Cases - 1996 term

Edwards v. Balisok

Wed, 13 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1352

Petitioner

Edwards et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Balisok

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 641 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, November 13, 1996

Decided

Monday, May 19, 1997

Advocates

Kathleen D. Mix (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Thomas H. Speedy Rice (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Jerry B. Balisok, a Washington state prison inmate, was found guilty of prison rules infractions resulting in the loss of thirty days of good time, credit he had previously earned toward his release. Balisok alleged that the procedures used in his disciplinary hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Balisok also alleged that the proceedings were deceitful and biased. Under federal law Balisok filed for a statement declaring the procedures unconstitutional, compensatory and punitive damages for their use, and an injunction to prevent future violations. The District Court held a state prisoner's claim for damages is not conceivable if a judgement for him would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that claims challenging only the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing are always cognizable.

Question

May prisoners invoke 42 USC Section 1983 to sue for monetary damages over procedures used to deprive them of good time credit toward early release?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Edwards, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Balisok's "claim for declaratory relief and monetary damages, based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable...."

McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama

Tue, 18 Mar 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-542

Petitioner

Mcmillian

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Monroe County, Alabama

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 781 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, March 18, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 2, 1997

Advocates

Bryan A. Stevenson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul M. Smith (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Monroe County court sentenced Walter McMillian to death for murder. Later evidence, suppressed by Monroe County Sheriff Tom Tate, exonerated McMillian after six years on Alabama's death row. McMillian sued Monroe County, claiming that Tate's actions were unconstitutional. McMillian argued that under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a county is liable for the actions of its sheriffs that constitute county policy. A District Court decided that Monroe County was not liable for Tate's actions because the county had no authority over law enforcement.

McMillian appealed, claiming that since the county employed Tate, the county should be liable for Tate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of Monroe County. The Eleventh Circuit held that though Tate was employed by Monroe County, he acted under the authority of the state.

Question

Is a county liable for constitutional violations committed by the county sheriff in matters of law enforcement?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Monroe County, Alabama, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts. The opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist held that because the county had no authority to make law enforcement policy, Sheriff Tate as a policymaker represented the state rather than the county. According to the Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code, the Court held, Alabama sheriffs "act for the State when exercising their law enforcement functions."

Babbitt v. Youpee

Mon, 02 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1595

Petitioner

Babbitt

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Youpee

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 234 (1997)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, January 21, 1997

Advocates

Rene A. Martell (Montana, argued the cause for the respondents)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A late nineteenth century congressional Indian land program resulted in the extreme fractionation of Indian lands as allottees passed their undivided interests on to multiple heirs. In 1983, Congress adopted the Indian Land Consolidation Act to reduce the fractionated ownership of allotted lands. Section 207 of the Act--the "escheat" provision--prohibited the descent of fractional interests that constituted 2 percent or less of the total acreage in an allotted tract and earned less than $100 in the preceding year. The interests described in Section 207 would escheat to the tribe, thereby consolidating the ownership of Indian lands. Section 207 made no provision for the payment of compensation to those who held such fractional interests. The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the original version of Section 207 on the ground that it was a taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Congress then amended Section 207. which looks back five years instead of one year to determine the income produced from a small interest. The will of William Youpee, an enrolled member of the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes, devised to the respondents, all of them enrolled tribal members, his several undivided interests in allotted lands on reservations. An administrative law judge found that interests devised to each of the respondents fell within amended Section 207 and should therefore escheat to the relevant tribal governments. The respondents, asserting the unconstitutionality of amended Section 207, appealed the order to the Board of Indian Appeals, which dismissed the appeal. The respondents then filed a suit against the Secretary of the Interior, alleging that amended Section 207 violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court agreed with respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does amended Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act violate the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Youpee, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 2206

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Court ruled that the amended Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act does not cure the constitutional deficiency The Court identified in the original version of Section 207, which amounted to a taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Ginsburg wrote Section 207 is unconstitutional because it "severely restricts the right of an individual to direct the descent of his property."

Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho

Wed, 16 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-1474

Petitioner

Idaho

Respondent

Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 261 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 1996

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1997

Advocates

Clive J. Strong (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Raymond C. Givens (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe (the Tribe) of Idaho filed an action against the State of Idaho, various state agencies, and numerous state officials alleging ownership of the submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene and various navigable tributaries and effluents lying within the original boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. The Tribe sought a declaratory judgment establishing its entitlement to the exclusive use and occupancy and the right to quiet enjoyment of the submerged lands, a declaration of the invalidity of all Idaho laws, customs, or usages purporting to regulate those lands, and a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from taking any action in violation of the Tribe's rights in the lands. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed all the components of the complaint on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the Eleventh Amendment barred all claims against the State and its agencies, as well as the title action against the officials. However, it allowed the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the state officials to proceed insofar as they sought to preclude continuing violations of federal law. The court reasoned that those claims were based on Idaho's ongoing interference with the Tribe's alleged ownership rights, and found it conceivable that the Tribe could prove facts entitling it to relief on the claims.

Question

May Indian Tribes proceed with suits against state officials in light of the sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Idaho, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

No. In an 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's suit against the state officials may not proceed in federal court because States enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits filed by Indian tribes. Justice Kennedy concluded, "the present suit is barred unless it falls within the exception this Court has recognized for certain suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers in their individual capacities."

Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services

Mon, 21 Apr 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1918

Petitioner

Arkansas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Farm Credit Services

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 821 (1997)

Argued

Monday, April 21, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 2, 1997

Advocates

Martha Grissom Hunt (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Richard A. Hanson (on behalf of the Respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Tax Injunction Act provides that federal "district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." In Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Act does not limit the power of federal courts if the U.S. sues to protect itself or its instrumentalities from state taxation. Four Production Credit Associations (PCA's), federally chartered corporate financial institutions organized by farmers primarily to make loans to farmers, sued, seeing a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting Arkansas from levying sales and income taxes against them. The PCA's argued that they constituted instrumentalities of the U.S. and that they were not subject to the Act's provisions. The District Court granted the PCA's summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Do Production Credit Associations fall within the exception in the Tax Injunction Act created by Department of Employment v. United States when they sue by themselves?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Arkansas, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1341

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Production Credit Associations are not included within the judicial exception to the Act by virtue of their designation as instrumentalities of the United States alone. Therefore, the Court continued, PCA's may not sue in federal court for an injunction against state taxation without the United States as co-plaintiff. "The Tax Injunction Act is grounded in the need of States to administer their fiscal affairs without undue interference from federal courts," wrote Justice Kennedy, "[a]s all parties concede, respondents have a 'speedy, plain, and efficient remedy' in state court."

Vacco v. Quill

Wed, 08 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

New York State Capitol

24 Eagle Street Albany NY 12207

Albany, NY 12207

United States

42° 39' 9.684" N, 73° 45' 27.1764" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1858

Petitioner

Vacco

Respondent

Quill

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 793 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, January 8, 1997

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 1997

Advocates

Dennis C. Vacco (Argued the cause for the petitioners, on behalf of the Petitioners)

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Dr. Timothy E. Quill, along with other physicians and three seriously ill patients who have since died, challenged the constitutionality of the New York State's ban on physician-assisted suicide. New York's ban, while permitting patients to refuse lifesaving treatment on their own, has historically made it a crime for doctors to help patients commit or attempt suicide, even if patients are terminally ill or in great pain. Following a District Court ruling favoring the State of New York, the Second Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted New York certiorari.

Question

Did New York's ban on physician-assisted suicide violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by allowing competent terminally ill adults to withdraw their own lifesaving treatment, but denying the same right to patients who could not withdraw their own treatment and could only hope that a physician would do so for them?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Vacco, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. Employing a rationality test to examine the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held that New York's ban was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting medical ethics, preventing euthanasia, shielding the disabled and terminally ill from prejudice which might encourage them to end their lives, and, above all, the preservation of human life. Moreover, while acknowledging the difficulty of its task, the Court distinguished between the refusal of lifesaving treatment and assisted suicide, by noting that the latter involves the criminal elements of causation and intent. No matter how noble a physician's motives may be, he may not deliberately cause, hasten, or aid a patient's death.

Johnson v. United States

Tue, 25 Feb 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-203

Petitioner

Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 461 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, February 25, 1997

Decided

Monday, May 12, 1997

Advocates

Wm. J. Sheppard (on behalf of the Petitioner)

William J. Sheppard (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

While testifying before a federal grand jury, which was investigating the disposition of proceeds from the alleged drug trafficking of her boyfriend Earl James Fields, Joyce B. Johnson testified that she had received a box of cash that she had used to fund home improvements. Subsequently, Johnson was indicted for perjury under federal law, which proscribes "knowingly mak[ing] any false material declaration" under oath before a grand jury. Johnson did not object when the District Court judge instructed the jury that materiality was a question for him to decide, and that he had determined that her statements were material. Afterwards, Johnson was convicted of perjury. However, before her appeal, the Supreme Court handed down a precedent that a jury, rather than a trial judge, must decide the materiality of a false statement. The Court of Appeals concluded the District Court judge had erred, but that any such error did not affect "substantial rights" because its independent review of the record showed that there was overwhelming evidence of materiality and that no reasonable juror could conclude that Johnson's false statements about the money's source were not material to the grand jury's investigation.

Question

Must criminal convictions for perjury be reversed when a trial judge fails to let the jury rule on whether the underlying statements were material?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William J. Rehnquist, the Court held that the trial court's action in this case was not "plain error" of the sort which an appellate court may notice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). The Court reasoned that there was no basis, on the record, for concluding that the materiality error had seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, in that the evidence supporting materiality was overwhelming. "No 'miscarriage of justice' will result here if we do not notice the error and we decline to do so," concluded Chief Justice Rehnquist.

Calif. Div. of Labor Standards Enf. v. Dillingham Constr.

Tue, 05 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-789

Petitioner

Calif. Div. of Labor Standards Enf.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dillingham Constr.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 316 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, November 5, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, February 18, 1997

Advocates

John M. Rea (California Department of Industrial Relations, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Richard N. Hill (Argued the cause for the respondents)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curia, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

California requires public works project contractors to pay its workers the prevailing wage in the project's locale, but allows payment of a lower wage to participants in state approved apprenticeship programs. Dillingham Construction subcontracted some of the work on its state contract to respondent Arceo, doing business as Sound Systems Media (SSM). SSM entered a collective bargaining agreement with Dillingham that included an apprenticeship wage scale and provided for affiliation with an apprenticeship committee that ran an unapproved program. SSM used that committee for its apprentices, to whom it paid the apprentice wage. The California Division of Apprenticeship Standards (the Division) issued a notice of noncompliance to both Dillingham and SSM, charging that paying the apprentice wage, rather than the prevailing journeyman wage, to apprentices from an unapproved program violated the state's prevailing wage law. Dillingham sued to prevent the Division from interfering with payment under the subcontract. Dillingham alleged that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted enforcement of the state law. The District Court ruled in favor of the Division. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship program was an "employee welfare benefit plan" under the ERISA, and that the state law "relate[d] to" the plan and was therefore superseded by it.

Question

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempt California's prevailing wage law to the extent that the law prohibits payment of an apprentice wage to an apprentice trained in an unapproved program?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Calif. Div. of Labor Standards Enf., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that California's prevailing wage law does not "relate to" employee benefit plans, and thus is not preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai

Mon, 13 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1621

Petitioner

Harbor Tug and Barge Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Papai

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 548 (1997)

Argued

Monday, January 13, 1997

Decided

Monday, May 12, 1997

Advocates

Thomas J. Boyle (Argued the cause for the respondents)

David C. Frederick (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Eric Danoff (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

John Papai was injured while painting the housing structure of the tug Pt. Barrow. The Pt. Barrow is operated by Harbor Tug & Barge Co., which hired Papai to do the work, which involved no sailing with the vessel. Papai had been employed by Harbor Tug on twelve previous occasions in the two months before his injury, receiving those jobs through the Inland Boatman's Union hiring hall, which had provided Papai with short term jobs with various vessels for about two years. Most of Papai's jobs were deckhand work, which Papai said involved manning the lines on and off board vessels while they dock or undock. Papai sued Harbor Tug, claiming negligence under the Jones Act, which serves to protect seamen or workers who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea. The District Court granted Harbor Tug summary judgment upon finding that Papai did not enjoy seaman status under the Jones Act. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a trial Papai's seaman status and his corresponding Jones Act claim. The court concluded that the relevant inquiry was not whether Papai had a permanent connection with the vessel, but whether his relationship with a vessel or an identifiable group of vessels was substantial in duration and nature, and found that this required consideration of his employment's total circumstances. Moreover, the court determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that Papai satisfied this test, for if the type of work a maritime worker customarily performs would entitle him to seaman status if performed for a single employer, he should not be deprived of that status simply because the industry operates under a daily assignment, rather than a permanent employment system.

Question

Could a reasonable jury conclude that John Papai is a Jones Act seaman in accordance with his record of employment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Harbor Tug and Barge Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Jones, or Death on the High Seas

No. In a 6-3 decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that John Papai's record would not permit a reasonable jury to conclude that he is a Jones Act seaman. Jones Act coverage is confined to seamen, those workers who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea. Justice Kennedy wrote, "[a]n important part of the test for determining who is a seaman is whether the injured worker has a substantial connection to a vessel or to a fleet of vessels, and the latter concept requires a requisite degree of common ownership or control."

United States v. Wells

Mon, 04 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1228

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wells

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 482 (1997)

Argued

Monday, November 4, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, February 26, 1997

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

James R. Wyrsch (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Jerry E. Wells and Kenneth R. Steele were charged with knowingly making false and "material" statements to a federally insured bank in violation of federal law. At the trial's end, the District Court instructed the jury, at the Government's request, that withholding a "material fact" made a statement or representation false and that materiality of an allegedly false statement was for the judge, not the jury, to determine. Subsequently, the jury treated Wells and Steele's statements as material and convicted them. The U.S. Supreme Court then decided that materiality was a question for the jury to decide. On appeal, Wells and Steele argued that materiality was an element of knowingly making false and "material" statements to a federally insured bank in violation of federal law and it was a question for the jury to decide. The Government then argued materiality was not an element of the crime, so that no harm had been done when the trial judge had dealt with the issue. The Court of Appeals agreed with Wells and Steele, vacated their convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Question

Is the materiality of falsehood an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1014

No. In an 8-1 decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that the materiality of falsehood is not an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank. Justice Souter wrote for the court that prosecutors need not prove that a lie was relevant enough to affect the outcome of a bank's decision because the law does not require such materiality.

Lawyer v. Department of Justice

Wed, 19 Feb 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-2024

Appellee

Department of Justice

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Lawyer

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 567 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, February 19, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 1997

Advocates

Richard G. Taranto (Argued the cause for the state appellees)

Robert J. Shapiro (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the federal appellee)

Facts of the Case

Based on the 1990 census, the Florida Legislature adopted a reapportionment plan for State Senate and House districts. After the Justice Department refused to preclear the plan and it appeared as if the Governor, Senate President, and House Speaker would not convene a session, the Florida Supreme Court revised the redistricting plan itself. In 1995, C. Martin Lawyer, III, and other residents filed suit against state and federal parties, alleging that his district, Senate District 21, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District permitted the State Senate and House of Representatives to intervene and ultimately, all the parties, but Lawyer, agreed to a settlement that revised District 21 under a new plan. The District Court rejected Lawyer's argument that the court had to find the original reapportionment plan unconstitutional, because race seemingly determined District 21's contours, before the settlement could be approved. The court approved the settlement.

