Cases - 1994 term

Mckennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.

Wed, 02 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1543

Petitioner

Mckennon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nashville Banner Publishing Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 352 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, November 2, 1994

Decided

Monday, January 23, 1995

Advocates

Michael E. Terry (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

R. Eddie Wayland (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mckennon, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

None

Miller v. Johnson

Wed, 19 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Georgia General Assembly

206 Washington Street Capitol Square Atlanta GA 30334

Atlanta, GA 30334

United States

33° 44' 53.826" N, 84° 23' 17.5344" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-631

Petitioner

Johnson

Respondent

Miller

Consolidation

Abrams v. Johnson, No. 94-797

United States v. Johnson, No. 94-929

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 900 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, April 19, 1995

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1995

Advocates

A. Lee Parks (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Drew S. Days, III (Argued the cause for the federal appellant)

David F. Walbert (Argued the cause for the state appellants)

Facts of the Case

Between 1980 and 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black. According to the 1990 decennial census, Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the state's congressional districts. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts, the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. This district, however, was called a "geographic monstrosity" because it extended 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. In short, "the social, political, and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community."

Question

Is racial gerrymandering of the congressional redistricting process a violation of the Equal Protection Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Johnson, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. In some instances, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based on race. Applying the rule laid down in Shaw v. Reno requires strict scrutiny whenever race is the "overriding, predominant force" in the redistricting process.

Stone v. Immigration And Naturalization Service

Mon, 28 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1199

Petitioner

Stone

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Immigration And Naturalization Service

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 386 (1995)

Argued

Monday, November 28, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, April 19, 1995

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (on behalf of the Respondent)

Alan B. Morrison (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Immigration And Naturalization Service, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

None

Anderson, Director, California Department Of Social Services

Wed, 18 Jan 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1883

Petitioner

Anderson, Director, California Department Of Social Services, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 143 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, January 18, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, March 22, 1995

Advocates

Paul A. Engelmayer (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Dennis Paul Eckhart (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Katherine Meiss (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Anderson, Director, California Department Of Social Services, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC--provisions of the Social Security Act)

None

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.

Tue, 10 Jan 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-18

Petitioner

Mastrobuono et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 52 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, January 10, 1995

Decided

Monday, March 6, 1995

Advocates

Joseph Polizzotto (on behalf of the Respondents)

Malcolm L. Stewart (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

William J. Harte (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Mastrobuono, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 1

None

United States v. Shabani

Mon, 03 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-981

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shabani

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 10 (1994)

Argued

Monday, October 3, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, November 1, 1994

Advocates

Dennis P. Riordan (on behalf of the Respondent)

Richard H. Seamon (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 846

None

Missouri v. Jenkins

Wed, 11 Jan 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1823

Petitioner

Missouri et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jenkins et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 70 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 12, 1995

Advocates

Paul Bender (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

John R. Munich (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Theodore M. Shaw (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Missouri, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Federal Election Commission v. Nra Political Victory Fund

Tue, 11 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1151

Petitioner

Federal Election Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nra Political Victory Fund et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 88 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, December 6, 1994

Advocates

Charles J. Cooper (on behalf of the Respondents)

Paul Bender (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Lawrence M. Noble (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Nra Political Victory Fund, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 2 U.S.C. 437

None

Nebraska Department Of Revenue v. Loewenstein

Tue, 11 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-823

Petitioner

Nebraska Department Of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Loewenstein

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 123 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 1994

Decided

Monday, December 12, 1994

Advocates

L. Jay Bartel (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Terry R. Wittler (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nebraska Department Of Revenue, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 31 U.S.C. 3124

None

North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas

Tue, 25 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-834

Petitioner

North Star Steel Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Thomas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 94-835

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 29 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, April 25, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, May 30, 1995

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Steven B. Feirson (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Laurence E. Gold (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) authorizes a civil enforcement action by aggrieved employees or their union against a covered employer who fails to give 60 days notice of a plant closing or mass layoff, but provides no limitations period for such an action. In 94-835, the United Steelworkers of America filed a WARN claim, charging Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. with laying off 85 employees without giving the required 60-day notice. In rejecting Crown Cork's contention that the statute of limitations had run, the District Court held that the source of the limitations period for WARN suits is state law and that the union's suit was timely under any of the arguably applicable Pennsylvania statutes. In 94-834, another District Court granted summary judgment for North Star Steel Company, holding the nonunion employees' suit barred under a limitations period borrowed from the National Labor Relations Act, which the court believed was more analogous to WARN than any state law. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and held that a WARN limitations period should be borrowed from state, not federal, law.

Question

Is state law the proper source of the limitations period for civil actions brought to enforce the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Thomas, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 29 U.S.C. 2101

Yes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that State law is the proper source of the limitations period for civil actions brought to enforce WARN. Where a federal statute fails to provide any limitations period for a new cause of action, the Court noted that its longstanding practice has been to borrow the limitations period from the most closely analogous state statute. The Court reasoned that North Star did not fall within the exception where the relevant state limitations periods would frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies or be at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in the judgment.

Hubbard v. United States

Tue, 21 Feb 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-172

Petitioner

Hubbard

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 695 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, February 21, 1995

Decided

Monday, May 15, 1995

Advocates

Richard P. Bress (on behalf of the Respondent)

Paul Morris (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Hubbard, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1001

None

United States v. X-Citement Video

Wed, 05 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-723

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

X-Citement Video

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 64 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, November 29, 1994

Advocates

Stanley Fleishman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Drew S. Days, III (Argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 prohibited the interstate transportation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual materials containing children engaged in sexually explicit acts. Richard Gottesman, owner and manager of X-Citement Video, sold forty-nine tapes to undercover officers. Gottesman shipped the videos, containing pornographic acts by industry legend Traci Lords before she turned eighteen, to Hawaii. Although he claimed he did not know the tapes contained underage pornographic acts, Gottesman was arrested for violating the sexual exploitation act.

Question

Did the Act's use of the term "knowingly" violate the First Amendment's Free Speech clause by not mandating a showing that the alleged offender knew which materials contained under-age performances?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2252

No. The Court relied on an awkward grammatical construction as it held that the term "knowingly" applied to the entire passage of the law. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated that other interpretations failed to make sense since Congress obviously did not envision people accidentally mailing underage pornographic materials. All the law required was a showing that alleged violators intentionally distributed illegal pornography, regardless of whether they knew it depicted underage performances.

Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation

Mon, 24 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-771

Petitioner

Oklahoma Tax Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chickasaw Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 450 (1995)

Argued

Monday, April 24, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, June 14, 1995

Advocates

Paul A. Engelmayer (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Charles A. Rothfeld (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Dennis W. Arrow (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Oklahoma Tax Commission, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 7 Stat. 333

Split Vote

None

Commissioner Of Internal Revenue v. Schleier

Mon, 27 Mar 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-500

Petitioner

Commissioner Of Internal Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Schleier et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 323 (1995)

Argued

Monday, March 27, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, June 14, 1995

Advocates

Kent L. Jones (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Thomas F. Joyce (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Commissioner Of Internal Revenue, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

None

American Airlines v. