Cases - 1997 term

Bogan and Roderick v. Scott-Harris

Wed, 03 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1569

Petitioner

Bogan and Roderick

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scott-Harris

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 44 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, December 3, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, March 3, 1998

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Harvey A. Schwartz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Janet Scott-Harris filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, the city's mayor, Daniel Bogan, the vice president of the city counsel, Marilyn Roderick, and others, alleging that the elimination of the city department in which Scott-Harris was the sole employee was motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights. The jury found the city, Bogan and Roderick liable on the First Amendment claim. The First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city, but affirmed the judgments against Bogan and Roderick. The court held that although Bogan and Roderick had absolute immunity from civil liability for their performance of legitimate legislative activities, their conduct in voting for and signing the ordinance that eliminated Scott-Harris's office was motivated by considerations relating to a particular individual and was therefore administrative rather than legislative in nature.

Question

Are actions by local officials introducing, voting for, and signing an ordinance outside the scope of legislative activities because of the motives of the government actors?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bogan and Roderick, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. Local legislators are entitled to the same absolute immunity from civil liability under Section 1983 for their legislative activities as are federal, state and regional legislators. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act itself, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. The acts at issue here were clearly legislative, and the ordinance itself bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.

GE v. Joiner

Tue, 14 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-188

Petitioner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joiner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 136 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, October 14, 1997

Decided

Monday, December 15, 1997

Advocates

Steven R. Kuney (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Michael H. Gottesman (on behalf of the Respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1992, Robert Joiner, after being diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer, sued General Electric Co. in Georgia state court, alleging that his disease was promoted by workplace exposure to chemical "PCBs" and their derivatives, including polychlorinated dibenzofurans (furans) and polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (dioxins). Ultimately, Joiner provided the District Court with expert witnesses' depositions that testified that PCBs, furans, and dioxins can promote cancer and that this was the likely cause of his cancer. The court granted GE summary judgment, reasoning that there was no genuine issue as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins and that his experts' testimony had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in excluding the testimony of Joiner's expert witnesses. The appellate court applied a stringent standard of review to reach its conclusion.

Question

Is the abuse of discretion standard the correct standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for GE, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Evidence

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that abuse of discretion, the standard ordinarily applicable to review of evidentiary rulings, is the proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude expert scientific evidence. Additionally, the Court held that the proper application of the correct standard of review indicates that the District Court did not err in excluding the expert testimony at issue. "The Federal Rules of Evidence," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "leave in place the 'gatekeeper' role of the trial judge in screening such evidence. A court of appeals applying 'abuse of discretion' review to such rulings may not categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings which disallow it."

United States v. Ramirez

Tue, 13 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1469

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ramirez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 65 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, January 13, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Advocates

David C. Frederick (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Levine (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

While in route to testify, Alan Shelby, a dangerous prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences, escaped custody. An ATF Agent, based on an informant's information, observed a person resembling Shelby at Hernan Ramirez's home in Boring, Oregon. Subsequently, the Government obtained a "no- knock" warrant to enter and search the home. Executing the warrant, officers broke a single window in Ramirez's home. Awakened, Ramirez fired a pistol into the garage ceiling. After being arrested, because of a stash of weapons in his garage, Ramirez was indicted on federal charges of being a felon in possession of firearms. Shelby was not found. Granting Ramirez's motion to suppress evidence regarding his possession of the weapons, the District Court found that the officers had violated the Fourth Amendment because there were "insufficient exigent circumstances" to justify the police officer's destruction of property in their execution of the warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment require that police officers have more than a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence before entering would be dangerous, futile, or inhibit the effective investigation of a crime when a "no-knock" entry results in the destruction of property?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not hold police officers to a higher standard than the test articulated in Richards v. Wisconsin. In Richards, the Court held that a no-knock entry was justified if police had a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be dangerous, futile, or would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime, when a no-knock entry resulted in the destruction of property. "Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search not subject to suppression," noted the Chief Justice.

Muscarello v. United States

Mon, 23 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1654

Petitioner

Muscarello

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 96-8837

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 125 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 23, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Norman S. Zalkind (Argued the cause for petitioners Cleveland and Gray-Santana in No. 96-8837)

Robert H. Klonoff (Argued the cause for petitioner Muscarello in No. 96-1654)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent in both cases)

Facts of the Case

18 USC section 924(c)(1) subjects a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime" to a 5-year mandatory prison term. In 96-1654, police officers found a handgun locked in Frank J. Muscarello's truck's glove compartment. Muscarello was transporting marijuana for sale in his truck. Muscarello argued that his "carrying" of the gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope of the statutory word "carries." In 96-8837, federal agents found drugs and guns in Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana's car at a drug-sale point. The Court of Appeals, in both cases, found that the defendants had violated section 924(c)(1).

Question

Does the fact that guns were found in a locked glove compartment, or the trunk, of a car, preclude the application of 18 U section 924(c)(1), which imposes a 5-year mandatory prison term upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime"?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the phrase "carries a firearm" applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. Exploring the meaning of "carry," Justice Breyer concluded, among other things, that the statute's basic purpose to combat the dangerous combination of drugs and guns does not support limiting "carry" to an "on the person" application. In a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that "carries a firearm" means bearing a firearm in a manner as to be ready to use it as a weapon.

AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.

Mon, 23 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-679

Petitioner

AT&T

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Central Office Telephone, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 214 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 23, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

David W. Carpenter (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Bruce M. Hall (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under the Communications Act of 1934, AT&T; must file "tariffs" containing all its charges for interstate services and all "classifications, practices and regulations affecting such charges" with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Under section 203(c) of the Act, a common carrier, such as AT&T;, may not "extend to any person any privileges or facilities in such communication, or employ or enforce any classifications, regulations, or practices affecting such charges, except as specified in such [tariff]."In 1989, AT&T; sold Central Office Telephone, Inc. its Software Defined Network, a long-distance service. Subsequently, Central Office experienced problems with the service and withdrew from the contract. Central Office sued AT&T; in Federal District Court, asserting state-law claims for breach of contract and for tortious interference with contractual relations for failure to deliver various service, provisioning, and billing options in addition to those set forth in the tariff. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's damages award.

Question

Do the federally filed tariff requirements of section 203 of the Communications Act of 1934 pre-empt state-law claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for AT&T, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Communication Act of 1934

Yes. In a 7-1 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Communications Act's filed-tariff requirements pre-empt Central Office Telephone, Inc.'s state-law claims. Invoking the "filed-rate" doctrine, under which the rate a carrier duly files is the only lawful charge, the Court denied Central Office's claims of AT&T;'s failure to fulfill promised preferences not specified in its tariff filed with the FCC. "Because [Central Office Telephone, Inc.] asks for privileges not included in the tariff," wrote Justice Scalia, "its state-law claims are barred in either case." Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal

Wed, 05 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1462

Petitioner

Lunding

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New York Tax Appeals Tribunal

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 287 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, November 5, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 1998

Advocates

Andrew D. Bing (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Christopher H. Lunding (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

New York Tax Law section 631(b)(6) denies only nonresident taxpayers a state income tax deduction for alimony paid. In 1990, Christopher Lunding and his wife, residents of Connecticut, were required to pay higher taxes on their New York income when the State denied their attempted deduction of a pro rata portion of the alimony Lunding paid a previous spouse. Lunding commenced suit, asserting that section 631(b)(6) discriminates against New York nonresidents in violation of the Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals held that section 631(b)(6) was adequately justified because New York residents who are subject to taxation on all of their income regardless of source should be entitled to the benefit of full deduction of expenses, while personal expenses of a nonresident taxpayer are more appropriately allocated to the State of residence.

Question

Does New York Tax Law section 631(b)(6), which effectively denies only nonresident taxpayers a state income tax deduction for alimony paid, violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 4, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Privileges and Immunities Clause

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that, in the absence of a substantial reason for the difference in treatment of nonresidents, section 631(b)(6) violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause by denying only nonresidents an income tax deduction for alimony payments. "The alimony obligation may be of a 'personal' nature, but it cannot be viewed as geographically fixed in the manner that other expenses, such as business losses, mortgage interest payments, or real estate taxes, might be," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined.

National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank

Mon, 06 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-843

Petitioner

National Credit Union Administration

Respondent

First National Bank

Consolidation

No. 96-847

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 479 (1998)

Argued

Monday, October 6, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 1998

Advocates

Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of the Federal Petitioner)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (on behalf of the Private Petitioners)

Michael S. Helfer (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act provides that that "federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district." The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) interprets section 9 to permit federal credit unions to be composed of multiple, unrelated employer groups, each having its own distinct common bond of occupation. Under this interpretation, the NCUA approved a series of charter amendments adding several unrelated employer groups to the membership of AT&T; Family Federal Credit Union, which now has approximately 110,000 members nationwide only 35% of whom are employees of AT&T; and its affiliates. Subsequently, a number of private actors brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the NCUA's decision was contrary to law because section 109 unambiguously requires that the same common bond of occupation unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union and members of the new groups did not share a common bond of occupation with AT&T; Family Federal Credit Union's existing members. Ultimately, the District Court held that the private interests lack standing to challenge NCUA's decision and the Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Do banks and professional associations have standing under the Administrative Procedure Act to seek federal-court review of the National Credit Union Administration's decisions? Is the NCUA's interpretation of section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act permissible?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for First National Bank, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 12 U.S.C. 1759

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that banks and professional associations have prudential standing under the APA to seek federal-court review of the NCUA's interpretation of section 109. By the same majority, the Court also held that the NCUA's interpretation of section 109, under which a common bond of occupation must unite only the members of each unrelated employer group, is impermissible. After concluding that the banks and professional associations' interests fall within the "zone of interests" protected by section 109, Justice Thomas wrote that the NCUA's interpretation "has the potential to read ["shall be limited"] out of the statute entirely."

City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons

Tue, 14 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-910

Petitioner

City of Chicago

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

International College of Surgeons

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 156 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, October 14, 1997

Decided

Monday, December 15, 1997

Advocates

Richard J. Brennan (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Benna Ruth Solomon (Chicago, IL, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1989, following the Chicago Landmarks Commission's preliminary determination that two of the International College of Surgeons and the United States Section of the International College of Surgeons' (ICS) buildings qualified for protection under the city's Landmarks Ordinance, the city enacted a Designation Ordinance creating a landmark district that included the buildings. After ICS applied for and was denied a permit to demolish all but the facades of the buildings, it sought judicial review of the Commission's decisions, alleging the ordinances and the manner in which the Commission conducted its proceedings violated the Federal and State Constitutions. Chicago removed the case to federal district court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision in favor of the city, ruling that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction of a case containing state law claims for on-the-record review of local administrative action.

Question

May a lawsuit filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking judicial review of decisions of the Chicago Landmarks Commission be removed to federal district court, where the case contains both federal constitutional and state administrative challenges to the Commission's decisions?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for City of Chicago, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1367

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that a case containing claims that local administrative action violates federal law, but also containing state law claims for on-the-record review of the administrative findings, can be removed to federal district court. The Court reasoned that the landowners' actions fell within the District Court's original jurisdiction over federal questions and that the court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. "Because neither the jurisdictional statutes nor our prior decisions suggest that federal jurisdiction is lacking in these circumstances, we now reverse," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent, in which Justice John Paul Stevens joined.

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel

Wed, 04 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-42

Petitioner

Eastern Enterprises

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Apfel

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 498 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

Peter Buscemi (on behalf of the Respondents UMWA)

Edwin S. Kneedler (supporting the Federal Respondents)

John T. Montgomery (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Currently unknown.

Question

Currently unknown.

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Eastern Enterprises, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Currently unknown.

Bryan v. United States

Tue, 31 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8422

Petitioner

Bryan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 184 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 31, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

Kent L. Jones (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Roger B. Adler (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) prohibits anyone from "willfully" dealing in firearms without a federal license. The Government presented evidence at Sillasse Bryan's trial to show that he did not have a federal license to deal in firearms, that he was dealing in firearms, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful. No evidence was presented that Bryan was aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that Bryan could be convicted only if he knew of the federal licensing requirement. The trial judge instructed that a person acts "willfully" if he acts with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, but that he need not be aware of the specific law that his conduct may be violating. A jury found Bryan guilty. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the instruction was proper and that the Government had shown that Bryan had acted willfully.

Question

Does the term "willfully" in 18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) require proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful and that he knew of the federal licensing requirement for dealing in firearms?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets, National Firearms, Organized Crime Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or Gun Control Acts, except for RICO (q.v.) portion

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the term "willfully" in section 924(a)(1)(D) requires proof only that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, not that he also knew of the federal licensing requirement. Justice Stevens wrote for that court that "the willfulness requirement of [section 924(a)(1)(D)] does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required." In a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that ambiguously worded criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the defendant.

United States v. Bestfoods

Tue, 24 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-454

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bestfoods

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 51 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 24, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Lois J. Schiffer (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kenneth S. Geller (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The site of a chemical manufacturing plant was polluted over many years. During much of the time, the companies running the plant were wholly owned subsidiaries of, first, CPC International Inc. (CPC), and later Aerojet- General Corp (Aerojet). By 1981, the federal Environmental Protection Agency had undertaken to have the site cleaned up. To recover some of the money spent, the U.S. filed an action under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a)(2). Section 107 allows the U.S. to seek reimbursement for cleanup costs from, among others, "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility." The first phase of the trial concerned only liability, and focused on whether CPC and Aerojet had "owned or operated" the facility.

Question

May a parent corporation that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of a subsidiary, without more, be held liable under CERCLA Section 107(a)(2) as an operator of a polluting facility owned or operated by the subsidiary?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 9607

No, unless the corporate veil may be pierced. But a corporate parent that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of the facility itself may be held directly liable in its own right as an operator of the facility.

Geissal v. Moore Medical Corporation

Wed, 29 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-689

Petitioner

Geissal

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Moore Medical Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 74 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, April 29, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Bradley J. Washburn (on behalf of the Respondents)

Bradley J. Washington (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Sheldon Weinhaus (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

S. Sheldon Weinhaus (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to permit a beneficiary of an employer's group health plan to elect continuing coverage when he might otherwise lose that benefit because of a "qualifying event," such as the termination of employment. In 1993, when Moore Medical Corporation fired James Geissal, it told him that COBRA gave him the right to elect continuing coverage under Moore's health plan. Later, Moore informed Geissal that he was not entitled to COBRA benefits because he was already covered by a group plan through his wife's employer. Geissal then filed suit against Moore, alleging that Moore was violating CORBA by renouncing an obligation to provide continuing coverage. Ultimately, a Magistrate Judge concluded that an employee with coverage under another group health plan on the date he elects COBRA coverage is ineligible for COBRA coverage under 29 USC section 1162(2)(D)(i), which allows an employer to cancel such coverage as of "the date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of the election... covered under any other group health plan." The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does 29 USC section 1162(2)(D)(i) allow an employer to deny Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 continuation health coverage to a qualified beneficiary who is covered under another group health plan at the time he makes his COBRA election?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Geissal, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that an employer may not deny COBRA continuation coverage under its health plan to an otherwise eligible beneficiary because he is covered under another group health plan at the time he elects COBRA coverage. "It is undisputed that both before and after James Geissal elected COBRA continuation coverage he was continuously a beneficiary of [his wife's employer's] group health plan," wrote Justice Souter, "[b]ecause he was thus covered before he made his COBRA election, and so did not 'first become' covered under the [his wife's employer's] plan after the date of election, Moore could not cut off his COBRA coverage under the plain meaning of [section 1162(2)(D)(i)]."

Dooley v. Korean Airlines

Mon, 27 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-704

Petitioner

Dooley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Korean Airlines

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 116 (1998)

Argued

Monday, April 27, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Juanita Madole (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Andrew J. Harakas (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed. Representatives of three of the passengers (petitioners) sued KAL for damages for their decedents' pre-death pain and suffering. While their suit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. In Zicherman, the Court held that the Warsaw Convention permits compensation only for legally cognizable harm and that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) supplies the applicable U.S. law where an airplane crashes on the high seas. DOHSA allows certain relatives of a decedent to sue for their own pecuniary losses, but does not authorize recovery for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. Subsequently, the District Court granted KAL's motion to dismiss petitioners' nonpecuniary damages claims on the ground that DOHSA does not permit recovery for such damages. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that general maritime law provides a survival action for pain and suffering damages.

Question

May certain relatives of decedents, in a case of death on the high seas, recover damages for their decedents' pre-death pain and suffering through a survival action under general maritime law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Korean Airlines, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 46 U.S.C. App.

No. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "[b]ecause Congress has chosen not to authorize a survival action for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, there can be no general maritime survival action for such damages." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that the "comprehensive scope of DOHSA is confirmed by its survival provision, which limits the recovery in such cases to the pecuniary losses suffered by surviving relatives. The Act thus expresses Congress' 'considered judgment' on the availability and contours of a survival action in cases of death on the high seas. For this reason, it cannot be contended that DOHSA has no bearing on survival actions; rather, Congress has simply chosen to adopt a more limited survival provision."

Swidler & Berlin v. United States

Mon, 08 Jun 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1192

Petitioner

Swidler & Berlin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 399 (1998)

Argued

Monday, June 8, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

Brett M. Kavanaugh (Argued the cause for the respondents)

James Hamilton (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

During the 1993 investigation of the White House Travel Office ("Travelgate"), Deputy White House Counsel Vincent W. Foster, Jr., met with an attorney from Swidler & Berlin's law firm named James Hamilton. Nine days later, Foster committed suicide. During a subsequent investigation into the legalities of Travelgate, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Hamilton's notes about his meeting with Foster. When Swidler & Berlin challenged Starr's subpoena as a violation of the attorney-client privilege, a district court agreed. On appeal from an appellate court reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Are communications between a client and his or her lawyer protected under the attorney-client confidentiality doctrine, beyond the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination, even after the client's death?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Swidler & Berlin, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court reminded that the purpose of the attorney- client privilege is to promote public observance of the law by encouraging complete and truthful communication between attorneys and their clients. Confidentiality, even after the client's death, is essential for such honesty in both criminal and civil contexts. The Court held that absent a posthumous application of the attorney-client privilege, people would be likely to withhold information for fear of their friends' or family's reputation, civil liability, and general well-being.

Textron Lycoming v. United Automobile Workers

Mon, 23 Feb 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-463

Petitioner

Textron Lycoming

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United Automobile Workers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 653 (1998)

Argued

Monday, February 23, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

Stephen A. Yokich (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Timothy B. Dyk (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its Local 187 are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that required Textron to notify the Union before entering into any agreement to "subcontract out" work that would otherwise be performed by Union members. In 1994, Textron announced plans to subcontract out work that would have caused approximately one-half of the Union members to lose their jobs. Subsequently, the Union filed suit, alleging that Textron had fraudulently induced the Union to sign the collective-bargaining agreement. The complaint invoked section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over "suits for violation of contracts" between an employer and a labor organization. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the cause of action alleged did not come within section 301(a). The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Does section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act permit a union to sue in federal court to declare a collective bargaining agreement voidable in the absence of any alleged violation of the agreement?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Textron Lycoming, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor-Management Relations

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that neither it nor the lower federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction under section 301 because the Union's complaint alleged no violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. "Suits for violation of contracts" under [section 301(a)] are not suits that claim a contract is invalid, but suits that claim a contract has been violated, wrote Justice Scalia. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer filed concurring opinions.

Hudson v. United States

Wed, 08 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-976

Petitioner

Hudson et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 93 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, December 10, 1997

Advocates

Bernard J. Rothbaum (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

John Hudson was chairman of the First National Bank of Tipton and the First National Bank of Hammon. Hudson used his position to regain bank stock he had used as collateral on defaulted loans through a series of bank loans to other parties. Upon investigation the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) found that the loans were made in violation of several banking statues and regulations. The OCC fined and debarred Hudson for the violations. Later, he faced criminal indictment in federal District Court for violations tied to those same events. Hudson objected, arguing that the indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit eventually found for the Government in light of United States v. Halper on the grounds that the original proceedings were civil in nature and not so disproportional to the proven damages to the Government as to qualify as a form of criminal punishment.

Question

Are punitive fines and debarment by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency a sufficiently "criminal" form of punishment that a subsequent criminal indictment for the same violations would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Double Jeopardy

No. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Circuit's decision based on the distinction made in United States v. Ward between criminal and civil punishments. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to non-criminal penalties, even if the purpose of the penalty is to punish the offenders and deter future offenders. Since the first punishment handed down by the OCC - a Federal Banking Agency, not a court - was not a criminal punishment, the subsequent indictments were upheld.

Sacramento v. Lewis

Tue, 09 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Sacramento County Police Department

711 G Street Sacramento CA 95814

Sacramento, CA 95814

United States

38° 35' 4.4088" N, 121° 29' 44.2608" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1337

Petitioner

Sacramento

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lewis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 833 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, December 9, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 1998

Advocates

Terence J. Cassidy (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Paul J. Hedlund (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Philip Lewis was a passenger on a motorcycle that was involved in a high-speed police chase. The chase ended when the motorcycle's driver lost control and tipped the bike over, hurling both riders to the pavement. James Smith, one of two pursuing Sacramento county sheriff's deputies, was unable to stop his car in time and skidded into Philip, causing fatal injuries. Philip's parents, Teri and Thomas Lewis, accused Smith and the Sacramento county police department of deliberate and reckless conduct which ultimately deprived their son of his due process right to life and his protection against unconstitutional seizure. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court decision favoring Smith, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Are the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process protection, or the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against illegal seizure, violated by a police officer who, in the course of pursuing a subject, causes their death through deliberate or reckless indifference?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sacramento, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a unanimous decision the Court first ruled that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standards prevented its illegal seizure protections from applying to high-speed police chases. Such incidents are merely pursuits and do not constitute actual seizures, especially if they fail due to the death of the subject. Moreover, addressing the Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the Court held that Smith's actions, while perhaps unwise, were not intended to injure or kill those pursued. As such, the negligent infliction of harm during a police chase does not violate due process since it is not an unexpectedly shocking or egregious result under the circumstances.

Texas v. United States

Wed, 14 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-29

Appellee

United States

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Texas

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 296 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, January 14, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 31, 1998

Advocates

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellees)

Javier Aguilar (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, the Texas Legislature enacted Chapter 39. Chapter 39 holds local school boards accountable to the State for student achievement in the public schools. The State Commissioner of Education may select from various sanctions, including the appointment of a master or a management team and the contracting out of services, when a school district falls short of Chapter 39's accreditation criteria. Under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Texas submitted Chapter 39 to the United States Attorney General for a determination whether any of the sanctions effected voting and thus required preclearance. Ultimately, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights cautioned that such sanctions implementation might violate section 5. Subsequently, Texas sought a declaration District Court that section 5 did not apply to such sanctions. The court concluded that Texas's claim was not ripe.

Question

Is Texas's claim for a declaratory judgment that Chapter 39's authorized sanctions against school districts for failure to meet mandated educational achievement levels do not need preclearance ripe for adjudication?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Texas's claim is not ripe for adjudication. The Court's holding turning on the fact that Texas did not indicate any school district in which an application of Chapter 39 was "foreseen or even likely." Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that, "we find it too speculative whether the problem Texas presents will ever need solving; we find the legal issues Texas raises not yet fit for our consideration, and the hardship to Texas of biding its time insubstantial."

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.

Wed, 03 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Location of the oil rig Oncale worked on

United States

29° 11' 12.8256" N, 89° 56' 12.2532" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-568

Petitioner

Oncale

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 75 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, December 3, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Advocates

Nicholas Canaday, III (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Harry M. Reasoner (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Joseph Oncale, a male, filed a complaint against his employer, Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., alleging that he was sexually harassed by co-workers, in their workplace, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). On appeal from a decision supporting a district court's ruling against Oncale, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Does the prohibition against sex discrimination, set out in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, apply to same-sex sexual harassment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Oncale, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that while Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace, it does bar all forms of discrimination "because of" sex. Such discrimination, whether motivated by sexual desire or not, is actionable so long at it places its victim in an objectively disadvantageous working condition, regardless of the victim's gender.

Cass County, MN v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians

Tue, 24 Feb 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-174

Petitioner

Cass County, MN

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 103 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, February 24, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Earl Edwin Maus (Walker, Minnesota, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara B. McDowell (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

James M. Schoessler (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, Cass County, Minnesota began assessing ad valorem taxes on 21 parcels of reservation land that had been alienated from tribal control under the Nelson Act and later reacquired by the Leech Lake Band of Chippewa, a federally recognized Indian tribe. In 1995, the Band filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that Cass County could not tax the 21 parcels. The District Court held that all of the land that had been alienated from tribal ownership under the Nelson Act was taxable. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals held that 13 parcels that had been allotted to individual Indians could be taxed so long as they had been patented after passage of the Burke Act proviso, because the explicit mention of "taxation" in the proviso expressed "unmistakably clear" intent. Reversing in part, the court held that the eight parcels sold as pine lands or homestead land could not be taxed because those sections did not incorporate the General Allotment Act or include any mention of an intent to tax lands distributed under them which might become reacquired by the Band.

Question

May state and local governments tax reservation land that was made alienable by Congress and sold to non-Indians by the Federal Government but was later repurchased by a tribe?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cass County, MN, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 Stat. 642

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that ad valorem taxes may be imposed upon such land. "When Congress makes Indian reservation land freely alienable, it manifests an unmistakably clear intent to render such land subject to state and local taxation," wrote Justice Thomas. Repurchasing the land by an Indian tribe does not return the land to tax-exempt status. Justice Thomas concluded that "[t]he eight parcels at issue here were therefore taxable unless and until they were restored to federal trust protection."

Campbell v. Louisiana

Tue, 20 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1584

Petitioner

Campbell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Louisiana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 392 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, January 20, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, April 21, 1998

Advocates

Dmitrc I. Burnes (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Richard I. Ieyoub (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

erry Campbell, a white man, was indicted for second-degree murder by a grand jury in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana. Campbell moved to quash the indictment by citing a long history of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons in Evangeline Parish. No African-American had served as a foreperson for the past 16 years despite the fact twenty percent of the registered voters were black. Campbell claimed such practices violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights. A Louisiana trial judge denied Campbell's challenge, holding that he lacked standing as a white man complaining about the exclusion of African-Americans from serving as forepersons. The Louisiana Court of Appeal overruled the trial judge and decided Campbell had standing. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal.

Question

Does the exclusion of other races other than the defendant's violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Campbell, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

Yes. Without reaching the merits, the Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that "a defendant has standing to litigate whether his conviction was procured by means or procedures which contravene due process." A white defendant could assert the right of the grand jury to be free of discrimination because racial discrimination in jury selection casts doubt on the integrity of the entire trial process.

Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp.

Mon, 10 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-370

Petitioner

Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ferbar Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 192 (1997)

Argued

Monday, November 10, 1997

Decided

Monday, December 15, 1997

Advocates

Marsha S. Berzon (on behalf of the Petitioner)

William F. Terheyden (on behalf of the Respondents)

Edward C. DuMont (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) requires employers who withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans to pay a "withdrawal liability," which is dischargeable with an arranged series of periodic payments. The Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund (Fund) is a multiemployer pension plan for laundry workers. The Ferbar Corporation contributed to the Fund, but ultimately ceased doing so. Subsequently, the Fund's trustees demanded payment of Ferbar's withdrawal liability. The trustees decided to allow Ferbar to satisfy its obligation by making monthly payments. However, Ferbar never made a payment. Ultimately, the District Court granted Ferbar summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The court noted that the trustees had filed suit eight days too late. This was the date Ferbar was to make its first payment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the six-year period began to run on the date Ferbar withdrew from the Fund, in March 1985. Under this view, the trustees commenced suit nearly two years too late.

Question

Does the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980's six-year statute of limitations begin to run on a pension fund's action to collect unpaid withdrawal liability on the date the employer withdraws from the plan?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 29 U.S.C. 1451

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the MPPAA's six-year statute of limitations on a pension fund's action to collect unpaid withdrawal liability does not begin to run until the employer fails to make a payment on the schedule set by the fund. Justice Ginsburg reasoned that a plan's interest in receiving withdrawal liability does not ripen into a cause of action triggering the limitations period until the trustees determine and demand payment and the employer defaults on an installment. The Court's conclusion prompted a second decision, that a pension fund's action to collect unpaid withdrawal liability is timely as to any installment payments that came due during the six years preceding the suit, but payments that came due prior to that time are lost.

Gray v. Maryland

Mon, 08 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8653

Petitioner

Gray

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Maryland

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 185 (1998)

Argued

Monday, December 8, 1997

Decided

Monday, March 9, 1998

Advocates

Roy W. McLeese (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Carmen M. Shepard (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Arthur A. Delano, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, the State of Maryland tried Anthony Bell and Kevin Gray jointly for the murder of Stacy Williams. The State entered Bell's confession into evidence at trial. According to the trial judge's order, the police detective who read the confession said the word "deleted" or "deletion" whenever Gray's name appeared. Subsequently, the prosecutor asked the detective if Bell's confession led to Gray's arrest. The detective answered that it did. Ultimately, Gray testified and Bell did not. When instructing the jury, the trial judge specified that the confession was evidence only against Bell. The jury convicted both Bell and Gray. Setting aside Gray's conviction, Maryland's intermediate appellate court applied Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, in which the Court held that, despite a limiting instruction that the jury should consider the confession as evidence only against the confessing codefendant, the introduction of such a confession at a joint trial violates the nonconfessing defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. Maryland's highest court reinstated the conviction.

Question

Does Bruton v. United States apply to a redaction that replaces a name with an obvious blank space or a symbol or a word such as "deleted?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gray, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the confession, which substituted blanks and the word "delete" for the respondent's proper name, falls within the class of statements to which Bruton's protections apply. Applying Bruton, Justice Breyer wrote that a jury will often react to an unredacted confession and a confession redacted with the word "delete" similarly by realizing that the confession refers to the defendant. Justice Anton Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that Bell's confession could constitutionally have been admitted with a limiting instruction to the jury.

Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink

Mon, 03 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1370

Petitioner

Fidelity Financial Services, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fink

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 211 (1998)

Argued

Monday, November 3, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, January 13, 1998

Advocates

Richard V. Fink (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Michael P. Gaughan (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After purchasing a car, Diane Beasley gave Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. a promissory note for the purchase price. The car secured the note. 21 days later, Fidelity mailed Beasley the application to perfect its security interest under Missouri law. After Beasley filed for bankruptcy, Richard V. Fink, the trustee of Beasley's bankruptcy estate, moved to set aside Fidelity's security interest on the ground that the lien was a voidable preference under federal law. 11 USC section 547(c)(3)(B) prohibits the avoidance of a security interest for a loan used to acquire property if, among other things, the security interest is "perfected on or before 20 days after the debtor receives possession of such property." Fink argued that this "enabling loan" exception was inapposite because Fidelity had not perfected its interest within the 20-day period. Affirming the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court, the Court of Appeals held a transfer to be perfected when the transferee takes the last step required by state law to perfect its security interest.

Question

May a creditor invoke 11 USC section 547(c)(3)(B)'s "enabling loan" exception if it performs the acts necessary to perfect its security interest more than 20 days after the debtor receives the property, but within a grace period provided by the otherwise applicable state law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fink, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a transfer of a security interest is perfected under section 547(c)(3)(B) on the date that the secured party has completed the steps necessary to perfect its interest, so that a creditor may invoke the enabling loan exception only by satisfying state law perfection requirements within the 20-day period provided by the federal statute. The Court turned to the text, structure, and history of the preference provisions to determine that the federal enabling loan exception of twenty-days controlled over otherwise applicable state law.

United States v. Beggerly

Mon, 27 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-731

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Beggerly

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 38 (1998)

Argued

Monday, April 27, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Ernest G. Taylor, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1979, the United States sued Chris W. Beggerly and the Beggerly family to quiet title to Horn Island, located within the state of Mississippi, for a federal park. The Government argued that Beggerly did not have clear title because the Government had never patented the disputed land after acquiring it as part of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1982, a settlement quieted title in the Government's favor. However, in 1994, with new evidence, Beggerly sued, seeking to set aside the settlement agreement and obtain damages. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found jurisdiction under the Quiet Title Act and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as an "independent action." The appellate court then vacated the settlement agreement and instructed the District Court to quiet title in Beggerly's favor.

Question

Do federal courts lack jurisdiction over action to reopen a settlement quieting land title in the Federal Government either under Rule 60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent action or under Quiet Title Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that this was a sufficient basis to justify reopening the judgment. "[A]n independent action should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "it should be obvious that [the Beggerlys'] allegations do not nearly approach this demanding standard." The Court also concluded that the Court of Appeals extension of the Quiet Title Act's statutory period by equitable tolling was unwarranted, given its generous nature. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion.

United States v. Cabrales

Wed, 29 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-643

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cabrales

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 1 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, April 29, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1998

Advocates

John W. Rogers (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

An indictment returned in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri charged Vickie S. Cabrales with various charges of money laundering. The incident alleged that Cabrales deposited $40,000 with the AmSouth Bank of Florida, of which she later withdrew $38,000. The money was traceable to illegal cocaine sales in Missouri. Cabrales moved to dismiss the indictment for improper venue. Because the money-laundering activity occurred entirely in Florida, the court dismissed two of the three counts against Cabrales. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that Article III, the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 required that a person be tried where the charged offense was committed. The court also noted that laundering alleged in the indictment occurred entirely in Florida and that the Government did not assert that Cabrales transported the money from Missouri to Florida.

Question

May a defendant in a federal money-laundering case in which all the transactions occurred in one state be prosecuted in a second state?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cabrales, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Missouri is not a place of proper venue for the money-laundering offenses with which Cabrales is charged. Rejecting the Government's "continuing offense" argument, under which Cabrales would have been triable in more than one place, the Court noted that the laundering transactions occurred only in Florida, making venue in Missouri improper. The Court also reasoned that if the Government could link Cabrales to the drug-trafficking activity, then she could be prosecuted for those violations in Missouri with her money laundering in Florida shown as overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. IRS

Mon, 02 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-147

Petitioner

Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

IRS

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 582 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 2, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, April 21, 1998

Advocates

Kent L. Jones (Argued the cause for the respondent)

George R. Abramowitz (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Internal Revenue Code allowed property and casualty insurers to fully deduct "loss reserves," or unpaid losses. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 altered the deduction formula. Under the Act, increases in loss reserves that constitute "reserve strengthening," or additions to the loss reserve, were excepted from a one time tax benefit because it would result in a tax deficiency. Treasury regulation and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue interpreted the law to say that any increase in loss reserves constituted reserve strengthening. The Commissioner then determined Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company had engaged in reserve strengthening. The Tax Court disagreed with the government's interpretation. It held reserve strengthening referred only to increases resulting from computational methods. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held reserve strengthening to encompass any increase in loss reserves.

Question

Is the government's interpretation of reserve strengthening correct in determining property and casualty insurers' liability?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for IRS, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the IRS interpretation of reserve strengthening seemed "reasonable accommodation." It was fair and unabusive. Furthermore, the language of the provision was broad enough to embrace all increases in the reserves.

United States v. Romani

Mon, 12 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1613

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Romani

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 517 (1998)

Argued

Monday, January 12, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, April 29, 1998

Advocates

Patrick F. McCartan (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Kent L. Jones (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Both a judgment lien and federal tax liens encumbered the real property of Francis Romani's Pennsylvania estate, worth $53,001, following his death. The estate's administrator sought a county court's permission to transfer the property to the judgment creditor. The Government objected to the conveyance, arguing that 31 USC section 3713(a), which provides that a Government claim "shall be paid first" when a decedent's estate cannot pay all of its debts, prioritized its payment. Nevertheless, the court authorized the conveyance. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The court concluded that Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 modified the Government's preference and recognized the priority of many state claims over federal tax liens.

Question

Does the federal priority statute, 31 USC section 3713(a), require that that a federal tax claim be given preference over a judgment creditor's perfected lien on real property where such a preference is not authorized by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Romani, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 31 U.S.C. 3713

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that section 3713(a) does not require that a federal tax claim be given preference over a judgment creditor's perfected lien on real property. Justice Stevens reasoned that section 3713(a) has been limited by Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, which provides that says a federal lien for back taxes is not valid until the government files proper notice with state or local officials. Accordingly, Justice Stevens wrote that the Tax Lien Act "represents Congress' detailed judgment as to when the Government's claims for unpaid taxes should yield to many different sorts of interests... in many different types of property... specifically crafted for tax collection purposes." Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Bragdon v. Abbott

Mon, 30 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Randon Bragdon's Dental Office

30 Judson Blvd Bangor ME 04401

Bangor, ME 04401

United States

44° 50' 29.7996" N, 68° 47' 42.2808" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-156

Petitioner

Bragdon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Abbott

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 624 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 30, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

Bennett H. Klein (Argued the cause for the respondents)

John W. McCarthy (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

During a visit to her dentist's office, in order to fill a cavity, Sidney Abbott disclosed that although she did not manifest any obvious symptoms she carried the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). When her dentist, Randon Bragdon, refused to treat her in his office, offering to conduct any necessary work at a hospital for no extra charge other than use of the facilities, Abbott challenged his policy as discriminatory. After both a federal trial and an appeals court ruled in Abbott's favor, Bragdon appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Can a physician refuse or alter care of an HIV-positive patient without violating the equal treatment stipulations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bragdon, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

No. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that although the ADA does not force care-givers to treat an "individual [who] poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others," it also prohibits discrimination against any individual "on the basis of disability in the enjoyment of the services of any place of public accommodation by any person who operates [such] a place." The Court then reasoned that since HIV "substantially limits" major life activities, such as reproduction, the infection is a "disability" that entitles its victims to ADA protections. Having said this, however, the Court concluded that only care-givers can determine if treating an HIV-positive individual would constitute a "direct threat" to themselves or others. Therefore, the Court remanded for further risk assessment based on objective medical evidence or risk.

Penn. Board of Probation v. Scott

Mon, 30 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-581

Petitioner

Penn. Board of Probation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scott

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 357 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 30, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1998

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Leonard N. Sosnov (Argued the cause for the respondent)

D. Michael Fisher (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In granting Keith M. Scott parole, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the "Board"), stipulated that he refrain from owning or possessing weapons. When officers learned that Scott may be in possession of weapons, they searched his home and found a bow and arrow and some firearms. Despite objecting at his parole violation hearing that the search was unconstitutional, the seized weapons were admitted as evidence and Scott was ultimately recommitted. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Scott's challenge to the search and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the decision. The Supreme Court granted the Board certiorari.

Question

Does the federal exclusionary rule, prohibiting the introduction of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable search and seizure, apply to parole revocation hearings?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Penn. Board of Probation, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings. Noting that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated, the Court explained that it applies only in situations where its deterrent benefits outweigh the utilities that accompany the consideration of reliable, probative evidence. Since officers are unaware of whether their search subjects are parolees or not, the danger of their deliberately conducting illegal searches is small. By comparison, the deleterious impact that an application of the exclusionary rule would have on traditionally flexible state parole revocation proceedings is great. State parole authorities must have greater legal latitude since they deal with individuals who, in light of past criminal activities, are more likely than average citizens to offend again.

Foster v. Love

Mon, 06 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-670

Petitioner

Foster

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Love

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 67 (1997)

Argued

Monday, October 6, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, December 2, 1997

Advocates

M. Miller Baker (on behalf of the Respondents)

Richard I. Ieyoub (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Elections Clause of the Constitution provides that "the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations." 2 USC sections 1 and 7 provide that the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in an even- numbered year is established as the date for federal congressional and presidential elections. In 1975, Louisiana adopted an "open primary," which occurs before the uniform federal election day and in which all candidates appear on the ballot and all voters may vote. If a candidate for a given office receives a majority at the open primary, that candidate is elected and no further act is done on federal election day to fill that office. Louisiana voters challenged the open primary is a violation of federal law. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that Louisiana's system squarely "conflicts with the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal election day."

Question

Does Louisiana's open primary violate the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal election day?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Love, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 4, Paragraph 1: Elections Clause

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that when Louisiana's open primary is applied to select among congressional candidates in October, it conflicts with federal law and to that extent is void. The Court rejected the argument that Louisiana's system only concerns the manner, not the time, of a federal election. Justice Souter reasoned that a federal election occurs in Louisiana before the federal election date whenever a candidate receives a majority in the open primary.

Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.v. Sierra Club

Wed, 25 Feb 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-16

Petitioner

Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sierra Club

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 726 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the federal respondents supporting the petitioner)

Steven R. Quarles (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Frederick M. Gittes (Argued the cause for the private respondents)

Facts of the Case

Pursuant to the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), the United States Forest Service developed a Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest. The Plan sets logging goals, selects the areas suited to timber production, and determines which probable methods of timber harvest are appropriate, but it does not itself authorize the cutting of any trees. Ultimately, the Sierra Club filed suit, alleging that erroneous analysis leads the Plan wrongly to favor logging and clearcutting. The District Court granted the Forest Service summary judgment, finding that the Forest Service had acted lawfully in making the various challenged determinations. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, finding both that the Sierra Club had standing to bring suit, and that since the suit was "ripe for review," there was no need to wait "until a site-specific action occurs," held that the Plan improperly favored clearcutting and therefore violated the NFMA.

Question

Does the United States Forest Service's Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest present a controversy that is justiciable? If so, does the Plan conform to statutory and regulatory requirements for a forest plan?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.v. Sierra Club, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the controversy is not yet ripe for judicial review. Justice Breyer wore for the Court that "'withhold court consideration' at present will not cause the parties significant 'hardship.'" "[B]efore the Forest Service can permit logging, it must focus upon a particular site, propose a specific harvesting method, prepare an environmental review, permit the public an opportunity to be heard, and (if challenged) justify the proposal in court," continued Justice Breyer, "[t]he Sierra Club thus will have ample opportunity later to bring its legal challenge at a time when harm is more imminent and more certain."

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey

Tue, 28 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-634

Petitioner

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Yeskey

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 206 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, April 28, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

Paul A. Tufano (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Donald Specter (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After being sentenced to 18 to 36 months in prison, Ronald Yeskey was recommended as a candidate for a Motivational Boot Camp for first-time offenders. Successful completion of the Boot Camp could have resulted in Yeskey's early parole after just six months. When the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections discovered Yeskey's medical history of hypertension, he was denied admission to the Boot Camp. Yeskey challenged the refusal as discriminatory. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Did the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' refusal to allow a prison inmate to participate in a motivational boot camp, because of the inmate's history of hypertension, violate Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibiting disability-based discrimination against qualified individuals?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Yeskey, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that under the ADA no "public entity" may discriminate against qualified disabled individuals due to their disability. Moreover, the Court stated that the ADA's protections extended to cover prison inmates as well as any other liberated citizen.

Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment

Mon, 06 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-643

Petitioner

Steel Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Citizens for a Better Environment

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 83 (1998)

Argued

Monday, October 6, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Advocates

Sanford M. Stein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David A. Strauss (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Citizens For A Better Environment, a environmental protection organization, filed an enforcement action for relief under the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986's (EPCRA) Citizen-Suit Provision. Citizens alleged that the Chicago Steel And Pickling Company had violated the EPCRA by failing to file timely toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports since 1988. Ultimately, Chicago Steel filed all of the overdue forms with the relevant agencies by the time the complaint was acted on. Arguing this fact and that the EPCRA does not allow suit for purely historical violations, Chicago Steel filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Citizens' allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court agreed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for purely past violations.

Question

Does an environmental organization have standing to bring suit against companies that fail to meet the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act Of 1986's deadlines for filing toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports? Does the EPCRA authorize suits for purely past violations?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Steel Company, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No and the Court did not answer the question. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held, because none of the relief sought would likely remedy its alleged injury in fact, that Citizens For A Better Environment lacked standing to maintain suit and that the Court and lower federal courts lack the jurisdiction to entertain it. While all nine Justices agreed that the organization lacked standing, they disagreed on the reasons. Lacking jurisdiction, the Court declined to answer whether the EPCRA authorizes suits for purely past violations. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Stephen G. Breyer, John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote concurring opinions.

Brogan v. United States

Tue, 02 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1579

Petitioner

Brogan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 398 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 1997

Decided

Monday, January 26, 1998

Advocates

Stuart A. Holtzman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

When questioned by federal agents as to the receipt of gifts or money from a company whose employees were members of the union in which he was an officer, James Brogan falsely answered "no." Brogan was subsequently indicted on federal bribery charges and the making of false statements within a federal agency's jurisdiction. Brogan challenged his conviction, arguing that false statements which merely deny wrongdoing, and do not impede federal functions, are protected under the Fifth Amendment. On appeal from an appeals court judgment upholding an adverse district court ruling, the Supreme Court granted Brogan certiorari.

Question

Is the so-called "exculpatory no" doctrine, excluding from criminal sanction false statements that merely deny one's wrongdoing, consistent with the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1001

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the imposition of criminal liability for false statements is not limited only to those falsehoods that pervert governmental functions - it applies to statements "of whatever kind." Moreover, even if the "exculpatory no" doctrine did apply to statements that do not impede federal functions, Brogan would not benefit from it since his falsehoods were intended to prevent federal agents from uncovering the truth. The Court concluded by noting that a literal reading of federal laws which prohibit the "exculpatory no" defense is consistent with the Fifth Amendment, since th Framers never intended to confer a privilege to lie.

Allentown Mack Sales v. NLRB

Wed, 15 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-795

Petitioner

Allentown Mack Sales

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 359 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, October 15, 1997

Decided

Monday, January 26, 1998

Advocates

Jonathan Nuechterlein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Stephen D. Shawe (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1990, Mack Trucks, Inc., sold its Allentown, Pennsylvania, branch to Allentown Mack Sales, Inc. A number of Mack employees made statement to the new owners suggesting that Local Lodge 724 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, had lost the support of bargaining- unit members generally. Subsequently, Allentown refused Local 724's request for recognition and commencement of collective-bargaining negotiations. Allentown, under a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent, claimed a good-faith reasonable doubt as to the union's support in order to conduct an internal poll of employee support for the union. The employees voted 19 to 13 against the union. Local 724 then filed an unfair-labor-practice charge with the NLRB. Ultimately, an Administrative Law Judge held that Allentown's poll was conducted in compliance with procedural standards, but that Allentown did not have an "objective reasonable doubt" about the majority status of the union. The Court of Appeals enforced the NLRB's order for Allentown to recognize and bargain with Local 724.

Question

Is the National Labor Relations Board's "good-faith reasonable doubt" standard for polling employees on union support rational and consistent with the National Labor Relations Act? Is the NLRB's factual determination that Allentown Mack Sales, Inc. lacked such doubt supported by substantial evidence in the record?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Allentown Mack Sales, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

Split Vote

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "the Board's 'reasonable doubt' test for employer polls is facially rational and consistent with the Act." However, in a separate 5-4 split, the Court held that "the Board's factual finding that Allentown Mack Sales lacked such a doubt is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Justice Scalia wrote, "the Board must be required to apply in fact the clearly understood legal standards that it enunciates in principle, such as good-faith reasonable doubt....Reviewing courts are entitled to take those standards to mean what they say, and to conduct substantial-evidence review on that basis. Even the most consistent and hence predictable Board departure from proper application of those standards will not alter the legal rule by which the agency's factfinding is to be judged."

Cohen v. De La Cruz

Tue, 20 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1923

Petitioner

Cohen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

De La Cruz

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 213 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, January 20, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 24, 1998

Advocates

Gregory G. Diebold (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the respondents)

Donald B. Ayer (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After the local rent control administrator ordered Edward S. Cohen to refund $31,382.50 in excessive rents he had charged Hilda de la Cruz and other tenants, Cohen sought to discharge his debts under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The tenants filed an adversary proceeding, arguing that the debt Cohen owed to them was nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, which excepts from discharge "any debt ... for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by ... actual fraud." The tenants also sought treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. The Bankruptcy Court ruled in their favor, finding that Cohen had committed "actual fraud" within the meaning of ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code and that his conduct violated the New Jersey law. The court, therefore, awarded the tenants treble damages totaling $94,147.50, plus attorney's fees and costs. The District Court affirmed, as did the Court of Appeals, which held that debts resulting from fraud are nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, and that the award of treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) in this case was therefore nondischargeable.

Question

May individuals who commit fraud discharge their debts, including damages awarded to those who were defrauded, under the Bankruptcy Code?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for De La Cruz, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, The Court ruled that because Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge all liability arising from fraud, treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) awarded on account of the debtor's fraud fall within the scope of the exception. Justice O'Connor wrote, "The bankruptcy code has long prohibited debtors from discharging liabilities incurred on account of their fraud, embodying a basic policy...of affording relief only to an honest but unfortunate debtor."

Forney v. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security

Wed, 22 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-5737

Petitioner

Forney

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 266 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, April 22, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (On behalf of the respondent in support of the petitioner)

Allen R. Snyder (As amicus curiae by invitation of the Court in support of the judgment below)

Ralph Wilborn (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Sandra K. Forney applied for Social Security disability benefits. A Social Security Judge determined Forney was minimally disabled, but that she was not disabled enough to qualify for benefits. Consequently she was denied her disability claim. The Social Security Administration's Appeals Council denied Forney's request for review. Forney then sought judicial review in federal District Court. The District Court found that the final determination was inadequately supported by the evidence and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings. Forney appealed the remand order to the Court of Appeals. She contended that the agency's denial of benefits should be reversed outright. The Court of Appeals did not hear her claim, however, for it decided that Forney did not have the legal right to appeal.

Question

Can a Social Security disability claimant seeking court reversal of an agency decision denying benefits appeal a district court order remanding the case to the agency for further proceeding?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Forney, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1291

Yes. In a unanimous decision announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a person seeking Social Security disability benefits may appeal to a federal Court of Appeals when a District Court remands the case to the agency for further proceedings.

Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. School Dist.

Wed, 25 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1866

Petitioner

Gebser

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lago Vista Ind. School Dist.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 274 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, March 25, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1998

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Wallace B. Jefferson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Terry L. Weldon (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Alida Star Gebser, a high school student in the Lago Vista Independent School District ("Lago Vista"), had a secret sexual affair with one of her teachers. At the time, Lago Vista had no official procedure for reporting sexual harassment nor any formal anti-harassment policy, as required by federal law. One day, after the two were discovered having sex, the teacher was arrested and fired. Claiming she was harassed in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (the "Amendments"), providing that no person "be subjected to discrimination" under any federally funded education program or activity, Gebser sought damages against Lago Vista. On appeal from a decision affirming a district court's ruling in favor of Lago Vista, the Supreme Court granted Gebser certiorari.

Question

Can a federally funded educational program or activity be required, under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, to pay sexual harassment damages to a student who was involved in a secret relationship with a member of its staff?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lago Vista Ind. School Dist., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Education Amendments of 1972

No. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court held that two minimal criteria must be met in order for an aggrieved party to recover sexual harassment damages under the Amendments. First, the party must show that a school district official, with the ability to institute corrective measures, knew of the forbidden conduct. Second, a showing must be made that despite having knowledge of the forbidden conduct, the educational establishment deliberately failed to respond in a proper manner. The Court concluded that Lago Vista never showed indifference to Gebser's relationship since it never knew, either formally or informally, of its existence. Accordingly, Lago Vista was not liable for sexual harassment damages.

New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed

Sun, 28 Apr 2013 10:00:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1217

Petitioner

New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reed

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 151 (1998)

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Facts of the Case

The Extradition Act implements the Constitution's extradition clause and provides for the extradition from one state of a fugitive from justice when a demand for the fugitive's extradition is made by another state. Manuel Ortiz, a parolee from the Ohio correctional system, fled to New Mexico after Ohio prison officials told him that they planned to revoke his parole status. The governor of New Mexico issued a warrant directing Ortiz's return upon Ohio's demand. Ortiz then sought habeas corpus relief in New Mexico. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief. The court expressed the view that Ortiz was a refugee from injustice and that the New Mexico constitution, which guarantees the right of seeking and obtaining safety, prevailed over the state's duty under the extradition clause.

Question

Did the Supreme Court of New Mexico err in upholding grant of state habeas corpus relief to parolee whom state of Ohio sought to extradite as alleged fugitive from justice by going beyond the scope of permissible inquiry?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 4, Section 2, Paragraph 2: Extradition Clause

Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that "the Supreme Court of New Mexico went beyond the permissible inquiry in an extradition case, and permitted the litigation of issues not open in the asylum State." The opinion stated, "this is simply not the kind of issue that may be tried in the asylum State. In case after case we have held that claims relating to what actually happened in the demanding State, the law of the demanding State, and what may be expected to happen in the demanding State when the fugitive returns, are issues that must be tried in the courts of that State, and not in those of the asylum State."

Almendarez-Torres v. United States

Tue, 14 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-6839

Petitioner

Almendarez-Torres

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 224 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, October 14, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, March 24, 1998

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Peter M. Fleury (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

8 USC section 1326(a) makes it a crime, punishable by up to two years in prison, for a deported alien to return to the United States without special permission. In 1998, Congress added subsection (b)(2), which authorizes a maximum prison term of 20 years for "any alien described" in subsection (a), if the initial "deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony." In 1995, Hugo Almendarez-Torres pleaded guilty to violating section 1326. Ultimately, the District Court sentenced Almendarez- Torres to 85 months' imprisonment. The court rejected his argument that, because his indictment failed to mention his aggravated felony convictions, the court could not sentence him to more than the maximum sentence authorized by section 1326(a). In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision which permits the imposition of a higher sentence when the unlawfully returning alien also has a record of prior convictions.

Question

Does subsection (b)(2) of 8 USC section 1326(a), which forbids an alien who once was deported to return to the United States without special permission, define a separate crime?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 8 U.S.C. 1326

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that subsection (b)(2) of 8 USC section 1326(a) is a penalty provision, which authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a recidivist, and does not define a separate crime. "[W]e note that the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism," wrote Justice Breyer, "[t]hat subject matter -- prior commission of a serious crime -- is as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine." Therefore, neither subsection (b)(2) nor the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment required that the government charge a prior aggravated felony conviction in the alien's indictment for the imposition of a sentence more than 2 years.

Trest v. Cain, Warden

Mon, 10 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-7901

Petitioner

Trest

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cain, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 87 (1997)

Argued

Monday, November 10, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, December 9, 1997

Advocates

Kathleen E. Petersen (on behalf of the Respondent)

Rebecca L. Hudsmith (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Richard Trest sought a writ of habeas corpus that would cancel the sentence he was serving in Louisiana for armed robbery. The District Court rejected his claim. Trest appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but before hearing the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as a "procedural default." The Court of Appeals ruled that Trent had failed to meet the deadline for filing his federal claims in state court. Though Louisiana had not raised the issue, the Fifth Circuit felt compelled to dismiss the case on its own initiative. Trest appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Fifth Circuit had incorrectly believed that it was required to decide the "procedural default" issue sua sponte - that is, without prompting from one of the parties.

Question

Is a Court of Appeals required to decide issues of procedural default on its own initiative, without prompting from one of the parties ("sua sponte")?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Trest, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. A Court of Appeals is not required to raise an issue of procedural default on its own initiative. In a unanimous opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer observed: "We are not aware of any precedent stating that a habeas court must raise such a matter where the State itself does not do so." The Court held that it was the State's duty to raise issues of procedural default, but did not rule on the question of whether the Court of Appeals retained the option of ruling on the issue sua sponte.

Calderon v. Thompson

Tue, 09 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

95 7th St San Francisco CA 94103

San Francisco, CA 94103

United States

37° 46' 45.4152" N, 122° 24' 39.5568" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-215

Petitioner

Calderon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Thompson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 538 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, December 9, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, April 29, 1998

Advocates

Gregory A. Long (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Holly D. Wilkens (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1983, Thomas M. Thompson was convicted of the rape and murder of Ginger Fleischli in California state court. The special circumstance found by the jury of murder during the commission of rape made Thompson eligible for the death penalty. In 1995, a federal District Court invalidated Thompson's death sentence by granted relief on his rape conviction and the rape special circumstance. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reinstated Thompson's death sentence, noting that the State presented strong evidence of rape at trial. The Court of Appeals then issued a mandate denying all habeas relief. Two days before Thompson's execution, the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate and granted Thompson relief. The appellate court found that Thompson was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial.

Question

Did the Court of Appeal's order recalling its mandate denying Thomas M. Thompson all habeas relief violate 28 USC section 2244(b) as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996? Was the order an abuse of the appellate court's discretion?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Calderon, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that although it was consistent with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the recall was a grave abuse of discretion. The Court established that "where a federal court of appeals sua sponte recalls its mandate to revisit the merits of an earlier decision denying habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, the court abuses its discretion unless it acts to avoid a miscarriage of justice as defined by our habeas corpus jurisprudence." Accordingly, Justice Kennedy, noting that Thompson's evidence was not clear and convincing, concluded that California's judgment would not result in a miscarriage of justice. Justice David H. Souter wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer joined.

Bousley v. United States

Tue, 03 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8516

Petitioner

Bousley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 614 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 3, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

L. Marshall Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent, on behalf of the United States)

Thomas C. Walsh (Argued the cause, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, in support of the judgment)

Facts of the Case

In 1990, Kenneth Eugene Bousley pleaded guilty to "using" a firearm "during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime," in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Ultimately, Bousley sough habeas relief, claiming his guilty plea lacked a factual basis because a connection between the firearms, located in the bedroom, and the location where the drug trafficking occurred, in the garage, was not shown in either the evidence or the plea. Dismissing the petition, the District Court found that a factual basis for the plea existed because the guns were in close proximity to the drugs and were readily accessible. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Bousley's argument, among others, that his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent because he was misinformed about the elements of a section 924(c)(1) offense.

Question

May defendants who pleaded guilty to "using" a firearm in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1) contest the validity of their convictions by claiming that their guilty pleas were not knowing and intelligent because they were misinformed by the District Court as to the nature of the charged crime?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Bousley, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that, although Bousley's claim was procedurally defaulted, Bousley may be entitled to a hearing on the merits of it if he makes the necessary showing to relieve the default. The Court's opinion made Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), which held that section 924(c)(1)'s "use" element requires the Government to show "active employment of the firearm," retroactive. Accordingly, the Court ruled that Bousley need demonstrate no more than that he did not "use" a firearm as defined in Bailey to be entitled to have his defaulted claim of an unintelligent plea considered on its merits.

Spencer v. Kemna

Wed, 12 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-7171

Petitioner

Spencer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kemna

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 1 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, November 12, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, March 3, 1998

Advocates

John W. Simon (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

James R. Layton (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1990, Randy G. Spencer began serving concurrent three-year sentences for convictions of felony stealing and burglary. In 1992, Spencer was released, but later that year his parole was revoked and he was returned to prison. Seeking to invalidate his parole revocation, Spencer filed unsuccessful habeas petitions in state court. Spencer then filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that he had not received due process in the parole revocation proceedings. In 1993, Spencer was re-released on parole before the District Court addressed the merits of his habeas petition. Subsequently, the court dismissed Spencer's petition as moot. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

May prison inmates challenge the revocation of their parole after they are re- released on parole?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Kemna, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. In a 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the expiration of Spencer's sentence caused his petition to be moot because it no longer presented an Article III case or controversy. The Court concluded that once a petitioner's sentence has expired he must demonstrate a concrete and continuing injury to maintain suit. Accordingly, the Court rejected that Spencer's asserted injuries established collateral consequences sufficient to state an Article III case or controversy. "The reincarceration that he incurred as a result of that action is now over, and cannot be undone," wrote Justice Scalia. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.

Caron v. United States

Tue, 21 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-6270

Petitioner

Caron

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 308 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, April 21, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1998

Advocates

Jonathan Nuechterlein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Owen S. Walker (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

18 USC section 922(g)(1) forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess any firearm. Section 924(e) requires that a three-time violent felon who violates section 922(g)(1) receive an enhanced sentence. Section 921(a)(20) provides that a previous conviction is not a predicate for the substantive offense or the enhanced sentence if the offender's civil rights have been restored, "unless such... restoration... expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms." In 1993, Gerald Caron was convicted of possessing six rifles and shotguns in violation of section 922(g). The District Court enhanced Caron's sentence based, in part, on three Massachusetts convictions. In vacating his sentence, the Court of Appeals concluded that a Massachusetts law that permitted Caron to possess rifles, but not handguns, had restored his civil rights. On remand, the District Court found that, because Massachusetts law allowed Caron to possess rifles, section 921(a)(20)'s "unless clause" was not activated. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Does 18 USC section 922(g)(1), which forbids felons from possessing firearms and enhances their sentences for a violation, apply to a felon who is allowed under state law to possess rifles and shotguns but not handguns?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 922

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Massachusetts treats [Caron] as too dangerous to trust with handguns, though it accords this right to law-abiding citizens. Federal law uses this state finding of dangerousness in forbidding [Caron] to have any guns." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "the unless clause is activated if a restoration of civil rights 'expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms.' Either the restorations forbade possession of 'firearms' and the convictions count for all purposes, or they did not and the convictions count not at all. The unless clause looks to the terms of the past restorations alone and does not refer to the weapons at issue in the present case. So if the Massachusetts convictions count for some purposes, they count for all and bar possession of all guns."

Miller v. Albright

Tue, 04 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States Department of State

2201 C St. NW Washington DC 20520

Washington, DC 20520

United States

38° 53' 37.0356" N, 77° 2' 56.8896" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1060

Petitioner

Miller

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Albright

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 420 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, November 4, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, April 22, 1998

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Donald R. Patterson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Lorelyn Miller was born in the Philippines, in 1970, to a Filipino national woman and an American soldier. Her parents were never married. In 1992, after the State Department rejected her first application for U.S. citizenship, Miller reapplied when a Texas court granted her father's petition for a paternity decree declaring him her father. When the State Department rejected her citizenship application again, claiming that 8 U.S.C. Section 1409(a) required foreign born illegitimate children of American fathers to be legitimated before age 18, Miller challenged the refusal. She claimed that since Section 1409(c) established at birth the citizenship of an illegitimate foreign-born child whose mother was an American citizen, the State Department's refusal to do the same under Section 1409(a), when the father is an American citizen, was unconstitutional. On appeal from an appellate court's decision to affirm the lower court's dismissal of the case, the Supreme Court granted Miller certiorari.

Question

Does 8 U.S.C. Section 1409, establishing upon birth the U.S. citizenship of illegitimate foreign-born children whose mothers only are U.S. citizens but failing to do the same if only their fathers are U.S. citizens, violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantees?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Albright, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

No. After ruling that Miller had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute, the Court held that 8 U.S.C. Section 1409 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court reasoned that different treatment of mothers and fathers of out-of-wedlock children was justified since the two parents are not "similarly situated." While the child's relationship with its father may be undisclosed for several years, its blood relationship to its mother is usually apparent through hospital records. Moreover, whereas birth mothers will know immediately of their child's existence, birth fathers and their children may never know each other. The statutory requirement that a child born out of wedlock to a citizen father obtain formal proof of paternity by age 18, either through legitimization, written acknowledgment by the father under oath, or adjudication by a competent court, is well tailored to address the difficulties of establishing a child's citizenship based only on the relation to the father.

Monge v. California

Tue, 28 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-6146

Petitioner

Monge

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 721 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, April 28, 1998

Decided

Friday, June 26, 1998

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Clifford Gardner (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David F. Glassman (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Angel Jaime Monge was convicted on three counts of violating California's drug laws, all felonies. Under California's "three-strikes" law a convicted felon with one prior felony conviction will have his prison term doubled. The state sought to have Monge's sentence enhanced based on a previous assault conviction and the resulting prison term. Subsequently the California trial court doubled his sentence and added a one-year enhancement for the prior prison term. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal ruled that the evidence was insufficient to trigger the sentence enhancement because the prior conviction allegations were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, a retrial to substantiate the allegations would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The California Supreme Court reversed the double jeopardy ruling, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause, though applicable in the capital sentencing context, does not extend to noncapital sentencing proceedings.

Question

Does the Double Jeopardy Clause preclude retrial on a prior conviction allegation in noncapital sentencing proceedings?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for California, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Double Jeopardy

No. In a 5-4 decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect convicted criminals from a second sentencing proceeding in noncapital cases. State prosecutors can try a second time to convince a court to impose an enhanced sentence under a state's "three-strikes" law.

Hopkins, Warden v. Reeves

Mon, 23 Feb 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1693

Petitioner

Hopkins, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reeves

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 88 (1998)

Argued

Monday, February 23, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Roy W. McLeese (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Donald B. Stenberg (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Paula Hutchinson (Appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Randolph K. Reeves was charged with two counts of felony murder for the sexual assault and murder of Janet Mesner and Victoria Lamm, both of Lincoln, Nebraska. Under Nebraska law, felony murder is a form of first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of certain felonies, including sexual assault. A conviction for felony murder renders a defendant eligible for the death penalty; however the jury does not charge the defendant because capital sentencing is a judicial function. In his trial Reeves requested the jury be given other options rather than just felony murder. The trial court judge denied Reeves's motion and he was subsequently convicted on both counts. A three-judge panel sentenced Reeves to death. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. After exhausting his state remedies, Reeves filed a federal habeas corpus petition that the trial court's failure to give the requested instructions was unconstitutional. The District Court granted relief on an unrelated due process claim. The Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's decision, but held that a constitutional error had occurred.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require jurors in capital cases to be given an option to convict a defendant of offenses that are not lesser-included offenses of the crime charged? Did the Nebraska trial court err in failing to give the requested jury instructions?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Hopkins, Warden, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No and no. The Court held 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, that (1) in capital cases, a state trial court is not required, under the Constitution, to instruct the jury on offenses that are not lesser included offenses of the charged crime under state law; and (2) the Nebraska trial court did not commit federal constitutional error in failing to give the requested jury instructions as to second-degree murder and manslaughter.

Edwards v. United States

Mon, 23 Feb 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8732

Petitioner

Edwards

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 511 (1998)

Argued

Monday, February 23, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, April 28, 1998

Advocates

Steven Shobat (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Edward C. DuMont (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

At Vincent Edwards, Reynolds A. Wintersmith, Horace Joiner, Karl V. Fort, and Joseph Tidwell's trial for "conspiring" to "possess with intent to...distribute [mixtures containing two] controlled substances," the jury was instructed that the Government must prove that the conspiracy involved measurable amounts of "cocaine or cocaine base (crack)." After the jury returned guilty verdicts, the District Judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioners' illegal conduct involved both cocaine and crack. On appeal, the petitioners argued that their sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack, because the word "or" in the jury instruction meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine. The United States Sentencing Guidelines treats cocaine more leniently than crack. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy.

Question

May federal judges sentence someone convicted of taking part in a drug conspiracy based on a finding that two illegal drugs were involved, even if the jury might have convicted based on one drug?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the judge was authorized to determine for sentencing purposes whether crack, as well as cocaine, was involved in the offense-related activities." Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "[t]he Sentencing Guidelines instruct the judge in a case like this one to determine both the amount and the kind of 'controlled substances' for which a defendant should be held accountable -- and then to impose a sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind. Consequently, regardless of the jury's actual, or assumed, beliefs about the conspiracy, the Guidelines nonetheless require the judge to determine whether the 'controlled substances' at issue -- and how much of those substances -- consisted of cocaine, crack, or both."

Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.

Wed, 21 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1768

Petitioner

Feltner

Respondent

Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 340 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, January 21, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 31, 1998

Advocates

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Henry J. Tashman (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1991, Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., terminated agreements licensing several television series, including "Who's the Boss," "Silver Spoons," "Hart to Hart," and "T. J. Hooker," to three television stations owned by C. Elvin Feltner after the stations' royalty payments became delinquent. Columbia sued Feltner after his stations continued to broadcast the programs for copyright infringement. After winning partial summary judgment as to liability on its copyright infringement claims, Columbia attempted to recover statutory damages under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act. The District Court denied Feltner's request for a jury trial and awarded Columbia statutory damages following a bench trial. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that neither section 504(c) nor the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on statutory damages.

Question

Does section 504(c) of the Copyright Act or the Seventh Amendment grant a right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Feltner, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 17 U.S.C. 504

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, despite section 504(c) of the Copyright Act's silence, the Seventh Amendment provides the right to a jury trial, which includes a right to a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages. Applying a historical Seventh Amendment analysis, Justice Thomas concluded that "there is clear and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff." "As a result, if a party so demands, a jury must determine the actual amount of statutory damages under [section 504(c)] in order 'to preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury,'" wrote Justice Thomas.

Salinas v. United States

Wed, 08 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-738

Petitioner

Salinas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 52 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, December 2, 1997

Advocates

Francisco J. Enriquez (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Hidalgo County agreed to take federal prisoners into its custody in return for federal money. During this agreement, Brigido Marmolejo, the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, Texas, and Mario Salinas, his deputy, accepted money and two watches and a truck respectively, from Homero Beltran-Aguirr, a federal prisoner housed in the county jail, in exchange for permitting his girlfriend to visit him. Ultimately, Salinas was charged with one count of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USC section 1962(c), one count of conspiracy to violate RICO, section 1962(d), and two counts of bribery, section 666(a)(1)(B). The jury convicted him on all but the substantive RICO count. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is the federal bribery statute, 18 USC section 666, limited to cases in which the bribe has a demonstrated effect upon federal funds? Does the conspiracy prohibition contained in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act apply only when the conspirator agrees to commit two of the predicate acts that RICO forbids?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 666

No and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that section 666(a)(1)(B) does not require the Government to prove the bribe in question had a demonstrated effect upon federal funds. Additionally, the Court held that, to be convicted of conspiracy to violate RICO under section 1962(d), the conspirator need not himself have committed or agreed to commit the two or more predicate acts, such as bribery, requisite for a substantive RICO offense under section 1962(c). Justice Kennedy reasoned that section 666(a)(1)(B)'s "expansive, unqualified language, both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered" did not support the position that federal funds must be affected for a violation to occur.

Kawaauhau v. Geiger

Wed, 21 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-115

Petitioner

Kawaauhau

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Geiger

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 57 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, January 21, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 3, 1998

Advocates

Norman W. Pressman (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Laura K. Grandy (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1983, Margaret Kawaauhau sought treatment from Dr. Paul Geiger for a foot injury. Later, Geiger cancelled Kawaauhau's transfer, by other physicians, to an infectious disease specialist. Ultimately, Kawaauhau required that her right leg be amputated below the knee. In the subsequently malpractice suit, a jury awarded Kawaauhau approximately $355,000 in damages. Geiger, who carried no malpractice insurance, ultimately filed for bankruptcy. Kawaauhau requested the Bankruptcy Court to hold the malpractice judgment nondischargeable under 11 USC section 523(a)(6), which provides that a "discharge [in bankruptcy]... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt... for willful and malicious injury... to another." The court held the debt nondischargeable. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that section 523(a)(6)'s exemption from discharge is confined to debts for an intentional tort, so that a debt for malpractice remains dischargeable because it is based on negligent or reckless conduct.

Question

Does a debt arising from a medical malpractice judgment, attributable to negligent or reckless conduct, fall within section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that a debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another" is not dischargeable?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Geiger, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that "debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of [section 523(a)(6)]." Therefore, the debt is dischargeable. Justice Ginsburg wore for the Court that "[t]he word 'willful' in [section 523(a)(6)] modifies the word 'injury,' indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. Had Congress meant to exempt debts resulting from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead 'willful acts that cause injury.' Or, Congress might have selected an additional word or words, i.e., 'reckless' or 'negligent,' to modify 'injury.'"

Lewis, Deceased v. Brunswick Corporation

Mon, 02 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-288

Petitioner

Vicky Lewis, et ux., individually, as parents, as next friends and as administrators of the Estate of Kathryn C. Lewis, Deceased

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brunswick Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 1114 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 2, 1998

Decided

Friday, May 15, 1998

Advocates

David E. Hudson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

David C. Frederick (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Kenneth S. Geller (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Kathryn Lewis was killed during a boating accident in which she fell into the water and was struck repeatedly by a boat's propellers. Her parents, Gary and Vicki Lewis, sued Brunswick Corporation on behalf of their daughter for negligence, property liability, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Lewis claimed that Brunswick negligently failed to fit the boat with a propeller guard, prevented other companies from manufacturing propeller guards for their engines, and discouraged government regulation by exaggerating the performance benefits of unguarded engines. Brunswick claimed that the Federal Boat Safety Act (FBSA) preempted all of Lewis's claims. Both the District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found for Brunswick, holding that the scope of the preemption clause in the FBSA did include Lewis's claims.

Question

Does the Federal Boat Safety Act's preemption clause include claims of negligence, property liability, and fraudulent misrepresentation?

Conclusion

Despite its win in the Eleventh Circuit, Brunswick settled the case for approximately $700,000 before the Supreme Court could rule.

Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal

Wed, 25 Feb 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-300

Petitioner

Stewart

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Martinez-Villareal

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 627 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

Denise I. Young (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Bruce M. Ferg (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Ramon Martinez-Villareal was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Arizona. His first three federal habeas corpus petitions were denied because he had not exhausted his state remedies. Martinez-Villareal claimed in his fourth habeas petition that he was incompetent to be executed. The District Court dismissed that claim as premature, but granted the writ on other grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed the writ. Martinez-Villareal moved to reopen his petition despite the fact that review of his incompetency claim might be prevented by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, a prisoner must ask the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to consider such a petition. By now Arizona had obtained a warrant for Martinez-Villareal's execution. Subsequently, he was found fit to be executed. The District Court denied another motion to reopen his incompetency claim, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under AEDPA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the law did not apply to a petition that raises only a competency-to-be-executed claim and that Martinez-Villareal did not, therefore, need authorization to file his petition in the District Court.

Question

May a state prison death row inmate who already has lost on one or more federal habeas corpus petitions file a subsequent petition to claim that he cannot be executed because he is incompetent?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Martinez-Villareal, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled Martinez-Villareal cannot be barred from raising his incompetency claim in a successive petition because his claim was really amended. The ban imposed by the AEDPA only covers truly successive petitions. "To hold otherwise," declared Rehnquist, "would mean that a dismissal of a first habeas petition for technical procedural reasons would bar the prisoner from ever obtaining federal habeas review."

Lewis v. United States

Wed, 12 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-7151

Petitioner

Lewis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 155 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, November 12, 1997

Decided

Monday, March 9, 1998

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Frank Granger (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

While living on the federal Army base Fort Polk, Debra Faye Lewis was charged with the murder of her four year-old daughter. Under the federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which provides that "whoever within... any [federal enclave], is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable... within the jurisdiction of the State... in which such place is situated, ...shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment," Lewis' indictment charged a violation of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. Lewis was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by the District Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the ACA did not apply because Congress made Lewis' acts punishable as federal second-degree murder. The appellate court, however, affirmed Lewis' conviction because the jury had necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree murder.

Question

Does the federal Assimilative Crimes Act make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute applicable on a federal Army base located in Louisiana?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Lewis, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 13

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that, because the ACA does not make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute part of federal law, the federal second-degree murder statute governs Lewis' crime. Because the federal second-degree murder statute does not mandate a life sentence, but rather provides for a sentence of "any term of years or life," Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that Lewis was also entitled to resentencing. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion.

Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation

Tue, 13 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1578

Petitioner

Phillips

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Washington Legal Foundation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 156 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, January 13, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Richard A. Samp (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Darrell E. Jordan (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Under Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) program, lawyers must deposit their client's funds into a special interest-bearing "NOW" account upon determination that the funds could not earn the client interest or compensate for other financial and accounting fees. Interest federally funded interest accrued on IOLTA accounts is then paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF) which supports legal services for low-income persons. Acting on behalf of others opposed to IOLTA, the Washington Legal Foundation (the "Foundation") challenged TEAJF's receipt and use of the IOLTA funds. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a favorable district court decision, the Supreme Court granted the Foundation certiorari.

Question

Does Texas' public use of interest accrued on principal client funds, deposited by mandate into federally funded accounts, violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Washington Legal Foundation, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that TEAJF's used of IOLTA interest funds violated the Takings Clause which prohibits the taking of "private property for public use, without just compensation." The Court noted that since the principal client fees deposited into the IOLTA account are private property, any accrued interest on such fees attaches as a property right incident to ownership of the underlying principal. Thus, since they may not redistribute the principal deposits, TEAJF is also prohibited from assigning any interest accumulated thereon.

Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.

Mon, 12 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1037

Petitioner

Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 751 (1998)

Argued

Monday, January 12, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 1998

Advocates

John E. Patterson, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Edward C. DuMont (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

R. Brown Wallace (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The U.S. holds in trust the Oklahoma land that the federally recognized Kiowa Tribe owns. In 1990, the then-Chairman of the Tribe's Business Committee signed a promissory note in the Tribe's name in order to purchase stock from Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. The note states that it was signed on tribal lands and provides that nothing in it subjects or limits the Tribe's sovereign rights. After the Tribe defaulted, Manufacturing Technologies sued the Tribe in state court, claiming that the note was executed and delivered beyond tribal lands. The Tribe moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Denying the motion, the trial court entered judgment for Manufacturing Technologies. In affirming, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that Indian tribes are subject to suit in state court for breaches of contract involving off- reservation commercial conduct.

Question

May Indian tribes be sued in state courts for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from civil suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a reservation. Noting that an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity, Justice Kennedy deferred to Congress, which has not abrogated a tribe's immunity from civil suits on contracts. In a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the Court should consider "whether a tribe is immune from a suit that has no meaningful nexus to the Tribe's land or its sovereign functions."

Bates v. United States

Tue, 07 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-7185

Petitioner

Bates

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 23 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, October 7, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, November 4, 1997

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (on behalf of the Respondent)

C. Richard Oren (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1986, Garrit Bates was appointed to serve as the Acme Institute of Technology's treasurer. In 1987, James Jackson, as Acme's president, signed a program participation agreement with the Department of Education that authorized the school to receive student loan checks through the Title IV Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program. Under the GSL program, governing regulations required Acme to return a portion of a loan if the student withdrew from Acme before the term ended. In 1987, Jackson and Bates began a practice of not making GSL refunds. Ultimately, in 1994, Bates was indicted on of "knowingly and willfully misapplying" federally insured student loan funds, in violation of 20 USC section 1097(a). The District Court dismissed Bates's indictment because it lacked an allegation of his "intent to injure or defraud the United States." Reinstating the prosecution, the Court of Appeals concluded that section 1097(a) required the Government to prove only that Bates knowingly and willfully misapplied Title IV funds.

Question

Does 20 USC section 1097(a), which makes it a felony "knowingly and willfully" to misapply student loan funds insured under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, require an allegation and proof that a defendant specifically intended to injure or defraud either the United States as loan guarantor or another?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 20 U.S.C. 1070

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the specific intent to injure or defraud someone, whether the United States or another, is not an element of the misapplication of funds proscribed by section 1097(a). Justice Ginsburg wore for the Court that, "the text of [section 1097(a)] does not include an 'intent to defraud' state of mind requirement, and we ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face." In contrast, Justice Ginsburg noted that 20 USC section 1097(d), which makes it a felony "knowingly and willfully" to "destroy or conceal any record relating to the provision of assistance under [Title IV] with intent to defraud the United States" contained an "intent to defraud" element.

Regions Hospital v. Shalala

Mon, 01 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1375

Petitioner

Regions Hospital

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shalala

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 448 (1998)

Argued

Monday, December 1, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, February 24, 1998

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Ronald N. Sutter (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Under the Medicare Act a hospital may obtain a reimbursement for certain graduate medical education (GME) programs for interns and residents by preparing certain reports. The GME Amendment, section 9202(a), of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985 directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine, for a hospital's cost reporting period starting during fiscal year 1984, the amount "recognized as reasonable" for GME costs. The Amendment then directs the Secretary to use the 1984 amount, adjusted for inflation, to calculate a hospital's GME reimbursement for subsequent years. The Secretary's "reaudit" regulation permits a second audit of the 1984 GME costs to ensure accurate reimbursements in future years. A reaudit of Regions Hospital significantly lowered the Hospital's allowable 1984 GME costs. Subsequently, the Hospital challenged the validity of the reaudit rule. Ultimately, the District Court granted the Secretary summary judgment, concluding that the rule reasonably interpreted Congress' prescription and that the reauditing did not impose an impermissible "retroactive rule." The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is the Secretary of Health and Human Services' "reaudit" rule a reasonable interpretation of the GME Amendment of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Shalala, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Medicare--provisions of the Social Security Act

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the reaudit rule is a reasonable interpretation of the GME Amendment and that it is not impermissibly retroactive. Given that the timing of the "recognized as reasonable" determination is silent and thus ambiguous, the Court concluded that, because it reflects a reasonable interpretation of the law, the reaudit rule merits the Court's approbation. "The Secretary's reaudit rule brings the base-year calculation in line with Congress' pervasive instruction for reasonable cost reimbursement," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined.

Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard

Wed, 10 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1769

Petitioner

Ohio Adult Parole Authority

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Woodard

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 272 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, December 10, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, March 25, 1998

Advocates

William A. Klatt (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

S. Adele Shank (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After Eugene Woodard's death sentence was finalized, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority commenced a clemency investigation. The Authority informed Woodard of his voluntary interview and clemency hearing. Ultimately, Woodard filed suit, alleging that Ohio's clemency process violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that Woodard had failed to establish a life or liberty interest protected by due process arising out of the clemency proceeding itself. The appellate court, however, also held that Woodard's pretrial life and liberty interests were protected because a minimal amount of due process attached to clemency due to its distance from trial. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a determination as to what that process should be.

Question

Does an inmate have a protected life or liberty interest in clemency proceedings? Does the option of voluntarily participating in an interview as part of the clemency process violate an inmate's Fifth Amendment rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Woodard, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court unanimously held that Ohio had not violated the Woodard's privilege against compelled self-incrimination by giving him the option of voluntarily participating in a clemency interview without the benefit of counsel or a grant of immunity for any statements. In an 8-1 split, with Justice John Paul Stevens dissenting, the Court held that Ohio's clemency procedures do not violate due process. The eight-member majority was unable to agree on an opinion as to the extent of due process protections required in clemency proceedings.

United States v. Scheffer

Mon, 03 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1133

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scheffer

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 303 (1998)

Argued

Monday, November 3, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, March 31, 1998

Advocates

Kim L. Sheffield (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

While defending himself before a military court martial on, among other things, substance abuse charges, airman Edward G. Scheffer sought to introduce his polygraph examination results. The results indicated there was "no deception" in Scheffer's denial that he used drugs while enlisted. Relying on Military Rule of Evidence 707 ("Rule 707"), prohibiting the use of polygraph results in court-martial proceedings, the military judge refused Scheffer's request to admit his results into evidence. On successive appeals, following his conviction on all charges, the Air Force Court of Appeals affirmed but the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed, finding the evidentiary exclusion to be unconstitutional. The United States appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Does Military Rule of Evidence 707, excluding the admission of polygraph results into evidence, violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a fair defense?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 6: Other Sixth Amendment Provisions

No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that Rule 707 was consistent with the legitimate interest of state and federal authorities to admit only reliable evidence. In addition to noting the even-handed scope of Rule 707, excluding from evidence both favorable and unfavorable polygraph results, the Court emphasized the poor reliability of polygraph evidence as a whole. In the absence of sounder detection methods, the Court noted that the fundamental premise of the criminal justice system is that juries are the ultimate and most reliable evaluators of credibility and truthfulness.

Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana

Wed, 21 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1971

Petitioner

Rivet

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Regions Bank of Louisiana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 470 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, January 21, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, February 24, 1998

Advocates

Charles L. Stern, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

John G. Odom (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1983, a partnership mortgaged its interest in the Louisiana equivalent of a leasehold estate on a parcel of real property in New Orleans to Regions Bank of Louisiana. The partnership then granted a second mortgage to Mary Anna Rivet, Minna Ree Winer, Edmond G. Miranne, and Edmond G. Miranne, Jr. Later, the partnership filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of the estate to the Bank, which sold the property. Rivet filed suit in Louisiana state court, alleging that the transfer of the property without satisfying their rights under the second mortgage violated state law. The Bank removed the action to federal court, contending that federal-question jurisdiction existed because the prior Bankruptcy Court orders extinguished Rivet's rights. Denying Rivet's motion to remand, the District Court granted the Bank summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that removal is proper where a plaintiff's state cause of action is completely precluded by a prior federal judgment on a federal question.

Question

May removal to federal court be predicated on a defendant's assertion that a prior federal judgment has disposed of an entire matter and thus bars plaintiffs from later pursuing a state-law-based case?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Rivet, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1441

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a defense claim of preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment provides no basis for removal and emphasized that the claim is properly made in state proceedings. Differing the case from a removable case governed by a preemptive federal statute, Justice Ginsburg wrote that the "prior federal judgment does not transform the plaintiff's state-law claims into federal claims but rather extinguishes them altogether."

Crawford-El v. Britton

Mon, 01 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-827

Petitioner

Crawford-El

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Britton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 574 (1998)

Argued

Monday, December 1, 1997

Decided

Monday, May 4, 1998

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Daniel M. Schember (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Walter A. Smith, Jr. (Washington, D.C., argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Leonard Crawford-El, a prisoner in the District of Columbia's correctional system, was ultimately transferred to a federal prison in Florida. Crawford- El's belongings were transferred separately. A correctional officer had Crawford-El's brother-in-law pick his belongs rather than ship them. Crawford- El finally received his belongings months after reaching Florida. Crawford-El filed suit under 42 USC section 1983, which provides that "Every person who... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...." Crawford-El alleged that the diversion of his property was motivated by an intent to retaliate against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the complaint. In remanding, the en banc Court of Appeals conclude among other things, that in an unconstitutional-motive case, a plaintiff must establish motive by clear and convincing evidence.

Question

May lawsuits invoking 42 USC section 1983 to allege that a public official violated a prisoner's rights because of an unlawful motive be dismissed because the plaintiff fails to produce clear and convincing evidence of the unlawful motive?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Crawford-El, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in fashioning a heightened burden of proof for unconstitutional-motive cases against public officials. "Neither the text of [section 1983] or any other federal statute, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides any support for imposing the clear and convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the summary judgment stage or in the trial itself," wrote Justice Stevens. In a dissent joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that a government official was entitled to immunity from a motive-based tort suit if the official could proffer a legitimate reason and the plaintiff could not establish that the reason given was a pretext.

United States v. Bajakajian

Tue, 04 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1487

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bajakajian

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 321 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, November 4, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1998

Advocates

James E. Blatt (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

During a routine check of departing international flight passengers, customs officers discovered $357,144 on the person of Hosep Bajakajian. In addition to charging him, under 31 U.S.C. Section 5316, of attempting to leave the United States with an unreported sum in excess of $10,000 cash, the government also sought forfeiture of the entire $357,144 under 18 U.S.C. Section 982 providing that the deliberate violation of Section 5316 shall result in the forfeiture of "any property involved in such an offense." After having its forfeiture claim rejected in both a district court and the Ninth Circuit, as excessively unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted the government certiorari.

Question

Is the forfeiture of $357,144 cash, a sum involved in the offense of failure to report property in excess of $10,000 while attempting to leave the country, a violation of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bajakajian, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 982

Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that the government's ability to extract fines is limited by the Excessive Fines Clause. The forfeiture of currency, when ordered for a violation of a reporting statute, is a punitive measure which constitutes a "fine" under the Eighth Amendment. Noting the importance of making punishments proportional to their crimes, the Court reminded that currency transportation is generally permissible. Bajakajian's failure to do so within statutory reporting guidelines was neither related to other illegal activity nor did it result in loss to the government. Therefore, forfeiture of the entire sum would be grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense.

City of Monroe v. United States

Sun, 28 Apr 2013 10:00:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-122

Appellee

United States

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

City of Monroe

Respondent Type

Appellant

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 34 (1997)

Decided

Monday, November 17, 1997

Facts of the Case

Monroe, Georgia is covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which requires the preclearance of certain voting changes. Prior to 1966, the Monroe city charter did not specify whether a majority vote or a plurality vote was needed to win a mayoral election. In practice, the city changed in 1966 from using a plurality-voting requirement to using a majority-voting requirement. The United States brought suit against the city, claiming that it had not sought preclearance of the change, as required by section 5 and sought to enjoin such majority voting and to require the city to return to plurality voting. The District Court, in granting summary judgment in favor of the United States, expressed the view that the change to majority voting had not been precleared in accordance with section 5.

Question

Is the city of Monroe, Georgia entitled to conduct elections under a state-law rule requiring majority vote to win, when the U.S. alleged that the city had not sought preclearance of the change from plurality voting as required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for City of Monroe, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the city was entitled to conduct elections under the auspices of a controlling state-law default rule that had been passed by the state's legislature in 1968. The Court reasoned that, because the U.S. Attorney General had approved and precleared the default rule when the state had submitted the 1968 code for preclearance, the submission had given the Attorney General an adequate opportunity to determine the purpose of the default-rule electoral changes and whether they would adversely affect minority voting.

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton

Wed, 25 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-282

Petitioner

Faragher

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Boca Raton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 775 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, March 25, 1998

Decided

Friday, June 26, 1998

Advocates

Harry A. Rissetto (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

William R. Amlong (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After resigning as a lifeguard, Beth Ann Faragher brought an action against the City of Boca Raton and her immediate supervisors, alleging that the supervisors had created a sexually hostile atmosphere by touching, remarking, and commenting. Faragher asserted that this conduct constituted discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court concluded that Faragher's supervisors' conduct was sufficiently serious to alter the conditions of her employment and constitute an abusive working environment. The court then held that the city could be held liable. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that Faragher's supervisors were not acting within the scope of their employment when they engaged in the harassing conduct, that knowledge of the harassment could not be imputed to the City, and that the City could not be held liable for negligence in failing to prevent it.

Question

May an employer be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the acts of an employee whose sexual harassment of subordinates has created a hostile work environment amounting to employment discrimination?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Faragher, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that an employer is vicariously liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor. The Court also held that such liability is subject to an affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of the plaintiff victim. "The City had entirely failed to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment among the beach employees and that its officials made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of supervisors like [Faragher's]," wrote Justice Souter, "[u]nder such circumstances, we hold as a matter of law that the City could not be found to have exercised reasonable care to prevent the supervisors' harassing conduct."

Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes and Lerach

Mon, 10 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1482

Petitioner

Lexecon, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes and Lerach

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 26 (1998)

Argued

Monday, November 10, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, March 3, 1998

Advocates

Michael K. Kellogg (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jerold S. Solovy (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lexecon Inc. was a defendant in a class action lawsuit. Under 28 USC section 1407(a), the lawsuit was transferred for pretrial proceedings to the District of Arizona. Section 1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact "to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings," but provides that the Panel "shall" remand any such action to the original district "at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings." After claims against it were dismissed, Lexecon brought suit against Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach and others (Milberg) in the class action lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois. Ultimately, the Panel, under section 1407(a), ordered the case transferred to the District of Arizona. Afterwards, Lexecon moved for the Arizona District Court to remand the case to Illinois. Milberg filed a countermotion requesting the Arizona District Court to invoke section 1404(a) to "transfer" the case to itself for trial.Ultimately, the court assigned the case to itself and the Court of Appeals affirmed its judgment.

Question

May a federal district court conducting "pretrial proceedings" under 28 USC section 1407(a) invoke section 1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lexecon, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1407

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a district court conducting pretrial proceedings pursuant to section 1407(a) has no authority to invoke section 1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial. The Court noted that the Panel's section 1407(a) instructions are crouched in the word "shall," which "creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion." Justice Souter wrote for the Court that, "the straightforward language imposing the Panel's responsibility to remand... bars recognizing any self-assignment power in a transferee court." The opinion was unanimous except insofar as Justice Antonin Scalia did not join Part II-C.

Caterpillar, Inc. v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America

Tue, 20 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1925

Petitioner

Caterpillar, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 1015 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, January 20, 1998

Decided

Monday, March 23, 1998

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

David Silberman (on behalf of the Respondents)

Columbus R. Gangemi (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

United Auto Workers and Caterpillar, Inc. were involved in a working agreement that provided for employees of Caterpillar, Inc. to devote part of their time to processing employee grievances on behalf of the union, while still maintaining full-time employment status and benefits. This agreement was eventually expanded to allow employees to continue receiving benefits from Caterpillar while working full time for the union. In 1991, Caterpillar refused to continue paying benefits to workers who were not directly providing services for the company. The union filed with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) asserting that Caterpillar was engaging in unfair labor practices. Caterpillar claimed that the benefit payments violated section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Both the NLRB and the District Court found that the payments did in fact violate Section 302 of the LMRA.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and ruled for the union. The Third Circuit found that Congress had not intended the LMRA to ban the type of payments at issue. Then-Judge Samuel Alito dissented, arguing that the payments were illegal under the plain meaning of the legislation.

Question

Does an employer who grants paid leave of absence to employees who then go to work as a union's full-time grievance chairmen violate Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act?

Conclusion

After the Supreme Court heard oral arguments, but before it ruled, the Union reached a settlement with Caterpillar rendering the case moot.

Newsweek, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue

Sun, 28 Apr 2013 10:00:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-663

Petitioner

Newsweek, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida Dep't of Revenue

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 442 (1998)

Decided

Monday, February 23, 1998

Facts of the Case

In 1988, a Florida statutory provision exempted newspapers, but not magazines, from sales tax. In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court found the classification invalid under the First Amendment. Subsequently, Newsweek, a magazine, filed a claim for a refund of the sales tax that it had paid between 1988 and 1990. The Florida Department of Revenue denied the refund. Newsweek then filed suit alleging that Florida's failure to accord the magazine retroactive relief was a violation of due process. Ultimately, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, concluded Newsweek was afforded due process because Florida law permits prepayment tax challenges by filing an action and paying the contested amount into the court registry, posting a bond, or obtaining a court order approving an alternative arrangement, without suffering onerous penalties.

Question

Did the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, err in denying Newsweek access to Florida postpayment remedies for a refund of the taxes it paid under an unconstitutional sales tax scheme?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Newsweek, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that "Newsweek is entitled to a clear and certain remedy and thus it can use [Florida] refund procedures to adjudicate the merits of its claim." The opinion stated that "[w]hile Florida may be free to require taxpayers to litigate first and pay later, due process prevents it from applying this requirement to taxpayers, like Newsweek, who reasonably relied on the apparent availability of a postpayment refund when paying the tax."

Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht

Mon, 20 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-461

Petitioner

Wisconsin Department of Corrections

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Schacht

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 381 (1998)

Argued

Monday, April 20, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1998

Advocates

Richard Briles Moriarty (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

David E. Lasker (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1996, Keith Schacht filed a state-court suit against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections and several of its employees (defendants), in their "personal" and in their "official" capacity, alleging that his dismissal violated the Federal Constitution and federal civil rights laws. After removing the case to federal court, the defendants asserted that the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the claims against the Department and its employees in their official capacity. The District Court granted the individual defendants summary judgment on the "personal capacity" claims and dismissed the claims against the Department and the individual defendants in their "official capacity." On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the removal had been improper because the presence of even one claim subject to an Eleventh Amendment bar deprives the federal courts of removal jurisdiction over the entire case.

Question

May a State and its actors as defendants in a state-court suit, with claims arising under federal law, remove the case to federal court when some claims are subject to the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1441

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a State's claim of an Eleventh Amendment bar to a plaintiff's claims against the state places those claims beyond the power of the federal courts to decide, but that the State may remove the case to a federal court and that the court can decide the nonbarred claims. "A State's proper assertion of an Eleventh Amendment bar after removal means that the federal court cannot hear the barred claim. But that circumstance does not destroy removal jurisdiction over the remaining claims in the case before us. A federal court can proceed to hear those other claims, and the District Court did not err in doing so," concluded Justice Breyer. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion.

Kalina v. Fletcher

Tue, 07 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-792

Petitioner

Kalina

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fletcher

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 118 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, October 7, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, December 10, 1997

Advocates

Norman Maleng (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Patricia A. Millett (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Timothy K. Ford (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lynne Kalina, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for King County, Washington, commenced criminal proceedings against Rodney Fletcher, in connection with a school robbery, by filing the appropriate documents. Included in those documents was a "Certification for Determination of Probable Cause." Based on the certification, the trial court found probable cause, and Fletcher was arrested. Kalina's certification contained two inaccurate factual statements: that Fletcher had "never been associated with the school in any manner and did not have permission to enter the school or to take any property," and that Fletcher had been identified asking for an appraisal of a computer stolen from the school. Subsequently, Fletcher sued Kalina for damages, alleging that she had violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The Federal District Court denied her motion for summary judgment, holding that she was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity and that whether qualified immunity would apply was a question of fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity protect a prosecutor for making false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant against a damages remedy under 42 USC section 1983?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fletcher, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that section 1983 may create a damages remedy against a prosecutor for making false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant, since such conduct is not protected by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Noting that the Fourth Amendment requires that arrest warrants be based "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation," Justice Stevens wrote that," [e]ven when the person who makes the constitutionally required 'Oath or affirmation' is a lawyer, the only function that she performs in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness." Thus, section 1983 may, under some circumstances, provide a damages remedy against such a prosecutor.

South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe

Mon, 08 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1581

Petitioner

South Dakota

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Yankton Sioux Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 329 (1998)

Argued

Monday, December 8, 1997

Decided

Monday, January 26, 1998

Advocates

Mark W. Barnett (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Barbara B. McDowell (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondents)

James G. Abourezk (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

An 1858 Treaty between the United States and the Yankton Tribe established the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. The 1887 Dawes Act permitted the Government to allot tracts of tribal land to individual Indians and, with tribal consent, to open the remaining holdings to non-Indian settlement. In 1892, pursuant to the Dawes Act, an agreement between the Tribe and the Government, ratified in 1894, provided that nothing "shall be construed to abrogate the [1858] treaty." In 1992, the Southern Missouri Recycling and Waste Management District acquired land for a solid waste disposal facility that lies on unallotted, non-Indian fee land, but falls within the reservation's original 1858 boundaries. In 1994, the Tribe filed suit to enjoin construction. Ultimately, the District Court declined to enjoin construction of the landfill, but granted a declaratory judgment that the landfill lies within the Yankton Sioux Reservation, where federal environmental regulations apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Did Congress diminish the boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota in an 1894 statute that ratified an agreement pursuant to the Dawes Act, which permitted the Government to open reservation land to non-Indian settlement?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for South Dakota, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 11 Stat. 743

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the 1894 statute's operative language and the circumstances surrounding its passage demonstrate that Congress intended to diminish the Yankton Reservation and as a result the unallotted lands ceded did not retain reservation status. Consequently, because the unallotted lands included the landfill site, which no longer constituted Indian country as defined by 18 USCS 1151(a), South Dakota has primary jurisdiction over the lands. Noting the repudiation of allotment philosophy, Justice O'Connor wrote that, "we must give effect to Congress' intent in passing the 1894 Act. Here... we believe that Congress spoke clearly, and although 'some might wish [it] had spoken differently... we cannot remake history.'"

FEC v. Akins

Wed, 14 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1590

Petitioner

FEC

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Akins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 11 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, January 14, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1998

Advocates

Daniel M. Schember (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) imposes recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon political committees which receive more than $1,000 in "contributions" or which make more than $1,000 in "expenditures" in a year "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." Certain assistance does not count toward the expenditure cap if it takes the form of a "communication" by a "membership organization or corporation" "to its members" as long as the organization is not "organized primarily for the purpose of influencing [any individual's] nomination... or election." A complaint filed by a group of voters asked the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to order the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to make public the information that FECA demands of political committees. Ultimately, the FEC found that AIPAC was not a political committee because its major purpose was not the nomination or election of candidates. The en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the FEC's major purpose test improperly interpreted FECA's definition of a political committee.

Question

Do voters have the proper legal standing to challenge the Federal Election Commission's decisions regarding political committees?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for FEC, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 2 U.S.C. 431

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that voters seeking information, to which they believe FECA entitles them, have standing to challenge the FEC's decision not to bring an enforcement action. Because FECA seeks to address the voters' injury, the failure to obtain relevant information, Justice Breyer concluded that the voters had prudential standing. Furthermore, because the voters' inability to obtain information constitutes an "injury in fact," continued Justice Breyer, the voters had standing under Article III. The Court did not address the FEC's major purpose test, allowing the FEC to address the issue under newly proposed rules. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined.

Hohn v. United States

Tue, 03 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8986

Petitioner

Hohn

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 236 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 3, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (Argued the cause for the United States)

Eileen Penner (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause as amicus curiae by invitation of the Court)

Facts of the Case

Arnold Hohn was convicted, among other things, of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Two years after his conviction became final, the Supreme Court decided that the term "use" in 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) required active employment of the firearm. Hohn filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his Section 942(c)(1) conviction on the ground that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to prove use of a firearm. While his motion was pending before the district court, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires a Section 2255 petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability from a circuit justice or judge before he can appeal the denial of a Section 2255 petition. 28 U.S.C. Section 2253(c)(1). The district court denied Hohn's petition and he appealed. The court of appeals treated the notice of appeal as an application for a certificate of appealability, and a three-judge panel declined to issue a certificate. Hohn then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the denial of the certificate, seeking to invoke the Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

Question

Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review decisions of the courts of appeals denying applications for certificates of appealability?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Hohn, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1254

Yes. A certificate application is a "case in" the court of appeals under Section 1254(1). It presents an immediate and redressable injury, and there is adversity as well as the other requisite qualities of a case. Indeed, Hohn's application moved through the Eighth Circuit as cases in general do, yielding a decision that has been regarded as precedential. Many other factors confirm this conclusion as well. This decision overrules that portion of House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 44 (1945) (per curiam), which held that the Court lacks statutory certiorari jurisdiction to review denials of certificates of probable cause.

Breard v. Greene

Sun, 28 Apr 2013 10:00:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-8214

Petitioner

Breard

Respondent

Greene

Consolidation

No. 97-1390

No. 97-8660

No. 125 ORIG

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 371 (1998)

Decided

Tuesday, April 14, 1998

Facts of the Case

In 1992, Angel Francisco Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, was convicted of the attempted rape and capital murder of Ruth Dickie. Breard was scheduled to be executed by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1996. Ultimately, Breard filed a motion for habeas relief in Federal District Court, alleging that arresting authorities violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations when they failed to inform him that, as a foreign national, he had the right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate. The court concluded that Breard had procedurally default this claim by failing to raise it in state court. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In 1996, Paraguayan officials brought suit alleging that Virginia officials had violated their rights under the Vienna Convention by failing to inform Breard of his treaty rights and the Paraguayan consulate of Breard's situation. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

May Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan citizen, and various Paraguayan diplomats receive a stay of execution and other relief, respectively, for the capital murder of Ruth Dickie under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Greene, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court denied the stay applications and all other relief. The majority of the Court concluded that, because he had procedurally defaulted it, Breard could not raise his Vienna Convention claim on federal habeas corpus review. Moreover, the Court reasoned that Breard could not have demonstrated that the alleged violation of the Vienna Convention had an effect on his state trial that ought to have resulted in the overturning of his conviction. Additionally, the Court found that the Vienna Convention did not clearly provide a foreign nation with a private right of action in U.S. courts. Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, in separate dissents, argued that the Court ought to have granted the stay applications and considered the merits of the case to different degrees.

Buchanan v. Angelone

Mon, 03 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8400

Petitioner

Buchanan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Angelone

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 269 (1998)

Argued

Monday, November 3, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 1998

Advocates

Gerald T. Zerkin (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Katherine P. Baldwin (Argued the cause for respondents)

Facts of the Case

Following Douglas Buchanan's conviction for the capital murders of his father, stepmother, and two brothers, the prosecutor sought the death penalty based on Virginia's aggravating factor that the crime was vile. The trial court instructed the jury that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Buchanan's conduct was vile, "then you may fix the punishment...at death," but "if you believe from all the evidence that...death...is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment...at life imprisonment." Buchanan sought four additional instructions on particular mitigating factors and a general instruction on the concept of mitigating evidence. The court denied Buchanan, refusing to single out certain mitigating factors to the sentencing jury. The jury returned with a verdict for the death penalty.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment require that a capital jury be instructed on particular statutory mitigating factors and the concept of mitigating evidence generally?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Angelone, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the concept of mitigation generally and on the four mitigating factors did not violate Buchanan's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that the court's instructions, by directing the jury to base the decision on "all the evidence," afforded the jurors an opportunity to consider mitigating evidence and did not constrain the manner in which the jury was able to give effect to mitigation. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, "'there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jurors in [Buchanan's] case understood the challenged instructions to preclude consideration of relevant mitigating evidence offered by [Buchanan].'" Justices Stephen G. Breyer, John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg disagreed in a dissent by Justice Breyer.

Arkansas Ed. Television Comm. v. Forbes

Wed, 08 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-779

Petitioner

Arkansas Ed. Television Comm.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Forbes

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 666 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 1997

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

Richard D. Marks (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kelly J. Shackelford (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

During the 1992 race for Arkansas' Third Congressional District, the Arkansas Educational Television Commission (AETC) -- a state-owned public television broadcaster -- sponsored a debate between the major party candidates. Running as an independent candidate with little popular support, Ralph Forbes sought to participate in the debate but was denied permission. After unsuccessfully challenging AETC's refusal in district court, Forbes appealed and won a reversal. AETC then appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Is the exclusion of a ballot-qualified candidate from a debate sponsored by a state-owned public television broadcaster a violation of the candidate's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Arkansas Ed. Television Comm., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that public broadcasters could selectively exclude participants from their sponsored debates, so long as these were not designed as "public forums." The Court found that by reserving participation rights only to candidates for a particular congressional district, rather then hosting an open-microphone format, and selecting among those which were eligible to participate, based on objective indications of their popular support rather then their view points, AETC's debate was a "nonpublic forum." As such, AETC could decide who should and should not participate in its sponsored event.

Oubre v. Entergy Operations Inc.

Wed, 12 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1291

Petitioner

Oubre

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Entergy Operations Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 422 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, November 12, 1997

Decided

Monday, January 26, 1998

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Barbara G. Haynie (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, Dolores Oubre, a scheduler at a power plant run by Entergy Operations, Inc., was given the option of either improving her job performance or accepting a voluntary arrangement for her severance. Accepting a severance package, Oubre signed a release of all claims against Entergy. Entergy failed to comply with several requirements for a release under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), as set forth in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). After receiving all of her severance pay, Oubre filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Oubre then sued Entergy, alleging constructive discharge on the basis of her age in violation of the ADEA and state law. Entergy argued that Oubre had ratified the defective release by failing to return the $6,258 in severance she had received. The District Court entered summary judgment for Entergy. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is an employee's release of claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act unenforceable if the release did not comply with the requirements of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Oubre, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that because the release did not comply with OWBPA's requirements, the release could not bar Oubre's ADEA claim. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that an employee may not waive an ADEA claim unless the waiver or release satisfies the OWBPA's requirements. Accordingly, Oubre's retention of her severance did not amount to a ratification equivalent to a valid release of her ADEA claims, since the retention did not comply with the OWBPA any more than the original release did. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia wrote dissenting opinions. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined Justice Thomas' dissent.

National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley

Tue, 31 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Location

National Endowment for the Arts

1100 Pennsylvania Ave NW Washington DC 20506

Washington, DC 20506

United States

38° 53' 43.1088" N, 77° 1' 38.406" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-371

Petitioner

National Endowment for the Arts

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Finley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 569 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 31, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

David D. Cole (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act entrusts the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) with discretion to award financial grants to the arts. The NEA's broad decision guidelines are: "artistic and cultural significance," with emphasis on "creativity and cultural diversity professional excellence," and the encouragement of "public education and appreciation of the arts." In 1990, Congress amended the criteria by requiring the NEA to consider "artistic excellence and artistic merit taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." After suffering a funding rejection, Karen Finely, along with three other performance artists and the National Association of Artists' Organizations, challenged the NEA's amended statutory review proceedings as unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory. After consecutive district and appellate court rulings in favor of Finley, the Supreme Court granted the NEA certiorari.

Question

Are the statutory funding guidelines requiring the NEA to consider artistic excellence, merit, and general standards of "decency and respect," overly vague and conducive of viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment's freedom of expression guarantees?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for National Endowment for the Arts, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In an 8-to-1 opinion the Court held that, unlike direct sovereign regulation of speech, Congress enjoys wide latitude when setting spending priorities which may indirectly affect certain forms of expression. The funding of one activity believed to be in the public interest, to the exclusion of another, does not constitute viewpoint discrimination. Moreover, the statutory funding guidelines were not impermissibly vague since they involved selective subsidies rather than criminal or regulatory prohibitions. The Court noted that while the amended regulations may add some measure of imprecision to the existing guidelines, they do so to an already highly subjective selection process, made so by the inevitable nature of the subject matter with which it deals.

Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank

Mon, 02 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-5310

Petitioner

Beach

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ocwen Federal Bank

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 410 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 2, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, April 21, 1998

Advocates

Bruce S. Rogow (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

David and Linda Beach refinanced their Florida house in 1986 with a loan from Great Western Bank. In 1991, they stopped making mortgage payments. In 1992, Great Western began foreclosure proceedings. While the Beach's acknowledged their default, they alleged that the bank's failure to make disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act gave them the right under federal law to rescind the mortgage agreement. The Florida trial court rejected that defense, holding that any right to rescind had expired in 1989 under federal law which provides that the right of rescission shall expire three years after the loan closes. The state's intermediate appellate court affirmed, as did the Florida Supreme Court.

Question

Can homeowners who face foreclosure rescind a mortgage loan on the ground that the lender violated the federal truth-in-lending law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ocwen Federal Bank, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1635

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled no such defense could be raised after the three-year deadline of the federal Truth in Lending Act expires.

Baker v. General Motors Corp.

Wed, 15 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-653

Petitioner

Baker

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

General Motors Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 222 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, October 15, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, January 13, 1998

Advocates

Paul T. Cappuccio (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

After working for General Motors Corporation (GM) for fifteen years as a vehicular fire analyst, Ronald Elwell sued GM for wrongful discharge. In an eventual settlement agreement reached in a Michigan county court, the parties agreed to a permanent injunction barring Elwell from testifying against GM without its consent, unless subpoenaed to do so by another court or tribunal. Thereafter, when Kenneth Lee Baker commenced a product liability action against GM in a Missouri county court, Elwell was subpoenaed to testify on Baker's behalf. When GM argued that Elwell was barred from testifying under the Michigan court injunction, the Missouri court disagreed and permitted his deposition and testimony. After suffering an adverse verdict in the Baker case, GM appealed on the basis that Elwell's testimony was illegally admitted. When a federal appeals court agreed with GM, Baker appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Was a Missouri county court's admission of a witness's testimony, barred by a Michigan county court's injunction, a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Baker, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 4, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit Clause

No. In unanimous decision, the Court held that GM's injunctive agreement with Elwell did not reach beyond the parties specific controversy to affect Elwell's conduct in other states. Noting Missouri's "public policy," shielding from disclosure only confidential or privileged information, the Court reasoned that since Elwell's testimony in the Baker case was neither confidential nor privileged, its prohibition would not be necessary. Finally, the Court ruled that full faith and credit does not require states to adopt other state's practices regarding time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Such enforcement measures are subject to the "even-handed" control of local state forums.

Quality King Distrib. v. L'anza Research Int.

Mon, 08 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1470

Petitioner

Quality King Distrib.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

L'anza Research Int.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 135 (1998)

Argued

Monday, December 8, 1997

Decided

Monday, March 9, 1998

Advocates

Allen R. Snyder (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Raymond H. Goettsch (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

L'anza Research International, Inc., a California based manufacturer and seller of hair care products, has copyrighted the labels that are affixed to its products. Compared to domestic markets, the price of L'anza products in foreign markets is substantially lower. L'anza's distributor in the United Kingdom arranged for the sale of L'anza products, affixed with copyrighted labels, to a distributor in Malta. The Malta distributor then sold the products to Quality King Distributors, Inc., who imported the products back to the U.S. and sold them at discounted prices to unauthorized retailers. In its suit, L'anza alleged that Quality King violated L'anza's exclusive rights under the Copyright Act of 1976 to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted material in the U.S. Rejecting Quality King's defense based on the "first sale" doctrine, the District Court ruled in favor of L'anza. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is section 602(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, which gives the copyright owner the right to prohibit the unauthorized importation of copies, limited by the "first sale" doctrine?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Quality King Distrib., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 17 U.S.C. 109

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the "first sale" doctrine endorsed in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 is applicable to imported copies. Accordingly, Quality King's unauthorized importation and resale of copyrighted labels from L'anza's foreign distributor was not prohibited by the Act because L'anza's distribution right did not encompass Quality King's reselling, as lawful owners, under first sale doctrine. "The whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion.

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth

Wed, 22 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-569

Petitioner

Burlington Industries, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ellerth

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 742 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, April 22, 1998

Decided

Friday, June 26, 1998

Advocates

James J. Casey (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Ernest T. Rossiello (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After working for Burlington Industries for 15 months, Kimberly B. Ellerth quit because she allegedly suffered sexual harassment by her supervisor - Ted Slowik. Despite her refusals of Slowik's advances Ellerth did not suffer any tangible retaliation and was, in fact, promoted once. Moreover, while she remained silent about Slowik's conduct despite her knowledge of Burlington's policy against sexual harassment, Ellerth challenged Burlington claiming that the company forced her constructive discharge.

Question

Can an employee, who despite refusing sexually harassing advances by a supervisor suffers no adverse job-related consequences, recover against an employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, without showing that the employer was responsible for the supervisor's harassing conduct?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ellerth, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

Yes. In a 7-to-2 opinion, the Court held that employers are vicariously liable for supervisors who create hostile working conditions for those over whom they have authority. In cases where harassed employee's suffer no job-related consequences, employers may defend themselves against liability by showing that they quickly acted to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and that the harassed employee failed to utilize their employer's protection. Such a defense, however, in not available when the alleged harassment culminates in an employment action, such as Ellerth's.

California v. Deep Sea Research

Mon, 01 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1400

Petitioner

California

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Deep Sea Research

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 491 (1998)

Argued

Monday, December 1, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, April 22, 1998

Advocates

Joseph C. Rusconi (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

David C. Frederick (On behalf of the United States, as the respondent supporting the petitioners in part)

Fletcher C. Alford (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

After several expeditions, Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR) located the wreck of the S.S. Brother Jonathan and its cargo which sank off the California coast in 1865. When DSR sought rights to the wreck and her cargo, under Article III, Section 2, federal admiralty jurisdiction, California challenged DSR claiming that it had title to the wreck under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA). The ASA requires the federal government to transfer title over "abandoned shipwrecks" to the states in whose submerged lands the wrecks are found. California also noted that under Section 6313 of its own public code, title to all abandoned shipwrecks found off its coast vests in the state. In light of its claims to the Brother Jonathan, California claimed that DSR's federal title action violated its rights under the Eleventh Amendment, even though it lacked possession of the wreck.

Question

Does the Eleventh Amendment, limiting federal jurisdiction over maritime matters, bar a federal court's jurisdiction over an admiralty property claim where the property itself is not within the State's possession?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Deep Sea Research, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

No. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that while precedent interpreting the Eleventh Amendment supports a limited bar on federal admiralty jurisdiction disputes centering on people or property that is in a state's possession, the same does not apply when the concerned state lacks possession of the disputed maritime property. The Court noted that in this case, neither the federal government nor the State of California had possession of the Brother Jonathan and, therefore, the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional ban was inapplicable. The Court concluded by noting that since several outstanding insurance claims were made on the Brother Jonathan at the time of her sinking, the question of whether the wreck was truly "abandoned" remained unresolved. Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter for further consideration.

Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians

Tue, 24 Feb 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1829

Petitioner

Montana

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Crow Tribe of Indians

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 696 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, February 24, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

Robert S. Pelcyger (Argued the cause for the private respondent)

Clay Riggs Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the federal respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1904, the Crow Tribe ceded part of its Montana Reservation to the United States for settlement by non-Indians, with the U.S holding the rights to the minerals underlying the ceded strip in trust for the Tribe. In 1972, pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), Westmoreland Resources, Inc., a non-Indian company, entered into a mining lease with the Tribe for coal underlying the ceded strip. In 1975, Montana imposed a severance tax and a gross proceeds tax on all coal produced in the State, including coal underlying the reservation and the ceded strip. In 1978, the Tribe brought a federal action for injunctive and declaratory relief against Montana and its counties, alleging that the State's severance and gross proceeds taxes were preempted by the IMLA and infringed on the Tribe's right to govern itself. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that both taxes were preempted by the IMLA and void for interfering with tribal governance. The U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Subsequently, the Tribe sough to recover certain taxes paid by Westmoreland. The District Court then concluded that the disgorgement remedy sought by the Tribe was not appropriate. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Is the restitution sought for the Crow Tribe from the State of Montana for the illegal collection of taxes and cola mined on the Tribe's reservation warranted?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Montana, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the restitution sought for the Tribe of all severance and gross proceeds taxes paid by Westmoreland to Montana and certain counties, before the tribe's severance tax became valid, was not warranted. The Court decision was based on findings that Westmoreland had forfeited its entitlement to a refund, that neither the state nor the tribe enjoyed authority to tax to the total exclusion of the other, and that the tribe could not have taxed the company during the periods in question. The Court also concluded that the District Court had ruled properly where the tribe and the U.S. had argued for total disgorgement rather than a different form of relief. In a partial dissent in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined, Justice David H. Souter argued that nothing disentitled the tribe at least to press for disgorgement of some or all of Montana's tax revenues.

Ricci v. Village of Arlington Heights

Tue, 21 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-501

Petitioner

Ricci

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Village of Arlington Heights

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 613 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, April 21, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 4, 1998

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

David A. Strauss (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kenneth N. Flaxman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Randall Ricci owns Rudeway Enterprises, a telemarketing business. After the Arlington Heights police department determined that Ricci lacked the required business license and that one of Ricci's employees had an outstanding warrant, officers went to Rudeway Enterprises to arrest the employee. While arresting the employee, the officers also searched Ricci's business papers without a warrant. Subsequently, Ricci was arrested for violating Section 9-201 of the Village of Arlington Heights Code of Ordinances, which makes it unlawful to operate a business without a license. Ultimately, Ricci filed a claim that the officers violated his civil rights by subjecting him to a full custodial arrest for committing a fine-only offense. The District Court dismissed the claim. Finding the arrest reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court of Appeals rejected Ricci's argument that a full custodial arrest for violation of a fine-only ordinance is constitutionally permissible only if the violation involves a breach of the peace.

Question

May police officers who do not have a warrant arrest someone for a violation of a fine-only ordinance?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Village of Arlington Heights, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Writ Improvidently Granted

The Court did not answer the question. The Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

LaChance v. Erickson

Tue, 02 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1395

Petitioner

LaChance

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Erickson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 262 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 1998

Advocates

Paul E. Marth (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Federal employees subject to adverse actions by their respective agencies, each made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken against him or her to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld the portion of each penalty that was based on the underlying charge. The Board overturned each false statement charge. The Board held that an employee's false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee's credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employee's underlying misconduct. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board and held that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim.

Question

Does either the Due Process Clause or the Civil Service Reform Act preclude a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding alleged employment-related misconduct on the part of the employee?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for LaChance, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that neither the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause nor the Civil Service Reform Act precludes a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding his alleged employment-related misconduct. "The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. "But we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle," continued Chief Justice Rehnquist, "the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in this case that a 'meaningful opportunity to be heard' includes a right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct."

Jefferson, Individually And As Administrator Of The Estate Of Jefferson, Deceased v. City Of Tarrant, Alabama

Tue, 04 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-957

Petitioner

Jefferson, Individually And As Administrator Of The Estate Of Jefferson, Deceased, et al.

Respondent

City Of Tarrant, Alabama

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 75 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, November 4, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, December 9, 1997

Advocates

Dennis G. Pantazis (on behalf of the Petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Alberta Jefferson, an African American woman, died as a result of a fire in her home in the city of Tarrant, Alabama. Her survivors filed multiple complaints against Tarrant City: two under state law and two under federal law. The state law complaints alleged wrongful death and the common-law tort of outrage, while the two federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleged that Ms. Jefferson's death was the direct result of indifference and racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The City claimed that the complaints were governed by Alabama's Wrongful Death Act, which the Alabama Supreme Court had interpreted to provide only for punitive damages. The City then argued that it could not be sued under Section 1983 because the Supreme Court had ruled that Section 1983 plaintiffs are not entitled to sue a municipality for punitive damages.

The state court ruled in favor of Jefferson, but the Alabama Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back to the state court after determining that the state Act did in fact govern the claims. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the federal complaints. The City contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the Alabama Supreme Court's order because the case was not yet final.

Question

Are federal claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 governed by the Alabama Wrongful Death Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for City Of Tarrant, Alabama, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1257

Unanswered. In an 8-1 decision the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the Court could not rule until the Alabama Supreme Court proceedings were completed and a final decision handed down. The case was dismissed.

United States v. Balsys

Mon, 20 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-873

Petitioner

United States

Respondent

Balsys

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 666 (1998)

Argued

Monday, April 20, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Ivars Berzins (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Aloyzas Balsys was subpoenaed by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to testify about his wartime activities between 1940 and 1944 and his subsequent immigration to the United States. Fearing prosecution by a foreign nation, Balsys refused the subpoena by claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court ruling granting OSI's subpoena enforcement petition, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.

Question

Is fear of foreign prosecution sufficient grounds to justify the invocation of the Firth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Self-Incrimination

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that although resident aliens are entitled to the same Fifth Amendment protections as citizen "persons" the risk of their deportation is not sufficient to sustain a self-incrimination privilege intended to apply only to the United States government. The Court explained that since the Fifth Amendment does not bind foreign governments, and that would not be subject to domestic enforcement of immunity-for- testimony deals, one could not assert a self-incrimination protection against possible prosecution at their hands.

Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller

Mon, 23 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-428

Petitioner

Air Line Pilots Association

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Miller

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 866 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 23, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 1998

Advocates

Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jerry D. Anker (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), a private-sector labor organization, represents pilots employed by Delta Air Lines. The collective-bargaining agreement between ALPA and Delta includes an "agency shop" clause that requires nonunion Delta pilots to pay ALPA a monthly service charge for representing them. 153 Delta pilots challenged in federal-court action the manner in which ALPA calculated agency fees. Under ALPA policy pilots who object to the fee calculation may request arbitration proceedings. When 174 Delta pilots filed objections to the agency-fee calculation, the ALPA treated the objections as requests for arbitration. The arbitrator sustained ALPA's calculation. The District Court concluded that the pilots seeking to challenge the fee calculation must exhaust arbitral remedies before proceeding in court. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found no legal basis for requiring objectors to arbitrate agency-fee challenges when they had not agreed to do so.

Question

Must the nonunion pilots go through arbitration before going to court to challenge the fees they are required to pay to the union under the "agency- shop" agreement?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Miller, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled the nonunion pilots cannot be forced to go through arbitration. "Unless they agree to the procedure, agency-fee objectors may not be required to exhaust an arbitration remedy before bringing their claims in federal court," wrote Ginsburg.

Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government

Wed, 10 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1577

Petitioner

Alaska

Respondent

Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 520 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, December 10, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 1998

Advocates

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Heather R. Kendall (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which completely extinguished all aboriginal claims to Alaska land. ANCSA revoked the Neets'aii Gwich'in Indians' reservation surrounding the Village of Venetie. Subsequently, two Native corporations established for the Neets'aii Gwich'in elected to use an ANCSA provision allowing them to take title to former reservation lands in return for forgoing the statute's monetary payments and transfers of nonreservation land. The title to the reservation was ultimately transferred to the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Tribe). In 1986, Alaska entered into a joint venture with a private contractor to construct a public school in Venetie. Afterwards, the Tribe notified the contractor that it owed the Tribe approximately $161,000 in taxes for conducting business activities on its land. The Federal District Court held that, because the Tribe's ANCSA lands were not "Indian country," the Tribe lacked the power to impose a tax upon nonmembers. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Is the land owned by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government "Indian country" pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Alaska, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1151

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Tribe's land is not "Indian country." "As noted, only one Indian reservation, the Annette Island Reserve, survived ANCSA," explained Justice Thomas in a footnote, [o]ther Indian country exists in Alaska post-ANCSA only if the land in question meets the requirements of a 'dependent Indian community' under our interpretation of [18 USC section 1151 (b)], or if it constitutes 'allotments' under [18 USC section 1151 (c)]." "The Tribe's ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements," concluded Justice Thomas, "[a]fter the enactment of ANCSA, the Tribe's lands are neither 'validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such,' nor are they under the superintendence of the Federal Government."

Calderon v. Ashmus

Tue, 24 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-391

Petitioner

Calderon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ashmus

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 740 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 24, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 1998

Advocates

Ronald S. Matthias (San Francisco, California, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Michael Laurence (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides an expedited review process for federal habeas proceedings in capital cases in States that meet certain conditions. California officials stated that they believed they qualified for Chapter 154. Troy Ashmus, a state prisoner sentenced to death, filed a class action suit, which included all capital prisoners in California whose convictions were affirmed on direct appeal after June 6, 1989, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve uncertainty over whether Chapter 154 applied. Holding that California did not qualify for Chapter 154, the District Court enjoined the State from invoking the Chapter in any proceedings involving class members. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit and that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment.

Question

Are state prisoners' challenges of the applicability of Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to their respective states, separate from a federal habeas corpus petition challenging their state court prosecution, an Article III "case or controversy" to which federal courts are limited?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Calderon, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "this action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief is not a justiciable case within the meaning of Article III." "If the class members file habeas petitions, and the State asserts Chapter 154, the members obviously can litigate California's compliance with Chapter 154 at that time. Any risk associated with resolving the question in habeas, rather than a pre-emptive suit, is no different from risks associated with choices commonly faced by litigants," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice David H. Souter joined.

United States v. United States Shoe Corp.

Wed, 04 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States Shoe Corporation

One Eastwood Drive Cincinnati OH 45227

Cincinnati, OH 45227

United States

39° 10' 7.122" N, 84° 24' 25.5024" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-372

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States Shoe Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 360 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 31, 1998

Advocates

Lawrence G. Wallace (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

James R. Atwood (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) obligates exporters, importers, and domestic shippers to pay 0.125 percent of the value of the commercial cargo they ship through the Nation's ports. From April to June 1994, United States Shoe Corporation paid the HMT for articles it exported. U.S. Shoe then filed a protest with the Customs Service alleging that, to the extent the toll applies to exports, the HMT violates the Export Clause of the Constitution, which provides that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." The Customs Service refuted the accusation, stating that the HMT is a statutorily mandated user fee. U.S. Shoe then sued for a refund in the Court of International Trade (CIT). Granting U.S. Shoe summary judgment, the CIT held that the HMT qualifies as a tax, reasoning that the tax is assessed ad valorem directly upon the value of the cargo itself, not upon any services rendered for the cargo. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the Harbor Maintenance Tax, as applied to goods loaded at U.S. ports for export, violate the Export Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States Shoe Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 26 U.S.C. 4461

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that "the [Harbor Maintenance Tax], which is imposed on an ad valorem basis, is not a fair approximation of services, facilities, or benefits furnished to the exporters, and therefore does not qualify as a permissible user fee." The Court noted that the Export Clause does not categorically bar Congress from imposing any tax on exports and that a charge designed as compensation for government-supplied services, facilities, or benefits would pass scrutiny.

Rogers v. United States

Wed, 05 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1279

Petitioner

Rogers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 252 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, November 5, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, January 14, 1998

Advocates

Javier H. Rubinstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jonathan Nuechterlein (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After searching his truck, Florida police arrested and charged George Rogers with knowingly possessing an unregistered firearm and a silencer. Rogers admitted during his arrest and trial that he knew he was in possession of a silencer. Nonetheless, he requested the District Court to instruct the jury to define the Government's burden of establishing "knowing possession" as proof that he deliberately possessed an item that he not only knew to be a "firearm," but that he knew such possession was illegal. Following the court's refusal of his instruction request, Rogers was convicted. On appeal from the Eleventh Circuit's decision to affirm the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court granted Rogers certiorari.

Question

Does a lower court's refusal to grant a jury instruction, the substance of which is confessed to and acknowledged by the defendant, grounds for a grant of certiorari to the Supreme Court?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Writ Improvidently Granted

No. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court held that the Government only had to establish that Rogers knowingly possessed a firearm. The government did not have to show that Rogers knew such possession was unlawful or even that his weapons were unregistered. Looking at Rogers' state of mind, the Court reasoned that his repeated admissions during arrest and trial concerning his awareness and knowledge of the weapons found in his truck, sufficiently demonstrated that his possession of the weapons was intentional. The Court dismissed it grant of certiorari as improvidently granted

State Oil Co. v. Khan

Tue, 07 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-871

Petitioner

State Oil Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Khan et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 3 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, October 7, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, November 4, 1997

Advocates

John Baumgartner (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Joel I. Klein (for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Pamela J. Harbour (for State amici curiae, supporting Respondents)

Anthony S. DiVincenzo (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Barkat U. Khan and his corporation contracted with State Oil to lease and run a gas station. Under the agreement, State Oil set a maximum profit margin for gasoline and required Khan to return any excess profits to State Oil. Khan fell behind in lease payments and was evicted. Khan then sued State Oil claiming that State Oil had engaged in price fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which disallows restrictions on trade. State Oil claimed that in setting profit margins, they had not prevented Kahn from setting prices and therefore were not guilty of price fixing.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in favor of Kahn based on the logic of Albrecht v. Herald Co. in which the Supreme Court ruled that some restrictions on trade, such as price-fixing, always have such negative effects coupled with such little competitive benefit that these restrictions are always unlawful.

Question

Is the setting of maximum prices always ("per se") a violation of the Sherman Act's prohibition on price fixing?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for State Oil Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sherman

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court overturned the Albrecht decision. The Court noted that antitrust cases are typically decided by weighing the costs and benefits of restrictions in each individual case instead of by per se rules as in Albrecht. Also, there was significant precedent contradicting the assertion that all trade restrictions are illegal, and there was evidence that the effects of price-fixing are not as detrimental as the Court thought at the time of Albrecht.

New Jersey v. New York

Mon, 12 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

120 ORIG

Plaintiff

New Jersey

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

New York

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 767 (1998)

Argued

Monday, January 12, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 1998

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States, amicus curiae)

Joseph L. Yannotti (Argued the cause for the plaintiff)

Daniel Smirlock (Argued the cause for the defendant)

Facts of the Case

Under an 1834 compact between New York and New Jersey, Ellis Island was deemed part of New York. It was later determined, by the Supreme Court, that New Jersey would have sovereign rights over all submerged lands on its side of the Hudson River. During the time Ellis Island was used to receive immigrants, the Federal Government filled around the island adding some 24.5 acres to its original size over 42 years. When immigration was diverted from Ellis Island in 1954, New York and New Jersey asserted rival sovereignty claims over the Island's filled portions. New Jersey finally invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to solve the matter once and for all time.

Question

Are the filled portions on Jersey's Side of Ellis Island under the sovereign authority of the State of New York or the State of New Jersey?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for New Jersey, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The Court held that the 1834 compact between the two states, although granting New York sovereignty over Ellis Island, did not support an inference that any portions added to the island's New Jersey side would also belong to New York. The lack of meets and bounds descriptions in the compact indicated that it merely applied to Ellis Island as it existed in 1834, and did not contemplate ownership of expanded portions. Moreover, the Court noted that under the common law doctrine of avulsion, sudden shoreline changes have no effect on boundaries. Thus, since New Jersey had sovereignty over previously submerged portions of Ellis Island, it would retain such sovereignty when these portions were filled until raised above the water line on its side of the Island.

Clinton v. City of New York

Mon, 27 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Ave Washington DC 20500

Washington, DC 20500

United States

38° 53' 51.7056" N, 77° 2' 11.4684" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1374

Appellee

City of New York

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Clinton

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 417 (1998)

Argued

Monday, April 27, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

Charles J. Cooper (Argued the cause for the appellee City of New York)

Louis R. Cohen (Argued the cause for the appellee Snake River Potato Growers)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of two cancellations, made by President William J. Clinton, under the Line Item Veto Act ("Act"). In the first, the City of New York, two hospital associations, a hospital, and two health care unions, challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers by the State of New York. In the second, the Snake River farmer's cooperative and one of its individual members challenged the President's cancellation of a provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The provision permitted some food refiners and processors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. After a district court held the Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal.

Question

Did the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, under the Line Item Veto Act, violate the Presentment Clause of Article I?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for City of New York, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 2: Separation of Powers

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. The Court then explained that under the Presentment Clause, legislation that passes both Houses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. signed) or rejected (i.e. vetoed) by the President. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by the Act, the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the "finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers.