Cases - 1999 term

Bond v. United States

Tue, 29 Feb 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-9349

Petitioner

Bond

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 334 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, February 29, 2000

Decided

Monday, April 17, 2000

Advocates

M. Carolyn Fuentes (San Antonio, Texas, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

While checking the immigration status of passengers on a bus in Texas, Border Patrol Agent Cesar Cantu squeezed the soft luggage which passengers had placed in the overhead storage space. When Agent Cantu squeezed a canvas bag above Steven Dewayne Bond, Agent Cantu noticed that it contained a "brick-like" object. After Bond admitted owning the bag and consented to its search, Agent Cantu discovered a "brick" of methamphetamine. Bond was indicted on federal drug charges. Bond moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the agent conducted an illegal search of his bag, when squeezing it, in alleged violation of the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The District Court denied the motion and subsequently found Bond guilty. On appeal, Bond conceded that other passengers had access to his bag, but contended that Agent Cantu manipulated the bag (by squeezing)in a way that other passengers would not, thus constituting an unreasonable search. In affirming the denial of the motion, the Court of Appeals held that Agent Cantu's manipulation of the bag was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.

Question

Does a law enforcement officer's physical manipulation of a bus passenger's carry-on luggage violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Bond, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "Agent Cantu's physical manipulation of petitioner's carry-on bag violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches." The Court concluded that Bond "possessed a privacy interest in his bag," and that such an expectation of privacy is reasonable. "Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, a bus passenger "does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner." Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissented, seeing no "reasonable expectation" that strangers would not manipulate luggage in a bus.

United States v. Morrison

Tue, 11 Jan 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

601 Market St Philadelphia PA 19106

Philadelphia, PA 19106

United States

39° 57' 2.7504" N, 75° 9' 1.3464" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Morrison

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 99-29

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 598 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2000

Advocates

Michael E. Rosman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Julie Goldscheid (Argued the cause for the petitioner in No. 99-29, Brzonkala v. Morrison)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States in No. 99-5)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university's administrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be "excessive." Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Morrison, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1398

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it redress harm caused by the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that [i]f the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of...Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States." Dissenting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the majority opinion "illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone." Additionally, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, noted that VAWA contained a "mountain of data assembled by Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services

Tue, 12 Oct 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-822

Petitioner

Friends of the Earth

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Laidlaw Environmental Services

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 167 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Advocates

Donald A. Cockrill (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioners)

Bruce J. Terris (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

After Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. bought a wastewater treatment plant, it was granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The permit authorized Laidlaw to discharge treated water and limited pollutants. Laidlaw's discharge of mercury into the North Tyger River repeatedly exceeded the limits set by the permit. Ultimately, Friends of the Earth and others (FOE) filed a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Laidlaw, alleging noncompliance with the NPDES permit, seeking injunctive relief and an award of civil penalties. Laidlaw moved for summary judgement on the ground that FOE lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. The District Court denied the motion. Ultimately, the District Court found that Laidlaw violated the mercury discharge limitation. In issuing its judgment, the District Court concluded that a civil penalty of $405,800 would be adequate to forestall future violations, given that Laidlaw would have to reimburse the plaintiffs for a significant amount of legal fees and had itself incurred significant legal expenses. The court declined to order injunctive relief because Laidlaw, after the lawsuit began, had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of its permit. FOE appealed to the amount of the District Court's civil penalty judgment, but did not appeal the denial of declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals ordered the case to be dismissed. The appellate court held that the case had become moot once Laidlaw complied with the terms of its permit. The court reasoned that the only remedy currently available to FOE, civil penalties payable to the Government, would not redress any injury FOE had suffered.

Question

Does an environmental group's citizen suit for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act become moot when the defendant, after commencement of the litigation, has come into compliance with its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Friends of the Earth, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a citizen suitor's claim for civil penalties need not be dismissed as moot when the defendant, after commencement of the litigation, has come into compliance with its NPDES permit. "A defendant's voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does not suffice to moot a case," Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court. "Congress has found that civil penalties in the Clean Water Act cases do more than promote immediate compliance... they also deter future violations," concluded Justice Ginsburg. The Court also ruled that FOE had standing to bring the suit on behalf on its members.

Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.

Mon, 08 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1109

Petitioner

Shalala

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 1 (2000)

Argued

Monday, November 8, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, February 29, 2000

Advocates

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kimball R. Anderson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Council), an association of nursing homes participating in Medicare, sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, challenging the validity of various Medicare regulations establishing sanctions and remedies for nursing homes found guilty of violating minimum health and safety standards. The Council alleged that certain terms in the new regulations were unconstitutionally vague, that the regulations created administrative procedures inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause, and that the regulations' legislative rules that were not promulgated consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act. The Council invoked the Federal District Court's federal-question jurisdiction, which states that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," to rule on its claims. The District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. The court concluded that set of special statutory provisions under the Medicare Act create a separate, virtually exclusive, system of administrative and judicial review for such claims. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Question

Does the Medicare Act bar judicial review, under federal-question jurisdiction, of challenges to the validity of Medicare regulations?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Shalala, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Medicare--provisions of the Social Security Act

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Medicare Act barred federal-question jurisdiction of the Council's challenges to the validity of various Medicare regulations. The Court concluded that the Council must proceed instead through the special review channel that the Medicare statutes create. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in his dissent that, "[d]elayed review...may mean no review at all. For when the costs of presenting a claim via the delayed review route exceed the costs of simply complying with the regulation, the regulated entity will buckle under and comply, even when the regulation is plainly invalid."

Hill v. Colorado

Wed, 19 Jan 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Colorado State Legislature

200 E Colfax Ave Denver CO 80203

Denver, CO 80203

United States

39° 44' 24.1332" N, 104° 59' 3.9048" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1856

Petitioner

Hill

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Colorado

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 703 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2000

Advocates

Michael E. McLachlan (Denver, Colorado, argued the cause for the respondents)

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondents)

Jay A. Sekulow (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A Colorado statute makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to "knowingly approach" within 8 feet of another person, without that person's consent, in order to pass "a leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person...." Leila Hill and others, sidewalk counselors who offer abortion alternatives to women entering abortion clinics, sought to enjoin the statute's enforcement in state court, claiming violations of their First Amendment free speech rights and right to a free press. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the statute imposed content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of communication. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment after holding that a provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment. In affirming, the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated the lower court's conclusions. The court concluded that the statute struck a proper balance between a person's right to protest and a person's right to medical treatment.

Question

Does Colorado's statutory requirement that speakers obtain consent from people within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance before speaking, displaying signs, or distributing leaflets to such people violate the First Amendment rights of the speaker?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Colorado, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Colorado statute's restrictions on speech-related conduct are constitutional. The Court concluded that the statute "is not a regulation of speech. Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur." "Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities," Justice Stevens wrote for the Court. "The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases." Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony M. Kennedy dissented.

Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council

Wed, 22 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Massachusetts Office for Administration and Finance

24 Beacon St Boston MA 02133

Boston, MA 02133

United States

42° 21' 27.9036" N, 71° 3' 50.058" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-474

Petitioner

Crosby

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Foreign Trade Council

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 363 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, March 22, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 19, 2000

Advocates

Thomas A. Barnico (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Timothy B. Dyk (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting affirmance)

Facts of the Case

In 1996, the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricted state entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, was passed. Afterwards, Congress also imposed mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma. Businesses with ties to Burma landed on Massachusetts' "restricted trade" list. The list came to include 34 members of the National Foreign Trade Council (Council), a non-profit advocate for American companies that do business abroad. The Council filed suit against Stephen Crosby, the Massachusetts Secretary of Administration and Finance, and other state officials in federal court, claiming that the state act unconstitutionally infringes on the federal foreign affairs power, violates the Foreign Commerce Clause, and is preempted by the Federal Burma Law. The District Court permanently enjoined the state act's enforcement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court also found that the Massachusetts Burma Law violated the Supremacy Clause because the state was acting in an area of unique federal concern, foreign policy, through a balanced, tailored approach.

Question

Is the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricts the authority of its agencies to purchase goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for National Foreign Trade Council, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 6, Section 2: Supremacy Clause

Yes. In a opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "the state Act is preempted, and its application unconstitutional, under the Supremacy Clause." Justice Souter wrote for the Court that Massachusetts' law created an obstacle to the President's discretion to control economic sanctions against Burma, interfered with Congress's intention to limit economic pressure against the Burmese Government, and was at odds with the President's authority to speak for the United States among the world's nations to develop a comprehensive, multilateral Burma strategy. Therefore, the Massachusetts Burma Law "is invalid under the Supremacy Clause...owing to its threat of frustrating federal statutory objectives."

Christensen v. Harris County

Wed, 23 Feb 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1167

Petitioner

Christensen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harris County

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 576 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 1, 2000

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

Michael P. Fleming (Houston, Texas, argued the cause for the respondents)

Michael T. Leibig (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) permits governmental entities to compensate their employees for overtime work by granting them compensatory time in lieu of cash payment. If the employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer must pay cash compensation under certain circumstances. Harris County, Texas, found that too many of its deputy sheriffs had too many hours of accrued compensatory time. Fearing a budget crisis, the county adopted a policy under which its employees could be ordered to schedule compensatory time at specified times in order to reduce the amount of accrued time that would otherwise require cash payment. Edward Christensen and 128 other deputy sheriffs in Harris County believed they had the right to use their compensatory time when they saw fit. The sheriffs sued, claiming that the FLSA does not permit an employer to compel an employee to use compensatory time in the absence of an agreement permitting the employer to do so. The District Court ruled in favor of the sheriffs, concluding that the policy violated the FLSA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the FLSA did not address the issue in question and thus did not prohibit the county from implementing a compensatory time policy.

Question

Does the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 prohibit a public employer from compelling its employees to use their compensatory time without a preexisting agreement?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Harris County, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held 6-3 that "[n]othing in the FLSA or its implementing regulations prohibits a public employer from compelling the use of compensatory time." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "under the FLSA, an employer is free to require an employee to take time off work, and an employer is also free to use the money it would have paid in wages to cash out accrued compensatory time. The compelled use of compensatory time challenged in this case merely involves doing both of these steps at once."

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.

Wed, 01 Dec 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1152

Petitioner

FDA

Respondent

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 120 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, March 21, 2000

Advocates

Richard M. Cooper (Argued the cause for respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) grants the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate, among other items, "drugs" and "devices." In 1996, the FDA asserted jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products, concluding that, under the FDCA, nicotine is a "drug" and cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are "devices" that deliver nicotine to the body. Accordingly, the FDA promulgated regulations governing tobacco products' promotion, labeling, and accessibility to children and adolescents. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, and a group of tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and advertisers, filed suit challenging the FDA's regulations. Brown moved for summary judgement on the ground that the FDA lacked the jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed, or without manufacturer claims of therapeutic benefit. The District Court ruled that the FDA had jurisdiction over tobacco as a device, but that the agency had overstepped its authority in attempting to restrict tobacco advertising. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Congress had not granted the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. The court found that the FDA's definition of tobacco as a device was flawed because the agency could not prove that the impact of tobacco products on the body was "intended" under the act.

Question

Does the Food and Drug Administration have the authority to regulate tobacco products as "drugs" and "devices" under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic, and related statutes

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that "Congress has not given the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed." The ruling was based on the FDCA as a whole and in conjunction with Congress' subsequent tobacco-specific legislation. "By no means do we question the seriousness of the problem that the FDA has sought to address," Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority. Nonetheless, Justice O' Connor wrote, "Congress, for better or for worse, has created a distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco products, squarely rejected proposals to give the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco, and repeatedly acted to preclude any agency from exercising significant policymaking authority in the area."

Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens

Mon, 29 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1828

Petitioner

Vermont Agency of Natural Resources

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States ex rel. Stevens

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 765 (2000)

Argued

Monday, November 29, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 22, 2000

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent United States)

J. Wallace Malley, Jr. (Montpelier, Vermont, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Theodore B. Olson (on behalf of Respondent Stevens)

Facts of the Case

Jonathan Stevens, a former attorney for the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, filed suit against his former employer, the agency, alleging that it had submitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in order to induce the EPA to disburse more grant money than it was entitled to receive. Stevens filed suit under the False Calms Act (FCA), which provides for a private person to bring a qui tam civil action "in the name of the [Federal] Government," against "any person" who "knowingly presents...to...the...Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment." The State of Vermont moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that a State or state agency is not a "person" subject to liability under the FCA and that a qui tam action in federal court against a State is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion. Vermont then filed an interlocutory appeal. Thereupon, the court stayed its proceedings and the United States intervened in the appeal in support of Stevens. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

May a private individual bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United States against a state or state agency under the False Claims Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act, but that the False Claims Act does not subject a state or state agency to liability in such actions. The Court concluded that the False Claims Act does not include states as "persons" who can be sued under the law. Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter dissented.

Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe

Wed, 29 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Santa Fe Independent School District

13310 Hwy 6 Santa Fe TX 77510

Santa Fe, TX 77510

United States

29° 22' 40.656" N, 95° 6' 16.38" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-62

Petitioner

Santa Fe Independent School Dist.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 290 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, March 29, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 19, 2000

Advocates

John Cornyn (Argued the cause for Texas, et al., as amici curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Jay A. Sekulow (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Anthony P. Griffin (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court enjoined the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student- led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The Court of Appeals held that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech.

Question

Does the Santa Fe Independent School District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Doe, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."

Portuondo v. Agard

Mon, 01 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1170

Petitioner

Portuondo

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Agard

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 61 (2000)

Argued

Monday, November 1, 1999

Decided

Monday, March 6, 2000

Advocates

Andrew Zwerling (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Beverly Van Ness (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jonathan Nuechterlein (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Ray Agard was tried in New York on sodomy, assault, and weapons counts. Ultimately, Agard's trial turned on whether the jury believed the testimony of the victim and her friend or the conflicting testimony of Agard. The prosecutor challenged Agard's credibility. During summation, the prosecutor remarked, "[h]e gets to sit here and listen to the testimony of all the other witnesses before he testifies," and "[t]hat gives [him] a big advantage, doesn't it?" The prosecutor alleged that Agard had tailored his testimony to fit evidence that he heard from witnesses through the course of the trial. The trial court rejected Agard's objection that these comments violated his right to be present at trial. After exhausting his state appeals, Agard petitioned for federal habeas corpus, claiming that the prosecutor's comments violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to be present at trial and confront his accusers, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court denied his petition. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Does a prosecutor's summation comment calling to the jury's attention the fact that the defendant had opportunity to hear all the other witnesses before testifying and tailor his testimony violate the accused's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Portuondo, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Confront and Cross-Examine, Compulsory Process

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the prosecutor's comments did not violate Agard's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and that the prosecutor's comments also did not violate Agard's right to due process. "Allowing comment upon the fact that a defendant's presence in the courtroom provides him a unique opportunity to tailor his testimony is appropriate and...sometimes essential to the central function of the trial, which is to discover the truth," Justice Scalia wrote for the Court. Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice David H. Souter, observed that the majority's holding "transforms a defendant's presence at trial from a Sixth Amendment right into an automatic burden on his credibility."

United States v. Weatherhead

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:39:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1904

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Weatherhead

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 1042 (1999)

Decided

Friday, December 3, 1999

Facts of the Case

In 1994, Sally Ann Croft was extradited from Great Britain to the U.S. to face federal criminal charges in Oregon. Seeking to change the venue of her trial, Croft's attorney, Leslie R. Weatherhead, sought a letter from the British Home Office, which expressed concerns about Croft's ability to receive a fair trial in Oregon. Weatherhead filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for disclosure of the letter. Ultimately, the government notified Weatherhead that it was withholding the letter under the FOIA's national security exemption. After pursuing administrative appeals without success, the Court of Appeals ordered the government to produce the letter. The court called the letter "innocuous," concluding that no national security interest had been established.

Question

Is the government justified in rejecting a Freedom of Information Act request and refusing to release a letter from British officials about a British woman's extradition to face a criminal charge in the United States?