Question

Did the District Court err in approving a remedial plan for the creation of a Florida state Senate district, which allegedly violated the Equal Protection Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Department of Justice, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by David H. Souter, the Court held that the State exercised the choice to which it was entitled under our cases, that Lawyer had no right to block the settlement, and that he failed to point out any unconstitutionality in the proposed plan. The Court found that Lawyer's agreement to the provisional settlement did not require the District Court to adjudicate the constitutionality of the plan before approving the settlement and that the court, in redrawing the district, did not subordinate Florida's traditional districting principles to race. Justice Souter wrote that "the evidence amply supports the trial court's views that race did not predominate over Florida's traditional districting principles....[Lawyer] has provided nothing that calls that conclusion into question, much less that points to any clear error." Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Young v. Harper

Mon, 09 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1598

Petitioner

Young

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harper

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 143 (1997)

Argued

Monday, December 9, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, March 18, 1997

Advocates

Sandra D. Howard (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Margaret Winter (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program took effect whenever the state prisons became overcrowded and authorized the conditional release of prisoners before their sentences expired. The Pardon and Parole Board determined who could participate in it, and an inmate could be placed on preparole after serving 15% of his sentence. An inmate was eligible for parole only after one third of his sentence had elapsed, and the Governor, based on the Board's recommendation, decided to grant parole. Program participants and parolees were released subject to similar constraints. Upon reviewing Leroy L. Young's criminal record and prison conduct, the Board recommended him for parole and released him under the Program. At that time, he had served 15 years of a life sentence. After he spent five months outside the penitentiary, the Governor denied him parole, whereupon he was ordered to, and did, report back to prison. Despite his claim that his summary reincarceration deprived him of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was denied habeas relief by the state trial court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Federal District Court. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that preparole was sufficiently like parole that a Program participant was entitled to procedural protections.

Question

Is Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program sufficiently like parole that participants are entitled to procedural protections, such as the due process safeguards set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Harper, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program, as it existed when Leroy L. Young was released, was equivalent to parole and therefore he was entitle to procedural due process safeguards.

Grimmett, Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Siragusa v. Brown

Mon, 06 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1723

Petitioner

Grimmett, Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Siragusa

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brown

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 233 (1997)

Argued

Monday, January 6, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, January 14, 1997

Advocates

Richard Sauber (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Philip A. Lacovara (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In a divorce settlement, Joanne Siragusa forfeited her entitlement to one-half of her ex-husband's ownership share in Heart Institute of Nevada (HIN) in exchange for monthly payments. In 1987, ex-husband Vincent Siragusa defaulted on the monthly payments, declared bankruptcy, and relinquished his ownership share in HIN by reorganizing HIN into Cardiology Associates of Nevada. Joanne alleged that Vincent had filed bankruptcy in order to evade monthly payments and subsequently reorganized his company in order to undo her collateral in HIN. In 1994, Joanne sought a three-fold reimbursement for damages caused by Vincent's fraudulent actions in accordance with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO). Tom Grimmett, the original trustee for the divorce settlement, prosecuted on behalf of Joanne. Patricia Brown, the consultant responsible for reorganizing HIN, defended Vincent.

The District Court dismissed Joanne's suit because it was based on actions that started in 1987. (RICO claims expire after four years.) Grimmett argued that the time limit should not have begun until Joanne discovered Vincent's "pattern" of fraud in 1990. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Joanne's first court action against Vincent in 1989 signified the beginning of the time limit and thus her claim had expired. Grimmett appealed to the Supreme Court, citing disagreements among Circuit Courts as to when the four-year time limit began.

Question

Does the four-year time limit on a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 begin after a pattern of racketeering activity has been discovered by the plaintiff?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Brown, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Unanswered. The unanimous Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

Lambert v. Wicklund

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 20:49:43 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-858

Petitioner

Lambert

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wicklund

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 292 (1997)

Decided

Monday, March 31, 1997

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Montana enacted the Parental Notice of Abortion Act, which prohibits a physician from performing an abortion on a minor unless the physician has notified one of the minor's parents or legal guardian 48 hours in advance. The Act provides for a waiver, or judicial bypass, of the notification requirement under certain circumstances, including if the notification of a parent or guardian was not in the best interests of the minor. Several physicians challenged the statute's validity. The Federal District Court, asserting that a parental notice requirement must be waived whenever an abortion would be in the minor's best interests, ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled that a judicial bypass based on the consideration of a minor's best interests only with respect to the possible consequences of parental notification was constitutionally impermissible, in that the bypass did not sufficiently protect the right of minors to have an abortion.

Question

Is a Montana statute authorizing the judicial bypass of parental notification as to a minor's abortion, under conditions including a showing that notification is not in best interests of minor, constitutional?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lambert, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals's ruling was in direct conflict with the Court's precedents to the effect that the allowance of a judicial bypass if a minor showed that parental notification was not in her best interests met the constitutional requirement that the minor be allowed to show that the desired abortion would be in her best interests. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment.

Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert

Tue, 12 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1402

Petitioner

Commissioner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Estate of Hubert

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 93 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, November 12, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, March 18, 1997

Advocates

Kent L. Jones (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

David D. Aughtry (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The executors of Otis C. Hubert's substantial estate filed a federal estate tax return about a year after his death. Subsequently, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, claiming underreporting of federal estate tax liability caused by the estate's asserted entitlement to marital and charitable deductions. While the estate's redetermination petition was pending in the Tax Court, the interested parties settled on the use of the estate's assets. The agreement divided the estate's principal, assumed to be worth $26 million, equally between marital trusts and a charitable trust. It also provided that the estate would pay its administration expenses either from the principal or the income of the assets. The estate paid about $500,000 of its nearly $2 million of administration expenses from principal and the rest from income. It then recalculated its tax liability, reducing the marital and charitable deductions by the amount of principal, but not the amount of income, used to pay the expenses. The Commissioner concluded that using income for expenses required a dollar for dollar reduction of the deductions. The Tax Court disagreed, finding that no reduction was required by reason of the executors' power, or the exercise of their power, to pay administration expenses from income. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the cost of administering an estate necessarily reduce the allowed estate-tax deduction for assets left to a spouse or charity?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Estate of Hubert, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court ruled that a taxpayer does not have to reduce the estate tax deduction for marital or charitable bequests by the amount of the administration expenses that were paid from income generated during administration by assets allocated to those bequests. "When income is used . . . to pay administration expenses, this does not require the estate tax deductions be diminished," wrote Justice Kennedy.

Agostini v. Felton

Tue, 15 Apr 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

New York Board of Education Headquarters

52 Chambers Street New York NY 10007

New York, NY 10007

United States

40° 42' 46.7604" N, 74° 0' 21.888" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-552

Petitioner

Agostini

Respondent

Felton

Consolidation

No. 96-553

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 203 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, April 15, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1997

Advocates

Paul A. Crotty (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the federal respondent, supporting the petitioners)

Stanley Geller (Argued the cause for the private respondents)

Facts of the Case

This suit was brought by a New York parochial school board, and some of its student's parents, as a challenge to a District Court ruling upholding the twelve-year-old decision set out in Aguilar v. Felton (473 US 402). The decision in Aguilar prohibited public school teachers from teaching in parochial schools as a violation of the Establishment Clause. On appeal from the Second Circuit's affirmance of a District Court's denial of the parent's challenge, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Is the Establishment Clause violated when public school teachers instruct in parochial schools?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Agostini, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

No. The Court overruled its decision in Aguilar v. Felton. The Court held that there was no evidence to support its former presumption that the entrance of public school teachers into parochial schools will inevitably lead to the indoctrination of state-sponsored religion. The New York program under which public school teachers were sent into parochial schools did not provide parochial schools with any incentive, financial or other, to establish religion in order to attract public school teachers. The Court added that under its new view, only those policies which generate an excessive conflict between church and state will be deemed to violate the Establishment Clause. As such, one should no longer find that all entanglements between church and state have a distinctly positive or negative impact on religion.

Lords Landing Village v. Continental Ins. Co.

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 20:49:43 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1033

Petitioner

Lords Landing Village

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Continental Ins. Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 893 (1997)

Decided

Monday, June 2, 1997

Facts of the Case

Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners, an association of condominium owners, sued Continental Insurance Company in Maryland state court, seeking to compel it to pay a judgment the association had obtained against an insured condominium developer. The company removed the case to federal court. As a matter of Maryland law, the case involved the extent of the developer's coverage under a general liability insurance policy. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the company. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Subsequently, the appellate court denied a petition for rehearing. Later, the association's counsel learned of a recent decision by Maryland's highest court in another case that also involved liability insurance coverage. The association brought this decision to the Court of Appeals' attention in a motion to stay or recall the court's mandate. The appellate court denied the motion.

Question

Is it appropriate, when a holding of the federal appellate court below is called into question by a recent decision of a State's highest court, for the U.S. Supreme Court to grant a petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of the lower court, and remand the case for further consideration?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Lords Landing Village, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that this case fits within the category of cases in which the Court has held that it is proper to issue a GVR order, or to grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of the lower court, and remand the case for further consideration. There was reason to question the correctness of the Court of Appeals' original decision because the decision by Maryland's highest court explicitly disapproved the two cases on which the Court of Appeals had primarily relied. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented.

United States v. LaBonte

Tue, 07 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1726

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

LaBonte

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 751 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, January 7, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 1997

Advocates

David N. Yellen (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

28 USC section 994(h) directs the United States Sentencing Commission to "assure" that its Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence "at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of" adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. Initially, the Guidelines failed to delineate whether the basic statutory maximum persons convicted of a particular offense or the enhanced penalty for career offenders convicted of that same offense should be applied. After the District Court used and the Court of Appeals affirmed the enhanced sentence for sentencing George LaBonte, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer, who qualified as career criminals, the Commission adopted Amendment 506, which precludes the consideration of statutory sentence enhancements. When the District Court split over whether reduce LaBonte, Hunnewell, and Dyer's sentences, the Court of Appeals found that Amendment 506 was a reasonable implementation of section 994(h)'s directive.

Question

Did Congress intend by "maximum term authorized" in 28 USC section 994(h) the maximum term available for the offense of conviction including any applicable statutory sentencing enhancements?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 994

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Commission's interpretation was inconsistent with section 994(h)'s plain language, and therefore "maximum term authorized" must be read to include all applicable statutory sentencing enhancements. "Congress surely did not establish enhanced penalties for repeat offenders only to have the Commission render them a virtual nullity," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Stephen G. Breyer in a dissent, in which Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, argued that the words "maximum term authorized" in section 994(h) were ambiguous, thus the Court should defer to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation.

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer

Tue, 25 Feb 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1340

Petitioner

Hughes Aircraft Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States ex rel. Schumer

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 939 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, February 25, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 16, 1997

Advocates

Kenneth W. Starr (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Laurence E. Gold (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1989, William J. Schumer filed an action against Hughes Aircraft Co. under the False Claims Act (FCA), specifically under the qui tam provision which allows suits by private parties on behalf of the United States against anyone submitting a false claim to the government. Schumer alleged that Hughes had submitted false claims related to two Air Force radar projects between 1982 and 1984. Hughes moved to dismiss the case claiming that the 1986 amendment to the FCA that Schumer had filed under was not retroactive and that the alleged conduct precluded the suit because the government already had the information on which the suit was based. The motion was dismissed; however, the District Court ruled in favor of Hughes based on the merits of the case. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected Hughes, finding that the FCA should be applied retroactively to suits pre-1986. The appellate court also found that, because no public disclosure of information possessed by the Government had been made, the action was not barred under the 1986 version of the Act.

Question

Does the False Claims Act, as amended in 1986, apply retroactively to qui tam suits regarding allegedly false claims submitted to the government submitted prior to is enactment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hughes Aircraft Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal False Claims

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, because the 1986 amendment does not apply retroactively to qui tam suits regarding allegedly false claims submitted prior to its enactment, Schumer's action should have been dismissed, as required by the pre-1986 version of the FCA. The Court reasoned that, prior to 1986, disclosure to the Government of information about the allegedly false claim would have constituted a full defense, which the retroactive application of the 1986 amendment would deprive Hughes of that defense. "Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the 1986 amendment to conduct completed before its enactment, we apply our presumption against retroactivity," concluded Justice Thomas.

United State Dept of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs v. Legal Assistance For Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc.

Tue, 15 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1521

Petitioner

United State Dept of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Legal Assistance For Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 1 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, October 15, 1996

Decided

Monday, October 21, 1996

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Daniel Wolf (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Prior to 1989, Hong Kong automatically granted Vietnamese immigrants temporary refuge. Due to increasing immigration rates from Vietnam, Hong Kong revoked the privilege in 1989 and began requiring that Vietnamese immigrants prove refugee status or be "screened-out" (advised to leave Hong Kong).

The United States consulate continued to process visas for "screened-out" applicants until 1993, when the State Department specifically instructed the consulate to buttress Hong Kong's immigration policy by sending "screened-out" applicants back to Vietnam. Two applicants claimed that the department had violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by denying visas to a class of applicants on the basis of their nationality and place of residence (8 U.S.C. 1152(a)). A district court held that the case was moot and granted summary judgment to the State Department.

Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc. (LAVAS) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which reversed the decision and mandated that the foreign consulate continue to process the visa applications. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court and consolidated with Le v. United States Dept. of State.

Question

Did the United States State Department violate the Immigration and Nationality Act by instructing a foreign consulate to cease issuing visas to a class of applicants?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United State Dept of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

Unanswered. Before the Supreme Court could decide the case, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRA), which clarified that no provision in the INA "shall be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of State to determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications or the locations where such applications will be processed." The Supreme Court, in a unanimous per curiam decision, instructed the District Court to reconsider the case in light of the IIRA's clarification.

Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party

Wed, 04 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1608

Petitioner

Timmons

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Twin Cities Area New Party

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 351 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, December 4, 1996

Decided

Monday, April 28, 1997

Advocates

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Richard S. Slowes (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Under Minnesota law, candidates for political office are prohibited from appearing on more than one party's ballot. When the Twin Cities Area New Party, a chapter of the national New Party, nominated someone for state representative who was already another political party's candidate, Minnesota election officials declined its petition. When the New Party challenged Minnesota's election laws the District Court upheld their constitutionality, but was reversed by the state's Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Did Minnesota's anti-fusion laws, banning a candidate from appearing on more than one party's ballot, violate the association rights protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Timmons, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Association

No. In its 6-to-3 opinion, the majority weighed the character and magnitude of the burden imposed by anti-fusion laws on association rights against Minnesota's stated interest in the necessity of such laws. It upheld Minnesota's interest in ballot integrity and political stability. According to the Court, prohibiting political parties from naming another party's candidate as their own did not overly burden their association rights since they were still free to endorse the other party's candidate. The only thing they could not do was "fuse" another party's candidate to their own petitions.

Boggs v. Boggs

Wed, 15 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-79

Petitioner

Boggs

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Boggs

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 833 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, January 15, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 2, 1997

Advocates

Edward J. Deano, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Marian M. Livaudais (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Isaac Boggs married Sandra Boggs, the petitioner, after the death of Dorothy, his previous wife. When Isaac retired in 1985, he received various benefits from his employer's retirement plans, including a lump sum savings plan distribution, shares of stock from the company's employee stock ownership plan, and a monthly annuity payment. In 1989, following Issac's death a dispute over ownership of the benefits arose between Sandra and Issac's sons, Thomas F., Harry M., and David B. Boggs. The sons' claim is based on Dorothy's purported testamentary transfer to them, under Louisiana law, of a portion of her community property interest in Isaac's undistributed pension plan benefits. Sandra contested the validity of that transfer, arguing that the sons' claim is pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The Federal District Court disagreed and granted summary judgment against Sandra. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 pre-empt state community-property law allowing a non-participant spouse to transfer by a testamentary instrument an interest in undistributed pension plan benefits?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Boggs, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

Yes. In a opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts state community-property law allowing a non-participant spouse to transfer by a testamentary instrument an interest in undistributed pension plan benefits. Justice Kennedy said "ERISA's solicitude for the economic security of surviving spouses would be undermined" by allowing a previous spouse's heirs to claim a share of such benefits."

Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC

Mon, 07 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-992

Appellee

FCC

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Turner Broadcasting System

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 180 (1997)

Argued

Monday, October 7, 1996

Decided

Monday, March 31, 1997

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the private appellees)

H. Bartow Farr, III (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the federal appellees)

Facts of the Case

The 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act required cable television systems to set aside some of their channels for local broadcast television. In 1994, the Supreme Court held that these must-carry provisions pass constitutional muster. (See Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, decided June 27, 1994). The Court then remanded the case to determine whether Congress had adequate factual support for its conclusion that the must-carry provision is necessary. A special three-judge district court held that there was sufficient evidence that the must-carry provision furthered important governmental objectives and that the provision was narrowly tailored to promote those interests. The broadcasters appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

Question

Is the 1992 "must carry" law an unconstitutional intrusion on cable operators' editorial autonomy, a form of Government-compelled speech that violates the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for FCC, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 534

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Congress "has an independent interest in preserving a multiplicity of broadcasters." The outcome supported Congress's right to judge what approach would best insure a competitive communications marketplace.

Richards v. Wisconsin

Mon, 24 Mar 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-5955

Petitioner

Richards

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wisconsin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 385 (1997)

Argued

Monday, March 24, 1997

Decided

Monday, April 28, 1997

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

David R. Karpe (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

James E. Doyle (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Police in Madison, Wisconsin, suspected Steiney Richards of drug possession, but failed to receive a magistrate's authorization for a "no-knock" entry into his hotel room. Instead, they obtained a conventional search warrant requiring them to knock on Richards' door and identify themselves as officers prior to resorting to forcible entry. After arriving on the scene, an officer knocked on Richards' door identifying himself as a hotel custodian. When Richards opened the door, he saw a uniformed officer and quickly slammed it shut. The officers broke through the door, grabbed Richards while trying to escape, and found cocaine and cash in his bathroom. At trial, Richards challenged the constitutionality of the officer's search but was denied. On appeal, Wisconsin's Supreme Court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Did the officers' use of deception and force, in order to gain entry into Richards' hotel room, violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal search and seizures?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wisconsin, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. After noting the general importance of following conventional "knock-and- announce" procedures, the Court held that in those circumstances when police have good reason to suspect that announcing their presence and intentions may be dangerous, futile, or result in the destruction of evidence, a "no-knock" entry is justified. The Court added that by immediately closing the door after witnessing the officers outside it, Richards gave police sufficient justification for breaking into his room - especially considering the disposable nature of the substances they were seeking.

Ohio v. Robinette

Tue, 08 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-891

Petitioner

Ohio

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robinette

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 33 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, October 8, 1996

Decided

Monday, November 18, 1996

Advocates

Carley J. Ingram (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

James D. Ruppert (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae, in support of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After stopping Robinette for speeding, an Ohio deputy warned him, returned his license, and asked him if he had any illegal contraband, weapons, or drugs in his car. Robinette answered "no" but after agreeing to have his car searched, the officer found some marijuana and a pill that later proved to be a powerful drug. On appeal from the Ohio Court of Appeals' reversal of his lower court conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the Ohio Supreme Court Affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Ohio certiorari.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal search and seizures require that a lawfully detained defendant be told that he is "free to go" before he can be said to have voluntarily agreed to any subsequent search?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Ohio, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. After establishing its federal jurisdiction, despite a claim that the matter involved aspects of Ohio's Constitution, the Court held that when looking at the totality of the circumstances it may be reasonably concluded that if a defendant consents to be searched, even if not first advised that he is "free to go," the ensuing search will be recognized as voluntary. The Court also added that Robinette's arrest on drug possession charges was lawful, even though the arresting officer did not stop him on an initial suspicion of drug possession nor intend to even issue him a speeding ticket.

Pennsylvania v. Labron

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 20:49:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1691

Petitioner

Pennsylvania

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Labron

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 95-1738

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

518 U.S. 938 (1996)

Decided

Monday, July 1, 1996

Facts of the Case

This is the consolidation of two cases involving the search and seizure of illicit drugs in automobiles. In Pennsylvania v. Labron 95-1691, the police observed Edwin Labron participating in a number of drug transactions out of his car on a street in Philadelphia. Without a warrant, but with probable cause, the police then found cocaine when they searched the trunk of Labron's car. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the search unconstitutional, finding that the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement required both the existence of probable cause and the presence of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search. In Pennsylvania v. Kilgore 95-1738, a search of Randy Kilgore's truck during a drug raid on his home turned up cocaine. Again, the police did not obtain a warrant, but probable cause existed. Again the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suppressed the evidence seized, holding that Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant before searching an automobile unless exigent circumstances are present.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth, require police to obtain a warrant before searching an automobile unless exigent circumstances are present?

Conclusion

No. In a 7-2 per curiam opinion, the Court held that if a vehicle is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits police to search the vehicle and contraband seized from such a search should not be suppressed. The Court noted that early cases establishing the automobile exception were based on the automobile's ready mobility, an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear. Justice John Paul Stevens, who was joined by Justine Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented.

Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley

Tue, 18 Feb 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-320

Petitioner

Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Buckley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 424 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, February 18, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1997

Advocates

Sheila L. Birnbaum (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Charles C. Goetsch (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Michael Buckley was exposed to insulation dust containing asbestos while employed as a pipefitter by Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. Buckley feared he would develop cancer, of which periodic medical check ups have revealed no evidence of an asbestos related disease. Buckley filed suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which permits a railroad worker to recover for an "injury . . . resulting from" his employer's "negligence." He sought damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress and to cover the cost of future check ups. The District Court dismissed Buckley's case because since there had been no "physical impact" from his exposure, the FELA did not permit recovery for his emotional injury. Buckley's medical monitoring claim was not discussed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that that his contact with the insulation dust was considered a physical impact that, when present, permits a FELA plaintiff to recover for accompanying emotional distress. Furthermore, Buckley could recover the costs of check ups made necessary by the exposure.

Question

May railroad workers invoke the Federal Employers' Liability Act to sue their employers for emotional distress due to asbestos, or some other disease- causing carcinogen, exposure if it has not made them ill?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Employers' Liability

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court ruled that railroad workers cannot invoke the Federal Employers' Liability Act to sue their employers for emotional distress due to asbestos, or some other disease- causing carcinogen, exposure unless, and until, they manifest symptoms of a disease. Furthermore, workers are not legally entitled to recover medical monitoring costs insofar as they are contingent upon an underlying injury.

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.

Wed, 06 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1376

Petitioner

Robinson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shell Oil Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 337 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, November 6, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, February 18, 1997

Advocates

Lawrence C. Butler (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Allen M. Lenchek (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Charles T. Robinson, Sr., was fired by Shell Oil Co. Thereafter, Robinson filed an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While that charge was pending, Robinson applied for a job with another company, which contacted Shell for an employment reference. Robinson, claiming that Shell gave him a negative reference in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC charge, then filed suit under Title VII, which makes it unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment" who have availed themselves of Title VII's protections. The District Court dismissed the suit. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the term "employees" in Title VII refers only to current employees and therefore petitioner's claim was not justicible under Title VII.

Question

Does the term "employees," as used in under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes former employees, such that a petitioner may bring suit against his or her former employer for post-employment actions allegedly taken in retaliation for having filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Robinson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

Yes. In an unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that because the term "employees," as used Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes former employees, Robinson may sue Shell for its allegedly retaliatory post-employment actions. Justice Thomas wrote for the court that barring such protection to former employees, while current employees have it, "would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring . . . claims" under Title VII.

M.L.B V. S.L.J.

Mon, 07 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-853

Petitioner

M.L.B V. S.L.J.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 102 (1996)

Argued

Monday, October 7, 1996

Decided

Monday, December 16, 1996

Advocates

Robert B. McDuff (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Rickey T. Moore (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, a Mississippi Chancery Court terminated M.L.B.'s parental rights to her two minor children. M.L.B. filed a timely appeal from the termination decree, but Mississippi law conditioned her right to appeal on prepayment of record preparation fees estimated at $2,352.36. Because she lacked the funds, M.L.B. sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied her application on the ground that, under its precedent, there is no right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil appeals. In front of the U.S. Supreme Court, M.L.B. argued that a State may not, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees.

Question

May a State, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for M.L.B V. S.L.J., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, just as a State may not block an indigent petty offender's access to an appeal afforded others, so Mississippi may not deny M.L.B., because of her poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain a parent. "We place decrees forever terminating parental rights in the category of cases in which the State may not 'bolt the door to equal justice,'" wrote Justice Ginsburg, "recognizing that parental termination decrees are among the most severe forms of state action." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia dissented.

Bennett v. Spear

Wed, 13 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-813

Petitioner

Bennett

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Spear

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 154 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, November 13, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, March 19, 1997

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Gregory K. Wilkerson (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Gregory K. Wilkinson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

When the Fish and Wildlife Service was notified that the operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project might affect two endangered species of fish, it concluded that the proposed long-term operation of the project was likely to jeopardize the species and decided to maintain minimum levels of water in certain reservoirs. The petitioners, irrigation districts receiving project water and operators of ranches in those districts, filed suit against the Service's director, regional directors, and the Secretary, claiming the determination and imposition of minimum water levels violated the Endangered Species Act's requirement that the designated area's economic impact be considered. The District Court dismissed the compliant because it lacked standing; economic interests were not enough to constitute a lawsuit in this matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Can private parties who claim they have suffered economic harm from enforcement of the Endangered Species Act sue to reverse regulation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bennett, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

Yes. In the unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the petitioners had standing to ask for judicial review of the minimum water level setting under the Endangered Species Act. The Act explicitly allows "any person" to sue the government over an alleged violation. Justice Scalia asserted this applies to the Secretary's actions over enforcement.

General Motors Corp. v. Tracy

Mon, 07 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1232

Petitioner

General Motors Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tracy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 278 (1997)

Argued

Monday, October 7, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, February 18, 1997

Advocates

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Columbus, Ohio, argued the cause for the respondent)

Timothy B. Dyk (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The State of Ohio imposes general sales and use taxes on natural gas purchases from all sellers, whether in-state or out-of-state, that do not meet its statutory definition of a "natural gas company." Ohio's state-regulated natural gas utilities, known as local distribution companies or LDC's, satisfy the definition. Other producers and independent marketers, according to the State Supreme Court, generally do not. During the period in question, General Motors Corporation (GMC) bought virtually all the gas for its plants from out- of-state independent marketers, rather than from LDC's, making it subject to the Ohio tax. In front of the State Supreme Court, GMC argued that denying a tax exemption to sales by marketers but not LDC's violates the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. After an initial conclusion, the court held that GMC lacked standing to bring a Commerce Clause challenge. The court then dismissed the equal protection claim as buried in GMC's Commerce Clause argument.

Question

Does the State of Ohio's different tax treatment of sales of gas by domestic utilities subject to regulation and sales of gas by other entities violate the Commerce Clause or Equal Protection Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Tracy, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Ohio's differential tax treatment of natural gas sales by public utilities and independent marketers violated neither the Commerce Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause. After concluding that GMC had standing to raise a Commerce Clause challenge, Justice Souter wrote for the Court, "we conclude that Ohio's regulatory response to the needs of the local natural gas market has resulted in a noncompetitive bundled gas product that distinguishes its regulated sellers from independent marketers to the point that the enterprises should not be considered 'similarly situated' for purposes of a claim of facial discrimination under the Commerce Clause. GMC's argument that the State discriminates between regulated local gas utilities and unregulated marketers must therefore fail." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Pounders v. Watson

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 20:49:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1383

Petitioner

Pounders

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Watson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 982 (1997)

Decided

Friday, June 27, 1997

Facts of the Case

A California trial judge convicted attorney Penelope Watson of summary contempt for her conduct in court. After the judge had stated repeatedly not to discuss punishment, Watson asked her client whether he was facing the death penalty and whether he was facing life without possibility of parole. The judge found that Watson had willfully refused to comply with his order not to discuss punishment and that Watson's questions had permanently prejudiced the jury in favor of her client. On appeal, Watson argued that her due process rights were violated because she did not have notice of the prohibited conduct and because the trial judge could not have known without a hearing whether her conduct was willful. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, in reversing, concluded that Watson had not engaged in a pattern of repeated violations that had pervaded the courtroom and threatened the dignity of the court.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals misinterpret the Constitution's due process requirements as applied to an attorney's summary contempt conviction for willful defiance when questioning her client?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Pounders, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals had misinterpreted the Constitution's due process requirements for the imposition of a summary contempt order. The Court reasoned that the trial judge's findings concerning jury prejudice, together with the judge's assessment of the flagrance of Watson's defiance, supported the finding of the need for summary contempt to vindicate the court's authority. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. Justice Stevens argued that it was not so clear whether the circumstances justified a summary contempt proceeding by the judge before whom the contempt had occurred as to justify the Court's summary reversal.

Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, As Receiver For City Savings, F. S. B.

Mon, 04 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-928

Petitioner

Atherton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, As Receiver For City Savings, F. S. B.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 213 (1997)

Argued

Monday, November 4, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, January 14, 1997

Advocates

Richard P. Bress (on behalf of the Respondent)

Ronald W. Stevens (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

City Federal Savings Bank (City Federal) lost a significant amount of its clients' money because of negligent investing by employee John Atherton. The client, Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), sued Atherton under state law for "gross negligence," "simple negligence," and "breach of fiduciary duty." A three-judge District Court held that Atherton could only be sued for gross negligence, because the more lenient "gross negligence" standard for negligent conduct set by federal statutory law annulled stricter standards set by state law. The U.S. Appeals Court for the Third Circuit reversed the decision, and held that federal statutes only ensured a minimum standard of "gross negligence." The stricter state standards still applied.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), petitioning on behalf of RTC, argued that federal common law should set a uniform standard of negligent conduct for all employees at federally chartered banks. According to FDIC, allowing state statutes to regulate federally chartered banks would contradict the federal charter system's purpose of upholding federal common law. The Supreme Court was asked to decide which law applied to Atherton: state law, federal common law, or federal statutory law.

Question

1) Can states apply standards of negligence that are stricter (more inclusive) than the federal standard of "gross negligence" for employees of federally- chartered banks?

2) Is there a federal common law governing negligence by employees of federally-chartered banks?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, As Receiver For City Savings, F. S. B., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 12 U.S.C. 1821

Yes and no. The unanimous Court concluded that "state law sets the standard of conduct as long as the state standard is stricter than that of the federal statute." The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that the federal "gross negligence" statute was only intended to set a "floor" or minimum standard for state laws governing negligent conduct. The Court also ruled that "[t]here is no federal common law that would create a general standard of care applicable to this case."

Lindh v. Murphy

Mon, 14 Apr 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-6298

Petitioner

Lindh

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Murphy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 320 (1997)

Argued

Monday, April 14, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1997

Advocates

James S. Liebman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Sally L. Wellman (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Aaron Lindh was convicted on multiple charges of murder and attempted murder in Wisconsin. Arguing that the Confrontation Clause was violated when the trial court barred him from questioning the motives of the State's psychiatrist, Lindh was denied relief on direct appeal. Lindh's subsequent federal habeas corpus application was also denied. After Lindh appealed again, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 amended the federal habeas statute. Following an en banc rehearing to consider the Act's impact, the Court of Appeals held that applying the new version of the law to pending cases would not have a retroactive effect because it would not attach new legal consequences to events preceding the Act's enactment.

Question

Does the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which amended the previous federal habeas statute, govern habeas applications in non-capital cases that were pending when the Act was enacted?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lindh, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the 1996 version of the federal habeas statute, as to standards affecting the entitlement of state prisoners to federal habeas corpus relief, does not to apply to non-capital habeas corpus cases that were pending when the Act was enacted. The Court reasoned that the statute's retroactive application was improper because new legal consequences attached. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined.

Auer v. Robbins

Tue, 10 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-897

Petitioner

Auer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robbins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 452 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, December 10, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, February 19, 1997

Advocates

John B. Renick (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Michael T. Leibig (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Michael T. Liebig (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Francis Bernard Auer, a St. Louis police sergeant, other St. Louis police sergeants, and a lieutenant sued the respondent police commissioners, including David A. Robbins, for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). The commissioners argued that Auer and the other petitioners were "bona fide executive, administrative, or professional" employees exempted from overtime pay requirements by the FLSA. Under the Secretary of Labor's regulations, that exemption applies to employees paid a specified minimum amount on a "salary basis," which requires that the "compensation...not [be] subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed." Auer claimed that that they did not meet this test because, under the terms of the Police Department Manual, their compensation could theoretically be reduced for a variety of disciplinary infractions related to the "quality or quantity" of their work. The District Court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with Auer's claim. Both courts held that the salary basis test was satisfied.

Question

Must sergeants and lieutenants in the St. Louis Police Department be paid for working overtime pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Robbins, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards

No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that sergeants and lieutenants are exempt as salaried employees from the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. The justices rejected the argument that the possibility of suspension without pay moves the officers out of the exempt category.

Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University v. Homar

Mon, 24 Mar 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-651

Petitioner

Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hamar

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 924 (1997)

Argued

Monday, March 24, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 9, 1997

Advocates

Gwendolyn T. Mosley (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Ann Hubbard (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

James V. Fareri (on behalf of the Respondents)

Gregory O'Duden (on behalf of the National Treasury Employees Union, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Richard J. Homar, a tenured policeman for East Stroudsburg University (ESU), was arrested for possession of illegal drugs. ESU, a Pennsylvania state institution, immediately suspended him without pay until his culpability could be determined. State police dropped the charges but the suspension continued. At a later hearing ESU demoted Homar to groundskeeper, relying on his confession to police. Homar argued that ESU president James Gilbert had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the suspension. A district court granted summary judgment to ESU. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the decision, holding that it was illegal to withhold pay without first providing a hearing.

Question

Does a state institution violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by suspending a tenured employee without pay before holding a hearing in which the employee can voice objections?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. The Court ruled unanimously that a pre-suspension hearing is not necessary to protect the rights of a tenured employee who is suspended without pay. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia balanced three factors relevant to constitutional due process: 1) the weight of the private interest of the accused; 2) the chance of wrongfully depriving the private interest; and 3) the weight of the government's interest. The Court held that "[s]o long as the suspended employee receives a sufficiently prompt post suspension hearing, the lost income is relatively insubstantial."

Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown

Tue, 05 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1100

Petitioner

Bryan County, Oklahoma

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brown

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 397 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, November 5, 1996

Decided

Monday, April 28, 1997

Advocates

Brian Serr (Texas, argued the cause for the respondents)

Wallace B. Jefferson (Texas, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Jill Brown brought a damages action against Bryan County alleging that that its Deputy Stacy Burns had arrested her with excessive force, and that it was liable for her injuries because its Sheriff B. J. Moore had hired Burns without adequately reviewing his background. Burns had pleaded guilty to various driving infractions and other misdemeanors, including assault and battery. Moore, whom the county stipulated was its Sheriff's Department policymaker, testified that he had obtained Burns' driving and criminal records, but had not closely reviewed either before hiring Burns. The District Court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law, which asserted that a policymaker's single hiring decision could not give rise to municipal liability. Brown prevailed following a jury trial, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the county was properly found liable based on Moore's decision to hire Burns.

Question

May municipalities be held liable for hiring employees who injure someone?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bryan County, Oklahoma, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that municipalities are not liable for hiring employees who violate someone's rights unless a reasonable policymaker would conclude that the "plainly obvious consequence . . . would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected rights. Thus, the county was not financially liable for Sheriff Moore's isolated decision to hire Burns without adequate screening because Brown had not proved that the decision reflected a conscious disregard for a risk that Burns would use excessive force in violation of her federally protected rights.

California v. Roy

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 20:49:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-2025

Petitioner

California

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Roy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 2 (1996)

Decided

Monday, November 4, 1996

Facts of the Case

A California court convicted Kenneth Roy of robbery and first-degree murder. The State argued that Roy, in coming to the aid of a confederate who was committing the robbery, helped with the murder. The jury had been instructed that it could convict if Roy, with knowledge of the confederate's unlawful purpose, had helped the confederate. The State Supreme Court later held an identical instruction erroneous because it did not require the jury to find that a defendant had the knowledge and intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the confederate's crime. The State Court of Appeal affirmed Roy's conviction, finding that the error was harmless. On federal habeas review, the Federal District Court also found the error harmless, reasoning that no rational juror could have found that Roy knew the confederate's purpose and helped him but also did not intend to help him. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals applied a special harmless-error standard and held that the omission of the instruction's intent part is harmless only if a review of the assistance and knowledge facts found by the jury establishes that the jury necessarily found the omitted intent element.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals, in applying a special harmless-error standard, apply a too-strict harmless-error standard for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review of a California trial judge's error in instructing a jury as to the elements of the crime of first-degree murder?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for California, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that as a federal court reviewing a state-court determination in a habeas corpus proceeding, the Court of Appeals should have applied the harmless-error standard whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. The Court reasoned that the error at issue, a misdescription of an element of the crime, was an error of omission and not an error of the structural sort in the trial mechanism that defies harmless-error analysis.

Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board

Mon, 09 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1455

Appellee

Bossier Parish School Board

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Reno

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

Price v. Bossier Parish School Board, No. 95-1508

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 471 (1997)

Argued

Monday, December 9, 1996

Decided

Monday, May 12, 1997

Advocates

Michael A. Carvin (Argued the cause for the appellees)

John W. Borkowski (Argued the cause for the non-federal appellants)

Deval L. Patrick (Argued the cause on behalf of the federal appellant)

Facts of the Case

The Bossier Parrish School Board is subject to the preclearance requirements of ?5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Therefore, the Board must obtain the approval of either the Attorney General or the District Court before implementing any changes to a voting "qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure." Based on the 1990 census, the Board redrew its 12 single member districts, adopting the redistricting plan that the Attorney General had precleared for use in elections of the parish's governing body. The Board rejected a plan proposed by the NAACP, which would have created two majority black districts. The Attorney General then objected to the preclearance, finding that the NAACP plan demonstrated that black residents were sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority in two districts and that the Board's plan unnecessarily limited the opportunity for minority voters to elect their candidates of choice, thereby diluting their voting strength in violation of ?2 of the Act. Subsequently, the Attorney General withheld preclearance to prevent a violation of ?2 of the Act. The Board filed an action with the District Court. A three-judge panel granted the Board's preclearance request. The court rejected the contentions that a voting change's failure to satisfy ?2 of the Act constituted an independent reason to deny preclearance under ?5 and that a court must consider evidence of a ?2 violation as evidence of a discriminatory purpose under ?5.

Question

Must preclearance be denied under ?5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 whenever a covered jurisdiction's new voting "standard, practice, or procedure" violates ?2 of the Act? Is evidence that a new "standard, practice, or procedure" has a dilutive impact irrelevant to the inquiry whether the covered jurisdiction acted with a discriminatory purpose under ?5 of the Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Reno, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

No and no. In an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Conner, the Court ruled that preclearance under ?5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 may not be denied solely on the basis that a covered jurisdiction's new voting "standard, practice, or procedure" violates ? 2 of the Act. Additionally, evidence showing that a jurisdiction's redistricting plan dilutes minorities' voting power may be relevant to establish a jurisdiction's "intent to retrogress" under ?5 of the Act.

Immigration And Naturalization Service v. Yueh-Shaio Yang

Tue, 15 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-938

Petitioner

Immigration And Naturalization Service

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Yueh-Shaio Yang

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 26 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, October 15, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, November 13, 1996

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Howard Hom (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Yueh-Shaio Yang and his wife, former Taiwan residents, executed elaborate fraudulent schemes to gain entry to the United States and, later, to obtain Yang's citizenship. While Yang's naturalization application was pending, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) learned of his unlawful entry and issued an order to show cause why he should not be deported at the time of entry. Yang conceded that he was deportable and filed a request for a waiver of deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act with the Attorney General. An Immigration Judge denied Yang's request. In affirming, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that Yang was statutorily eligible for a waiver, but denied it as a matter of discretion. In vacating, the Court of Appeals held that the Board had abused its discretion by considering the adverse factors of Yang's participation in his wife's fraudulent entry and, secondly, his fraudulent naturalization application. The court reasoned that Yang's actions in his wife's fraudulent entry were "inextricably intertwined" with his own efforts to secure entry and must be considered part of the initial fraud, while his application must be considered an "extension" of that initial fraud.

Question

May the Imigration and Naturalization Service, when deciding whether to grant a discretionary waiver of deportation under the applicable provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, take into account acts of fraud committed by an alien in connection to his entry into the United States?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Immigration And Naturalization Service, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that in deciding whether to grant a waiver under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General or her delegate, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, may take into account acts of fraud committed by the alien in connection to his entry into the United States. Justice Scalia wrote, the Act "imposes no limitations on the factors that the INS may consider in determining who, among the class of eligible aliens, should be granted relief."

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona

Wed, 04 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-974

Petitioner

Arizonans for Official English

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arizona

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 43 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, December 4, 1996

Decided

Monday, March 3, 1997

Advocates

Barnaby W. Zall (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Robert H. Pohlman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Maria Kelly F. Yniguez, an Arizona state employee, sued the state and various state officials alleging provisions of the state constitution, which declare English "the official language of the State," and allow state residents and businesses to bring suit to enforce the article, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Yniguez used both English and Spanish in her work and feared that the article would require her to face discharge or other discipline if she did not refrain from speaking Spanish while serving the state. The District Court dismissed the case against the state because of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, but held the article on English unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals accepted the case after Yniguez resigned and ultimately affirmed the District Court's ruling that the article violated the Free Speech Clause and announced that Yniguez was entitled to damages from the state.

Question

Was a challenge to a state's efforts to make English its official language a justiciable controversy after the state employee who mounted the challenge left her government job?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Arizona, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the dispute was moot due to the previous resignation of Yniguez. The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the article.

Lambrix v. Singletary

Wed, 15 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-5658

Petitioner

Lambrix

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Singletary

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 518 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, January 15, 1997

Decided

Monday, May 12, 1997

Advocates

Carol M. Dittmar (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Matthew C. Lawry (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In the sentencing phase of the trial at which Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted on two counts of first degree murder, the Florida state court jury rendered an advisory verdict recommending death sentences on both counts. Finding numerous aggravating circumstances in connection with both murders, and no mitigating circumstances as to either, the trial court sentenced Lambrix to death on both counts. After his conviction and sentence were upheld by the Florida courts, Lambrix filed a habeas corpus petition in the Federal District Court, which rejected all of his claims. While Lambrix's appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, The U.S. Supreme Court handed down a ruling that if the sentencing judge in a "weighing" State (i.e., a State such as Florida that requires specified aggravating circumstances to be weighed against any mitigating circumstances at a capital trial's sentencing phase) is required to give deference to a jury's advisory sentencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. Lambrix claimed that his sentencing jury was improperly instructed on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator. The Court of Appeals held its proceedings in abeyance to permit Lambrix to present his claim to the Florida Supreme Court, which rejected the claim without considering its merits on the ground that the claim was procedurally barred. The Court of Appeals denied relief, ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court had announced a "new rule" which could not be applied retroactively on federal habeas corpus petitions.

Question

Can a Florida killer's death sentence be challenged even though it was based on aggravating factors later ruled to be unconstitutional?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Singletary, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that a prisoner whose conviction became final before the ruling, which held that if the sentencing judge in a "weighing" State is required to give deference to a jury's advisory sentencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances, is foreclosed from relying on that decision in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Justice Scalia wrote for the court that the later ruling announced a "new rule" that could not be applied to already-finalized convictions challenged in federal habeas corpus petitions.

United States v. O'hagan

Wed, 16 Apr 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-842

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

O'hagan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 642 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, April 16, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 1997

Advocates

John D. French (on behalf of the Respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) found James O'Hagan, a partner at Dorsey and Whitney law firm (Dorsey), guilty of 57 counts of fraud for profiting from stock options in Pillsbury Company based on nonpublic information he misappropriated for his personal benefit. O'Hagan knew that Dorsey's client, Grand Metropolitan PLC, was considering placing a tender offer (a public offer to pay shareholders a premium for their stock at a specified time) to acquire a majority share in Pillsbury Company. O'Hagan bought a large number of stock options without telling his firm and later sold his options for a $4.3 million profit.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed O'Hagan's convictions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Eighth Circuit applied the Act only to security-traders who wrongfully use confidential information pertaining to their own companies. The Circuit Court ruled that the SEC had exceeded the rule-making authority granted to it by the Act by making it a fraudulent action to trade securities on exclusive non-public foreknowledge of a tender offer.

Question

1) Does a security-trader violate the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 by trading securities on the basis of misappropriated information pertaining to a company other than his own?

2) Did the Security Exchange Commission have the authority to make Rule 14e-3(a), which forbids security trading on nonpublic foreknowledge of a tender offer?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

Yes and Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion in the Court's 6-3 decision. The Court ruled that a security-trader who fails to disclose personal profits gained from reliance on exclusive information is guilty of employing "a deceptive device...in connection with the purchase of a security." The security-trader knowingly abuses the duty owed toward the source of information, whether the source is the company he works for or not.

The Court also held that the SEC has authority to "define and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent...acts...in connection with any tender offer." Rule 14e-3(a) of the Exchange Act, adopted under this fraud- prevention authority, forbids security-traders from trading on the basis of information they know should be kept private unless they publicly disclose their trades.

Mazurek v. Armstrong

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 20:49:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1104

Petitioner

Mazurek

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Armstrong

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 968 (1997)

Decided

Monday, June 16, 1997

Facts of the Case

In 1995, the Montana Legislature enacted a statute restricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians. A group of licensed physicians and one physician-assistant brought suit, challenging that statute under the Constitution. The District Court denied the practitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not established any likelihood of prevailing on their claim that the law imposed an undue burden concerning abortion rights. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the practitioners had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their claim and thus had met the threshold requirement for preliminary injunctive. On remand, the District Court entered an injunction pending appeal and postponed a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion until the U.S. Supreme Court's disposition of the state attorney general's certiorari petition.

Question

Did a Court of Appeals err in holding that the parties seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a Montana statute, which restricted the performance of abortions to licensed physicians, had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their claim of undue burden concerning abortion rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Mazurek, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals' finding that the practitioners had shown a fair chance of success on the merits was erroneous. The Court noted that its precedents repeatedly stated that the performance of abortions could be restricted to physicians, where there was no evidence of an unlawful motive on the part of the state legislature. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented.

Old Chief v. United States

Wed, 16 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-6556

Petitioner

Old Chief

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 172 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, January 7, 1997

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Daniel Donovan (Montana, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Johnny Lynn Old Chief was involved in a disturbance involving gunfire. Subsequently, Old Chief was charged with violating federal law, 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction. The earlier crime that was charged in the indictment against Old Chief was assault causing serious bodily injury. Old Chief moved for an order requiring the Government to refrain from revealing the name and nature of his prior assault conviction, which, he argued, would unfairly tax the jury's capacity to hold the Government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence, on current charges of assault, possession, and violence with a firearm. Old Chief offered to stipulate, or concede, to the fact of the prior conviction without releasing its name or nature. The Government refused to join the stipulation. The Government argued it had the right to present its own evidence of the prior conviction. The District Court ruled in favor of the Government. In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals found that the Government was entitled to introduce probative evidence to prove the prior offense regardless of the stipulation offer.

Question

Does a District Court have the authority to reject a defendant's offer to conceded a prior conviction and admit the prosecution's presentation of it when the name or nature of the conviction raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Old Chief, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Evidence

No. In an opinion authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that a district court abuses its discretion under the Federal Rules of Evidence if it spurns a defendant's offer to concede a prior judgment and admits the full judgment record over the defendant's objection, when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction.

Johnson v. Fankell

Wed, 26 Feb 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-292

Petitioner

Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fankell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 911 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, February 26, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 9, 1997

Advocates

Michael S. Gilmore (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

W. B. Latta, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Kristine L. Fankell filed an action for damages in Idaho State Court, alleging that the termination of her state employment by Marian Johnson, and other officials of the Idaho Liquor Dispensary, deprived her of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court dismissed Johnson and others' motion to dismiss, which asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed their appeal from that ruling, explaining that the denial was neither an appealable final order under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) nor appealable as a matter of federal right.

Question

Do defendants in an action brought under 42 USC section 1983 in state court have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fankell, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In unanimous opinion delivered by John Paul Stevens, the Court held that defendants in a state-court section 1983 action do not have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. The Court reasoned that in construing state rules allowing appeals from final judgments, state courts did not need to accept the federal definition of a "final decision" within the meaning of federal law. The right to an interlocutory appeal of a denial of immunity "is a federal procedural right that simply does not apply in a non-federal forum," Justice Stevens wrote for the court.

Klehr Et Ux. v. A. O. Smith Corp.

Mon, 21 Apr 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-663

Petitioner

Klehr Et Ux.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

A. O. Smith Corp. et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 179 (1997)

Argued

Monday, April 21, 1997

Decided

Thursday, June 19, 1997

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

Charles A. Bird (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Marvin Klehr purchased inadequate cattle feed containers from A. O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc. (Harvestore) in 1974. Over a long period of time, the containers damaged Klehr's cattle feed. In 1993, Klehr filed a civil claim against Harvestore under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO). The District Court dismissed Klehr's suit, ruling that the four-year time limit for bringing a civil RICO suit had expired. Klehr claimed that he was not at fault for failing to discover the injury within four years, because Harvestore purposely designed the containers to conceal their inadequacy.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court. The Eighth Circuit held that Klehr should have discovered the pattern of racketeering activity much earlier. Since the statute of limitations began from the time Klehr could reasonably be expected to have discovered the pattern, Klehr was out of time. The Eighth Circuit's "pattern of activity" rule contradicted the Third Circuit's "last predicate act" rule, which allows a plaintiff to recover damages accumulated since the first injury as long as the last RICO violation ("last predicate act") happened within four years of the lawsuit.

Question

1)Does the time limit for filing a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO) begin after the plaintiff discovers the last illegal act ("last predicate act") at the end of a pattern of racketeering activity?

2)If the plaintiff demonstrates "fraudulent concealment" of the injury inflicted, can RICO's civil-claim limitations period be extended?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for A. O. Smith Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

No and No. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. The "last predicate rule...lengthens the limitations period dramatically" and thereby contradicts Congress's intention of ensuring a time limit for civil RICO claims. Also, "the plaintiff cannot use an independent, new act as a bootstrap to recover for injuries caused by other predicate acts that took place outside the limitations period."

RICO intends "not only to compensate victims but also to encourage those victims diligently to investigate and thereby to uncover unlawful activity." To demonstrate "fraudulent concealment", a plaintiff must have failed to discover injuries inflicted upon him after acting with "reasonable diligence" to discover the source and pattern of the injuries.

Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott

Mon, 02 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1184

Petitioner

Glickman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wileman Brothers & Elliot

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 457 (1997)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 1997

Advocates

Thomas E. Campagne (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Alan Jenkins (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1937, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) to promote fair pricing and uniform marketing conditions in the agriculture business. Exempted from antitrust laws, the AMAA mandated uniform prices, product standards, and other conditions; all of which had to be approved by at least two-thirds of the affected producers and implemented by producer committees appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. The AMAA's administrative expenses were to be covered by assessments imposed on activities such as product advertising and promotion. After suffering adverse rulings at the administrative, District, and Circuit Court levels, a group of California tree fruit growers, handlers, and processors appealed their constitutional challenge of the AMAA to the Supreme Court - which granted certiorari.

Question

Did the AMAA's assessments on product advertising and promotion violate of the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Glickman, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. Exempting its financial regulations from the heightened review standard appropriate in most First Amendment issues, the Court's 5-to-4 decision held that just because the AMAA's economic regulations may indirectly result in the reduction of the complaining parties' advertising budgets, they did not violate their free speech. The relevant assessments did not force the growers, handlers, or processors to repeat unsuccessful ads, to respond to negative ads when they preferred to remain silent, or to be publicly identified with messages other than their own. All the AMAA required of these parties were contributions for ad campaigns which were ultimately aimed at promoting their own welfare by encouraging customers to buy their products.

Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison

Wed, 09 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Camp Newfound Owatonna

4 Camp Newfound Rd. Harrison ME 04040

Harrison, ME 04040

United States

44° 4' 49.1268" N, 70° 40' 26.5044" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-1988

Petitioner

Camps Newfound/Owatonna

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harrison

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 564 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, October 9, 1996

Decided

Monday, May 19, 1997

Advocates

William L. Plouffe (Argued the cause for the respondents)

William H. Dempsey (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. (Camps) operates a children's church camp in Maine and finances its operations through a $400 per camper weekly tuition charge. The majority of its campers are out of state children. Maine's tax scheme exempts charitable institutions incorporated in the state, and provides a more limited tax benefit for institutions which principally benefit non- Maine residents so long as their weekly service charge does not exceed $30 per person. Ineligible for any exemptions, Camps challenged the constitutionality of Maine's tax exemption statute. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari following a reversal of a favorable Superior Court ruling by the Supreme Court of Maine.

Question

Did Maine's tax exemption statute violate the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that Maine's tax exemption statute violated the dormant commerce clause since it selectively awarded greater tax benefits to those institutions which served mostly state residents, while penalizing institutions that conducted mostly interstate business. By imposing such selective benefits on a commercial activity in which it did not directly participate, the Court found Maine's governmental tax regulations to be an unconstitutional form of economic protectionism favoring local consumers and business providers.

Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 20:49:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-713

Petitioner

Bibles

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 355 (1997)

Decided

Tuesday, February 18, 1997

Facts of the Case

The Oregon Natural Desert Association filed a request with the Oregon Bureau of Land Management in order to obtain the names and addresses of people who received a newsletter that provided information about the Bureau's activities and plans affecting the Oregon desert. Invoking Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Bureau refused to release any portion of the list. Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure files "similar" to personnel and medical files. Subsequently, the association filed an action in District Court under the FOIA to obtain the list. The court ordered the release. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that there was a substantial public interest in knowing to whom the government was directing information and providing those persons with additional information from other sources that did not share the Bureau's views.

Question

Must the Oregon Bureau of Land Management release a list of people who receive its newsletter under the Freedom of Information Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bibles, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals engaged in an incorrect public-interest analysis in determining whether the Oregon Bureau of Land Management's mailing list was exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6 of the FOIA. In accordance with previous case history, the Court concluded that "the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis was the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would shed light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what the government was up to." The Court additionally concluded that the purpose of requests have no bearing on disclosure.

Printz v. United States

Tue, 03 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Sheriff Printz's Office

205 Bedford Street Hamilton MT 59840

Hamilton, MT 59840

United States

46° 14' 41.6544" N, 114° 9' 24.75" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1478

Petitioner

Printz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 95-1503

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 898 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, December 3, 1996

Decided

Friday, June 27, 1997

Advocates

Stephen P. Halbrook (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

David Dellinger (Argued the cause for the United States)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-check provisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States.

Question

Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification, can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to regulate handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background-checks?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Printz, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 922

No. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them.

O'Gilvie v. United States

Wed, 09 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-966

Petitioner

O'Gilvie

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 95-977

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 79 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, October 9, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, December 10, 1996

Advocates

Linda D. King (on behalf of the Petitioner in No. 95-977)

Stephen R. McAllister (Argued the cause for petitioners in 95-966)

Cornelia T. L. Pillard (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondents)

Kent L. Jones (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

After her death from toxic shock syndrome, Betty O'Gilvie's husband and two children received a jury award of $1,525,000 actual damages and $10 million punitive damages in a tort suit based on Kansas law against the maker of the product that caused Betty's death. The O'Gilvie's paid income tax on the portion of the award that represented punitive damages, but then sought a refund. Subsequently, Betty O'Gilvie's husband sued the Government for a refund and the Government sued the O'Gilvie children to recover the refund it had made earlier. In finding for the O'Gilvies, the District Court found that 26 USC section 104(a)(2), as read in 1988, excluded from gross income the "amount of any damages received... on account of personal injuries or sickness." The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Does the exclusionary provision of 26 USC section 104(a)(2), which excludes from gross income the "amount of any damages received... on account of personal injuries or sickness," apply to punitive damages received by a plaintiff in a tort suit for personal injuries?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the punitive damages received by the O'Gilvies were not received "on account of" personal injuries," and therefore the provision did not apply and the damages were taxable. Agreeing with the Government's definition, Justice Breyer reasoned that the exclusionary provision applied to those personal injury lawsuit damages that were awarded by reason of, or because of, the personal injuries, and not to punitive damages that do not compensate injury, but are private fines to punish and deter reprehensible conduct. Justice Antonin Scalia, who was joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Warner Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.

Tue, 15 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-728

Petitioner

Warner Jenkinson Co., Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hilton Davis Chemical Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 17 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, October 15, 1996

Decided

Monday, March 3, 1997

Advocates

Richard G. Taranto (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David E. Schmit (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Warner Jenkinson Co. and Hilton Davis Chemical Co. both manufacture dyes from which impurities must be removed. Davis's "'746 patent," which was issued in 1985, discloses an improved purification process involving the "ultrafiltration" of dye through a porous membrane at pH levels between 6.0 and 9.0. In 1986, Jenkinson developed its own ultrafiltration process, which operated at a pH level of 5.0. Davis sued for infringement of the '746 patent. Davis's suit relied solely on the "doctrine of equivalents," under which a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is an "equivalence" between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Jenkinson argued that the Patent Act of 1952 had supplanted the doctrine. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against Jenkinson after a jury had found that Jenkinson had infringed upon the '746 patent. The en banc Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of equivalents continues to exist and that the jury had substantial evidence from which to conclude that petitioner's process was not substantially different from the process disclosed in the '746 patent.

Question

Is the "doctrine of equivalents" a legitimate test for determining how similar a new invention must be to an existing patent to be deemed an illegal infringement?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Warner Jenkinson Co., Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that it adheres to the "doctrine of equivalents," which is not superseded by the Patent Act of 1952. However, the Court held that the Court of Appeals had not considered all of the requirements of the doctrine of equivalents as described by the Court in this case on which the case was reversed and remanded.

Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Office of Worker's Comp. Prog.

Tue, 12 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1081

Petitioner

Ingalls Shipbuilding

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Office of Worker's Comp. Prog.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 248 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, November 12, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, February 18, 1997

Advocates

Wynn E. Clark (Argued the cause for the private respondent)

Beth S. Brinkmann (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the federal respondent)

Richard P. Salloum (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

After being exposed to asbestos while working for Ingalls Shipbuilding as a shipfitter, Jefferson Yates filed a claim for disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). While Ingalls and Yates settled, Yates also sued the manufacturers and suppliers of the asbestos products that were allegedly present in his workplace when he contracted asbestosis. Yates also settled with some of the manufacturers and suppliers he sued, each of whom required releases from Yates and his wife. Ingalls did not approve of any releases. When Yates died, his wife then filed for benefits under the LHWCA, which provides, "If the person entitled to compensation... enters into a settlement with a third person... for an amount less than the compensation to which the person... would be entitled under this [Act], the employer shall be liable for compensation only if written approval of the settlement is obtained from the employer before the settlement is executed." Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed that at the time Mrs. Yates executed the predeath settlements, she was not a "person entitled to compensation" because her husband was still alive, thus her right to death benefits had not yet vested.

Question

Is an injured worker's spouse, who may be eligible to receive death benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act after the worker dies, a "person entitled to compensation" when the spouse enters into a settlement agreement with a third party before the worker's death?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Office of Worker's Comp. Prog., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that before an injured worker's death, the worker's spouse is not a "person entitled to compensation" for death benefits and did not forfeit the right to collect death benefits under the LHWCA for failure to obtain the worker's employer's approval of settlements entered into by the worker's spouse with third parties before the worker's death. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provided that the "agency" had to be named respondent in an appeal of an order of a federal administrative agency or board to a Federal Court of Appeals, conferred upon the Director the right to appear as a respondent before the Courts of Appeals in appeals from final orders of the Benefits Review Board.

City of Boerne v. Flores

Wed, 19 Feb 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

City Hall

402 E Blanco Boerne TX 78006

Boerne, TX 78006

United States

29° 47' 43.8468" N, 98° 43' 46.8588" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-2074

Petitioner

City of Boerne

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Flores

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 507 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, February 19, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 1997

Advocates

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause on behalf of Ohio et al., as amici curiae, support the petitioner)

Marci A. Hamilton (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the Federal respondent)

Douglas Laycock (Argued the cause for the respondent Flores)

Facts of the Case

The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), by denying him a permit to expand his church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the Archbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance forbidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a District Court's finding against Archbishop Flores, the Court granted Boerne's request for certiorari.

Question

Did Congress exceed its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers by enacting the RFRA which, in part, subjected local ordinances to federal regulation?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for City of Boerne, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause

Yes. Under the RFRA, the government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]" religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest, and, even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden. The Court held that while Congress may enact such legislation as the RFRA, in an attempt to prevent the abuse of religious freedoms, it may not determine the manner in which states enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions. This, the Court added, is precisely what the RFRA does by overly restricting the states' freedom to enforce its spirit in a manner which they deem most appropriate. With respect to this case, specifically, there was no evidence to suggest that Boerne's historic preservation ordinance favored one religion over another, or that it was based on animus or hostility for free religious exercise.

Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises

Wed, 06 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-259

Petitioner

Walters

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Metropolitan Educational Enterprises

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 95-779

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 202 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, November 6, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, January 14, 1997

Advocates

Patrick J. Falahee, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Constantine John Gekas (Argued the cause for petitioner Walters)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause of the petitioner EEOC)

Facts of the Case

In 1990, Darlene Walters was fired by Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. (Metropolitan). Soon thereafter, Walters filed an employment discrimination charge against Metropolitan under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC sued Metropolitan alleging that the firing violated Title VII's anti- retaliation provision. Metropolitan filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, claiming that it was not an "employer" covered by Title VII because, at the time of the alleged retaliation, it was not "a person . . . who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." The parties stipulated that Metropolitan failed to satisfy the 15-employee threshold in 1989; that, during most of 1990, it had between 15 and 17 employees on its payroll on each working day; and that, during 1990, there were only nine weeks in which it was actually compensating 15 or more employees on each working day. The District Court dismissed the case. It reasoned that employees may be counted for Title VII purposes only on days on which they actually performed work or were being compensated despite their absence as opposed to any working day on which the employer maintains an employment relationship with the employee. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does an employer "have" an employee on any working day on which the employer maintains an employment relationship with the employee as pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Walters, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the ultimate touchstone under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is whether an employer has employment relationships with 15 or more individuals for each working day in 20 or more weeks during the year in question.

Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Wed, 13 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1181

Petitioner

Dunn

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 465 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, November 13, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, February 25, 1997

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Gary D. Stumpp (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) brought an action against William C. Dunn and Delta Consultants, Inc. claiming that they had solicited investments in and operated a fraudulent scheme involving transactions in foreign currency options in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and CFTC regulations. Dunn and Delta Consultants allegedly engaged in the transactions by contracting directly with international banks, rather than using a regulated exchange or board of trade. This is known as "off exchange" trading. Dunn, Delta Consultants, and their customers suffered heavy losses. The District Court appointed a temporary receiver to take control of Dunn and Delta Consultants' property. The court rejecting their defense that the transactions were exempt from the CEA under the "Treasury Amendment," which excepts "transactions in foreign currency" unless they involve a sale "for future delivery" "conducted on a board of trade." The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Commodity Futures Trading Commission have the authority to regulate "off exchange" trading in options to buy or sell foreign currency?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Dunn, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 7 U.S.C. 1

No. In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, The Court ruled that the "Treasury Amendment" of the Commodity Exchange Act exempts from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulation off exchange trading in foreign currency options. "The arguments favoring each side in the important public policy dispute over whether off exchange foreign currency options should be exempt from CEA regulation are best addressed to the Congress, not the Courts," wrote Justice Stevens.

Raines v. Byrd

Tue, 27 May 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Senator Byrd's Office

311 Hart Senate Office Building Washington D.C. 20510

Washington 20510

United States

38° 53' 34.422" N, 77° 0' 13.7052" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1671

Appellee

Byrd

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Raines

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 811 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, May 27, 1997

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 1997

Advocates

Alan B. Morrison (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

Several individual members of the 104th Congress, who voted against the passage of the Line Item Veto Act (Act) giving the President authority to veto individual tax and spending measures after having signed them into law, sued to challenge the Act's constitutionality. After granting them standing, the District Court ruled in the congressmen's favor as it found the Act unconstitutional. Direct appeal was granted to the Supreme Court.

Question

Did the congressmen have Article III standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act as a violation of the Presentment Clause in Article I?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Raines, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, which avoided the question of the Act's constitutionality, the Court held that the individual congressmen lacked proper Article III standing to maintain their suit. The Court explained that the congressmen failed to show how the allegedly unconstitutional Act resulted in their personal injury, since it applied to the entire institution of Congress. Moreover, the congressmen based their claim on a loss of political power rather then a demonstration of how the Act violated one of their particularized legally protected interests. The Court concluded that, having failed to meet both of these standing requirements, the congressmen did not present the Court with a case-or-controversy over which it had jurisdiction.

Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Wed, 26 Feb 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-243

Petitioner

Suitum

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 725 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, February 26, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 1997

Advocates

R. S. Radford (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Richard J. Lazarus (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Bernadine Suitum owned an undeveloped lot near Lake Tahoe. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency determined that the lot was ineligible for development under agency regulations. However, the agency determined that Suitum was entitled to "Transferable Development Rights" (TDRs) that she could sell to other landowners with the agency's approval. Rather than sell her TDRs, Suitum filed suit claiming that the agency's determination amounted to a regulatory taking of her property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court held that Suitum's claim was unjusticible because she had not attempted to sell her TDRs. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that an agency action on a TDR transfer application would be the requisite "final decision" regarding Suitum's lot in order for her claim to be ripe for adjudication.

Question

Must property owners attempt to sell their developmental rights before claiming the regulatory taking of property without just compensation, in accordance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Suitum, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Suitum's regulatory taking claim was ripe for adjudication. Justice Souter reasoned that, by determining that Suitum's property was ineligible for development, the agency had had made final determination, even though she had not attempted to sell the TDRs which she had received, or was eligible to receive, under the agency plan. "While the pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDRs both to the claim that a taking has occurred and to the constitutional requirement of just compensation, we have no occasion to decide, and we do not decide, whether or not these TDRs may be considered in deciding the issue of whether there has been a taking in this case, as opposed to the issue of whether just compensation has been afforded for such a taking," wrote Justice Souter.

Strate v. A-1 Contractors

Tue, 07 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1872

Petitioner

Strate

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

A-1 Contractors

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 438 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, January 7, 1997

Decided

Monday, April 28, 1997

Advocates

Melody L. McCoy (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jonathan Nuechterlein (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Patrick J. Ward (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Vehicles driven by Gisela Fredericks and Lyle Stockert collided on a portion of a North Dakota state highway that runs through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. The stretch of highway within the reservation is open to the public, affords access to a federal water resource project, and is maintained by North Dakota under a federally granted right of way that lies on land held by the United States in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and their members. While neither driver was a member of the Tribes or an Indian, Fredericks filed a personal injury action in the Tribal Court of the Three Affliated Tribes against Stockert and A-1 Contractors, who owned the truck Stockert was driving at the time of the collision. The Tribal Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over Fredericks' claim and therefore denied A-1 Contractors and Stockert's motion to dismiss. The Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals affirmed. A-1 contractors and Stockert then filed a action in the District Court against Fredericks, the Tribal Court, and Tribal Judge William Strate, seeking a declaratory judgment that, as a matter of federal law, the Tribal Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate Fredericks' claims. A-1 Contractors and Stockert also sought an injunction against further Tribal Court proceedings. The District Court dismissed. It held that that the Tribal Court had civil jurisdiction over Fredericks' complaint. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Question

Does a tribal court have jurisdiction over a civil action against an allegedly negligent driver and the driver's employer, neither of whom is a member of the tribe, when an accident occurs on a portion of a public highway maintained by the State under a federally granted right of way over Indian reservation land?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for A-1 Contractors, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an unanimous decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that when an accident occurs on a public highway maintained by the State pursuant to a federally granted right of way over Indian reservation land, a civil action against allegedly negligent nonmembers falls within state or federal regulatory and adjudicatory governance; absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers driving on the State's highway, tribal courts may not exercise jurisdiction in such cases.

United States v. Lanier

Tue, 07 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1717

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lanier

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 259 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, January 7, 1997

Decided

Monday, March 31, 1997

Advocates

Alfred H. Knight (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

David W. Lanier was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 242 of criminally violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexually while he served as a state judge. The jury had been instructed that the Government had to prove, as an element of the offense, that Lanier had deprived the victims of their Fourteenth Amendment due process right to liberty, which included the right to be free from sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. The District Court denied Lanier's motion, which sought to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the law is void for vagueness. The en banc Court of Appeals vacated Lanier's convictions for "lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute includes simple or sexual assault crimes within its coverage." The Court of Appeals held that the law may be imposed only if the constitutional right, said to have been violated, is first identified in a decision of the U.S Supreme Court, and only when the right has been held to apply in a factual situation "fundamentally similar." The court regarded these combined requirements as substantially higher than the "clearly established" standard used to judge qualified immunity in civil cases.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals use a too demanding standard when it ruled that freedom from sexual assault, as included under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process right to liberty, has never been recognized as a federally protected constitutional right and therefore cannot be the basis for a federal prosecution?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 242

es. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the standard of notice that the Court of Appeals employed was higher than the Constitution requires and too demanding. Justice Souter wrote that the Court of Appeals mistakenly concluded that it takes a Supreme Court decision in a "fundamentally similar" case to make a constitutional right specific enough that its violation can be prosecuted. Law makes it a crime to deprive anyone of rights "secured . . . by the Constitution."

Maryland v. Wilson

Wed, 11 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Wilson's Car

I-95 Baltimore County MD

Baltimore County, MD

United States

39° 52' 53.6808" N, 75° 15' 11.9016" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1268

Petitioner

Maryland

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wilson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 408 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, December 11, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, February 19, 1997

Advocates

J. Joseph Curran, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Janet Reno (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the petitioner)

Byron L. Warnkbn (on behalf of the Respondent)

Byron L. Warnken (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After a Maryland state trooper stopped the speeding car in which he was riding, a nervous Wilson was ordered to step out. As he did, a quantity of cocaine fell on the ground. When arrested for possession with intent to distribute, Wilson challenged the manner in which the evidence against him was obtained. After the Baltimore County Circuit Court ruled to suppress the evidence against Wilson, Maryland appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals - which affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Maryland certiorari.

Question

Did Maryland's state trooper violate the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure guarantees by ordering Wilson, a mere passenger in the suspect vehicle, to exit the car during a traffic stop?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Maryland, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. The Court held that after lawfully stopping a speeding vehicle, an officer may order its passengers to step out. While burdening their personal liberty somewhat, officers must be permitted such authority over passengers if the overriding government's interest in officer safety is to be protected.

United States v. Watts

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 20:49:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1906

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Watts

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 148 (1997)

Decided

Monday, January 6, 1997

Facts of the Case

After police discovered cocaine base in his kitchen and two loaded guns in his bedroom, a jury convicted Vernon Watts of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute. The jury acquitted Watts of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense. By a preponderance of the evidence, the District Court, afterwards, found that Watts had possessed the guns in connection with the drug offense and sentenced him accordingly. In a similar case, authorities videotaped Cheryl Putra selling cocaine to a government informant. A jury convicted Putra of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute one ounce of cocaine, but acquitted her of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five ounces of cocaine on a separate occasion. By a preponderance of the evidence, the District Court, afterwards, found that Putra had indeed been involved in the second transaction and sentenced her accordingly. Reversing both cases, separate Courts of Appeals held that sentencing courts could not consider the conduct of the defendants' underlying charges of which they had been acquitted.

Question

May sentencing courts consider the conduct of a defendant's underlying charges of which she or he has been acquitted?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

Yes. In a 7-2 per curiam opinion, the Court held that a jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent a sentencing court from considering a defendant's conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen G. Breyer concurred. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the additional offense should have been required to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt for sentencing purposes, where a defendant's sentence was lengthened. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, also dissenting, expressed the view that the cases should have been set for full briefing and consideration.

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York

Wed, 16 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Western District Court of New York

68 Court Street Buffalo NY 14202

Buffalo, NY 14202

United States

42° 53' 8.8476" N, 78° 52' 37.5312" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1065

Petitioner

Schenck

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pro-Choice Network of Western New York

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 357 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, February 19, 1997

Advocates

Jay A. Sekulow (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Lucinda M. Finley (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

This action was filed by the Pro-Choice Network of Western New York (PCN), on behalf of health care providers, to enjoin Schenck and others from continuously staging blockades and other disruptive illegal activities in front of abortion clinics. After its restraining order proved ineffective, a District Court issued a preliminary injunction creating "fixed buffer zones" which prohibited demonstrations within fifteen feet of entrances to abortion clinics, parking lots, or driveways. The court also created "floating buffer zones" prohibiting demonstrators from coming within fifteen feet of people or vehicles seeking access to the clinics. Following the Appellate Court's decision to uphold the District Court's ruling that the "buffer zones" were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted Schenck certiorari.

Question

Did either or both types of "buffer zones" violate Schenck's First Amendment right to freedom of speech.

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Split Vote

The Court held that while the "fixed buffer zones" were constitutional, the "floating buffer zones" were not. It distinguished between the two types of "buffer zones." The Court supported the "fixed buffer zones" because they protected the government's interest in public safety, by preventing protesters from engaging in unlawful conduct (i.e. spitting on and shouting in clinic users' faces, blocking doorways), while still allowing them to be heard from a short distance. "Floating buffer zones," by contrast, were struck down by the Court since they imposed a greater burden on free speech than was required to protect the government's interest in public safety and free traffic flow. The Court found that forcing demonstrators to remain at least 15 feet away from the people they wished to communicate with would create an inordinate amount of dangerous confusion and congestion.

Clinton v. Jones

Mon, 13 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Arkansas State Capitol

425 W Capitol Ave Little Rock AR 72201

Little Rock, AR 72201

United States

34° 44' 39.3288" N, 92° 16' 31.2348" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1853

Petitioner

Clinton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jones

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 681 (1997)

Argued

Monday, January 13, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 1997

Advocates

Robert S. Bennett (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Gilbert K. Davis (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton. She alleged that while she was an Arkansas state employee, she suffered several "abhorrent" sexual advances from then Arkansas Governor Clinton. Jones claimed that her continued rejection of Clinton's advances ultimately resulted in punishment by her state supervisors. Following a District Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to the suit be suspended, pending a ruling on his prior request to have the suit dismissed on grounds of presidential immunity, Clinton sought to invoke his immunity to completely dismiss the Jones suit against him. While the District Judge denied Clinton's immunity request, the judge ordered the stay of any trial in the matter until after Clinton's Presidency. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial but reversed the trial deferment ruling since it would be a "functional equivalent" to an unlawful grant of temporary presidential immunity.

Question

Is a serving President, for separation of powers reasons, entitled to absolute immunity from civil litigation arising out of events which transpired prior to his taking office?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jones, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 2: Separation of Powers

No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not grant a sitting President immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusual circumstances. After noting the great respect and dignity owed to the Executive office, the Court held that neither separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified Presidential immunity from judicial process. While the independence of our government's branches must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Constitution does not prohibit these branches from exercising any control over one another. This, the Court added, is true despite the procedural burdens which Article III jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and resources of the Chief Executive.

DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clin. Service Fund

Mon, 24 Feb 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1594

Petitioner

DeBuono

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

NYSA-ILA Med. and Clin. Service Fund

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 806 (1997)

Argued

Monday, February 24, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 2, 1997

Advocates

Donato Caruso (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

M. Patricia Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

New York's Health Facility Assessment (HFA) imposes a tax on gross receipts for patient services at diagnostic and treatment centers. The NYSA ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, which administers a plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), owns and operates New York treatment centers for longshore workers, retirees and their dependents. The Fund's trustees discontinued paying the New York tax and filed to enjoin the state from making future assessments and to obtain a refund. Lawyers for the Fund alleged that the HFA is preempted by the ERISA, as it applies to hospitals run by it. The District Court ruled that the HFA is not preempted because it is a tax of general application having only an incidental impact on benefit plans. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the HFA directly reduces the amount of Fund assets that would otherwise be available to provide plan members with benefits, and could cause the plan to limit its benefits or to charge plan members higher fees; therefore, the HFA was preempted by the ERISA.

Question

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act preclude New York's Health Facility Assessment from imposing a gross-receipts tax on the income of medical centers operated by ERISA funds?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for DeBuono, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

No. In a 7-2 decision, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act does not preclude New York from imposing a gross receipts tax on ERISA funded medical centers. Justice Stevens wrote, "Any state tax, or other law, that increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees" will affect the benefit plan, "but that simply cannot mean that every state law with such an effect is pre- empted.

Washington v. Glucksberg

Wed, 08 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Dr. Harold Glucksberg's Residence Seattle, WA

United States

47° 36' 22.356" N, 122° 19' 55.4556" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-110

Petitioner

Washington

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Glucksberg

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 702 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, January 8, 1997

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 1997

Advocates

Kathryn L. Tucker (Argued the cause of the respondents)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

William L. Williams (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Dr. Harold Glucksberg -- along with four other physicians, three terminally ill patients who have since died, and a nonprofit organization that counsels individuals contemplating physician assisted-suicide -- brought this suit challenging the state of Washington's ban on physician assisted-suicide. The State of Washington has historically criminalized the promotion of suicide attempts by those who "knowingly cause or aid another person to attempt suicide." Glucksberg alleged that Washington's ban was unconstitutional. Following a District Court ruling favoring Glucksberg and his fellow petitioners, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted Washington certiorari.

Question

Did Washington's ban on physician assisted-suicide violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by denying competent terminally ill adults the liberty to choose death over life?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Washington, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. Analyzing the guarantees of the Due Process Clause, the Court focused on two primary aspects: the protection of our nation's objective fundamental, historically rooted, rights and liberties; and the cautious definition of what constitutes a due process liberty interest. The Court held that the right to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause since its practice has been, and continues to be, offensive to our national traditions and practices. Moreover, employing a rationality test, the Court held that Washington's ban was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting medical ethics, shielding disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice which might encourage them to end their lives, and, above all, the preservation of human life.

Edmond v. United States

Mon, 24 Feb 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-262

Petitioner

Edmond

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 651 (1997)

Argued

Monday, February 24, 1997

Decided

Monday, May 19, 1997

Advocates

Alan B. Morrison (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, formerly the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, hears appeals from the decisions of courts martial, and its decisions are subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals' judges may be officers or civilians. During the time in dispute, two civilian members sat on the court. The General Counsel of the Department of Transportation originally assigned both civilian judges to the court. Afterwards the Secretary of Transportation issued a memorandum adopting the General Counsel's assignments as appointments of his own. Jon E. Edmond and others were convicted while one or both civilian judges participated on the court. Subsequently, their convictions were upheld on appeal. Edmond and others argued that the civilian judges' appointments were invalid due to the Appointments Clause, which holds "principle officers" must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Question

Has Congress authorized the Secretary of Transportation to appoint civilian members of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals? If so, is this authorization constitutional under the Appointments Clause of Article II?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 323

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the judicial appointments were valid. The Court unanimously found that Congress has authorized the Secretary to appoint civilian members of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the Court also reasoned that the Secretary's 1993 appointments of the two civilian judges in question were valid under the Appointments Clause, since such judges were inferior officers within the clause's meaning, by reason of the supervision of the judges' work by the General Counsel and by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Justice Scalia noted that the Appointments Clause gives the President the exclusive power to select principal officers by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, but authorizes Congress to "vest the Appointment of...inferior Officers...in the Heads of Departments." Justice David H. Souter filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac & Co.

Tue, 18 Feb 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1764

Petitioner

Saratoga Fishing Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

J. M. Martinac & Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 875 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, February 18, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 2, 1997

Advocates

Keith Zakarin (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Daniel B. MacLeod (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

J. M. Martinac & Co. built the fishing vessel M/V Saratoga. Martinac installed a hydraulic system designed by Marco Seattle Inc. in the Saratoga. The initial user, Joseph Madruga, bought the ship new and added extra equipment. Madruga then sold the Saratoga to Saratoga Fishing Co., the subsequent user. Saratoga Fishing used the ship until it caught fire and sank. Saratoga Fishing then filed an admiralty tort suit against Martinac and Marco. Precedent stated that an admiralty tort plaintiff cannot recover damages for the physical damage that a defective product caused to the "product itself," but can recover damages for physical damage that the product caused to "other property." The District Court found that the hydraulic system had been defectively designed and awarded Saratoga Fishing damages, including damages for the loss of the equipment added by Madruga. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the added equipment was part of the ship when it was resold to Saratoga Fishing and, therefore, was part of the defective product that itself caused the harm.

Question

Can extra equipment, added to a ship after it was constructed, be considered "other property" for which the ship manufacturer is liable?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Saratoga Fishing Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a decision authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that equipment added by the initial user before he sold the ship to the subsequent user is "other property," and as Justice Breyer wrote, "[e]quipment added to a product after the manufacturer . . . has sold the product to an initial user is not part of the product that itself caused the physical harm."

Foreman v. Dallas County

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 20:49:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-987

Appellee

Dallas County

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Foreman

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 96-1389

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 979 (1997)

Decided

Friday, June 27, 1997

Facts of the Case

In 1972, Texas became a covered jurisdiction for purposes of section 5 of Voting Rights Act of 1965. By statute, Texas authorizes counties to appoint election judges, who supervise voting at the polls on election days. In 1983 and several times thereafter, Dallas County changed procedures for selecting election judges. Each of the new methods used party-affiliation formulas. In 1996, various parties brought suit in Federal District Court against the county, claiming that section 5 required the changes to be precleared by the U.S. Department of Justice. The District Court concluded that preclearance was not required, as the county had simply exercised its discretion under a state statute to adjust the procedure for appointing election judges. The court also noted that Department's preclearance of a 1985 submission from the state operated to preclear the county's use of partisan considerations in selecting election judges.

Question

Are Dallas County, Texas's changed procedures for selecting election judges exempt from preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Foreman, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the fact that the county had exercised its discretion, pursuant to state statute, to adjust the procedure for appointing election judges according to party power, did not mean that the methods at issue were exempt from section 5 preclearance. The Court also concluded that the county's 1985 submission was insufficient to put the Department on notice that the State was seeking preclearance of the use of partisan affiliations in selecting election judges. Ultimately, the Court remanded the case, noting that because the record was silent as to the procedure used by the county for appointing election judges as of 1972, it could make no final determination as to whether preclearance was in fact required.

Chandler v. Miller

Tue, 14 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-126

Petitioner

Walker L. Chandler

Respondent

Zell D. Miller

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 305 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, January 14, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, April 15, 1997

Advocates

Walker L. Chandler (Argued the cause pro se for the petitioners )

Patricia Guilday (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Under a Georgia statute, all candidates for elected state office must pass a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to their qualifying for nomination or election. Chandler, on behalf of several state office nominees from the Libertarian Party, challenged the statute's constitutionality, naming Georgia's governor and two other regulatory officials as defendants. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Did Georgia's drug testing statute violate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against illegal search and seizures?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Chandler, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In an 8-to-1 opinion, the Court noted that while the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits officials from conducting search and seizures without individualized suspicion, there does exist a narrowly defined category of permissible suspicionless searches and seizures. The Court held, however, that Georgia's statute did not fall in this exceptional category, since it failed to show why its desire to avoid drug users in its high political offices should outweigh candidates' privacy interests. In addition to Georgia's failure to provide evidence of a drug problem among its state officials, the Court concluded that even if such a problem did exist, the affected officials would most likely not perform the kind of high-risk, safety sensitive tasks, which might justify the statute's proposed incursion on their individual privacy rights.

Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash

Wed, 16 Apr 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-454

Petitioner

Associates Commercial Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rash

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 953 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, April 16, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 16, 1997

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kent L. Jones (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

John J. Durkay (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1992, Elray Rash filed a repayment plan under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Associates Commercial Corporation (ACC) was listed in the bankruptcy petition as a creditor holding a secured claim because it held a valid loan and lien on Rash's tractor truck. Ultimately to gain confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan and retain the truck, Rash invoked the "cram-down" provision of the Code. The cram-down provision allows a debtor to keep collateral over the objection of the creditor and requires the debtor to provide the creditor with payments that will total the present value of the collateral. At an evidentiary hearing, ACC maintained, under the "replacement-value" standard, that Rash would have to pay approximately $41,000 for a similar truck. Under the "foreclosure-value" standard, Rash maintained that the proper valuation was the net amount ACC would realize upon foreclosure and sale of the collateral, or approximately $31,875. The Bankruptcy Court adopted Rash's valuation figure and approved the plan. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is the value of collateral, under the "cram-down" provision of the Bankruptcy Code, section 1325(a)(5)(B), determined by the "foreclosure-value" standard, or what a secured creditor could obtain through a foreclosure sale of the property?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Associates Commercial Corp., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs the value of a secured claim, directs the application of the replacement-value standard when debtor, in a repayment plan under Chapter 13, has exercised the cram-down provision. Justice Ginsburg wrote that, "under [section 506(a)], the value of property retained because the debtor has exercised the [section 1325(a)(5)(B)] 'cram down' option is the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same 'proposed... use.'" Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens expressed the view that the text of 506(a) pointed to foreclosure as the proper method of valuation in the case at hand.

Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo

Mon, 17 Mar 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-272

Petitioner

Metropolitan Stevedore Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rambo

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 121 (1997)

Argued

Monday, March 17, 1997

Decided

Thursday, June 19, 1997

Advocates

Robert E. Babcock ()

Thomas J. Pierry ()

Malcolm L. Stewart ()

Facts of the Case

John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan then filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits because of his increased earnings. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA only authorizes disability award modifications if there has been a change in an employee's physical condition. Later the appellate court reversed another order discontinuing compensation.

Question

Does the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act bar nominal compensation to a worker who is presently able to earn at least as much as before he was injured?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Rambo, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that nominal compensation is proper when there is a significant possibility that the worker's wage-earning capacity will fall below the level of his pre-injury wages sometime in the future. The Court reasoned that a worker is entitled to nominal compensation under the LHWCA when a work-related injury has not diminished the worker's present wage-earning capacity under current circumstances, but when there is a significant possibility that the injury will cause diminished capacity under future conditions. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.

Regents of the University of California v. Doe

Mon, 02 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1694

Petitioner

Regents of the University of California

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 425 (1997)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, February 19, 1997

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Charles A. Miller (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Richard Gayer (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

John Doe sued the University of California alleging that it had agreed to employ him at a laboratory it operated pursuant to a contract with the federal Department of Energy (DOE), and that it had wrongfully breached its agreement upon determining that he could not obtain a required security clearance. The university argued that it was immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Mr. Doe asserted that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to the case because any damages awarded would be paid by the DOE. The District Court held that the university was an arm of the state and therefore the Eleventh Amendment prohibited Mr. Doe from maintaining his breach-of-contract claim in federal court. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision citing the university's agreement with the DOE, under which the department was liable for any judgments rendered against the university, not the state.

Question

Does the Eleventh Amendment shield state-run schools from being sued unwillingly in federal court even though any award of monetary damages would not come from the state?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Regents of the University of California, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that the California university could not be sued by Doe regardless of his claim that the job offer was illegally withdrawn and despite the fact the federal government would be responsible for the judgment. Stevens declared that the Eleventh Amendment shields the state from "the risk of adverse judgments even though the state may be indemnified by a third party."

Inter Modal Rail Employees Association v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.

Mon, 17 Mar 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-491

Petitioner

Inter Modal Rail Employees Association

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 510 (1997)

Argued

Monday, March 17, 1997

Decided

Monday, May 12, 1997

Advocates

Cornelia T. L. Pillard (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Richard E. Schwartz (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

James D. Holzhauer (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Employees of Santa Fe Terminal Services, Inc. (SFTS), a wholly owned subsidiary of The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. (ATSF), were entitled to pension, health and welfare benefits under the terms of their collective bargaining agreements. These benefit plans were subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In 1990, ATSF awarded the work performed by SFTS to In Terminal Services (ITS), and terminated those SFTS employees unwilling to continue work with ITS. The benefit plan offered by ITS was less favorable than the SFTS plan, and SFTS employees brought suit under, alleging that they had been discharged "for the purpose of interfering with the attainment" of rights to which they would have "become entitled under [their SFTS] plan." ERISA Section 510. After the District Court dismissed the Section 510 claims, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinstated the employees' pension claims because Section 510 prevented interference with vested rights, but dismissed the employees' welfare benefit claims because such benefits did not vest.

Question

Does Section 510 of ERISA bar interference only with vested rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Inter Modal Rail Employees Association, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

No. The plain language of Section 510 indicates that the applicability of its interference clause is not limited to vested rights. Congress used the word "plan" to refer to both pension and welfare benefits, and at the same time indicated that welfare plans are exempt from ERISA's stringent vesting requirements. This statutory language forecloses the possibility that Congress meant to limit the protections of Section 510 to vested rights. The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for determination of whether the fact that the SFTS employees were eligible for welfare benefits meant that they had already "attained" such rights, so that any subsequent actions taken by SFTS could not "interfere" with the "attainment of . . . right[s] . . . under the plan."

United States v. Gonzales

Wed, 11 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1605

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gonzales

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 1 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, December 11, 1996

Decided

Monday, March 3, 1997

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edward O. Bustamante (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Miguel Gonzales, Orlenis Hernandez Diaz, and Mario Perez were convicted in New Mexico state court on charges arising from their use of guns to holdup undercover officers during a drug sting. After they began to serve their state sentences, they were convicted by a District Court on federal drug and firearm charges related to the sting. Federal law requires a five-year prison sentence for carrying a gun while committing a crime. A Court of Appeals vacated the additional firearms sentences on the ground that they should have run concurrently with the state prison terms.

Question

Can the federal mandatory five-year prison term for carrying a gun while committing a crime be served concurrently with a separate state sentence?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

No. In a 7-to-2 decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court announced "[t]he plain language of (the law) forbids a district court to direct that a term of imprisonment under the statute run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, whether state or federal."

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis

Tue, 12 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1263

Petitioner

Caterpillar Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lewis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 61 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, November 12, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, December 10, 1996

Advocates

Leonard J. Stayton (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Kenneth S. Geller (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Asserting state law claims, Lewis, a Kentucky native, brought suit in Kentucky state court, for injuries sustained in a construction accident, against Caterpillar Inc. (Caterpillar), a Delaware corporation, and Whayne Supply Company (Whayne), a Kentucky corporation. Liberty Mutual Insurance Group (Liberty Mutual), a Massachusetts corporation, later intervened in the case as a plaintiff. Less than a year after filing his complaint Lewis entered into a settlement with Whayne. Caterpillar immediately moved to remove the action to federal court, arguing that the settlement between Lewis and Whayne meant that there was complete diversity. Lewis protested that complete diversity was not present because Liberty Mutual had not yet settled with Whayne, so that both Whayne and Lewis were still party to the lawsuit. The District Court denied Lewis' motion to remand, erroneously concluding that complete diversity was present. Five months before the trial, Liberty Mutual and Whayne reached a settlement and the District Court dismissed Whayne from the case. Complete diversity was present for the remainder of the case, including trial and judgment in favor of Caterpillar. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment, holding that the lower court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of removal because there was not complete diversity, and should have remanded the case to state court.

Question

Is the absence of complete diversity at the time of removal from state to federal court fatal to federal adjudication even when there is complete diversity at the time of judgment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Caterpillar Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1332

No. A failure to remand a case improperly removed is not fatal to federal adjudication of the case so long as federal jurisdictional requirements are met at the time judgment is entered. When a diversity case has been tried in federal court under state rules of decision, the importance of finality, efficiency and economy in judicial determinations becomes decisive. To remand this case for a new trial after several years of litigation, despite the fact that the jurisdictional defect had been cured by the time of judgment, would be to impose an exorbitant cost on the judicial system.

United States v. Jose

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 20:49:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-2082

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jose

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 54 (1996)

Decided

Monday, December 2, 1996

Facts of the Case

In a proceeding to enforce two IRS summonses issued to Laddie Jose, as trustee for the Jose Business Trust and Jose Family Trust, the U.S. and an IRS agent represented that the documents sought were for a civil investigation. Ultimately, the District Court ordered enforcement of the summonses, requiring the IRS to give Jose five days' notice before transferring summoned information from its Examination Division to any other IRS office. The IRS appealed, challenging the District Court's authority to impose such a restriction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as not ripe because the record did not indicate that the Examination Division had attempted to disclose the documents to any other IRS division; therefore, the five-day notice requirement had not been triggered.

Question

Is a Federal District Court's order, which enforced IRS summonses but required the IRS to give notice prior to any internal transfer of summoned documents, appealable as final decision?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1291

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the District Court issued a final, appealable order. The Court reasoned that the District Court's final order was indeed final because it was a decision dispositively granting in part and denying in part the remedy requested by the IRS. The Court also noted that finality, not ripeness, is the doctrine governing appeals from the District Court to the Court of Appeals. To appeal the District Court's decision, the IRS was neither obligated to defy the order nor required to provide notice of its intention to transfer documents internally, concluded the Court.

Adams v. Robertson

Tue, 14 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1873

Petitioner

Adams

Respondent

Robertson

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 83 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, January 14, 1997

Decided

Monday, March 3, 1997

Advocates

Norman E. Waldrop, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1992, Charlie Frank Robertson filed a class action suit in an Alabama trial court, alleging that Liberty National Life Insurance Company had fraudulently encouraged its customers to exchange existing health insurance policies for new policies that, according to Robertson, provided less coverage for cancer treatment. The trial court appointed Robertson as class representative and certified the class pursuant to provisions of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure that do not give class members the right to exclude themselves from a class. The trial court then approved a settlement agreement that precluded class members from individually suing Liberty National for fraud based on its insurance policy exchange program. Guy E. Adams and other petitioners, who had objected to the settlement in the trial court, appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. The court's opinion only addressed state law issues and did not answer whether the certification and settlement of this class action suit violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the class members were not afforded the right to opt out of the class or the settlement.

Question

Does the Supreme Court of Alabama's approval of the certification and settlement of a class action lawsuit, whose class members were not afforded the right to opt out of the class or the settlement, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Robertson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Writ Improvidently Granted

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The Court noted that the Alabama Supreme Court did not expressly address the question on which certiorari was granted and that the petitioners had failed to establish that they had properly presented the issue to that court. Therefore, the Court concluded that it could not reach the question presented without unbalancing our dual system of government to "disturb the finality of state judgments on a federal ground that the state court did not have occasion to consider."

United States v. Alaska

Mon, 24 Feb 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84 ORIG

Petitioner

United States

Respondent

Alaska

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 1 (1997)

Argued

Monday, February 24, 1997

Decided

Thursday, June 19, 1997

Advocates

G. Thomas Koester (Argued the cause for the defendant)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the plaintiff)

Facts of the Case

The United States disputed the ownership of submerged lands along Alaska's Arctic Coast. The Alaska Statehood Act expressly provided that the federal Submerged Lands Act (Act) applies to Alaska. The Act entitles Alaska to submerged lands beneath tidal and inland navigable waters and submerged lands extending three miles seaward of the State's coastline. The United States claimed a right to submerged lands along the Alaska's Arctic Coast for mineral leasing. Alaska, in a counterclaim, sought to quiet its title to coastal submerged lands within two federal reservations, the National Petroleum Reserve Alaska and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, formerly known as the Arctic National Wildlife Range.

Question

Does the United States own disputed submerged lands along Alaska's Arctic Coast?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Submerged Lands Acts

Yes. In a decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the federal government, the United States, owned the disputed submerged lands - adjacent to the National Wildlife Refuge and the National Petroleum Reserve - along Alaska's Arctic Coast.

Abrams v. Johnson

Mon, 09 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1425

Appellee

Johnson

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Abrams

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 95-1460

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 74 (1997)

Argued

Monday, December 9, 1996

Decided

Thursday, June 19, 1997

Advocates

Michael J. Bowers (Argued the cause on behalf of the appellees Miller et al)

Laughlin McDonald (Argued the cause on behalf of the appellants Abrams et al)

A. Lee Parks (Argued the cause on behalf of the appellees Johnson, et al)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause on behalf of the federal appellant)

Facts of the Case

Following a suit by Georgia residents challenging the constitutionality of a legislative redistricting plan (Miller v. Johnson, 515 US 900), and seeking an injunction against its further use, a District Court found the plan unconstitutional. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed - holding that race was a predominant factor in the plan's creation - and remanded it for redrafting. Shortly thereafter the composition of another of the plan's districts was challenged in a District Court which, after unsuccessfully deferring the matter to Georgia's Legislature for redrafting, drew its own plan creating one black-majority district in place of the proposed three. After the 1996 elections were held under the court's new plan, Abrams and several other voters challenged its constitutionality. Again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Did the District Court's redistricting plan violate the 1965 Voting Rights Act or Article I of the Constitution, guaranteeing "one person, one vote"?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Johnson, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

No, in a five-to-four decision. First, the Court held that in re-drafting the plans, the District Court had no obligation to preserve all three of the old plan's black-majority districts, if this would result in racial gerrymandering. Second, the Court supported the District Court's decision not to preserve two black-majority districts as it held that the area's black population was not sufficiently compact to sustain such a plan. Third, the Court ruled that the plan's creation of only one black-majority district would not violate the 1965 Voting Rights Act by causing a retrogression in the political position of Abrams and his fellow plaintiffs. The Court, in addition to noting Abrams' failure to meet his retrogression claim's population density requirement, found that in the last election, held under the challenged plan, all three black incumbents won re-election, two of whom while running against white candidates from white-majority districts. Finally, the Court concluded that the District Court's redistricting plan did not violate the Constitution's guarantee of "one person, one vote." In addition to finding that the plan's overall and average population deviations were acceptable, the Court held that even if these deviations were slightly "off" they must be tolerated given their six year tenure in an area which has seen significant population shifts. Accordingly, any minor errors would be best corrected by the next census rather than by judicial intervention.

Blessing v. Freestone

Mon, 06 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1441

Petitioner

Blessing

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Freestone

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 329 (1997)

Argued

Monday, January 6, 1997

Decided

Monday, April 21, 1997

Advocates

Marsha S. Berzon (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Patricia A. Millett (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

C. Tim Delaney (Phoenix, Arizona, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Cathy Freestone and four other Arizona mothers, whose children are eligible for state child support services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, filed suit against Linda J. Blessing, the director of the state child support agency, claiming that they properly applied for child support services; that, despite their good faith efforts to cooperate, the agency never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments for them; that these omissions were largely attributable to staff shortages and other structural defects in the State's program; and that these systemic failures violated their individual rights under Title IV-D to have all mandated services delivered in substantial compliance with the title and its implementing regulations. Freestone sought relief including a declaratory judgment that the Arizona program's operation violates Title IV-D provisions creating rights in them that are enforceable and an injunction requiring the director to achieve substantial compliance with Title IV-D throughout all programmatic operations. The District Court granted summary judgment for Blessing. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Freestone had an enforceable individual right to have the State achieve "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D. Additionally, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court that that Congress had foreclosed private Title IV-D enforcement actions by authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to audit and cut off funds to States whose programs do not substantially comply with Title IV-D's requirements.

Question

Can parents sue states under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act to force overall compliance with federal efforts under Title IV-D to collect child- support payments from ex-spouses?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Blessing, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC--provisions of the Social Security Act)

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply with Title IV-D. Justice O'Connor wrote for the court that parents cannot sue merely because a state fails to be in "substantial compliance" with federal collection standards.

Bracy v. Gramley

Mon, 14 Apr 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-6133

Petitioner

Bracy

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gramley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 899 (1997)

Argued

Monday, April 14, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 9, 1997

Advocates

Barbara A. Preiner (on behalf of the Respondent)

Gilbert H. Levy (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

During Thomas J. Maloney's tenure as an Illinois judge, William Bracy was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death before him for a triple murder. Maloney was later convicted on federal charges of taking bribes from criminal defendants. In his federal habeas petition, Bracy argued that, because he had "fixed" other murder cases, Maloney had an interest in a conviction here to deflect suspicion. Bract contended that Maloney's interest violated the fair- trial guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District Court denied the claim, concluding that Bracy's allegations contained insufficient specificity or good cause. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also concluded that Bracy had not shown "good cause" for discovery to prove his claim.

Question

Does a prisoner make a sufficient factual showing to establish "good cause," as required by Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a), for discovery on his claim by showing that the trial judge was steeped in corruption and by making specific allegations as to how his case was affected?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bracy, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Bracy had made a sufficient factual showing to establish "good cause," as required by Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a), for discovery on his claim of actual judicial bias in his case. Chief Justice Rehnquist drew heavily on Bracy's contentions that his trial attorney, a former associate of Maloney's, had allegedly been involved in corruption and that he might have agreed to take Bracy's case to trial quickly so that the conviction would deflect any suspicion surrounding the rigged murder cases.

O'Dell v. Netherland

Tue, 18 Mar 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-6867

Petitioner

O'Dell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Netherland

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 151 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, March 18, 1997

Decided

Thursday, June 19, 1997

Advocates

Katherine P. Baldwin (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Robert S. Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

At the penalty phase of Joseph Roger O'Dell's state trial on capital murder, rape, and sodomy charges, the government presented evidence that he had been convicted of numerous other offenses. The court, subsequently, denied O'Dell's request for a jury instruction that he was ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison. After the jury determined that O'Dell presented a future danger, he was sentenced to death. The District Court, in granting O'Dell habeas relief, found that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, which requires that a capital defendant be permitted to inform his sentencing jury that he is parole-ineligible if the prosecution argues his future dangerousness, was not a "new rule" and, thus, entitled O'Dell to resentencing.

Question

Is the rule set forth in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, which requires that a capital defendant be permitted to inform his sentencing jury that he is parole-ineligible if the prosecution argues that he presents a future danger, new and thereby inapplicable to an already final death sentence?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Netherland, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the rule was new, and that it could not be used to disturb O'Dell's death sentence, which had been final for six years when Simmons was decided. Justice Thomas reasoned that the rule was new within the meaning of Teague v Lane, 489 U.S. 288. Moreover, Justice Thomas wrote that the rule was not a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding, so as to fall within an exception to Teague, thus making it applicable to O'Dell. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, arguing that the rule was not new and, if it was, its importance to the accuracy and fairness of a capital sentencing proceeding placed it within an exception to Teague.

Richardson v. McKnight

Wed, 19 Mar 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-318

Petitioner

Richardson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

McKnight

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 399 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, March 19, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1997

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

David C. Vladeck (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Charles R. Ray (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Ronnie Lee McKnight, a prisoner at Tennessee's South Central Correctional Center (SCCC), filed suit, under 42 USC section 1983, against two prison guards after he was placed in extremely tight physical restraints. Previously, the SCCC's management had been privatized by the State. Ultimately, the prison guards, Darryl Richardson and John Walker, asserted a qualified immunity and moved to dismiss the action. The District Court denied the motion, finding that, since a private prison management firm employed them, they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Are prison guards, who are employees of a private prison management firm, entitled to a qualified immunity from suit under 42 USC section 1983?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for McKnight, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that prison guards employed by a private firm are not entitled to a qualified immunity from suit by prisoners charging a section 1983 violation. Emphasizing that a private firm was systematically organized to manage the prison, Justice Breyer wrote that, "[o]ur examination of history and purpose...reveals nothing special enough about the job or about its organizational structure that would warrant providing these private prison guards with a governmental immunity." Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the Court had routinely determined section 1983 immunity on the basis of the public function being performed. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined Justice Scalia.

Young v. Ford Ice

Mon, 06 Jan 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-2031

Appellee

Ford Ice et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Young et al.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 273 (1997)

Argued

Monday, January 6, 1997

Decided

Monday, March 31, 1997

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Appellants)

Robert E. Sanders (on behalf of the Appellees)

Brenda Wright (on behalf of the Appellants)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Mississippi attempted to simplify voter registration in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). A "Provisional Plan" for registration replaced the "Old System," mandating that, among other things, driver's license applications could double as voter registration forms for state and federal elections. As required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), the U.S. Attorney General pre-cleared the Provisional Plan, confirming that it did not discriminate against minority voters. Mississippi abandoned the pre-cleared Provisional Plan in favor of a composite "New System," which used the Old System for state elections and both the Provisional Plan and Old System for federal elections. Mississippi assumed that the Attorney General's pre-clearance of the Provisional Plan extended to the New System. Thomas Young, a Mississippi citizen, filed suit against Governor Kirk Fordice, alleging a violation of the VRA. A three-judge District Court ruled in favor of Mississippi.

Question

Did the state of Mississippi violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by implementing a new voter registration policy, the "New System," without explicit approval from the U.S. Attorney General?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Young, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

Yes. The unanimous Court reversed the District Court and ruled that Mississippi must submit the New System to the Attorney General for pre- clearance. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that "the New System contains numerous examples of new, significantly different administrative practices [....]" Therefore, the Attorney General must ensure that the proposed policy does not discriminate against minorities.

Kansas v. Hendricks

Tue, 10 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Larned State Hospital

1301 Kansas 264 Hwy Larned KS 67550

Larned, KS 67550

United States

38° 10' 50.0484" N, 99° 5' 55.3668" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1649

Petitioner

Kansas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hendricks

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 95-9075

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 346 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, December 10, 1996

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1997

Advocates

Carla J. Stovall (Argued the cause for Kansas)

Thomas J. Weilert (Argued the cause for Hendricks)

Facts of the Case

As the time neared for Leroy Hendricks' release from prison, having served for his long history of child sexual molestation, the State of Kansas sought his commitment under its Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act). After testifying that he agreed with the diagnosis that he still suffered from pedophilia and is likely to molest children again, Hendricks became a candidate for civil commitment under the Act which provided for the institutionalization of persons likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence" brought on by "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder[s]." On appeal from a court ordered commitment, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Kansas certiorari.

Question

Did the Act's civil commitment provisions, based on its definition of what constitutes a "mental abnormality," violate substantive due process and double jeopardy requirements?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kansas, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. Despite Hendricks' claim that a certification of "mental illness" alone was too arbitrary to sustain a civil commitment order, the Court held that the Act met substantive due process standards by requiring considerable evidence of past violent sexual behavior and a present mental inclination to repeat such offenses. Furthermore, the Court held that since it required the release of confined persons who became mentally stable and no longer dangerous, did not speak of scienter, and lacked other procedural safeguards characteristic of criminal trials, the Act did not violate double jeopardy guarantees since it merely authorized "civil" rather than "criminal" commitments

Lynce v. Mathis

Mon, 04 Nov 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-7452

Petitioner

Lynce

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mathis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 433 (1997)

Argued

Monday, November 4, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, February 19, 1997

Advocates

Joel T. Remland (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Parker D. Thomson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Beginning in 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted a series of statutes authorizing the award of early release credits to prison inmates when the state prison population exceeded predetermined levels. In 1986, Kenneth Lynce received a 22-year prison sentence on a charge of attempted murder. In 1992, he was released based on the determination that he had accumulated five different types of early release credits totaling 5,668 days, including 1,860 days of "provisional credits" awarded as a result of prison overcrowding. Lynce was re-arrested and returned to custody shortly thereafter when the attorney general issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as having retroactively canceled all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder and attempted murder. Lynce filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution. The District Court rejected Lynce's argument dismissing the petition on the ground that the sole purpose of these credits was to alleviate prison overcrowding. The Court of Appeals denied a certificate of probable cause.

Question

Does Florida's 1992 statute canceling early release credits to prison inmates after they have been awarded violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lynce, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10: Ex Post Facto

Yes. In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the 1992 statute canceling provisional release credits violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution.

United States v. Hyde

Tue, 15 Apr 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-667

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hyde

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 670 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, April 15, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 1997

Advocates

Jonathan D. Soglin (on behalf of the Respondent)

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

United States v. Brockamp

Tue, 03 Dec 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1225

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brockamp

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. ?

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 347 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, December 3, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, February 18, 1997

Advocates

Robert F. Klueger (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Stanley B. McGill, whose estate is administrated by Marion Brockamp, paid the Internal Revenue Service money he did not owe. McGill, or his representative, submitted an administrative refund claim several years past the end of the applicable filing period set forth in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. McGill asked the court to extend the statutory period for an "equitable" reason, namely that he had a mental disability that caused the delay. Although such a reason is not mentioned in the Internal Revenue Code, the Court of Appeals read the statute as if it contained an implied "equitable tolling" exception, which the court found justified, and therefore permitted the actions to proceed.

Question

May courts toll, for nonstatutory reasons, the statutory time limitations for filing tax refund claims set forth in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that Congress did not intend the "equitable tolling" doctrine to apply to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986's time limitations for filing tax refund claims. Justice Breyer wrote that allowing such exceptions to the filing deadline "could create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, large numbers of late claims."

Lopez v. Monterey County

Tue, 08 Oct 1996 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1201

Appellee

Monterey County

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Lopez

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 9 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, October 8, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, November 6, 1996

Advocates

Daniel G. Stone (Sacramento, California; argued the cause for the appellees)

Alan Jenkins (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the appellants)

Joaquin G. Avila (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

Because Monterey County, California is a jurisdiction covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it must obtain federal preclearance of any voting practice different from its practices on November 1, 1968. Between 1972 and 1983, the County merged its nine separate and independent inferior court districts into a single, countywide municipal court served by judges whom County residents elected at large. In 1991, five Hispanic voters, who resided in the County, sued, alleging that the County had violated section 5 by failing to obtain federal preclearance of its judicial district consolidation ordinances. The County did not submit its ordinances after a three-judge District Court ruled against it. Rather, the County began to work with the voters to develop a new judicial election plan. Ultimately, the District Court ordered the County to conduct judicial elections under an at-large, countywide election plan.

Question

May a district court issue an order that authorizes a county covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to conduct judicial elections under an election plan that has not received federal approval pursuant to section 5?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lopez, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the District Court had erred in ordering the county to conduct the election under a plan that had not received federal approval pursuant to section 5. The Court reasoned that the County had not discharged its obligation of gaining preclearance of its election plan prior to its enactment. On remand, the Court left it to the District Court to decide whether changes in California law transformed the County into a state plan, for which section 5 preclearance is not required.

Reno v. ACLU

Wed, 19 Mar 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Attorney General Office

"950 Pennsylvania Avenue**** NW" Washington D.C. 20530

Washington 20530

United States

38° 53' 31.8084" N, 77° 1' 30.2196" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-511

Petitioner

ACLU

Respondent

Reno

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 844 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, March 19, 1997

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 1997

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner deemed "offensive" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions.

Question

Did certain provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violate the First and Fifth Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their definitions of the types of internet communications which they criminalized?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for ACLU, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications, limit its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact adults), provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive" material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that since the First Amendment distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions, protecting only the former, the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent" from its text. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.

Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor

Tue, 18 Feb 1997 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-270

Petitioner

Amchem Products, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Windsor

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 591 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, February 18, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 1997

Advocates

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Stephen M. Shapiro (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The volume and complexity of asbestos litigation led the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation to transfer all asbestos claims filed in federal courts, but not yet on trial, to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After this consolidation, counsel for the plaintiffs and the defendant manufacturers reached a partial global settlement: a class consisting of all individuals with potential asbestos claims who had not yet filed lawsuits would be certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(3) (FRCP) for purposes of settlement only. The proposed settlement created an administrative structure which provided set compensation for certain asbestos-related diseases. The District Court approved the plan, and certified the proposed class. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the lower court's order, finding that the requirements of class certification had not been met. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that while a class may be certified for the sole purpose of settlement, the certification requirements of FRCP 23 must still be met as though the case were going to trial. In this instance, the class failed to demonstrate that common issues predominated over other questions, FRCP 23(b)(3), or that the named plaintiffs would "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."

Question

May settlement play a role, under FRCP 23, in determining the propriety of class certification?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Windsor, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes, but a limited one. While the court of appeals had erred by stating that settlement was not relevant to class certification determinations, the lower court had, in fact, closely examined the terms of the settlement, and remand was therefore not merited. A court considering a class for settlement need not consider whether certification would present intractable management problems at the trial stage, but the remaining requirements of FRCP 23 must be met. Here those requirements were not fulfilled. First, despite the over-arching issue of asbestos-related health problems, common issues did not predominate given the very different injuries suffered by the plaintiffs, and the fact that some class members had not yet manifested physical disease. FRCP 23(b)(3). Second, the named parties would not adequately represent the class because those currently injured had interests distinct from those who had been exposed to asbestos but had not yet exhibited any physical symptoms. FRCP 23(a)(4). In resolving the case the Court declined to reach the issue of whether the settlement proceeding was a justiciable case or controversy under Article III because, it held, determination of class certification was logically antecedent to these issues.