The Oyez Project: 2000 Term Decisions

Alabama v. Bozeman (No. 00-492)

May an act, found to be civil, be deemed punitive "as applied" to an individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses, thereby providing a cause for release?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because the Washington Community Protection Act of 1990 had been found to be civil, it could not be deemed punitive as applied to Young for the purposes of double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority that an "as-applied" analysis would be "unworkable" because it would "never conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination of the scheme's validity under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Alexander v. Sandoval (No. 99-1908)

No details yet.

Arkansas v. Sullivan (No. 00-262)

Was a Texas trial court's supplemental instruction on mitigating evidence of mental retardation under the state's "special circumstances" for sentencing in capital murder cases to a jury constitutionally adequate? Does the admission into evidence of statements from a psychiatric report based on an uncounseled interview with the defendant violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination?

No and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the supplemental instruction was constitutionally inadequate. "Any realistic assessment of the manner in which the supplemental instruction operated would therefore lead to the same conclusion we reached in Penry I," wrote Justice O'Connor "'A reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence.'" Unanimously, the Court held that "considerable doubt" that the psychiatric report "even if erroneous, had a 'substantial and injurious effect'" on the verdict, meant not overturning the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection of Penry's Fifth Amendment claim.

Artuz v. Bennett (No. 99-1238)

May a federal defendant, who has been sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, challenge his federal sentence through a motion on the ground that his prior convictions were unconstitutionally obtained?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the nonexistent or unsuccessful pursuit of available challenges to the constitutionality of prior state convictions, which were used to enhance a federal sentence, precluded such challenge to collaterally attack a federal sentence. "[Daniels] could have pursued his claims while he was in custody on those convictions," wrote Justice O'Connor for the majority. "As his counsel conceded at oral argument, there is no indication that [Daniels] did so or that he was prevented from doing so by some external force."

Atkinson Trading v. Shirley (No. 00-454)

Do officers, with probable cause to believe that a man had hidden marijuana in his home, who subsequently prevent that man from entering the home for about two hours while they obtain a search warrant, violate the Fourth Amendment?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that given the nature of the intrusion and the law enforcement interest at stake, the brief seizure of the premises was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. "We have found no case in which this Court has held unlawful a temporary seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence while the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period of time," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens noted he would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (No. 99-1408)

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Bartnicki v. Vopper (No. 99-1687)

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Becker v. Montgomery (No. 00-6374)

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 pre-empt a Washington statute provides that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset is revoked automatically upon divorce?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that that the Washington statute has a "connection with" ERISA plans and is therefore pre-empted. "Differing state regulations affecting an ERISA plan's 'system for processing claims and paying benefits' impose 'precisely the burden that ERISA pre-emption was intended to avoid,'" wrote Justice Thomas. He continued: "The statute at issue here directly conflicts with ERISA's requirements that plans be administered, and benefits be paid, in accordance with plan documents." Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice John Paul Stevens joined.

Board of Trustees v. Garrett (No. 99-1240)

Is a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment if the patient has not consented to the procedure?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the diagnostic tests constituted an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to the procedure. The interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine cannot justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant. Examining the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens wrote that a special need is "divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement," and that under the city's view "virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate...purpose."

Booth v. Churner (No. 99-1964)

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Brentwood Acad. v. TN Sec. School Ath. Assn. (No. 99-901)

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Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia (No. 99-1848)

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Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee (No. 98-1768)

May a tribal court assert jurisdiction over civil claims against state officials who entered tribal land to execute a search warrant against a tribe member suspected of having violated state law outside the reservation?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, a unanimous Court held that "[b]ecause the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes lacked legislative authority to restrict, condition, or otherwise regulate the ability of state officials to investigate off-reservation violations of state law, they also lacked adjudicative authority to hear respondent's claim that those officials violated tribal law in the performance of their duties. "[S]ince the lack of authority is clear," continued Scalia, "there is no need to exhaust the jurisdictional dispute in tribal court. State officials operating on a reservation to investigate off-reservation violations of state law are properly held accountable for tortious conduct and civil rights violations in either state or federal court, but not in tribal court."

Buford v. United States (No. 99-9073)

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Bush v. Gore (No. 00-949)

May a state prisoner use a federal habeas petition to challenge a current sentence on the ground that it was enhanced based on an unconstitutional prior conviction for which the sentence has fully expired?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that "once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a [federal habeas petition] on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained." Justice David H. Souter filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion.

Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board (No. 00-836)

Does the party claiming that an employee is a supervisor bear the burden of proving supervisor status in a representation hearing and unfair labor practice proceeding under the National Labor Relations Act? Under the National Labor Relations Act, is judgment "independent judgment" when it is informed by professional or technical training or experience?

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the burden of proving the applicability of the supervisory exception of the Act falls on the party asserting it. Justice Scalia wrote that the "Act does not...expressly allocate the burden of proving or disproving a challenged employee's supervisory status. The Board therefore has filled the statutory gap with the consistent rule that the burden is borne by the party claiming that the employee is a supervisor." Additionally, in a 5-4 split, the Court held that the NLRB's application of its interpretation of "independent judgment" to create categorical exclusion for nurses who exercised ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services was unlawful under the NLRA.

C&L Enterprises v. Citizen Band Potawatomi (No. 00-292)

Does a single sexually explicit remark and a change in employment status less than a month after an employee files a complaint about the remark meet the threshold for an adverse employment action under Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964?

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that a cause for retaliation was not shown. "No reasonable person could have believed that the single incident recounted above violated Title VII's standard," declared the Court. Continuing, the opinion noted that the occurrence was "at worst an 'isolated incident' that cannot remotely be considered 'extremely serious,' as our cases require."

Calcano-Martinez v. INS (No. 00-1011)

Does the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 remove the jurisdiction of federal appellate courts to review direct appeals of final deportation orders, but preserve federal district courts' habeas jurisdiction over challenges to those orders?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions for direct but petitioners can proceed with their habeas petitions if they wish to obtain relief. "As petitioners in this case were convicted of 'aggravated felonies' within the meaning of the relevant statutes," wrote Justice Stevens, "the plain language of [IIRIRA] fairly explicitly strips the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to hear their claims on petitions for direct review." Justice Stevens continued that "Congress has not spoken with sufficient clarity to strip the district courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions raising identical claims."

Cedric Kushner Promotions v. King (No. 00-549)

Does section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency? May the Administrator of the EPA consider the costs of implementation in setting national ambient air quality standards under section 109(b)(1)? Does the Court of Appeals have the jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA, with respect to implementing the revised ozone NAAQS?

No, no, and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the CAA properly delegated legislative power to the EPA, but that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting primary and secondary NAAQS. Moreover, the Court held that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA related to the implementation of the revised ozone NAAQS; however, the EPA's interpretation of Part D was unreasonable.

Central Green Co. v. United States (No. 99-859)

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Circuit City v. Adams (No. 99-1379)

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City News & Novelty v. Waukesha (No. 99-1680)

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City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (No. 99-1030)

May a property owner who acquired title to the property after is was subject to wetlands regulations still bring a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "the State Supreme Court erred in finding [Palazzolo's] claims were unripe and in ruling that acquisition of title after the effective date of the regulations barred the takings claims. The court did not err in finding that [Palazzolo] failed to establish a deprivation of all economic value, for it is undisputed that the parcel retains significant worth for construction of a residence." Discussing the post-regulation acquisition of title, Justice Kennedy wrote, "[w]ere we to accept the State's rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land."

Clark County School District v. Breeden (No. 00-866)

Did a district court err in finding that North Carolina violated the Equal Protection Clause in its 1997 redrawing of its Twelfth Congressional District's 1992 boundaries?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the District Court's conclusion that the state violated the Equal Protection Clause in drawing the 1997 boundaries is based on clearly erroneous findings. Justice Breyer wore for the Court that "the primary evidence upon which the District Court relied for its 'race, not politics,' conclusion is evidence of voting registration, not voting behavior; and that is precisely the kind of evidence that we said was inadequate the last time this case was before us." Justice Clarence Thomas's dissented, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.

Cleveland v. United States (No. 99-804)

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Cook v. Gralike (No. 99-929)

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Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Grp. (No. 99-2035)

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Daniels v. United States (No. 99-9136)

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Dept of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protect. Assoc. (No. 99-1871)

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District of Columbia v. Tri County Industries (No. 99-1953)

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Duncan v. Walker (No. 00-121)

Do white Alabama voters, who are residents of various majority-white districts, have standing to challenge Alabama's re-districting plan, which had an acknowledged purpose of maximizing the number of majority-minority districts?

No. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that the appellees lacked standing to maintain their challenge. The opinion stated that the appellees "have neither alleged nor produced any evidence that any of them was assigned to his or her district as a direct result of having 'personally been subjected to a racial classification.'" Consequently, the appellees lacked standing.

Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers (No. 99-1038)

Does the funding restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, which prevents attorneys from representing clients in an attempt to amend or challenge existing welfare law, violate the First Amendment?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the funding provision that limited arguments legal services attorneys were allowed to make on behalf of indigent welfare claimants violated the First Amendment by regulating private speech and insulating federal law from legitimate judicial challenge. Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that, "the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message." Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas, arguing that the Appropriations Act "does not directly regulate speech, and it neither establishes a public forum nor discriminates on the basis of viewpoint."

Egelhoff v. Egelhoff (No. 99-1529)

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FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Cmte. (No. 00-191)

Is New York v. Belton's bright-line rule limited to situations where the officer initiates contact with a vehicle's occupant while that person remains in the vehicle?

In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Florida Supreme Court's decision did not fit any of the categories where the Court "treated state-court judgments as final for jurisdictional purposes although there were further proceedings to take place in the state court." Thus, the Court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court's decision was not final.

Ferguson v. City of Charleston (No. 99-936)

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Fiore v. White (No. 98-942)

Did Milford Central School violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school? If a violation occurred, was it justified by Milford's concern that permitting the Club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause?

Yes and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation." "When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment," wrote Justice Thomas.

Florida v. Thomas (No. 00-391)

Are highway checkpoint programs, whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics, consistent with the Fourth Amendment?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because the checkpoint program's primary purpose was indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment. "We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime," wrote Justice O'Connor. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the reasonableness of the city's roadblocks depended on whether they served a "significant state interest with minimal intrusion on motorists."

Gitlitz v. Commissioner (No. 99-1295)

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Glover v. United States (No. 99-8576)

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Good News Club v. Milford Central School (No. 99-2036)

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Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph (No. 99-1235)

May a statewide association, incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary schools, be regarded as engaging in state action when it enforces a rule against a member school?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the ostensibly private organization, which regulated school sports, and the state education board's acknowledgment of the organization, indicated that the organization is a state actor for civil rights purposes. "The nominally private character of the Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and there is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards to it," wrote Justice Souter for the majority. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined Justice Clarence Thomas' dissent.

Hunt v. Cromartie (No. 99-1864)

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Idaho v. United States (No. 00-189)

Does a maritime cause of action for wrongful death resulting from negligence exist?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the general maritime cause of action for death caused by violation of maritime duties is available for the negligent breach of a maritime duty of care. "The general maritime law has recognized the tort of negligence for more than a century, and it has been clear since [Moragne v. States Marine Lines Inc.] that breaches of a maritime duty are actionable when they cause death, as when they cause injury," wrote Justice Scalia for the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part, which was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer.

Illinois v. McArthur (No. 99-1132)

Does the Bureau of Prisons have the authority to categorically deny consideration for eligibility for early release to inmates convicted of non-violent offenses after they have completed substance abuse programs?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the categorically denial of early release to a prisoner who committed felony using firearm is a permissible exercise of the BOP's discretion, even if the prisoner has successfully completed a substance abuse program. "The Bureau reasonably concluded that an inmate's prior involvement with firearms, in connection with the commission of a felony, suggests his readiness to resort to life-endangering violence and therefore appropriately determines the early release decision," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the majority. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented.

INS v. St. Cyr (No. 00-767)

Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extend to crimes that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "offense specific," it does not necessarily extend to offenses that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged. Since the right to counsel was offense specific, and the offenses were separate, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar police from interrogating [Cobb] regarding the murders, and [Cobb's] confession was therefore admissible." Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Kansas v. Colorado (No. 105 ORIG)

Must federal appellate courts conduct a "more searching inquiry" than "abuse of discretion" when reviewing a federal trial court's decision to grant a new trial?

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The dismissal had the effect of leaving in place the ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that new-trial grants demand a "more searching inquiry" than the usual abuse-of-discretion review and reinstating the appellate court's decision that upheld the first jury's verdict that awarded Tri County $5 million in damages.

Kyllo v. United States (No. 99-8508)

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Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss (No. 99-1884)

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Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez (No. 99-603)

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Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine (No. 99-1331)

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Lopez v. Davis (No. 99-7504)

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Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly (No. 00-596)

Did a District Court abuse its discretion when it dissolved an injunction under the Limitation of Liability Act, which prevented a seaman from suing a vessel owner in state court for personal injuries sustained aboard the vessel?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because state courts may adjudicate claims like Lewis' against vessel owners so long as the owner's right to seek limitation of liability is protected, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the District Court's decision to dissolve the injunction. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Conner rejected the respondent's proposal to make "run of the mill personal injury actions involving vessels a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction except where the claimant happens to seek a jury trial."

Lujan v. G&G Fire Sprinklers (No. 00-152)

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 provide access to professional golf tournaments by a qualified entrant with a disability? May a disabled contestant be denied the use of a golf cart because it would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the tournaments to allow him to ride when all other contestants must walk?

Yes and no. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Title III of the ADA, by its plain terms, prohibits the PGA from denying Martin equal access to its tours on the basis of his disability and that allowing Martin to use a cart, despite the walking rule, is not a modification that would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the game. "The purpose of the walking rule is... not compromised in the slightest by allowing Martin to use a cart," wrote Justice Stevens, noting Martin's fatiguing disability. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Missouri Director of Revenue v. CoBank ACB (No. 99-1792)

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MLB Players Assn v. Garvey (No. 00-1210)

Must states provide contractors and subcontractors a hearing to challenge a decision to withhold wage payments from contractors and subcontractors who fail to pay prevailing wages to satisfy due process?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that because California state law affords G & G sufficient opportunity to pursue its claim for payment under its contracts in state court, the statutory scheme does not deprive it of due process. A contractor's claim for payment is "an interest...that can be fully protected by an ordinary breach-of-contract suit," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. The Chief Justice continued that "if California makes ordinary judicial process available to [G & G] for resolving its contractual dispute, that process is due process."

Nevada v. Hicks (No. 99-1994)

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New Hampshire v. Maine (No. 130 ORIG)

Is the reasonableness inquiry into claims of qualified immunity by a police officer accused of using excessive force in an arrest the same as the reasonableness inquiry on the merits of the excessive-force claim?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "the ruling on qualified immunity requires an analysis not susceptible of fusion with the question whether unreasonable force was used in making the arrest." "The approach the Court of Appeals adopted -- to deny summary judgment any time a material issue of fact remains on the excessive force claim -- could undermine the goal of qualified immunity to 'avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment,'" wrote Justice Kennedy. The majority then concluded that the military policeman was entitled to qualified immunity.

New York Times v. Tasini (No. 00-201)

Does the Interstate Agreement on Detainers require the dismissal of criminal charges when a prisoner serving a federal sentence is transferred for a day to be arraigned on state charges and then returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the literal language of Article IV(e) of the Agreement bars any further criminal proceedings when a defendant is returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial. The Court rejected the argument that the one-day breach did not interrupt rehabilitation significantly for two reasons. First, "the language of the Agreement militates against an implicit exception, for it is absolute," wrote Justice Breyer. Second, continued Justice Breyer, "even were we to assume for argument's sake that the Agreement exempts violations that...are de minimis...we could not say that the violation at issue here qualifies as trivial."

NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care (No. 99-1815)

No details yet.

Norfolk Shipbuilding v. Garris (No. 00-346)

Does the Eleventh Amendment preclude the recommended award of damages based on losses sustained by individual water users in Kansas? Should the damages include prejudgment interest? Is the amount of interest excessive? Should the prejudgment interest be paid from 1950 rather than 1969? Did the Special Master improperly calculate the value of the crop losses attributable to the Compact violations?

No, yes, no, no, and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court remanded the case to the Special Master for preparation of a final judgment consistent with its opinion. The Court unanimously concluded that the recommended damages award does not violate the Eleventh Amendment and that the Special Master properly determined the value of the crop losses attributable to Compact violations. In a 6-3 split, the Court ruled that the unliquidated nature of Kansas' money damages does not bar an award of prejudgment interest and that the Special Master determined the appropriate rate for the prejudgment interest award, which should begin running in 1969.

Ohio v. Reiner (No. 00-1028)

Is a federal habeas corpus petition is an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within the meaning of 28 USC section 2244(d)(2), such that the one-year statute-of-limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act is tolled?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that an federal habeas corpus petition is not an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within the meaning of 28 USC section 2244(d)(2). "Section 2244(d)(2) therefore did not toll the limitation period during the pendency of [Walker's] first federal habeas petition," wrote Justice O'Connor. "[I]f the statute were construed so as to give applications for federal review the same tolling effect as applications for state collateral review, then [section] 2244(d)(2) would furnish little incentive for individuals to seek relief from the state courts before filing federal habeas petitions," concluded Justice O'Connor.

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (No. 99-2047)

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Penry v. Johnson (No. 00-6677)

Is Marketing Displays, Inc.'s trade dress infringement claim precluded because its dual-spring design is a functional feature for which there is no trade dress protection?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that because MDI's dual-spring design is a functional feature for which there is no trade dress protection, MDI's claim is barred. "A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional, " wrote Justice Kennedy. Focusing on the dual-spring design, Justice Kennedy continued that "[w]here the expired patent claimed the features in question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device." "MDI did not, and cannot, carry the burden," concluded the Court.

PGA Tour v. Martin (No. 00-24)

Was the ruled established under Cage v. Louisiana, that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt, "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," such that an inmate is entitled to submit successive a habeas petition based on that new rule?

No. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Cage rule was not "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that "[b]ecause 'made' means 'held'...it is clear that the Cage rule has not been 'made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.' Cage itself does not hold that it is retroactive. The only holding in Cage is that the particular jury instruction violated the Due Process Clause." Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined.

Pollard v. DuPont (No. 00-763)

Does the guarantee of prompt judicial review that must accompany an adult business-licensing scheme mean a prompt judicial determination?

The Court did not answer the question. In a unanimous opinion deliver by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari because City News was not properly situated to raise the question on which the Court granted review. The city of Waukesha had argued the case was moot after City News decided to withdraw its renewal application and close its business upon the city's grant of a license to another business, with which the Court agreed. "We do not doubt that an ongoing adult enterprise facing loss of its license to do business may allege First Amendment injuries. Such an establishment's typical concern, however, is not the speed of court proceedings, but the availability of a stay of adverse action during the pendency of judicial review, however long that review takes," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court.

Rogers v. Tennessee (No. 99-6218)

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Saucier v. Katz (No. 99-1977)

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Seling v. Young (No. 99-1185)

Is a significant increase on a prison sentence required in order to show prejudice in a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Court of appeals erred in engrafting onto the prejudice branch of the Strickland test the requirement that any increase in sentence must meet a standard of significance. Thus, the denial of Glover's motion to correct his sentence was reversed and remanded. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the Court of Appeals erred "because there is no obvious dividing line by which to measure how much longer a sentence must be for the increase to constitute substantial prejudice. ... Although the amount by which a defendant's sentence is increased by a particular decision may be a factor to consider in determining whether counsel's performance in failing to argue the point constitutes ineffective assistance, ...it cannot serve as a bar to a showing of prejudice."

Semtek v. Lockheed Martin (No. 99-1551)

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Shafer v. S. Carolina (No. 00-5250)

Is an application for state postconviction relief containing procedurally barred claims properly filed within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that an application for state postconviction relief containing procedurally barred claims is properly filed within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Antonin Scalia said that "[o]nly individual claims, and not the application containing those claims, can be procedurally defaulted under state law." "An application is 'filed,' as that term is commonly understood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record," noted Justice Scalia. "By construing 'properly filed application' to mean 'application raising claims that are not mandatorily procedurally barred,' [the Federal Government] elides the difference between an 'application' and a 'claim,'" argued Justice Scalia.

Shaw v. Murphy (No. 99-1613)

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Sinkfield v. Kelley (No. 00-132)

Does the National Government hold title, in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, to lands underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the National Government holds title, in trust for the Tribe, to lands underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that "Congress recognized the full extent of the Executive Order reservation lying within the stated boundaries it ultimately confirmed, and intended to bar passage to Idaho of title to the submerged lands at issue here." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, with whom Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas joined, dissented. "Congress' desire to divest an entering State of its sovereign interest in submerged lands must be 'definitely declared or otherwise made very plain,'" argued Chief Justice Rehnquist, "That standard has not been met here."

Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Engineers (No. 99-1178)

Do state video poker licenses qualify as property for purposes of the federal mail fraud statute?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that State and municipal licenses in general, and Louisiana's video poker licenses in particular, do not rank as "property," for purposes of federal law, in the hands of the official licensor. Thus, Cleveland's conviction for making false statements to obtain state video poker license was vacated. "Equating issuance of licenses or permits with deprivation of property would subject to federal mail fraud prosecution a wide range of conduct traditionally regulated by state and local authorities," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court.

Texas v. Cobb (No. 99-1702)

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TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc. (No. 99-1571)

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Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS (No. 99-2071)

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Tyler v. Cain (No. 00-5961)

Does the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limit a police officer's authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. "If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender," wrote Justice Souter for the Court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissenting opinion argued that the Court's decision "neglects the Fourth Amendment's express command in the name of administrative ease" and thus "cloaks the pointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the mantle of reasonableness."

United Dominion Industries v. United States (No. 00-157)

Do mandatory advertising assessments imposed on mushroom producers and handlers under the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act violate the First Amendment?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the assessment requirement violates the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy wore for the Court that "the mandated support is contrary to the First Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who object to the speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity." "We have not upheld compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the principal object is speech itself," continued Justice Kennedy.

United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. (No. 00-203)

Are Don King and his corporation a distinct "person" and "enterprise," such that RICO applies?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the need for two distinct entities is satisfied; hence, the RICO provision...applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole owner -- whether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority." "The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity," wrote Justice Breyer. "A corporate employee who conducts the corporation's affairs through an unlawful RICO 'pattern...of activity,' uses that corporation as a 'vehicle' whether he is, or is not, its sole owner."

United States v. Hatter (No. 99-1978)

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United States v. Mead Corp. (No. 99-1434)

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United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop (No. 00-151)

Do print and electronic publishers violate the copyrights of freelance authors when they include the freelancers' already-published articles in computer databases without the author's permission?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that section 201(c) does not authorize the copying at issue. "The publishers are not sheltered by [section 201(c)], we conclude, because the databases reproduce and distribute articles standing alone and not in context, not 'as part of that particular collective work' to which the author contributed, 'as part of...any revision' thereof, or 'as part of...any later collective work in the same series.' Both the print publishers and the electronic publishers, we rule, have infringed the copyrights of the freelance authors," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, argued that "[e]ach individual file still reminds the reader that he is viewing 'part of' a particular collective work. And the entire editorial content of that work still exists at the reader's fingertips."

United States v. United Foods (No. 00-276)

Do the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 strip district courts of their jurisdiction under the general habeas corpus statute to entertain St. Cyr's challenge? Do the AEDPA and IIRIRA deny relief under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to aliens who would have been eligible for such relief at the time of their convictions?

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that habeas jurisdiction was not repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA. Additionally, the Court held that "[section 212(c)] relief remains available for aliens, like [Enrico St. Cyr], whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for [section 212(c)] relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect." Justice Stevens wrote that "[w]e find nothing in IIRIRA unmistakably indicating that Congress considered the question whether to apply its repeal of [section 212(c)] retroactively to such aliens."

Wharf Holdings Ltd. v. United International Holdings (No. 00-347)

Does the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, pre-empt civil actions related to the alleged fraudulent approval of orthopedic bone screw devices?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the plaintiffs' state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflicted with, and were therefore pre-empted by, the FDCA, as amended by the MDA. "The conflict," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist for the Court, "stems from the fact that the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against the Agency, and that this authority is used by the Agency to achieve a somewhat delicate balance of statutory objectives. The balance sought by the Agency can be skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort law." Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the "FDA...has at its disposal a variety of enforcement options that allow it to make a measured response to suspected fraud upon the Agency." Justices John Paul Stevens and Clarence Thomas concurred.

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations (No. 99-1257)

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Zadvydas v. Davis (No. 99-7791)

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