Glover v. United States - Opinion Announcement

Argument of Speaker

Mr. Speaker: The opinion of the Court in No. 99-8576 Glover against United States will be announced by Justice Kennedy.

Argument of Justice Kennedy

Mr. Kennedy: Now, the question in this case is whether an unlawful increase in a federal prison sentence and the increase was somewhere between 06 to 21 months can be non prejudicial when the prisoner claims the illegal sentence, the improper increase resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel.

After a petitioner Glover’s conviction the pre sentence investigation report recommended that his convictions for labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasions be grouped together under one of the sentencing guidelines.

The government objected to grouping those counts.

In Trial Court Glover’s attorneys did not submit papers or offer extensive oral arguments contesting this no grouping position on the part of the government.

When the District Court decided not to group the money laundering counts, Glover’s offense level was increased by two levels that yield a concomitant increase in the sentencing range.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Glover’s attorneys did not raise the grouping issue.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and the sentence.

Then Glover filed a pro se 2255 motion.

He argued that the failure of his counsel to press the grouping issue was ineffected the assistance of counsel at the sentencing proceeding.

Under Glover’s theory of the case is 84 months sentence for somewhere, as I have indicated between 06 and 21 months more than authorized by law because of the Trial Court’s alleged error in not grouping the offenses.

The District Court denied Glover’s 2255 motion.

It determined that under the Seventh Circuit precedent an increase of 06 to 21 months was not significant enough to prejudice for purposes of Strickland versus Washington.

As a result the District Court did not decide whether Glover’s attorneys fell below a reasonable standard of confidence.

The Court of Appeals affirmed and it relied on the same no prejudice theory.

We granted certiorari.

The government now acknowledges that the Seventh Circuit’s rule is inconsistent with this Court’s cases and unworkable.

It appears that the Seventh Circuit drew the substance of its no prejudice rule from our decision in Lockhart versus Fretwell.

That case held that in some circumstances a mere difference in outcome will not suffice to establish prejudice.

But we explained last time that our holding on Lockhart does not supplant the Strickland analysis.

The Seventh Circuit was incorrect to rely on Lockhart to deny relief to persons alleging deficient performance by counsel, because the alleged unlawful increase in sentence does not meet some baseline standard of prejudice.

Our jurisprudence suggests that any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.

Now, the Seventh Circuit’s rule is not well considered in any event because there is no obvious dividing line by which the measure how much longer a sentence must be to constitute substantial prejudice.

We express no opinion on the ultimate merits of Glover’s claim because the question on deficient performance is not a force, we also express no opinion on the alternative grounds of performance advanced by the government which were neither raised in nor passed upon by the Court of Appeals.

The judgment of the Seventh Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The opinion of the Court is unanimous.