Cases - 1997 term

Bogan and Roderick v. Scott-Harris

Wed, 03 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1569

Petitioner

Bogan and Roderick

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scott-Harris

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 44 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, December 3, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, March 3, 1998

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Harvey A. Schwartz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Janet Scott-Harris filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, the city's mayor, Daniel Bogan, the vice president of the city counsel, Marilyn Roderick, and others, alleging that the elimination of the city department in which Scott-Harris was the sole employee was motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights. The jury found the city, Bogan and Roderick liable on the First Amendment claim. The First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city, but affirmed the judgments against Bogan and Roderick. The court held that although Bogan and Roderick had absolute immunity from civil liability for their performance of legitimate legislative activities, their conduct in voting for and signing the ordinance that eliminated Scott-Harris's office was motivated by considerations relating to a particular individual and was therefore administrative rather than legislative in nature.

Question

Are actions by local officials introducing, voting for, and signing an ordinance outside the scope of legislative activities because of the motives of the government actors?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bogan and Roderick, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. Local legislators are entitled to the same absolute immunity from civil liability under Section 1983 for their legislative activities as are federal, state and regional legislators. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act itself, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. The acts at issue here were clearly legislative, and the ordinance itself bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.

GE v. Joiner

Tue, 14 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-188

Petitioner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joiner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 136 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, October 14, 1997

Decided

Monday, December 15, 1997

Advocates

Steven R. Kuney (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Michael H. Gottesman (on behalf of the Respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1992, Robert Joiner, after being diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer, sued General Electric Co. in Georgia state court, alleging that his disease was promoted by workplace exposure to chemical "PCBs" and their derivatives, including polychlorinated dibenzofurans (furans) and polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (dioxins). Ultimately, Joiner provided the District Court with expert witnesses' depositions that testified that PCBs, furans, and dioxins can promote cancer and that this was the likely cause of his cancer. The court granted GE summary judgment, reasoning that there was no genuine issue as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins and that his experts' testimony had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in excluding the testimony of Joiner's expert witnesses. The appellate court applied a stringent standard of review to reach its conclusion.

Question

Is the abuse of discretion standard the correct standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for GE, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Evidence

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that abuse of discretion, the standard ordinarily applicable to review of evidentiary rulings, is the proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude expert scientific evidence. Additionally, the Court held that the proper application of the correct standard of review indicates that the District Court did not err in excluding the expert testimony at issue. "The Federal Rules of Evidence," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "leave in place the 'gatekeeper' role of the trial judge in screening such evidence. A court of appeals applying 'abuse of discretion' review to such rulings may not categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings which disallow it."

United States v. Ramirez

Tue, 13 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1469

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ramirez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 65 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, January 13, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Advocates

David C. Frederick (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Levine (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

While in route to testify, Alan Shelby, a dangerous prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences, escaped custody. An ATF Agent, based on an informant's information, observed a person resembling Shelby at Hernan Ramirez's home in Boring, Oregon. Subsequently, the Government obtained a "no- knock" warrant to enter and search the home. Executing the warrant, officers broke a single window in Ramirez's home. Awakened, Ramirez fired a pistol into the garage ceiling. After being arrested, because of a stash of weapons in his garage, Ramirez was indicted on federal charges of being a felon in possession of firearms. Shelby was not found. Granting Ramirez's motion to suppress evidence regarding his possession of the weapons, the District Court found that the officers had violated the Fourth Amendment because there were "insufficient exigent circumstances" to justify the police officer's destruction of property in their execution of the warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment require that police officers have more than a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence before entering would be dangerous, futile, or inhibit the effective investigation of a crime when a "no-knock" entry results in the destruction of property?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not hold police officers to a higher standard than the test articulated in Richards v. Wisconsin. In Richards, the Court held that a no-knock entry was justified if police had a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be dangerous, futile, or would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime, when a no-knock entry resulted in the destruction of property. "Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search not subject to suppression," noted the Chief Justice.

Muscarello v. United States

Mon, 23 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1654

Petitioner

Muscarello

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 96-8837

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 125 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 23, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Norman S. Zalkind (Argued the cause for petitioners Cleveland and Gray-Santana in No. 96-8837)

Robert H. Klonoff (Argued the cause for petitioner Muscarello in No. 96-1654)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent in both cases)

Facts of the Case

18 USC section 924(c)(1) subjects a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime" to a 5-year mandatory prison term. In 96-1654, police officers found a handgun locked in Frank J. Muscarello's truck's glove compartment. Muscarello was transporting marijuana for sale in his truck. Muscarello argued that his "carrying" of the gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope of the statutory word "carries." In 96-8837, federal agents found drugs and guns in Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana's car at a drug-sale point. The Court of Appeals, in both cases, found that the defendants had violated section 924(c)(1).

Question

Does the fact that guns were found in a locked glove compartment, or the trunk, of a car, preclude the application of 18 U section 924(c)(1), which imposes a 5-year mandatory prison term upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime"?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the phrase "carries a firearm" applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. Exploring the meaning of "carry," Justice Breyer concluded, among other things, that the statute's basic purpose to combat the dangerous combination of drugs and guns does not support limiting "carry" to an "on the person" application. In a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that "carries a firearm" means bearing a firearm in a manner as to be ready to use it as a weapon.

AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.

Mon, 23 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-679

Petitioner

AT&T

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Central Office Telephone, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 214 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 23, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

David W. Carpenter (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Bruce M. Hall (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under the Communications Act of 1934, AT&T; must file "tariffs" containing all its charges for interstate services and all "classifications, practices and regulations affecting such charges" with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Under section 203(c) of the Act, a common carrier, such as AT&T;, may not "extend to any person any privileges or facilities in such communication, or employ or enforce any classifications, regulations, or practices affecting such charges, except as specified in such [tariff]."In 1989, AT&T; sold Central Office Telephone, Inc. its Software Defined Network, a long-distance service. Subsequently, Central Office experienced problems with the service and withdrew from the contract. Central Office sued AT&T; in Federal District Court, asserting state-law claims for breach of contract and for tortious interference with contractual relations for failure to deliver various service, provisioning, and billing options in addition to those set forth in the tariff. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's damages award.

Question

Do the federally filed tariff requirements of section 203 of the Communications Act of 1934 pre-empt state-law claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for AT&T, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Communication Act of 1934

Yes. In a 7-1 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Communications Act's filed-tariff requirements pre-empt Central Office Telephone, Inc.'s state-law claims. Invoking the "filed-rate" doctrine, under which the rate a carrier duly files is the only lawful charge, the Court denied Central Office's claims of AT&T;'s failure to fulfill promised preferences not specified in its tariff filed with the FCC. "Because [Central Office Telephone, Inc.] asks for privileges not included in the tariff," wrote Justice Scalia, "its state-law claims are barred in either case." Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal

Wed, 05 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1462

Petitioner

Lunding

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New York Tax Appeals Tribunal

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 287 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, November 5, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 1998

Advocates

Andrew D. Bing (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Christopher H. Lunding (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

New York Tax Law section 631(b)(6) denies only nonresident taxpayers a state income tax deduction for alimony paid. In 1990, Christopher Lunding and his wife, residents of Connecticut, were required to pay higher taxes on their New York income when the State denied their attempted deduction of a pro rata portion of the alimony Lunding paid a previous spouse. Lunding commenced suit, asserting that section 631(b)(6) discriminates against New York nonresidents in violation of the Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals held that section 631(b)(6) was adequately justified because New York residents who are subject to taxation on all of their income regardless of source should be entitled to the benefit of full deduction of expenses, while personal expenses of a nonresident taxpayer are more appropriately allocated to the State of residence.

Question

Does New York Tax Law section 631(b)(6), which effectively denies only nonresident taxpayers a state income tax deduction for alimony paid, violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 4, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Privileges and Immunities Clause

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that, in the absence of a substantial reason for the difference in treatment of nonresidents, section 631(b)(6) violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause by denying only nonresidents an income tax deduction for alimony payments. "The alimony obligation may be of a 'personal' nature, but it cannot be viewed as geographically fixed in the manner that other expenses, such as business losses, mortgage interest payments, or real estate taxes, might be," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined.

National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank

Mon, 06 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-843

Petitioner

National Credit Union Administration

Respondent

First National Bank

Consolidation

No. 96-847

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 479 (1998)

Argued

Monday, October 6, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 1998

Advocates

Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of the Federal Petitioner)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (on behalf of the Private Petitioners)

Michael S. Helfer (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act provides that that "federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district." The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) interprets section 9 to permit federal credit unions to be composed of multiple, unrelated employer groups, each having its own distinct common bond of occupation. Under this interpretation, the NCUA approved a series of charter amendments adding several unrelated employer groups to the membership of AT&T; Family Federal Credit Union, which now has approximately 110,000 members nationwide only 35% of whom are employees of AT&T; and its affiliates. Subsequently, a number of private actors brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the NCUA's decision was contrary to law because section 109 unambiguously requires that the same common bond of occupation unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union and members of the new groups did not share a common bond of occupation with AT&T; Family Federal Credit Union's existing members. Ultimately, the District Court held that the private interests lack standing to challenge NCUA's decision and the Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Do banks and professional associations have standing under the Administrative Procedure Act to seek federal-court review of the National Credit Union Administration's decisions? Is the NCUA's interpretation of section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act permissible?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for First National Bank, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 12 U.S.C. 1759

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that banks and professional associations have prudential standing under the APA to seek federal-court review of the NCUA's interpretation of section 109. By the same majority, the Court also held that the NCUA's interpretation of section 109, under which a common bond of occupation must unite only the members of each unrelated employer group, is impermissible. After concluding that the banks and professional associations' interests fall within the "zone of interests" protected by section 109, Justice Thomas wrote that the NCUA's interpretation "has the potential to read ["shall be limited"] out of the statute entirely."

City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons

Tue, 14 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-910

Petitioner

City of Chicago

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

International College of Surgeons

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 156 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, October 14, 1997

Decided

Monday, December 15, 1997

Advocates

Richard J. Brennan (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Benna Ruth Solomon (Chicago, IL, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1989, following the Chicago Landmarks Commission's preliminary determination that two of the International College of Surgeons and the United States Section of the International College of Surgeons' (ICS) buildings qualified for protection under the city's Landmarks Ordinance, the city enacted a Designation Ordinance creating a landmark district that included the buildings. After ICS applied for and was denied a permit to demolish all but the facades of the buildings, it sought judicial review of the Commission's decisions, alleging the ordinances and the manner in which the Commission conducted its proceedings violated the Federal and State Constitutions. Chicago removed the case to federal district court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision in favor of the city, ruling that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction of a case containing state law claims for on-the-record review of local administrative action.

Question

May a lawsuit filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking judicial review of decisions of the Chicago Landmarks Commission be removed to federal district court, where the case contains both federal constitutional and state administrative challenges to the Commission's decisions?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for City of Chicago, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1367

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that a case containing claims that local administrative action violates federal law, but also containing state law claims for on-the-record review of the administrative findings, can be removed to federal district court. The Court reasoned that the landowners' actions fell within the District Court's original jurisdiction over federal questions and that the court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. "Because neither the jurisdictional statutes nor our prior decisions suggest that federal jurisdiction is lacking in these circumstances, we now reverse," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent, in which Justice John Paul Stevens joined.

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel

Wed, 04 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-42

Petitioner

Eastern Enterprises

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Apfel

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 498 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

Peter Buscemi (on behalf of the Respondents UMWA)

Edwin S. Kneedler (supporting the Federal Respondents)

John T. Montgomery (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Currently unknown.

Question

Currently unknown.

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Eastern Enterprises, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Currently unknown.

Bryan v. United States

Tue, 31 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8422

Petitioner

Bryan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 184 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 31, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

Kent L. Jones (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Roger B. Adler (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) prohibits anyone from "willfully" dealing in firearms without a federal license. The Government presented evidence at Sillasse Bryan's trial to show that he did not have a federal license to deal in firearms, that he was dealing in firearms, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful. No evidence was presented that Bryan was aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that Bryan could be convicted only if he knew of the federal licensing requirement. The trial judge instructed that a person acts "willfully" if he acts with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, but that he need not be aware of the specific law that his conduct may be violating. A jury found Bryan guilty. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the instruction was proper and that the Government had shown that Bryan had acted willfully.

Question

Does the term "willfully" in 18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) require proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful and that he knew of the federal licensing requirement for dealing in firearms?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets, National Firearms, Organized Crime Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or Gun Control Acts, except for RICO (q.v.) portion

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the term "willfully" in section 924(a)(1)(D) requires proof only that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, not that he also knew of the federal licensing requirement. Justice Stevens wrote for that court that "the willfulness requirement of [section 924(a)(1)(D)] does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required." In a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that ambiguously worded criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the defendant.

United States v. Bestfoods

Tue, 24 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-454

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bestfoods

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 51 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 24, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Lois J. Schiffer (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kenneth S. Geller (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The site of a chemical manufacturing plant was polluted over many years. During much of the time, the companies running the plant were wholly owned subsidiaries of, first, CPC International Inc. (CPC), and later Aerojet- General Corp (Aerojet). By 1981, the federal Environmental Protection Agency had undertaken to have the site cleaned up. To recover some of the money spent, the U.S. filed an action under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a)(2). Section 107 allows the U.S. to seek reimbursement for cleanup costs from, among others, "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility." The first phase of the trial concerned only liability, and focused on whether CPC and Aerojet had "owned or operated" the facility.

Question

May a parent corporation that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of a subsidiary, without more, be held liable under CERCLA Section 107(a)(2) as an operator of a polluting facility owned or operated by the subsidiary?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 9607

No, unless the corporate veil may be pierced. But a corporate parent that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of the facility itself may be held directly liable in its own right as an operator of the facility.

Geissal v. Moore Medical Corporation

Wed, 29 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-689

Petitioner

Geissal

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Moore Medical Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 74 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, April 29, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Bradley J. Washburn (on behalf of the Respondents)

Bradley J. Washington (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Sheldon Weinhaus (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

S. Sheldon Weinhaus (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to permit a beneficiary of an employer's group health plan to elect continuing coverage when he might otherwise lose that benefit because of a "qualifying event," such as the termination of employment. In 1993, when Moore Medical Corporation fired James Geissal, it told him that COBRA gave him the right to elect continuing coverage under Moore's health plan. Later, Moore informed Geissal that he was not entitled to COBRA benefits because he was already covered by a group plan through his wife's employer. Geissal then filed suit against Moore, alleging that Moore was violating CORBA by renouncing an obligation to provide continuing coverage. Ultimately, a Magistrate Judge concluded that an employee with coverage under another group health plan on the date he elects COBRA coverage is ineligible for COBRA coverage under 29 USC section 1162(2)(D)(i), which allows an employer to cancel such coverage as of "the date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of the election... covered under any other group health plan." The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does 29 USC section 1162(2)(D)(i) allow an employer to deny Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 continuation health coverage to a qualified beneficiary who is covered under another group health plan at the time he makes his COBRA election?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Geissal, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that an employer may not deny COBRA continuation coverage under its health plan to an otherwise eligible beneficiary because he is covered under another group health plan at the time he elects COBRA coverage. "It is undisputed that both before and after James Geissal elected COBRA continuation coverage he was continuously a beneficiary of [his wife's employer's] group health plan," wrote Justice Souter, "[b]ecause he was thus covered before he made his COBRA election, and so did not 'first become' covered under the [his wife's employer's] plan after the date of election, Moore could not cut off his COBRA coverage under the plain meaning of [section 1162(2)(D)(i)]."

Dooley v. Korean Airlines

Mon, 27 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-704

Petitioner

Dooley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Korean Airlines

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 116 (1998)

Argued

Monday, April 27, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Juanita Madole (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Andrew J. Harakas (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed. Representatives of three of the passengers (petitioners) sued KAL for damages for their decedents' pre-death pain and suffering. While their suit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. In Zicherman, the Court held that the Warsaw Convention permits compensation only for legally cognizable harm and that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) supplies the applicable U.S. law where an airplane crashes on the high seas. DOHSA allows certain relatives of a decedent to sue for their own pecuniary losses, but does not authorize recovery for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. Subsequently, the District Court granted KAL's motion to dismiss petitioners' nonpecuniary damages claims on the ground that DOHSA does not permit recovery for such damages. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that general maritime law provides a survival action for pain and suffering damages.

Question

May certain relatives of decedents, in a case of death on the high seas, recover damages for their decedents' pre-death pain and suffering through a survival action under general maritime law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Korean Airlines, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 46 U.S.C. App.

No. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "[b]ecause Congress has chosen not to authorize a survival action for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, there can be no general maritime survival action for such damages." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that the "comprehensive scope of DOHSA is confirmed by its survival provision, which limits the recovery in such cases to the pecuniary losses suffered by surviving relatives. The Act thus expresses Congress' 'considered judgment' on the availability and contours of a survival action in cases of death on the high seas. For this reason, it cannot be contended that DOHSA has no bearing on survival actions; rather, Congress has simply chosen to adopt a more limited survival provision."

