http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Tue, 17 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Washington State's Community Protection Act of 1990 (Act) authorizes the civil commitment of "sexually violent predators," or persons who suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. After his imprisonment for committing six rapes, Andre Brigham Young was scheduled to be released from prison in 1990. Prior to his release, the state successfully filed a petition to commit Young as a sexually violent predator. Ultimately, Young instituted a federal habeas action. Initially, the District Court granted the writ, finding that the Act was criminal rather than civil, and that it violated the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees of the Constitution. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court denied Young's petition. The court determined that the Act was civil and, therefore, it could not violate the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the case turned on whether the Act was punitive "as applied" to Young.</p> <p>May an act, found to be civil, be deemed punitive "as applied" to an individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses, thereby providing a cause for release?</p> 00-492_20010417-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_492/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 16 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1908_20010116-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1908/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 10 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1994, Earthy D. Daniels, Jr., was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence on anyone convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and who has three previous convictions for a violent felony, Daniels' sentence was enhanced. After an unsuccessful appeal, Daniels filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. Daniels argued that his sentence violated the Constitution because it was based in part on two prior convictions that were themselves unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>May a federal defendant, who has been sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, challenge his federal sentence through a motion on the ground that his prior convictions were unconstitutionally obtained?</p> 99-1238_20001010-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1238/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 27 Mar 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1997, Tera McArthur asked two police officers to accompany her to her trailer, where she lived with her husband, Charles McArthur, so that they could keep the peace while she removed her belongings. While at the trailer, Tera alerted the officers, Assistant Chief John Love and Officer Richard Skidis, that her husband had marijuana hidden under the couch. Love then asked Charles for permission to search the trailer. Permission was denied and Love sent Officer Skidis with Tera to get a search warrant. Love told Charles he could not reenter his trailer, unless a police officer accompanied him. Afterwards, Love stood just inside the door to observe Charles when he went into the trailer. About two hours later, a search warrant was obtained. Subsequently, a search of the trailer transpired and officers found drug paraphernalia and marijuana. Charles McArthur was arrested. At trial, McArthur moved to suppress the drug paraphernalia and marijuana on the ground that they were the "fruit" of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter the trailer unaccompanied, which would have permitted him, he said, to "have destroyed the marijuana." The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Illinois Supreme Court denied the state's petition for leave to appeal.</p> <p>Do officers, with probable cause to believe that a man had hidden marijuana in his home, who subsequently prevent that man from entering the home for about two hours while they obtain a search warrant, violate the Fourth Amendment?</p> 00-454_20010327-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_454/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 04 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1408_20001204-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1408/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 05 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1687_20001205-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1687/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 16 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>David A. Egelhoff designated his wife, Donna Rae Egelhoff, as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy and a pension plan provided by his employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Two months after the Egelhoffs divorced, Mr. Egelhoff died. His children then sued Donna Rae to recover the insurance proceeds and the pension plan benefits. The children relied on a Washington state statue that provides that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset - defined to include a life insurance policy or employee benefit plan - is revoked automatically upon divorce. Subsequently, the proceeds would pass to the children as Mr. Egelhoff's statutory heirs under state law. Under ERISA, the state trial courts granted Donna Rae summary judgment. In reversing, the Washington Court of Appeals found that the statute was not pre-empted by ERISA. In affirming, the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute does not "refer to" ERISA plans to an extent that would require pre-emption.</p> <p>Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 pre-empt a Washington statute provides that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset is revoked automatically upon divorce?</p> 00-6374_20010416-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_6374/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 11 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>After an increase in the use of cocaine by patients receiving prenatal care, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) started to cooperate with Charleston to formulate a policy to prosecute mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. MUSC obstetrical patients were arrested after testing positive for cocaine. They filed suit challenging the policy's validity on the theory that warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches. Among the District Court's actions was an instruction to the jury to find for the patients unless they had consented to such searches. The jury found in favor of the city. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the searches were reasonable, reasoning that special needs may, in certain exceptional circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends.</p> <p>Is a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment if the patient has not consented to the procedure?</p> 99-1240_20001011-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1240/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Mar 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1964_20010320-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1964/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 11 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-901_20001011-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_901/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 27 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1848_20010227-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1848/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 04 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Floyd Hicks is a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes of western Nevada. After tribal police observed that Hicks was in possession of two California bighorn sheep heads, state game wardens obtained search warrants from state court and from the tribal court. After the warrants were executed, Hicks filed suit in Tribal Court, alleging trespass to land and chattels, abuse of process, and violation of civil rights, specifically denial of equal protection, denial of due process, and unreasonable search and seizure. The Tribal Court held that it had jurisdiction over the claims and the Tribal Appeals Court affirmed. Agreeing, the District Court held that the wardens would have to exhaust their qualified immunity claims in Tribal Court. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fact that Hicks's home is on tribe-owned reservation land is sufficient to support tribal jurisdiction over civil claims against nonmembers arising from their activities on that land.</p> <p>May a tribal court assert jurisdiction over civil claims against state officials who entered tribal land to execute a search warrant against a tribe member suspected of having violated state law outside the reservation?</p> 98-1768_20001204-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_98_1768/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 08 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-9073_20010108-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_9073/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 11 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1986, after being convicted for simple assault, institutional vandalism, and criminal mischief, Edward R. Coss, Jr., filed a petition for relief, but the Pennsylvania courts never ruled on the petition. In 1990, after he had served the full sentences for his 1986 convictions, Coss was convicted of aggravated assault. Ultimately, the sentencing court did not consider Coss' 1986 convictions in determining his eligible sentencing range. In choosing a sentence within the applicable range, the court considered several factors including Coss' extensive criminal record, making reference to his 1986 convictions. Coss then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his 1986 convictions were constitutionally invalid. The Federal District Court denied the petition reasoning that Coss had not been prejudiced by his 1986 counsel's ineffectiveness. The Court of Appeals found that Coss would not have been convicted in 1986 but for the ineffective assistance. The court remanded the case ordering a retrial or resentencing without consideration of the 1986 conviction.</p> <p>May a state prisoner use a federal habeas petition to challenge a current sentence on the ground that it was enhanced based on an unconstitutional prior conviction for which the sentence has fully expired?</p> 00-949_20001211-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_949/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Fri, 01 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1997, a labor union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to represent a unit of all the employees at the Caney Creek Developmental Complex, which is operated by Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. Kentucky River objected to the inclusion of its registered nurses in the unit because they were "supervisors" under National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Under the NLRA, employees are deemed to be "supervisors" and thereby excluded from the NLRA if they exercise "independent judgment" in "responsibly...directing" other employees "in the interest of the employer." At the ensuing representation hearing, the NLRB placed the burden of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River and found that it had not carried its burden. The NLRB rejected Kentucky River's proof of supervisory status on the ground that employees do not use "independent judgment" under the NLRA when they exercise "ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with employer-specified standards." Kentucky River then refused to bargain with the union. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals refused to enforce a bargaining order issued by the NLRB at an unfair labor practice proceeding. The court rejected the NLRB's interpretation of "independent judgment" under the NLRA's test for supervisory status and held that NLRB had erred in placing the burden of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River.</p> <p>Does the party claiming that an employee is a supervisor bear the burden of proving supervisor status in a representation hearing and unfair labor practice proceeding under the National Labor Relations Act? Under the National Labor Relations Act, is judgment "independent judgment" when it is informed by professional or technical training or experience?</p> 00-836_20001201-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_836/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 19 Mar 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees...because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]." Shirley Breeden alleged that, during a review of job applicant files in 1994, a male co-worker's vocal reaction to an applicant's psychological evaluation report constituted sexual harassment. Moreover, Breeden alleged that she suffered from adverse employment actions for complaining about the about the alleged harassment. Breeden claimed she was transferred about a month later to a job with less supervisory authority. In 1997, Breeden filed a retaliation claim against Clark County School District. The District Court granted summary judgment for the school district. A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Does a single sexually explicit remark and a change in employment status less than a month after an employee files a complaint about the remark meet the threshold for an adverse employment action under Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964?</p> 00-292_20010319-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_292/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 24 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) expressly precludes courts of appeals from exercising "jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against any alien who is removable by reason of "a conviction for certain criminal offenses, including any aggravated felony." Deboris Calcano-Martinez, Sergio Madrid, and Fazila Khan are all lawful permanent residents of the United States subject to administratively final orders of removal because they were convicted of aggravated felonies. Each filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals and a habeas corpus petition in the District Court to challenge the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that they were ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of deportation under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. The court also held that they could pursue their claims in a District Court habeas action.</p> <p>Does the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 remove the jurisdiction of federal appellate courts to review direct appeals of final deportation orders, but preserve federal district courts' habeas jurisdiction over challenges to those orders?</p> 00-1011_20010424-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_1011/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 18 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Section 109(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for each air pollutant for which "air quality criteria" have been issued under section 108. In 1997, Christine Todd Whitman, the Administrator of the EPA, revised the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. Afterwards, her revised NAAQS were challenged in court. The District of Columbia Circuit found that section 109(b)(1), which instructs the EPA to set standards, delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Federal Constitution because the court found that the EPA had interpreted the statute to provide no "intelligible principle" to guide the agency's exercise of authority. The court remanded the NAAQS to the EPA. The courts also held to its rule that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting the NAAQS. Additionally, the court rejected the EPA's position that the implementation provisions for ozone found in Part D, Subpart 2, of Title I of the CAA, were so tied to the existing ozone standard that the EPA lacked the power to revise the standard.</p> <p>Does section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency? May the Administrator of the EPA consider the costs of implementation in setting national ambient air quality standards under section 109(b)(1)? Does the Court of Appeals have the jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA, with respect to implementing the revised ozone NAAQS?</p> 00-549_20010418-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_549/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 30 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-859_20001030-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_859/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 06 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1379_20001106-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1379/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1680_20001128-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1680/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Anthony Palazzolo owns a waterfront parcel of land in Rhode Island. Most of the property is salt marsh, subject to tidal flooding. The Rhode Island Resources Management Council's Coastal Resources Management Program regulations designate salt marshes as protected "coastal wetlands," on which development is greatly limited. After multiple development proposals of his were denied, Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court. Palazzolo asserted that the State's wetlands regulations had taken his property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the Council's action had deprived him of "all economically beneficial use" of his property. Ruling against Palazzolo, the court held that his takings claim was not ripe, that he had no right to challenge the regulations predating his acquisition of the property's title, and that he could not assert a takings claim based on the denial of all economic use of his property in light of undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in development value remaining on an upland parcel of the property.</p> <p>May a property owner who acquired title to the property after is was subject to wetlands regulations still bring a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment?</p> 99-1030_20001003-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1030/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 10 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-804_20001010-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_804/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 06 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-929_20001106-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_929/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 26 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-2035_20010226-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_2035/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 08 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-9136_20010108-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_9136/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 10 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1871_20010110-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1871/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 10 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1953_20010110-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1953/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 02 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Legal Services Corporation Act authorizes the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to distribute funds, appropriated by Congress, to local grantee organizations, which provide free legal assistance to indigent clients in welfare benefits claims. The Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 prohibited the LSC from funding any organization that represented clients in an effort to amend or challenge existing welfare law, among other things. The prohibition was such that grantees could not continue representation in a welfare matter even where a constitutional or statutory validity challenge became apparent after representation was well under way. LSC grantee lawyers and others filed suit to have the restriction declared unconstitutional. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction. However, the Court of Appeals invalidated the restriction, concluding that it was impermissible viewpoint discrimination that violated the First Amendment.</p> <p>Does the funding restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, which prevents attorneys from representing clients in an attempt to amend or challenge existing welfare law, violate the First Amendment?</p> 99-1038_20001002-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1038/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 08 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1529_20001108-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1529/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 28 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>While officers were investigating marijuana sales at Florida home, Robert Thomas drove up to the house. An officer asked Thomas for his name and driver license. Thomas was arrested when a search on his license revealed an outstanding warrant. After taking Thomas inside the house, the officer searched Thomas' car and found methamphetamine. Subsequently, the trial court granted Thomas' motion to suppress. In reversing, the appellate found the search valid under New York v. Belton. In New York v. Belton, the U.S. Supreme Court established a "bright-line" rule permitting an officer who has made a lawful custodial arrest of a car's occupant to search the car's passenger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest. In reversing, the Florida Supreme Court held Belton did not apply because it is limited to situations where the officer initiates contact with a vehicle's occupant while that person remains in the vehicle.</p> <p>Is New York v. Belton's bright-line rule limited to situations where the officer initiates contact with a vehicle's occupant while that person remains in the vehicle?