The Oyez Project: 2001 Term Decisions

Adams v. Florida Power Corp. (No. 01-584)

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Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta (No. 00-730)

Does the First Amendment permit the Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the announce clause violates the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the announce clause prohibits speech based on its content and burdens a category of speech that is at the core of First Amendment freedoms - speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office. Moreover, the Court concluded that the clause did not serve to preserve the state judiciary's impartiality, its argued compelling state interest. "There is an obvious tension between the article of Minnesota's popularly approved Constitution which provides that judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's announce clause which places most subjects of interest to the voters off limits," wrote Justice Scalia.

Alabama v. Shelton (No. 00-1214)

Did a border agent have reasonable suspicion to believe that Ralph Arvizu was engaged in illegal activity based on a number of factors?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Court of Appeals' methodology was contrary to its prior decisions and that it reached the wrong result in this case. The Court concluded that Stoddard had reasonable suspicion to believe that Arvizu was engaged in illegal activity, having considered the totality of the circumstances and given due weight to the factual inferences drawn by the law enforcement officer and District Court Judge. The Court reasoned that, although each factor alone could have appeared innocent, when taken together they sufficed to form a particularized and objective basis for Stoddard's stopping the vehicle, making the stop reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion.

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (No. 00-1293)

Does the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, allow local public housing agencies to evict tenants for drug-related activity of non-tenant relatives or guests regardless of whether tenants knew, or should have known, about the activity?

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "Congress' decision not to impose any qualification in the statute, combined with its use of the term 'any' to modify 'drug-related criminal activity,' precludes any knowledge requirement." The Chief Justice also noted that it was reasonable for Congress to permit no-fault evictions in order to provide public housing that was decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the case.

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (No. 00-795)

Is a corporation organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands a "citizen or subject of a foreign state" for the purposes of alienage diversity jurisdiction?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a corporation organized under the laws of the BVI is a "citizen or subject of a foreign state" for the purposes of alienage diversity jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that, because of the United Kingdom's retention and exercise of authority over the BVI, statutes permitting incorporation in the BVI are enacted in the exercise of the United Kingdom's political authority. "It is enough to hold that the United Kingdom's retention and exercise of authority over the BVI renders BVI citizens, both natural and juridic, 'citizens or subjects' of the United Kingdom," wrote Justice Souter. Thus, Traffic Stream was a citizen or subject of a foreign state for the purposes of alienage diversity jurisdiction.

Atkins v. Virginia (No. 00-8452)

Does an agreement between an employer and an employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes bar the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief in an enforcement action alleging that the employer has violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the arbitration agreement did not bar the EEOC from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief in an ADA enforcement action. The Court reasoned that the EECO's statutory enforcement powers unambiguously authorized the EEOC to obtain the relief that it sought in its complaint, if it could prove its case against the employer. The Court further noted that no language existed to suggest that an arbitration agreement between private parties materially changed the EEOC's statutory function or the remedies otherwise available. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia joined.

Barnes v. Gorman (No. 01-682)

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Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. (No. 00-1307)

Must a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an employment discrimination complaint need not include specific facts establishing a prima facie case under the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and instead must contain only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Thomas noted that the prima facie case operates as a flexible evidentiary standard and not a pleading requirement for discrimination cases. "Under the Second Circuit's heightened pleading standard, a plaintiff without direct evidence of discrimination at the time of his complaint must plead a prima facie case of discrimination, even though discovery might uncover such direct evidence," wrote Justice Thomas. "It thus seems incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may ultimately need to prove to succeed on the merits if direct evidence of discrimination is discovered."

Barnhart v. Walton (No. 00-1937)

Does the Court of Appeals holding of qualified immunity where prison guards' conduct violated the Eighth Amendment comport with United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the defense of qualified immunity was precluded at the summary judgment phase of Hope's trial. The Court reasoned that, although Hope's allegations if true established an Eighth Amendment violation, prison guards could be shielded from liability for their constitutionally impermissible conduct if their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Noting that United States v. Lanier makes clear that officials can be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual situations, the Court concluded that a reasonable officer would have known that using a hitching post as Hope alleged was unlawful.

BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB (No. 01-518)

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Bell v. Cone (No. 01-400)

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Board of Education v. Earls (No. 01-332)

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Carey v. Saffold (No. 01-301)

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Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. (No. 00-927)

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Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal (No. 00-1406)

Does the Indian Regulatory Gaming Act exempt tribes from paying the gambling-related taxes, which State need not pay, imposed by chapter 35 of the Internal Revenue Code?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Indian Regulatory Gaming Act does not create such an exemption. The Court reasoned that despite its parenthetical reference, the language outside the parenthetical was unambiguous and the subsection applied only to Internal Revenue Code provisions that concerned the reporting and withholding of taxes. The language inside the parenthetical was meant simply to be illustrative. Moreover, the Court noted that when Congress enacts a tax exemption, it ordinarily does so explicitly. "We can find no comparable instance in which Congress legislated an exemption through an inexplicit numerical cross-reference -- especially a cross-reference that might easily escape notice," wrote Justice Breyer.

Chickasaw Nation v. United States (No. 00-507)

Did the Court of Appeals err in interpreting Arizona law concerning its postconviction-relief rule?

In a per curiam opinion, the Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals holding. The Court reasoned that in order to determine whether the District Court may review Smith's claims, it first had to know whether the Court of Appeals properly interpreted Arizona law concerning Rule 32.2(a)(3) and, therefore, certified the following question to the Arizona Supreme Court: "At the time of respondent's third Rule 32 petition in 1995, did the question whether an asserted claim was of 'sufficient constitutional magnitude' to require a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver for purposes of Rule 32.2(a)(3) depend upon the merits of the particular claim or merely upon the particular right alleged to have been violated?"

Christopher v. Harbury (No. 01-394)

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City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service (No. 01-419)

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City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. (No. 00-799)

May punitive damages be awarded in a private cause of action brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that, because punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it follows that they may not be awarded in suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The Court noted that the remedies of the sections of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act Gorman sued under are coextensive with those available in a private action under Title VI. Under a contract-law analogy, the Court reasoned because Title VI-funding recipients did not, merely by accepting funds, implicitly consent to liability for punitive damages, it followed that they could not be awarded in suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko (No. 00-860)

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Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker (No. 00-1770)

Does a criminal defendant who lets a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 error pass without objection in the trial court bear the burden of showing plain error under Rule 52? May a court reviewing Rule 11 error examine the entire record begun at the defendant's first appearance in the matter leading to his eventual plea when considering the effect of any error on the defendant's substantial rights?

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held 8-1 that silent defendant has the burden to satisfy the plain-error rule and unanimously that a reviewing court may consult the whole record when considering the effect of any error on substantial rights. The Court reasoned that to hold that Rule 11(h)'s terms imply that the latter half of Rule 52 has no application to Rule 11 errors would amount to finding a partial repeal of Rule 52(b) by implication, a disfavored result that Vonn had not establish enough support for. "The value of finality requires defense counsel to be on his toes, not just the judge, and the defendant who just sits there when a mistake can be fixed cannot just sit there when he speaks up later on," wrote Justice Souter.

Devlin v. Scardelletti (No. 01-417)

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Dusenbery v. United States (No. 00-6567)

Does a State's sovereign immunity preclude the Federal Maritime Commission from adjudicating a private party's complaint that a state-run port has violated the Shipping Act of 1984?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that state sovereign immunity bars the FMC from adjudicating a private party's complaint against a nonconsenting State. Historically, the Court noted, states were not subject to private suits in administrative adjudications when the Constitution was adopted, and states were thus presumptively immune from such actions. Moreover, the Court pointed to the similarities between the FMC's proceedings and civil litigation to conclude that there was no basis for distinguishing between the actions for purposes of sovereign immunity. "Although the Framers likely did not envision the intrusion on state sovereignty at issue in today's case, we are nonetheless confident that it is contrary to their constitutional design," wrote Justice Thomas.

Edelman v. Lynchburg College (No. 00-1072)

Does a moratorium on development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that that the mere enactment of the regulations implementing the moratoria did not constitute a per se taking of the landowners' property. The Court reasoned that whether a taking occurred depended upon the considerations of landowners' expectations, actual impact, public interest, and reasons for the moratoria. Moreover, the Court concluded that the adoption of a categorical rule that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constituted a compensable taking would impose unreasonable financial obligations upon governments for the normal delays involved in processing land use applications. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia.

EEOC v. Waffle House (No. 99-1823)

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Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority (No. 01-46)

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Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (No. 00-1543)

Does the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 abridge freedom of speech where it where it proscribes a significant universe of speech that is neither obscene under Miller v. California nor child pornography under New York v. Ferber?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the two prohibitions described above are overbroad and unconstitutional. The Court found the CPPA to be inconsistent with Miller insofar as the CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity, because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by the obscenity definition. Moreover, the Court found the CPPA to have no support in Ferber since the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Provisions of the CPPA cover "materials beyond the categories recognized in Ferber and Miller, and the reasons the Government offers in support of limiting the freedom of speech have no justification in our precedents or in the law of the First Amendment" and abridge "the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech," wrote Justice Kennedy.

Franconia Associates v. United States (No. 01-455)

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Gisbrecht v. Barnhart (No. 01-131)

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Gonzaga University v. Doe (No. 01-679)

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Great-West Life and Annuity Ins. v. Knudson (No. 99-1786)

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Harris v. United States (No. 00-10666)

Does the practice of peer grading violate the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Peer grading does not violate FERPA. The Court reasoned that peer-graded items did not constitute education records protected by FERPA until a teacher collected the grades on the students' papers or other items and recorded the grades in the teacher's grade book. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that peer-graded items were not "maintained" within in the meaning of FERPA, as the student graders only handled the items for a few moments. Moreover, the Court stated that each student grader, by grading assignments, did not constitute a person acting for an educational institution within FERPA.

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB (No. 00-1595)

Does the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 require that all prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances or occurrences exhaust any applicable administrative remedies before filing suit?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. The Court rejected Nussle's argument that Congress added the words "prison conditions" to exempt excessive force claims. Justice Ginsburg wrote that the Court's precedents and the act's "dominant concern to promote administrative redress, filter out groundless claims, and foster better prepared litigation of claims aired in court" persuade the Court "strongly away from classifying suits about prison guards' use of excessive force, one or many times, as anything other than actions 'with respect to prison conditions.'"

Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation System (No. 01-408)

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Hope v. Pelzer (No. 01-309)

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Horn v. Banks (No. 01-1385)

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J.E.M. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International (No. 99-1996)

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JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd. (No. 01-651)

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Kansas v. Crane (No. 00-957)

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Kelly v. South Carolina (No. 00-9280)

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Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia (No. 01-298)

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Lee v. Kemna (No. 00-6933)

Does Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violate the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee by entrusting to a judge the finding of facts sufficient to impose the death penalty?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operates as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be "exposed...to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone," the Court overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, insofar it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. "The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death," wrote Justice Ginsburg.

Mathias v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc. (No. 00-878)

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McKune v. Lile (No. 00-1187)

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 permit the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulation that allows the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the ADA did not preclude the EEOC's regulation allowing the harm-to-self defense. The Court reasoned that deference applied to the regulation because it made sense of the statutory defense for qualification standards that are job-related and consistent with business necessity. The Court also found that the risk of violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) was enough to show that the regulation was permissible. "Although there may be an open question whether an employer would actually be liable under OSHA for hiring an individual who knowingly consented to the particular dangers the job would pose to him, there is no denying that the employer would be asking for trouble: his decision to hire would put Congress's policy in the ADA, a disabled individual's right to operate on equal terms within the workplace, at loggerheads with the competing policy of OSHA, to ensure the safety of 'each and 'every worker," wrote Justice Souter.

