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Abstract

Oral Argument: Wednesday, November 28, 2001
Decision: Monday, June 10, 2002
Issues: Criminal Procedure, Self-Incrimination

Advocates

Gregory G. Garre (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)
Stephen R. McAllister (Argued the cause for the petitioners)
Matthew J. Wiltanger (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A few years before his release, prison officials ordered Robert Lile, who was convicted of rape, to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program, participating inmates are required to complete and sign an "Admission of Responsibility" form, in which they accept responsibility for the crimes for which they have been sentenced, and complete a sexual history form detailing all prior sexual activities, regardless of whether the activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. The information obtained from SATP participants is not privileged. By refusing to participate, a prisoner's privileges are reduced. Lile refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The District Court granted Lile summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the compelled self-incrimination can be established by penalties that do not constitute deprivations of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. The appellate court concluded that the SATP could treat inmate admissions as privileged.

Question

Does the Kansas Sexual Abuse Treatment Program violate inmates' Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination?

Conclusion

No. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the SATP serves a vital penological purpose, and that offering inmates minimal incentives to participate does not amount to compelled self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Filing an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, while noting that the Court was divided over the standard for evaluating compulsion for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a prison setting, agreed that Lile's argument was unpersuasive. Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Fifth Amendment's text does not prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person's refusal to incriminate himself; it prohibits only the compulsion of such testimony. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined, arguing that the Court's decision "characterized a threatened harm as 'a minimal incentive.'"

Supreme Court Justice Opinions and Votes (by Ideology)

Sort by Seniority
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Judgment of the Court: 5 - 4
Voted with the minority, authored a dissent
Stevens
Voted with the minority, joined Stevens' dissent
Ginsburg
Voted with the minority, joined Stevens' dissent
Souter
Voted with the minority, joined Stevens' dissent
Breyer
Voted with the majority, authored a special concurrence
O'Connor
Voted with the majority, authored a judgment of the court
Kennedy
Voted with the majority, joined Kennedy's judgment of the court
Rehnquist
Voted with the majority, joined Kennedy's judgment of the court
Scalia
Voted with the majority, joined Kennedy's judgment of the court
Thomas

Cite this page

The Oyez Project, McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002),
available at: <http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1187/>
(last visited ).