</p> 00-191_20010228-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_191/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 04 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-936_20001004-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_936/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 25 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Are highway checkpoint programs, whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics, consistent with the Fourth Amendment?</p> 00-391_20010425-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_391/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 02 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1295_20001002-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1295/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-8576_20001127-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_8576/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 28 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-2036_20010228-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_2036/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (Association) is a not-for-profit membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sports among its members, a large portion of the public and private high schools in Tennessee. The Association's role in regulating interscholastic competition in public schools has been long acknowledged by the State Board of Education. Brentwood Academy sued the Association after it penalized the academy for placing "undue influence" on football recruits. At the time, all the voting members of the Association were public school administrators. Brentwood claimed that the rule's enforcement was state action that violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court agreed and enjoined the rule's enforcement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no state action.</p> <p>May a statewide association, incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary schools, be regarded as engaging in state action when it enforces a rule against a member school?</p> 99-1235_20001003-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1235/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1864_20001127-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1864/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 23 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Christopher Garris' mother filed a complaint in Federal District Court alleging that her son died as the result of injuries he sustained while sandblasting aboard the USNS Maj. Stephen W. Pless. Because the vessel was berthed in the navigable waters of the United States, Garris invoked federal admiralty jurisdiction and sought damages under general maritime law. Garris asserted that the injuries were caused by the negligence of Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corporation. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a federal claim. The court stated that no cause of action exists, under general maritime law, for death resulting from negligence. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that although the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet recognized a maritime cause of action for wrongful death resulting from negligence, the action was made appropriate by principles contained in precedent.</p> <p>Does a maritime cause of action for wrongful death resulting from negligence exist?</p> 00-189_20010423-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_189/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 01 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Congress has provided the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) with the statutory authority to reduce the prison term of an inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony by up to one year, if the prisoner successfully completes a substance abuse program. The BOP's implementing regulation categorically denies early release to prisoners whose offense is a felony attended by "the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm." In 1997, Christopher A. Lopez was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Additionally, the court found that Lopez possessed a firearm in connection with his offense. While incarcerated, Lopez requested substance abuse treatment. The BOP found Lopez qualified for its residential drug abuse program, but was found him categorically ineligible for early release. The District Court, in ordering the BOP to reconsider Lopez for early release, held that the BOP may not, based on weapons possession, categorically count out inmates, whose underlying conviction was for a nonviolent crime. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Does the Bureau of Prisons have the authority to categorically deny consideration for eligibility for early release to inmates convicted of non-violent offenses after they have completed substance abuse programs?</p> 99-1132_20001101-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1132/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 24 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1994, while under arrest for an unrelated offense, Raymond Levi Cobb confessed to a home burglary. Cobb, however, denied knowledge of the disappearance of a woman and child from the home. In 1995, after counsel was appointed to represent him in the burglary case, Cobb confessed to killing the woman and child to his father, who contacted the police. Cobb, now in custody, waived his rights under Miranda and confessed to the murders. Cobb was then indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Cobb argued that his confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which he claimed attached when counsel was appointed in the burglary case. In reversing, the court held that once the right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any other offense that is very closely factually related to the offense charged.</p> <p>Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extend to crimes that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged?</p> 00-767_20010424-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_767/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 19 Mar 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Using a 1993 building permit issued by the District of Columbia, Tri County Industries, Inc. spent nearly $600,000 readying a site for a "soil remediation" facility, which would decontaminate soil tainted by hazardous wastes. After protests and a dispute over whether the company was violating its permit by storing contaminated soil on the site, the city issued a stop-work order. Tri County filed suit against the District of Columbia for suspending its building permit on the facility claiming its due process rights had been violated. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reinstated a 1998 jury's $5 million award. The appellate court rule that the District Court should have conducted a "more searching inquiry" than it had to preserve the Seventh Amendment right to jury trials in civil cases. The appellate court normally applies a "abuse of discretion" standard. Under the "more searching inquiry," the appellate court discounted the reasons the district judge had cited in ordering a new trial.</p> <p>Must federal appellate courts conduct a "more searching inquiry" than "abuse of discretion" when reviewing a federal trial court's decision to grant a new trial?