Mickens v. Taylor (No. 00-9285)

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National Cable and Telecom. Assoc. v. Gulf Power (No. 00-832)

Does the Census Bureau's use of "hot-deck imputation," in the 2000 census, violate the statutory provision forbidding use of the statistical method known as sampling? Is this methodology inconsistent with the Constitution's statement that an "actual Enumeration be made?

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the use of hot-deck imputation violates neither the statute nor the Constitution. The Court reasoned that, whereas sampling seeks to extrapolate the features of a large population from a small one, the Bureau's imputation process simply sought to fill in missing data as part of an effort to count individuals one by one and that these differences placed imputation outside the scope of the prohibitive statute. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that Article 1's wording that the "actual Enumeration" shall take place "in such Manner as" Congress itself "shall by Law direct," suggested a breadth of congressional methodological authority, rather than a limitation.

National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan (No. 00-1614)

Is a state commission's action relating to the enforcement of an interconnection agreement under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 reviewable in federal court? Does a state commission waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily participating in the regulatory scheme established by the Act? Does the doctrine of Ex parte Young permit suit for relief against state public utility commissioners in their official capacities for alleged ongoing violations of the Act?

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The Court noted that it had granted certiorari to review the same questions arising in the same factual context in Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md.

New York v. FERC (No. 00-568)

Does the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have appellate jurisdiction over a case in which the complaint does not allege a claim arising under federal patent law, but the answer contains a patent-law counterclaim?

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the appellate could not assert jurisdiction over such a case. Noting that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is fixed and turns on whether an action is one arising under federal patent law, the Court reasoned that because the complaint asserted no claim arising under patent law, the court erred in asserting jurisdiction over the appeal. "By limiting the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to cases in which district courts would have jurisdiction...Congress referred to a well-established body of law that requires courts to consider whether a patent-law claim appears on the face of the plaintiff's...complaint. Because [Holmes's] complaint did not include any claim based on patent law, we vacate the judgment of the Federal Circuit," wrote Justice Scalia.

Owasso Independent School Dist. No. I011 v. Falvo (No. 00-1073)

Does the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel, as defined in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, apply to a defendant who was sentenced to a suspended sentence?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held, according to Argersinger, that a suspended sentence that may "end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty" may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded "the guiding hand of counsel" in the prosecution for the crime charged. The Court reasoned that, because the invocation of the suspended incarceration would constitute a prison term imposed for the assault offense of which defendant was convicted without the assistance of counsel, the Constitution required the provision of counsel. Justice Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that the Court's prior decisions emphasized actual imprisonment as the touchstone of entitlement to appointed counsel.

Porter v. Nussle (No. 00-853)

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Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide (No. 00-6029)

May the state power reserved in 49 USC section 14501(c)(2)(A) be delegated to municipalities, permitting them to exercise safety regulatory authority over local tow-truck operations?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that section 14501(c) does not bar a State from delegating to municipalities and other local units the State's authority to establish safety regulations governing motor carriers of property, including tow trucks. "A locality, as section 14501(c) recognizes, is a 'political subdivision' of the State," wrote Justice Ginsburg. "Ordinarily, a political subdivision may exercise whatever portion of state power the State...chooses to delegate to the subdivision. Absent a clear statement to the contrary, Congress' reference to the 'regulatory authority of a State' should be read to preserve, not preempt, the traditional prerogative of the States to delegate their authority to their constituent parts." Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined.

Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota (No. 00-1514)

May the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission require a public utility to transmit competitors' electricity over its lines on the same terms that the utility applies to its own energy transmissions, if the utility unbundles, or separates, the cost of transmission from the cost of electrical energy when billing its retail customers? Must FERC impose that requirement on utilities that continue to offer only bundled retail sales?

Yes and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that FERC properly construed its statutory authority. The Court's 9-0 decision affirmed that FERC had the jurisdiction to require nondiscriminatory access to electrical transmission by utilities, which unbundled their costs, regardless of state regulation of retail sales, and, by a 6-3 vote, was not required to impose requirements on bundled retail sales. "Because the FPA authorizes FERC's jurisdiction over interstate transmissions, without regard to whether the transmissions are sold to a reseller or directly to a consumer, FERC's exercise of this power is valid," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (No. 01-521)

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Ring v. Arizona (No. 01-488)

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Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran (No. 00-1021)

Is the Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Act, as applied to health benefits provided by a health maintenance organization under contract with an employee welfare benefit plan, preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that ERISA does not preempt the Illinois HMO Act. Under its common-sense view of the matter, the Court reasoned that, because HMOs are risk-bearing organizations subject to state insurance regulation and almost universally regulated as insurers under state law, "the Illinois HMO Act is a law 'directed toward' the insurance industry and an 'insurance regulation'" and is, thus, saved from preemption under ERISA's saving clause. Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that ERISA's civil enforcement provision provides the exclusive means for actions asserting a claim for benefits under health plans governed by ERISA and therefore state laws that create additional remedies are preempted.

SEC v. Zandford (No. 01-147)

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Stewart v. Smith (No. 01-339)

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Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. (No. 00-1853)

Does a State's act of removing a lawsuit from state court to federal court waive the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other States?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court. The Court concluded that that the university officials' voluntary removal of the action expressly invoked the jurisdiction of the federal courts and thus constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to state law claims for which immunity was waived in state court. Under the general principle that a State's voluntary appearance in federal court amounts to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court reasoned that Georgia was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in state court, but it then voluntarily removed the case to federal court, thus voluntarily invoking that court's jurisdiction.

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (No. 00-1167)

Does the Child Online Protection Act's use of "community standards" to identify "material that is harmful to minors" violate the First Amendment?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that COPA's reliance on community standards to identify what material is harmful to minors does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for First Amendment purposes. The Court expressed no view as to whether COPA was overbroad for other reasons or was unconstitutionally vague and did not vacate the preliminary injunction because it could not do so without addressing matters yet to be considered. "In its original form, the community standard provided a shield for communications that are offensive only to the least tolerant members of society," argued Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissent. "In the context of the Internet, however, community standards become a sword, rather than a shield. If a prurient appeal is offensive in a puritan village, it may be a crime to post it on the World Wide Web."

Thomas v. Chicago Park District (No. 00-1249)

Does a patentee, by narrowing a claim to obtain a patent, surrender all equivalents to the amended claim element?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that prosecution history estoppel may apply to any claim amendment made to satisfy the Patent Act's requirements, not just to amendments made to avoid the prior art, but that estoppel need not bar suit against every equivalent to the amended claim element. Noting that by amending an application the inventor is deemed to concede that the patent does not extend as far as the original claim, the Court reasoned that the patentee should bear the burden of showing that the amendment does not surrender the equivalent in question. Justice Kennedy wrote that, in cases where an equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the application, the patentee could rebut the presumption that prosecution history estoppel barred a finding of equivalence by showing that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.

Thompson v. Western States Medical Center (No. 01-344)

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Toyota Motor Mfg v. Williams (No. 00-1089)

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a position as a reasonable accommodation even though another employee is entitled to hold the position under the employer's seniority system?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the ADA did not require the employer to assign the employee to the mailroom position in violation of the established seniority system. The Court reasoned that an employer's showing that a requested accommodation conflicts with seniority rules is ordinarily sufficient to show that an accommodation is not reasonable. However, the Court added, an employee remains free to present evidence of special circumstances that makes a seniority rule exception reasonable in the particular case. Justice Antonin Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, argued that the accommodation provision of the ADA requires the suspension, within reason, of employment rules and practices that an employee's disability prevents him from observing. Also dissenting, Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that US Airways failed to establish any burden brought on by accommodating Barnett.

TRW v. Andrews (No. 00-1045)

Is McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, valid after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that section 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single offense, in which brandishing a firearm is a sentencing factor to be found by the judge, not an offense element to be found by the jury. Reaffirming McMillan, the Court also concluded that section 924(c)(1)(A) is constitutional because basing a 2-year increase in the defendant's minimum sentence on a judicial finding of brandishing does not evade the requirements of neither the Fifth and Sixth Amendments nor Apprendi. "Apprendi's conclusions do not undermine McMillan's. There was no comparable historical practice of submitting facts increasing the mandatory minimum to the jury, so the Apprendi rule did not extend to those facts," wrote Justice Kennedy.

United States v. Arvizu (No. 00-1519)

Does the FBI's notice of intended forfeiture by sending certified letters to inmates while incarcerated satisfy due process?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the FBI's notice of the cash forfeiture satisfied due process. The Court reasoned that the means employed to provide notice to the prisoner were reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the prisoner of the forfeiture. The prisoner did not actually have to receive the notice, noted Chief Justice Rehnquist. "The Government could, for example, have allowed [Dusenbery] to make an escorted visit to the post office himself in order to sign for his letter. But the Due Process Clause does not require such heroic efforts by the Government; it requires only that the Government's effort be 'reasonably calculated' to apprise a party of the pendency of the action." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the Court was condoning a procedure that was too lax to reliably insure that a prisoner would receive a legal notice.

United States v. Cotton (No. 01-687)

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United States v. Craft (No. 00-1831)

Did the Court of Appeals err by failing to perform an analysis of whether Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, applied retroactively to cases on federal habeas corpus review under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals committed a clear error by failing to perform a Teague analysis. The Court reasoned that, since the officials raised the retroactivity issue in both the district court and the appellate court, it was clear error for the appellate court to refuse to determine the retroactive applicability of the new case law, even though the highest state court did not consider the issue in determining the inmate's direct appeal. The Court concluded that the retroactivity question was a threshold issue which required resolution prior to any consideration of the merits of Banks' claims.

United States v. Drayton (No. 01-631)

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United States v. Fior D'Italia, Inc. (No. 01-463)

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United States v. Knights (No. 00-1260)

Does a municipal ordinance that requires a permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and to display upon demand the permit, which contains one's name, violate the First Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or discourse?

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the ordinance's provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violate the First Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills. The Court reasoned that the village's interest in preventing fraud could not support the ordinance's application to the religious organizations, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. Dissenting, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the Court decision deprived Stratton residents of the degree of accountability and safety that the permit requirement provides.

United States v. Ruiz (No. 01-595)

No details yet.

United States v. Vonn (No. 00-973)

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US Airways v. Barnett (No. 00-1250)

Does the National Labor Relations Board have the discretion to award backpay to an undocumented alien employee who was not legally authorized to work in the United States?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that such relief is foreclosed by federal immigration policy, as expressed by Congress in the IRCA. The Court reasoned that allowing the Board to award backpay to illegal aliens ran counter to explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy and that however broad the Board's discretion to fashion remedies when dealing only with the NLRA was, it was not so unbounded as to authorize the award. "Congress has expressly made it criminally punishable for an alien to obtain employment with false documents. There is no reason to think that Congress nonetheless intended to permit backpay where but for an employer's unfair labor practices, an alien-employee would have remained in the United States illegally, and continued to work illegally, all the while successfully evading apprehension by immigration authorities," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

USPS v. Gregory (No. 00-758)

Do the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require federal prosecutors, before entering into a binding plea agreement with a criminal defendant, to disclose impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses?

