The Oyez Project: 2001 Term Arguments

Adams v. Florida Power Corp. (No. 01-584) - Oral Argument

Wed, 20 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta (No. 00-730) - Oral Argument

Wed, 31 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

Minnesota's Constitution provides for the selection of all state judges by popular election. The announcement clause of the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibits a candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. While running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gregory Wersal filed suit, seeking a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. Wersal alleged that he was forced to refrain from announcing his views on disputed issues during the 1998 campaign, to the point where he declined response to questions put to him by the press and public, out of concern that he might run afoul of the announce clause. The District Court found that the announcement clause did not violate the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Alabama v. Shelton (No. 00-1214) - Oral Argument

Tue, 19 Feb 2002 12:00:00 -0500

In 1998, Ralph Arvizu was stopped by Border Patrol Agent Clinton Stoddard while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona. A number of factors prompted Stoddard to stop Arvizu, including his slowing down, his failure to acknowledge the agent, the raised position of the children's knees, and their odd waving. After receiving permission to search the vehicle, Stoddard found more than 100 pounds of marijuana. Arvizu was charged with possession with intent to distribute. Arvizu moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing among other things that Stoddard did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle as required by the Fourth Amendment. Denying the motion, the District Court cited a number of facts that gave Stoddard reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, including its location. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court relied on factors that carried little or no weight in reasonable-suspicion calculus and that the remaining factors were not enough to render the stop permissible. In the appellate court's view, fact-specific weighing of circumstances or other multifactor tests introduced uncertainty and unpredictability into the Fourth Amendment analysis, making it necessary to clearly delimit the factors that an officer may consider in making stops such as this one.

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (No. 00-1293) - Oral Argument

Wed, 28 Nov 2001 12:00:00 -0500

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, provides that each "public housing agency shall utilize leases...providing that...any drug-related criminal activity on or off [federally assisted low-income housing] premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy." Paragraph 9(m) of the leases of the tenants of the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) obligates them to "assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant's control, shall not engage in?any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises." After the relations of four tenants were linked to drug activity, OHA instituted state-court eviction proceedings against respondents, alleging violations of lease paragraph 9(m) by a member of each tenant's household or a guest. The tenants filed an action, arguing that the Act does not require lease terms authorizing the eviction of the "innocent" tenants. The District Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction against OHA was affirmed by an en banc Court of Appeals.

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (No. 00-795) - Oral Argument

Tue, 30 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd. is a corporation organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands (BVI), an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom. In 1998, Chase Manhattan Bank, now JPMorgan Chase Bank, agreed to finance certain Traffic Stream ventures, with the contract to be governed by New York law and with Traffic Stream agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of federal courts in Manhattan. Subsequently, Chase sued Traffic Stream for defaulting on its obligations. The District Court found subject-matter jurisdiction under the alienage diversity statute, 28 USC section 1332(a)(2), which gives district courts jurisdiction over civil actions where the controversy is "between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state," and granted Chase summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because Traffic Stream was a citizen of an Overseas Territory and not an independent foreign state, jurisdiction was lacking.

Atkins v. Virginia (No. 00-8452) - Oral Argument

Wed, 20 Feb 2002 12:00:00 -0500

Waffle House, Inc.'s employees must each sign an agreement requiring employment disputes to be settled by binding arbitration. After he suffered a seizure and was fired by Waffle House, Eric Baker filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that his discharge violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The EEOC then filed suit, alleging that Baker?s discharge violated the ADA, and sought injunctive relief and specific relief for Baker, including backpay, reinstatement, and compensatory damages, and punitive damages for malicious and reckless conduct. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Waffle House petitioned to stay the EEOC's suit and compel arbitration. The District Court did not stay the action. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House did not foreclose the enforcement action because the EEOC was not a party to the contract, but had independent statutory authority to bring suit in any federal district court where venue was proper. The appellate court also held that the EEOC was limited to injunctive relief.