Conclusion

The Court did not answer the question. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the appellate court with directions to vacate the judgment of the District Court and dismiss the case as moot. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented. Note: The British Home Office, ultimately, asked the government to provide Weatherhead with a copy of the letter.

Rotella v. Wood

Wed, 03 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-896

Petitioner

Rotella

Respondent

Wood

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 549 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 2000

Advocates

Richard P. Hogan, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Charles T. Frazier, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Mark Rotella was admitted to a Brookhaven Psychiatric Pavilion in 1985 and discharged in 1986 after Brookhaven allegedly coerced him to stay longer than he intended. In 1994, the facility's parent company pleaded guilty to charges of fraud, conspiracy and violations of RICO, for giving physicians monetary incentives to needlessly admit, treat and retain patients at their hospitals. Rotella learned of the plea that same year, and in 1997 he filed a civil damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), claiming that the Brookhaven doctors and related business entities, had conspired to keep him hospitalized to maximize their profits. RICO makes it criminal "to conduct" an "enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." A "pattern" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, the last of which occurred within 10 years after the commission of a prior act. Brookhaven countered that the statute of limitations under RICO had run on the charge. The District Court granted Brookhaven summary judgment on the ground that the 4-year limitation period for civil RICO claims had expired in 1990, four years after Rotella admitted discovering his injury. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Rotella's argument that the limitations period does not begin to run until a plaintiff discovers (or should have discovered) both the injury and the pattern of racketeering activity.

Question

Does the four year statute of limitations on claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act begin to run before a claimant actually discovers that a defendant's racketeering activity caused the harm?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wood, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Rotella's action was not timely, because the start of the 4-year limitations period applicable to a civil RICO action was not governed by an "injury and pattern discovery" accrual rule under which such a civil claim would accrue only when the claimant discovered, or should have discovered, both an injury and a pattern of racketeering activity. In a footnote, Justice Souter noted that "[w]e do not...settle upon a final rule."

Antonelli v. Caridine

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:39:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-9933

Petitioner

Antonelli

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Caridine

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 99-5445

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 3 (1999)

Decided

Tuesday, October 12, 1999

Facts of the Case

Pro se petitioner Michael C. Antonelli sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to two petitions for certiorari. In 1993, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Antonelli in forma pauperis status with respect to two petitions for certiorari. Before the two Rule 39.8 denials, Antonelli had filed 34 petitions for certiorari and 2 petitions for extraordinary writs. After the two Rule 39.8 denials, Antonelli filed 17 petitions for certiorari. All 55 of Antonelli's previous petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent.

Question

May pro se petitioner Michael C. Antonelli be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Supreme Court Rule 39?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Caridine, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Supreme Court Rules

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court denied Antonelli's requests as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Noting that Antonelli had abused the Court's certiorari and extraordinary writ processes, the Court directed the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from Antonelli in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1. "The order," the opinion concluded, "will not prevent Antonelli from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Flippo v. West Virginia

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:39:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-8770

Petitioner

Flippo

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

West Virginia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 11 (1999)

Decided

Monday, October 18, 1999

Facts of the Case

In 1996, James Michael Flippo called 911 to report that he and his wife had been attacked while camping in a West Virginia state park. Inside Flippo's cabin, officer's found his wife, with fatal head wounds. During their search, officers found and opened a closed briefcase, in which they discovered various photographs and negatives that allegedly incriminated Flippo. After he was indicted for murder, Flippo moved to suppress the photographs and negatives on the grounds that the police had obtained no warrant, and that no exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment had justified the search and seizure. The Circuit Court denied the motion to suppress on the ground that the officers, having secured the homicide crime scene for investigative purposes, had been within the law to conduct a thorough investigation and examination of anything and everything found within the crime scene area. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia denied discretionary review.

Question

Does the judgment of a West Virginia Circuit Court, which denied a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that the police were entitled to make a thorough search of any crime scene and the objects found there, conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mincey v. Arizona?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Flippo, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Circuit Court's "position squarely conflicts with Mincey v. Arizona (437 U.S. 385) where we rejected the contention that there is a 'murder scene exception' to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment." "We noted that police may make warrantless entries onto premises if they reasonably believe a person is in need of immediate aid and may make prompt warrantless searches of a homicide scene for possible other victims or a killer on the premises, but we rejected any general 'murder scene exception' as 'inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments -- . . . the warrantless search of Mincey's apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there,'" stated the opinion.

Public Lands Council v. Babbitt

Wed, 01 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1991

Petitioner

Public Lands Council

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Babbitt

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 728 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2000

Advocates

Timothy S. Bishop (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Taylor Grazing Act grants the Secretary of the Interior authority to divide the public rangelands into grazing districts, to specify the amount of grazing permitted in each district, and to issue grazing leases or permits to "settlers, residents, and other stock owners." When Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt announced new regulations governing the administration of livestock on 170 million acres of public range, the Public Lands Council (Council), a group of nonprofit ranching-related organizations, objected. The Council's members who held grazing permits brought an action against Secretary Babbitt challenging 10 of the new federal grazing regulations issued by the Secretary in 1995. The Council claimed that the Secretary acted beyond his power in regulating the grazing patterns. The District Court found 4 of the 10 regulations unlawful. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals upheld three previously overturned regulations, which changed the definition of "grazing preference," permitted those who were not "engaged in the livestock business" to qualify for grazing permits; and granted the United States title to all future range improvements.

Question

Do the Secretary of the Interior's amendments governing grazing preferences, permit issuance, and ownership of range improvements to the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 exceed the authority that this statute grants the Secretary and violate the Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Babbitt, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 43 U.S.C. 315

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "[t]he regulatory changes do not exceed the Secretary's Taylor Grazing Act authority." "Congress itself has directed development of land-use plans, and their use in the allocation process in order to preserve, improve and develop the public rangelands," wrote Justice Stephen G. Breyer. "And the secretary [of the Interior] has always had the statutory authority...to reclassify and withdraw range land from grazing use."

Troxel v. Granville

Wed, 12 Jan 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Skagit County Superior Court

205 W Kincaid St Mount Vernon WA 98273

Mount Vernon, WA 98273

United States

48° 25' 4.008" N, 122° 20' 12.426" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-138

Petitioner

Troxel

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Granville

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 57 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 5, 2000

Advocates

Catherine W. Smith (Argued the cause for respondent)

Mark D. Olson (Argued the cause for petitioners)

Facts of the Case

During Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel's relationship, which ended in 1991, they had two daughters. Until Brad's suicide in 1993, Brad's parents Jenifer and Gary Troxel, the paternal grandparents, had regularly seen their granddaughters on weekends. However, after Brad's suicide, Granville informed the Troxels that she wished to reduced their visitation time to one short visit per month. The Troxels filed suit for the right to visit their grandchildren, under section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington, which permits "any person" to petition for visitation rights "at any time" and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child's best interest. Granville did not oppose the petition outright but did oppose the amount of visitation time sought by the Troxels. Subsequently, a Washington Superior Court ordered more visitation than Granville desired. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that non-parents lacked standing to sue under the statute. In affirming, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the statute unconstitutionally interfered with parents' right to rear their children.

Question

Does the Washington statute, which allows any person to petition for a court- ordered right to see a child over a custodial parent's objection if such visitation is found to be in the child's best interest, unconstitutionally interfere with the fundamental right of parents to rear their children?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Granville, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 6-3 decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Washington Statute violated the right of parents, under the due process clause of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that "[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy dissented.

United States v. Martinez-Salazar

Mon, 29 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1255

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Martinez-Salazar

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 304 (2000)

Argued

Monday, November 29, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 19, 2000

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for petitioner)

Michael Gordon (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Abel Martinez-Salazar was charged with a variety of federal narcotics and weapons offenses. The District Court allotted him 10 peremptory challenges exercisable in the selection of 12 jurors. After prospective juror Don Gilbert indicated several times that he would favor the prosecution, Martinez- Salazar's counsel challenged him for cause. The court declined to excuse Gilbert. After twice objecting, unsuccessfully, to the for-cause ruling, Martinez-Salazar used a peremptory challenge to remove him. Subsequently, Martinez-Salazar exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Thereafter, Martinez-Salazar's counsel did not object to the final seating of the jurors. Martinez-Salazar was then convicted on all counts. On appeal, Martinez-Salazar argued that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Gilbert for cause and that this error used one of his peremptory challenges wrongly. The Court of Appeals agreed that the District Court's refusal to strike Gilbert for cause was an abuse of discretion. Ultimately, the court found that the District Court's error resulted in a violation of Martinez- Salazar's Fifth Amendment due process rights because it forced him to use a peremptory challenge curatively, which impaired his right to a full complement of peremptory challenges. The Court of Appeals held that the error required an automatic reversal.

Question

s a defendant's peremptory challenge right impaired or denied when he or she peremptorily challenges a potential juror, whom the district court erroneously refused to excuse for cause, and the defendant thereafter exhausts his peremptory challenges?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use such a challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "if the defendant elects to cure such an error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right." The Court also concluded that the loss of a peremptory challenge did not constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

Judd v. United States District Court

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:39:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5260

Petitioner

Judd

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States District Court

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 5 (1999)

Decided

Tuesday, October 12, 1999

Facts of the Case

Pro se petitioner Keith Russell Judd sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for certiorari. In May 1995, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Judd in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for an extraordinary writ. Before the 39.8 denial, Judd had filed six petitions for certiorari. After the 39.8 denial, Judd filed four petitions for certiorari. All eleven of Judd's previous petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent.

Question

May pro se petitioner Keith Russell Judd be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Supreme Court Rule 39?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States District Court, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Supreme Court Rules

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court denied Judd's request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Noting that Judd had abused the Court's certiorari and extraordinary writ processes, the Court directed the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from Judd in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1. "The order," the opinion concluded, "will not prevent Judd from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Board of Regents Univ. Wisc. v. Southworth

Tue, 09 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1189

Petitioner

Board of Regents Univ. Wisc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Southworth

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 217 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, March 22, 2000

Advocates

Susan K. Ullman (Madison, Wisconsin, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jordan W. Lorence (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The University of Wisconsin, a public university, requires students to pay an activity fee. The fee supports various campus services and extracurricular student activities including the Future Financial Gurus of America; the International Socialist Organization; the College Democrats and Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter. Scott Harold Southworth filed suit against the University, alleging that the fee violated his rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. Southworth argued that the University must grant him the choice not to fund registered student organizations (RSO) that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to his personal beliefs. In granting Southworth judgment, the Federal District Court concluded that the fee program compelled students to support political and ideological activities with which they disagree in violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The court declared the fee program invalid and enjoined the University from using the fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fee program was "not germane to the University's mission, did not further a vital University policy, and imposed too much of a burden on [Southworth's] free speech rights."

Question

May public universities and colleges subsidize campus groups by means of a mandatory student activity fee without violating the First Amendment rights of students who find some campus groups objectionable?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Board of Regents Univ. Wisc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the "First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[w]hen a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others." Justice David H. Souter, in an opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment only.

Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board of California

Wed, 12 Jan 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-2043

Petitioner

Hunt-Wesson, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Franchise Tax Board of California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 458 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, February 22, 2000

Advocates

Walter Hellerstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David Lew (Oakland, California, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

California's "unitary business" income-calculation system for determining the State's taxable share of a multistate corporation's business income authorizes a deduction for interest expense. The system, however, permits use of that deduction only to the extent that the amount exceeds certain out-of-state income arising from the unrelated business activity of a discrete business enterprise. Hunt-Wesson, Inc. is a successor in interest to a nondomiciliary corporation that incurred interest expense. California disallowed a deduction for the expense insofar as it had received nonunitary dividend and interest income. Hunt-Wesson challenged the validity of the disallowance. The California Court of Appeal found the disallowance constitutional. The California Supreme Court denied review.

Question

Does California's exception to its interest expense deduction, which it measures by the amount of nonunitary dividend and interest income that a nondomiciliary corporation has received, violate the Due Process and Commerce Clauses?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the provision violates the Due Process and Commerce Clauses. "California's statute does not directly impose a tax on nonunitary income. Rather, it simply denies the taxpayer use of a portion of a deduction from unitary income..., income which does bear a 'rational relationship' or 'nexus' to California," wrote Justice Breyer. "Because California's offset provision is not a reasonable allocation of expense deductions to the income that the expense generates, it constitutes impermissible taxation of income outside its jurisdictional reach," concluded Justice Breyer.

Beck v. Prupis

Wed, 03 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1480

Petitioner

Beck

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Prupis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 494 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 2000

Advocates

Michael M. Rosenbaum (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jay Starkman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Robert A. Beck, II, of Southeastern Insurance Group (SIG), alleged that after he discovered former senior officer and director Ronald M. Prupis' unlawful conduct and contacted regulators, Prupis enacted a scheme to remove him from SIG. Beck sued Prupis under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Beck alleged that his injury, the loss of his employment, served to further Prupis' conspiracy and therefore provided a cause of action under RICO. The District Court dismissed Beck's RICO conspiracy claim. The court agreed with Prupis that employees who are terminated for refusing to participate in RICO activities, or who threaten to report RICO activities, do not have standing to sue under RICO for damages from their loss of employment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the act causing Beck's injury was not an act of racketeering, it could not support a RICO cause of action.

Question

May a person injured by an action furthering a conspiracy sue under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act even if the action itself was not an act of racketeering?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Prupis, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not give rise to a cause of action under RICO. Thus, because Prupis' scheme to remove Beck from SIG was not an act of racketeering itself, Beck had no ground to sue him under RICO. Although Prupis did engage in acts of racketeering, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "the alleged overt act (terminating) in the present case was not independently wrongful under any substantive provision of RICO."

Dempsey v. Martin

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:39:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5283

Petitioner

Dempsey

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Martin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 99-5316

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 7 (1999)

Decided

Tuesday, October 12, 1999

Facts of the Case

Pro se petitioner John B. Dempsey sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for certiorari. In October 1992, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Dempsey in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for certiorari. Before the 39.8 denial Dempsey had filed eleven petitions for certiorari and one petition for an extraordinary writ. After the 39.8 denial, Dempsey filed five petitions for certiorari. All eighteen of Dempsey's previous petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent.

Question

May pro se petitioner John B. Dempsey be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Supreme Court Rule 39?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Martin, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Supreme Court Rules

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court denied Dempsey's request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Noting that Dempsey had abused this Court's certiorari and extraordinary writ processes, the Court directed the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from Dempsey in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1. "The order," the opinion concluded, "will not prevent Dempsey from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Carter v. United States

Wed, 19 Apr 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5716

Petitioner

Carter

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 255 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, April 19, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 12, 2000

Advocates

Donald J. McCauley (on behalf of the Petitioner)

David C. Frederick (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Floyd J. Carter donned a ski mask and entered the Collective Federal Savings Bank unarmed. In the process, Carter pushed an exiting customer back into the bank and startled customers already inside. Carter removed almost $16,000 from the bank and fled. After his apprehension, Carter was charged with federal bank robbery, 18 USC Section 2113(a), which punishes "[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes... any... thing of value [from a] bank." Carter pleaded not guilty, claiming that he had not taken the bank's money by force, violence, or intimidation as required of robbery. Carter moved that the District Court instruct the jury that they could consider whether he committed federal bank larceny, USC Section 2113(b), as a lesser included offense in the broader crime of robbery, in which case, Carter could be guilty of larceny without being guilty of robbery. The larceny law punishes "[w]hoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any... thing of value exceeding $1,000 [from a]... bank," with a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison, as opposed to robbery's 20-year maximum. The District Court denied the motion. The jury, instructed on robbery alone, returned a guilty verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

May defendants charged with federal bank robbery have the jury consider whether they committed the lesser crime of federal bank larceny?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2113

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that federal bank larceny is not a "lesser included offense" of federal bank robbery. The "[p]etitioner is accordingly prohibited as a matter of law from obtaining a lesser included offense instruction," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Thomas concluded that the larceny law requires proof of three elements not included in robbery: the intent to steal, property worth more than $ 1,000, and proof that the defendant "takes and carries away" the property. Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer, expressed the view that the Court's decision gave "short shrift to the common-law origin and statutory evolution of [18 USC Section 2113]."

Pegram v. Herdrich

Wed, 23 Feb 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1949

Petitioner

Pegram

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Herdrich

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 211 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 12, 2000

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

James P. Ginzkey (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1991, Cynthia Herdrich, after feeling an unusual pain in her stomach, was examined by Lori Pegram, a physician affiliated with Carle Clinic Association, P. C., Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. (hereafter Carle). Carle functions as a health maintenance organization (HMO) organized for profit. Pegram then required Herdrich to wait eight days for an ultrasound of her inflamed abdomen, which was to be performed at a facility staffed by Carle more than 50 miles away from Herdrich. During that period, Herdrich's appendix ruptured. Herdrich sued Carle, including Pegram, in State court for medical malpractice and two counts of fraud. Carle and Pegram, under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), removed the case to federal court. Ultimately, Herdrich was only able to pursue one fraud count, which was amended to allege that Carle's HMO organization provisions rewarding its physician owners for limiting medical care, entailed an inherent or anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, because the terms create an incentive to make decisions in the physicians' self-interest, rather than the plan participants' exclusive interests. The District Court granted Carle's motion to dismiss on the ground that Carle was not acting as an ERISA fiduciary. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal.

Question

Are treatment decisions made by a health maintenance organization, acting through its physician employees, fiduciary acts within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Pegram, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that mixed treatment and eligibility decisions to delay medical treatment by sending a patient to a HMO owned facility, with adverse consequences, made by a health maintenance organization through its physician, are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA. Thus, Herdrich did not state an ERISA claim. "Herdrich's remedy -- return of profit to the plan for the participants' benefit -- would be nothing less than elimination of the for-profit HMO," wrote Justice Souter for the Court, "no HMO organization could survive without some incentive connecting physician reward with treatment rationing." Justice Souter noted that "the Federal Judiciary would be acting contrary to the congressional policy of allowing HMO organizations if it were to entertain an ERISA fiduciary claim portending wholesale attacks on existing HMOs solely because of their structure."

Brancato v. Gunn

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:39:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-9913

Petitioner

Brancato

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gunn

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 1 (1999)

Decided

Tuesday, October 12, 1999

Facts of the Case

Pro se petitioner Donald H. Brancato sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for certiorari. In June 1999, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Brancato in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for certiorari. Before the 39.8 denial, Brancato had filed six petitions for certiorari. All seven of Brancato's previous petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent.

Question

May pro se petitioner Donald H. Brancato be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Supreme Court Rule 39?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Gunn, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Supreme Court Rules

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court denied Brancato's request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Noting that Brancato had abused the Court's certiorari process, the Court directed the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Brancato in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1. "The order," the opinion concluded, "will not prevent Brancato from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Edwards v. Carpenter

Mon, 28 Feb 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-2060

Petitioner

Edwards

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carpenter

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 446 (2000)

Argued

Monday, February 28, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, April 25, 2000

Advocates

J. Joseph Bodine, Jr. (Columbus, Ohio, argued the cause for the respondent)

Edward B. Foley (Columbus, Ohio, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Robert Carpenter was indicted on charges of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, pleaded guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment, with parole possible after 30 years. On direct appeal, Carpenter unsuccessfully challenged only the length of the minimum sentence. After unsuccessfully pursuing state post-conviction relief and represented by new counsel, Carpenter petitioned the Ohio Court of Appeals to reopen his direct appeal on the ground that his original appellate counsel had been constitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and sentence. The court dismissed the application as untimely, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Carpenter then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, raising the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, and alleging that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not raising that claim on direct appeal. The District Court determined that, while the sufficiency claim had been procedurally defaulted, the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could excuse that default; concluded that Carpenter's appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective; and granted the writ. The Court of Appeals concluded that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of the sufficiency claim, regardless of whether the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim had been procedurally defaulted; and found prejudice from counsel's failure to raise the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim on direct appeal.

Question

May a state prisoner's procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel excuse the procedural default of another habeas corpus claim?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Edwards, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a state prisoner's procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can excuse the procedural default of another habeas claim only if the inmate can demonstrate that the poor lawyering rises to a constitutional level, not only that it prejudiced them at trial. The 7-2 decision means that ineffective-assistance claims filed too late in a state appellate court generally cannot be used in federal court to excuse an inmate's default on other claims. Justice Scalia wrote for the court that it is not enough to say such a claim "was presented to the state courts even though it was not presented in the manner that state law requires."

Fiore v. White

Tue, 12 Oct 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-942

Appellee

White

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Fiore

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 23 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, November 30, 1999

Advocates

Robert A. Graci (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; argued the cause for the respondents)

James B. Lieber (Pennsylvania; argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

William Fiore and his co-defendant, David Scarpone, were convicted of operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit in violation of Pennsylvania State law after deliberately altering a monitoring pipe. Fiore appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the conviction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then denied further review of Fiore's case, and his conviction became final. Scarpone appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which noted the existence of a "valid permit" and set aside the conviction. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed and found that Scarpone's conduct did not constitute the operation of the facility without a permit because the law Fiore and Scarpone were convicted under does not apply to those who possess a permit but deviate radically from the permit's terms. Fiore had asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review his case after it had agreed to review Scarpone's case and twice more after it decided Scarpone. The court denied Fiore's requests. Ultimately, Fiore sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the U.S. Constitution required that his conviction be set aside because his conduct was not criminal under the statutory section charged. The District Court granted his petition. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that state courts have no obligation to apply their decisions retroactively.

Question

Should federal habeas corpus relief be extended to protect a defendant whose conviction was upheld even though his co-defendant's conviction under the same law was invalidated after a state court ruled that he had been prosecuted under the wrong law? Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause require that the defendant's conviction be set aside?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fiore, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

The questions were left pending. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court certified to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the question whether the court's interpretation of the statute set forth in Scarpone's case stated the correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law on the date which Fiore's conviction became final. The Court also reserved judgment and further proceedings in the case pending a response by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "the answer to this question will help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this case."

Garner v. Jones

Tue, 11 Jan 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-137

Petitioner

Garner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jones

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 244 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, March 28, 2000

Advocates

Christopher S. Brasher (Atlanta, Georgia, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Elizabeth S. Kertscher (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

While serving a life sentence for murder in Georgia, Robert Jones escaped and committed a second murder in 1982. Jones was sentenced to a second life term. At the time of Jones' second offense, Georgia law required the State's Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to consider inmates serving life sentences for parole after seven years and if it was not granted at that time, that it be reconsidered every three years thereafter. Jones was initially considered for parole in 1989, seven years after his 1982 conviction, and parole was denied. After Jones was incarcerated but before his first parole hearing, the Board amended its rule to require that parole reconsideration take place only once every eight years. Subsequently, the Board scheduled Jones for reconsideration eight years later, in 1997. However, a Federal Court of Appeals ruling, that such board actions could not be applied retroactively, allowed Jones to be reconsidered for parole in 1992 and again in 1995. Then a U.S. Supreme Court decision was read to allow for retroactive adjustments in parole and Jones was scheduled for reconsideration in 2003 (eight years later), rather then in 1998. Jones sued the Board members, claiming that retroactive application of the amended rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The District Court ruled in favor of the Board. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the amended Rule's retroactive application was necessarily an ex post facto violation.

Question

Does the retroactive application of a Georgia provision permitting the extension of intervals between parole considerations violate the Ex Post Facto Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Garner, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10: Ex Post Facto

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the retroactive application of the Georgia provision permitting extension of intervals between parole considerations does not to necessarily violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court concluded that the key element in deciding whether an increase in the interval between a state's parole hearings for prison inmates violates the Ex Post Facto Clause is whether the change creates a sufficient risk of increasing the punishment attached to the covered crimes. "States must have due flexibility in formulating parole procedure and addressing problems associated with confinement and release," wrote Justice Kennedy.

Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co.

Mon, 10 Jan 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1960

Petitioner

Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bill Harbert Constr. Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 193 (2000)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, March 21, 2000

Advocates

Daniel H. Bromberg (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Susan S. Wagner (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Cortez Byrd Chips hired Bill Harbert Construction to install a chip mill in Mississippi. Byrd and Harbert agreed that any ensuing disputes would be decided by arbitration. After the installation, Harbert demanded an upward adjustment on the bill. Byrd refused, claiming that Harbert had not submitted a written statement requesting additional compensation as required under their contract. Harbert called in the American Arbitration Association. Arbitration was conducted in Alabama and Harbert received an award. In response, Byrd sought to vacate or modify the award in a Federal District Court of Mississippi, where the contract was performed. Harbert then sought to confirm the award in Alabama. The latter court refused to dismiss, transfer, or stay its action, concluding that venue was proper only there because "[t]he place of arbitration determines the jurisdiction of the court," and it entered judgment for Harbert. Byrd appealed, claiming that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provided that the case should be deferred to Mississippi because the suit had been filed there first. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that, under the FAA, venue for motions to confirm, vacate, or modify awards was exclusively in the district where the arbitration award was made, and thus venue was limited to the Alabama court.

Question

Do the venue provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act limit motions to confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award to the district where the award was made?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 9

No. In an unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the "FAA's venue provisions are permissive, allowing a motion to confirm, vacate, or modify to be brought either in the district where the award was made or in any district proper under the general venue statute." Writing for the Court, Justice Souter reasoned that because both the history and function of the FAA's venue provisions dictate that they were meant to expand, not limit, venue choice, it was appropriate for Cortez Byrd to seek to vacate the arbitrator's award in federal court in Mississippi.

Florida v. J. L.

Tue, 29 Feb 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

A bus stop

NW 183rd St and NW 24th Ave Opa Locka FL 33056

Opa Locka, FL 33056

United States

25° 56' 35.52" N, 80° 14' 29.04" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1993

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

J. L.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 266 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, February 29, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, March 28, 2000

Advocates

Michael J. Neimand (Fort Lauderdale, Florida, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Harvey J. Sepler (Miami, Florida, argued the cause for respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

On October 13, 1995 Miami-Dade police received an anonymous tip that a black male wearing a plaid shirt was standing near a bus stop carrying a gun. The two officers who responded found three black males, one of which, J.L., a 15 -year-old, was wearing a plaid shirt. After frisking him, the officers did find a firearm. J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed weapon without a license. At trial, he moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing that the frisking performed by the officers was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court granted the motion, but was reversed by the immediate appellate court. The Florida Supreme Court overruled the appellate court and suppressed the evidence.

Question

Did searching J.L. solely on the basis of the anonymous tip received by the Miami-Dade police violate his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for J. L., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court concluded that J.L. the anonymous tip did not meet the minimum requirements to perform a warrantless search. Justice Ginsburg, drawing from the Court's logic in Terry v. Ohio and Adams v. Williams, indicated that an anonymous tip must posses a moderate level of reliability, including "predictive information" that offers police a "means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility." An accurate description of a person without a reliable assertion of illegality or description of the crime in question, as was the anonymous tip in this case, does not meet this standard. "All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believe he had inside information."

Baral v. United States

Tue, 18 Jan 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1667

Petitioner

Baral

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 431 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, February 22, 2000

Advocates

Walter J. Rockler (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kent L. Jones (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

David H. Baral made two remittances to the Internal Revenue Service towards his 1988 income tax, which was due on April 15, 1989. The first was a standard withholding from Baral's wages throughout 1988 by his employer. The second was an estimated income tax remitted in January 1989 by Baral himself. Baral received an extension until August 15, but did not file the return until June 1, 1993. On the return, Baral claimed a $1,175 overpayment and asked the IRS to apply this excess as a credit toward his outstanding tax obligations for the 1989 tax year. The IRS denied the requested credit citing 26 U. S. C. Section 6511, which states that "the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return." According to the IRS, Baral had paid no portion of the overpaid tax between February 1, 1990 and June 1, 1993, and therefore he faced a ceiling of zero on any allowable refund or credit. Baral commenced suit for a refund in the Federal District Court, which granted the IRS summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that both remittances were paid on April 15, 1989.

Question

Are remittances of withholding tax and estimated income tax paid on the due date of the taxpayer's income tax return?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that remittances of withholding tax and estimated income tax are paid on the due date of a calendar year taxpayer's income tax return. The Court concluded that the ceiling on Baral's requested credit was zero, because, rather than being paid within the look-back period, between February 1, 1990 and June 1, 1993, both the withholding and the estimated taxes had been paid on April 15, 1989. The decision means that the three-year time limit for seeking a refund begins running when someone's withholding and estimated tax payments are made to the government. The deadline does not depend on when the person's income tax return is filed, the court said.

Weisgram v. Marley

Tue, 18 Jan 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-161

Petitioner

Weisgram

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Marley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 440 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, February 22, 2000

Advocates

Paul A. Strandness (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Christine A. Hogan (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Bonnie Weisgram died of carbon monoxide poisoning during a fire in her home. Chad Weisgram, her son, brought a diversity suit in federal District Court, seeking wrongful death damages, alleging that a defective heater, manufactured by Marley Company and used by Bonnie Weisgram, cause both the fire and her death. At trial, Weisgram introduced the testimony of three supposed experts to prove the alleged heater defect and its causal connection to the fire. Marley's objection that the testimony was unreliable, and therefore inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, was overruled by the District Court. After Weisgram's evidence was introduced, Marley again unsuccessfully moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Weisgram had failed to meet his burden of proof on the issues of defect and causation. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for Weisgram. Afterwards, Marley, once again, requested judgment as a matter of law. Additionally, Marley requested a new trial. The court denied the motions and entered judgment for Weisgram. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Marley's motion for judgment as a matter of law should have been granted because the testimony of Weisgram's expert witnesses, the sole evidence supporting the product defect charge, was speculative and not shown to be scientifically sound. The appeals court did not order a new trial.

Question

May an appeals court order judgment as a matter of law after determining that a plaintiff's expert testimony should have been excluded at trial and that the remaining evidence was insufficient to support the verdict?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Marley, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 permits an appellate court to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law when it determines that evidence was erroneously admitted at trial and that the remaining, properly admitted, evidence is insufficient to constitute a submissible case. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "if...the court of appeals concludes that further proceedings are unwarranted because the loser on appeal has had a full and fair opportunity to present the case, including arguments for a new trial, the appellate court may appropriately instruct the district court to enter judgment against the jury-verdict winner. "

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC

Tue, 05 Oct 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-963

Petitioner

Nixon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shrink Missouri Government PAC

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 377 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, October 5, 1999

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2000

Advocates

Jeremiah W. Nixon (Jefferson City, Missouri, argued the cause for petitioners)

D. Bruce La Pierre (Argued the cause for respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, in support of the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo established a $1,000 cap on individuals' contributions to candidates for federal office. Missouri law imposes campaign contribution limits, ranging from $250 to $1,000, to candidates for state office. The statute allows for periodic adjustments, which increased the 1998 contribution limit to $1,075 for candidates for statewide office, including state auditor. In 1998, Zev David Fredman, a candidate for the Republican nomination for Missouri state auditor, and the Shrink Missouri Government PAC, a political action committee, filed suit, alleging that the Missouri statute imposing limits on contributions to candidates for state office violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The PAC had contributed $1,075 to Fredman and argued, without the limitation, it would contribute more to Fredman's campaign. Additionally, Fredman alleged he could campaign effectively only with more generous contributions. The Federal District Court, applying Buckley v. Valeo, upheld the statute. The court rejected Fredman's and the PAC's contention that inflation since Buckley's approval of a federal $1,000 restriction meant that the state limit of $1,075 for a statewide office could not be constitutional today. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, found that Missouri's interest in avoiding the corruption or the perception of corruption caused by candidates' acceptance of large campaign contributions was insufficient to satisfy Buckley's strict scrutiny standard of review.

Question

Does Buckley v. Valeo govern state regulations on contributions to state political candidates? Do the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, define the scope of permissible state limitations? Is Missouri's statutory limit on campaign contributions unconstitutional?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Nixon, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes, no, and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Buckley is the authority for comparable state regulation and, but that the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, do not define the scope of permissible state limitations. The Court held the Missouri statute not to violate the First Amendment. "Even without the authority of Buckley, there would be no serious question about the legitimacy of the interests claimed, wrote Justice Souter for the Court, "the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." Justices Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, voting to overturn Buckley as a violation of First Amendment speech rights.

New York v. Hill

Tue, 02 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1299

Petitioner

New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hill

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 110 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, January 11, 2000

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioner and urging reversal)

Robert Mastrocola (Rochester, New York, argued the cause for petitioner)

Brian Shiffrin (Rochester, New York, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact to establish procedures for resolution of one state's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another state. Under the Compact Clause, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. In order to resolve outstanding murder and robbery charges against Michael Hill, an Ohio prisoner, the State of New York lodged a detainer against him under the IAD. Hill filed a request for disposition of the detainer, pursuant to IAD Article III, and was returned to New York. Article III provides that, upon such a request, that the prisoner be brought to trial within 180 days. Thereafter, Hill's counsel agreed to a trial date outside the 180-day period. Subsequently, Hill moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the IAD's time limit had expired. The trial court denied Hill's motion, concluding that his defense counsel's explicit agreement to the trial date constituted a waiver or abandonment of Hill's IAD rights. After his conviction and subsequent appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to dismiss. In reversing, the state Court of Appeals ordered that Hill's indictment be dismissed because his counsel's agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive his IAD speedy trial rights.

Question

Does a defense counsel's agreement to a trial date outside the 180-day time period required by Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers waive the defendant's right to a speedy trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for New York, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a defense counsel's agreement to a trial date outside the period provided for by the IAD bars the defendant from seeking dismissal on the ground that trial did not occur within that period. Noting scheduling matters are generally controlled by counsel without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, Justice Scalia wrote, "[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue." In such cases, "[a]bsent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel's word on such matters is the last." Thus, defense counsel's agreement to a later trial date waived Hill's speedy trial rights under the IAD.

Williams v. Taylor

Mon, 28 Feb 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-6615

Petitioner

Williams

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Taylor

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 420 (2000)

Argued

Monday, February 28, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, April 18, 2000

Advocates

Donald R. Curry (Richmond, Virginia, argued the cause for the respondent)

John H. Blume (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Michael Wayne Williams was sentenced to death after he was convicted of two capital murders. Ultimately, Williams sought federal habeas relief, in which he requested an evidentiary hearing on three constitutional claims, regarding the fairness of his trial, which he had tried unsuccessfully to develop in the state-court proceedings. The District Court granted Williams' evidentiary hearing. However, before any hearing could be held, the Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth's requests for an emergency stay and for a writ of mandamus and prohibition. The Commonwealth argued that Williams' evidentiary hearing was prohibited by federal law as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). On remand, the District Court dismissed Williams' petition citing the AEDPA statute and finding that Williams failed to show "actual innocence." In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Williams could not satisfy the statute's conditions for excusing his failure to develop the facts of his claims and barred him from receiving an evidentiary hearing.

Question

Does federal law, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, bar an evidentiary hearing, if the petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis of his claims in State court proceedings despite diligent efforts?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Williams, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that under federal law, as amended by the AEDPA, "a 'failure to develop' a claim's factual basis in state court proceedings is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or his counsel." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "comity is not served by saying a prisoner 'has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim' where he was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort. In that circumstance, an evidentiary hearing is not barred."

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale

Wed, 26 Apr 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Boy Scouts of America

1325 W Walnut Hill Ln Irving TX 75038

Irving, TX 75038

United States

32° 53' 10.4856" N, 96° 58' 13.4508" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-699

Petitioner

Boy Scouts of America

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dale

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 640 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, April 26, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2000

Advocates

George A. Davidson (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Evan Wolfson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based membership solicitation and its connections with various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's membership based on his homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law did not violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion would not significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the court concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message.

Question

Does the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Boy Scouts of America, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association." In effect, the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill," and that a gay troop leader's presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."

United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.

Tue, 30 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1682

Appellee

Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 803 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 22, 2000

Advocates

Robert Corn-Revere (Argued the cause for the appellee)

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

In 1996, Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act, of which section 505 required that cable operators, providing channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming," either to "fully scramble or otherwise fully block" those channels or to broadcast those channels during the "safe-harbor" hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. - times when young children were unlikely to be watching. The purpose of section 505 was to protect non-subscribers, and their children, from "signal bleed," or when audio and visual portions of the scrambled programs might be heard or seen. In February 1996, Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. filed suit challenging section 505's constitutionality. A three-judge District Court panel found that section 505's content-based restriction on speech violated the First Amendment because the Government might further its interests in less restrictive ways. The court also found that the Act provided for a less restrictive alternative than section 505, in that section 504 stated that cable operators had an obligation to block channels at a customer's request.

Question

Is section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 the least restrictive means to block the transmission of cable television channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming, such that it does not violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 561

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that because the Federal Government failed to show that section 505 was the least restrictive means to further its interests, requiring cable television operators to fully scramble or limit time when sexually-oriented programming was transmitted violated the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. In finding section 505 a content-based regulation, Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that "[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative." In dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer maintained that the majority had not made a "realistic assessment of the alternatives."

United States v. Hubbell

Tue, 22 Feb 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-166

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hubbell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 27 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 5, 2000

Advocates

Ronald J. Mann (Argued the cause for petitioner)

John W. Nields, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the Justice Department, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the Independent Counsel)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, Webster Hubbell, in a plea agreement, promised to provide the Independent Counsel with information about matters relating to the Whitewater investigation. Subsequently, the Independent Counsel served Hubbell with a subpoena calling for such information, and Hubbell invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to state whether he had the documents the Independent Counsel demanded. After being granted immunity, pursuant to 18 USC section 6003 (a), Hubbell produced the desired documents. The Independent Counsel then used those documents to indict Hubbell on tax and fraud charges. The District Court dismissed the indictment because the evidence that would be used against Hubbell was derived either directly or indirectly from his immunized act of producing those documents. Vacating that decision, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to determine the scope of the Government's knowledge of Hubbell's financial affairs on the day the subpoena was issued. The court determined that if the Government could not demonstrate with reasonable particularity that there existed a prior awareness of the contents of the documents and that those documents were in Hubbell's possession, then the indictment was tainted. After acknowledging he could not meet this standard, the Independent Counsel entered into a conditional plea agreement providing for the dismissal of the indictment, unless the Supreme Court's disposition of the case made it reasonably likely that Hubbell's immunity would not pose a significant bar to his prosecution.

Question

Does the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protect a witness from being compelled to disclose the existence of incriminating documents that the Government is unable to describe with reasonable particularity? If the witness produces such documents, pursuant to a grant of immunity, may the Government use them to prepare criminal charges against him?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Hubbell, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 6002

Yes and no. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court, in order to determine the precise scope of a grant of immunity with respect to the production of documents in response to a subpoena, held that a person responding to subpoena, pursuant to a court order granting immunity, could not be prosecuted on the basis of information in the documents produced if the government did not have any prior, independent knowledge of the documents. Thus, the indictment against Hubbell was dismissed because it was not derived from sources independent of documents produced under his grant of immunity. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, "we have no doubt that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects the target of a grand jury investigation from being compelled to answer questions designed to elicit information about the existence of sources of potentially incriminating evidence." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist was the lone dissenter.

Apprendi v. New Jersey

Tue, 28 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-478

Petitioner

Apprendi

Respondent

New Jersey

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 466 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, March 28, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 26, 2000

Advocates

Joseph D. O'Neill (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edward C. DuMont (Argued the cause on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Lisa S. Gochman (Trenton, New Jersey, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Charles C. Apprendi, Jr. fired several shots into the home of an African- American family. While in custody, Apprendi made a statement, which he later retracted, that he did not want the family in his neighborhood because of their race. Apprendi was charged under New Jersey law with second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which carries a prison term of 5 to 10 years. The count did not refer to the state's hate crime statute, which provides for an enhanced sentence if a trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the crime with a purpose to intimidate a person or group because of race. After Apprendi pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the sentence. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the shooting was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to a 12-year term on the firearms count. In upholding the sentence, the appeals court rejected Apprendi's claim that the Due Process Clause requires that a bias finding be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The State Supreme Court affirmed.

Question

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Apprendi, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In an 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Due Process Clause requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that "the New Jersey procedure challenged in this case is an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system." Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Stephen G. Breyer wrote dissenting opinions that were joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.

Weeks v. Angelone

Mon, 06 Dec 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5746

Petitioner

Weeks

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Angelone

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 225 (2000)

Argued

Monday, December 6, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 19, 2000

Advocates

Mark E. Olive (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Robert H. Anderson, III (Richmond, Virginia, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lonnie Weeks, Jr., was found guilty of capital murder in the death of Virginia State Trooper Jose Cavazos. During the penalty phase of his trial, the prosecution sought to prove two aggravating circumstances. Weeks' defense presented 10 witnesses in mitigation. During deliberations, the jurors sent the trial judge a note asking whether, if they believed Weeks guilty of at least one of the aggravating circumstances, it was their duty to issue the death penalty, or whether they must decide whether to issue the death penalty or a life sentence. In responding, the trial judge only referred the jury to their instructions, which stated: "If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either of the two [aggravating circumstances], and as to that alternative, you are unanimous, then you may fix the punishment...at death, or if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment...at life imprisonment." The defense counsel objected, arguing for the judge to instruct the jury it could find one or both of the aggravating circumstances and still impose a life sentence. In finding one of the aggravating circumstances and after considering the evidence in mitigation, the jury returned a unanimous verdict fixing Weeks' punishment at death. On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Weeks' presented 47 assignments of error, of which his assignment of error respecting the judge's answering the jury's question about mitigating circumstances was number 44. The court affirmed Weeks' conviction and sentence. Weeks' petition for federal habeas relief was ultimately denied.

Question

Is the Constitution's due process requirement violated when a trial judge directs a capital jury's attention to a specific paragraph of a constitutionally sufficient instruction in response to a question regarding the proper consideration of mitigating circumstances?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Angelone, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Constitution was not violated by the Virginia trial judge who, during a capital trial's penalty phase, directed the jury's attention to the allegedly ambiguous paragraph of the jury's instruction in response to the jury's question as to mitigating evidence. "Given that petitioner's jury was adequately instructed, and given that the trial judge responded to the jury's question by directing its attention to the precise paragraph of the constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its inquiry, the question becomes whether the Constitution requires anything more," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "[w]e hold that it does not." Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that "[t]he record in this case establishes, not just a 'reasonable likelihood' of jury confusion, but a virtual certainty that the jury did not realize that there were two distinct legal bases for concluding that a death sentence was not 'justified.'"

Sims v. Apfel

Tue, 28 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-9537

Petitioner

Sims

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Apfel

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 103 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, March 28, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 5, 2000

Advocates

Sarah H. Bohr (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After a state agency denied Juatassa Sims' application for Social Security disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits, she obtained a hearing before a Social Security Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ also denied Sims' claims, concluding that, although she did have some medical impairments, she had not been and was not under a "disability." Sims then sought review by the Social Security Appeals Council, which denied review. She next filed suit in the Federal District Court, contending that the ALJ erred in three ways by making selective use of the record, by posing defective questions to a vocational expert, and by failing to order a consultative examination. The District Court rejected her contentions. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the contentions because they were not included in Sims' request for review by the Appeals Council.

Question

Is a Social Security claimant barred from federal judicial review of issues he or she failed to raise during the administrative process?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Sims, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Social Security, as amended, including Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, but excluding Medicare, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children

No. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held, 5 to 4, that Social Security claimants who exhaust administrative remedies need not also exhaust issues administratively in order to preserve judicial review of those issues. Justice Thomas wrote that the issue- exhaustion requirement, usually required even in the absence of a statute or regulation, does not apply in a non-adversarial proceeding, as in Social Security cases. Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.

Erie v. Pap's A. M.

Wed, 10 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Erie City Council

626 State St Erie PA 16501

Erie, PA 16501

United States

42° 7' 40.8" N, 80° 5' 7.44" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1161

Petitioner

Erie

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pap's A. M.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 277 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, November 10, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, March 29, 2000

Advocates

Gregory A. Karle (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

John H. Weston (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

"Kandyland," operated by Pap's A. M. in Erie PA, featured totally nude female erotic dancing. The city council enacted an ordinance making it an offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a "state of nudity," To comply with the ordinance, dancers had to wear, at a minimum, "pasties" and a "G-string." Pap's filed suit against Erie, seeking a permanent injunction against the ordinance's enforcement. The Court of Common Pleas struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional, but the Commonwealth Court reversed. In reversing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the ordinance's public nudity sections violated Pap's right to freedom of expression as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court explained that, although one purpose of the ordinance was to combat negative secondary effects, there was also an unmentioned purpose to "impact negatively on the erotic message of the dance." Additionally, because the ordinance was not content neutral, the court subjected it to strict scrutiny and found that it failed the narrow tailoring requirement of such a test. After the U.S Supreme Court granted certiorari, Pap's filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot, noting that Kandyland no longer operated as a nude dancing club, and that Pap's did not operate such a club at any other location. The Court denied the motion.

Question

Does Erie, Pennsylvania's public indecency ordinance, as applied to prohibit nude dancing, violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free expression?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Erie, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Erie's public indecency ordinance did not violate any cognizable First Amendment protections of expressive conduct. In splintered voting that did not yield a majority opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that, "[e]ven if Erie's public nudity ban has some minimal effect on the erotic message by muting that portion of the expression that occurs when the last stitch is dropped, the dancers... are free to perform wearing pasties and G-strings." "The requirement... is a minimal restriction in furtherance of the asserted government interests, and the restriction leaves ample capacity to convey the dancers' erotic message."

Fischer v. United States

Tue, 22 Feb 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-116

Petitioner

Fischer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 667 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2000

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Mark L. Horwitz (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Jeffrey Fischer, while president and part owner of Quality Medical Consultants, Inc. (QMC), arranged for QMC to receive a $1.2 million loan from West Volusia Hospital Authority (WVHA), a municipal agency that operates two hospitals, which participate in and receive funding from the federal Medicare program. To get the loan, Fischer pledged QMC's accounts receivables and offered a $1 million letter of credit. After a 1994 audit of WHVA raised questions about the QMC loan, Fischer was indicted for federal bribery, including defrauding an organization which "receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program." A jury convicted him and the District Court sentenced him to imprisonment, imposed a term of supervised release, and ordered the payment of restitution. On appeal, Fischer argued that the Government failed to prove WHVA, as the organization affected by his wrongdoing, received "benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program," as required by the federal bribery statute. In rejecting that argument and affirming the convictions, the Court of Appeals held that funds received by an organization constitute "benefits" within the statute's meaning if the source of the funds is a federal program, like Medicare, which provides aid or assistance to participating organizations.

Question

Do Medicare funds received by health care providers constitute "benefits" within the meaning of the federal bribery statute prohibiting fraud and other offenses against organizations receiving federal benefits?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 666

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Health care providers such as the one defrauded by [Fischer] receive 'benefits' within the meaning of [the federal bribery statute]." Thus, the Medicare funds hospitals receive for treating Medicare patients subject people who bribe hospital officials to federal prosecution. "The government has a legitimate and significant interest in prohibiting financial fraud or acts of bribery being perpetrated upon Medicare providers," Justice Kennedy wrote for the court. "Fraudulent acts threaten the program's integrity. They raise the risk participating organizations will lack the resources...to provide the level and quality of care envisioned by the program." Justice Clarence Thomas, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, argued that "[t]he only persons who receive 'benefits' under Medicare are the individual elderly and disabled Medicare patients, not the medical providers who serve them."

In re Bauer

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:39:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5440

Petitioner

In re Bauer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 16 (1999)

Decided

Monday, October 18, 1999

Facts of the Case

Pro se petitioner Frederick W. Bauer sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for mandamus. In October 1993, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Bauer in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for an extraordinary writ. Before the 39.8 denial, Bauer had filed three petitions for certiorari and five petitions for extraordinary writs. After the 39.8 denial, Bauer filed two petitions for certiorari. All eleven of Bauer's previous petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent.

Question

May pro se petitioner Frederick W. Bauer be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Supreme Court Rule 39?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for , 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Supreme Court Rules

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court denied Bauer's request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Noting that Bauer had repeatedly abused the Court's certiorari and extraordinary writ processes, the Court directed the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or extraordinary writs from Bauer in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1. "The order," the opinion concluded, "will not prevent Bauer from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Slack v. McDaniel

Mon, 04 Oct 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-6322

Petitioner

Slack

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

McDaniel

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 473 (2000)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 1999

Reargued:

Wednesday, March 29, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 2000

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

Michael Pescetta (Las Vegas, Nevada, argued and reargued the cause for the petitioner)

David F. Sarnowski (Carson City, Nevada, argued and reargued the cause for respondents)

Facts of the Case

Antonio Tonton Slack was convicted of second-degree murder in Nevada. In 1991, after an unsuccessful direct appeal, Slack filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. In federal court, Slack attempted to litigate claims he had not yet presented to the Nevada courts and was prevented from doing so. Slack, therefore, filed a motion to hold his federal petition in abeyance while he returned to state court to exhaust his new claims. The Federal District Court ordered the habeas petition dismissed and granted Slack leave to file an application to renew upon his exhaustion of state remedies. In 1995, after unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Slack filed again in the federal court. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that Slack's petition raised claims that had not been presented to the state courts and that claims not raised in Slack's 1991 federal petition had to be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. The District Court granted the state's motion. Slack then filed a notice of appeal. The court denied Slack leave to appeal, concluding the appeal would raise no substantial issue. The Court of Appeals also denied Slack leave to appeal.

Question

If a person's petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies and is re-filed after those remedies are exhausted, are any claims not raised in the first petition "second or successive" and abusive of the right?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Slack, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In an 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that a federal habeas corpus petition filed by a state prisoner, after an initial petition was dismissed without adjudication on the merits, does not constitute a "second or successive" petition, subject to dismissal for abuse of writ. That "a vexatious litigant could inject undue delay into the collateral review process," wrote Justice Kennedy, can be countered, "the State remains free to impose proper procedural bars to restrict repeated returns to state court for postconviction proceedings."

Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc.

Mon, 17 Apr 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-579

Petitioner

Harris Trust & Sav. Bank

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Salomon Smith Barney Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 238 (2000)

Argued

Monday, April 17, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 12, 2000

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioners)

Peter C. Hein (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Robert A. Long, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Section 406(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) bars a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan from causing the plan to engage in certain prohibited transactions with a "party in interest." Such a party encompasses entities that a fiduciary might be inclined to favor at the expense of the plan's beneficiaries. After the Ameritech Pension Trust (APT), an ERISA pension plan, allegedly entered into a transaction prohibited by ERISA with Salomon Smith Barney Inc., APT's fiduciaries sued Salomon under section 502(a)(3), which authorizes a fiduciary to bring a civil action to obtain appropriate equitable relief." Salomon arguing that section 502(a)(3) only authorizes a suit against the fiduciary who caused the plan to enter the prohibited transaction. Ultimately, the District Court held that ERISA provides a private cause of action against nonfiduciaries who participate in a prohibited transaction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the authority to sue under section 502(a)(3) does not extend to a suit against a nonfiduciary "party in interest" to a transaction barred by section 406(a).

Question

Does section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which authorizes a "participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary" of a plan to bring a civil action to obtain "appropriate equitable relief" to redress violations of ERISA, extend to a suit against a nonfiduciary "party in interest" to a transaction barred by section 406(a)?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Section 502(a)(3)'s authorization to a plan "participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary" to bring a civil action for "appropriate equitable relief" extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary "party in interest" to a prohibited transaction barred by section 406(a). "We reject," wrote Justice Thomas that, "absent a substantive provision of ERISA expressly imposing a duty upon a nonfiduciary party in interest, the nonfiduciary party may not be held liable under [section 502(a)(3)]." Justice Thomas concluded that "[section 502(a)(3)] itself imposes certain duties, and therefore that liability under that provision does not depend on whether ERISA's substantive provisions impose a specific duty on the party being sued."

Ohler v. United States

Mon, 20 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-9828

Petitioner

Ohler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 753 (2000)

Argued

Monday, March 20, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 22, 2000

Advocates

Benjamin L. Coleman (Argued the cause for petitioner)

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Maria Ohler was arrested and charged with importation of marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, after a customs inspector noticed that someone had tampered with one of Ohler's van interior panels and discovered approximately 81 pounds of marijuana. Before the trial, the government filed in limine motions to admit Ohler's prior felony conviction as character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and as impeachment evidence under Rule 609(a)(1). Also before the trial, the District Court denied the motion to admit the conviction as character evidence. After the beginning of the trail, the court ruled that if Ohler testified, evidence of her prior conviction would be admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). While testifying, Ohler admitted on direct examination that she had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine in 1993. Subsequently, Ohler was found guilty. On appeal, Ohler challenged the District Court's in limine ruling, allowing the government to use her prior conviction for impeachment purposes. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Ohler waived her objection by introducing evidence of the conviction during her direct examination.

Question

Does a defendant waive her right to appeal a ruling granting the government's motion to introduce evidence of a prior conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1), if she introduces the prior conviction while testifying on direct examination?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Evidence

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error." Thus, federal defendants, who choose to acknowledge their prior convictions, waive the right to appeal the evidence's admissibility. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice David H. Souter argued, [t]here is no reason to discourage the defendant from introducing the conviction herself, as the majority's waiver rule necessarily does."

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products

Tue, 21 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-536

Petitioner

Reeves

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sanderson Plumbing Products

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 133 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, March 21, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 12, 2000

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Taylor B. Smith (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jim Waide (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Roger Reeves, 57, and Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, were supervisors in different Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. departments. Reeves' duties included making sure workers under his supervision were on time and at work and logging such data. Reeves' department was managed by Russell Caldwell, 45, who was responsible for reviewing Reeves' work. Caldwell informed the company's director of manufacturing, Powe Chesnut, that production in Revees' department was down because employees were often absent, coming in late, and leaving early. Chesnut ordered an audit, which revealed numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations by Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt. Chesnut recommended that Reeves and Caldwell be fired and, subsequently, their employment was terminated. Reeves filed suit, alleging that he had been terminated because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). At trial, Sanderson contended that Reeves was fired because of his failure to maintain accurate attendance records. Reeves attempted to demonstrate that this explanation was a pretext for age discrimination and introduced evidence that he had accurately recorded the attendance of employees under his supervision and that Chesnut had demonstrated age-related animosity when dealing with him. Ultimately, the case went to a jury, which returned a verdict for Reeves. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Reeves had not presented sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of age-based discrimination.

Question

Is a plaintiff's prima facie case of age discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Reeves, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

Yes. In a unanimous opinion deliver by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that "[a] plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, may be adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination under the ADEA." The ruling means that an employer is liable to a former employee under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 if a reasonable jury can find that the employer's explanation for the employee's dismissal was pretext for discrimination.

Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue

Mon, 17 Apr 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-387

Petitioner

Raleigh

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois Dept. of Revenue

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 15 (2000)

Argued

Monday, April 17, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, May 30, 2000

Advocates

Robert Radasevich (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

A. Benjamin Goldgar (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1998, William Stoecker formed Chandler Enterprises, Inc., which purchased a plane out of state and moved it to Illinois. By the time the Illinois Department of Revenue, having discovered that the corporation had failed to file a use tax return or pay the tax on the plane, issued a notice of tax liability against the corporation and a notice of penalty liability against the debtor in the District Court, the corporation was defunct and Stoecker was in bankruptcy. Under Illinois law, any corporate officer who is responsible for filing tax returns and making payments, and who "willfully" fails to do so, is personally liable for a penalty "equal to the total amount of tax unpaid by the corporation." There was no proof that Stoecker was responsible for payment of the tax and the court ruled that while Chandler owed taxes on the plane, Stoecker should not be penalized. However, Illinois law shifted the burden of proof, both on production and persuasion, to the purportedly responsible officer, the trustee in bankruptcy, Thomas Raleigh, once a notice of penalty liability was issued. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Department, holding that the burden of proof remained with Raleigh, just as it would have been on Stoecker had the proceedings taken place outside of bankruptcy, and finding that Raleigh had not satisfied the burden of persuasion.

Question

Does the burden of proof on a tax claim in bankruptcy court remain with the trustee in a bankruptcy?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "[w]hen the substantive law creating a tax obligation puts the burden of proof on a taxpayer, the burden of proof on the tax claim in bankruptcy court remains where the substantive law put it (in this case, on the trustee in bankruptcy)." The Court concluded that the bankruptcy estate's obligation to the Department was established by the state's tax code and that the Bankruptcy Code made no provision for altering the burden on a tax claim, and its silence said that no change was intended.

Mitchell v. Helms

Wed, 01 Dec 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Jefferson Parish Public School System

501 Manhattan Blvd Harvey LA 70058

Harvey, LA 70058

United States

29° 54' 35.3664" N, 90° 4' 12.3564" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1648

Petitioner

Mitchell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Helms

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 793 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2000

Advocates

Lee Boothby (Argued the cause for the respondents Mary L. Helms, et al)

Michael W. McConnell (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued the cause for the respondent United States in support of the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 provides for the allocation of funds for educational materials and equipment, including library materials and computer software and hardware, to public and private elementary and secondary schools to implement "secular, neutral, and nonideological" programs. In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, about 30% of Chapter 2 funds are allocated for private schools, most of which are Catholic or otherwise religiously affiliated. Mary Helms and other public school parents file suit alleging that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The District Court initially agreed, finding that Chapter 2 had the primary effect of advancing religion because the materials and equipment loaned to the Catholic schools were direct aid and that the schools were pervasively sectarian. However, after the presiding judge who made the initial ruling retired, the case was reviewed by a new judge, who reversed that decision. Thereafter, based on different precedent, the court upheld Chapter 2. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Chapter 2 unconstitutional.

Question

Does Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Mitchell, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

No. In a 6-3 plurality decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, is not a law respecting an establishment of religion simply because many of the private schools receiving Chapter 2 aid in the parish are religiously affiliated. Turning to neutrality to distinguish between indoctrination attributable to the State and that which is not, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court, "[i]f the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government."

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc.

Wed, 19 Jan 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-150

Petitioner

Wal-Mart Stores Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Samara Bros. Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 205 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, March 22, 2000

Advocates

William D. Coston (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Stuart M. Riback (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

Facts of the Case

Samara Brothers, Inc. designs and manufactures a line of children's clothing. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., contracted with a supplier, Judy-Philippine, Inc. (JPI), to manufacture outfits based on photographs of Samara garments and to be offered under Wal-Mart's house label, "Small Steps." When JPI manufactured the clothes, it copied sixteen of Samara's garments with some small modifications to produce the line of clothes required under its contract with Wal-Mart. After discovering that Wal-Mart and other retailers were selling the so-called knockoffs, Samara brought an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946. The jury found for Samara and awarded the company more than $1 million in damages. Wal-Mart then renewed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Samara's clothing designs could be legally protected as distinctive trade dress for purposes of section 43(a). The District Court denied the motion and awarded Samara relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion and concluded that "copyrights depicting familiar objects, such as the hearts, daisies, and strawberries in Samara's copyrights are entitled to very narrow protection. It is only the virtually identical copying...which will result in a successful claim of infringement of familiar objects."

Question

Is a product's design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, from "knockoffs" in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1125

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "[i]n a section 43(a) action for infringement of unregistered trade dress, a product's design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning. The fact that product design almost invariably serves purposes other than source identification not only renders inherent distinctiveness problematic; it also renders application of an inherent- distinctiveness principle more harmful to other consumer interests," Justice Scalia wrote for the Court. "Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness," Justice Scalia concluded.

Dickerson v. United States

Wed, 19 Apr 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

FBI Field Office

601 4th St NW Washington DC 20535

Washington, DC 20535

United States

38° 53' 52.188" N, 77° 0' 56.5272" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5525

Petitioner

Dickerson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 428 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, April 19, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 26, 2000

Advocates

Paul G. Cassell (As amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below)

James W. Hundley (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

During questioning about a robbery he was connected to, Charles Dickerson made statements to authorities admitting that he was the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies. Dickerson was then placed under arrest. The timing of his statement is disputed. The FBI and local detectives testified that Dickerson was advised of his Miranda rights, established in Miranda v. Arizona, and waived them before he made his statement. Dickerson said he was not read his Miranda warnings until after he gave his statement. After his indictment for bank robbery, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the statement that he made on the ground that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The government argued that even if the Miranda warnings were not read, the statement was voluntary and therefore admissible under 18 USC Section 3501, which provides that "a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." The District Court granted Dickerson's motion, finding that he had not been read his Miranda rights or signed a waiver until after he made his statement, but the court did not address section 3501. In reversing, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings, but held that section 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. The court held that "Congress enacted section 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court."

Question

May Congress legislatively overrule Miranda v. Arizona and its warnings that govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Dickerson, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Miranda Warnings

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture," wrote Rehnquist. "Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. We decline to overrule Miranda ourselves," concluded the Chief Justice. Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, blasted the Court's ruling, writing that the majority opinion gave needless protection to "foolish (but not compelled) confessions."

United States v. Johnson

Wed, 08 Dec 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1696

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Johnson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 53 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, March 1, 2000

Advocates

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kevin M. Schad (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Roy Lee Johnson had been serving time in federal prison for multiple drug and firearms felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. The District Court ordered his immediate release. Johnson's 3-year term of supervised release that was yet to be served on the remaining convictions then went into effect. As a result of serving time for the two invalid convictions, Johnson had served 2.5 years' too much prison time. After his release, Johnson filed a motion to credit the excess two and one-half years he was erroneously incarcerated toward his three-year supervised release sentence. The District Court denied relief, explaining that the supervised release commenced upon Johnson's actual release from incarceration, not before. In reversing, the Court of Appeals accepted Johnson's argument that his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left prison, but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired.

Question

May a federal criminal defendant's excess prison time be credited towards this supervised release term, reducing its length?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3624

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the length of a supervised release term cannot be reduced by reason of excess time served in prison. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[t]he objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release." The Court found that Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community life and that supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.

Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publishing Corp

Wed, 13 Oct 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-678

Petitioner

Los Angeles Police Dept.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United Reporting Publishing Corp

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 32 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, December 7, 1999

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Edward C. DuMont (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Thomas C. Goldstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The former version of the California public records statute required a state or local law enforcement agency to make public the name, address, and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency. In 1996, the state amended the statute to require that a person requesting an arrestee's address declare, under penalty of perjury, that the request was being made for journalistic, scholarly, political, governmental, or investigative purposes, and that the address would not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service. The United Reporting Publishing Corporation publishes the "JAILMAIL" list, which provides the names and addresses of recently arrested individuals for its customers. United received its information from the Los Angeles Police Department and other California law enforcement agencies under the former version of the statute. United sought declaratory and injunctive relief to hold the amendment unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Federal District Court granted United summary judgment, on the ground that the amended statute was an impermissible restriction on commercial speech and thus violated the First Amendment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the amended statute restricted commercial speech, which was entitled to a limited measure of First Amendment protection; and that although an asserted governmental interest in protecting an arrestees' privacy was substantial, the amended statute's numerous exceptions precluded the statute from directly and materially advancing such an interest.

Question

Does California's amended public record statute, under which an arrestee's address disclosed by governmental agency may not be used to sell a product or service, violate the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Los Angeles Police Dept., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the amended statute was not an abridgment of anyone's right to engage in speech, commercial or otherwise, but simply a law regulating access to information in the hands of law enforcement agencies. The Court concluded that United's facial challenge to the statute was not warranted, as there was "'no possibility that protected speech would be muted.'" Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment." Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens expressed the view that the amended statute was invalid as applied to the service, because California was denying access to information based on their intended use of the information for a constitutionally protected purpose, and that such discrimination was not justified by state interests.

Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.

Mon, 27 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-502

Petitioner

Nelson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Adams USA, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 460 (2000)

Argued

Monday, March 27, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, April 25, 2000

Advocates

Debra J. Dixon (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jack A. Wheat (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Ohio Cellular Products Corporation (OCP) sued Adams USA, Inc. (Adams), for patent infringement. After the District Court ruled in Adams' favor by dismissing the suit, Adams motioned for attorney fees and costs. In granting the motion, the court found that Donald Nelson, who was at all relevant times president and sole shareholder of OCP, had acted in a way that constituted inequitable conduct chargeable to OCP. Fearing it would be unable to collect the award, Adams moved under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend its pleading to add Nelson, personally, as a party from whom fees could be collected. Additionally, Adams asked the court, under Rule 59(e), to amend the judgment to make Nelson immediately liable for the fee award. The District Court granted the motion in full. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision simultaneously making Nelson a party and subjecting him to judgement.

Question

May a party, who has been made a party to a civil action, be simultaneously made personally liable?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nelson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the District Court erred in amending the judgment immediately upon permitting the amendment of the pleading. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[d]ue process, as reflected in Rule 15 as well as Rule 12, required that Nelson be given an opportunity to respond and contest his personal liability for the award after he was made a party and before the entry of judgment against him." Thus, the District Court's granting of Adams' motion to simultaneously make Nelson a party and personally liable violated due process.

Williams v. Taylor

Mon, 04 Oct 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-8384

Petitioner

Williams

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Taylor

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 362 (2000)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, April 18, 2000

Advocates

Robert Q. Harris (Richmond, Virginia, argued the cause for respondent)

John J. Gibbons (Argued the cause for petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After Terry Williams was convicted of robbery and capital murder; his punishment was fixed at death. In state habeas corpus proceedings a judge determined that his conviction was valid. However, the judge also found that Williams' counsel's failure to discover and present significant mitigating evidence violated his right to effective counsel and recommended that he be re-sentenced. Rejecting this, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Williams had not suffered sufficient prejudice to warrant relief. In habeas corpus proceedings under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal trial judge also found that the death sentence was constitutionally weak on ineffective-assistance grounds. The court, under the AEDPA, concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that it could not conclude that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision on prejudice was an unreasonable application of standards established by the Supreme Court.

Question

Was Terry Williams' constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel violated? Was the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court refusing to set aside Williams' death sentence "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States?"

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Williams, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Split Vote

Yes and yes. In a judgment announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court, with different majorities of Justices for each holding, held that Williams had been deprived of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and that the Virginia Supreme Court's refusal to set aside the Williams death sentence was a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Court. This conclusion followed from "'a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different' if competent counsel had presented and explained the significance of all the available evidence.'"

Hartford Underwriters v. Union Planters Bank NA

Mon, 20 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-409

Petitioner

Hartford Underwriters

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Union Planters Bank NA

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 1 (2000)

Argued

Monday, March 20, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, May 30, 2000

Advocates

Robert H. Brownlee (Argued the cause for the respondent)

G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Hen House Interstate, Inc. filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. During the reorganization attempt, Hen House obtained workers' compensation insurance from Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company. Hen House repeatedly failed to make the monthly premium payments required by the policy. Ultimately, Hen House's reorganization failed and the court converted the case to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding and appointed a trustee. Hartford, learning of the bankruptcy proceedings, sought to recover its premiums as an administrative expense. Recognizing that the estate lacked unencumbered funds to pay the premiums, Hartford attempted to charge the premiums to Union Planters Bank, the secured creditor for all of the property of Hen House, by filing a claim with the Bankruptcy Court under 11 USC Section 506(c). The Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of Hartford and the ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en banc and reversed, on the ground that an administrative claimant could not invoke section 506(c).

Question

Does 11 USC Section 506(c) allow an administrative claimant in a bankruptcy case to seek payment of its administrative claim from the property of a bankrupt estate encumbered by a secured creditor's lien?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Union Planters Bank NA, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "Section 506(c) does not provide an administrative claimant of a bankruptcy estate an independent right to seek payment of its claim from property encumbered by a secured creditor's lien, or subject to secured claims. Justice Scalia noted that plain meaning of the language in Section 506(c) and the "most natural reading" of the section persuaded the court that no one other than the trustee has an independent right to seek payment of administrative claim, like premiums from property secured by a creditor's lien, under the section.

Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.

Tue, 07 Dec 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1811

Petitioner

Geier

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Honda Motor Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 861 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 22, 2000

Advocates

Arthur H. Bryant (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Malcolm E. Wheeler (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Department of Transportation, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act), promulgated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208, which required auto manufacturers to equip some of their 1987 vehicles with passive restraints. To comply with FMVSS 208, Honda installed manual seat belts and a warning light, instead of a driver-side airbag, for the 1987 Honda Accord. Alexis Geier suffered severe head and facial injuries in an accident while driving a 1987 Honda Accord that did not have a driver- side airbag. Geier and her parents sought damages under District of Columbia tort law, claiming that American Honda Motor Company was negligent in not equiping the Accord with a driver's side airbag. The District Court ruled in favor of Honda, finding that Geier's claims were expressly pre-empted by the Act because a jury verdict in Geier's favor "might establish a safety standard that was not identical to Standard 208." In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that, because Geier's state tort claims posed an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of FMVSS 208, those claims conflicted with that standard and that the Act consequently pre-empted the lawsuit.

Question

Does the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 pre-empt a tort action in which the plaintiff claims that the defendant auto manufacturer, who was in compliance with the safety standard promulgated under the Act, should nonetheless have equipped an automobile with airbags?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for American Honda Motor Co., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1381

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "[Geier's] 'no airbag' lawsuit conflicts with the objectives of FMVSS 208 and is therefore pre-empted by the Act." Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that a rule of state tort law imposing a duty to install airbags in cars such as Honda's would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation sought and to the phase-in that the federal regulation deliberately imposed. It would also have made adoption of state mandatory seatbelt laws less likely." The dissent found fault in the majority's "unprecedented use of inferences from regulatory history and commentary as a basis for implied pre-emption."

Calderon v. Coleman

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:39:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-437

Petitioner

Calderon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Coleman

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 141 (1998)

Decided

Monday, December 14, 1998

Facts of the Case

During the penalty phase of Russell Coleman's trial, the trial judge gave the jury a "Briggs instruction," explaining the Governor's commutation power. The trial judge then instructed the jury that it was not to consider the Governor's power in reaching its verdict. Ultimately, Coleman sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The District Court found that, because the Governor may not commute the sentence of a prisoner who, like Coleman, is a twice-convicted felon without the approval of four judges of the California Supreme Court, the Briggs instruction violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by "giving the jury inaccurate information and potentially diverting its attention from the mitigation evidence presented." In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the giving of the instruction was constitutional error.

Question

Did a court of appeals, in overturning a death sentence due to constitutional errors in the jury instruction, fail to adequately consider whether the errors were "harmless" and made a difference in the final result under Brecht v. Abrahamson?

Conclusion

Yes. In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that "once the Court of Appeals determined that the giving of the Briggs instruction was constitutional error, it was bound to apply the harmless-error analysis mandated by Brecht." The Court held in Brecht that "a federal court may grant habeas relief based on trial error only when that error "'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that "there might have been a slight flaw in the Court of Appeals' brief explanation of why the invalid instruction given to the jury was not harmless, but...the Court's ruling was unquestionably correct." Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined Justice Stevens' dissent.

Castillo v. United States

Mon, 24 Apr 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-658

Petitioner

Castillo

Respondent

United States

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 120 (2000)

Argued

Monday, April 24, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 5, 2000

Advocates

James K. Robinson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Stephen P. Halbrook (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, Jaime Castillo and other Branch-Davidians were involved in a violent confrontation with federal agents near Waco, Texas. Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder federal officers. A jury determined that Castillo, by using firearms in connection with the alleged conspiracy, had violated 18 USC Section 924(c)(1), which read in relevant part: "Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years... and if the firearm is a machinegun... to imprisonment for thirty years." During sentencing, the District Court found that Castillo had possessed machineguns and imposed the mandatory 30-year prison sentence. On appeal, the Courts of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of whether Castillo had used, rather than merely possessed, machineguns. The court also concluded that statutory terms such as "machinegun" did not state elements of a crime separate from that of using a firearm, but instead established factors enhancing a sentence and that the District Court could reimpose the 30-year sentence if it found that machineguns had been actively used. The District Court then reimposed the 30-year sentence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the provision of USC Section 924(c)(1), which imposes a stiffer penalty for using a "machinegun" in a crime of violence, state factors enhancing a sentence rather than elements of a separate offense?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Castillo, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Section 924(c)(1) uses the word "machinegun" (and similar words) to state an element of a separate, aggravated crime." Therefore, the federal law that subjects anyone who carries a machine gun during a violent crime to an additional 30 years in prison states an element of an offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury rather than determined by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence as are sentencing factors. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "our consideration of Section 924(c)(1)'s language, structure, context, history and such factors that typically help courts determine a statute's objectives leads us to conclude that the relevant words create a separate substantive crime."

Gutierrez v. Ada

Mon, 06 Dec 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-51

Petitioner

Gutierrez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ada

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 250 (2000)

Argued

Monday, December 6, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 19, 2000

Advocates

Dennis P. Riordan (Argued the case for the respondents)

Seth M. Hufstedler (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Organic Act of Guam provides that that "if no [slate of] candidates [for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Guam] receives a majority of the votes cast in any election...a runoff election shall be held." The Election Commission certified that the Democratic slate of Carl T.C. Gutierrez for governor and Madeleine Z. Bordallo for lieutenant governor had defeated the Republican slate, Joseph F. Ada and Felix P. Camacho. Gutierrez and Bordallo had received a majority of the votes cast for gubernatorial slates in the 1998 Guam general election, but did not receive a majority of the total number of ballots that voters cast due to voters selecting write-in candidates, people voting for both slates, and blank ballots. The opposing Republican slate sought a writ of mandamus ordering a runoff election. According to Ada and Camacho, the phrase "in any election" means the majority as measured by the votes cast in the entire election, not simply in the race for governor. Gutierrez responded that "votes cast" meant actual votes cast for governor and lieutenant governor, rather than ballots in which the governor's contest is left blank. The District Court issued the writ and the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, interpreting the statutory phrase "majority of the votes cast in any election" to require that a slate receive a majority of the total number of ballots cast in the general election.

Question

Does the Organic Act of Guam require a runoff election when a candidate slate has received a majority of the votes cast for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, but not a majority of the number of ballots cast in the simultaneous general election?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gutierrez, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 48 U.S.C. 1421

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "[t]he Guam Organic Act does not require a runoff election when a candidate slate has received a majority of the votes cast for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the Territory, but not a majority of the number of ballots cast in the simultaneous general election." Justice Souter wrote for the Court that an "obvious reading" of the law requires only a majority of votes cast in that one specific race, "Congress did not shift its attention when it used 'any election' unadorned by a gubernatorial reference or other definite modifier."

Jones v. United States

Tue, 21 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5739

Petitioner

Jones

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 848 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, March 21, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 22, 2000

Advocates

Donald M. Falk (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1998, Dewey Jones, of Detroit, tossed a Molotov cocktail into the home of his cousin, James Walker, Jr., in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Walker's home was severely damaged. Subsequently, Jones was convicted in U.S. District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. section 844(i), which makes it a federal crime to "maliciously damage or destroy, ...by means of fire or an explosive, any building... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." The Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction. Before both courts, Jones unsuccessfully argued that section 844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

Question

Does the federal arson statute apply to the arson of a private residence?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jones, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets, National Firearms, Organized Crime Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or Gun Control Acts, except for RICO (q.v.) portion

No. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity, such that arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under section 844(i). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[w]ere we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of section 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain."

Illinois v. Wardlow

Tue, 02 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Location

4035 West Van Buren St

4035 West Van Buren St Chicago IL 60624

Chicago, IL 60624

United States

41° 52' 30" N, 87° 43' 33.6" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1036

Petitioner

Illinois

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wardlow

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 119 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Advocates

James B. Koch (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

Richard A. Devine (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Sam Wardlow, who was holding an opaque bag, inexplicably fled an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking after noticing police officers in the area. When officers caught up with him on the street, one stopped him and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. The officers arrested Wardlow after discovering that he was carrying handgun. In a trial motion to suppress the gun, Wardlow claimed that in order to stop an individual, short of actually arresting the person, police first had to point to "specific reasonable inferences" why the stop was necessary. The Illinois trial court denied the motion, finding that the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. Wardlow was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. In reversing, the Illinois Appellate Court found that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high crime area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop because flight may simply be an exercise of the right to "go on one's way."

Question

Is a person's sudden and unprovoked flight from identifiable police officers, patrolling a high crime area, sufficiently suspicious to justify the officers' stop of that person?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Illinois, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held, 5 to 4, that the police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they stopped Wardlow, because the officer was justified in suspecting that the accused was involved in criminal activity and, therefore, in investigating further. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that, "[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion" to justify a stop. The Chief Justice noted that "flight is the consummate act of evasion." Stevens, joined by three other justices, concurred in avoiding a per se rule but dissented from the majority holding.

Rice v. Cayetano

Wed, 06 Oct 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Hawaii Office of Elections

802 Lehua Ave Pearl City HI 96782

Pearl City, HI 96782

United States

21° 23' 21.9444" N, 157° 58' 22.5156" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-818

Petitioner

Rice

Respondent

Cayetano

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 495 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, October 6, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 2000

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Hawaiian Constitution limits the right to vote for the nine trustees of the state agency known as the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). The agency administers programs designed for the benefit of two subclasses of Hawaiian citizenry, "Hawaiians," defined as descendants of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Islands before 1778, and "native Hawaiians," defined as descendants of the peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778. Only "Hawaiians" may vote in the statewide election for the trusties. Harold Rice, born in Hawaii and a Hawaiian citizen, does not have the requisite ancestry to be a "Hawaiian" under state law. However, Rice applied to vote in OHA trustee elections. After Rice's application was denied, he sued Hawaiian Governor Benjamin J. Cayetano, claiming that the voting exclusion was invalid under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Federal District Court granted the state summary judgment. The court examined the voting qualifications with the latitude applied to legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power over Indian affairs, and found that the electoral scheme was rationally related to the state's responsibility to utilize a part of the proceeds from certain public lands for the native Hawaiians' benefit. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Hawaii "may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to whom trust obligations run and to whom OHA trustees owe a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who the trustees ought to be."

Question

Does the Hawaiian Constitutional provision, which limits the right to for the trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to qualified "Hawaiians," violate the Fifteenth Amendment by creating a race-based voting qualification?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Rice, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 15: Fifteenth Amendment

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Hawaii's denial of Rice's right to vote in OHA trustee elections violates the Fifteenth Amendment," in creating a race-based voting qualification. "A state may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, and this law does so," Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court. The court rejected the state's argument that the voting limitation was one based on ancestry, not race. In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for himself and Ruth Bader Ginsburg that the majority's decision "rests largely on the repetition of glittering generalities that have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the state of Hawaii."

Miller v. French

Tue, 18 Apr 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-224

Petitioner

Miller

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

French

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

United States v. French, No. 99-582

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 327 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, April 18, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 19, 2000

Advocates

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued the cause for the United States, on behalf of the petitioners)

Kenneth Falk (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jon Laramore (Argued the cause for petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1975, inmates at the Pendleton Correctional Facility filed a class action lawsuit, which ultimately led the District Court to issue an injunction to remedy Eighth Amendment violations regarding conditions of confinement. In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), which sets a standard for the entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions challenging prison conditions. The PLRA provides that a motion to terminate such relief "shall operate as a stay" of that relief beginning 30 days after the motion is filed and ending when the court rules on the motion. In 1997, the State of Indiana filed a motion to terminate the remedial order against the correctional facility. Under the PLRA, the motion stayed the court's original remedial order. The prisoners of Pendleton moved to enjoin the operation of the automatic stay, arguing that the automatic stay provision of the PLRA violated due process and the separation of powers doctrine. The District Court enjoined the stay. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that the provision precluded courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin the stay, but concluded that the statute was unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds.

Question

Does the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995's "automatic stay" provision preclude courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin such a stay? Does the provision violate the constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Miller, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3696

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Congress clearly intended to make operation of the PLRA's automatic stay provision mandatory, precluding courts from exercising their equitable power to enjoin the stay and that the PLRA does not violate separation of powers principles. Thus, Congress lawfully imposed deadlines for federal judges to review states officials' motions to discontinue court monitoring and supervision of state prison conditions. Justice O'Connor, in addressing whether the PLRA violated the separation of powers, remarked in a footnote that, "[t]he PLRA does not deprive courts of their adjudicatory role, but merely provides a new legal standard for relief and encourages courts to apply that standard promptly." Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer and John Paul Stevens dissented.

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech

Mon, 10 Jan 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1288

Petitioner

Village of Willowbrook

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Olech

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 562 (2000)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 2000

Advocates

James L. DeAno (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

John R. Wimmer (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Grace Olech asked the Village of Willowbrook to connect her property to the municipal water supply. The Village conditioned the connection on Olech's granting of a 33-foot easement. Olech refused, claiming that the Village only required a 15-foot easement from other property owners seeking access to the water supply. Olech sued the Village claiming that the Village's demand of an additional 18-foot easement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff can allege an equal protection violation by asserting that state action was motivated solely by a "spiteful effort to 'get' him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective."

Question

Does the Equal Protection Clause give rise to a cause of action on behalf of a "class of one" where the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Olech, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Olech's allegations were sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis. "Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment," stated the unanimous, unsigned opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred.

Smith v. Robbins

Tue, 05 Oct 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1037

Petitioner

Smith

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robbins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 259 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, October 5, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 19, 2000

Advocates

Ronald J. Nessim (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Carol F. Jorstad (Los Angeles, California, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A California state-court jury convicted Lee Robbins of second degree murder and grand theft auto. After the trial, in which Robbins defended himself, his appointed counsel on appeal concluded that an appeal would be frivolous. Under a new California procedure, established in People v. Wende, Robbins' counsel then filed with the California Court of Appeal to allow him to withdraw or to let the court dispose of the case by filing a brief that was silent on the merits of the case and offered to brief issues at the court's direction. The court affirmed and, after Robbins appealed his own case, the California Supreme Court denied review. After exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, Robbins sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that he had been denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. The Federal District Court granted Robbins' petition and concluded that his counsel failed to meet even the minimum duty to further a client's case after determining that his appeal was without merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded the case for the District Court to consider other trial errors raised by Robbins.

Question

Does California's no-merit brief procedure, in which defense counsel has concluded that an appeal would be frivolous, violate a defendant's right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Smith, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant's right to appellate counsel," as does California's procedure. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that California's procedure "reasonably ensures that an indigent's appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal. Whatever its strengths or weaknesses as a matter of policy, we cannot say that it fails to afford indigents the adequate and effective appellate review that the Fourteenth Amendment requires." The dissenting minority collectively noted that California's procedures allowed attorneys to remain too passive.

Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents

Wed, 13 Oct 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Florida State University

600 W College Ave Tallahassee FL 32306

Tallahassee, FL 32306

United States

30° 26' 26.7324" N, 84° 17' 26.9592" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-791

Petitioner

Kimel

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida Bd. Of Regents

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 98-796

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 62 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, January 11, 2000

Advocates

Jeremiah A. Collins (Argued the cause for petitioners in No. 98-791 (Kimel, et al.), and respondents under the Court's Rule 12.6 in support of petitioner in No. 98-796)

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued for the United States, as petitioner in No. 98-796, and respondent in support of petitioners in No. 98-791)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for state respondents in both cases)

Facts of the Case

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) makes it unlawful for a private employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual...because of such individual's age." In 1974, Congress extended the ADEA's substantive requirements to the states. First, in 1994, employees of the University of Montevallo filed suit against the university, a branch of the State of Alabama, alleging that the university had discriminated against them on the basis of their age. The federal District Court dismissed the case based on the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court determined that, although the ADEA shows Congress' intent to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress did not enact or extend the ADEA under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. The court, therefore, held that the ADEA did not abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Second, in 1995, a group of faculty and librarians of Florida State University filed suit against the Board of Regents, alleging that the university's fiscal actions had violated the ADEA because the actions had a disparate impact on the pay of older employees. When the Florida Board of Regents moved to dismiss the suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the District Court denied the motion, holding that Congress expressed its intent to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity in the ADEA, and that the ADEA is a proper exercise of congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise, in 1996, a third case, involving an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections, was similarly decided. The Court of Appeals, in deciding all three cases, held that the ADEA does not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Question

Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Florida Bd. Of Regents, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

Split Vote

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the ADEA contains a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the states' immunity, but that the abrogation exceeds Congress' authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. "States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest," wrote Justice O'Connor for the Court. Justice O'Connor noted that, "[o]ld age also does not define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience it." Justice O'Connor concluded that "[i]n contrast, when a State discriminates on the basis of race or gender, we require a tighter fit between the discriminatory means and the legitimate ends they serve." Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer dissented.

Reno v. Condon

Wed, 10 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1464

Petitioner

Reno

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Condon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 141 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, November 10, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Advocates

Charles Condon (Columbia, South Carolina, argued the cause for respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for petitioners)

Facts of the Case

State departments of motor vehicles (DMVs) require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person's name, address, telephone number, Social Security number, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver's license or registering an automobile. Congress enacted the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA),which establishes a regulatory scheme that restricts the States' ability to disclose a driver's personal information without the driver's consent, after finding that many States sell such information. The DPPA conflicts with South Carolina law, under which information contained in the State's DMV records is available to any person or entity that fills out a form listing the requester's name and address and stating that the information will not be used for telephone solicitation. The Attorney General of South Carolina filed suit, alleging the DPPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. The District Court concluded that the DPPA was incompatible with the principles of federalism, granted summary judgement for the State, and permanently enjoined the DPPA's enforcement against the State. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also concluded that the DPPA violated the constitutional principles of federalism.

Question

Does the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 violate the constitutional principles of federalism?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Reno, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2721

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and doesn't run afoul of federalism principles. The law "does not require the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. "It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals," the Chief Justice added.

Free v. Abbott Laboratories Inc.

Mon, 27 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-391

Petitioner

Free

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Abbott Laboratories Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 333 (2000)

Argued

Monday, March 27, 2000

Decided

Monday, April 3, 2000

Advocates

Frank Cicero, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Daniel A. Small (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Robin Free and Renee Free, consumers of infant formula, sued Abbott Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, and Mead Johnson & Company (collectively Abbott), under Louisiana's antitrust laws alleging a price- fixing conspiracy. After Abbott successfully removed the case to federal court, the District Court granted the Frees' motion to remand, holding that it lacked federal question jurisdiction and that it had diversity jurisdiction only over the named plaintiffs' claims, not over the other class members. Ultimately concluding that federal jurisdiction extended to the case, the Court of Appeals held that the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs because it had diversity jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs' claims.

Question

Does federal jurisdiction extend to class actions in which not all the claims of individual class members satisfy the $50,000 amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 USC section 1332, as long as diversity jurisdiction exists over the claims of one named plaintiff and, thus, supplemental jurisdiction exists over the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs?

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Abbott Laboratories Inc., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a per curiam opinion announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals by an equally divided 4-4 ruling. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Arizona v. California

Tue, 25 Apr 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

8 ORIG

Plaintiff

Arizona

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

California

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 392 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, April 25, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 19, 2000

Advocates

Mason D. Morisset (Argued the cause for the Quechan Indian Tribe)

Jerome C. Muys (Argued the cause for the state parties)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

In 1952, Arizona invoked the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to resolve a dispute with California over the extent of each state's right to use water from the Colorado River. The United States intervened, seeking water rights on behalf of five Indian reservations. Culminating in Arizona I, the Court held that the United States had reserved water rights for the five reservations. In a 1964 decree, the Court specified the water entitlements for the parties and the reservations, but held that the water rights for the reservations would be subject to adjustment in the event that the reservations' disputed boundaries were finally determined. Thereafter in Arizona II, the Court concluded that the reservations' boundaries had yet to be determined. Ultimately, the Quechan Tribe (Tribe) of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation and the United States entered an agreement returning land encompassing some 25,000 acres of disputed boundary lands not attributed to that reservation in earlier litigation. In 1983, the Court of Claims consented to the settlement. The Tribe and the United States then filed claims seeking increased water rights for the Fort Yuma Reservation. In 1989, the Court granted the motion of Arizona, California, and two municipal water districts (State parties) to reopen the 1964 decree to determine whether the Fort Yuma Reservation was entitled to claim additional boundary lands and, if so, additional water rights. The State parties asserted that the Fort Yuma claims of the Tribe and the United States were precluded by Arizona I and by the Claims Court consent judgment.

Question

Are the Quechan Tribe and the United States claims for increased water rights for the Fort Yuma Reservation from the Colorado River precluded by the Supreme Court's prior decision in Arizona v. California and by a consent judgement?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Arizona, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: res judicata

No. In a opinion deliver by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court rejected both grounds for preclusion and remanded the case to a Special Master for a determination on the merits of the outstanding claims for additional water rights associated with disputed Fort Yuma Reservation boundary lands. "Those claims are the only ones that remain to be decided in Arizona v. California; their resolution will enable the Court to enter a final consolidated decree and bring this case to a close," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court.

Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist.

Tue, 09 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-7809

Petitioner

Martinez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 152 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Advocates

Ronald D. Maines (By appointment of the Court, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner)

Robert Foster (San Diego, California, argued the cause for respondent)

Facts of the Case

Salvador Martinez, a self-described self-taught paralegal with 25 years of experience at 12 different law firms, was working for a Santa Ana, California law firm when a client gave him $6,000.00 to bail her boyfriend out of jail. The bail was never posted and Martinez was subsequently charged with grand theft and the fraudulent appropriation of the property of another. Martinez chose to represent himself at trial before a jury, which acquitted him of theft, but convicted him of embezzlement. Martinez then filed a timely notice of appeal, a motion to represent himself, and a waiver of counsel. The motion to represent himself was denied by the California Court of Appeal. The court explained: "There is no constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal as of right. The right to counsel on appeal stems from the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth Amendment....The denial of self-representation at this level does not violate due process or equal protection guarantees."

Question

Does a criminal defendant have a constitutional right to choose to represent himself on direct appeal?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that here is no constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction. "We are not aware of any historical consensus establishing a right of self-representation on appeal," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Noting that the rights established by the Sixth Amendment "are presented strictly as rights that are available in preparation for trial and at the trial itself" and that the Amendment "does not include any right to appeal," Justice Stevens concluded, "[i]t necessarily follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal." Justice Stevens added "[o]ur experience has taught us that "a pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney." Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Antonin Scalia wrote concurring opinions.

United States v. Locke

Tue, 07 Dec 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1701

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Locke

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 98-1706

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 89 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 1999

Decided

Monday, March 6, 2000

Advocates

William B. Collins (Olympia, Washington, argued the cause for respondents)

C. Jonathan Benner (Argued the cause for petitioner in No. 98-1706)

David C. Frederick (Department of Justice, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 98-1701)

Facts of the Case

In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the State of Washington created the Office of Marine Safety, which was directed to establish standards to provide the "best achievable protection" (BAP) from oil spill damage. The agency promulgated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), a trade association of tanker operators, filed suit against the state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations. Intertanko argued that Washington's BAP standards had entered an area occupied by the federal government and imposed unique requirements in an area where national uniformity was mandated. Further, Intertanko argued that if every political subdivision were to promulgate such maritime regulations, the goal of national governments to develop effective international environmental and safety would be undermined. The District Court upheld Washington's regulations. Thereafter, the Federal Government intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Are the State of Washington's maritime regulations on tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements pre-empted by federal law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 46 U.S.C. 3703

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Washington's regulations regarding general navigation watch procedures, crew English-language skills and training, and maritime casualty reporting are pre-empted by the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers. "The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and is now well established," wrote Justice Kennedy for the Court. Justice Kennedy also noted that States may regulate their own ports and waterways so long as the rules are based on "the peculiarities of local waters" and do not conflict with federal regulation.

Drye v. United States

Mon, 08 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1101

Petitioner

Drye

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 49 (1999)

Argued

Monday, November 8, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, December 7, 1999

Advocates

Daniel M. Traylor (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Kent L. Jones (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, Irma Drye died, leaving a $233,000 estate. The sole heir to the estate under Arkansas law was Rohn Drye, Jr., her son. Drye owed the Federal Government approximately $325,000 in unpaid tax assessments. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had valid tax liens against all of Drye's "property and rights to property" under federal law, 26 USC section 6321. Several months after Drye was appointed the administrator of his mother's estate, he disclaimed his interest in the estate, which then passed under state law to his daughter. Arkansas law provides that the disavowing heir's creditors may not reach property thus disclaimed. Drye's daughter then proceeded to use the estate's proceeds to establish a family trust (Trust), of which she and her parents are the beneficiaries. Under state law the Trust was shielded from creditors seeking to satisfy the debts of the Trust's beneficiaries. After Drye revealed his beneficial interest in the Trust to the IRS, the IRS filed a notice of federal tax lien against the Trust. Ultimately, the District Court ruled in favor of the Government and its lien. In affirming, the Court of Appeals interpreted precedent to mean that state law determines whether a given set of circumstances creates a right or interest, but federal law determines whether that right or interest constitutes "property" or "rights to property" under section 6321, thus subjecting it to federal tax liens.

Question

Does an heir's interest to an estate constitute "property" or "rights to property" such that federal liens are valid against the heir's interest, even if the heir has disclaimed the interest under state law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Drye's disclaimer did not defeat the federal tax liens. The Court read the Internal Revenue Code to look to state law for a delineation of a taxpayer's rights or interests, but to leave to federal law the determine whether those rights or interests constitute "property" or "rights to property" under section 6321. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "Drye had the unqualified right to receive the entire value of his mother's estate...or to channel that value to his daughter. The control rein he held under state law, we hold, rendered the inheritance 'property' or 'rights to property' belonging to him within the meaning of [section] 6321, and hence subject to the federal tax liens that sparked this controversy."

Ramdass v. Angelone

Tue, 18 Apr 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-7000

Petitioner

Ramdass

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Angelone

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 156 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, April 18, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 12, 2000

Advocates

Katherine P. Baldwin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David I. Bruck (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Virginia jury found Bobby Ramdass guilty of murdering Mohammed Kayani, a clerk in the 7-Eleven he held up, and recommended the death sentence. At the time of the sentencing phase of his trial, final judgment had been entered against Ramdass for an armed robbery and he had been found guilty of a second armed robbery, but no final judgment had been entered. Under Virginia law, a conviction does not become final until the jury returns a verdict and the judge enters a final judgment of conviction and pronounces sentence. The Kayani judge paused and scheduled a future hearing to consider whether to impose the recommended sentence. During the interval between the jury trial and this hearing, final judgment had been entered on the second armed robbery conviction. At the sentencing hearing in the capital murder case, Ramdass, in arguing for a life sentence, claimed that his prior convictions made him ineligible for parole under Virginia's three-strikes law. The court sentenced Ramdass to death, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. On remand from the U.S Supreme Court, the Virginia Supreme Court again affirmed the sentence over Ramdass' argument that he should have been allowed to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. The court declined to apply a previous U.S Supreme Court holding that a jury considering imposing death should be told if the defendant is parole ineligible under state law. The court concluded that Ramdass was not parole ineligible when the jury was considering his sentence because the second armed robbery, in which no final judgment had been entered, did not count as a conviction for purposes of the three-strikes law. Ultimately, Ramdass sought federal habeas corpus relief. The District Court granted his petition, ruling that the jury should have been advised that he was ineligible for parole. In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that Ramdass was not, at the time of his sentencing proceedings, legally ineligible for parole.

Question

Must a jury must be instructed in the death penalty phase of sentencing that if the defendant is not given the death sentence, that he will be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Angelone, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Ramdass was not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because he was not entitled to instruction on parole ineligibility at sentencing since conviction had not been entered yet on the earlier jury verdict making him parole ineligible. In a plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the Virginia Supreme Court's finding that the state's three-strikes law did not cover the defendant until shortly after he was sentenced must be honored because it "was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application" of a decision in which the justices said that defendants have the right to tell jurors about their parole status in such cases.

Roe v. Flores-Ortega

Mon, 01 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1441

Petitioner

Roe

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Flores-Ortega

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 470 (2000)

Argued

Monday, November 1, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 2000

Advocates

Paul E. O'Connor (Sacramento, California argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edward C. DuMont (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Quin Denvir (Sacramento, California, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lucio Flores-Ortega, who does not speak English fluently, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. At his sentencing, the trial judge advised him that he had 60 days to file an appeal. His counsel, a public defender, did not file a notice of appeal in the period set by the court even though her file contained the words "bring appeal papers." Flores-Ortega's subsequent attempt to file such notice was rejected as untimely. Flores-Ortega's efforts to secure state habeas corpus relief were unsuccessful. Represented by a federal defender, Flores-Ortega then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based his counsel's failure to file the notice after promising to do so. The District Court denied relief. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Flores-Ortega was entitled to relief because, under its precedent, a habeas petitioner need only show that his counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal was without the petitioner's consent.

Question

Does trial counsel have a duty to file a notice of appeal following a guilty plea if the defendant has not requested so, but has been informed of his appeal rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Roe, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that counsel is not always required to file a notice of appeal after their clients plead guilty unless the clients specifically ask them to so. "We cannot say, as a constitutional matter, that in every case counsel's failure to consult with the defendant about an appeal is necessarily unreasonable and therefore deficient," Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority. "We therefore reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal," concluded Justice O'Connor. In dissent, Justice David Souter, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens, wrote that attorneys should be required to consult with their clients about possible appeals in virtually all cases, even those in which the defendants plead guilty.

Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Shanklin

Wed, 01 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-312

Petitioner

Norfolk Southern R. Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shanklin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 344 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 2000

Decided

Monday, April 17, 2000

Advocates

Gregory S. Coleman (Austin, Texas, argued the cause for the Texas, et al., as amici curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioner)

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Thomas C. Goldstein (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, Eddie Shanklin was struck and killed by a Norfolk Southern train at a railroad intersection. At the time of the accident, the intersection was equipped with advanced warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks, which were installed with federal funds under the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program and were fully compliant with the federal standards for such devices. Afterwards, Dedra Shanklin, Mr. Shanklin's widow, brought a diversity wrongful death action against Norfolk Southern. Shanklin alleged, based on Tennessee statutory and common law, that Norfolk Southern had been negligent by failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing. Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA) pre-empted Shanklin's suit. The FRSA contains an express pre- emption provision, which allows States to enforce their railroad safety measures until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. The District Court held that Shanklin's allegation that the signs installed at the crossing were inadequate was not pre-empted and, ultimately, entered judgement for her. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reasoned that federal funding alone was insufficient to trigger pre-emption of state tort actions under the FRSA. The court concluded that because the Tennessee Department of Transportation had installed the signs for the purpose of providing "minimum protection," no individualized determination of adequacy had be made by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) under the Crossings Program.

Question

Does the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 pre-empt tort claims, based on State statutory and common law, concerning a railroad's failure to maintain adequate warning devices at crossings where federal funds have participated in the installation of the devices?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Norfolk Southern R. Co., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 2010

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that railroads cannot b sued under state tort law over allegedly inadequate warning devices at rail crossings if the equipment installed was federally funded. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that "[o]nce the FHWA approved the project and the signs were installed using federal funds, the federal standard for adequacy displaced Tennessee statutory and common law addressing the same subject, thereby pre-empting [Shanklin's] claim." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote that the consequence of the Court's decision "is that state negligence law is displaced with no substantive federal standard of conduct to fill the void."

Carmell v. Texas

Tue, 30 Nov 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Denton County District Court

401 W Hickory St Denton TX 76201

Denton, TX 76201

United States

33° 12' 50.5116" N, 97° 8' 11.8392" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-7540

Petitioner

Carmell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Texas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 513 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 1, 2000

Advocates

John Cornyn (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Beth S. Brinkmann (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court supporting the respondent)

Richard D. Bernstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Scott Carmell was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his stepdaughter from 1991 to 1995, when she was 12 to 16 years old. Before September 1, 1993, the relevant Texas statute specified that a victim's testimony alone about a sexual offense could not support a conviction unless corroborated by other evidence or if the victim had informed another person of the offense within six months of its occurrence (outcry). However, the statute provided that if a victim was under 14 at the time of the offense, the victim's testimony alone could support a conviction. A 1993 amendment allowed the victim's testimony alone to support a conviction if the victim was under 18. Carmell argued, before the Texas Court of Appeals, that four of his convictions could not stand under the pre-1993 version of the law, which was in effect at the time of his alleged conduct, because they were based solely on the testimony of the victim, who was not under 14 at the time of four of the offenses and had not made a timely outcry. The court held that applying the 1993 amendment retrospectively did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because the amended statute did not alter the punishment or the elements of the offense that the State must prove. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied review.

Question

Does an amended Texas statute that authorizes the conviction of sexual offenses on the victim's testimony alone, whereas the statute previously required the victim's testimony along with corroborating evidence, violate the constitutional prohibition against State "ex post facto" laws when applied in a trial for offenses committed before the amendment's effective date?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Carmell, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10: Ex Post Facto

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the retrospective application of Texas's amended statutory provision allowing alleged sexual offense victim's uncorroborated testimony to support a conviction violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that, "[a] law reducing the quantum of evidence required to convict an offender is as grossly unfair as, say, retrospectively eliminating an element of the offense, increasing the punishment for an existing offense or lowering the burden of proof." For the dissenting minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the amended statute accords victims of a sexual offense "full testimonial stature," and that "such a witness competency rule validly may be applied to offenses committed before its enactment."

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:40:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-295

Petitioner

Adarand Constructors, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Slater

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 216 (2000)

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Facts of the Case

In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand I)(512 U.S. 200 (1995)), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) use of race-based measures is subject to strict scrutiny. On remand, the District Court held that the Subcontractor Compensation Clause required by the Small Business Act, which rewards prime contractors for subcontracting with disadvantaged business enterprises, and its race-based presumption, failed strict scrutiny because they were not narrowly tailored (Adarand II). After Adarand II, Colorado altered its disadvantaged business enterprise status certification procedure. Under the new procedures, Adarand Constructors, Inc. requested and received disadvantaged-business status from the Colorado DOT (CDOT). Upon learning that CDOT had given Adarand disadvantaged-business status, the Court of Appeals held that Adarand's cause of action was moot and vacated the District Court's judgment in Adarand II.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Adarand Constructors, Inc.'s suit challenging the U.S. Department of Transportation's procedure for certifying contractors as disadvantaged business enterprises as moot when the Colorado Department of Transportation granted Adarand disadvantaged-business status?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Adarand Constructors, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that "[b]ecause, under the circumstances of this case, it is impossible to conclude that respondents have borne their burden of establishing that it is 'absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,' [Adarand's] cause of action remains alive." "It is no small matter to deprive a litigant of the rewards of its efforts," concluded the opinion, "[s]uch action on grounds of mootness would be justified only if it were absolutely clear that the litigant no longer had any need of the judicial protection that it sought."

Johnson v. United States

Tue, 22 Feb 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5153

Petitioner

Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 694 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2000

Advocates

Rita La Lumia (Chattanooga, Tennessee, argued the cause for petitioner)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced most forms of parole with supervised release. If release conditions are violated, the sentencing court may revoke the release and order the violator to serve part or all of the release term in prison without credit for time previously served on release. In 1994, Cornell Johnson was convicted of conspiring to produce and use counterfeit credit cards. Johnson was sentenced to imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release. While on supervised release, Johnson violated its terms. Subsequently, the District Court revoked Johnson's release and ordered him to serve an 18-month prison term to be followed by an additional 12 months of supervised release. The court cited no authority for ordering the new supervised release. The court could have cited a subsection added to the Act in 1994, 18 USC section 3583(h), which explicitly gave it the authority to add the new term; however, Congress made the amendment after Johnson's conviction. On appeal, Johnson argued that the application of the federal law established after his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision.

Question

May a district court, under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, impose an additional term of supervised release following the reimprisonment of those who violate the conditions of an initial term of supervised release, without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3583

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that 18 USC section 3583(h) is not retroactively applicable; however, its prior version, 18 USC section 3583(e)(3), authorizes a Federal District Court to impose additional term of supervised release after revocation of initial term and reimprisonment. Thus, Johnson's judgment was affirmed because the federal sentencing statute, which was in effect at the time of his original offense, permitted the imposition of supervised release following recommitment. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that "[p]re-Guidelines practice, linguistic continuity from the old scheme to the current one, and the obvious thrust of congressional sentencing policy confirm that, in applying the law as before the enactment of subsection (h), district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release following reimprisonment." Justice Antonin Scalia dissented.

California Democratic Party v. Jones

Mon, 24 Apr 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

California Secretary of State

1500 11st St Sacramento CA 95814

Sacramento, CA 95814

United States

38° 34' 56.9748" N, 121° 29' 39.0264" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-401

Petitioner

California Democratic Party

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jones

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 567 (2000)

Argued

Monday, April 24, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 26, 2000

Advocates

Thomas F. Gede (Argued the cause for the respondents)

George Waters (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In California, candidates for public office can gain access to the general ballot by winning a qualified political party's primary. In 1996, voter approved Proposition 198 changed California's partisan primary from a closed primary, in which only a political party's members can vote on its nominees, to a blanket primary, in which each voter's ballot lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allows the voter to choose freely among them. The candidate of each party who wins the most votes is that party's nominee for the general election. The California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party have historically prohibited nonmembers from voting in their party's primary. Each political party filed suit against Bill Jones, the California Secretary of State, alleging that the blanket primary violated their First Amendment right of association. Jones countered that a blanket primary will intensify the election and allow for better representation in elected office. Siding with Jones, the District Court held that the primary's burden on the parties' associational rights was not severe and was justified by substantial state interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does California's voter approved Proposition 198, which changes its partisan primary from a closed primary to a blanket primary, violate political parties' First Amendment right of association?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for California Democratic Party, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Association

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that California's blanket primary violates a political party's First Amendment right of association. "Proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with -- to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by -- those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival," wrote Justice Antonin Scalia for the majority. "A single election in which the party nominee is selected by nonparty members could be enough to destroy the party." Justice Scalia went on to state for the Court that Proposition 198 takes away a party's "basic function" to choose its own leaders and is functionally "both severe and unnecessary." Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. "This Court's willingness to invalidate the primary schemes of 3 States and cast serious constitutional doubt on the schemes of 29 others at the parties' behest is," Justice Stevens wrote, "an extraordinary intrusion into the complex and changing election laws of the States."

Prunty v. Brooks

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:40:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5316

Petitioner

Prunty

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brooks

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 99-5283

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 9 (1999)

Decided

Tuesday, October 12, 1999

Facts of the Case

Pro se petitioner Robert E. Prunty sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for certiorari. In April 1999, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Prunty in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for certiorari. Before the 39.8 denial, Prunty had filed eight petitions for certiorari, all of which were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent.

Question

May pro se petitioner Robert E. Prunty be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Supreme Court Rule 39?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Brooks, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Supreme Court Rules

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court denied Prunty's request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Noting that Prunty had abused the Court's certiorari process, the Court directed the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Prunty in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1. "The order," the opinion concluded, "will not prevent Prunty from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Stenberg v. Carhart

Tue, 25 Apr 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Nebraska General Assembly

2115 State Capitol Lincoln NE 68509

Lincoln, NE 68509

United States

40° 48' 32.5872" N, 96° 41' 21.0012" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-830

Petitioner

Stenberg

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carhart

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 914 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, April 25, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2000

Advocates

Donald B. Stenberg (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Simon Heller (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Nebraska law prohibited any "partial birth abortion" unless that procedure was necessary to save the mother's life. It defined "partial birth abortion" as a procedure in which the doctor "partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the... child," and defined the latter phrase to mean "intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the [abortionist] knows will kill the... child and does kill the... child." Violation of the law is a felony, and it provides for the automatic revocation of a convicted doctor's state license to practice medicine. Leroy Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting, brought suit seeking a declaration that the statute violates the U.S. Constitution, claiming the law was unconstitutionally vague and placed an undue burden on himself and female patients seeking abortions. The District Court held the statute unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Nebraska statute, which makes the performance of a "partial birth abortions" a crime, violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Carhart, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a complicated 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Nebraska's statute criminalizing the performance of "partial birth abortion[s]" violates the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted in Casey and Roe." The sharply divided Court struck down the statute because it placed an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion and did not allow for exception in cases of threatened health. "All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment," that results in "an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent concluded that "[t]he notion that the Constitution of the United States... prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd."

Mobil Oil Exploration v. United States

Wed, 22 Mar 2000 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-244

Petitioner

Mobil Oil Exploration

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 99-253

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 604 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, March 22, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 26, 2000

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for petitioners)

Kent L. Jones (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

In 1981, Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. and Marathon Oil Co. both paid the Federal Government over $150 million in return for the rights to explore for and develop oil off the coast of North Carolina, provided that the companies received exploration and development permissions in accordance with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), and the regulations promulgated pursuant to OCSLA and CZMA. In 1990, the companies submitted an exploration plan, as required by OCSLA and CZMA, to the Department of the Interior for approval. Thereafter, the Outer Banks Protection Act (OBPA) became effective. The OBPA prevented the Secretary of the Interior from approving the exploration plan for at least 13 months. The state of North Carolina then objected to certification of the companies' plans under the CZMA. Before the Secretary of Commerce rejected Mobil's request to override North Carolina's objection, the companies filed a breach-of-contract lawsuit. In granting summary judgement for the companies, the Court of Federal Claims found that the Federal Government had broken its contractual promise to follow OCSLA's requirement to approve an exploration plan that satisfied OCSLA's requirements within 30 days of the plan's submission, which constituted the repudiation of the contract and entitled the companies to restitution of the payments. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Federal Government's refusal to consider the companies' final exploration plan was not the operative cause of any failure to carry out the contracts' terms, because North Carolina's objection would have prevented the companies from exploring.

Question

Does the enactment of a new statute, which prevents the Federal Government from following a contractual promise to follow the terms of pre-existing statutes and regulations, constitute the repudiation of a contract?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Mobil Oil Exploration, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Federal Government broke its promise, repudiated the contracts, and must give the companies their money back. "We find that the oil companies gave the United States $158 million in return for a contractual promise to follow the terms of pre-existing statutes and regulations. The new statute prevented the Government from keeping that promise," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court, "therefore the Government must give the companies their money back."

Texas v. Lesage

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 22:40:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1111

Petitioner

Texas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lesage

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 18 (1999)

Decided

Monday, November 29, 1999

Facts of the Case

Francois Daniel Lesage, an African immigrant of Caucasian descent, was denied admission to the University of Texas Ph.D. program in counseling psychology for the 1996-1997 academic year. Subsequently, Lesage filed suit, alleging that by establishing and maintaining a race-conscious admissions process the university had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and various federal civil rights statutes. The university did not dispute that it considered the race of its applicants at some stage during the review process. The university argued that Lesage was unqualified for admission. Granting the university summary judgment, the District Court concluded that considerations of race had no effect on the Lesage's rejection. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there remained a factual dispute as to whether the stage of review during which Lesage's application was eliminated was in some way race conscious.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the University of Texas was not entitled to summary judgment for its rejection of an African immigrant Ph.D. applicant of Caucasian descent even if he would have been rejected under a race-neutral policy?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lesage, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that "[i]nsofar as the Court of Appeals held that [the University of Texas was] not entitled to summary judgment on Lesage's section 1983 claim for damages relating to the rejection of his application for the 1996-1997 academic year even if he would have been denied admission under a race-neutral policy, its decision contradicts our holding in Mt. Healthy." "Under Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration," stated the opinion.