survived incarceration. The Court also concluded that the visitation restriction for inmates with two substance-abuse violations is not a cruel and unusual confinement condition violating the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned that withdrawing visitation privileges for a limited period is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for confinement conditions. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine (No. 01-706)

Do different tax rates levied against racetrack and casino gambling violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Iowa's differential tax rate, which distinguishes between adjusted revenues from slot machines at racetracks and revenues from riverboat slot machines, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the facts did not preclude an inference that the reason for the different tax rates was to help the riverboat industry or the river communities. Thus, the Court reasoned there was a rational basis for the law.

State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell (No. 01-1289)

Does the First Amendment permit a State to maintain fraud actions alleging that fundraisers made false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, consistent with the Court's precedent and the First Amendment, States may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used. The Court reasoned that, while bare failure to disclose that information directly to potential donors does not suffice to establish fraud, when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive the listener, the First Amendment does not preclude a fraud claim. Because the state's action was on misrepresentations that were not protected by freedom of speech, rather than the high percentage of donations retained, the Court concluded that the allegations against the telemarketers therefore state a claim for relief that can survive a motion to dismiss.

Stogner v. California (No. 01-1757)

Is 28 USC section 1367(d), which requires state statute of limitations to be tolled for the period during which a plaintiff's cause of action had previously been pending in federal court, constitutional as applied to lawsuits brought against a State's political subdivisions?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that section 1367(d)'s application to claims brought against a State's political subdivisions is constitutional. The Court reasoned that section 1367(d) is necessary and proper for carrying into execution Congress's power "to constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, as it provides a straightforward tolling rule, which promotes fair and efficient operation of the federal courts and is therefore conducive to the administration of justice. The Court also reiterated that, while Congress lacks Article I authority to override a State's immunity from suit in its own courts, it may subject a municipality to suit in state court if that is done pursuant to a valid exercise of its enumerated powers. Justice David H. Souter filed a concurring opinion, noting that he did not shift from his dissent in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706.

Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson (No. 01-757)

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United States v. American Library Association (No. 02-361)

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United States v. Bean (No. 01-704)

May a corporation participating in a public debate be subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the theory that its statements are commercial speech because they might affect consumers' opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing decisions?

The Court did not answer the question dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy dissented. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, dissented. Justice Breyer argued that no jurisdictional rule prevented the Court from decided the case and that "delay itself may inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of free speech without making the issue significantly easier to decide later on."

United States v. Navajo Nation (No. 01-1375)

Does section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibit the Federal Communications Commission from revoking licenses held by a debtor in bankruptcy upon the debtor's failure to make timely payments owed to the FCC for purchase of the licenses?

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the FCC's cancellations of the licenses violated section 525(a) as revocations of government licenses solely for nonpayment of the debtors' dischargeable debts. The Court rejected the FCC's argument that it did not revoke NextWave's licenses solely because of nonpayment and noted that the fact that the FCC had a valid regulatory motive for its action was irrelevant. Justice Scalia reasoned that, because the statute refers to failure to pay a debt as the sole cause of cancellation, it cannot reasonably be understood to include the governmental unit's motive in effecting the cancellation, since such a reading would deprive section 525 of force. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Stephen G. Breyer authored a dissenting opinion.

United States v. Recio (No. 01-1184)

May an individual sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. The Court reasoned that Congress both clearly stated its intention to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under the FMLA and acted within its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting prophylactic, rather than substantively redefining, legislation. "In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [section] 5 legislation," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy, who was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Scalia, filed dissents.

United States v. White Mt. Apache Tribe (No. 01-1067)

Does the Commonwealth of Virginia's cross-burning statute, which prohibits the burning of a cross with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, violate the First Amendment?

Yes, but in a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that while a State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, in which four other justices joined, the provision in the Virginia statute treating any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate renders the statute unconstitutional in its current form, in which three other justices joined. Justice Antonin Scalia left the latter portion of the Court's conclusion to argue that the Court should vacate and remand the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court with respect to Elliott and O'Mara, so that that court could have an opportunity to construe the cross-burning statute's prima-facie-evidence provision. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concluded that the Virginia statute is unconstitutional and therefore concurred in the Court's judgment insofar as it affirmed the invalidation of Black's conviction. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

Virginia v. Black (No. 01-1107)

Is the Ninth Circuit rule -- that a conspiracy ends automatically when the object of the conspiracy becomes impossible to achieve -- valid?

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because the federal government has defeated its object, such that Ninth Circuit's conspiracy-termination law is erroneous. Justice Breyer stated that the Ninth Circuit's rule is inconsistent with basic conspiracy law and that the agreement to commit an unlawful act is "'a distinct evil,'" which "'may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues.'" Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Virginia v. Hicks (No. 02-371)

No details yet.

Washington Dept. of Social & Health Services v. Guardianship of Keffeler (No. 01-1420)

Does the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 preempt state common-law claims related to propeller safety?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held 8-0 that neither the text nor the intent of the FBSA preempts Sprietsma's common law claims, either explicitly or implicitly. Justice Stevens wrote, "Absent a contrary decision by the Coast Guard" - the agency in charge of propeller-safety regulations - "the concern with uniformity does not justify the displacement of state common-law remedies that compensate accident victims..."

Wiggins v. Smith (No. 02-311)

No details yet.

Woodford v. Garceau (No. 01-1862)

Does the NBA require that any suits involving charges of excessive interest be heard in federal rather than state court?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the National Bank Act preempted the state-law claim and provided the exclusive cause of action for usury claims against national banks. Thus, the claim arose under federal law. The Court reasoned that the provisions of the Act create a federal remedy for overcharges that is exclusive, even when a state complainant relies entirely on state law. "Because [sections of the Act] provide the exclusive cause of action for such claims, there is, in short, no such thing as a state-law claim of usury against a national bank," wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Yellow Transportation, Inc. v. Michigan (No. 01-270)

Is the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority's trespass policy, which provides for arrest after being served notice for being on the premises without "a legitimate business or social purpose," facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the RRHA's trespass policy is not facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine. Noting that he was not in Whitcomb Court to engage in constitutionally protected speech, the Court reasoned that Hicks had not shown that the RRHA policy prohibited a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applications. Justice Scalia wrote, "both the notice-barment rule and the 'legitimate business or social purpose' rule apply to all persons who enter the streets of Whitcomb Court, not just to those who seek to engage in expression."