Barnes v. Gorman (No. 01-682) - Oral Argument

Tue, 23 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. (No. 00-1307) - Oral Argument

Wed, 07 Nov 2001 12:00:00 -0500

Akos Swierkiewicz, a 53-year-old native of Hungary, began working for Sorema N. A., a reinsurance company principally owned and controlled by a French parent corporation, in 1989. Six years later, the Chief Executive Officer, a French national, demoted Swierkiewicz from the position of senior vice president and chief underwriting officer to a marketing and services position with fewer responsibilities. A younger French national was promoted to Swierkiewicz's old position. Swierkiewicz filed suit, alleging that he had been fired on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,and on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In dismissing the case, the District Court found that Swierkiewicz had not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in that he had not adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent requiring an employment discrimination complaint to allege facts constituting a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792.

Barnhart v. Walton (No. 00-1937) - Oral Argument

Wed, 16 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

As an Alabama prison inmate, Larry Hope was twice handcuffed to a hitching post for disruptive conduct. Both times prison guards handcuffed Hope above shoulder height, and when he tried moving his arms to improve circulation, the handcuffs cut into his wrists. During the second incident, guards order Hope to remove his shirt and he spent seven hours on the hitching post in the sun. While there, he was given one or two water breaks, but no bathroom breaks. Hope filed a civil suit against the guards. Subsequently, a Magistrate Judge found that the guards were entitled to qualified immunity. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals, while finding that the hitching post's use for punitive purposes violated the Eighth Amendment, concluded that the guards nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity.

BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB (No. 01-518) - Oral Argument

Tue, 16 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Bell v. Cone (No. 01-400) - Oral Argument

Mon, 25 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Board of Education v. Earls (No. 01-332) - Oral Argument

Tue, 19 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Carey v. Saffold (No. 01-301) - Oral Argument

Wed, 27 Feb 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. (No. 00-927) - Oral Argument

Wed, 31 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal (No. 00-1406) - Oral Argument

Wed, 27 Feb 2002 12:00:00 -0500

The Indian Regulatory Gaming Act provides that Internal Revenue Code provisions "(including sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and chapter 35() concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes" with respect to gambling operations shall apply to Indian tribes in the same way as they apply to States. Chapter 35 imposes taxes from which it exempts certain state-controlled gambling activities, but says nothing about tax reporting or withholding. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, in a lawsuit, claimed that the Gaming Act subsection's explicit parenthetical reference exempts them from paying those chapter 35 taxes from which the States are exempt. Rejecting that claim, the Court of Appeals ultimately held that the subsection applies only to Code provisions concerning tax withholding and reporting.

Chickasaw Nation v. United States (No. 00-507) - Oral Argument

Tue, 02 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

Robert Smith was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Smith filed a series of petitions for state postconviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The Superior Court denied Smith's claims, finding them waived under Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) because he failed to raise them in his previous Rule 32 petitions. The court rejected Smith's argument that his failure to raise these claims was also due to ineffective assistance because his prior appellate and Rule 32 counsel, who are members of the Arizona Public Defender's office, refused to file ineffective assistance of counsel claims because his trial counsel was also a member of the Public Defender's office. The Federal District Court held that Smith's claim was barred by the lower court's procedural ruling. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the state procedural default was not independent of federal law and thus did not bar federal review of the merits of Smith's claim. The appellate court reasoned that Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) applies a different standard for waiver depending on whether the claim asserted in a Rule 32 petition was of sufficient constitutional magnitude and that determination whether a claim is of sufficient magnitude required consideration of the merits of the claim.

Christopher v. Harbury (No. 01-394) - Oral Argument

Mon, 18 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service (No. 01-419) - Oral Argument

Tue, 23 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. (No. 00-799) - Oral Argument

Tue, 04 Dec 2001 12:00:00 -0500

Jeffrey Gorman is a paraplegic. After being arrested, he was transported to a Kansas City police station in a van that was not equipped to accommodate the disabled. Gorman was removed from his wheelchair and seatbelted to a bench in the van. During the ride, Gorman fell to the floor, suffering serious injuries that left him unable to work full time. Gorman sued certain Kansas police officials for discriminating against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, by failing to maintain appropriate policies for the arrest and transportation of persons with spinal cord injuries. A jury awarded him compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court vacated as to punitive damages, holding that they are unavailable in private suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found punitive damages available under a general rule that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief for violation of a federal right.

Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko (No. 00-860) - Oral Argument

Mon, 01 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker (No. 00-1770) - Oral Argument

Tue, 19 Feb 2002 12:00:00 -0500

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 lays out steps that a judge must take to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Rule 11(h)'s requirement that any variance from those procedures "which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded" is similar to the general harmless-error rule in Rule 52(a). On February 28, 1997, Alphonso Vonn was charged with federal bank robbery and firearm crimes. That day a Magistrate Judge twice advised him of his constitutional rights. Vonn also signed a statement saying that he had read and understood his rights and he answered yes to the court's questions whether he had understood the court's explanation of his rights and whether he had read and signed the statement. When Vonn later pleaded guilty to robbery, the court advised him of the constitutional rights he was relinquishing, but skipped the advice required by Rule (11)(c)(3) that he would have the right to assistance of counsel at trial. Subsequently, Vonn pleaded guilty to the firearm charge and to a later-charged conspiracy count. Again, the court advised him of the rights he was waiving, but did not mention the right to counsel. Appealing his convictions, Vonn raised Rule 11 for the first time. The Court of Appeals agreed that there had been error and vacated the convictions.

Devlin v. Scardelletti (No. 01-417) - Oral Argument

Tue, 26 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Dusenbery v. United States (No. 00-6567) - Oral Argument

Mon, 29 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. (Maritime Services), asked the South Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA) five times for permission to berth a cruise ship, the M/V Tropic Sea, at the SCSPA's port facilities in Charleston, South Carolina. Some cruises offered by Maritime Services would allow passengers to participate in gambling activities while on board. The SCSPA repeatedly denied Maritime Services' requests, contending that it had an established policy of denying berths in the Port of Charleston to vessels whose primary purpose was gambling. Maritime Services file a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), arguing that SCSPA violated the Shipping Act by its denials. The complaint was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found that the SCSPA, as an arm of the State of South Carolina, was entitled to sovereign immunity and thus dismissed the complaint. Reversing on its own motion, the FMC concluded that state sovereign immunity covers proceedings before judicial tribunals, not Executive Branch agencies. In reversing, Court of Appeals fund that the proceedings were an adjudication and thus subject to state sovereign immunity.

Edelman v. Lynchburg College (No. 00-1072) - Oral Argument

Tue, 08 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposed two moratoria from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983 and from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Real estate owners affected by the moratoria and an association representing such owners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., filed suits, claiming that TRPA's actions constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. The District Court found that TRPA had not effected a partial taking; however, it concluded that the moratoria did constitute a categorical taking because TRPA temporarily deprived real estate owners of all economically viable use of their land. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that because the regulations had only a temporary impact, no categorical taking had occurred.

EEOC v. Waffle House (No. 99-1823) - Oral Argument

Wed, 10 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority (No. 01-46) - Oral Argument

Mon, 25 Feb 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (No. 00-1543) - Oral Argument

Tue, 08 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) prohibits "any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture" that "is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and any sexually explicit image that is "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression" it depicts "a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." The Free Speech Coalition, an adult-entertainment trade association, and others filed suit, alleging that the "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" provisions are overbroad and vague and, thus, restrain works otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held the CPPA invalid on its face, finding it to be substantially overbroad because it bans materials that are neither obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, nor produced by the exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.

Franconia Associates v. United States (No. 01-455) - Oral Argument

Mon, 15 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart (No. 01-131) - Oral Argument

Wed, 20 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Gonzaga University v. Doe (No. 01-679) - Oral Argument

Wed, 24 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Great-West Life and Annuity Ins. v. Knudson (No. 99-1786) - Oral Argument

Mon, 01 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Harris v. United States (No. 00-10666) - Oral Argument

Mon, 25 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

Kristja J. Falvo asked the Owasso Independent School District to ban peer grading, or the practice of allowing students to score each other's tests, papers, and assignments as the teachers explain the correct answers to the entire class, because it embarrassed her children. When the school district declined, Falvo filed an action against the school district, claming that such peer grading violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). FERPA authorizes federal funds to be withheld from school districts that permit students' "education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein)" to be released without their parents' written consent and defines education records as "records, files, documents, and other materials" containing information directly related to a student, which "are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution." Disagreeing with Falvo, the District Court held that grades put on papers by another student are not "education records." In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that grades marked by students on each other's work are "education records," such that the very act of grading is an impermissible release of information to the student grader.