</p> 105orig_20010319-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_105_orig/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-8508_20010220-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_8508/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1884_20010220-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1884/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 04 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-603_20001004-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_603/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 29 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1331_20001129-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1331/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 30 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-7504_20001030-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_7504/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 25 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1998, James F. Lewis, a deckhand aboard the M/V Karen Michelle owned by Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., claimed that he was injured when he tripped over a wire on the boat. Lewis then sued Lewis & Clark in Illinois County Court, for personal injuries claiming negligence under the Jones Act. Lewis & Clark had already filed a complaint for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in the District Court under the Limitation of Liability Act (Act). Subsequently, the court approved a surety bond of $450,000, representing Lewis & Clark's interest in the vessel, ordered that any claim related to the incident be filed with the court within a specified period, and enjoined the filing or prosecution of any suits related to the incident. The injunction prevented Lewis from litigating his personal injury claims in state court and he moved to dissolve it. The District Court noted that federal courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a vessel owner is entitled to limited liability, but also recognized that the statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime suits to federal courts saves to suitors "all other remedies to which they are other wise entitled." Ultimately, the court dissolved the injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Did a District Court abuse its discretion when it dissolved an injunction under the Limitation of Liability Act, which prevented a seaman from suing a vessel owner in state court for personal injuries sustained aboard the vessel?</p> 00-596_20010425-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_596/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 26 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Casey Martin is afflicted with a degenerative circulatory disorder that prevents him from walking golf courses. His disorder constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). When Casey made a request to use a golf cart for the duration of the qualification tournament onto the professional tours sponsored by PGA Tour, Inc., PGA refused. Martin then filed suit under Title III of the ADA, which requires an entity operating "public accommodations" to make "reasonable modifications" in its policies "when... necessary to afford such...accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such...accommodations." Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against PGA, requiring it to allow Martin to use a cart. The court found that the purpose of the PGA's walking rule was to insert fatigue into the skill of shot-making, and that Martin suffered significant fatigue due to his disability, even with the use of a cart. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that golf courses are places of public accommodation during professional tournaments and that permitting Martin to use a cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of those tournaments.</p> <p>Does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 provide access to professional golf tournaments by a qualified entrant with a disability? May a disabled contestant be denied the use of a golf cart because it would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the tournaments to allow him to ride when all other contestants must walk?</p> 00-152_20010226-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_152/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1792_20001128-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1792/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 21 Mar 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1994_20010321-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1994/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 16 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Donald Saucier, a military police officer, arrested Elliot Katz, who was protesting during a speech by Vice President Gore at the Presidio Army Base in San Francisco. Katz filed suit against Saucier alleging that Saucier had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in arresting him. Rejecting Saucier's motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the District Court held that the immunity inquiry is the same as the inquiry made on the merits. In affirming, the Court of Appeals made a two-part qualified immunity inquiry. After finding that the law governing Saucier's conduct was clearly established when the incident occurred, the court moved to determined whether a reasonable officer could have believed, in light of the clearly established law, that his conduct was lawful. The court then reasoned that this step and the merits of a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim were identical because both concern the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct in light of the circumstances the officer faced at the scene. Subsequently, the court found that summary judgment based on qualified immunity was inappropriate.</p> <p>Is the reasonableness inquiry into claims of qualified immunity by a police officer accused of using excessive force in an arrest the same as the reasonableness inquiry on the merits of the excessive-force claim?</p> 130orig_20010416-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_130_orig/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 28 Mar 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Interstate Agreement on Detainers creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, a legal order that requires a state to hold a currently imprisoned individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime. In 1997, Michael Bozeman was serving a federal prison sentence at a federal prison in Florida. In January, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama sought temporary custody of Bozeman to arraign him on state firearm charges for which an earlier detainer had been filed. The Agreement provides that a state that obtains a prisoner for purposes of trial must try him within 120 days of his arrival, and if it returns him to his "original place of imprisonment" prior to that trial, charges shall be dismissed. After appearing in Alabama court, Bozeman was returned to federal prison in Florida. When Bozeman returned to Alabama court, his local counsel filed a motion to dismiss the state charges on the ground that Bozeman had been "returned to the original place of imprisonment" (the federal prison) "prior to" "trial" on state charges being "had." Ultimately, Bozeman was convicted and an appellate court affirmed. In reversing, the Alabama State Supreme Court held that the literal language of the Agreement required dismissal of the state charges.