http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Wed, 06 Nov 2002 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 01-9094_20021106-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_9094/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 23 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-722_20030423-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_722/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 13 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>After attending a gun show in Texas, Thomas Bean drove to Mexico. When Mexican officials stopped his vehicle at the border, they found ammunition, and Bean was subsequently convicted in a Mexican court of importing ammunition. Because of his felony conviction, 18 USC section 922(g)(1) prohibited Bean from possessing, distributing, or receiving firearms or ammunition. Bean applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for relief from his firearms disabilities, but the ATF returned the application unprocessed, explaining that its annual appropriations law forbade it from expending any funds to investigate or act upon applications such as Bean's. Bean then filed suit, asking the District Court to conduct its own inquiry into his fitness to possess a gun and grant relief from his inability to possess, distribute, or receive firearms or ammunition. The court granted the requested relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Does a federal district court, despite appropriation provisions barring the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms from acting on applications for relief from firearms disabilities from persons convicted of a felony, have the authority to grant such relief?</p> 01-1418_20030113-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1418/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 08 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Catharina Costa was fired from her job as a heavy equipment operator at Desert Palace Casino. She filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit, charging that the firing was the culmination of discrimination that had occurred during her employment. Jurors during the trial were instructed by the judge to rule for Costa if they determined that sex was a motivating factor in the firing, even if other (legal) factors were present as well. The jury ruled for Costa. Desert Palace appealed, saying that the instructions incorrectly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in the case. A three judge panel from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling for the casino, but a subsequent review of the case by all 11 judges of the 11th Circuit reversed the panel's decision.</p> <p>Must a plaintiff present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991?</p> 01-705_20021008-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_705/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 30 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-306_20030430-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_306/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 28 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-469_20030428-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_469/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 09 Dec 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1991, Leonard and Arlene Warner sold the Warner Manufacturing Company to Elliott and Carol Archer. Subsequently, the Archers sued the Warners for fraud connected with the sale. In settling the lawsuit, the Archers executed releases except for obligations under a $100,000 promissory note and then voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit. After the Warners failed to make the first payment on the promissory note, the Archers sued in state court. The Warners filed for bankruptcy, and the Bankruptcy Court ordered liquidation under Chapter 7. The Archers then brought a claim asking the Bankruptcy Court to find the $100,000 debt nondischargeable and to order the Warners to pay the sum. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy "to the extent" it is "for money...obtained by...false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." The Bankruptcy Court denied the Archers' claim. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Does the Bankruptcy Code cover a debt embodied in a settlement agreement that settled a creditor's earlier claim "for money...obtained by...fraud?"</p> 01-1209_20021209-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1209/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 10 Dec 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Erick Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in federal District Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions on November 23, 1998, the court's mandate issued on December 15, 1998, and Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. One year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate, and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expired, Clay filed a motion for postconviction relief under 28 USC section 2255. Section 2255 provides that such motions are subject to a one-year time limitation that runs from "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." The District Court stated that when a federal prisoner does not seek certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for section 2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals's mandate. Because Clay filed his motion more than one year after that date, the court denied it as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Does a judgment become "final" for postconviction relief when the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the conviction where a defendant in a federal prosecution takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment of conviction but does not next petition for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court?</p> 01-1243_20021210-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1243/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 10 Dec 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>When Dallas County prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 10 of the 11 African-Americans eligible to serve on the jury at Thomas Miller-El's capital murder trial, he moved to strike the jury on the ground that the exclusions violated equal protection. The trial judge denied relief, finding no evidence indicating a systematic exclusion of African-Americans. Subsequently, the jury found Miller-El guilty, and he was sentenced to death. After Miller-El's direct appeal and state habeas corpus petitions were denied, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The Federal District Court denied Miller-El's application for a certificate of appealability (COA) in deference to the state courts' acceptance of the prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking the potential jurors. The Court of Appeals also denied the COA, finding that Miller-El failed to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.</p> <p>Must an inmate demonstrate that a state court's finding of the absence of purposeful discrimination was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence in order for a court of appeals to issue a certificate of appealability?</p> 01-1437_20021210-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1437/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 02 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-337_20030402-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_337/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 09 Dec 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In order to achieve savings on Medicaid purchases above federal cost-saving measures, the "Maine Rx" Program reduces prescription drug prices for state residents. Under the program, Maine attempts negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers. If a company does not enter into a rebate agreement, its Medicaid sales are subjected to a prior authorization procedure that requires state agency approval to qualify a doctor's prescription for reimbursement. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of nonresident drug manufacturers, challenged the program, claiming that it is pre-empted by the Medicaid Act and violates the Commerce Clause. Without resolving any factual issues, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the statute's implementation, concluding that any obstacle to the federal program's administration is sufficient to establish pre-emption. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Is a Maine statute providing for affordable prescription drugs pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause? Does the statute violate the Commerce Clause?</p> 01-1325_20021209-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1325/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 24 Feb 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-42_20030224-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_42/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 04 Dec 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>When Ford Motor Company and Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. canceled a credit card rebate program that enabled cardholders to accrue and redeem rebates towards the purchase of a new Ford, cardholders filed multiple state-based class actions. Ford and Citibank removed the cases to federal court. The cardholder plaintiffs consolidated their actions, seeking reinstitution of the program. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that each class member was asserting a separate and distinct claim and that the individual claims did not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. The appellate court also concluded that premising jurisdiction on the cost of complying with an injunction in favor of a single plaintiff would conflict with the principle of the amount-in-controversy requirement.</p> <p>Is the amount-in-controversy requirement of the federal diversity statute satisfied where a class representative seeks an injunction that would cost the defendant more than $75,000 to implement whether the injunction applies to one plaintiff or all class members?</p> 01-1444_20021204-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1444/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Under the False Claims Act (FCA), "any person" who "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" is liable to the federal government. A private person may bring a qui tam action "in the name of the Government" under the FCA. After the National Institute of Drug Abuse gave Cook County Hospital a $5 million research grant, Janet Chandler, who ran the study for a nonprofit research institute affiliated with the hospital, filed a qui tam action, claiming that Cook County and the institute had submitted false statements to obtain grant funds. Based on precedent, which held that States are not "persons" subject to FCA qui tam actions, the District Court granted the County's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Are local governments "persons" subject to qui tam actions under the False Claims Act?</p> 01-1269_20030121-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1269/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 25 Feb 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Hurley Henson filed suit in Louisiana state court against Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and sale of a chlordimeform-based insecticide. When Henson successfully intervened in a similar action, Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., in federal district court, the Louisiana court stayed his state court claim. Although the ensuing settlement in Price stipulated that his state-court action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson to proceed. Syngenta then removed the action to the federal District Court under the All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state-court action as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating the dismissal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act could not properly support removal of the state-court action.</p> <p>Does the All Writs Act give a federal district court the authority to remove a state-court case in order to prevent the frustration of orders the federal court has previously issued?</p> 01-1435_20030225-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1435/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 13 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.</p> <p>Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?</p> 01-1500_20030113-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1500/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 13 Nov 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Oliverio Martinez was stopped while riding his bicycle home from work by police investigating narcotics violations. When police attempted to handcuff him, a struggle ensued, but it is unclear who started it. During the struggle, Martinez was shot, resulting in permanent paralysis and loss of vision. A year later he sued the officers, saying the search and use of deadly force were unconstitutional. The officers introduced as evidence in their defense a taped confession obtained while Martinez was receiving medical treatment in the hospital, in which he admitted to grabbing the gun of one of the officers during the struggle. Martinez claimed that the tape could not be used as evidence because he had not been read his Miranda rights. The district court ruled with Martinez that the tape was inadmissible. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.</p> <p>Are a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from coercive questioning violated when he was subjected to coercive questioning while in police custody, even if his coerced statements were never used against him in a criminal case?</p> 01-1231_20021113-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1231/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 14 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>A group of physicians filed suit against a number of managed-health-care organizations, alleging they violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by failing to reimburse them for health-care services that they had provided to patients covered by the organizations' plans. The District Court refused to compel arbitration of the RICO claims on the ground that the arbitration clauses in the parties' agreements prohibited awards of punitive damages. Subsequently, the court found the arbitration agreements unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Can a group of physicians be compelled to arbitrate claims arising under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, even though the parties' arbitration agreements may be construed to limit the arbitrator's authority to award damages?</p> 01-1572_20030114-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1572/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 02 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-428_20030402-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_428/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>California regulates the minimum price paid to dairy farmers producing raw milk by establishing price minimums and requiring contributions to a price equalization pool. After it became profitable for some California processors to buy raw milk from out-of-state producers, the California Department of Food and Agriculture amended its regulations to require contributions to the price equalization pool on some out-of-state purchases. Four dairy farms in Nevada filed suit, alleging that the amendment unconstitutionally discriminated against them. Without reaching the merits, the District Court dismissed both cases. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 immunized California's milk pricing and pooling laws from Commerce Clause challenge. The appellate court also held that the individual petitioners' Privileges and Immunities Clause claims failed because the amendment did not create classifications based on any individual's residency or citizenship.</p> <p>Does the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 exempt California's milk pricing and pooling regulations from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause? Are individual claims under the Privileges and Immunities Clause against California's required contributions to the price equalization pool on some out-of-state purchases foreclosed because those regulations do not discriminate on their face on the basis of state citizenship or state residence?</p> 01-1491_20030115-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1491/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 21 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-679_20030421-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_679/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Gilbert Hyatt filed a part-year resident income-tax return in California for 1991, which represented that he had become a Nevada resident in October 1991, shortly before he received substantial licensing fees. The California Franchise Tax Board (CFTB) determined that Hyatt was a California resident until April 1992 and issued notices of proposed assessments and imposed substantial civil fraud penalties. Hyatt filed suit against CFTB in a Nevada state court, alleging that CFTB had committed negligence and intentional torts during the course of its audit. CFTB argued that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because full faith and credit required that the court apply California law immunizing CFTB from suit. Ultimately, the Nevada Supreme Court allowed the intentional tort claims to proceed to trial. The court held that affording CFTB statutory immunity with respect to intentional torts would contravene Nevada's interest in protecting its citizens from injurious intentional torts and bad faith acts committed by sister States' government employees.</p> <p>Does the Nevada Supreme Court's refusal to extend full faith and credit to California's statute immunizing its tax collection agency from suit violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution?</p> 01-593_20030122-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_593/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 26 Feb 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-271_20030226-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_271/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 09 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>With the recommendation of his doctor, Kenneth Nord filed for disability benefits with his employer of 25 years, Kwikset Corp., a company owned by Black & Decker Corp. After the company denied his claim, Nord asked for a review of the denial. A doctor hired by the company determined that Nord could in fact perform the duties required by his job and was therefore ineligible for benefits, despite determinations to the contrary by Nord's physician, his orthopedic surgeon and a Black & Decker human resource representative. Nord sued to have the decision reversed, claiming that the company's preference of its doctor's opinion over the opinions of the other physicians violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The district court ruled in favor of Black & Decker Corp. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Under ERISA, are companies required to defer to the decision of a disability claimant's personal physician?</p> 01-618_20021009-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_618/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 28 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-299_20030428-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_299/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 05 Nov 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>During Duyonn Vincent's trial, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder. Subsequently, when the prosecution made a statement on first-degree murder, defense counsel objected, arguing that the court had granted its directed verdict motion and that further prosecution on first-degree murder would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judge responded that he had granted the motion but had not directed a verdict. The judge then submitted the first-degree murder charge to the jury, which convicted Vincent on that charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. In reversing, the State Supreme Court determined that the trial judge's comments were not sufficiently final to terminate jeopardy. Subsequently, the Federal District Court granted Vincent's federal habeas corpus petition after concluding that continued prosecution for first-degree murder had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Is a defendant's right against double jeopardy violated when a trial judge grants a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder, but does not direct such a verdict to the jury that subsequently convicts the defendant of first-degree murder?</p> 01-6978_20021105-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_6978/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 08 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The California Medical Board denied Hason a license to practice medicine because of his mental illness. Hason sued in federal district court, alleging that his rights were violated under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed the suit, holding that his claims were barred by the 11th Amendment's guarantee of sovereign immunity, which prohibits a private party from suing a non-consenting state or its agencies in federal court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Congress abrogated 11th Amendment sovereign immunity by enacting Title II of the ADA "and thus states and their agencies may be sued pursuant to Title II."</p> <p>Does the 11th Amendment's grant of sovereign immunity bar suit under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act for denial of a medical license based on an applicant's mental illness?</p> 01-653_20021008-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_653/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 25 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-403_20030325-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_403/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 29 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-695_20030429-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_695/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 07 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 01-896_20021007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_896/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 29 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-182_20030429-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_182/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 01 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-516_20030401-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_516/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 22 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-634_20030422-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_634/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 01 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-241_20030401-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_241/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 22 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 01-950_20030422-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_950/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 09 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 01-800_20021009-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_800/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 31 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-281_20030331-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_281/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 05 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-258_20030305-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_258/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 14 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Kentucky's two "Any Willing Provider" (AWP) statutes prohibit "[a] health insurer [from] discriminating against any provider who is...willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established by the?insurer," and require a "health benefit plan that includes chiropractic benefits [to]...permit any licensed chiropractor who agrees to abide by the terms [and] conditions?of the?plan to serve as a participating primary chiropractic provider." Certain health maintenance organizations (HMOs) filed suit asserting that Kentucky's AWP laws are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which preempts all state laws "insofar as they?relate to any employee benefit plan," but saves from preemption state "laws...which regulate insurance." The District Court concluded that although both AWP statutes "relate to" employee benefit plans each law "regulates insurance" and is therefore saved from preemption. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempt any of Kentucky's "Any Willing Provider" statutes?</p> 00-1471_20030114-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_00_1471/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 26 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-102_20030326-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_102/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 05 Nov 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Although investigators concluded that Curtis Campbell caused an accident in which one person was killed and another permanently disabled, his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contested liability and took the case to trial. State Farm assured the Campbells that they would represent their interests. After losing in court, the Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the first part of the trial, the jury found State Farm's decision not to settle unreasonable. In the second part, the trial court denied State Farm's renewed motion to exclude dissimilar out-of-state conduct evidence, ruling such evidence was admissible to determine whether State Farm's conduct in the Campbell case was indeed intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages. The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively. The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award.</p> <p>Is an award of $145 million in punitive damages, when full compensatory damages are $1 million, excessive and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?</p> 01-1127_20021105-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1127/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 03 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>During an investigation of welfare fraud, the Inyo County Sheriff's office requested personnel files from a casino owned by the Paiute-Shoshone Indian tribe. When the request was denied, the Sheriff's office obtained a warrant to search for the records at the casino. After the search, the tribe sued, claiming that it was a violation of their sovereign immunity. The district court ruled for Inyo County; a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, ruling for the Paiute-Shoshone tribe.</p> <p>Does a federally recognized tribe qualify as a "person" who may sue under 42 USC section 1983? Does a tribe's suit qualify for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than section 1983?</p> 01-1806_20030303-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1806/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 25 Feb 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Following the 2000 Census, the Democratic-controlled Georgia legislature passed a redistricting plan that was backed by many black leaders because it would have spread black voters and influence across several districts rather than concentrating them in a select few. Georgia's Republican governor objected to the plan because he said it violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which discourages the dilution of minority voting strength. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the legislature's plan.</p> <p>Did the redistricting plan violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by spreading minority voters across several districts rather than concentrating them in a few heavily minority ones?</p> 01-1559_20030225-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1559/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Dec 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1993, Angelo Tsakopoulos purchased the Borden Ranch, an 8348-acre ranch in California. Tsakopoulos planned to subdivide the land into parcels for cultivation as vineyards and orchards. Because a dense layer of material prevented water from reaching the depths necessary to cultivate vineyards or orchards, Tsakopoulos intended to "deep rip" the soil. Deep ripping has a dramatic effect on the character of a wetland area. The Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency informed Tsakopoulos that he was not to deep rip protected waters without a permit. Ultimately, the District Court found that Tsakopoulos had violated the Clean Water Act multiple times and imposed a substantial fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part.</p> <p>Does deep plowing ranchland to plant deep-rooted crops constitute the "addition" of a "pollutant" from a "point source" so as to fall within the regulation of the Clean Water Act? Is deep plowing ranchland which is farmable in its natural state to plant deep-rooted crops statutorily exempt from regulation under the Act's exemption for any discharge from "normal farming...activities such as plowing?" Does the Act's civil penalty section authorize assessing the maximum daily penalty for each time a plow crosses a seasonal drainage feature, without regard to the number of days when such activity occurred?</p> 01-1120_20021203-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1120/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 16 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 01-7662_20021016-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_7662/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 12 Nov 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Under Public Law 86-392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate the property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to dismiss, the federal government argued that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation could be read to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone authorize compensation for breach. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the federal government's property use triggered a common-law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of the Interior chose to utilize, which also supported a money damages claim.</p> <p>Does the Court of Federal Claims, under the Indian Tucker Act, have jurisdiction over the White Mountain Apache Tribe's suit against the United States for breach of fiduciary duty to manage land and improvements held in trust for the Tribe but occupied by the federal government?</p> 01-1015_20021112-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1015/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 04 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-196_20030304-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_196/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1997, a group of farm workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama, who alleged injury from chemical exposure, filed a state-court action against Dole Food Company and others. Subsequently, Dole impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Co. and Bromine Compounds, Ltd., or the Dead Sea Companies. Dole successfully removed the action to federal court, arguing that the federal common law of foreign relations provided federal-question jurisdiction. The District Court rejected the argument that the Dead Sea Companies were instrumentalities of a foreign state, Israel, as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) and thus entitled to removal. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Dole could not base removal on the federal common law of foreign relations and that the Dead Sea Companies were not instrumentalities of Israel because they did not meet the FSIA's instrumentality definition.</p> <p>May a corporate subsidiary claim instrumentality status where the foreign state does not own a majority of its shares but does own a majority of the shares of a corporate parent one or more tiers above the subsidiary? Is a corporation's instrumentality status defined as of the time an alleged tort or other actionable wrong occurred?</p> 01-1368_20030115-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1368/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 24 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Fair Housing Act (FHA) forbids racial discrimination in respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. The Holleys, an interracial couple, alleged that a Triad real-estate corporation sales representative prevented them from buying a Triad-listed house for racially discriminatory reasons. The Holleys filed suit against the sales representative and David Meyer, Triad's president, sole shareholder, and licensed "officer/broker," claiming that he was vicariously liable for the sales representative's unlawful actions. The District Court dismissed the claims, stating that the FHA did not impose personal vicarious liability upon a corporate officer or a "designated officer/broker." In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled that the FHA imposes strict liability principles beyond those traditionally associated with agent/principal or employee/employer relationships.</p> <p>Does the Fair Housing Act impose personal liability without fault upon an officer or owner of a residential real estate corporation for the unlawful activity of the corporation's employee or agent?</p> 01-10873_20030324-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_10873/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 23 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-575_20030423-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_575/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 06 Nov 2002 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 01-963_20021106-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_963/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 26 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-94_20030326-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_94/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 24 Feb 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-215_20030224-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_215/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Philip Breuer sued in state court to resolve an overtime dispute under the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Attorneys for Breuer's employer, Jim's Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved to federal court by citing the federal removal statute. According to the statute, defendants in state court cases dealing with federal laws may have the case moved to federal court "unless otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress." Breuer's attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits under the FLSA to be heard in state court and that the case should therefore be returned to state court; attorneys for Jim's Concrete disagreed. The district court refused to send the case back to state court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>In providing for suits under the FLSA, did Congress bar removal of such actions from state to federal court?</p> 01-188_20030122-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_188/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 04 Nov 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Deborah Wells worked for Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. from 1986 until 1997. Wells filed suit, alleging that Clackamas Gastroenterology violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) when it terminated her employment. Clackamas moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not covered by the Act because it did not have 15 or more employees for the 20 weeks required by the ADA. This argument depended on the four physician-shareholders, who own the professional corporation and constitute its board of directors, not being counted as employees. In granting the motion, the District Court concluded that the physicians were more analogous to partners in a partnership than to shareholders in a corporation and therefore were not employees under the ADA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found no reasoned to permit the professional corporation to argue it was a partnership so as to avoid employment discrimination liability.</p> <p>Should four physicians actively engaged in medical practice as shareholders and directors of a professional corporation be counted as employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?</p> 01-1229_20021104-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1229/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 21 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-524_20030421-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_524/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 26 Feb 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-69_20030226-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_69/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 04 Nov 2002 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 01-7574_20021104-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_7574/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 04 Dec 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Hazard Elimination Program provides state governments with funding to improve the most dangerous sections of their roads. To be eligible for funding, a state must undertake a thorough evaluation of its public roads. This led to concerns that the absence of confidentiality would increase the liability risk for accidents that took place at hazardous locations before improvements could be made. Ultimately, Congress provided that materials "compiled or collected" for purposes of the program "shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding." In 1996, Ignacio Guillen's wife died in an automobile accident in a Pierce County, Washington intersection. While Washington had previously been denied funding for the intersection where the accident occurred, its second request was granted after the accident. Guillen first sought information on the intersection and then asserted that the state had been negligent in failing to install proper traffic controls. Washington sought to protect itself under the Program. The Washington Supreme Court held that the Program exceeded Congress's power under the Constitution.</p> <p>Does the Hazard Elimination Program exceed Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause?</p> 01-1118_20021204-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1118/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 03 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-5664_20030303-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_5664/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 13 Nov 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1995, after the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) banned visits to inmates by little brothers and sisters, nieces, nephews and other minors, a group of prisoners sued. They claimed that the ban violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and that it restricted their First Amendment right to association. The district court agreed, ruling against the ban. On appeal, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court's ruling.</p> <p>Did the Department of Corrections ban on visits by minors violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the freedom of association of the First Amendment?</p> 01-729_20021113-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_729/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 15 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>A group of racetracks that earn revenue from gambling sued the state of Iowa, claiming that the state's practice of taxing racetrack gambling at a higher rate than riverboat gambling violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The group asserted that gambling at racetracks and riverboat casinos is is not substantially different, and that the state should therefore charge the same tax rate for both activities. A state district court sided with the state, ruling that important differences did exist between riverboat and racetrack gambling; the Iowa Supreme Court reversed in a 4-3 decision.</p> <p>Do different tax rates levied against racetrack and casino gambling violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?</p> 01-706_20021015-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_706/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 11 Dec 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>VietNow National Headquarters, a charitable nonprofit corporation, retained for-profit fundraising telemarketing corporations to solicit donations to aid Vietnam veterans. The contracts provided that the telemarketers would retain 85 percent of the gross receipts from Illinois donors. The Illinois Attorney General filed a complaint in state court, alleging that the telemarketers represented to donors that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be paid over to VietNow for charitable endeavors and that such representations were knowingly deceptive and materially false and constituted a fraud. The trial court granted the telemarketers' motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. In affirming, the Illinois Supreme Courts relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that held that certain regulations of charitable solicitation barring fees in excess of a prescribed level effectively imposed prior restraints on fundraising and were therefore incompatible with the First Amendment.</p> <p>Does the First Amendment permit a State to maintain fraud actions alleging that fundraisers made false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used?</p> 01-1289_20021211-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1289/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 31 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>If a federal court with jurisdiction over a civil action declines to exercise supplement jurisdiction over other related claims, the claims will be dismissed and must be refiled in state court. To prevent the limitations period on those claims from expiring, 28 USC section 1367(d) requires state courts to toll the period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court. In 1994, Susan Jinks filed a federal-court action against Richland County, South Carolina. The District Court granted the county summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over Jinks's state-law claims. Jinks then filed the supplemental claims in state court and won. In reversing, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found the state-law claims time-barred. Although they would not have been barred under section 1367(d)'s tolling rule, the court held section 1367(d) unconstitutional as applied to claims brought in state court against a State's political subdivisions.</p> <p>Is 28 USC section 1367(d), which requires state statute of limitations to be tolled for the period during which a plaintiff's cause of action had previously been pending in federal court, constitutional as applied to lawsuits brought against a State's political subdivisions?</p> 01-1757_20030331-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1757/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 15 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 01-757_20021015-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_757/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 05 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-361_20030305-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_361/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 16 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Beginning in 1996, a number of allegations arose that Nike was mistreating and underpaying workers at foreign facilities. Nike responded to the charges in numerous ways, such as by issuing press releases. In 1998, Marc Kasky, a California resident, sued Nike for unfair and deceptive practices under California's Unfair Competition Law. Kasky alleged that Nike made "false statements and/or material omissions of fact" concerning the working conditions under which its products are manufactured. Nike filed a demurrer, contending that Kasky's suit was absolutely barred by the First Amendment. The trial court dismissed the case and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. In reversing, the California Supreme Court found that Nike's messages were commercial speech, but that the suit was at such a preliminary stage that the issue whether any false representations had been made had yet to be resolved.</p> <p>May a corporation participating in a public debate be subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the theory that its statements are commercial speech because they might affect consumers' opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing decisions?</p> 01-704_20021016-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_704/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 02 Dec 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>After the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auctioned off certain broadband personal communications services licenses to NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., Nextwave filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and suspended payments to all creditors, including the FCC. The FCC asserted that NextWave's licenses had been canceled automatically when the company missed its first payment-deadline and announced that NextWave's licenses were available for auction. Ultimately, when the FCC denied NextWave's petition for reconsideration of the license cancellation, the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit held that the cancellation violated 11 USC section 525(a), which provides that a "governmental unit may not...revoke...a license...to...a debtor...solely because such...debtor...has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case." (Together with No. 01-657, Arctic Slope Regional Corp. et al. v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc. et al.)</p> <p>Does section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibit the Federal Communications Commission from revoking licenses held by a debtor in bankruptcy upon the debtor's failure to make timely payments owed to the FCC for purchase of the licenses?</p> 01-1375_20021202-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1375/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 12 Nov 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a "serious health condition" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action "against any employer" that "interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>May an individual sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993?</p> 01-1184_20021112-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1184/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 02 Dec 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Barry Black, Richard Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted separately of violating a Virginia statute that makes it a felony "for any person..., with the intent of intimidating any person or group..., to burn...a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place," and specifies that "any such burning...shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group." At trial, Black objected on First Amendment grounds to a jury instruction that cross burning by itself is sufficient evidence from which the required "intent to intimidate" could be inferred. He was found guilty. O'Mara pleaded guilty to charges of violating the statute, but reserved the right to challenge its constitutionality. In Elliott's trial, the judge did not give an instruction on the statute's prima facie evidence provision. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court held, among other things, that the cross-burning statute is unconstitutional on its face and that the prima facie evidence provision renders the statute overbroad because the probability of prosecution under the statute chills the expression of protected speech.</p> <p>Does the Commonwealth of Virginia's cross-burning statute, which prohibits the burning of a cross with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, violate the First Amendment?</p> 01-1067_20021202-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1067/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 11 Dec 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada and seized the illegal drugs that it was carrying. With the help of the truck drivers, the police set up a sting. Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza came for the truck and were subsequently arrested. A jury convicted Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza of conspiracy, but the trial judge ordered a new trial under Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent that held a conspiracy terminates when "'there is affirmative evidence of...defeat of the object of the conspiracy.'" In other words, the federal government could not prosecute the drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the government seized the drugs. The new jury convicted the two men once again. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence presented at the second trial was insufficient to show that Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza had joined the conspiracy before the drug seizure.</p> <p>Is the Ninth Circuit rule -- that a conspiracy ends automatically when the object of the conspiracy becomes impossible to achieve -- valid?</p> 01-1107_20021211-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1107/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 30 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-371_20030430-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_371/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Dec 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Rex Sprietsma's wife was killed in a boating accident when she was struck by the propeller of a motor made by Mercury Marine. Sprietsma sued Mercury Marine under Illinois common law, alleging that his wife's injuries were caused by an unreasonably dangerous motor. The trial court, the intermediate court, and the Illinois Supreme Court all dismissed the complaint, finding the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) preempted such state common-law claims.</p> <p>Does the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 preempt state common-law claims related to propeller safety?</p> 01-1420_20021203-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1420/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 24 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 02-311_20030324-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_311/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Several H&R Block customers, who took out loans from Beneficial National Bank in anticipation of their tax refunds, sued the bank in state court. The customers alleged that the bank charged excessive interest in violation of Alabama law. The bank asked that the case be heard in federal, rather than state, court, because the issues were covered under the National Bank Act (NBA), a federal law. The district court ruled in favor of the bank; the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the NBA did not completely preempt state laws governing lending rates and that the case could therefore be heard in state court.</p> <p>Does the NBA require that any suits involving charges of excessive interest be heard in federal rather than state court?</p> 01-1862_20030121-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1862/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 07 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA), a political subdivision of Virginia, owns and operates Whitcomb Court, a low-income housing development. In 1997, the Richmond City Council conveyed Whitcomb Court's streets to the RRHA. Subsequently, the RRHA enacted a policy authorizing the Richmond police to serve notice on any person lacking "a legitimate business or social purpose" for being on the premises and to arrest for trespassing any person who remains or returns after having been notified. After the RRHA gave Kevin Hicks, a nonresident, written notice barring him from Whitcomb Court, he trespassed there and was arrested and convicted. At trial, Hicks claimed that RRHA's policy was unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. The Virginia en banc Court of Appeals vacated his conviction. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found the policy unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.</p> <p>Is the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority's trespass policy, which provides for arrest after being served notice for being on the premises without "a legitimate business or social purpose," facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine?</p> 01-270_20021007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_270/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist