Cases - 1998 term

United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno

Mon, 07 Dec 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1139

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rodriguez-Moreno

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 275 (1999)

Argued

Monday, December 7, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 30, 1999

Advocates

John P. McDonald (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Jacinto Rodriguez-Moreno and others were hired by a drug distributor to find a drug dealer who stole cocaine from the distributor while holding captive the botched deal's middleman, Ephrain Avendano. In pursuit of the dealer, Rodriguez-Moreno took Avendano from Texas to New Jersey to New York to Maryland. In Maryland, Rodriguez-Moreno took possession of a revolver and threatened to kill Avendano. However, Avendano escaped and called the police. Rodriguez-Moreno was then arrested. Rodriguez-Moreno was charged in a federal District Court with, among kidnapping and other violations, using and carrying a firearm in relation to Avendano's kidnapping, in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1), which proscribes using or carrying a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of violence." Rodriguez-Moreno moved to dismiss the firearm count for lack of venue. Rodriguez-Moreno argued that the only place where the Government had proved he had actually used a gun was Maryland and, therefore, venue was proper only in Maryland. The court denied the motion and a jury found Rodriguez-Moreno guilty of the count. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied a "verb test," under which a violation of section 924(c)(1) is committed only in the district where a defendant "uses" or "carries" a firearm. Thus, the New Jersey court venue for the firearm count was improper.

Question

Is the venue for prosecuting a violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1), which proscribes using or carrying a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of violence," proper only in the district were the firearm was used or carried?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "[v]enue in a prosecution for using or carrying a firearm 'during and in relation to any crime of violence' in violation of section 924(c)(1) is proper in any district where the crime of violence was committed." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "A kidnapping...does not end until the victim is free. It does not make sense...to speak of it in discrete geographic fragments....[I]t does not matter that respondent used the revolver...only in Maryland because he did so 'during and in relation to' a kidnaping that was begun in Texas and continued in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland." Justice Antonin Scalia, with joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented, expressing the view that the crime defined in 924(c)(1) could be "committed only where the defendant both engages in the acts making up the predicate offense and uses or carries the gun." Moreover, Justice Scalia argued, because the accused's use of the gun occurred only in Maryland, venue was proper only there.

Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael

Mon, 07 Dec 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1709

Petitioner

Kumho Tire Co. Ltd.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carmichael

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 137 (1999)

Argued

Monday, December 7, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 23, 1999

Advocates

Joseph H. Babington (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioners)

Sidney W. Jackson (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, the right rear tire of a minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out and the vehicle overturned. One passenger died in the accident and several others were severely injured. Subsequently, the Carmichaels brought a diversity suit against the Kumho Tire Company and others, claiming that the tire was defective. A significant part of the Carmichaels' case turned on the testimony of Dennis Carlson, Jr., an expert in tire failure analysis. Carlson intended to testify to support the Carmichaels' conclusion that a defect in the tire's manufacture or design caused the blow out. To support this conclusion, Carlson used a methodology that was partly disputed. Kumho moved to exclude Carlson's testimony on the ground that his methodology failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact..., a witness qualified as an expert...may testify thereto in the form of an opinion." The Federal District Court granted the motion, excluded Carlson's testimony, and entered summary judgment for Kumho. The court found that Carlson's methodology was insufficiently reliable. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that a federal trial judge's "gatekeeping" obligations under the Federal Rules of Evidence were limited to scientific context, and not Carlson's testimony, which the court characterized as skill- or experience- based.

Question

Does a federal trial judge's "gatekeeping" obligation, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, apply to testimony based on skill or experience as it does to testimony based on scientific knowledge?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kumho Tire Co. Ltd., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a federal trial judge's "gatekeeping" obligation applies not only to "scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "makes no relevant distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized knowledge. It makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony." The Court concluded that this interpretation of Rule 702 would insure that an expert witness's testimony rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. The Court also concluded that the District Court's determination that Carlson's methodology was not reliable was within the court's discretion.

Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes At Monterey, Ltd.

Wed, 07 Oct 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1235

Petitioner

Monterey

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Del Monte Dunes At Monterey, Ltd.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 687 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, October 7, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 24, 1999

Advocates

Michael M. Berger (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Edwin S. Kneedler (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

George A. Yuhas (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Del Monte Dunes sought to develop property it owned within the jurisdiction of the city of Monterey. Monterey continuously denied Del Monte Dunes' proposals to develop the property. Each rejection was followed by stricter and more rigorous demands for a smaller, less intrusive development. After years of rejection, Del Monte Dunes decided Monterey would not allow development under any circumstances. Del Monte Dunes sued the city in federal court under 42 USC Section 1983, alleging that the denial of their final proposal was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, Del Monte Dunes claimed, the continuous demands constituted regulatory abuse. The District Court submitted Del Monte Dunes case to the jury. The judge instructed the jury to find for Del Monte Dunes if the jurors found Del Monte Dunes had been denied every economically viable use for its property or if the city's decision to reject the development did not directly advance a legitimate public purpose. The jury found for Del Monte Dunes on the equal protection and abuse claims, and it awarded monetary damages. The city prevailed on the due process claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings despite the city of Monterey's objection to the use of a jury in government land-use regulation cases. It found no errors in the use of the jury or the jury's decision.

Question

Do plaintiffs have a right to a jury trial over land-use regulations when they allege constitutional violations under 42 USC Section 1983?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Del Monte Dunes At Monterey, Ltd., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Yes. The Court held, in an opinion authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, that property owners who file a Section 1983 civil rights suit seeking compensation for an alleged taking of their property can have a jury trial in some circumstances. "[T]he disputed questions were whether the government had denied a constitutional right outside the bounds of its authority, and, if so, the extent of any resulting damages." Justice Kennedy then added: "These were questions for the jury."

Wyoming v. Houghton

Tue, 12 Jan 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-184

Petitioner

Wyoming

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Houghton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 295 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, January 12, 1999

Decided

Monday, April 5, 1999

Advocates

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Paul S. Rehurek (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Donna D. Domonkos (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After pulling Sandra Haughton's friend over during a routine traffic stop, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer noticed a needle in the driver's shirt pocket. Upon learning that the needle was used for drugs, the officer searched the car and Haughton's purse, where he found more drug paraphernalia. Haughton challenged her subsequent arrest on drug charges, alleging that the officer's search of her purse was unconstitutional. On appeal from an adverse appeals court ruling, overturning a favorable trial court decision, the Supreme Court granted Wyoming certiorari.

Question

May police officers, with probable cause to search a car, inspect personal items belonging to its passengers without violating the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Wyoming, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court held that so long as there is probable cause to search a stopped vehicle, all subsequent searches of its contents are legal as well. The Court added that such searches are especially warranted if aimed at looking into objects or personal belongings capable of concealing items that are the object of the search.

United States v. Haggar Apparel Company

Mon, 11 Jan 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-2044

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Haggar Apparel Company

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 380 (1999)

Argued

Monday, January 11, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, April 21, 1999

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Kent L. Jones (Argued the cause for petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States provides importers a partial exemption from duties otherwise imposed for articles which were assembled abroad, but that were not enhanced abroad, except by operations incidental to the assembly process. A regulation issued by the United States Customs Service deems permapressing operations to be an additional step in manufacture, not part of or incidental to the assembly process. The Haggar Apparel Company sought a refund for duties imposed on a collection of its men's trousers that it had shipped to the U.S. from an assembly plant in Mexico. The trousers' pre-treated fabric had been cut in the U.S. and then shipped to Mexico, along with the thread, buttons, and zippers necessary to complete the garments. Under the HTSUS, had the trousers only been sewn and reshipped they would have been eligible for the duty exemption that Haggar sought. However, Haggar also permapressed the trousers by baking them in an oven at the Mexican facility before shipping them to the U.S. The Customs Service claimed that the baking was a process in addition to assembly and denied the duty exemption. Haggar contended that the baking was simply part of the assembly process. Subsequently, Haggar filed suit, seeking the refund, in the Court of International Trade. The court declined to treat the Customs Service's regulation as controlling and ruled in Haggar's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is the United States Customs Service's regulation regarding permapressing entitled to judicial deference?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 19 U.S.C. 1202

The Court did not expressly answer the question. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court vacated and remanded the case. The Court concluded that the regulation in question was subject to further analysis. Additionally, the Court held that if the regulation was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision, then it required judicial deference in the Court of International Trade.

El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie

Tue, 02 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-6

Petitioner

El Paso Natural Gas Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Neztsosie

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 473 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, March 2, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 3, 1999

Advocates

Jonathan Nuechterlein (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court)

H. Bartow Farr, III (Argued the cause for the respondents)

James R. Atwood (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Laura and Arlinda Neztsosie, and others, filed separate lawsuits in the Navajo Tribal Courts, claiming damages for injuries suffered as a result of El Paso Natural Gas Corporation's and Cyprus Foote Mineral Company's uranium mining operations. El Paso and Cyprus Foote, defendants in those suits, each filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing their tribal court claims. The District Court denied preliminary injunctions except to the extent that the Neztsosies sought relief in the Tribal Courts under the Price-Anderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act provides certain federal licensees with limited liability for claims of "public liability" arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident, converts such actions into federal claims, grants federal district courts removal jurisdiction over such actions, and provides the mechanics for consolidating the actions and for managing them once consolidated. The District Court left the determinations whether the Act applied to the Neztsosies' claims to the Tribal Courts. On El Paso's and Cyprus Foote's consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decisions not to enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing non-Price-Anderson Act claims and to allow the Tribal Courts to decide whether the Neztsosies' claims fell under that Act. Further, although the Neztsosies had not appealed the partial injunctions, the Court of Appeals moved on its own to reverse them.

Question

Do tribal courts have the authority to determine its own jurisdiction over damage actions stemming from nuclear incidents under the Price-Anderson Act, which grants federal district courts removal jurisdiction over such actions?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for El Paso Natural Gas Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 2210

No. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that requiring a district court to stay its hand while a tribal court determines its own jurisdiction, or the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion, does not apply in this case, which if brought in a state court would be subject to removal. "By the Price-Anderson Act's unusual preemption provision Congress expressed an unmistakable preference for a federal forum, at the behest of the defending party," wrote Justice Souter.

Hughes Aircraft Company v. Jacobson

Mon, 02 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1287

Petitioner

Hughes Aircraft Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jacobson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 432 (1999)

Argued

Monday, November 2, 1998

Decided

Monday, January 25, 1999

Advocates

Paul T. Cappuccio (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Lisa S. Blatt (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Seth Kupferberg (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Stanley I. Jacobson and other retired employees of Hughes Aircraft Company were beneficiaries of Hughes Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan. Jacobson and the others claimed in their class-action lawsuit that Hughes violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the federal pension protection law, when it amended the plan twice in response to a $1.2 billion dollar surplus. ERISA requires that some of the surplus be distributed to cover employees when a pension plan is terminated. Hughes' first amendment to the plan established an early retirement program that provided significant additional retirement benefits to certain eligible active employees. The second amendment disallowed new participants from contributing to the plan. Jacobson and others argued that Hughes had terminated one plan and started another by stopping its pension plan contributions. Thus, the company had used the plan's surplus to benefit new employees at the expense of the retirees. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court by finding that the early retirement program and noncontributory benefit structure were prohibited by the ERISA.

Question

Did an employer violate federal pension protection law when it amended its retirement plan by establishing an early retirement program and creating a noncontributory benefit structure for new participants?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hughes Aircraft Company, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held Hughes did not violate the ERISA by establishing an early retirement program and creating a noncontributory benefit structure for new participants. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, said the plan amendments "did not affect the rights of pre-existing plan participants and Hughes did not use the surplus for its own benefit."

Holloway v. United States

Mon, 09 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-7164

Petitioner

Holloway

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 1 (1999)

Argued

Monday, November 9, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 2, 1999

Advocates

Kevin J. Keating (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Franois Holloway, a.k.a. Abdu Ali, was charged with several federal offenses, including carjacking. Federal law defines carjacking as "tak[ing] a motor vehicle ... from ... another by force and violence or by intimidation" "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." Holloway's accomplice testified that there was no intent to harm the drivers of the cars, just steal their vehicles. However, he said he would have used his gun if he had been given a "hard time." The District Court judge instructed the jury that the requisite intend under law may be conditional. Moreover, the government would satisfy this condition if it had proved to them that the defendant intended to cause death or bodily harm if the drivers refused to turn over their cars. Subsequently, the jury found Holloway guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that a conditional intent to harm was within a reasonable interpretation of the legislative purpose of the carjacking law.

Question

Does the federal carjacking law apply to crimes committed with the "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 2119

Yes. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law applies to carjacking crimes committed with "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands. "The intent requirement...is satisfied when the government proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car," wrote Justice Stevens.

Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co.

Tue, 08 Dec 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1536

Petitioner

Arizona Department of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Blaze Constr. Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 32 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, December 8, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 2, 1999

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Patrick Irvine (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Bruce C. Smith (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Over several years, the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs contracted with Blaze Construction Company to build, repair, and improve roads on several Indian reservations located in Arizona. When the various contracts expired, the Arizona Department of Revenue issued a tax deficiency assessment against Blaze for its failure to pay Arizona's transaction privilege tax, the tax levied on the gross receipts of companies doing business in the state, on the proceeds from its contracts with the Bureau. Blaze protested the assessment and prevailed in administrative proceedings. On review, the Arizona Tax Court granted summary judgment for the Department. In reversing, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that federal law pre-empted the tax's application to Blaze. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied review.

Question

May a state impose a nondiscriminatory tax upon a private company's proceeds from contracts with the Federal Government when the federal contractor renders its services on an Indian reservation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Arizona Department of Revenue, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a "State generally may impose a nondiscriminatory tax upon a private company's proceeds from contracts with the Federal Government, regardless of whether the federal contractor renders its services on an Indian reservation." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "[a]bsent a constitutional immunity or congressional exemption, federal law does not shield Blaze (a federal contractor) from Arizona's transaction privilege tax."

Chicago v. Morales

Wed, 09 Dec 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1121

Petitioner

Chicago

Respondent

Morales

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 41 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, December 9, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 10, 1999

Advocates

Lawrence Rosenthal (For the petitioner)

Harvey Grossman (For the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A violation of the ordinance arises when anyone does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An officer's discretion was purportedly limited by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in a Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.

Question

Does Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Morales, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a plurality ruling, Justice John Paul Stevens delivered an opinion for a marjority on several key points. The Court held that Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and provided law enforcement officials too much discretion to decide what activities constitute loitering. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that the ordinance's definition of loitering as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose" does not give people adequate notice of what is prohibited and what is permitted, even if a person does not violate the law until he refuses to disperse. "'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty."

Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education

Tue, 12 Jan 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-843

Petitioner

Davis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Monroe County Board of Education

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 629 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, January 12, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 24, 1999

Advocates

Barbara D. Underwood (Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

W. Warren Plowden, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Verna L. Williams (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Aurelia Davis sued the Monroe County Board of Education (the "Board"), on behalf of her fifth grade daughter LaShonda, alleging that school officials failed to prevent Lashonda's suffering sexual harassment at the hands of another student. Davis claimed that the school's complacency created an abusive environment that deprived her daughter of educational benefits promised her under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX). On appeal from successive adverse rulings in both district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Davis certiorari.

Question

Can a school board be held responsible under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, meant to secure equal access of students to educational benefits and opportunities, for "student-on-student" harassment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Davis, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Education Amendments of 1972

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court began by noting that because there is an implied private right to education under Title IX, private damage actions may lie against schools that act with deliberate indifference to harassment that is severe enough to prevent victims from enjoying educational opportunities. The Court added that Title IX's prohibitions against harassment in school are clear enough to have served proper notice to school boards in general and the Board in particular. As such, consistent with the Spending Clause, the Title IX guidelines that Congress attached to its school funds obligate all recipient schools to comply or face the pain of legal action. The Court also observed that the Board acted with deliberate indifference, since it ignored several complaints by Davis, and that the harassment in question was serious and systematic.

Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala

Wed, 02 Dec 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1489

Petitioner

Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shalala

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 449 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, December 2, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, February 23, 1999

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Diana L. Gustin (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. provides home health care services to Medicare beneficiaries. Under the Medicare Act, providers seeking reimbursement for covered health services submit a yearly cost report to a fiscal intermediary, usually a private insurance company. The intermediary then issues a Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR) determining the provider's reimbursement. The Act allows the provider up to 180 days to appeal a reimbursement determination to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. The provider also has up to three years to ask the intermediary to reopen a determination of the Board. Your Home Visiting Nurse submitted cost reports for 1989 to its intermediary and did not appeal the reimbursement decision. However, within three years Your Home Visiting Nurse asked its intermediary to reopen its 1989 reimbursement determination on the ground that "new and material" evidence demonstrated entitlement to additional compensation. The intermediary denied the request. Your Home Visiting Nurse appealed the denial to the Board, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that lacked it jurisdiction to review an intermediary's refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. Your Home Visiting Nurse then brought action in Federal District Court, seeking review of the Board's dismissal and of the intermediary's refusal to reopen. The District Court agreed that the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the refusal to reopen. Moreover, it rejected Your Home Visiting Nurse's contention that the federal-question statute or the mandamus statute gave the District Court jurisdiction to review the intermediary's refusal directly. Subsequently, the court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Can Medicare-reimbursed health care providers appeal a fiscal intermediary's refusal to reopen previous reimbursement decisions?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Shalala, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Medicare--provisions of the Social Security Act

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the Board does not have jurisdiction to review a fiscal intermediary's refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. Moreover, the Court held that the federal-question statute and mandamus statute do not entitle Your Home Visiting Nurse to judicial review of the intermediary's reopening decision.

Florida v. White

Tue, 23 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-223

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

White

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 559 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, March 23, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 17, 1999

Advocates

Carolyn M. Snurkowski (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court)

David P. Gauldin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Two months after officers observed Tyvessel Tyvorus White using his car to deliver cocaine, he was arrested at his workplace on unrelated charges. At the same time, the arresting officers seized his car, without securing a warrant, because they believed that it was subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. During a subsequent inventory search, the police discovered cocaine in the car. White was then charged with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Florida law. At White's trial on the drug charge, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search, arguing that the car's warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, thereby making the cocaine the "fruit of the poisonous tree." After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court denied the motion. On appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The court also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless seizure of an automobile under the Act violated the Fourth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court answered that the warrantless seizure did violate the Fourth Amendment, quashed the lower court opinion, and remanded. The court reasoned that although the police developed probable cause to believe a violation of the Act had occurred, this alone did not justify a warrantless seizure.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Florida, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband. Thomas wrote: "Although the police here lacked probable cause to believe that [White's] car contained contraband, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband under Florida law. ... [T]he need to seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away...is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure." In dissenting, Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concluded that the seizure was not reasonable without a warrant.

Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems

Wed, 24 Feb 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1008

Petitioner

Cleveland

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Policy Management Systems

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 795 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, February 24, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 24, 1999

Advocates

Stephen G. Morrison (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Matthew D. Roberts (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioner)

John E. Wall, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

While working for Policy Management Systems (PMS), Carolyn Cleveland suffered a stroke. Ultimately, she lost her job but was awarded Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits because she claimed she was unable to work due to her stroke-induced disability. A week before her SSDI award, Cleveland challenged her termination by PMS as a violation of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). PMS defended itself by stating that Cleveland's SSDI award negated her ADA suit, because her receipt of SSDI funds proved she was not terminated in spite of an ability to perform her duties. On appeal from adverse rulings in both the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Cleveland certiorari.

Question

Does application for, and receipt of, Social Security Disability Insurance reflexively bar alleged victims of discrimination from simultaneously pursuing a claim against their former employers under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cleveland, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that SSDI and ADA claims do not conflict in such a way as to automatically bar anyone from raising them jointly. The Court explained that when determining SSDI eligibility, the significant ADA question of whether someone would have been capable of performing their job if "reasonable accommodations" had been made by their employer, is not considered. As such, the "reasonable accommodation" issue is left open for resolution during an ADA claim. The Court added that any inconsistencies between ADA and SSDI claims are even more trivial if the ADA claim is brought prior to an actual SSDI award - as Cleveland did. Even in clear cases, where a contradiction would seem to lie between the two claims, alleged victims must still have the opportunity to present their cases.

AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board

Tue, 13 Oct 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-826

Petitioner

AT&T

Respondent

Iowa Utilities Board

Consolidation

No. 97-829

No. 97-831

No. 97-830

No. 97-1075

No. 97-1087

No. 97-1099

No. 97-1141

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 366 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, October 13, 1998

Decided

Monday, January 25, 1999

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the private petitioners)

David W. Carpenter (Argued the cause for the private cross-respondents/petitioners)

William P. Barr (Argued the cause for the cross-petitioners/respondents)

Diane Munns (Argued the cause for the State Commission respondents)

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the private respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the federal cross-respondents/petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The 1996 Telecommunications Act (Act) fundamentally altered local telephone markets by ending the monopolies traditionally given to local exchange carriers (LECs) by states and subjecting LECs to a host of duties meant to facilitate market entry. Among these was the imposition of an obligation on incumbent LECs to share their networks with competitors. Following the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) issuance of regulations implementing the Act's guidelines, AT&T; challenged their constitutionality on behalf of itself and other existing phone service providers.

Question

Does the Federal Communication Commission have authority to implement the competition-inducing guidelines set out in the 1996 Telecommunications Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for AT&T, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Communication Act of 1934

Yes. In a complicated split opinion, the Court held that the FCC has rulemaking authority to uphold those provision of the Act in question. Despite the local nature of some of the LECs involved, the Court emphasized their interconnectivity with regional and national carriers. As such, the FCC could also reach local LEC markets and regulate their competitive business practices. Such regulatory authority would include the ability to tell LECs what portions of their services they had to share with new competitors, allow new competitors to use local networks without having to own them, and forbid incumbent LECs from separating their network elements before leasing them to competitors.

Alden v. Maine

Wed, 31 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Alden's Workplace Cumberland County, ME

United States

43° 48' 47.8728" N, 70° 23' 13.4124" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-436

Petitioner

Alden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Maine

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 706 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, March 31, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, June 23, 1999

Advocates

Peter J. Brann (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Laurence E. Gold (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court)

Facts of the Case

A group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in 1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996)which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunitythe probation officers' suit was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court. The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court.

Question

May Congress use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Maine, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

No. A sharply divided court held in a 5-4 decision that Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Both the terms and history of the eleventh amendment suggest that States are immune from suits in their own courts. And more generally, the original understanding of the Constitution's structure and the terms of the tenth amendment confirm that states retained much of their sovereignty despite their agreeing that the national government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.

California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen

Mon, 11 Jan 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1732

Petitioner

California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Felzen

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 315 (1999)

Argued

Monday, January 11, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 20, 1999

Advocates

Michael K. Kellogg (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

John G. Kester (Argued the cause for the respondents)

David C. Frederick (For the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Shareholders sought to appeal from a federal District Court settlement of a stockholder derivative suit. The suit arose out of claims that managers conspired with rival sellers thereby exposing the corporation to criminal and treble-damages liability. The Court of Appeals held that shareholders who had not intervened and were not parties to the derivate action could not appeal an unsatisfactory settlement. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Question

Must shareholders formally intervene in a derivative lawsuit before they can appeal its settlement?

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Felzen, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The Court did not answer the question. An equally divided Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Olmstead v. Zimring

Wed, 21 Apr 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-536

Petitioner

Olmstead

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Zimring

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 581 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, April 21, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, June 22, 1999

Advocates

Beverly P. Downing (Atlanta, Georgia, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Michael H. Gottesman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Jonathan Zimring, on the consolidated behalf of two mentally disabled female patients, challenged Tommy Olmstead, the Commissioner of Georgia's Department of Human Resources, for the Georgia Regional Hospital's (GRH) decision to keep the two women in psychiatric isolation. Zimring argued that under Title II of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the women had to be moved to the most communally integrated setting possible. Defending GRH's decision, Olmstead argued that although the women were medically cleared for a more integrated treatment setting, financial constraints and the need to fundamentally alter treatment programs prevented this from happening.

Question

Should financial constraints entirely determine whether states comply by the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act guidelines concerning community treatment programs for the mentally handicapped?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Zimring, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court began by noting that the question in this case was still ripe even though the two women at issue were placed in communal care since their controversies were initiated. The Court then found that the ADA required the placement of mentally disabled patients in "integrated settings" when they are medically cleared for such settings, they themselves express a desire for such settings, and the resources for such a transfer are available. The Court added that financial constraints might be significant if the state can show that allocation of resources to one patient will cause harm to others. The case was remanded for a better analysis of GRH spending priorities.

South Central Bell Telephone v. Alabama

Tue, 19 Jan 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-2045

Petitioner

South Central Bell Telephone

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alabama

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 160 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, January 19, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, March 23, 1999

Advocates

Mark L. Evans (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Charles J. Cooper (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Alabama requires each corporation doing business in that state to pay a franchise tax based on the firm's capital. A domestic firm, organized under the laws of Alabama, has leeway in controlling its own tax base and tax liability. A foreign firm, organized under the laws of a State other than Alabama, does not have similar leeway to control its tax base. In 1986, the Reynolds Metals Company and other foreign corporations sued Alabama's tax authorities, seeking a refund of the foreign franchise tax they had paid on the ground that the tax discriminated against foreign corporations in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected Reynolds' claims, holding that the special burden imposed on foreign corporations simply offset a different burden imposed exclusively on domestic corporations by Alabama's domestic shares tax. During the Reynolds case, the South Central Bell Telephone Company and others brought a suit asserting similar Commerce and Equal Protection Clause claims. The Alabama trial court agreed with South Central Bell that the tax substantially discriminated against foreign corporations, but nonetheless dismissed their claims as barred by res judicata in light of the State Supreme Court's Reynolds decision. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.

Question

Does Alabama's franchise tax discriminates against interstate commerce, in violation of the Commerce Clause? Did the Alabama Supreme Court's refusal to permit the South Central Bell Telephone Company and others to raise their constitutional claims because of res judicata deprive them of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for South Central Bell Telephone, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Alabama franchise tax was unconstitutional. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that, "Alabama law gives domestic corporations the ability to reduce their franchise tax liability..., while it denies foreign corporations that same ability. And no one claims that the different tax rates for foreign and domestic corporations offset the difference in the tax base. The tax therefore facially discriminates against interstate commerce and is unconstitutional unless the State can offer a sufficient justification for it." The Court concluded the State could not justify the tax. The Court also held that the State Supreme Court's decision was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee because the South Central Bell case was unrelated to the court's prior judgement and thus could not be bound by it. Furthermore, the Court rejected the State's argument that the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.

College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid

Tue, 20 Apr 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-149

Petitioner

College Savings Bank

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida Prepaid

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 666 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, April 20, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, June 23, 1999

Advocates

William B. Mallin (on behalf of the Respondents Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, et al)

David C. Todd (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States as respondent)

Facts of the Case

This case is the second tier of a patent infringement action. College Savings Bank, a New Jersey chartered bank, markets and sells certificates of deposit designed to finance college costs. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity, administers a tuition prepayment program. In addition to its original patent infringement action, College Savings filed an action alleging that Florida Prepaid violated section 43 of the Lanham Act by making misstatements about its tuition savings plans in its brochures and annual reports. The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) subjects states to suits brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for false and misleading advertising. The District Court granted Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The court rejected arguments from College Savings and the United States that Florida Prepaid had waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in interstate marketing and administration of its program after the TRCA made clear that such activity would subject it to suit; and that Congress's abrogation of sovereign immunity in the TRCA was effective, since it was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) permit suits against states for alleged misrepresentations of their own products by providing a constitutionally permissible abrogation of state sovereign immunity? Does the TRCA permit suits against states for alleged misrepresentations of their own products by operating as a waiver of sovereign immunity when a state engages in activities regulated by the Lanham Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Florida Prepaid, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1125

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "the federal courts are without jurisdiction to entertain this suit against an arm of the State of Florida." Justice Scalia concluded that "the sovereign immunity of the State of Florida was neither validly abrogated by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived by the State's activities in interstate commerce." Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Stephen G. Breyer expressed the view that Congress possesses the authority to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity where necessary and proper to the exercise of a congressional power under the Constitution's Article I. Justice John Paul Stevens filed his own dissenting opinion and joined that of Justice Breyer.

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee

Wed, 04 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Attorney General Office

950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

Washington D.C., DC 20530

United States

38° 53' 31.8084" N, 77° 1' 30.2196" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1252

Petitioner

Reno

Respondent

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 471 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, November 4, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, February 24, 1999

Advocates

David D. Cole (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Bashar Amer, Aiad Barakat, Julie Mungai, Amjad Obeid, Ayman Obeid, Naim Sharif, Khader Hamide, and Michel Shehadeh, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), were marked for deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The PFLP is characterized by the government as an international terrorist and communist organization. The resident aliens filed suit alleging the Attorney General and other federal parties had targeted them for deportation because of their affiliation with a politically unpopular group, in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. Initially, the District Court enjoined the deportation proceedings. During the case, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). The IIRIRA restricts judicial review of the Attorney General's "decision or action" to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act." Reno then filed motions arguing that the IIRIRA deprived the courts of jurisdiction over the aliens' selective-enforcement claim. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision on the merits.

Question

Does the IIRIRA deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over aliens' suits alleging that actions of the Attorney General are selectively enforced?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Reno, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 8 U.S.C. 1252

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the IIRIRA deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over the selective- enforcement claim. Justice Scalia wrote, "[a]s a general matter -- and assuredly in the context of claims such as those put forward in the present case -- an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation."

El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng

Tue, 10 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-475

Petitioner

El Al Israel Airlines

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tseng

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 155 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, November 10, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, January 12, 1999

Advocates

Jonathan E. Nuechtherlein (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Jonathan Nuechterlein (For the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Robert H. Silk (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Diane W. Wilson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In a New York State court, Tsui Yuan Tseng alleged El Al Israel Airlines subjected her to an intrusive security search resulting in assault and false imprisonment before a flight from New York to Tel Aviv. Tseng alleged that psychic or psychosomatic personal injuries followed the incident, but no bodily injury occurred. El Al moved the case to federal court. The District Court dismissed the case due to the Warsaw Convention treaty. Convention provisions describe air carrier liability for international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods. Bodily injury, baggage or goods destruction, loss, or damage, and damage caused by delay are compensable under the Convention. Psychic or psychosomatic injury is not covered. Thus, Tseng's claim was not justicible. Moreover, New York tort law prevents El Al from liability suits covered under the Convention. The Court of Appeals held, in reversing, that the Convention drafters did not intend to remove all liability from an airline carrier, that the Convention does not shield routine operating procedures from the laws of signatory nations, and that the Convention precludes recourse to local law only when an incident is not exclusively covered. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the Convention would create uniformity because doing so would supplant applicable laws.

Question

Does the Warsaw Convention preclude international passengers from pursuing personal injury suits under local law?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for El Al Israel Airlines, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Treaty

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that the Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local law when her claim does not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention. In her opinion, Justice Bader wrote, "[w]e would be hard put to conclude that the delegates at Warsaw meant to subject air carriers to the distinct, non-uniform liability rules of the individual signatory nations."

City of West Covina v. Perkins

Tue, 03 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1230

Petitioner

City of West Covina

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Perkins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 234 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, November 3, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, January 13, 1999

Advocates

Patrick S. Smith (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (For Ohio et al., as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

David D. Lawrence (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Police officers of the city of West Covina lawfully seized Perkins Lawrence's personal property from his home. The officers left a notice form specifying the facts of the search, its date, the searching agency, the date of the warrent, the issuing judge and his court, the persons to be contacted for information, and an itemized list of the property seized. The officers did not leave the search warrant number. Lawrence filed suit after attempts to obtain the seized property failed. The District Court ultimately ruled in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It held that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that Lawrence be provided a detailed notice of state procedures for the return of seized property and the information to be able to invoke the procedures, along with the information he was already provided. This meant the search warrant number must be furnished or at least the method for obtaining it.

Question

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require officers who seize someone's property lawfully to provide the owner with state procedures for the property's return?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City of West Covina, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a decision authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause does not require police officers to provide property owners with information on how to recover their property in a lawful seizure. The Due Process clause only requires that officers inform property owners that something they own has been seized. Justice Kennedy said the property owner could turn to public sources to learn about the procedures available.

Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg

Wed, 28 Apr 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-591

Petitioner

Albertsons Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kirkingburg

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 555 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, April 28, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, June 22, 1999

Advocates

Scott N. Hunt (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Edward C. DuMont (Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Corbett Gordon (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Before starting his job as a truck driver for Albertsons Inc., Hallie Kirkingburg underwent an eye examination during which he was erroneously certified as meeting basic Department of Transportation (DOT) visual standards. Two years later, in 1992, the error of Kirkingburg's earlier diagnosis was discovered during a routine physical examination. Kinrkingburg was told that he had to obtain a DOT waiver if he wanted to continue driving. Before he could do so, however, Albertsons fired him for failing to meet minimum visual requirements and refused to rehire him even after he obtained the waiver. Kirkingburg challenged his dismissal under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On appeal from an adverse Ninth Circuit Court ruling reversing a favorable district court finding, the Supreme Court granted Albertsons certiorari.

Question

Are all individuals with vision problems of any degree "disabled" under the Americans with Disabilities Act and, therefore, subject to its protections?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Albertsons Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that not all individuals who suffer some sort of physical difficulty are per se "disabled" under the ADA. Instead, those who believe they suffer from a disability must prove their claim on a case-by-case basis by showing that their alleged disability substantially impacts on a major life activity. Moreover, such impact could be mitigated by the availability of artificial aids, such as medications or technical devices, and the body's own corrective measures. As such, Kirkingburg's visual limitation was not reflexively covered under the ADA and so his challenge was inappropriate.

NFFE, Local 139 v. Department of the Interior

Mon, 09 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1184

Petitioner

NFFE, Local 139

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Department of the Interior

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 97-1243

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 86 (1999)

Argued

Monday, November 9, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, March 3, 1999

Advocates

David M. Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Gregory O'Duden (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, on behalf of the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The National Federation of Federal Employees, a federal employees' union, proposed to include a provision obligating the Interior Department to negotiate midterm matters not in the original contract between the union and the Agency. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, that created the Federal Labor Relations Authority, requires federal agencies and their employees' unions to negotiate in good faith to arrive at a collective bargaining agreement. Initially, the Authority held that the good-faith bargaining clause did not extend to union-initiated proposals during the term of the basic contract. The Court of Appeals did not agree and, in turn, the Authority reversed its decision. The Interior Department refused the proposal on the ground that union-initiated midterm bargaining is inconsistent with the Statute. The Authority then ordered the Agency to comply with the bargaining.

Question

Can federal agencies be required to bargain with federal employees' unions over issues that arise during the duration of a contract?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for NFFE, Local 139, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 7101

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute gave the Federal Labor Relations Authority power to determine whether parties must engage in midterm bargaining. Justice Breyer wrote, "Congress delegated to the authority the power to determine -- within appropriate legal bounds...whether, when, where and what sort of midterm bargaining is required."

Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.

Tue, 06 Oct 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1130

Petitioner

Pfaff

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wells Electronics, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 55 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, October 6, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, November 10, 1998

Advocates

C. Randall Bain (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey P. Minear (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Jerry R. Selinger (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1980, Wayne K. Pfaff developed a new type of computer chip socket for Texas Instruments (TI). In early April 1981, TI confirmed they would order and use Pfaff's socket. No actual socket was made until July 1981. Pfaff applied for a patent in April 1982. A patent was not granted on Pfaff's socket until 1985. After the patent was issued, Pfaff sued Wells Electronics, who had developed a competing socket, for patent infringement. Pfaff claimed that Wells' socket infringed upon six of his patent's claims. The District Court held that Wells' socket violated three of Pfaff's patent claims. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Pfaff had sold the socket to TI more than a year before he applied for a patent. Thus, Wells' socket did not infringe on Pfaff's under the Patent Act of 1952, which states that no one can patent an invention that has been on sale for more than one year before filing a patent application.

Question

Does the confirmation of a commercial sale mark the beginning of the one year period inventors have to file for a patent, despite the fact the invention has not been produced?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wells Electronics, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 35 U.S.C. 102

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled federal patent law does not permit patents to be granted if an invention has been on sale for more than one year in this country before the patent application is filed. Moreover, a patent is on sale when a commercial sale offer has been made and when the inventor has made the invention, prepared drawings, or described the invention enough to be produced.

Martin v. Hadix

Tue, 30 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-262

Petitioner

Martin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hadix

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 343 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, March 30, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 21, 1999

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (Lansing, Michigan, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Deborah LaBelle (on behalf of the Respondents)

Deborah A. La Belle (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Everett Hadix and other prisoners in the Michigan prison system filed a class action lawsuit against prison officials claiming that the conditions of their confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Thereafter, Hadix and the officials entered into a consent decree to remedy the situation. In 1987, the District Court ruled that Hadix was entitled to attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring of compliance with the decrees. The court established specific market rates for awarding fees. By April 26, 1996, the effective date of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the market rate was $150 per hour. The PLRA limited the size of fees that may be awarded to attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits to a maximum hourly rate of $112.50. When first presented with the issue, the District Court concluded that the PLRA cap did not limit attorney's fees for services performed in these cases prior to, but that were still unpaid by, the PLRA's effective date. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Next, fee requests were filed with the District Court for services performed during a period encompassing work performed both before and after the PLRA's effective date. The District Court reiterated its earlier conclusion. The Court of Appeals held that the PLRA's fee limitation does not apply to cases pending on the enactment date because if it did, it would have an impermissible retroactive effect, regardless of when the work was performed.

Question

Does the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 limit an attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring services that were pending when the Act became effective?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Martin, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1997

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 "limits attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA's effective date, but does not limit fees for monitoring performed before that date." "To impose the new standards now, for work performed before the PLRA became effective, would upset the reasonable expectations of the parties," Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court. All nine justices agreed that the PLRA should apply to services performed after the law's effective date. However, the Court split over whether the new fee limits contained in the law apply to work performed after April 26, 1996, in cases begun before that date. A 7-2 majority said that the new limits do apply to such cases. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens dissented from that part of the Court's conclusion.

INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre

Wed, 03 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1754

Petitioner

INS

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Aguirre-Aguirre

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 415 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, March 3, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 3, 1999

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Nadine K. Wettstein (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

While the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides asylum to aliens who can demonstrate that they will be persecuted if deported, it does not protect aliens who commit "serious nonpolitical crimes" before their arrival in the United States. After burning busses, assaulting passengers, and vandalizing private property in his native Guatemala, Juan Aguiree fled to and, sought asylum in, the United States. Despite Aguirre's claims that his acts constituted political protest, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) overturned an administrative court's finding in favor of asylum. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed as it found the BIA's analysis deficient in three parts: it failed to balance the severity of Aguirre's offenses against the threat of political persecution; it failed to qualify the atrocities of Aguiree's acts in comparison with others it faced in the past; and it did not consider whether Aguree's acts were politically necessary or successful. When the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Does the Immigration and Nationality Act require deportation boards, who face aliens that committed nonpolitical crimes prior to seeking asylum, to: balance the severity of the alien's offenses against the threat of political persecution, compare the atrocities of the crimes with others it faced in the past, or consider whether the crimes were politically necessary or successful?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for INS, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court noted that withholding of deportation is mandatory if an alien establishes that it is more likely than not that he or she will suffer political persecution if deported. The Court added that the BIA was not required to balance the severity of the acts in question against threats of political persecution, compare the actions with others, or pronounce on their political success or necessity. Likelihood of political persecution is the overarching issue when considering an alien's deportability, followed by a determination of whether the crimes at issue were serious and nonpolitical.

Amoco Production Company v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe

Mon, 19 Apr 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-830

Petitioner

Amoco Production Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Southern Ute Indian Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 865 (1999)

Argued

Monday, April 19, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 7, 1999

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States)

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Thomas H. Shipps (Argued the cause for the Souther Ute Indian Tribe)

Thomas J. Davidson (Argued the cause for the amici States)

Facts of the Case

Land patents issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 (the Acts) reserve all rights to the coal contained in the subject properties to the United States. The Southern Ute Indian Tribe has equitable title to coal within its reservation lands. These lands contain large quantities of coalbed methane gas (CBM gas), now considered a valuable energy source, within the coal formations. In 1981, the Department of the Interior issued an opinion that concluded that the reservation of coal under the Acts did not encompass CBM gas. Energy companies then entered into leases with landowners holding title under the Acts to produce CBM gas. The Tribe field suit against the Amoco Production Company and others, royalty owners and producers under the oil and gas leases covering that land, and various federal entities, seeking a declaration stating CBM gas to be coal reserved by the Acts and therefore belonging to the Tribe. The District Court disagreed and concluded that the plain meaning of the term "coal" was limited to the solid rock substance and did not include the CBM gas. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Acts' use of the term "coal" was ambiguous, and ambiguities in land grants must be resolved in favor of the sovereign. Therefore, the Acts' reservation of coal included the CBM gas.

Question

Does the reservation of coal under the land patents issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 include the coal-bed methane gas found within the coal formation?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Amoco Production Company, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 30 U.S.C. 81

No. In a 7-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that, "[t]he term 'coal' as used in the 1909 and 1910 Acts does not encompass CBM gas;" therefore, CBM gas is not included in the reserved coal rights. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "[t]he common understanding of coal in 1909 and 1910 would not have encompassed CBM gas, both because it is a gas rather than a solid mineral and because it was understood as a distinct substance that escaped from coal as the coal was mined, rather than as part of the coal itself." Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that Congress, at the time the Acts were passed, would have assumed that the coal owner had dominion over and responsibility for the CBM gas. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the case.

Saenz v. Roe

Wed, 13 Jan 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Residence of Brenda Roe Long Beach, CA

United States

33° 48' 15.0012" N, 118° 9' 29.0016" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-97

Petitioner

Saenz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Roe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 489 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, January 13, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 17, 1999

Advocates

Mark D. Rosenbaum (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore Garelis (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

Facts of the Case

Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), states receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) can pay the benefit amount of another State's TANF program to residents who have lived in the State for less than 12 months. When California announced it would enforce this option, Brenda Roe brought this class action, on behalf of other first year residents, challenging the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement. On appeal from successive adverse rulings in the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Rita Saenz, the Director of California's Department of Social Services, certiorari.

Question

Does a state statute, authorizing states receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families to pay the benefit amount of another State's TANF to its first year residents, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's right-to-travel protections?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Roe, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Privileges and Immunities Clause

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to travel in three ways by: allowing citizens to move freely between states, securing the right to be treated equally in all states when visiting, and securing the rights of new citizens to be treated like long-time citizens of a state. The Court explained that by paying first-year residents the same TNF benefits they received in their state of origin, states treated new residents differently than others who have lived in their borders for over one year. As such, enforcement of the PRWORA power unconstitutionally discriminated among residents.

NASA v. FLRA

Tue, 23 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-369

Petitioner

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 229 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, March 23, 1999

Decided

Thursday, June 17, 1999

Advocates

Stuart Kirsch (Argued the cause for respondent American Federation of Government Employees)

David M. Smith (Argued the cause for respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority)

David C. Frederick (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

After enacting the Inspector General Act (IGA), which created an Office of Inspector General (OIG) in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other federal agencies, Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor- Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS). The FSLMRS permits union participation at an employee examination conducted "by a representative of the agency" if the employee believes that the examination will result in disciplinary action and requests such representation. In January 1993, NASA's OIG (NASA-OIG) conducted an investigation of certain threatening activities of a NASA employee. A NASA-OIG investigator interviewed the employee and permitted the employee's union representative to attend. Subsequently, the employee's union filed a charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority), alleging that NASA and its OIG had committed an unfair labor practice when the investigator limited the union representative's participation in the interview. In ruling for the union, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that the OIG investigator was a "representative" of NASA within FSLMRS' meaning, and that the investigator's behavior had violated the employee's right to union representation. On review, the Authority agreed and granted relief against both NASA and NASA-OIG. The Court of Appeals upheld the Authority's rulings and granted the Authority's application for enforcement of its order.

Question

May an investigator employed in NASA's Office of Inspector General be considered a "representative" of NASA when examining a NASA employee, such that the right to union representation in the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute may be invoked?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for FLRA, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 7114

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that an investigator from NASA's Office of Inspector General is a "representative" of NASA when conducting an employee examination covered by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, such that the right to union representation in the FSLMRS may be invoked. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, declared: "[E]mploying ordinary tools of statutory construction...we have no difficulty concluding that [the law] is not limited to agency investigators representing an entity that collectively bargains with the employee's union." Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia, dissented, citing the independence guaranteed Inspectors General by the Inspector General Act as reason for investigators not representing management with the meaning of the FSLMRS.

Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc.

Tue, 01 Dec 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-53

Petitioner

Roberts

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Galen of Virginia, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 249 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, December 1, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, January 13, 1999

Advocates

Joseph H. Mattingly, III (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the respondent)

James A. Feldman (For the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Wanda Johnson was run over by a truck in May 1992 and was rushed to the Humana Hospital-University of Louisville, Kentucky, now Galen of Virginia, Inc. After about six weeks at Galen, during which time Johnson's health remained in a volatile state, Galen's agents arranged for her transfer to the Crestview Health Care Facility in Indiana. Johnson was transferred to Crestview in July, and upon arrival her condition deteriorated significantly. Johnson was taken to the Midwest Medical Center where she remained for many months and incurred substantial medical expenses as a result of her deterioration. Jane Roberts, Johnson's guardian, then filed a federal action under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), alleging violations of Section 1395dd(b) of the Act. Section 1395dd of the Act places obligations of screening and stabilization upon hospitals and emergency rooms that receive patients suffering from an "emergency medical condition." The District Court granted summary judgment for Galen on the ground that Roberts had failed to show that "either the medical opinion that Johnson was stable or the decision to authorize her transfer was caused by an improper motive." In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that in order to state a claim in an EMTALA suit alleging a violation of Section 1395dd(b)'s stabilization requirement, a plaintiff must show that the hospital's inappropriate stabilization resulted from an improper motive such as one involving the indigency, race, or sex of the patient.

Question

Must a plaintiff prove that a hospital acted with an improper motive in failing to stabilize a patient in order to prove a violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Roberts, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1395

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Section 1395dd(b) of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act contains no expressed or implied "improper motive" requirement. According o the Court's opinion, "there is no question that the text of Section 1395dd(b) does not require an "appropriate stabilization, nor can it reasonably be read to require an improper motive."

Conn and Najera v. Gabbert

Tue, 23 Feb 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1802

Petitioner

Conn and Najera

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gabbert

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 286 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, February 23, 1999

Decided

Monday, April 5, 1999

Advocates

Kevin C. Brazile (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Michael J. Lightfoot (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorneys David Conn and Carol Najera, prosecutors in the retrial of the Menendez brothers, learned that Lyle Menendez had written a letter to Traci Baker, in which he may have instructed her to testify falsely at the first trial. After being subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury and to produce any correspondence that she had received from Menendez, Baker responded that she had given all of Menendez's letters to her attorney, Paul L. Gabbert. When Baker appeared as directed before the grand jury, accompanied by Gabbert, Conn directed police to secure a warrant to search Gabbert for the letter. While Gabbert was being searched, Najera called Baker before the grand jury for questioning. Gabbert brought suit against the prosecutors contending that his Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession without unreasonable government interference was violated when the prosecutors executed a search warrant at the same time his client was testifying before the grand jury. The Federal District Court granted Conn and Najera summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals held that Conn and Najera were not entitled to qualified immunity on Gabbert's Fourteenth Amendment claim because their actions were not objectively reasonable. The court concluded that Gabbert had a right to practice his profession without undue and unreasonable government interference.

Question

Does a prosecutor violate the opposing attorney's Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession when the prosecutor causes the attorney to be searched at the same time his client is testifying before a grand jury?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Conn and Najera, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "[a] prosecutor does not violate an attorney's Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession by executing a search warrant while the attorney's client is testifying before a grand jury." Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[w]e hold that the 14th Amendment right to practice one's calling is not violated by the execution of a search warrant, whether calculated to annoy or even to prevent consultation with a grand jury witness." Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment.

Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild

Mon, 05 Oct 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1056

Petitioner

Marquez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Screen Actors Guild

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 33 (1998)

Argued

Monday, October 5, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, November 3, 1998

Advocates

Leo Geffner (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Naomi Marquez, part-time actress, auditioned successfully for a role in a television series produced by Lakeside Pictures. Pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement, Lakeside contacted the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) to confirm that Marquez met the "union security clause" of the agreement that requires union "membership" as a condition for employment. The clause stated one must be a member "in good standing." Subsequently, Marquez was denied the part because she had not paid her dues. Marquez filed suit alleging SAG breached its duty of fair representation with its union security clause. First, Marquez argued she should have been made aware of her established legal right not to join the union, but only to pay for its representational activities. Second, Marquez claimed that the clause required repetitious thirty-day previous work periods every time motion picture employment ceased. The District Court summarily ruled against Marquez because the clause followed the National Labor Relations Act; therefore, it did not breach its duty of fair representation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on the first claim, but held the second claim was in the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.

Question

Can collective bargaining contracts require membership for employment without articulating what it means to be "in good standing?"

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Screen Actors Guild, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled collective bargaining contracts do not have to spell out what it means to be "in good standing." Justice O'Conner noted that requiring membership to be specified in a contract would force all terms to be specified. There would be no limit.

Mitchell v. United States

Wed, 09 Dec 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-7541

Petitioner

Mitchell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 314 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, December 9, 1998

Decided

Monday, April 5, 1999

Advocates

Steven A. Morley (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent)

Facts of the Case

Amanda Mitchell and others were indicted for offenses arising from a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Mitchell was charged with one count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. Mitchell pleaded guilty, but reserved the right to contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count during her sentencing hearing. Before accepting her plea, the District Court told Mitchell that she faced a mandatory minimum of 1 year in prison for distributing cocaine and a 10-year minimum for conspiracy if the government could show the required 5 kilograms. The court also explained to Mitchell that by pleading guilty she would be waiving her right "at trial to remain silent." At Mitchell's sentencing hearing, the District Court found, after hearing testimony that included some of Mitchell's codefendants, that Mitchell's alleged drug sales of 1 1/2 to 2 ounces of cocaine twice a week for year and a half put her over the 5-kilogram threshold. Mitchell did not testify to rebut the Government's evidence about drug quantity; however, her counsel argued the quantity of cocaine attributable to her for sentencing purposes. The District Court ruled that as a consequence of Mitchell's guilty plea, she had no right to remain silent about her crime's details; found that the codefendants' testimony put her over the 5-kilogram threshold, thus mandating the 10-year minimum; and noted that her failure to testify was a factor in persuading the court to rely on the codefendants' testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does a guilty plea in federal court waive a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during sentencing? When a defendant invokes his or her Fifth Amendment privilege during sentencing, may a trial court draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Mitchell, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Self-Incrimination

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that in the federal criminal system, a guilty plea does not waive the self-incrimination privilege at sentencing and that a sentencing court may not draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence in determining facts relating to the circumstances and details of the crime. "Treating a guilty plea as a waiver of the privilege at sentencing would be a grave encroachment on the rights of defendants," wrote Justice Kennedy for the Court. Justice Kennedy continued that "by holding [Mitchell's] silence against her in determining the facts of the offense at the sentencing hearing, the District Court imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise of the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination." Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the dissenting minority, expressed the view that, while the Court properly held Mitchell did not waive her privilege, she "did not have the right to have the sentencer abstain from making the adverse inferences that reasonably flow from her failure to testify."

Neder v. United States

Tue, 23 Feb 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1985

Petitioner

Neder

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 1 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, February 23, 1999

Decided

Thursday, June 10, 1999

Advocates

Roy W. McLeese (Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent)

Javier H. Rubenstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Javier H. Rubinstein (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In the mid-1980's, Ellis E. Neder, Jr., engaged in a number of real estate transactions financed by fraudulently obtained bank loans and schemes involving land development fraud. He was indicted on numerous counts of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud and of filing false federal income tax returns. At trial, the District Court instructed the jury that, to convict on the bank and tax offenses, it did not need to consider the materiality of any false statements, or whether Neder's actions, in fact, caused others to be defrauded. In instructing the jury on mail and wire fraud, the court did not include materiality as an element of either offense. Neder objected. Thereafter, Neder was convicted of filing false federal income tax returns and of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the court erred in failing to submit the materiality element of the tax offense to the jury. However, under harmless-error analysis, the appeals court concluded the error was harmless because the error "'did not contribute to the verdict obtained." The appeals court also determined that materiality is not an element of mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. Thus, the District Court did not err in failing to submit materiality to the jury.

Question

Does the District Court's omission of the element of materiality from a jury instruction on tax fraud constitute harmless error? Is materiality an element of federal mail, wire, and bank fraud?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes and Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chef Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held 6-3 that under the harmless-error rule, which applies to a jury instruction that omits an element of an offense, the trial court's error did not render Neder's trial "fundamentally unfair." Thus, the error was harmless. In dissent, Justices Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that depriving a criminal defendant of the right to have a jury determine his commission of every element of the crime charged could not constitute a harmless error. Additionally, the Court unanimously held that materiality is an element of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud.

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians

Wed, 02 Dec 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1337

Petitioner

Minnesota

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 172 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, December 2, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, March 24, 1999

Advocates

John L. Kirwin (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara B. McDowell (Argued the cause on behalf of the United States)

Randy V. Thompson (Argued the cause on behalf of the respondents John W. Thompson et al)

Marc D. Slonim (on behalf of the Respondents Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, et al)

Mark D. Slonim (Argued the cause of behalf of the respondents Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, et al)

Facts of the Case

Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians ceded land in present-day Minnesota to the U.S. in an 1837 treaty. In return, the U.S. granted the Mille Lacs Band certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded land. An 1850 Executive Order by President Taylor ordered the removal of the Mille Lacs Band and revoked their usufructuary rights. An 1855 treaty set aside reservation lands for the Mille Lacs Band, but did not mention their rights. The Mille Lacs Band sued, seeking a declaratory judgment stated that they retained their usufructuary rights and an injunction to prevent the state's interference with those rights. The District Court ultimately ruled that the Mille Lacs Band retained their usufructuary rights under the 1837 treaty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The courts rejected arguments that the 1850 Executive Order abrogated the usufructuary rights guaranteed by the 1837 treaty and that Minnesota's entrance into the Union in 1858 extinguished any Indian treaty rights under the "equal footing doctrine."

Question

Does the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians have usufructuary rights on land now part of the state of Minnesota?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 7 Stat. 536

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians does have usufructuary rights that were guaranteed to them by the 1837 treaty. After an examination of the historical record, the Court held that the 1850 Executive Order was ineffective to terminate Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary rights, that the Mille Lacs Band did not relinquish its 1837 treaty rights in the 1855 treaty, and that the Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary rights were not extinguished when Minnesota was admitted to the Union.

Clinton v. Goldsmith

Mon, 22 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-347

Petitioner

Clinton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Goldsmith

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 529 (1999)

Argued

Monday, March 22, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 17, 1999

Advocates

John M. Economidy (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

James T. Goldsmith, an Air Force major, defied an order from a superior officer to inform his sex partners that he was infected with HIV and to take measures to block any transfer of bodily fluids during sexual intercourse. Goldsmith was convicted by general court-martial under several counts and sentenced to six years' confinement and partial forfeiture of salary. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Goldsmith sought no review of the decision in the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) and his conviction became final. Subsequently, the Air Force notified Goldsmith that it was taking action to drop him from the rolls under a newly enacted statute. Goldsmith then petitioned the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act, which authorizes courts established by Congress to "issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions," to redress the unrelated alleged interruption of his HIV medication during his incarceration, but did not immediately contest his removal from the Air Force rolls. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to act. On appeal to the CAAF from this determination, Goldsmith first asserted the claim that the Air Force's action to drop him violated the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution. He argued that the statute had been enacted after the date of his court-martial conviction and that the action would inflict successive punishment based on the same conduct underlying his first conviction. The CAAF granted his petition for extraordinary relief to redress the interruption of his HIV medication and relied on the All Writs Act in enjoining the President and other officials from dropping Goldsmith from the Air Force rolls.

Question

Does the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have the jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to enjoin the President and various military officials from dropping a convict from the rolls of the Air Force?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Clinton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1651

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that because the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' resort to the All Writs Act was neither in aid of its strictly circumscribed jurisdiction to review court-martial findings and sentences nor "necessary or appropriate" in light of a servicemember's alternative opportunities to seek relief, that court lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction against dropping Goldsmith from the Air Force rolls. Justice Souter's opinion emphasized the alternative avenues of relief available to Goldsmith.

Bank of America v. 203 North LaSalle Partnership

Mon, 02 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1418

Petitioner

Bank of America

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

203 North LaSalle Partnership

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 424 (1999)

Argued

Monday, November 2, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 3, 1999

Advocates

Roy T. Englert, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Richard M. Bendix, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Patricia A. Millett (For the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association issued a $93 million loan to 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the debtor's principal asset, part of a Chicago office building. When the debtor defaulted on the loan, the bank began foreclosure. LaSalle filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code. The debtor's purposed reorganization plan called for only previous equity holders to contribute new capital in exchange for the debtor's entire ownership of the reorganized entity. The Bank of America objected. The bank's objection prevented confirmation of the plan. LaSalle resorted to a judicial "cramdown" process for imposing the plan on Bank of America. The cramdown process requires a reorganization plan to be fair and equitable with respect to the creditors so a judge will authorize it. Bank of America argued the plan violated the cramdown's "absolute priority rule," which prevents debtor's equity holders from receiving ownership when claims will not be paid in full and, thus, the plan should have been denied. Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Court approved the plan. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Question

May a debtor's prebankruptcy equity holders contribute new capital and receive ownership in a reorganized entity when the creditor objected to the reorganization plan?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Bank of America, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

No. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled a debtor's prebankruptcy equity holders may not, over the objections of creditors, contribute new capital and receive ownership in the debtor's reorganized entity if no one else has been given a chance to come up with an alternative reorganization plan.

Jefferson County v. Acker

Mon, 29 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-10

Petitioner

Jefferson County

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Acker

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 423 (1999)

Argued

Monday, March 29, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 21, 1999

Advocates

Alan B. Morrison (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jeffrey M. Sewell (Birmingham, Alabama, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kent L. Jones (Argued the cause for the United States, supporting the petitioner, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

Facts of the Case

Two U.S. District Judges, William M. Acker, Jr., and U. W. Clemon, who maintain their principal offices in Jefferson County, Alabama, resisted payment of a state-approved, county-authorized occupational tax on the ground that it violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. The county instituted collection suits in Alabama small claims court against the judges, who removed the suits to the Federal District Court under the federal officer removal statute. The federal court denied the county's motions to remand and granted summary judgment for the judges, holding the county tax unconstitutional under the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine to the extent that it reached federal judges' compensation. The en banc Court of Appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Jefferson County's initial petition for certiorari and remanded for further consideration of whether the Tax Injunction Act deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its prior en banc decision. Certiorari was granted again to consider whether the removal from state court to federal court was unauthorized by the federal officer removal statute, the Tax Injunction Act issue, and the merits of the case.

Question

May Jefferson County impose a "license or privilege tax" upon two U.S. District Judges? Was the dispute properly transferred to the federal district court under the federal officer removal statute? Does the Tax Injunction Act deprive the district court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Jefferson County, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 4 U.S.C. 111

Yes, yes, and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Jefferson County may impose an occupation tax on the U.S. District Judges, for "Jefferson County's tax operates as a nondiscriminatory tax on the judges' compensation, to which the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 consents when it allows States to tax the pay that federal employees receive if the taxation does not discriminate against [that] employee because of the source of the pay or compensation." Further, the Court held that the case was properly removed under the federal officer removal statute because the Jefferson County tax effects the judges' "performance of federal judicial duties in the county and risks interfering with the Federal Judiciary's operation in violation of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine." The Court also concluded that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar federal-court adjudication of the matter.

California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission

Wed, 13 Jan 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1625

Petitioner

California Dental Association

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Federal Trade Commission

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 756 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, January 13, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 24, 1999

Advocates

Peter M. Sfikas (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The California Dental Association (CDA), a nonprofit association of local dental societies, provides its members with insurance and financing arrangements, and engages in lobbying, litigation, marketing, and public relations for members' benefit. Members agree to abide by the CDA's Code of Ethics, which prohibits false or misleading advertising. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought a complaint against the CDA, alleging that the CDA's guidelines restricted two types of truthful, non-deceptive advertising: price advertising and advertising relating to the quality of dental services and therefore had violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that the FTC had jurisdiction over the CDA and found a violation of section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC adopted most of the ALJ's factual findings and held that the price advertising, as well as the non-price, restrictions were violations of the Sherman and FTC Acts under an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis. In affirming, the Court of Appeals sustain the FTC's jurisdiction and concluded that an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was proper in this case.

Question

Does the Federal Trade Commission have jurisdiction over the California Dental Association (CDA), a nonprofit professional association? Does an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis suffice to justify the conclusion that the CDA's advertising restrictions violated the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for California Dental Association, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Trade Commission

Yes and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the FTC's jurisdiction extends to associations like the CDA, which provide substantial economic benefit to their for-profit members, but that because the disputed anti-competitive efforts were not obvious, more than the abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis, performed in this case, was required. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that, "[n]onprofit entities organized on behalf of for-profit members have the same capacity... to engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair and deceptive acts." Justice Souter, however, concluded that the Court of Appeals should have used a less-abbreviated standard of review to determine whether the FTC's invalidation of the CDA's rules was justified.

Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc.

Mon, 05 Oct 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1570

Petitioner

Nynex Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Discon, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 128 (1998)

Argued

Monday, October 5, 1998

Decided

Monday, December 14, 1998

Advocates

Lawrence C. Brown (Argued the cause for the respondent)

James R. Young (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Lawrence G. Wallace (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Discon Incorporated sold services to remove obsolete telephone equipment to Material Enterprises Company, a subsidiary of NYNEX Corporation. When Material Enterprises started to buy removal services from AT&T; Technologies instead, Discon filed suit alleging NYNEX had engaged in unfair and anticompetitive practices. Discon claimed that Material Enterprises paid AT&T; more than Discon would have received. Material Enterprises passed on the extra cost to the customers of NYNEX. Material Enterprises then received a rebate from AT&T; and shared it with NYNEX. Discon alleged these practices were intended to them and to benefit their competitor, AT&T;, because Discon refused to participate in the scheme. The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, but held Discon's claims were founded under the Sherman Act. Discon had a valid claim in antitrust rules that prohibit group boycotts because the practices were anticompetitive. Moreover, the complaint stated a valid conspiracy to monopolize. NYNEX argued that this case did not constitute a group boycott and therefore it could not proceed.

Question

Does the antitrust rule outlawing group boycotts apply to a single buyer's decision to buy from one company over another?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nynex Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sherman

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled the group boycott rule does not apply to claims with a single buyer and a single supplier. In the competitive environment antitrust laws seek to encourage, NYNEX had the freedom to switch its vendor. As for the conspiracy to monopolize claim, the Court remanded the case to provide Discon a chance to show that NYNEX agreements possibly harmed the competitive process.

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.

Mon, 22 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-470

Petitioner

Ruhrgas AG

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Marathon Oil Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 574 (1999)

Argued

Monday, March 22, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 17, 1999

Advocates

Clifton T. Hutchinson (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Charles Alan Wright (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1976, Marathon Oil Company and Marathon International Oil Company acquired Marathon Petroleum Norge (Norge) and Marathon Petroleum Company (Norway) (MPCN). Following the acquisition, Norge assigned its license to produce gas from the North Sea's Heimdal Field to MPCN, which then contracted to sell 70 percent of its share of the Heimdal gas production to a group of European buyers, including Ruhrgas AG. MPCN's sales agreement with Ruhrgas and the other European buyers provided that disputes would be settled by arbitration in Sweden. In 1995, Marathon Oil Company, Marathon International Oil Company, and Norge sued Ruhrgas in Texas state court, asserting state-law claims of fraud, tortious interference with prospective business relations, participation in breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. Ruhrgas removed the case to the District Court, asserting three bases for federal jurisdiction. Ruhrgas then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the parties. Marathon moved to remand the case to the state court for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the category of claim in the suit. The District Court granted Ruhrgas' motion. Noting that Texas' long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the court addressed the constitutional question and concluded that Ruhrgas' contacts with Texas were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that, in removed cases, district courts must decide issues of subject-matter jurisdiction first, reaching issues of personal jurisdiction only if subject- matter jurisdiction is found to exist.

Question

Is a federal district court barred from dismissing a removed case for lack of personal jurisdiction without first deciding its subject-matter jurisdiction?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ruhrgas AG, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1331

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that in cases removed from a state court to federal court there is "no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy requiring the federal court to adjudicate subject-matter jurisdiction before considering a challenge to personal jurisdiction." Customarily, however, a federal court would first resolve doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter. Justice Ginsburg wrote, "[w]here...a district court has before it a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the alleged defect in subject matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction."

Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.

Wed, 07 Oct 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-889

Petitioner

Wright

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Universal Maritime Service Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 70 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, October 7, 1998

Decided

Monday, November 16, 1998

Advocates

Charles A. Edwards (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Ray P. McClain (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Barbara D. Underwood (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Ceasar Wright worked as a longshoreman. He belonged to the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, a union that supplied workers to the South Carolina Stevedores Association (SCSA). In 1992, Wright sustained a worked-related; he sought compensation for permanent disability under federal law. In 1995, Wright returned to Longshoremen's Association to be referred for work. When the stevedoring companies, to which he was referred, discovered that he had previously settled a claim for permanent disability, they informed the union they would not accept Wright for employment. Under the collective- bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Longshoremen's Association and the SCSA, Wright was not qualified to perform longshore work if he was permanently disabled. Wright chose not to file a grievance under the CBA, but instead to file a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). He alleged the stevedoring companies and the SCSA had discriminated against him by refusing him work. The District Court dismissed the case because Wright had failed to pursue the grievance procedure -- arbitration -- provided by the CBA. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

May employees sue over alleged discrimination under the ADA when their union contract requires grievances to be handled through arbitration?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wright, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the CBA's arbitration clause did not require Wright to use the arbitration procedure for the alleged violation of the ADA. In his opinion, Scalia wrote that the CBA did not contain a waiver of the employee's right to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment discrimination.

Dickinson v. Zurko

Wed, 24 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-377

Petitioner

Dickinson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Zurko

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 150 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, March 24, 1999

Decided

Thursday, June 10, 1999

Advocates

Ernest Gellhorn (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Mary E. Zurko, and others, applied for a patent upon a method for increasing computer security. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) patent examiner concluded that Zurko's method was obvious in light of prior art and, therefore, denied the application. The PTO's review board, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, upheld the examiner's decision. Zurko sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In reviewing PTO's decision to deny Zurko's patent application, the Federal Circuit analyzed the PTO's factual finding using a "clearly erroneous" standard of review, which generally governs appellate review of district court findings of fact (court/court review), rather than the less stringent standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permit a court to set aside agency findings of fact found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence. The court found the PTO's factual finding to be clearly erroneous. The Federal Circuit then heard the matter en banc. After examining relevant precedents, the en banc court concluded that its use of the stricter court/court standard was legally proper. The Solicitor General, representing the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Q. Todd Dickinson, sought certiorari.

Question

Must the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit use the framework set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act when reviewing the Patent and Trademark Office's findings of fact?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Dickinson, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Administrative Procedure, or Administrative Orders Review

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit must use the framework set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act when reviewing PTO findings of fact. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that, "[A] close examination of the...cases reviewing PTO decisions do not reflect a well-established court/court standard." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, dissented, noting that at the time of the enactment of the APA judicial review of fact-finding by the PTO under the "clearly erroneous" standard was an "additional requiremen[t]...recognized by law."

Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.

Tue, 08 Dec 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1704

Petitioner

Ortiz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fibreboard Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 815 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, December 8, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, June 23, 1999

Advocates

Elihu Inselbuch (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

After decades of litigation, Fibreboard Corporation and a group of plaintiffs' lawyers reached a "Global Settlement Agreement" of its asbestos personal- injury liability. Subsequently, a group of named plaintiffs filed the present action in Federal District Court, seeking certification for settlement purposes of a mandatory class that comprised three certain groups. Intervening objectors argued that the absence of a "limited fund" precluded Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) provides that "an action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of... (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." The court ruled that both the disputed insurance asset liquidated by the global settlement, and, alternatively, the sum of the value of Fibreboard plus the value of its insurance coverage, as measured by the insurance funds' settlement value, were relevant "limited funds." The Court of Appeals affirmed both the class certification and the adequacy of the settlement. The appellate court approved the class certification, under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), on a limited fund rationale based on the threat to other class members' ability to receive full payment from the manufacturer's limited assets.

Question

Is a mandatory settlement class in asbestos personal injury litigation certifiable on limited fund theory under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ortiz, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "applicants for contested certification [of a mandatory settlement class on a limited fund theory under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)] must show that the fund is limited by more than the agreement of the parties, and has been allocated to claimants belonging within the class by a process addressing any conflicting interests of class members." "The record on which the District Court rested its certification of the class for the purpose of the global settlement did not support the essential premises of mandatory limited fund actions. It failed to demonstrate that the fund was limited except by the agreement of the parties, and it showed exclusions from the class and allocations of assets at odds with the concept of limited fund treatment and the structural protections of Rule 23(a) explained in [Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor]," concluded Justice Souter.

Minnesota v. Carter

Tue, 06 Oct 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Kimberley Thompson's Apartment

3943 South Valley View Drive Eagan MN 55122

Eagan, MN 55122

United States

44° 48' 43.2" N, 93° 12' 32.4" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1147

Petitioner

Minnesota

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carter

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 83 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, October 6, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, December 1, 1998

Advocates

Bradford Colbert (Argued the cause for the respondents)

James C. Backstrom (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Wayne Thomas Carter, Melvin Johns, and Kimberly Thompson were arrested after a police officer observed them through a window bagging cocaine in Thompson's apartment. During the trial in Minnesota state court, the defendants moved to suppress the cocaine as evidence. They argued the officer's initial observation was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Subsequently, they were all convicted on state drug charges. The Minnesota trial court held that because they were not overnight social guests they were not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the court held that the officer's window-based observation was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the state intermediate appellate court held Carter did not have standing for an objection to the officer's action because his use of the apartment for drug purposes removed any legitimate expectation of privacy. The court also affirmed Johns' conviction . The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. It held that the defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place and that the officer's observation constituted an unreasonable search. Minnesota sought a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.

Question

In accordance with the Fourth Amendment, do household visitors have the same protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as do residents or overnight social guests?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Minnesota, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. The Court held, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, that people who visit someone's home for a short time do not have the same protection against unreasonable police searches and seizures as do the residents or their overnight guests. Short-term visits for commercial transactions are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that nothing in the case served to show that Carter was accepted into the household.

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel

Tue, 30 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-2048

Petitioner

O'Sullivan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Boerckel

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 838 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, March 30, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 7, 1999

Advocates

William L. Browers (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David B. Mote (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After Darren Boerckel's state convictions of rape, burglary, and aggravated battery were affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The petition asked for relief on six grounds: (1) that Boerckel had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights; (2) that his confession was not voluntary; (3) that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (4) that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest; (5) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (6) that his right to discovery of exculpatory material was violated. In denying the petition, the District Court found that Boerckel had procedurally defaulted his first three claims by failing to include them in his petition to the Illinois Supreme Court. In reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeals concluding that Boerckel had not procedurally defaulted those claims because he was not required to present them in a petition for discretionary review to the Illinois Supreme Court in order to satisfy 28 U. S. C. Sections 2254(b)(1), (c), the exhaustion requirement. Under the exhaustion requirement federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have exhausted their claims in state court.

Question

Must a state prisoner present all of his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, 28 U. S. C. Sections 2254(b)(1), (c), for federal habeas relief?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for O'Sullivan, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 6-3 decision, delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review when that review is part of the State's ordinary appellate review procedure. Justice O'Connor wrote for the court that "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the state's established appellate review process." Inmates can use federal habeas petitions as shortcuts only if their state's highest court does not allow them to raise all claims before it, she said.

Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. and Charlene F.

Wed, 04 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1793

Petitioner

Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Garret F. and Charlene F.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 66 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, November 4, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, March 3, 1999

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Susan L. Seitz (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Douglas R. Oelschlaeger (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Garret F., a minor and student in Cedar Rapids Community School District, is wheelchair-bound and ventilator dependent. He requires assistance in attending to his physical needs during the school day. The school district declined to accept financial responsibility for Garret's services in order for him to be able to attend school. The school district believed it was not legally obligated to provide one-on-one care. An Administrative Law judge concluded that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) required the school district to provide "school health services," which are provided by a "qualified school nurse or other qualified person," but not medical services, which are limited to services provided by a physician. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed despite arguments from the school district that such one-on-one care is too costly and too involved to be considered anything but medical in nature.

Question

Do schools that receive federal funding under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act have to pay for one-on-one nursing assistance for certain of their disabled students?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Garret F. and Charlene F., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Education of the Handicapped, Education for All Handicapped Children, or Individuals with Disabilities Education Acts, or related statutes, as amended; also see ADA

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that if the services in question are "related" to keeping the disabled child in school and able to access educational opportunities available to others IDEA funded school districts must provide such services. The Court added that although the nature and cost of providing certain IDEA "related services" is not determinative of whether their financial burdens must be met, potential financial burdens shall inform any decision governing their provision. In the present case, the benefits of providing Garret with his needed care outweighed the burdens.

Cunningham v. Hamilton County OH

Mon, 19 Apr 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-727

Petitioner

Cunningham

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hamilton County OH

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 198 (1999)

Argued

Monday, April 19, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 14, 1999

Advocates

Thomas C. Goldstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

John J. Arnold (Cincinnati, Ohio, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Teresa L. Cunningham, an attorney representing a plaintiff, was served with a request for interrogatories and documents with responses due within 30 days after service. Cunningham failed to comply with those discovery orders, and a Magistrate Judge granted Hamilton County's motion for sanctions against her under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4). The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge's order for sanctions. The court also disqualified Cunningham as counsel. Although the District Court proceedings were ongoing, Cunningham immediately appealed the order affirming the sanctions award. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because federal appellate court jurisdiction is ordinarily limited to appeals from "final decisions of the district courts." The court also held that the sanctions order was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, which provides that certain orders may be appealed, notwithstanding the absence of final judgment, because Cunningham's appeal was not completely separate from the merits of the case.

Question

Is an order imposing sanctions on an attorney, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4), a final decision and, thus, immediately appealable?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hamilton County OH, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an order imposing sanctions on an attorney pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4) is not a "final decision," even where the attorney no longer represents a party in the case. "To permit an immediate appeal from such a sanctions order would undermine the very purposes of Rule 37(a), which was designed to protect courts and opposing parties from delaying or harassing tactics during the discovery process," Justice Thomas wrote for the Court. The Court concluded that piecemeal appeals and concomitant delays would preclude final judgement if such immediate appeals were possible. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion.

Sutton v. United Air Lines

Wed, 28 Apr 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1943

Petitioner

Sutton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United Air Lines

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 471 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, April 28, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, June 22, 1999

Advocates

Roy T. Englert, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Edwin S. Kneedler (For the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Van Aaron Hughes (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton (the Suttons) are identical twins who suffer from acute visual myopia. They brought suit against United Airlines (United) under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Section12101 et seq., after United failed to hire them as commercial airline pilots because their uncorrected vision was worse than 20/100. Although each sister suffered from severe myopia, their vision was correctable with glasses and both sisters were able to function normally in their daily lives. The Suttons claimed that they were disabled within the meaning of the ADA either because, under 42 U.S.C. Section12102(2)(A), they suffered from a physical impairment that "substantially limits . . . major life activities," or because, under 42 U.S.C. Section12102(2)(C), they were regarded as having such an impairment. The district court granted United's 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the Suttons' complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.

Question

(1) Should the determination of disability under 42 U.S.C. Section12102(2)(A) be made without reference to corrective measures that mitigate the impairment? (2) Is poor vision regarded as an impairment that substantially limits the Suttons in a major life activity?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United Air Lines, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

No and no. Determination of disability under the ADA should be made in reference to an individual's ability to mitigate his or her impairment through corrective measures. This reading is in harmony with the statutory language and history of the ADA because (1) the phrase "substantially limits" requires consideration of present, not future or hypothetical, impairment; (2) the ADA calls for individualized assessments of impairment; and (3) Congress found that approximately 43 million Americans were disabled, a number that would be far too low if Congress had meant to include all those with correctable impairments. Also, assuming without deciding that working is a major life activity for purposes of the ADA, poor vision cannot be regarded as a substantially limiting impairment because it has only foreclosed the Suttons from pursuing work as "global airline pilots," not from numerous other positions in the aviation industry.

Kolstad v. American Dental Association

Mon, 01 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-208

Petitioner

Kolstad

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Dental Association

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 526 (1999)

Argued

Monday, March 1, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, June 22, 1999

Advocates

Eric Schnapper (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Raymond C. Fay (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Carole Kolstad sued the American Dental Association (ADA) for gender discrimination, under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title II), when it promoted a man instead of her. At trial, the District Court denied Kolstad's request for punitive damages based on a showing that the ADA acted with "malice" and "reckless indifference" to her federally protected rights. When the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, Kolstad appealed and the Supreme Court granted he certiorari.

Question

Does an employer's conduct have to be "egregious" or "outrageous," independent of its state of mind, in order to sustain an award of punitive damages under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for American Dental Association, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1991

Split Vote

No. In a complicated split opinion, the Court held that if an employee can show their employer knowingly acted in violation of federal law then punitive damages may be sustained. The Court explained that the "malice" or "reckless indifference" standard applied to the relationship between employers and federal law, and is not a characterization of the severity threshold that the discrimination itself must meet. In other words, if an employer maliciously or recklessly violates a federal anti-discrimination law, regardless of the severity of their discriminatory acts, them punitive damages may be imposed. The Court remanded Kolstad's case for renewed consideration of her employer's state of mind during the alleged violations.

Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank

Tue, 20 Apr 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-531

Petitioner

Florida Prepaid

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

College Savings Bank

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 627 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, April 20, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, June 23, 1999

Advocates

Kevin J. Culligan (Argued the cause for College Savings Bank)

Jonathan A. Glogau (Tallahassee, Florida; argued the cause for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

Immediately after the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Act) changed patent laws to abrogate state's sovereign immunity, College Savings Bank (College) filed a patent infringement suit against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity. Florida Prepaid asked that College's suit be dismissed and that the Act be declared unconstitutional, based on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (517 US 44) which upheld state sovereign immunity. The United States joined College looking to uphold the Act's constitutionality. After agreeing with College, the District Court denied Florida Prepaid's dismissal motion. When the Federal Circuit affirmed, Florida Prepaid appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Did nullification of state sovereign immunity, under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, constitute valid legislation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Florida Prepaid, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 35 U.S.C. 271

No. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court began by noting that there was no doubt that the Act intended to abrogate states' immunity from patent infringement. The Court then added that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Patent Clause give Congress the power to curtail state sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims. The Court reasoned that although the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to pass "appropriate legislation" to protect parties from being deprived of property without due process, this in itself does not permit the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Only a showing of a consistent pattern of state patent violations, and a lack of adequate legal remedies to address such violations, would justify a limited effort to suspend a state's sovereign immunity. Since College made no such showing, and since the Act's language was overly broad in its scope, the Court dismissed College's suit and declared unconstitutional corresponding segments of the Act.

West v. Gibson

Mon, 26 Apr 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-238

Petitioner

West

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gibson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 212 (1999)

Argued

Monday, April 26, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 14, 1999

Advocates

Timothy M. Kelly (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1991, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to permit victims of intentional employment discrimination, whether within the private sector or the federal government, to recover compensatory damages. Thereafter, Michael Gibson filed a complaint with the Department of Veterans Affairs, alleging that the Department had discriminated against him by denying him a promotion on the basis of his gender. The Department found against Gibson. Afterwards, however, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) awarded Gibson the promotion plus backpay. Later Gibson filed suit, in the District Court, seeking compensatory damages and a court order for the Department to comply with the EEOC's order. Subsequently, the Department voluntarily complied with the EEOC's order, but it opposed Gibson's claim for compensatory damages. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Gibson's complaint. On appeal, the Department supported the District Court's dismissal with the argument that Gibson had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in respect to his compensatory damages claim; therefore, he could not bring that claim in court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals rejected the Department's argument. The court viewed the EEOC as lacking the legal power necessary to award compensatory damages. Consequently, there was no administrative remedy to exhaust.

Question

Does the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission possess the legal authority to require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they discriminate in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for West, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission possess the legal authority to require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they discriminate in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the dissenting minority, expressed the view that that the EEOC could not have awarded compensatory damages against the United States under Title VII because the statute did not authorize such awards in explicit terms. Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy, it did not provide the required waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity.

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund

Wed, 31 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-231

Petitioner

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alliance Bond Fund

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 308 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, March 31, 1999

Decided

Thursday, June 17, 1999

Advocates

Richard A. Mescon (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Drew S. Days, III (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., an investment fund, purchased approximately $75 million in unsecured notes (Notes) from Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A., (GMD) a Mexican holding company involved in a tool road construction program sponsored by the Government of Mexico. Four GMD subsidiaries guaranteed the Notes. After GMD fell into financial trouble and missed an interest payment on the Notes, Alliance accelerated the Notes' principal amount and filed suit for the amount due in Federal District Court. Alliance requested a preliminary injunction restraining GMD from transferring its assets alleging that GMD was at risk of insolvency, or already insolvent, that it was preferring its Mexican creditors by its planned allocation to them of its most valuable assets, and that these actions would frustrate any judgment that Alliance could obtain. Alliance sought monetary damages and no lien or equitable interest was claimed. The District Court issued the preliminary injunction and ordered GMD to post a $50,000 bond. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the District Court, in an action for monetary damages, have the authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing the defendant from transferring assets in which no lien or equitable interest is claimed?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the District Court lacked the authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing defendants being sued by creditors from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of the creditor's contract claim for monetary damages because such a remedy was historically unavailable from a court of equity. Allowing federal courts to grant creditors such injunctions "could radically alter the balance between debtors' and creditors' rights," Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, and "might induce creditors to engage in a race to the courthouse...which might prove financially fatal to the struggling debtor."

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan

Tue, 19 Jan 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-2000

Petitioner

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sullivan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 40 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, January 19, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, March 3, 1999

Advocates

Michael W. McConnell (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Loralyn McKinley (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court)

Facts of the Case

Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act (Act) provides that once an employer's liability for an employee's injury has been established, then either the self-insured employer or insurer (collectively insurers) is responsible for paying for the employee's "reasonable" and "necessary" medical treatment. In 1993, this system was amended to allow insurers to withhold payment for disputed treatments, pending the outcome of an independent utilization review. Ten employees and two organizations representing employees that had received benefits under the Act filed suit against state officials, the self-insured school district of Philadelphia, and a number of private insurance companies. Their complaint alleged that the state and private defendants, acting under color of state law, had deprived them of property in violation of due process.

Question

1) Can the private insurers' decision to withhold payment for disputed medical treatment be considered state action, so as to bring them within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment? (2) Do workers have a constitutionally protected property interest in continuing payment of disputed medical treatment before such treatment is determined to be reasonable and necessary?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No to both. A finding of state action requires both that the deprivation be caused by actions taken under state law and that the deprivation be fairly attributable to the state. While the alleged deprivation in this case was clearly taken pursuant to state law, the decision of private insurers to withhold medical payments for disputed treatment is not fairly attributable to the state. Mere creation of a new dispute resolution mechanism by the state does not constitute state encouragement or authorization. Nor has Pennsylvania delegated to private insurers powers that were exclusively those of the state, as Pennsylvania has simply authorized insurers to do what they would do in the absence of regulation: dispute payment of unreasonable and unnecessary treatment. Further, under Pennsylvania law no due process protection attaches to payment of disputed medical expenses before the reasonableness and necessity of those expenses is determined. The Act does not entitle an employee to payment of all medical treatment, but only that treatment which is reasonable and necessary. In order to assert a protected property interest a worker must demonstrate not only that his or her employer was liable for a work related injury, but also that the treatment for which payment is sought was reasonable and necessary. In this case the plaintiffs had only established their initial eligibility for treatment, not that treatment was reasonable and necessary.

Mosley v. United States

Wed, 14 Oct 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-7213

Petitioner

Mosley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 120 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, October 14, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, December 8, 1998

Advocates

Donald J. McCauley (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David C. Frederick (Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Sylvester Mosley was arrested after robbing two banks in eleven days. At the first bank, Mosley displayed a "HOLD UP" sign and asked the teller "Can I have all your money?" At the second bank, Mosley told the teller "This is a holdup, open your bottom draw and give me all your big bills." Because he merely asked for the money, Mosley asked the trial judge to instruct the jury that it could find him guilty of larceny as a lesser-included offense of robbery. Mosley argued that the federal bank robbery statute, 18 USC 2113(a), requires that the robber take the money "by force or violence, or intimidation." The court denied the motion, finding that Mosley had intimated the tellers. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that larceny could not be considered a lesser offense of robbery because an element of larceny is intent and intent is not contained in the robbery definition.

Question

Must jurors be instructed in some bank robbery prosecutions to consider the lesser charge of bank larceny?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The Court did not answer the question. In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the order granting the writ of certiorari and dismissed the petition. The Court was "advised that [Sylvester Mosley] died in Springfield, Missouri, on November 16, 1998."

Jones v. United States

Mon, 05 Oct 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-6203

Petitioner

Jones

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 227 (1999)

Argued

Monday, October 5, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, March 24, 1999

Advocates

Edward C. DuMont (Argued the cause for the United States)

Quin Denvir (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Nathaniel Jones was indicted on federal offenses for using a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence and carjacking. Federal law prescribed varying prison terms based on the extent of the carjacking crime. Specifically, it imposed a maximum of 25 years for crimes resulting in serious bodily injury, but not-more-than-fifteen-years and life sentence clauses were included in the law. The Magistrate Judge explained to Jones that he faced a maximum of fifteen years on the carjacking charge. Based on the Magistrate's judgment, the District Court's instructions to the jury rested on the fact that the government only had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a carjacking had occurred to convict Jones for up to fifteen years. Subsequently, the jury found Jones guilty. However, a later report showed one of the carjacking victims had sustained a serious injury to the head as a result of the carjacking. Thus, the District Court imposed a twenty-five year sentence on Jones. The court rejected Jones' arguments that a serious bodily injury had neither been pleaded in the indictment nor proved before the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It held that a serious bodily injury was a sentencing factor, not an element of an offense.

Question

Does the federal carjacking law define a single crime with three penalty options dependent on sentencing factors?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Jones, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2119

No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law established three separate offenses by the specification of elements, each of which must be charged by indictment, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.

Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipestringing, Inc.

Mon, 01 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1909

Petitioner

Murphy Brothers, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michetti Pipestringing, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 344 (1999)

Argued

Monday, March 1, 1999

Decided

Monday, April 5, 1999

Advocates

J. David Pugh (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Deborah A. Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

On January 26, 1996, Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. (Michetti), filed a complaint in Alabama state court seeking damages for an alleged breach of contract and fraud by Murphy Bros., Inc. (Murphy). Michetti did not serve Murphy then, but three days later it faxed a "courtesy copy" of the complaint to a Murphy vice president. Michetti officially served Murphy under local law by certified mail on February 12, 1996. On March 13, 1996, 30 days after service but 44 days after receiving the faxed copy of the complaint, Murphy removed the case under 28 U. S. C. ?1441 to the Federal District Court. Michetti moved to remand the case to the state court on the ground that Murphy filed the removal notice 14 days too late under 28 U. S. C. ?1446(b), which specifies that the notice "shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the [complaint]." Michetti asserted that the removal was untimely because the notice had not been filed within 30 days of the date on which Murphy's vice president received the facsimile transmission. The District Court denied the remand motion on the ground that the 30-day removal period did not commence until Murphy was officially served with a summons. On an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, instructing the District Court to remand the action to state court. The court held that the defendant's receipt of a faxed copy of the filed initial pleading sufficed to commence the 30-day removal period, emphasizing the statutory words "receipt...or otherwise."

Question

Is the time limit in which a named defendant may remove a state-court action to a federal court, as set forth in 28 U. S. C. ?1446(b), triggered by the mere receipt of a complaint unattended by any formal service?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Murphy Brothers, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1446

No. In a 6-3 decision, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a named defendant's time to remove a state-court action to a federal court is triggered by the simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, "through service or otherwise," after and apart from service of the summons, but not by the mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service. Justice Ginsburg wrote for that Court that, "[i]t would take a clearer statement than Congress has made to read its endeavor to extend removal time...to effect so strange a change_to set removal apart from all other responsive acts, to render removal the sole instance in which one's procedural rights slip away before service of a summons."

Dept of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives

Mon, 30 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-404

Appellee

U.S. House of Representatives

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Dept of Commerce

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

Clinton, President of the United States, et al. v. Glavin et al., No. 98-564

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 316 (1999)

Argued

Monday, November 30, 1998

Decided

Monday, January 25, 1999

Advocates

Michael A. Carvin (Argued the cause for the appellees in No. 98-564)

Maureen E. Mahoney (Argued the cause for the appellees in No. 98-404)

Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of the Appellees in No. 98-404)

Facts of the Case

Under the Census Clause (Art. I, Sect. 2, Cl. 3), Congress is authorized to conduct a census of the American public every 10 years. Among other purposes, the census provides a basis for apportionment of congressional districts. Under the Census Act, Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary). When the Census Bureau (Bureau) announced plans to use two new forms of discretionary statistical sampling in the 2000 census, various United States residents, counties, and the House of Representatives challenged the constitutionality of the new sampling methods in two separate suits. On direct appeals from three-judge district courts enjoining the use of the new sampling methods, the Supreme Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari.

Question

Is the use of statistical sampling in the execution of the census inconsistent with provisions of the Census Act or in conflict with the Census Clause of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for U.S. House of Representatives, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 13 U.S.C. 1

Yes with regard to the Census Act. The Court began by noting that the plaintiffs in the joined cases had good standing to bring their challenges because they stood to suffer a decrease in the number of their congressional representatives and a corresponding dilution of voting strength. The Court then added that the disputed Amendment to the Census Act, authorizing the discretionary use of statistical sampling, did not alter the Act's older statutory prohibition against the use of sampling. Consequently, the Court struck down the sampling provision on statutory grounds and avoided the constitutional question.

Richardson v. United States

Mon, 22 Feb 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-8629

Petitioner

Richardson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 813 (1999)

Argued

Monday, February 22, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, June 1, 1999

Advocates

William A. Barnett, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A federal criminal statute, 21 U.S.C. section 848(a), proscribes any person from engaging in "continuing criminal enterprise (CCE)," which is defined as involving a violation of federal drug statutes where such a violation was part of a "continuing series of violations." Eddie Richardson, who had organized and managed the Chicago street gang called the Undertaker Vice Lords in order to sell drugs, was charge with a CCE violation. At trial, Richardson proposed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree not only that he committed some "continuing series of violations" but also that the he committed each of the individual "violations" necessary to make up that "continuing series." In other words, the proposed instruction would have required the jury to unanimously agree on which three acts constituted the alleged series of violations. The judge rejected Richardson's proposal and, instead, instructed the jurors that they must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses, but did not have to agree as to the particular offenses. Subsequently, the jury convicted Richardson. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's jury instruction.

Question

Does the "continuing criminal enterprise" statute require juror unanimity as to each specific violation of federal law for conviction?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Richardson, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 848

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a jury in a "continuing criminal enterprise" case is required to agree unanimously not only that accused committed continuing series of violations, but also which specific violations made up the continuing series. Looking to the language of the statute, Justice Breyer concluded that in the law "each 'violation' amounts to a separate element" and that combined with a "tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the law," calls for juror unanimity. In dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed the view that the Court's decision "rewards those drug kingpins whose operations are so vast that the individual violations cannot be recalled or charged with specificity."

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers

Tue, 02 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-131

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sun-Diamond Growers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 398 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, March 2, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, April 27, 1999

Advocates

Eric W. Bloom (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Robert W. Ray (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Sun-Diamond Growers of California (Sun-Diamond), an agricultural trade association, was charged with violating a federal statute that prohibited the giving of anything valuable to a present, past, or future official "for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official." Sun-Diamond's indictment alleged that it gave illegal gratuities to former Agriculture Secretary Michael Espy while he was considering two matters in which Sun-Diamond had a vested interest. The indictment, however, did not claim a connection between the gratuities in question and either of the matters under Espy's review. Based on this lack of connectivity, Sun-Diamond challenged its indictment but lost in district court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reserved part of the district court decision and the government appealed. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Must there be a specific link between the giving of a gratuity to a government official and the latter's performance of a specific act in order to sustain an illegal-gratuity-statute conviction?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sun-Diamond Growers, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 201

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that to sustain conviction for federal bribery there must be a clear quid pro quo link between the gratuity received and performance of a specific past, present, or future "official" act. The Court reasoned that a statutory interpretation that punished the giving of any gifts to public officials would not fit comfortably with the legislation's spirit and traditions. The Court noted that the giving of gratuities to officials, by virtue of their position, is not the same as bribery of officials for the performance of specific conduct.

Murphy v. United Parcel Service

Tue, 27 Apr 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1992

Petitioner

Murphy

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United Parcel Service

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 516 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, April 27, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, June 22, 1999

Advocates

William J. Kilberg (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Stephen R. McAllister (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

At the time of his hiring by United Parcel Service (UPS) to a mechanics position that required him to drive commercial trucks, Vaughn Murphy was misdiagnosed as meeting Department of Transportation (DOT) health guidelines. When UPS discovered that Murphy's blood pressure exceeded DOT requirements, they fired him. Murphy challenged his dismissal as a form of discrimination prohibited under Title I of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Following defeat in trial and appellate courts, Murphy appealed and the Supreme Court granted him certiorari.

Question

Is high blood pressure a "substantial impairment" that might limit one's life activities to such an extent as to justify their being called "disabled" and, therefore, entitled to protection under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United Parcel Service, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the determination of whether one is "disabled" under the ADA must be made in light of available mitigating circumstances. In the present case, the Court did not find Murphy "disabled" since he could function normally with the help of blood pressure medication. Moreover, although no longer able to serve as a commercial truck driver for UPS, Murphy could still work as a mechanic - the position for which he was officially hired. The Court concluded that in order to be designated as "disabled" an employee must be unable to perform more than just one task.

NCAA v. Smith

Wed, 20 Jan 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-84

Petitioner

NCAA

Respondent

Smith

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 459 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, January 20, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, February 23, 1999

Advocates

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Postbaccalaureate Bylaw of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a private organization, only allows a postgraduate student-athlete to participate in intercollegiate athletics at the institution that awarded her undergraduate degree. Under this rule, Renee M. Smith, who played undergraduate volleyball at St. Bonaventure University, was denied permission from the NCAA to play at two other institutions she attended as a graduate student. Subsequently, Smith filed suit alleging that the NCAA's refusal to waive the bylaw denied her from playing intercollegiate volleyball on the basis of her sex in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which proscribes sexual discrimination in "any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." The NCAA responded by moving to dismiss the case on the ground that Smith failed to allege that the NCAA is a recipient of federal financial assistance. Smith, in turn, argued that "the NCAA governs the federally funded intercollegiate athletics programs of its members, that these programs are educational, and that the NCAA benefited economically from its members' receipt of federal funds." The District Court concluded that the alleged connections between the NCAA and federal financial assistance to member institutions were too attenuated to sustain a Title IX claim and dismissed the suit. Smith then moved for leave to amend her complaint. The court denied the motion as moot. Reversing that denial, the Court of Appeals, in addressing Smith's proposed amended complaint, held that the NCAA's receipt of dues from federally funded member institutions would suffice, if proven, to bring the NCAA within the scope of Title IX as a recipient of federal funds.

Question

Does the National Collegiate Athletic Association's receipt of dues from federally funded member institutions subject it to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for NCAA, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Education Amendments of 1972

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that dues payments from recipients of federal funds do not suffice to subject the NCAA to suit under Title IX. Justice Ginsburg distinguished the coverage of Title IX in that "[e]ntities that receive federal assistance, whether directly or through an intermediary, are recipients within the meaning of Title IX; entities that only benefit economically from federal assistance are not." Justice Ginsburg then concluded that "the Association's receipt of dues demonstrates that it indirectly benefits from the federal assistance afforded its members," which without more, "is insufficient to trigger Title IX coverage."

Maryland v. Dyson

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 15:55:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1062

Petitioner

Maryland

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dyson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 465 (1999)

Decided

Monday, June 21, 1999

Facts of the Case

Acting on a tip from a confidential informant and a subsequent investigation, sheriff's deputies stopped and searched Kevin Dyson's automobile. The deputies found 23 grams of crack cocaine in a duffel bag in the trunk. Dyson was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. In reversing, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that in order for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment to apply, there must be not only probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is contained in the automobile, but also a separate finding of an exigency which precluded the police from obtaining a warrant. Although there was abundant probable cause, the court concluded that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no exigency that prevented or even made it significantly difficult for the police to obtain a search warrant.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment require police to obtain a search warrant before searching a vehicle which they have probable cause to believe contains illegal drugs?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Maryland, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals rested upon an incorrect interpretation of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that, because the automobile exception has no separate exigency requirement and where there is probable cause to search an automobile, a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant is not actually obtained. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented.

Strickler v. Greene

Wed, 03 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-5864

Petitioner

Strickler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Greene

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 263 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, March 3, 1999

Decided

Thursday, June 17, 1999

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Pamela A. Rumpz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Commonwealth of Virginia charged Tommy David Strickler with capital murder and related crimes. Strickler's counsel did not file a pretrial motion for discovery of all possible exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland because an open file policy gave him access to all of the evidence in the prosecutor's files. At Strickler's trial, Anne Stoltzfus gave detailed eyewitness testimony about the crimes and Strickler's role as one of the perpetrators. The prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory materials in the police files, consisting of notes taken by a detective during interviews with Stoltzfus, and letters written by Stoltzfus to the detective, that cast serious doubt on significant portions of her testimony. The jury found Strickler guilty and he was sentenced to death. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. In subsequent state habeas corpus proceedings, Strickler advanced an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to file a motion for disclosure of all exculpatory evidence known to the prosecution or in its possession under Brady. In response, the Commonwealth asserted that such a motion was unnecessary because of the prosecutor's open file policy. The trial court denied relief and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Strickler then filed a federal habeas corpus petition and was granted access to the exculpatory Stoltzfus materials. The District Court vacated Strickler's capital murder conviction and death sentence on the grounds that the Commonwealth had failed to disclose those materials and that he had not, in consequence, received a fair trial. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Strickler had procedurally defaulted his Brady claim by not raising it at his trial or in the state collateral proceedings. Ultimately, the court concluded that the claim was, in any event, without merit.

Question

Did Virginia violate Brady v. Maryland, which provides for the disclosure of all possible exculpatory evidence, when a prosecutor failed to disclose all the exculpatory materials in the police's files? Was there an acceptable reason for Tommy Strickler's failure to raise a Brady claim in state court after such an event? Would the outcome of Strickler's trial been different in presence of the exculpatory evidence?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Greene, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No, yes, and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that although Strickler demonstrated cause for his failure to raise a Brady claim, Virginia did not violate Brady by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to him. Further, the Court held that Strickler received a fair trial in the absence of the exculpatory evidence and did not show a "reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence would have been different had these materials been disclosed," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court.

Peguero v. United States

Mon, 11 Jan 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-9217

Petitioner

Peguero

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 23 (1999)

Argued

Monday, January 11, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, March 2, 1999

Advocates

Roy W. McLeese (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Daniel I. Siegel (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1992, the District Court sentenced Manuel D. Peguero to 274 months of imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to federal drug charges. During sentencing, the court did not inform Peguero of his right to appeal the sentence. In 1996, in a later motion for habeas relief, Peguero claimed that the court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(2) by failing to advise him of his right to appeal. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that, although it failed to advise Peguero of his right, he knew of his right when the sentencing hearing occurred. Thus the court, rejecting Peguero's claim that any violation of Rule 32 is enough to vacate a sentence, held that he was not entitled to relief because he was aware of his right to appeal at the time of sentencing. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that a Rule 32 violation was subject to harmless-error review and concluded that the rule's purpose had been served since Peguero was aware of his right to appeal.

Question

Does a District Court's failure to advise a defendant of his right to appeal, as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provide ground for habeas relief when the defendant was aware of his right and elected not to appeal?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that "a district court's failure to advise the defendant of his right to appeal does not entitle him to habeas relief if he knew of his right and hence suffered no prejudice from the omission." Noting the importance of the rule and acknowledging that the omission was an error, Justice Kennedy stated "[t]rial judges must be meticulous and precise in following each of the requirements of Rule 32 in every case." The Court concluded that Rule 32 violations do not entitle defendants to relief in all circumstances, rather only when the defendant is prejudiced by the court's error.

Humana Inc. v. Forsyth

Mon, 30 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-303

Petitioner

Humana Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Forsyth

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 299 (1999)

Argued

Monday, November 30, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, January 20, 1999

Advocates

James W. Colbert, III (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

G. Robert Blakey (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Mary Forsyth, the beneficiary of a group health insurance policy issued by Humana Health Insurance of Nevada, Inc., received medical care at a hospital owned by Humana Inc. Humana Insurance agreed to pay 80 percent of Forsyth's hospital charges over a designated deductible. Forsyth bore responsibility for the remaining 20 percent of the charges. Forsyth complained that the hospital gave Human Insurance large discounts on their portion of the hospital charges. Thus, Humana Insurance paid the hospital significantly less than the actual 80 percent of the original bill and, in turn, Forsyth paid significantly more than her 20 percent of the hospital charges. Forsyth alleged that Humana Insurance and Humana Inc. had violated the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through fraudulent activity. The District Court ruled in favor of Humana, citing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which prevents acts of Congress from encroaching on state insurance law unless the act specifically relates to insurance. The Court of Appeals reversed and adopted a "direct conflict" test for determining when a federal law "invalidate[s], impair[s], or supersede[s]" a state insurance law. Under such a test, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar Forsyth's suit because the Act does not preclude application of a federal statute prohibiting acts that are also prohibited under state insurance laws. The Act and Nevada law only provided for different damages to be collected.

Question

May plaintiffs use the federal anti-racketeering law to sue their health insurers over alleged fraud?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Forsyth, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1012

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announce by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that because RICO advances states' interests in preventing insurance fraud, and since RICO does not encroach on Nevada law, the McCarran- Ferguson Act did not block Forsyth's recourse to RICO in this case.

Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.

Tue, 01 Dec 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1642

Petitioner

Department of the Army

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Blue Fox, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 255 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, December 1, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, January 20, 1999

Advocates

Thomas F. Spaulding (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Verdan Technology, Inc.,, a prime contractor, failed to pay Blue Fox Inc., a subcontractor, for work completed on a construction project for the Department of the Army. Under the Miller Act, a contractor working on any public building or public work of the US must post a bond for possible defaults. However, the Army treated the work agreement as a "services contract," and removed Verdan's bond requirements. When Verdan failed to pay Blue Fox, it directly sued the Army. Blue Fox sought an "equitable lien" on any funds from the Verdan contract not paid to Verdan, or any funds available or appropriated for the completion of the project, and an order directing payment of those funds to it. The District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter, and thus ruled in favor of the Army because the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did not apply to Blue Fox's claim. The Court of Appeals held that the APA waives immunity for equitable actions, thus allowing Blue Fox's equitable lien.

Question

Can subcontractors on federal projects force the government to pay when prime contractors fail to do so?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Department of the Army, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Administrative Procedure, or Administrative Orders Review

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that "unless waived by Congress, sovereign immunity bars subcontractors and other creditors from enforcing liens on government property or funds to recoup their losses." The APA prohibits people and companies with grievances from suing the government for monetary damages. Blue Fox's lien was ruled "merely a means to the end of satisfying a claim for the recovery of money."

Lilly v. Virginia

Mon, 29 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-5881

Petitioner

Lilly

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Virginia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 116 (1999)

Argued

Monday, March 29, 1999

Decided

Thursday, June 10, 1999

Advocates

Kathleen P. Baldwin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Katherine P. Baldwin (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Ira S. Sacks ()

Facts of the Case

Benjamin Lee Lilly, his brother Mark Lilly, and Gary Barker were arrested after stealing liquor and guns and abducting Alex DeFilippis, who was later shot and killed. Under police questioning, Mark admitted stealing liquor, but claimed that Benjamin and Barker stole the guns and that Benjamin shot DeFilippis. When Virginia called Mark as a witness at Benjamin's subsequent criminal trial, Mark invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination. The trial court then admitted his statements to the police as declarations of an unavailable witness against penal interest. The court overruled Benjamin's objections that the statements were not against Mark's penal interest because they shifted responsibility for the crimes to Barker and Benjamin, and that their admission would violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Subsequently, Benjamin was convicted of the DeFilippis murder and other crimes. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found that the Confrontation Clause was satisfied because Mark's statements fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. The court also held that the statements were reliable because Mark knew that he was implicating himself as a participant in numerous crimes and because the statements were independently corroborated by other evidence at trial.

Question

Does trial evidence that includes out-of-court statements, that admit some wrongdoing but place primary blame on the defendant, by an alleged, nontestifying accomplice violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right to confront all adverse witnesses?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lilly, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Confront and Cross-Examine, Compulsory Process

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the admission of Mark's confession violated Benjamin's Confrontation Clause right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." All nine justices voted to overturn the Virginia Supreme Court's decision that had allowed such hearsay testimony under an exception for statements made against penal interest. Justice Stevens wrote for a plurality that the confession could not be considered "sufficiently reliable as to be admissible without allowing [the defendant] to cross-examine him." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Stephen G. Breyer wrote concurring opinions.

Central State Univ. v. AAUP

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 15:55:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1071

Petitioner

Central State Univ.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

AAUP

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 124 (1999)

Decided

Monday, March 22, 1999

Facts of the Case

To increase the amount of time that public university professors spend teaching, Ohio enacted Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section 3345.45. Central State University adopted a workload policy pursuant to section 3345.45. The university then notified its professors that it would not bargain over the issue of faculty workload. The professors' collective-bargaining agent filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that section 3345.45 created a class of public employees not entitled to bargain regarding their workload and that this classification violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. In response, the state argued that achieving equal workloads was necessary to recapture the decline in teaching and that collective bargaining produced variation in workloads. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the professors and found that no evidence linked collective bargaining to the decline in faculty time devoted to undergraduate teaching.

Question

Does Ohio statutory exemption of state university faculties' instructional workload standards from collective bargaining violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Central State Univ., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court held that "the Ohio Supreme Court's holding cannot be reconciled with the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause." "One of [section 3345.45's] objectives was to increase the time spent by faculty in the classroom; the imposition of a faculty workload policy not subject to collective bargaining was an entirely rational step to accomplish this objective," stated the opinion. "Under our precedent," the court concluded "this is sufficient to sustain the exclusion of university professors from the otherwise general collective-bargaining scheme for public employees." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc.

Wed, 14 Oct 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-930

Petitioner

Buckley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 182 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, October 14, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, January 12, 1999

Advocates

Gale Norton (Argued the cause for the petitioner, on behalf of the Petitioner)

Neil D. O'Toole (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Colorado practices an initiative-petition process in which citizens can make laws directly through balloting initiatives. Acting on behalf of ballot petitioners, the American Constitutional Law Foundation (Foundation) challenged the constitutionality of six limitations imposed by Colorado on the petitioning process. After mixed rulings in both trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review three of the six original restrictions. The first required petition circulators to be registered voters. The second required them to wear identification badges with their names, status as "volunteer" or "paid," and if the latter then their employer's phone number. The third required initiative proponents to report names, addresses, and registration voting counties for all paid circulators, as well as salary per petition signature, and each circulator's total salary. Proponents also had to report, on a monthly basis, all proponent names, names and addresses of circulators, circulators' monthly salary and debt totals, and the name of each proposed ballot measure.

Question

Did the State of Colorado's imposition of name, badge, and financial disclosure requirements, on initiative-petition proponents and their circulators, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court found the name, badge, and disclosure requirements to be unconstitutional. Weighing Colorado's need to protect the integrity of the initiative-petition process against the burdens that its guidelines placed on political expression, the Court found that the latter outweighed the former. Noting that the appellate court upheld a requirement that each circulator submit an affidavit setting out, among several particulars, his or her name and address, the Court explained that the vital information sought by the three additional restrictions at issue was already being secured either directly or indirectly.

Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board

Mon, 26 Apr 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-405

Appellee

Bossier Parish School Board

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Reno

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 98-406

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 320 (2000)

Argued

Monday, April 26, 1999

Reargued:

Wednesday, October 6, 1999

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2000

Advocates

Michael A. Carvin (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Patricia A. Brannan (Argued the cause for appellants Price, et al)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellant Reno)

Facts of the Case

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act on 1995 prohibits Bossier Parish, Louisiana from enacting any change in a "voting qualification[,] prerequisite[,] standard, practice, or procedure" without first obtaining preclearance from either the Attorney General or the District Court. Following the 1990 census, the District Court granted Bossier Parish preclearance to redistrict. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471, vacated the court's judgment and remanded for the court to question whether the section 5 purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent. The District Court again granted preclearance. The court found that there was no evidence of discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. The court left open the question of whether section 5 prohibits preclearance of a plan enacted with such a purpose.

Question

Does section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bossier Parish School Board, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that section 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. "As we have repeatedly noted, in vote-dilution cases [section 5] prevents nothing but backsliding, and preclearance under [section 5] affirms nothing but the absence of backsliding," wrote Justice Scalia. Justices David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the opinions of Justices Souter and Stevens. "Now executive and judicial officers of the United States will be forced to preclear illegal and unconstitutional voting schemes patently intended to perpetuate discrimination," argued Justice Souter.

UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward

Wed, 24 Feb 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1868

Petitioner

UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ward

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 358 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, February 24, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, April 20, 1999

Advocates

Jeffrey I. Erlich (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey L. Ehrlich (on behalf of the Respondent)

Edwin S. Kneedler (On behalf of the United States as amicus curiae supporting the Petitioner in part and the Respondent in part)

William J. Kayatta, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

UNUM Life Insurance Company of America (UNUM) issued a long-term group disability policy to Management Analysis Company (MAC) as an insured welfare benefit plan governed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The policy provides that proof of claims must be furnished to UNUM within one year and 180 days after the onset of disability. John E. Ward, a California MAC employee, became permanently disabled in May 1992. Ward informed MAC of his disability in late February or early March 1993. UNUM received proof of Ward's claim on April 11, 1994. Ward was notified that his claim was denied as untimely because his notice was late under the terms of the policy. Ward then filed suit under ERISA's civil enforcement provision to recover the disability benefits provided by the plan. Ward argued that, under California's common-law agency rule, an employer administering an insured group health plan should be deemed to act as the insurance company's agent; therefore, his notice of permanent disability to MAC, in late February or early March 1993, sufficed to supply timely notice to UNUM. The District Court rejected Ward's argument and ruled in favor of UNUM, citing ERISA's preemption clause, which states that ERISA provisions "shall supersede ... State laws" to the extent that those laws "relate to any employee benefit plan." In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that Ward might prevail under California's "notice-prejudice" rule, under which an insurer cannot avoid liability although the proof of claim is untimely, unless the insurer shows it suffered actual prejudice from the delay.

Question

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempt California's common-law agency rule, under which a California employer administering an insured group health plan should be deemed to act as the insurance company's agent? Does ERISA preempt California's "notice-prejudice" rule?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ward, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that California's agency rule is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that California's common-law agency rule "would have a marked effect on plan administration," adding that it would force employers to take on a role for which they had not volunteered. Further, the Court held that California's notice-prejudice rule is not preempted by ERISA because it is a "law ... which regulates insurance." Thus, Ward's insurance claim may go forward even though he filed for benefits after the deadline because UNUM did not suffer any prejudice from the delay. "By allowing a longer period to file than the minimum filing terms mandated by federal law, the [California] rule complements rather than contradicts ERISA and the regulations," wrote Justice Ginsburg.

Knowles v. Iowa

Tue, 03 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Knowles' Car Jasper County, IA

United States

41° 38' 29.3712" N, 93° 1' 3.2556" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-7597

Petitioner

Knowles

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Iowa

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 113 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, November 3, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, December 8, 1998

Advocates

Bridget A. Chambers (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Paul Rosenberg (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After stopping him for speeding, an Iowa police officer issued Patrick Knowles a citation and conducted a full search of his car without probable cause or Knowles' consent. When his search turned up a "pot pipe" and some marijuana, the officer arrested Knowles on state drug charges. Knowles challenged these on grounds that because he was not arrested at any time prior to the search, the search was unconstitutional. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Knowles certiorari.

Question

Can a search of a stopped vehicle, that occurs prior to the driver's arrest, be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" exception that permits officers to search stopped vehicles without first obtaining a search warrant?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Knowles, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a unanimous opinion that Court held that full stopped-car searches can only be conducted when the safety of the officers is at risk. One significant indication of such danger is when an officer arrests the subject as a reaction to possible or actual threat. In the present case, no serious danger accompanied the stop of Knowles car as evidenced by the officer's initial decision not to arrest Knowles or even issue him a ticket. As such, regardless of its uncovered contents, the subsequent search violated the "search incident to arrest" power and the Fourth Amendment's prohibition again unlawful search and seizures.

Hanlon v. Berger

Wed, 24 Mar 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1927

Petitioner

Hanlon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Berger

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 808 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, March 24, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 24, 1999

Advocates

Richard A. Cordray (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Henry H. Rossbacher (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Lawrence R. Fletcher-Hill (on behalf of the State Respondents in No. 98-83)

Richard K. Willard (on behalf of the Petitioners in No. 98-83)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, a magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the search of Paul and Erma Berger's Montana ranch for evidence of the taking of wildlife in violation of federal law. Later, a multiple-vehicle caravan consisting of government agents and a crew of photographers and reporters from CNN proceeded to the ranch. In executing the warrant, the federal officers allowed the media crew to accompany and observe them. Subsequently, the Berger's filed suit, asserting that the officials, special agents of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and an assistant United States attorney, had violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court concluded that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, as no clearly established law protecting individuals from the commercial recording of a search of their premises existed at the time. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Do federal agents violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when they let representatives of the news media accompany and observe their conduct in the execution of a search warrant?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Hanlon, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that, although the agents did violate the Fourth Amendment, they were entitled to qualified immunity. The opinion stated that "police violate the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners when they allow members of the media to accompany them during the execution of a warrant in their home. We also hold there that because the law on this question before today's decision was not clearly established, the police in that case were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." Justice John Paul Stevens, concurring and dissenting in part, argued that the constitutional rule recognized had been clearly established long before 1992.

Lopez v. Monterey County

Mon, 02 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1396

Appellee

Monterey County

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Lopez

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 266 (1999)

Argued

Monday, November 2, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, January 20, 1999

Advocates

Daniel G. Stone (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Appellants)

Joaquin G. Avila (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires designated states and political subdivisions to obtain federal pre-clearance before giving effect to changes in their voting laws. Hispanic voters, residing in Monterey County, California, filed suit in federal court claiming the county had failed to obtain the required pre-clearance for a series of ordinances changing the method for electing county judges. A three-judge District Court ultimately dismissed the case because the section of the Voting Rights Act that requires pre-clearance did not cover California. Moreover, California had passed legislation requiring the voting changes forged by Monterey County.

Question

Does the Voting Rights Act's pre-clearance requirement apply to states not explicitly covered by the Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Lopez, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the county is covered by the Act's pre-clearance requirement, but the state was not. Justice O'Connor wrote, "We conclude that the county is required to seek pre-clearance before implementing California laws that effect voting changes in that county."

Hunt v. Cromartie

Wed, 20 Jan 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Location

North Carolina General Assembly

16 West Jones Street Raleigh NC 27601

Raleigh, NC 27601

United States

35° 46' 59.5704" N, 78° 38' 20.202" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-85

Appellee

Cromartie

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Hunt

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 541 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, January 20, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 17, 1999

Advocates

Robinson O. Everett (Argued the cause for the appellees)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the appellants)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Hunt (517 US 899), declaring North Carolina's 12th district to have been unconstitutionally drawn, the state made a new districting plan in 1997. Acting on behalf of other residents, Martin Cromartie again challenged the new make-up of the 12th district as the product of racial gerrymandering. However, even before an evidentiary hearing, a three-judge District Court granted Cromartie summary judgment. Hunt appealed and the Supreme Court granted him certiorari.

Question

Is the presence of "uncontroverted material facts," concerning the practice of racial gerrymandering, sufficient to sustain a summary judgment even prior to conducting an evidentiary hearing or discovery?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hunt, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that despite strong evidence of racial gerrymandering, the North Carolina General Assembly's motivations were in dispute. As such, further inquiry was warranted on this alone. Moreover, since accusations of racial gerrymandering rise to the level of being constitutionally significant, they must be evaluated with strict scrutiny. Therefore, the dismissal of such serious accusations with a summary judgment was erroneous.

Stewart v. LaGrand

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 15:55:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1412

Petitioner

Stewart

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

LaGrand

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 115 (1999)

Decided

Wednesday, March 3, 1999

Facts of the Case

After they were sentenced to death in Arizona, Walter LaGrand and Karl LaGrand filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Among other things, Walter's petition claimed that execution by lethal gas constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the claim unripe until and unless Walter chose gas as his method of execution and denied his petition. Under Arizona law, lethal injection is the default form of execution. Separately, as part of its ultimate order, the Court of Appeals stayed Karl's execution and enjoined Arizona from executing anyone by means of lethal gas. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals ultimately denied Walter a stay of execution but restrained and enjoined the Arizona from executing him by means of lethal gas.

Question

Did Walter LaGrand waive his claim that execution by lethal gas constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment by electing to be executed by lethal gas, when Arizona's default form of execution is lethal injection?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Stewart, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that "[b]y declaring his method of execution, picking lethal gas over the state's default form of execution-- lethal injection--Walter LaGrand has waived any objection he might have to it." Additionally, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals injunctive order. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. Arguing for full briefing and argument, Justice Stevens stated that "the answer to the question whether a capital defendant may consent to be executed by an unacceptably torturous method of execution is by no means clear."

Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc. v. U.S.

Tue, 27 Apr 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-387

Petitioner

Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

U.S.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 173 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, April 27, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 14, 1999

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara D. Underwood (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association (Association) wanted to run advertisements for lawful private casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi. The Association challenged the government's prohibition against such radio- and television-based advertising. After suffering defeat in both trial and appellate courts, the Association appealed and the Supreme Court granted them certiorari.

Question

Does a federal prohibition against advertising lawful privately-held casino- gambling violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court found the advertising restrictions unconstitutional insofar as they applied to Louisiana-based advertisers - where the gambling activities being promoted are legal. The government failed to demonstrate that its restriction would alleviate harmful gambling practices to any material degree. Instead, the Court noted, the regulations in question provided only ineffective and remote support for the government's concerns, since all sorts of other gambling activities would continue unaffected. Thus, the government restrictions unfairly singled out a specific form of speech for regulation while leaving others untouched.

Jones v. United States

Mon, 22 Feb 1999 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-9361

Petitioner

Jones

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 373 (1999)

Argued

Monday, February 22, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 21, 1999

Advocates

Timothy Crooks (Fort Worth, Texas, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Louis Jones, Jr., kidnapped Private Tracie Joy McBride at gunpoint from the Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas. After sexually assaulting McBride, Jones killed her with repeated blows to the head from a tire iron. The Federal Government charged Jones with kidnapping resulting in the victim's death, in violation of 18 USC section 1201(a)(2), an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death. Pursuant to the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, the government sought the death sentence. A jury found Jones guilty. The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty at Jones's sentencing hearing. The District Court imposed the death sentence in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The court refused Jones' request to include in the jury instructions an instruction that in the event of a jury deadlock concerning what sentence to impose -- either death or life imprisonment without possibility of release -- the District Court would impose no less of a sentence than of life imprisonment without possibility of release. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is a death-sentence-eligible defendant entitled to a jury instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock? Is there a reasonable likelihood that a jury might believe that a death-sentence-eligible defendant would receive a court- imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that they could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Jones was not entitled to an instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not require such an instruction and the Court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to require such an instruction in every capital case. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "in a capital sentencing proceeding, the Government has 'a strong interest in having the jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.' [A] charge to the jury of the sort proposed by petitioner might well have the effect of undermining this strong governmental interest." Furthermore, the Court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury had been led to believe that Jones would receive a court-imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that the jury could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that, "'[a]ccurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a [jury's] determination of whether a defendant shall live or die.' That 'indispensable prerequisite' was not satisfied in this case."

Haddle v. Garrison

Tue, 10 Nov 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1472

Petitioner

Haddle

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Garrison

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 121 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, November 10, 1998

Decided

Monday, December 14, 1998

Advocates

Phillip A. Bradley (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Matthew D. Roberts (Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Charles C. Stebbins (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Michael A. Haddle, an at-will employee for Healthmaster, Inc., filed suit in federal court alleging his employer, along with 2 previous Healthmaster, Inc. officers, Jeanette Garrison and Dennis Kelly, conspired to have him fired in retaliation for obeying a federal grand jury subpoena and later testifying in a criminal trial against Healthmaster, Inc. for Medicare fraud. Haddle claimed his employers' acts had had "injured [him] in his person or property" in violation of federal law, specifically the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The District Court, relying on precedent, dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The precedent the court cited held that an at-will employee discharged pursuant to a conspiracy proscribed by the Act has suffered no actual injury because he has no constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

May at-will employees sue their employers over firings allegedly carried out to retaliate for testimony against their employers?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Haddle, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1985)

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that such interference may give rise to a claim for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. "The kind of interference with at-will employment relations alleged here is merely a species of the traditional torts of intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective contractual relations," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.