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB (No. 00-1595) - Oral Argument

Tue, 15 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

In 1999, Ronald Nussle, an inmate at the Cheshire Correctional Institution in Connecticut, filed a federal action under 42 USC section 1983, charging that certain correction officers had subjected him to a sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation and had singled him out for a severe beating in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, Nussle did not file a grievance under the applicable Connecticut Department of Correction procedures. Based on the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that PLRA directs that "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983...or any other Federal law, by a prisoner...until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for a claim of the kind Nussle asserted. Citing legislative history, the appellate court found that the phrase "prisons conditions" covers only conditions affecting prisoners generally, not single incidents that immediately affect only particular prisoners.

Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation System (No. 01-408) - Oral Argument

Tue, 19 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Hope v. Pelzer (No. 01-309) - Oral Argument

Wed, 17 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

J.E.M. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International (No. 99-1996) - Oral Argument

Wed, 03 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd. (No. 01-651) - Oral Argument

Wed, 17 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Kansas v. Crane (No. 00-957) - Oral Argument

Tue, 30 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Kelly v. South Carolina (No. 00-9280) - Oral Argument

Mon, 26 Nov 2001 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia (No. 01-298) - Oral Argument

Mon, 25 Feb 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Lee v. Kemna (No. 00-6933) - Oral Argument

Mon, 29 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

At Timothy Ring's trial for murder, the jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but found Ring guilty of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, unless further findings were made by a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing and only if the judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Because the jury had convicted Ring of felony murder, not premeditated murder, Ring would be eligible for the death penalty only if he was the victim's actual killer. Citing accomplice testimony at the sentencing hearing, the judge found that Ring was the killer. The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of them being that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, as well as one mitigating factor, Ring's minimal criminal record, and ruled that the latter did not call for leniency.

Mathias v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc. (No. 00-878) - Oral Argument

Wed, 05 Dec 2001 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

McKune v. Lile (No. 00-1187) - Oral Argument

Wed, 28 Nov 2001 12:00:00 -0500

Beginning in 1972, Mario Echazabal worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. When Echazabal applied for a job directly with Chevron, the company's physical examination revealed he had a liver condition, the cause identified as Hepatitis C. Chevron's doctors said that the condition would be exacerbated by continued exposure to toxins at the refinery. In response to Chevron's request that the refinery reassign Echazabal to a job without exposure to toxins or remove him, the contractor employing him laid him off. Echazabal filed suit, claiming that Chevron's action violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Under an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation that permits the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health, Chevron defended its action. The District Court granted Chevron summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the regulation exceeded the scope of permissible rulemaking under the ADA.

Mickens v. Taylor (No. 00-9285) - Oral Argument

Mon, 05 Nov 2001 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

National Cable and Telecom. Assoc. v. Gulf Power (No. 00-832) - Oral Argument

Tue, 02 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

In conducting the 2000 census, the Census Bureau used "hot-deck imputation" to fill in certain gaps in its information and resolved certain conflicts in the data. Under this methodology, the Bureau imputes the relevant information by inferring that the address or unit about which it is uncertain has the same population characteristics as those of its geographically closest neighbor of the same type. Hot-deck Imputation increased North Carolina's population by 0.4% while increasing Utah's population by only 0.2% such that North Carolina will receive one more Representative and Utah one less than if the Bureau had simply filled relevant informational gaps by counting the related number of individuals as zero. Utah brought suit against the officials charged with conducting the census, claiming that the Bureau's use of hot-deck imputation violates 13 USC section 195, which prohibits use of "the statistical method known as 'sampling,'" and is inconsistent with Article 1, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution, which states that an "actual Enumeration be made." Utah sought an injunction compelling a change of the official census results. The District Court found for the Bureau.

National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan (No. 00-1614) - Oral Argument

Wed, 09 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that incumbent local-exchange carriers (LECs) provide interconnection with their existing networks; that the carriers then establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transporting and terminating the calls of each others' customers; and that their interconnection agreements be approved by a state utility commission. The local LEC, Illinois Bell Telephone Company, doing business as Ameritech Illinois, refused to pay reciprocal compensation for calls made by its competitors' customers to the local access numbers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Ameritech argued that ISP traffic was not local traffic subject to the reciprocal compensation agreement. The competitors filed complaints and the Illinois Commerce Commission ruled in their favor. In affirming, the District Court concluded that the Commission's decision did not violate the Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

New York v. FERC (No. 00-568) - Oral Argument

Wed, 03 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., is a manufacturer of patented fans and heaters. In 1992, Vornado sued Duracraft Corp., claiming that Duracraft's use of a spiral grill design in its fans infringed Vornado's trade dress. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that Vornado had no protectible trade-dress rights in the grill design. Later, Vornado filed a complaint with the U.S. International Trade Commission, claiming that Holmes Group, Inc.'s sale of fans and heaters with a spiral grill design infringed Vornado's trade dress. Subsequently, Holmes filed a federal-court action, seeking a declaratory judgment that its products did not infringe Vornado's trade dress and an injunction restraining Vornado from accusing it of such infringement. In response, Vornado asserted a compulsory patent-infringement counterclaim. The District Court ruled in Holmes's favor. Vornado appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which, notwithstanding Holmes's challenge to its jurisdiction, vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case.

Owasso Independent School Dist. No. I011 v. Falvo (No. 00-1073) - Oral Argument

Tue, 27 Nov 2001 12:00:00 -0500

Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.

Porter v. Nussle (No. 00-853) - Oral Argument

Mon, 14 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide (No. 00-6029) - Oral Argument

Mon, 07 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

Pursuant to 49 USC section 14501(c)(2)(A), federal preemption prescriptions relating to motor carriers "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles." Columbus, Ohio, extensively regulates the operation of tow trucks seeking to pick up vehicles within city limits. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., a tow-truck operator and a trade association of such operators, sought to enjoin enforcement of the City's tow-truck regulations on the ground that they were preempted. The District Court granted Ours Garage summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent that section 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule explicitly applies to "a State [or] political subdivision of a State," while the exception for safety regulations, section 14501(c)(2)(A), refers only to the "authority of a State." The appellate court also noted that precedent determined that the contrast in statutory language indicated that Congress meant to limit the safety exception to States alone.

Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota (No. 00-1514) - Oral Argument

Mon, 26 Nov 2001 12:00:00 -0500

In 1935, when the Federal Power Act (FPA) became law, most electric utilities operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation and their sales were bundled, meaning that consumers paid a single charge for both the cost of the electricity and the cost of its delivery. Section 201(b) of the FPA provides the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with jurisdiction over "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce" and section 205 prohibits unreasonable rates and undue discrimination "with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the [Commission's] jurisdiction." Currently, public utilities still retain ownership of the transmission lines that their competitors must use to deliver electricity to wholesale and retail customers and thus can refuse to deliver their competitors' energy or deliver that power on terms and conditions less favorable than those they apply to their own transmissions. In Order No. 888, FERC found such practices discriminatory under section 205. FERC then ordered the unbundling of wholesale generation and transmission services, which means that each utility must state separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services; imposed a similar open access requirement on unbundled retail transmissions in interstate commerce; and declined to extend the open access requirement to the transmission component of bundled retail sales. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals upheld the order.

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (No. 01-521) - Oral Argument

Tue, 26 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran (No. 00-1021) - Oral Argument

Wed, 16 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., a health maintenance organization that provides medical services for employee welfare benefits plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), denied Debra Moran's request to have surgery by an unaffiliated specialist. Under the Illinois HMO Act (Act), which provides that "in the event that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to be medically necessary," the HMO "shall provide" the service, Moran made a written demand for an independent medical review of her claim. After Rush refused her demand, Moran sued in state court to compel compliance with the Act. The court ordered the review, which found the treatment necessary. While the suit was pending, Moran had the surgery and amended her complaint to seek reimbursement. Rush removed the case to federal court, arguing that the amended complaint stated a claim for ERISA benefits. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found Moran's reimbursement claim preempted by ERISA so as to place the case in federal court, but it concluded that the Act was not preempted as a state law that "relates to" an employee benefit plan because it also "regulates insurance" under ERISA's saving clause.

SEC v. Zandford (No. 01-147) - Oral Argument

Mon, 18 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. (No. 00-1853) - Oral Argument

Tue, 15 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, filed a state-court lawsuit against the system?s board of regents and other university officials, alleging that the officials had violated state tort law and 42 USC section 1983 when they placed sexual harassment allegations in his personnel files. The defendants removed the case to Federal District Court and then sought a dismissal. Conceding that a state statute had waived Georgia's sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, the State claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal court. The District Court held that Georgia had waived such immunity when it removed the case to federal court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because state law was unclear as to whether the state attorney general had the legal authority to waive Georgia's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State retained the legal right to assert immunity, even after the removal.

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (No. 00-1167) - Oral Argument

Mon, 07 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

Unlike the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only "material that is harmful to minors." Moreover, COPA requires jurors to apply "contemporary community standards" in assessing material. Before it was scheduled to go into effect, a number of organizations affected by COPA filed suit, alleging that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, reasoning that COPA's use of contemporary community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad.

Thomas v. Chicago Park District (No. 00-1249) - Oral Argument

Mon, 03 Dec 2001 12:00:00 -0500

Festo Corporation owns two patents for an improved magnetic rodless cylinder, a piston-driven device that relies on magnets to move objects in a conveying system. When the patent examiner rejected the initial application for the first patent because of defects in description, the application was amended to add the new limitations that the device would contain a pair of one-way sealing rings and that its outer sleeve would be made of a magnetizable material. The second patent was also amended during a reexamination proceeding to add the sealing rings limitation. After Festo began selling its device, SMC entered the market with a similar device that uses one two-way sealing ring and a nonmagnetizable sleeve. Festo filed suit, claiming that SMC's device is so similar that it infringes Festo's patents under the doctrine of equivalents. Rejecting SMC's argument that the prosecution history, or the public record of the patent proceedings, estopped Festo from saying that SMC's device was similar, the District Court ruled in Festo's favor. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the prosecution history estoppel applied, ruling that estoppel arises from any amendment that narrows a claim to comply with the Patent Act. The Court of Appeals also held that, when estoppel applies, it bars any claim of equivalence for the element that was amended.

Thompson v. Western States Medical Center (No. 01-344) - Oral Argument

Tue, 26 Feb 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Toyota Motor Mfg v. Williams (No. 00-1089) - Oral Argument

Wed, 07 Nov 2001 12:00:00 -0500

In 1990, Robert Barnett injured his back while working in a cargo-handling position at US Airways. Invoking his seniority rights, Barnett transferred to a less physically demanding position in the mailroom. Subsequently, Barnett's new position became open to seniority-based employee bidding under US Airways' seniority system and, ultimately, he lost his job. Barnett then filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against "an individual with a disability" who with "reasonable accommodation" can perform a job's essential functions unless the employer "can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business." In granting US Airways summary judgment, the District Court found that altering a seniority system would result in an "undue hardship" to both US Airways and its nondisabled employees. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the seniority system was merely a factor in the undue hardship analysis and that a case-by-case, fact intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular assignment would constitute an undue hardship.

TRW v. Andrews (No. 00-1045) - Oral Argument

Tue, 09 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm "shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years." When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.

United States v. Arvizu (No. 00-1519) - Oral Argument

Tue, 27 Nov 2001 12:00:00 -0500

While Larry Dean Dusenbery was in prison on federal drug charges, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began an administrative process to forfeit cash that officers seized when they executed a search warrant for the residence where he was arrested. The FBI sought to notify Dusenbery by sending certified mail addressed to him care of the federal correctional institution where he was incarcerated; to the address of the residence where he was arrested; and to an address in the town where his mother lived. The FBI received no response in the time allotted and turned over the cash to the United States Marshals Service. When Dusenbery moved for the return of all the property and funds seized in his criminal case, the District Court denied the motion. On remand, the District Court ruled that the Government's sending of notice by certified mail to Dusenbery's place of incarceration satisfied his due process rights as to the cash. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

United States v. Cotton (No. 01-687) - Oral Argument

Mon, 15 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

United States v. Craft (No. 00-1831) - Oral Argument

Mon, 14 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

George Banks was convicted of 12 counts of first-degree murder. After Banks' direct appeal was denied, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, that the Constitution prohibits a state from requiring jurors unanimously to agree that a particular mitigating circumstance exists before they are permitted to consider that circumstance in their sentencing determination. Under this new case law, Mills argued that the jurors in his trial were instructed improperly. Custodial officials argued that the law was not applicable retroactively on habeas corpus review. Ultimately, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not rule on retroactivity, the Federal Court of Appeals concluded that the State Supreme Court had unreasonably applied federal law in evaluating Banks' claim that his penalty phase jury instructions and verdict forms were improper under Mills without evaluating retroactivity.

United States v. Drayton (No. 01-631) - Oral Argument

Tue, 16 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

United States v. Fior D'Italia, Inc. (No. 01-463) - Oral Argument

Mon, 22 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

United States v. Knights (No. 00-1260) - Oral Argument

Tue, 06 Nov 2001 12:00:00 -0500

The Village of Stratton promulgated an ordinance that prohibits canvassers from entering private residential property to promote any cause without first obtaining a permit from the mayor's office. The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought an action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Village's interests in protecting its residents from fraud and its desire to prevent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation.

United States v. Ruiz (No. 01-595) - Oral Argument

Wed, 24 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

United States v. Vonn (No. 00-973) - Oral Argument

Tue, 06 Nov 2001 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

US Airways v. Barnett (No. 00-1250) - Oral Argument

Tue, 04 Dec 2001 12:00:00 -0500

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. hired Jose Castro on the basis of documents appearing to verify his authorization to work in the United States. After Castro engaged in union-organizing activities, Hoffman laid him off. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the layoff violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and ordered backpay for Castro. At a compliance hearing, Castor testified before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that he was born in Mexico, that he had never been legally admitted to, or authorized to work in, this country, and that he gained employment with Hoffman only after tendering a birth certificate that was not his. The ALJ found that Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which makes it unlawful for employers knowingly to hire undocumented workers or for employees to use fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility, precluded Castro's award. In reversing, the Board noted that the most effective way to further the immigration policies embodied in IRCA is to provide the NLRA's protections and remedies to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order.

USPS v. Gregory (No. 00-758) - Oral Argument

Tue, 09 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her a "fast track" plea bargain in which she would waive indictment, trial, and an appeal in exchange for a reduced sentence recommendation. The prosecutors' offer requires that the defendant waive the right to receive impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses, as well as information supporting any affirmative defense she raises if the case goes to trial. When Ruiz rejected the waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their offer, indicted her for unlawful drug possession, and she pleaded guilty. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same reduced sentence that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the plea bargain. The Government opposed her request, and the District Court denied it. In vacating the sentence, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Constitution prohibits defendants from waiving their right to certain impeachment information.

Utah v. Evans (No. 01-714) - Oral Argument

Wed, 27 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Verizon Communications v. FCC (No. 00-511) - Oral Argument

Wed, 10 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500

Jennifer Harbury, a United States citizen, is the widow of Efrain Bamaca-Velasquez, a Guatemalan rebel leader. Harbury alleged that Government officials intentionally deceived her in concealing information that her husband had been executed by Guatemalan army officers paid by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Harbury also alleged that this deception denied her access to the courts by leaving her without information, or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit that might have saved her husband's life. Harbury filed suit, listing 28 causes of action, for the violation of her constitutional right of access to courts. With respect to the access-to-courts counts, the District Court held that Harbury had not stated a valid cause of action. Given that she had not filed a prior suit, the court reasoned that she could only guess how the alleged cover-up might have prejudiced her rights to bring a separate action and that the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed only the dismissal of one of Harbury's claims for denial of access to courts.

Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland (No. 00-1531) - Oral Argument

Wed, 05 Dec 2001 12:00:00 -0500

In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, held that strict scrutiny governs whether race-based classifications violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (Adarand I). The Court then remanded the case for a determination whether the race-based components of the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program could withstand this standard of review. Ultimately, the Court remanded Adarand for a second time for a determination on the merits consistent with Adarand I. When the Court of Appeals held, that by virtue of a new regulatory framework under which the DOT's state and local DBE program now operated, that program passed constitutional muster, the Court again certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny standard announced in Adarand I.

Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton (No. 00-1737) - Oral Argument

Tue, 26 Feb 2002 12:00:00 -0500

After convicting William Kelly for murder, a South Carolina jury was asked to determine whether any aggravating factors had been shown and, if so, to recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment. During sentencing, the prosecutor presented testimony that Kelly had taken part in an escape attempt with plans to hold a female guard hostage; provided evidence of Kelly's sadism and his desires to kill anyone who irritated him; and spoke of Kelly as a "butcher," "bloody," and "dangerous." Relying on the holding of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, that when "a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death...is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant 'to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility,'" Kelly's counsel requested a jury instruction stating that Kelly would be ineligible for parole if he received a life sentence. In refusing, the trial court said that the State's evidence went to Kelly's character and characteristics, not to future dangerousness. The jury recommended a death sentence. In affirming the sentence, the State Supreme Court held Simmons inapposite because state law provided the jury with a third sentencing alternative and future dangerousness was not at issue.

Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer (No. 00-952) - Oral Argument

Mon, 03 Dec 2001 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Young v. United States (No. 00-1567) - Oral Argument

Wed, 09 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

The Pole Attachments Act requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to set reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for certain attachments to telephone and electric poles. A pole attachment includes "any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service to a [utility's] pole, conduit, or right-of-way." After the FCC issued an order that interpreted the Act to cover pole attachments for commingled high-speed Internet and traditional cable television services and attachments by wireless telecommunications providers, pole-owning utilities challenged the order. Reversing both of the FCC's positions, the Court of Appeals held that commingled services are not covered by either of the Act's two specific rate formulas and, thus, were not covered by the Act. Additionally, the appellate court held that the Act does not give the FCC authority to regulate wireless communications.

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (No. 00-1751) - Oral Argument

Wed, 20 Feb 2002 12:00:00 -0500

The spousal impoverishment provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA) permit a spouse living at home to reserve certain income and assets to meet the minimum monthly maintenance needs he or she will have when the other spouse is institutionalized, usually in a nursing home, and becomes eligible for Medicaid. The MCCA's resource allocation rules provide that, in determining the institutionalized spouse's Medicaid eligibility, a portion of the couple's resources, called the "community spouse resource allowance" (CSRA), shall be reserved for the benefit of the community spouse. The MCCA allows an increase in the standard allowance if either spouse shows, at a state-administered hearing, that the community spouse will not be able to maintain the statutorily defined minimum level of income on which to live after the institutionalized spouse gains Medicaid eligibility. In 1996, after entering a Wisconsin nursing home, Irene Blumer applied for Medicaid through her husband Burnett and ultimately sought a higher CSRA. Under the "income-first" method for determining whether the community spouse is entitled to a higher CSRA, which Wisconsin uses, the State considers first whether potential income transfers from the institutionalized spouse will suffice to enable the community spouse to meet monthly needs once the institutionalized spouse qualifies for Medicaid. Subsequently, an examiner denied Blumer's request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State's income-first statute conflicted with the MCCA, which, the appeals court held, unambiguously mandates the resources-first method.