</p> <p>Does the Interstate Agreement on Detainers require the dismissal of criminal charges when a prisoner serving a federal sentence is transferred for a day to be arraigned on state charges and then returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial?</p> 00-201_20010328-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_201/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 21 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1815_20010221-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1815/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 18 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1949, Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact. Article IV-D provided that future development of the river basin could not materially deplete the usable quantity or availability to other users of the river's waters. In 1986, Kansas filed suit alleging that Colorado had violated the Compact. Ultimately, the Special Master found that post-Compact increases in groundwater well pumping in Colorado had materially depleted the waters in violation of Article IV-D. The Special Master, in his second report, recommended that damages be awarded to Kansas. In his third report, the Special Master recommended that such damages be measured by Kansas' losses attributable to Compact violations since 1950, be paid in money not water, and include prejudgment interest from 1969 to the date of judgment. Colorado filed four objections to the third report, Kansas filed one, and the United States submitted that all objections should be overruled.</p> <p>Does the Eleventh Amendment preclude the recommended award of damages based on losses sustained by individual water users in Kansas? Should the damages include prejudgment interest? Is the amount of interest excessive? Should the prejudgment interest be paid from 1950 rather than 1969? Did the Special Master improperly calculate the value of the crop losses attributable to the Compact violations?</p> 00-346_20010418-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_346/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 26 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-2047_20010226-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_2047/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 27 Mar 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Marketing Displays, Inc. (MDI) held utility patents for a "dual-spring design" mechanism that keeps temporary road and other outdoor signs upright in wind. After the patents expired, TrafFix Devices, Inc. began marketing sign stands with a dual-spring mechanism copied from MDI's design. MDI brought suit under the Trademark Act of 1964 for, among other things, trade dress infringement. MDA claimed that its sign stands were recognizable to buyers and users because the patented design was visible. In granting summary judgement for TrafFix, the District Court concluded that MDI had not established a "secondary meaning," or that consumers did not associate the look of the dual-spring design with MDI. The court also found that there could be no trade dress protection for the design because it was functional. In reversing, the Court of Appeals suggested that the District Court committed legal error by looking only to the dual-spring design when evaluating MDI's trade dress because a competitor had to find some way to hide the design or otherwise set it apart from MDI's and noted the issue whether an expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of trade dress protection in the product's design.</p> <p>Is Marketing Displays, Inc.'s trade dress infringement claim precluded because its dual-spring design is a functional feature for which there is no trade dress protection?</p> 00-6677_20010327-mq-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_6677/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 17 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Melvin Tyler was convicted of second-degree murder. Ultimately, Tyler filed his sixth state habeas petition after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cage v. Louisiana, which held that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Tyler claimed that that a jury instruction in his trial was similar to the one ruled unconstitutional in Cage. Ultimately, Tyler filed a second federal habeas petition pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The District Court denied relief. In affirming, the Court of Appeals stated the District Court had failed to determine whether Tyler had satisfied the AEDPA's successive habeas standard, which requires a district court to dismiss a claim in a second or successive application unless the applicant "shows" that the "claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." The court concluded that Tyler did not meet this standard because he "could not show that any Supreme Court decision renders the Cage decision retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review."</p> <p>Was the ruled established under Cage v. Louisiana, that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt, "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," such that an inmate is entitled to submit successive a habeas petition based on that new rule?</p> 00-24_20010117-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_24/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 23 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The City of Waukesha, Wisconsin requires sellers of sexually explicit materials to obtain and annually renew adult business licenses. City News and Novelty, Inc. (City News), owned and operated an adult-oriented shop in Waukesha. City News had first obtained a license in 1989. In 1995, City News applied for a renewal of its license. Waukesha's Common Council denied the application. The Council found that City News had violated Waukesha ordinances by permitting minors to loiter on the premises, failing to maintain an unobstructed view of booths in the store, and allowing patrons to engage in sexual activity inside the booths. Waukesha's refusal to renew City News's license was upheld in administrative proceedings and on judicial review in the state courts. Among other questions raised in its petition for certiorari, City News asked the Court to "resolve...whether the guarantee of prompt judicial review that must accompany [an adult business] licensing scheme means a prompt judicial determination or simply the right to promptly file for judicial review."</p> <p>Does the guarantee of prompt judicial review that must accompany an adult business-licensing scheme mean a prompt judicial determination?</p> 00-763_20010423-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_763/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 01 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-6218_20001101-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_6218/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Mar 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1977_20010320-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1977/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 31 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In the 1980's and early 1990's, Paul Glover was the Vice President and General Counsel of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union. Ultimately, Glover was convicted of federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion, among other things, after using his control over the union's investments to enrich himself through kickbacks. Glover's probation officer, in his pre-sentence investigation report, recommended that Glover's federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion convictions be grouped under the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual section 3D1.2, which allows the grouping of counts involving substantially the same harm. The Federal Government objected to the grouping and the District Court agreed. Glover's offense level was thus increased by two levels, resulting in an increased sentence of between 6 and 21 months. Glover's counsel did not pursue the grouping issue on appeal. Glover then filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his counsel's failure to pursue the issue was ineffective assistance, without which his offense level would have been lower. The District Court denied Glover's motion, concluding that a 6 to 21 month sentencing increase was not significant enough to establish prejudice under the test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington. Thus, the court denied his ineffective-assistance claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Is a significant increase on a prison sentence required in order to show prejudice in a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel?</p> 99-1185_20001031-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1185/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 05 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1551_20001205-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1551/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 09 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1984, after firing two bullets at police during a car chase, Tony Bruce Bennett was convicted of attempted murder, among other crimes. Bennett moved pro se to vacate his judgment of conviction in 1995. A New York trial court orally denied Bennett's motion. Bennett claimed that he never received a copy of a written order reflecting the denial. In 1998, Bennett filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging violations of his rights to present witnesses in his defense and to a fair trial, to be present at all material stages of the trial, and to the effective assistance of counsel. The Federal District Court dismissed Bennett's federal habeas corpus petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which set a 1-year period of limitation on federal habeas corpus applications by state prisoners. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Bennett's habeas petition was not time-barred because his 1995 motion was still pending, under the AEDPA's tolling provision, since he had never received notification of the state's decision regarding it. Thus, the time for appealing the denial of that motion had not yet expired. Additionally, the court found that the 1995 motion was a "properly filed" application, even though the claims contained in the motion were procedurally barred under two New York statutory provisions.</p> <p>Is an application for state postconviction relief containing procedurally barred claims properly filed within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?</p> 00-5250_20010109-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_5250/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 16 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1613_20010116-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1613/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 31 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Louisiana law authorizes the State to award nontransferable, annually renewable licenses to operate video poker machines. In 1992, Fred Goodson and his family formed Truck Stop Gaming, Ltd. (TSG), a video poker business. Carl Cleveland, a lawyer, assisted Goodson in preparing TSG's video poker license applications, each of which identified Goodson's children as the sole beneficial owners of the partnership. From 1992 through 1995, TSG successfully renewed its license. In 1996, Cleveland and Goodson were charged with money laundering under federal law, along with racketeering and conspiracy in connection with a scheme to bribe state legislators to vote in a manner favorable to the video poker industry. Acts supporting these charges came from federal mail fraud charges, defined as "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining...property by means of...fraudulent...representations." The indictment alleged that Cleveland and Goodson fraudulently concealed that they were the true owners of TSG in the license applications they had mailed to the State because they had tax and financial problems that could have undermined their ability to receive a video poker license. Before trial, Cleveland moved to dismiss the mail fraud counts on the ground that the alleged fraud did not deprive the State of "property." The District Court denied the motion, concluding that licenses constitute property even before they are issued. A jury found Cleveland guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Do state video poker licenses qualify as property for purposes of the federal mail fraud statute?</p> 99-1178_20001031-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1178/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 16 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1702_20010116-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1702/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 29 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1571_20001129-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1571/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 09 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-2071_20010109-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_2071/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 16 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Under Texas law, it is a misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine, either for a front-seat passenger in a car equipped with safety belts not to wear one or for the driver to fail to secure any small child riding in front. In 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her truck in Lago Vista. Neither of Atwater's children, who were sitting in the front seat, was wearing seatbelts. Lago Vista policeman Bart Turek observed the violations and pulled Atwater over. Ultimately, Atwater was handcuffed, placed in jail, and released on bond. Atwater then filed suit alleging that Turek's actions had violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In granting the city summary judgment, the District Court ruled the claim meritless. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the arrest was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes because no one disputed that Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater, and there was no evidence the arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to Atwater's privacy interests.</p> <p>Does the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limit a police officer's authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses?</p> 00-5961_20010416-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_5961/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 26 Mar 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act mandates that fresh mushroom handlers pay assessments used primarily to fund advertisements promoting mushroom sales. United Foods, Inc. refused to pay the assessment, claiming that it violated the First Amendment. Ultimately, United Foods sought review in the District Court. In granting the Government summary judgement, the court relied on Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., which held that the First Amendment was not violated when agricultural marketing orders, as part of a larger regulatory marketing scheme, required producers of California tree fruit to pay assessments for product advertising. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Glickman did not control because the mandated payments in this case were not part of a comprehensive statutory agricultural marketing program.</p> <p>Do mandatory advertising assessments imposed on mushroom producers and handlers under the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act violate the First Amendment?</p> 00-157_20010326-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_157/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 27 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., a corporate promoter of boxing matches, sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of a rival corporation, alleging that King had conducted his corporation's affairs in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise...to conduct or participate...in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." The District Court dismissed the complaint. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that RICO applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a "person" and a distinct "enterprise," the affairs of which that "person" improperly conducts. The court concluded that King was part of the corporation, not a "person," distinct from the "enterprise," who allegedly improperly conducted the "enterprise's affairs."</p> <p>Are Don King and his corporation a distinct "person" and "enterprise," such that RICO applies?</p> 00-203_20010227-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_203/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1978_20010220-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1978/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 08 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1434_20001108-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1434/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 28 Mar 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Various freelance authors wrote articles for various print publishers. The publishers treated the authors as independent contractors under contracts. The publishers each licensed rights to copy and sell articles to LEXIS/NEXIS, owner and operator of a computerized database containing articles in text-only format. NEXIS does not reproduce the print publication's formatting. The authors filed suit alleging that their copyrights were infringed when the print publishers placed their articles in the electronic publishers' databases, such as LEXIS/NEXIS. In response, the print and electronic publishers raised the privilege accorded collective work copyright owners by section 201(c) of the Copyright Act. In granting the publishers summary judgment, the District Court held that the electronic databases reproduced and distributed the authors' works, under section 201(c), "as part of...[a] revision of that collective work" to which the authors had first contributed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the databases were not among the collective works covered by section 201(c), and specifically, were not "revisions" of the periodicals in which the Articles first appeared.</p> <p>Do print and electronic publishers violate the copyrights of freelance authors when they include the freelancers' already-published articles in computer databases without the author's permission?</p> 00-151_20010328-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_151/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 17 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>On March 8, 1996, Enrico St. Cyr, a lawful permanent resident, pled guilty in a Connecticut court to a charge of selling a controlled substance. That conviction made him deportable. Before the effective dates of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was interpreted to give the Attorney General broad discretion to waive deportation of resident aliens. The AEDPA and IIRIRA restricted the class of aliens depending on section 212(c) for relief. St. Cyr's removal proceedings commenced after AEDPA's and IIRIRA's effective dates. Subsequently, the Attorney General claimed that the AEDPA and IIRIRA withdrew his authority to grant St. Cyr a waiver. The District Court accepted St. Cyr's habeas corpus application and agreed that the new restrictions do not apply to removal proceedings brought against an alien who pleaded guilty to a deportable crime before their enactment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Do the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 strip district courts of their jurisdiction under the general habeas corpus statute to entertain St. Cyr's challenge? Do the AEDPA and IIRIRA deny relief under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to aliens who would have been eligible for such relief at the time of their convictions?</p> 00-276_20010417-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_276/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 21 Mar 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) regulate medical devices. Under the MDA, Class III devices "present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury" and thus require the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) strictest regulation. In 1985, after a previously failed attempt, the AcroMed Corporation sought approval for its orthopedic bone screw device, a Class III device, for use in spinal surgery with the assistance of Buckman Company, a regulatory consultant to medical device manufacturers. The FDA also denied the second application. On the third attempt, instead of trying to show the bone screw device was "substantially equivalent" to similar devices already on the market and thus as safe and effective, AcroMed and Buckman split the device into its component parts, renamed them, and altered the intended use of the parts. Thus, the FDA approved the component devices for long bone surgery. Subsequently, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has directed over 2,300 civil actions related to these medical devices to the Federal District Court. Many actions claim, under state tort law, that AcroMed and Buckman made fraudulent representations to the FDA as to the intended use of the bone screws and that, as a result, the devices were improperly given market clearance, which injured the plaintiffs. The District Court dismissed the fraud claims as pre-empted by the MDA. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Does the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, pre-empt civil actions related to the alleged fraudulent approval of orthopedic bone screw devices?</p> 00-347_20010321-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_347/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 07 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1257_20001107-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1257/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 07 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-1426_20001107-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1257/argument_99-1426/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 21 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 99-7791_20010221-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_7791/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist