Argument of Chief Justice Rehnquist
Mr. Rehnquist: I have the opinion of the Court to announce in No. 01-0679 Gonzaga University versus John Doe.
John Doe, a respondent here studied elementary education at Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington.
Before he graduated, he learned that Gonzaga disclosed false and defamatory allegations about him to officials of the State of Washington.
He sued under State Court claiming tort and contract violations under state law and appending federal violation of the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, the acronym for which is FERPA.
The basis for the FERPA claim was section 1983 which provides a cause of action to enforce federal rights against state actors.
A jury awarded him not only compensatory but punitive damages on both his state and federal claims.
Gonzaga appealed.
It argued that FERPA creates no federal rights and therefore cannot be enforced.
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed.
In an opinion filed with the Clerk today, we reverse the Washington Supreme Court.
Section 1983 provides the means for enforcing individual rights that are secured by the constitution and laws of the United States.
The question presented here is whether FERPA confers upon the respondent an individual right to be enforced under this section.
We find that it confers no such right.
We begin by noting that our opinions in this area suggested inconsistent standards for determining whether a federal statute is enforceable by 1983.
But we hold today that a federal statute is enforceable by section 1983 only if it clearly and ambiguously confers right upon a class of persons that includes the plaintiff bringing suit.
This standard is the same as that used to determine whether a statute confers with federal rights in the context of suits brought against private parties under an implied right of action.
Both inquiries simply require courts to determine whether Congress unambiguously confer to federal rights.
FERPA's confidentiality provisions clearly lack the sort of rights creating language critical to showing the required legislative intent to create new rights.
Unlike the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VI and IX which focus directly on the individual to be protected and thus, confirm individual rights, FERPA merely instructs the Secretary of Education how to distribute federal funds.
The operative language of the statute, for example, says no fund shall be made available to schools or institutions that have a policy of practice of disclosing private information.
This language is far removed from the sort of language required to confer a new federal right.
Accordingly, we hold FERPA provides no basis for a private lawsuit brought under section 1983.
Justice Breyer has filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Souter joins; Justice Stevens has filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsburg joins.