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant. Although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide that defendants have the right to receive exculpatory impeachment material from prosecutors, the Court reasoned that a criminal defendant's guilty plea under the plea agreement, with its accompanying waiver of constitutional rights, could have been accepted as knowing and voluntary despite any misapprehension by Ruiz concerning the specific extent or nature of the impeachment evidence. Furthermore, Justice Breyer noted that requiring disclosure of the evidence would improperly force the Government to engage in substantial trial preparation prior to plea bargaining.

Utah v. Evans (No. 01-714)

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Verizon Communications v. FCC (No. 00-511)

Does the charge that an official deception denied a plaintiff access to the courts by leaving her without information or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit, state an actionable claim?

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Harbury had not stated a claim for denial of judicial access. The Court reasoned that Harbury's complaint failed to identify the underlying cause of action for relief that she would have raised had it not been for the alleged deception. Moreover, the Court noted that Harbury's informal amendment accepted by the Court of Appeals failed to seek any relief presently available for denial of access to courts that would be unavailable otherwise. "It is true that [Harbury] cannot obtain in any present tort action the order she would have sought before her husband's death, the order that might have saved her husband's life. But neither can she obtain any such order on her access claim, which therefore cannot recompense Harbury for the unique loss she claims as a consequence of her inability to bring an intentional-infliction action earlier," wrote Justice Souter. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment.

Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland (No. 00-1531)

Did the Court of Appeals misapply the strict scrutiny standard in determining if Congress had a compelling interest to enact legislation designed to remedy the effects of racial discrimination? Is the U.S. Department of Transportation's current Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest?

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. After Adarand asserted that it was only challenging the rules pertaining to the direct procurement of DOT funds for highway construction on federal lands rather than any part of the DOT's DBE program as it pertained to state and local procurement, the Court concluded that the posture of the case had changed. The Court reasoned that such a shift required dismissal as it had not been addressed whether the various race-based programs applicable to such direct procurement could satisfy strict scrutiny and that reaching the merits of such a challenge would require a threshold examination whether the company had standing to challenge such direct-procurement provisions, which was not in the writ of certiorari.

Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton (No. 00-1737)

Did the state trial court err in holding Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 inapposite in the death sentence proceeding of William Kelly?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Kelly was entitled to a jury instruction that he would be ineligible for parole under a life sentence. The Court reasoned that the Simons rule was applicable because under South Carolina's sentencing scheme, although a defendant charged with murder carrying the possibility of a death sentence could receive a sentence less than life imprisonment, a jury's only alternatives were to recommend death or life without parole, if the jury found the existence of an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, the Court found that the assertion that the defendant's future dangerousness was not at issue was unsupportable on the record.

Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer (No. 00-952)

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Young v. United States (No. 00-1567)

Does the Pole Attachments Act cover attachments that provide both cable television and high-speed Internet service? Does the Act cover attachments by wireless telecommunications providers?

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held 6-2 that the Act covers attachments that provide high-speed Internet access at the same time as cable television and 8-0 that the Act applies to wireless attachments by providers of wireless telecommunications services. The Court reasoned that the FCC's assertion of jurisdiction under the Act to regulate rates charged for attachments that provided commingled cable television and high-speed Internet access and for attachments by wireless telecommunications providers was reasonable and, therefore, entitled to deference. Joined by Justice David H. Souter, Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that the FCC had failed to clearly explain the specific statutory basis on which the FCC was regulating rates for attachments that provided commingled cable television service and high-speed Internet access. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (No. 00-1751)

Is the income-first method of determining whether a community spouse is entitled to a higher community spouse resource allowance consistent with the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the income-first method qualified as a permissible interpretation of the MCCA. The Court reasoned that neither the text not the structure of the MCCA barred Wisconsin's use of the income-first method. Among the Court's findings were that that income-first method did not render meaningless the MCCA's key prohibition against deeming income of the community spouse available to the institutionalized spouse and that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who possessed the authority to prescribe standards relevant to the issue at hand, had declared in a proposed rule that the Federal Government ought to leave to states the decision whether to use the income-first method or the resources-first method. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, dissented.