Swidler & Berlin v. United States

Mon, 08 Jun 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1192

Petitioner

Swidler & Berlin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 399 (1998)

Argued

Monday, June 8, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

Brett M. Kavanaugh (Argued the cause for the respondents)

James Hamilton (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

During the 1993 investigation of the White House Travel Office ("Travelgate"), Deputy White House Counsel Vincent W. Foster, Jr., met with an attorney from Swidler & Berlin's law firm named James Hamilton. Nine days later, Foster committed suicide. During a subsequent investigation into the legalities of Travelgate, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Hamilton's notes about his meeting with Foster. When Swidler & Berlin challenged Starr's subpoena as a violation of the attorney-client privilege, a district court agreed. On appeal from an appellate court reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Are communications between a client and his or her lawyer protected under the attorney-client confidentiality doctrine, beyond the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination, even after the client's death?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Swidler & Berlin, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court reminded that the purpose of the attorney- client privilege is to promote public observance of the law by encouraging complete and truthful communication between attorneys and their clients. Confidentiality, even after the client's death, is essential for such honesty in both criminal and civil contexts. The Court held that absent a posthumous application of the attorney-client privilege, people would be likely to withhold information for fear of their friends' or family's reputation, civil liability, and general well-being.

Textron Lycoming v. United Automobile Workers

Mon, 23 Feb 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-463

Petitioner

Textron Lycoming

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United Automobile Workers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 653 (1998)

Argued

Monday, February 23, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

Stephen A. Yokich (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Timothy B. Dyk (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its Local 187 are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that required Textron to notify the Union before entering into any agreement to "subcontract out" work that would otherwise be performed by Union members. In 1994, Textron announced plans to subcontract out work that would have caused approximately one-half of the Union members to lose their jobs. Subsequently, the Union filed suit, alleging that Textron had fraudulently induced the Union to sign the collective-bargaining agreement. The complaint invoked section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over "suits for violation of contracts" between an employer and a labor organization. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the cause of action alleged did not come within section 301(a). The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Does section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act permit a union to sue in federal court to declare a collective bargaining agreement voidable in the absence of any alleged violation of the agreement?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Textron Lycoming, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor-Management Relations

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that neither it nor the lower federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction under section 301 because the Union's complaint alleged no violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. "Suits for violation of contracts" under [section 301(a)] are not suits that claim a contract is invalid, but suits that claim a contract has been violated, wrote Justice Scalia. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer filed concurring opinions.

Hudson v. United States

Wed, 08 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-976

Petitioner

Hudson et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 93 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, December 10, 1997

Advocates

Bernard J. Rothbaum (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

John Hudson was chairman of the First National Bank of Tipton and the First National Bank of Hammon. Hudson used his position to regain bank stock he had used as collateral on defaulted loans through a series of bank loans to other parties. Upon investigation the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) found that the loans were made in violation of several banking statues and regulations. The OCC fined and debarred Hudson for the violations. Later, he faced criminal indictment in federal District Court for violations tied to those same events. Hudson objected, arguing that the indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit eventually found for the Government in light of United States v. Halper on the grounds that the original proceedings were civil in nature and not so disproportional to the proven damages to the Government as to qualify as a form of criminal punishment.

Question

Are punitive fines and debarment by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency a sufficiently "criminal" form of punishment that a subsequent criminal indictment for the same violations would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Double Jeopardy

No. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Circuit's decision based on the distinction made in United States v. Ward between criminal and civil punishments. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to non-criminal penalties, even if the purpose of the penalty is to punish the offenders and deter future offenders. Since the first punishment handed down by the OCC - a Federal Banking Agency, not a court - was not a criminal punishment, the subsequent indictments were upheld.

Sacramento v. Lewis

Tue, 09 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Sacramento County Police Department

711 G Street Sacramento CA 95814

Sacramento, CA 95814

United States

38° 35' 4.4088" N, 121° 29' 44.2608" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1337

Petitioner

Sacramento

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lewis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 833 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, December 9, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 1998

Advocates

Terence J. Cassidy (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Paul J. Hedlund (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Philip Lewis was a passenger on a motorcycle that was involved in a high-speed police chase. The chase ended when the motorcycle's driver lost control and tipped the bike over, hurling both riders to the pavement. James Smith, one of two pursuing Sacramento county sheriff's deputies, was unable to stop his car in time and skidded into Philip, causing fatal injuries. Philip's parents, Teri and Thomas Lewis, accused Smith and the Sacramento county police department of deliberate and reckless conduct which ultimately deprived their son of his due process right to life and his protection against unconstitutional seizure. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court decision favoring Smith, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Are the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process protection, or the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against illegal seizure, violated by a police officer who, in the course of pursuing a subject, causes their death through deliberate or reckless indifference?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sacramento, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a unanimous decision the Court first ruled that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standards prevented its illegal seizure protections from applying to high-speed police chases. Such incidents are merely pursuits and do not constitute actual seizures, especially if they fail due to the death of the subject. Moreover, addressing the Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the Court held that Smith's actions, while perhaps unwise, were not intended to injure or kill those pursued. As such, the negligent infliction of harm during a police chase does not violate due process since it is not an unexpectedly shocking or egregious result under the circumstances.

Texas v. United States

Wed, 14 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-29

Appellee

United States

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Texas

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 296 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, January 14, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 31, 1998

Advocates

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellees)

Javier Aguilar (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, the Texas Legislature enacted Chapter 39. Chapter 39 holds local school boards accountable to the State for student achievement in the public schools. The State Commissioner of Education may select from various sanctions, including the appointment of a master or a management team and the contracting out of services, when a school district falls short of Chapter 39's accreditation criteria. Under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Texas submitted Chapter 39 to the United States Attorney General for a determination whether any of the sanctions effected voting and thus required preclearance. Ultimately, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights cautioned that such sanctions implementation might violate section 5. Subsequently, Texas sought a declaration District Court that section 5 did not apply to such sanctions. The court concluded that Texas's claim was not ripe.

Question

Is Texas's claim for a declaratory judgment that Chapter 39's authorized sanctions against school districts for failure to meet mandated educational achievement levels do not need preclearance ripe for adjudication?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Texas's claim is not ripe for adjudication. The Court's holding turning on the fact that Texas did not indicate any school district in which an application of Chapter 39 was "foreseen or even likely." Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that, "we find it too speculative whether the problem Texas presents will ever need solving; we find the legal issues Texas raises not yet fit for our consideration, and the hardship to Texas of biding its time insubstantial."

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.

Wed, 03 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Location of the oil rig Oncale worked on

United States

29° 11' 12.8256" N, 89° 56' 12.2532" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-568

Petitioner

Oncale

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 75 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, December 3, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Advocates

Nicholas Canaday, III (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Harry M. Reasoner (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Joseph Oncale, a male, filed a complaint against his employer, Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., alleging that he was sexually harassed by co-workers, in their workplace, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). On appeal from a decision supporting a district court's ruling against Oncale, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Does the prohibition against sex discrimination, set out in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, apply to same-sex sexual harassment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Oncale, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that while Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace, it does bar all forms of discrimination "because of" sex. Such discrimination, whether motivated by sexual desire or not, is actionable so long at it places its victim in an objectively disadvantageous working condition, regardless of the victim's gender.

Cass County, MN v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians

Tue, 24 Feb 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-174

Petitioner

Cass County, MN

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 103 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, February 24, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Earl Edwin Maus (Walker, Minnesota, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara B. McDowell (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

James M. Schoessler (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, Cass County, Minnesota began assessing ad valorem taxes on 21 parcels of reservation land that had been alienated from tribal control under the Nelson Act and later reacquired by the Leech Lake Band of Chippewa, a federally recognized Indian tribe. In 1995, the Band filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that Cass County could not tax the 21 parcels. The District Court held that all of the land that had been alienated from tribal ownership under the Nelson Act was taxable. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals held that 13 parcels that had been allotted to individual Indians could be taxed so long as they had been patented after passage of the Burke Act proviso, because the explicit mention of "taxation" in the proviso expressed "unmistakably clear" intent. Reversing in part, the court held that the eight parcels sold as pine lands or homestead land could not be taxed because those sections did not incorporate the General Allotment Act or include any mention of an intent to tax lands distributed under them which might become reacquired by the Band.

Question

May state and local governments tax reservation land that was made alienable by Congress and sold to non-Indians by the Federal Government but was later repurchased by a tribe?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cass County, MN, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 Stat. 642

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that ad valorem taxes may be imposed upon such land. "When Congress makes Indian reservation land freely alienable, it manifests an unmistakably clear intent to render such land subject to state and local taxation," wrote Justice Thomas. Repurchasing the land by an Indian tribe does not return the land to tax-exempt status. Justice Thomas concluded that "[t]he eight parcels at issue here were therefore taxable unless and until they were restored to federal trust protection."

Campbell v. Louisiana

Tue, 20 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1584

Petitioner

Campbell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Louisiana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 392 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, January 20, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, April 21, 1998

Advocates

Dmitrc I. Burnes (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Richard I. Ieyoub (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

erry Campbell, a white man, was indicted for second-degree murder by a grand jury in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana. Campbell moved to quash the indictment by citing a long history of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons in Evangeline Parish. No African-American had served as a foreperson for the past 16 years despite the fact twenty percent of the registered voters were black. Campbell claimed such practices violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights. A Louisiana trial judge denied Campbell's challenge, holding that he lacked standing as a white man complaining about the exclusion of African-Americans from serving as forepersons. The Louisiana Court of Appeal overruled the trial judge and decided Campbell had standing. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal.

Question

Does the exclusion of other races other than the defendant's violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Campbell, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

Yes. Without reaching the merits, the Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that "a defendant has standing to litigate whether his conviction was procured by means or procedures which contravene due process." A white defendant could assert the right of the grand jury to be free of discrimination because racial discrimination in jury selection casts doubt on the integrity of the entire trial process.

Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp.

Mon, 10 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-370

Petitioner

Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ferbar Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 192 (1997)

Argued

Monday, November 10, 1997

Decided

Monday, December 15, 1997

Advocates

Marsha S. Berzon (on behalf of the Petitioner)

William F. Terheyden (on behalf of the Respondents)

Edward C. DuMont (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) requires employers who withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans to pay a "withdrawal liability," which is dischargeable with an arranged series of periodic payments. The Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund (Fund) is a multiemployer pension plan for laundry workers. The Ferbar Corporation contributed to the Fund, but ultimately ceased doing so. Subsequently, the Fund's trustees demanded payment of Ferbar's withdrawal liability. The trustees decided to allow Ferbar to satisfy its obligation by making monthly payments. However, Ferbar never made a payment. Ultimately, the District Court granted Ferbar summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The court noted that the trustees had filed suit eight days too late. This was the date Ferbar was to make its first payment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the six-year period began to run on the date Ferbar withdrew from the Fund, in March 1985. Under this view, the trustees commenced suit nearly two years too late.

Question

Does the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980's six-year statute of limitations begin to run on a pension fund's action to collect unpaid withdrawal liability on the date the employer withdraws from the plan?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 29 U.S.C. 1451

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the MPPAA's six-year statute of limitations on a pension fund's action to collect unpaid withdrawal liability does not begin to run until the employer fails to make a payment on the schedule set by the fund. Justice Ginsburg reasoned that a plan's interest in receiving withdrawal liability does not ripen into a cause of action triggering the limitations period until the trustees determine and demand payment and the employer defaults on an installment. The Court's conclusion prompted a second decision, that a pension fund's action to collect unpaid withdrawal liability is timely as to any installment payments that came due during the six years preceding the suit, but payments that came due prior to that time are lost.

Gray v. Maryland

Mon, 08 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8653

Petitioner

Gray

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Maryland

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 185 (1998)

Argued

Monday, December 8, 1997

Decided

Monday, March 9, 1998

Advocates

Roy W. McLeese (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Carmen M. Shepard (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Arthur A. Delano, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, the State of Maryland tried Anthony Bell and Kevin Gray jointly for the murder of Stacy Williams. The State entered Bell's confession into evidence at trial. According to the trial judge's order, the police detective who read the confession said the word "deleted" or "deletion" whenever Gray's name appeared. Subsequently, the prosecutor asked the detective if Bell's confession led to Gray's arrest. The detective answered that it did. Ultimately, Gray testified and Bell did not. When instructing the jury, the trial judge specified that the confession was evidence only against Bell. The jury convicted both Bell and Gray. Setting aside Gray's conviction, Maryland's intermediate appellate court applied Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, in which the Court held that, despite a limiting instruction that the jury should consider the confession as evidence only against the confessing codefendant, the introduction of such a confession at a joint trial violates the nonconfessing defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. Maryland's highest court reinstated the conviction.

Question

Does Bruton v. United States apply to a redaction that replaces a name with an obvious blank space or a symbol or a word such as "deleted?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gray, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the confession, which substituted blanks and the word "delete" for the respondent's proper name, falls within the class of statements to which Bruton's protections apply. Applying Bruton, Justice Breyer wrote that a jury will often react to an unredacted confession and a confession redacted with the word "delete" similarly by realizing that the confession refers to the defendant. Justice Anton Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that Bell's confession could constitutionally have been admitted with a limiting instruction to the jury.

Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink

Mon, 03 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1370

Petitioner

Fidelity Financial Services, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fink

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 211 (1998)

Argued

Monday, November 3, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, January 13, 1998

Advocates

Richard V. Fink (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Michael P. Gaughan (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After purchasing a car, Diane Beasley gave Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. a promissory note for the purchase price. The car secured the note. 21 days later, Fidelity mailed Beasley the application to perfect its security interest under Missouri law. After Beasley filed for bankruptcy, Richard V. Fink, the trustee of Beasley's bankruptcy estate, moved to set aside Fidelity's security interest on the ground that the lien was a voidable preference under federal law. 11 USC section 547(c)(3)(B) prohibits the avoidance of a security interest for a loan used to acquire property if, among other things, the security interest is "perfected on or before 20 days after the debtor receives possession of such property." Fink argued that this "enabling loan" exception was inapposite because Fidelity had not perfected its interest within the 20-day period. Affirming the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court, the Court of Appeals held a transfer to be perfected when the transferee takes the last step required by state law to perfect its security interest.

Question

May a creditor invoke 11 USC section 547(c)(3)(B)'s "enabling loan" exception if it performs the acts necessary to perfect its security interest more than 20 days after the debtor receives the property, but within a grace period provided by the otherwise applicable state law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fink, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a transfer of a security interest is perfected under section 547(c)(3)(B) on the date that the secured party has completed the steps necessary to perfect its interest, so that a creditor may invoke the enabling loan exception only by satisfying state law perfection requirements within the 20-day period provided by the federal statute. The Court turned to the text, structure, and history of the preference provisions to determine that the federal enabling loan exception of twenty-days controlled over otherwise applicable state law.

United States v. Beggerly

Mon, 27 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-731

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Beggerly

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 38 (1998)

Argued

Monday, April 27, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Ernest G. Taylor, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1979, the United States sued Chris W. Beggerly and the Beggerly family to quiet title to Horn Island, located within the state of Mississippi, for a federal park. The Government argued that Beggerly did not have clear title because the Government had never patented the disputed land after acquiring it as part of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1982, a settlement quieted title in the Government's favor. However, in 1994, with new evidence, Beggerly sued, seeking to set aside the settlement agreement and obtain damages. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found jurisdiction under the Quiet Title Act and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as an "independent action." The appellate court then vacated the settlement agreement and instructed the District Court to quiet title in Beggerly's favor.

Question

Do federal courts lack jurisdiction over action to reopen a settlement quieting land title in the Federal Government either under Rule 60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent action or under Quiet Title Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that this was a sufficient basis to justify reopening the judgment. "[A]n independent action should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "it should be obvious that [the Beggerlys'] allegations do not nearly approach this demanding standard." The Court also concluded that the Court of Appeals extension of the Quiet Title Act's statutory period by equitable tolling was unwarranted, given its generous nature. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion.

United States v. Cabrales

Wed, 29 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-643

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cabrales

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 1 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, April 29, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1998

Advocates

John W. Rogers (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

An indictment returned in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri charged Vickie S. Cabrales with various charges of money laundering. The incident alleged that Cabrales deposited $40,000 with the AmSouth Bank of Florida, of which she later withdrew $38,000. The money was traceable to illegal cocaine sales in Missouri. Cabrales moved to dismiss the indictment for improper venue. Because the money-laundering activity occurred entirely in Florida, the court dismissed two of the three counts against Cabrales. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that Article III, the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 required that a person be tried where the charged offense was committed. The court also noted that laundering alleged in the indictment occurred entirely in Florida and that the Government did not assert that Cabrales transported the money from Missouri to Florida.

Question

May a defendant in a federal money-laundering case in which all the transactions occurred in one state be prosecuted in a second state?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cabrales, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Missouri is not a place of proper venue for the money-laundering offenses with which Cabrales is charged. Rejecting the Government's "continuing offense" argument, under which Cabrales would have been triable in more than one place, the Court noted that the laundering transactions occurred only in Florida, making venue in Missouri improper. The Court also reasoned that if the Government could link Cabrales to the drug-trafficking activity, then she could be prosecuted for those violations in Missouri with her money laundering in Florida shown as overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. IRS

Mon, 02 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-147

Petitioner

Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

IRS

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 582 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 2, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, April 21, 1998

Advocates

Kent L. Jones (Argued the cause for the respondent)

George R. Abramowitz (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Internal Revenue Code allowed property and casualty insurers to fully deduct "loss reserves," or unpaid losses. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 altered the deduction formula. Under the Act, increases in loss reserves that constitute "reserve strengthening," or additions to the loss reserve, were excepted from a one time tax benefit because it would result in a tax deficiency. Treasury regulation and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue interpreted the law to say that any increase in loss reserves constituted reserve strengthening. The Commissioner then determined Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company had engaged in reserve strengthening. The Tax Court disagreed with the government's interpretation. It held reserve strengthening referred only to increases resulting from computational methods. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held reserve strengthening to encompass any increase in loss reserves.

Question

Is the government's interpretation of reserve strengthening correct in determining property and casualty insurers' liability?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for IRS, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the IRS interpretation of reserve strengthening seemed "reasonable accommodation." It was fair and unabusive. Furthermore, the language of the provision was broad enough to embrace all increases in the reserves.

United States v. Romani

Mon, 12 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1613

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Romani

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 517 (1998)

Argued

Monday, January 12, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, April 29, 1998

Advocates

Patrick F. McCartan (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Kent L. Jones (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Both a judgment lien and federal tax liens encumbered the real property of Francis Romani's Pennsylvania estate, worth $53,001, following his death. The estate's administrator sought a county court's permission to transfer the property to the judgment creditor. The Government objected to the conveyance, arguing that 31 USC section 3713(a), which provides that a Government claim "shall be paid first" when a decedent's estate cannot pay all of its debts, prioritized its payment. Nevertheless, the court authorized the conveyance. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The court concluded that Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 modified the Government's preference and recognized the priority of many state claims over federal tax liens.

Question

Does the federal priority statute, 31 USC section 3713(a), require that that a federal tax claim be given preference over a judgment creditor's perfected lien on real property where such a preference is not authorized by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Romani, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 31 U.S.C. 3713

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that section 3713(a) does not require that a federal tax claim be given preference over a judgment creditor's perfected lien on real property. Justice Stevens reasoned that section 3713(a) has been limited by Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, which provides that says a federal lien for back taxes is not valid until the government files proper notice with state or local officials. Accordingly, Justice Stevens wrote that the Tax Lien Act "represents Congress' detailed judgment as to when the Government's claims for unpaid taxes should yield to many different sorts of interests... in many different types of property... specifically crafted for tax collection purposes." Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Bragdon v. Abbott

Mon, 30 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Randon Bragdon's Dental Office

30 Judson Blvd Bangor ME 04401

Bangor, ME 04401

United States

44° 50' 29.7996" N, 68° 47' 42.2808" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-156

Petitioner

Bragdon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Abbott

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 624 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 30, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

Bennett H. Klein (Argued the cause for the respondents)

John W. McCarthy (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

During a visit to her dentist's office, in order to fill a cavity, Sidney Abbott disclosed that although she did not manifest any obvious symptoms she carried the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). When her dentist, Randon Bragdon, refused to treat her in his office, offering to conduct any necessary work at a hospital for no extra charge other than use of the facilities, Abbott challenged his policy as discriminatory. After both a federal trial and an appeals court ruled in Abbott's favor, Bragdon appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Can a physician refuse or alter care of an HIV-positive patient without violating the equal treatment stipulations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bragdon, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

No. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that although the ADA does not force care-givers to treat an "individual [who] poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others," it also prohibits discrimination against any individual "on the basis of disability in the enjoyment of the services of any place of public accommodation by any person who operates [such] a place." The Court then reasoned that since HIV "substantially limits" major life activities, such as reproduction, the infection is a "disability" that entitles its victims to ADA protections. Having said this, however, the Court concluded that only care-givers can determine if treating an HIV-positive individual would constitute a "direct threat" to themselves or others. Therefore, the Court remanded for further risk assessment based on objective medical evidence or risk.

Penn. Board of Probation v. Scott

Mon, 30 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-581

Petitioner

Penn. Board of Probation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scott

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 357 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 30, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1998

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Leonard N. Sosnov (Argued the cause for the respondent)

D. Michael Fisher (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In granting Keith M. Scott parole, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the "Board"), stipulated that he refrain from owning or possessing weapons. When officers learned that Scott may be in possession of weapons, they searched his home and found a bow and arrow and some firearms. Despite objecting at his parole violation hearing that the search was unconstitutional, the seized weapons were admitted as evidence and Scott was ultimately recommitted. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Scott's challenge to the search and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the decision. The Supreme Court granted the Board certiorari.

Question

Does the federal exclusionary rule, prohibiting the introduction of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable search and seizure, apply to parole revocation hearings?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Penn. Board of Probation, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings. Noting that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated, the Court explained that it applies only in situations where its deterrent benefits outweigh the utilities that accompany the consideration of reliable, probative evidence. Since officers are unaware of whether their search subjects are parolees or not, the danger of their deliberately conducting illegal searches is small. By comparison, the deleterious impact that an application of the exclusionary rule would have on traditionally flexible state parole revocation proceedings is great. State parole authorities must have greater legal latitude since they deal with individuals who, in light of past criminal activities, are more likely than average citizens to offend again.

Foster v. Love

Mon, 06 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-670

Petitioner

Foster

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Love

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 67 (1997)

Argued

Monday, October 6, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, December 2, 1997

Advocates

M. Miller Baker (on behalf of the Respondents)

Richard I. Ieyoub (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Elections Clause of the Constitution provides that "the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations." 2 USC sections 1 and 7 provide that the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in an even- numbered year is established as the date for federal congressional and presidential elections. In 1975, Louisiana adopted an "open primary," which occurs before the uniform federal election day and in which all candidates appear on the ballot and all voters may vote. If a candidate for a given office receives a majority at the open primary, that candidate is elected and no further act is done on federal election day to fill that office. Louisiana voters challenged the open primary is a violation of federal law. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that Louisiana's system squarely "conflicts with the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal election day."

Question

Does Louisiana's open primary violate the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal election day?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Love, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 4, Paragraph 1: Elections Clause

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that when Louisiana's open primary is applied to select among congressional candidates in October, it conflicts with federal law and to that extent is void. The Court rejected the argument that Louisiana's system only concerns the manner, not the time, of a federal election. Justice Souter reasoned that a federal election occurs in Louisiana before the federal election date whenever a candidate receives a majority in the open primary.

Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.v. Sierra Club

Wed, 25 Feb 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-16

Petitioner

Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sierra Club

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 726 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the federal respondents supporting the petitioner)

Steven R. Quarles (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Frederick M. Gittes (Argued the cause for the private respondents)

Facts of the Case

Pursuant to the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), the United States Forest Service developed a Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest. The Plan sets logging goals, selects the areas suited to timber production, and determines which probable methods of timber harvest are appropriate, but it does not itself authorize the cutting of any trees. Ultimately, the Sierra Club filed suit, alleging that erroneous analysis leads the Plan wrongly to favor logging and clearcutting. The District Court granted the Forest Service summary judgment, finding that the Forest Service had acted lawfully in making the various challenged determinations. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, finding both that the Sierra Club had standing to bring suit, and that since the suit was "ripe for review," there was no need to wait "until a site-specific action occurs," held that the Plan improperly favored clearcutting and therefore violated the NFMA.

Question

Does the United States Forest Service's Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest present a controversy that is justiciable? If so, does the Plan conform to statutory and regulatory requirements for a forest plan?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.v. Sierra Club, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the controversy is not yet ripe for judicial review. Justice Breyer wore for the Court that "'withhold court consideration' at present will not cause the parties significant 'hardship.'" "[B]efore the Forest Service can permit logging, it must focus upon a particular site, propose a specific harvesting method, prepare an environmental review, permit the public an opportunity to be heard, and (if challenged) justify the proposal in court," continued Justice Breyer, "[t]he Sierra Club thus will have ample opportunity later to bring its legal challenge at a time when harm is more imminent and more certain."

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey

Tue, 28 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-634

Petitioner

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Yeskey

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 206 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, April 28, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

Paul A. Tufano (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Donald Specter (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After being sentenced to 18 to 36 months in prison, Ronald Yeskey was recommended as a candidate for a Motivational Boot Camp for first-time offenders. Successful completion of the Boot Camp could have resulted in Yeskey's early parole after just six months. When the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections discovered Yeskey's medical history of hypertension, he was denied admission to the Boot Camp. Yeskey challenged the refusal as discriminatory. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Did the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' refusal to allow a prison inmate to participate in a motivational boot camp, because of the inmate's history of hypertension, violate Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibiting disability-based discrimination against qualified individuals?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Yeskey, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that under the ADA no "public entity" may discriminate against qualified disabled individuals due to their disability. Moreover, the Court stated that the ADA's protections extended to cover prison inmates as well as any other liberated citizen.

Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment

Mon, 06 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-643

Petitioner

Steel Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Citizens for a Better Environment

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 83 (1998)

Argued

Monday, October 6, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Advocates

Sanford M. Stein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David A. Strauss (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Citizens For A Better Environment, a environmental protection organization, filed an enforcement action for relief under the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986's (EPCRA) Citizen-Suit Provision. Citizens alleged that the Chicago Steel And Pickling Company had violated the EPCRA by failing to file timely toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports since 1988. Ultimately, Chicago Steel filed all of the overdue forms with the relevant agencies by the time the complaint was acted on. Arguing this fact and that the EPCRA does not allow suit for purely historical violations, Chicago Steel filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Citizens' allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court agreed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for purely past violations.

Question

Does an environmental organization have standing to bring suit against companies that fail to meet the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act Of 1986's deadlines for filing toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports? Does the EPCRA authorize suits for purely past violations?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Steel Company, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No and the Court did not answer the question. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held, because none of the relief sought would likely remedy its alleged injury in fact, that Citizens For A Better Environment lacked standing to maintain suit and that the Court and lower federal courts lack the jurisdiction to entertain it. While all nine Justices agreed that the organization lacked standing, they disagreed on the reasons. Lacking jurisdiction, the Court declined to answer whether the EPCRA authorizes suits for purely past violations. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Stephen G. Breyer, John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote concurring opinions.

Brogan v. United States

Tue, 02 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1579

Petitioner

Brogan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 398 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 1997

Decided

Monday, January 26, 1998

Advocates

Stuart A. Holtzman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

When questioned by federal agents as to the receipt of gifts or money from a company whose employees were members of the union in which he was an officer, James Brogan falsely answered "no." Brogan was subsequently indicted on federal bribery charges and the making of false statements within a federal agency's jurisdiction. Brogan challenged his conviction, arguing that false statements which merely deny wrongdoing, and do not impede federal functions, are protected under the Fifth Amendment. On appeal from an appeals court judgment upholding an adverse district court ruling, the Supreme Court granted Brogan certiorari.

Question

Is the so-called "exculpatory no" doctrine, excluding from criminal sanction false statements that merely deny one's wrongdoing, consistent with the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1001

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the imposition of criminal liability for false statements is not limited only to those falsehoods that pervert governmental functions - it applies to statements "of whatever kind." Moreover, even if the "exculpatory no" doctrine did apply to statements that do not impede federal functions, Brogan would not benefit from it since his falsehoods were intended to prevent federal agents from uncovering the truth. The Court concluded by noting that a literal reading of federal laws which prohibit the "exculpatory no" defense is consistent with the Fifth Amendment, since th Framers never intended to confer a privilege to lie.

Allentown Mack Sales v. NLRB

Wed, 15 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-795

Petitioner

Allentown Mack Sales

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 359 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, October 15, 1997

Decided

Monday, January 26, 1998

Advocates

Jonathan Nuechterlein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Stephen D. Shawe (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1990, Mack Trucks, Inc., sold its Allentown, Pennsylvania, branch to Allentown Mack Sales, Inc. A number of Mack employees made statement to the new owners suggesting that Local Lodge 724 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, had lost the support of bargaining- unit members generally. Subsequently, Allentown refused Local 724's request for recognition and commencement of collective-bargaining negotiations. Allentown, under a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent, claimed a good-faith reasonable doubt as to the union's support in order to conduct an internal poll of employee support for the union. The employees voted 19 to 13 against the union. Local 724 then filed an unfair-labor-practice charge with the NLRB. Ultimately, an Administrative Law Judge held that Allentown's poll was conducted in compliance with procedural standards, but that Allentown did not have an "objective reasonable doubt" about the majority status of the union. The Court of Appeals enforced the NLRB's order for Allentown to recognize and bargain with Local 724.

Question

Is the National Labor Relations Board's "good-faith reasonable doubt" standard for polling employees on union support rational and consistent with the National Labor Relations Act? Is the NLRB's factual determination that Allentown Mack Sales, Inc. lacked such doubt supported by substantial evidence in the record?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Allentown Mack Sales, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

Split Vote

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "the Board's 'reasonable doubt' test for employer polls is facially rational and consistent with the Act." However, in a separate 5-4 split, the Court held that "the Board's factual finding that Allentown Mack Sales lacked such a doubt is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Justice Scalia wrote, "the Board must be required to apply in fact the clearly understood legal standards that it enunciates in principle, such as good-faith reasonable doubt....Reviewing courts are entitled to take those standards to mean what they say, and to conduct substantial-evidence review on that basis. Even the most consistent and hence predictable Board departure from proper application of those standards will not alter the legal rule by which the agency's factfinding is to be judged."

Cohen v. De La Cruz

Tue, 20 Jan 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1923

Petitioner

Cohen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

De La Cruz

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 213 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, January 20, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 24, 1998

Advocates

Gregory G. Diebold (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the respondents)

Donald B. Ayer (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After the local rent control administrator ordered Edward S. Cohen to refund $31,382.50 in excessive rents he had charged Hilda de la Cruz and other tenants, Cohen sought to discharge his debts under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The tenants filed an adversary proceeding, arguing that the debt Cohen owed to them was nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, which excepts from discharge "any debt ... for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by ... actual fraud." The tenants also sought treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. The Bankruptcy Court ruled in their favor, finding that Cohen had committed "actual fraud" within the meaning of ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code and that his conduct violated the New Jersey law. The court, therefore, awarded the tenants treble damages totaling $94,147.50, plus attorney's fees and costs. The District Court affirmed, as did the Court of Appeals, which held that debts resulting from fraud are nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, and that the award of treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) in this case was therefore nondischargeable.

Question

May individuals who commit fraud discharge their debts, including damages awarded to those who were defrauded, under the Bankruptcy Code?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for De La Cruz, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, The Court ruled that because Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge all liability arising from fraud, treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) awarded on account of the debtor's fraud fall within the scope of the exception. Justice O'Connor wrote, "The bankruptcy code has long prohibited debtors from discharging liabilities incurred on account of their fraud, embodying a basic policy...of affording relief only to an honest but unfortunate debtor."

Forney v. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security

Wed, 22 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-5737

Petitioner

Forney

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 266 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, April 22, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (On behalf of the respondent in support of the petitioner)

Allen R. Snyder (As amicus curiae by invitation of the Court in support of the judgment below)

Ralph Wilborn (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Sandra K. Forney applied for Social Security disability benefits. A Social Security Judge determined Forney was minimally disabled, but that she was not disabled enough to qualify for benefits. Consequently she was denied her disability claim. The Social Security Administration's Appeals Council denied Forney's request for review. Forney then sought judicial review in federal District Court. The District Court found that the final determination was inadequately supported by the evidence and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings. Forney appealed the remand order to the Court of Appeals. She contended that the agency's denial of benefits should be reversed outright. The Court of Appeals did not hear her claim, however, for it decided that Forney did not have the legal right to appeal.

Question

Can a Social Security disability claimant seeking court reversal of an agency decision denying benefits appeal a district court order remanding the case to the agency for further proceeding?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Forney, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1291

Yes. In a unanimous decision announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a person seeking Social Security disability benefits may appeal to a federal Court of Appeals when a District Court remands the case to the agency for further proceedings.

Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. School Dist.

Wed, 25 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1866

Petitioner

Gebser

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lago Vista Ind. School Dist.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 274 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, March 25, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1998

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Wallace B. Jefferson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Terry L. Weldon (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Alida Star Gebser, a high school student in the Lago Vista Independent School District ("Lago Vista"), had a secret sexual affair with one of her teachers. At the time, Lago Vista had no official procedure for reporting sexual harassment nor any formal anti-harassment policy, as required by federal law. One day, after the two were discovered having sex, the teacher was arrested and fired. Claiming she was harassed in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (the "Amendments"), providing that no person "be subjected to discrimination" under any federally funded education program or activity, Gebser sought damages against Lago Vista. On appeal from a decision affirming a district court's ruling in favor of Lago Vista, the Supreme Court granted Gebser certiorari.

Question

Can a federally funded educational program or activity be required, under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, to pay sexual harassment damages to a student who was involved in a secret relationship with a member of its staff?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lago Vista Ind. School Dist., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Education Amendments of 1972

No. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court held that two minimal criteria must be met in order for an aggrieved party to recover sexual harassment damages under the Amendments. First, the party must show that a school district official, with the ability to institute corrective measures, knew of the forbidden conduct. Second, a showing must be made that despite having knowledge of the forbidden conduct, the educational establishment deliberately failed to respond in a proper manner. The Court concluded that Lago Vista never showed indifference to Gebser's relationship since it never knew, either formally or informally, of its existence. Accordingly, Lago Vista was not liable for sexual harassment damages.

New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed

Thu, 17 May 2012 15:12:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1217

Petitioner

New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reed

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 151 (1998)

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Facts of the Case

The Extradition Act implements the Constitution's extradition clause and provides for the extradition from one state of a fugitive from justice when a demand for the fugitive's extradition is made by another state. Manuel Ortiz, a parolee from the Ohio correctional system, fled to New Mexico after Ohio prison officials told him that they planned to revoke his parole status. The governor of New Mexico issued a warrant directing Ortiz's return upon Ohio's demand. Ortiz then sought habeas corpus relief in New Mexico. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief. The court expressed the view that Ortiz was a refugee from injustice and that the New Mexico constitution, which guarantees the right of seeking and obtaining safety, prevailed over the state's duty under the extradition clause.

Question

Did the Supreme Court of New Mexico err in upholding grant of state habeas corpus relief to parolee whom state of Ohio sought to extradite as alleged fugitive from justice by going beyond the scope of permissible inquiry?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 4, Section 2, Paragraph 2: Extradition Clause

Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that "the Supreme Court of New Mexico went beyond the permissible inquiry in an extradition case, and permitted the litigation of issues not open in the asylum State." The opinion stated, "this is simply not the kind of issue that may be tried in the asylum State. In case after case we have held that claims relating to what actually happened in the demanding State, the law of the demanding State, and what may be expected to happen in the demanding State when the fugitive returns, are issues that must be tried in the courts of that State, and not in those of the asylum State."

Almendarez-Torres v. United States

Tue, 14 Oct 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-6839

Petitioner

Almendarez-Torres

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 224 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, October 14, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, March 24, 1998

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Peter M. Fleury (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

8 USC section 1326(a) makes it a crime, punishable by up to two years in prison, for a deported alien to return to the United States without special permission. In 1998, Congress added subsection (b)(2), which authorizes a maximum prison term of 20 years for "any alien described" in subsection (a), if the initial "deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony." In 1995, Hugo Almendarez-Torres pleaded guilty to violating section 1326. Ultimately, the District Court sentenced Almendarez- Torres to 85 months' imprisonment. The court rejected his argument that, because his indictment failed to mention his aggravated felony convictions, the court could not sentence him to more than the maximum sentence authorized by section 1326(a). In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision which permits the imposition of a higher sentence when the unlawfully returning alien also has a record of prior convictions.

Question

Does subsection (b)(2) of 8 USC section 1326(a), which forbids an alien who once was deported to return to the United States without special permission, define a separate crime?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 8 U.S.C. 1326

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that subsection (b)(2) of 8 USC section 1326(a) is a penalty provision, which authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a recidivist, and does not define a separate crime. "[W]e note that the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism," wrote Justice Breyer, "[t]hat subject matter -- prior commission of a serious crime -- is as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine." Therefore, neither subsection (b)(2) nor the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment required that the government charge a prior aggravated felony conviction in the alien's indictment for the imposition of a sentence more than 2 years.

Trest v. Cain, Warden

Mon, 10 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-7901

Petitioner

Trest

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cain, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 87 (1997)

Argued

Monday, November 10, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, December 9, 1997

Advocates

Kathleen E. Petersen (on behalf of the Respondent)

Rebecca L. Hudsmith (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Richard Trest sought a writ of habeas corpus that would cancel the sentence he was serving in Louisiana for armed robbery. The District Court rejected his claim. Trest appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but before hearing the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as a "procedural default." The Court of Appeals ruled that Trent had failed to meet the deadline for filing his federal claims in state court. Though Louisiana had not raised the issue, the Fifth Circuit felt compelled to dismiss the case on its own initiative. Trest appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Fifth Circuit had incorrectly believed that it was required to decide the "procedural default" issue sua sponte - that is, without prompting from one of the parties.

Question

Is a Court of Appeals required to decide issues of procedural default on its own initiative, without prompting from one of the parties ("sua sponte")?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Trest, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. A Court of Appeals is not required to raise an issue of procedural default on its own initiative. In a unanimous opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer observed: "We are not aware of any precedent stating that a habeas court must raise such a matter where the State itself does not do so." The Court held that it was the State's duty to raise issues of procedural default, but did not rule on the question of whether the Court of Appeals retained the option of ruling on the issue sua sponte.

Calderon v. Thompson

Tue, 09 Dec 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

95 7th St San Francisco CA 94103

San Francisco, CA 94103

United States

37° 46' 45.4152" N, 122° 24' 39.5568" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-215

Petitioner

Calderon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Thompson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 538 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, December 9, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, April 29, 1998

Advocates

Gregory A. Long (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Holly D. Wilkens (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1983, Thomas M. Thompson was convicted of the rape and murder of Ginger Fleischli in California state court. The special circumstance found by the jury of murder during the commission of rape made Thompson eligible for the death penalty. In 1995, a federal District Court invalidated Thompson's death sentence by granted relief on his rape conviction and the rape special circumstance. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reinstated Thompson's death sentence, noting that the State presented strong evidence of rape at trial. The Court of Appeals then issued a mandate denying all habeas relief. Two days before Thompson's execution, the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate and granted Thompson relief. The appellate court found that Thompson was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial.

Question

Did the Court of Appeal's order recalling its mandate denying Thomas M. Thompson all habeas relief violate 28 USC section 2244(b) as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996? Was the order an abuse of the appellate court's discretion?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Calderon, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that although it was consistent with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the recall was a grave abuse of discretion. The Court established that "where a federal court of appeals sua sponte recalls its mandate to revisit the merits of an earlier decision denying habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, the court abuses its discretion unless it acts to avoid a miscarriage of justice as defined by our habeas corpus jurisprudence." Accordingly, Justice Kennedy, noting that Thompson's evidence was not clear and convincing, concluded that California's judgment would not result in a miscarriage of justice. Justice David H. Souter wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer joined.

Bousley v. United States

Tue, 03 Mar 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8516

Petitioner

Bousley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 614 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 3, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

L. Marshall Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent, on behalf of the United States)

Thomas C. Walsh (Argued the cause, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, in support of the judgment)

Facts of the Case

In 1990, Kenneth Eugene Bousley pleaded guilty to "using" a firearm "during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime," in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Ultimately, Bousley sough habeas relief, claiming his guilty plea lacked a factual basis because a connection between the firearms, located in the bedroom, and the location where the drug trafficking occurred, in the garage, was not shown in either the evidence or the plea. Dismissing the petition, the District Court found that a factual basis for the plea existed because the guns were in close proximity to the drugs and were readily accessible. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Bousley's argument, among others, that his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent because he was misinformed about the elements of a section 924(c)(1) offense.

Question

May defendants who pleaded guilty to "using" a firearm in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1) contest the validity of their convictions by claiming that their guilty pleas were not knowing and intelligent because they were misinformed by the District Court as to the nature of the charged crime?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Bousley, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that, although Bousley's claim was procedurally defaulted, Bousley may be entitled to a hearing on the merits of it if he makes the necessary showing to relieve the default. The Court's opinion made Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), which held that section 924(c)(1)'s "use" element requires the Government to show "active employment of the firearm," retroactive. Accordingly, the Court ruled that Bousley need demonstrate no more than that he did not "use" a firearm as defined in Bailey to be entitled to have his defaulted claim of an unintelligent plea considered on its merits.

Spencer v. Kemna

Wed, 12 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-7171

Petitioner

Spencer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kemna

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 1 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, November 12, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, March 3, 1998

Advocates

John W. Simon (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

James R. Layton (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1990, Randy G. Spencer began serving concurrent three-year sentences for convictions of felony stealing and burglary. In 1992, Spencer was released, but later that year his parole was revoked and he was returned to prison. Seeking to invalidate his parole revocation, Spencer filed unsuccessful habeas petitions in state court. Spencer then filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that he had not received due process in the parole revocation proceedings. In 1993, Spencer was re-released on parole before the District Court addressed the merits of his habeas petition. Subsequently, the court dismissed Spencer's petition as moot. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

May prison inmates challenge the revocation of their parole after they are re- released on parole?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Kemna, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. In a 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the expiration of Spencer's sentence caused his petition to be moot because it no longer presented an Article III case or controversy. The Court concluded that once a petitioner's sentence has expired he must demonstrate a concrete and continuing injury to maintain suit. Accordingly, the Court rejected that Spencer's asserted injuries established collateral consequences sufficient to state an Article III case or controversy. "The reincarceration that he incurred as a result of that action is now over, and cannot be undone," wrote Justice Scalia. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.

Caron v. United States

Tue, 21 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-6270

Petitioner

Caron

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 308 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, April 21, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1998

Advocates

Jonathan Nuechterlein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Owen S. Walker (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

18 USC section 922(g)(1) forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess any firearm. Section 924(e) requires that a three-time violent felon who violates section 922(g)(1) receive an enhanced sentence. Section 921(a)(20) provides that a previous conviction is not a predicate for the substantive offense or the enhanced sentence if the offender's civil rights have been restored, "unless such... restoration... expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms." In 1993, Gerald Caron was convicted of possessing six rifles and shotguns in violation of section 922(g). The District Court enhanced Caron's sentence based, in part, on three Massachusetts convictions. In vacating his sentence, the Court of Appeals concluded that a Massachusetts law that permitted Caron to possess rifles, but not handguns, had restored his civil rights. On remand, the District Court found that, because Massachusetts law allowed Caron to possess rifles, section 921(a)(20)'s "unless clause" was not activated. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Does 18 USC section 922(g)(1), which forbids felons from possessing firearms and enhances their sentences for a violation, apply to a felon who is allowed under state law to possess rifles and shotguns but not handguns?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 922

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Massachusetts treats [Caron] as too dangerous to trust with handguns, though it accords this right to law-abiding citizens. Federal law uses this state finding of dangerousness in forbidding [Caron] to have any guns." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "the unless clause is activated if a restoration of civil rights 'expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms.' Either the restorations forbade possession of 'firearms' and the convictions count for all purposes, or they did not and the convictions count not at all. The unless clause looks to the terms of the past restorations alone and does not refer to the weapons at issue in the present case. So if the Massachusetts convictions count for some purposes, they count for all and bar possession of all guns."

Miller v. Albright

Tue, 04 Nov 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States Department of State

2201 C St. NW Washington DC 20520

Washington, DC 20520

United States

38° 53' 37.0356" N, 77° 2' 56.8896" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1060

Petitioner

Miller

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Albright

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 420 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, November 4, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, April 22, 1998

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Donald R. Patterson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Lorelyn Miller was born in the Philippines, in 1970, to a Filipino national woman and an American soldier. Her parents were never married. In 1992, after the State Department rejected her first application for U.S. citizenship, Miller reapplied when a Texas court granted her father's petition for a paternity decree declaring him her father. When the State Department rejected her citizenship application again, claiming that 8 U.S.C. Section 1409(a) required foreign born illegitimate children of American fathers to be legitimated before age 18, Miller challenged the refusal. She claimed that since Section 1409(c) established at birth the citizenship of an illegitimate foreign-born child whose mother was an American citizen, the State Department's refusal to do the same under Section 1409(a), when the father is an American citizen, was unconstitutional. On appeal from an appellate court's decision to affirm the lower court's dismissal of the case, the Supreme Court granted Miller certiorari.

Question

Does 8 U.S.C. Section 1409, establishing upon birth the U.S. citizenship of illegitimate foreign-born children whose mothers only are U.S. citizens but failing to do the same if only their fathers are U.S. citizens, violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantees?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Albright, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

No. After ruling that Miller had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute, the Court held that 8 U.S.C. Section 1409 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court reasoned that different treatment of mothers and fathers of out-of-wedlock children was justified since the two parents are not "similarly situated." While the child's relationship with its father may be undisclosed for several years, its blood relationship to its mother is usually apparent through hospital records. Moreover, whereas birth mothers will know immediately of their child's existence, birth fathers and their children may never know each other. The statutory requirement that a child born out of wedlock to a citizen father obtain formal proof of paternity by age 18, either through legitimization, written acknowledgment by the father under oath, or adjudication by a competent court, is well tailored to address the difficulties of establishing a child's citizenship based only on the relation to the father.

Monge v. California

Tue, 28 Apr 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-6146

Petitioner

Monge

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 721 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, April 28, 1998

Decided

Friday, June 26, 1998

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Clifford Gardner (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David F. Glassman (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Angel Jaime Monge was convicted on three counts of violating California's drug laws, all felonies. Under California's "three-strikes" law a convicted felon with one prior felony conviction will have his prison term doubled. The state sought to have Monge's sentence enhanced based on a previous assault conviction and the resulting prison term. Subsequently the California trial court doubled his sentence and added a one-year enhancement for the prior prison term. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal ruled that the evidence was insufficient to trigger the sentence enhancement because the prior conviction allegations were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, a retrial to substantiate the allegations would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The California Supreme Court reversed the double jeopardy ruling, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause, though applicable in the capital sentencing context, does not extend to noncapital sentencing proceedings.

Question

Does the Double Jeopardy Clause preclude retrial on a prior conviction allegation in noncapital sentencing proceedings?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for California, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Double Jeopardy

No. In a 5-4 decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect convicted criminals from a second sentencing proceeding in noncapital cases. State prosecutors can try a second time to convince a court to impose an enhanced sentence under a state's "three-strikes" law.

Hopkins, Warden v. Reeves

Mon, 23 Feb 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1693

Petitioner

Hopkins, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reeves

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 88 (1998)

Argued

Monday, February 23, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Roy W. McLeese (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Donald B. Stenberg (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Paula Hutchinson (Appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Randolph K. Reeves was charged with two counts of felony murder for the sexual assault and murder of Janet Mesner and Victoria Lamm, both of Lincoln, Nebraska. Under Nebraska law, felony murder is a form of first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of certain felonies, including sexual assault. A conviction for felony murder renders a defendant eligible for the death penalty; however the jury does not charge the defendant because capital sentencing is a judicial function. In his trial Reeves requested the jury be given other options rather than just felony murder. The trial court judge denied Reeves's motion and he was subsequently convicted on both counts. A three-judge panel sentenced Reeves to death. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. After exhausting his state remedies, Reeves filed a federal habeas corpus petition that the trial court's failure to give the requested instructions was unconstitutional. The District Court granted relief on an unrelated due process claim. The Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's decision, but held that a constitutional error had occurred.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require jurors in capital cases to be given an option to convict a defendant of offenses that are not lesser-included offenses of the crime charged? Did the Nebraska trial court err in failing to give the requested jury instructions?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Hopkins, Warden, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No and no. The Court held 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, that (1) in capital cases, a state trial court is not required, under the Constitution, to instruct the jury on offenses that are not lesser included offenses of the charged crime under state law; and (2) the Nebraska trial court did not commit federal constitutional error in failing to give the requested jury instructions as to second-degree murder and manslaughter.

Edwards v. United States

Mon, 23 Feb 1998 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8732

Petitioner

Edwards

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 511 (1998)

Argued

Monday, February 23, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, April 28, 1998

Advocates

Steven Shobat (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Edward C. DuMont (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

At Vincent Edwards, Reynolds A. Wintersmith, Horace Joiner, Karl V. Fort, and Joseph Tidwell's trial for "conspiring" to "possess with intent to...distribute [mixtures containing two] controlled substances," the jury was instructed that the Government must prove that the conspiracy involved measurable amounts of "cocaine or cocaine base (crack)." After the jury returned guilty verdicts, the District Judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioners' illegal conduct involved both cocaine and crack. On appeal, the petitioners argued that their sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack, because the word "or" in the jury instruction meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine. The United States Sentencing Guidelines treats cocaine more leniently than crack. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy.

Question

May federal judges sentence someone convicted of taking part in a drug conspiracy based on a finding that two illegal drugs were involved, even if the jury might have convicted based on one drug?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the judge was authorized to determine for sentencing purposes whether crack, as well as cocaine, was involved in the offense-related activities." Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "[t]he Sentencing Guidelines instruct the judge in a case like this one to determine both the amount and the kind of 'controlled substances' for which a defendant should be held accountable -- and then to impose a sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind. Consequently, regardless of the jury's actual, or assumed, beliefs about the conspiracy, the Guidelines nonetheless require the judge to determine whether the 'controlled substances' at issue -- and how much of those substances -- consisted of cocaine, crack, or both."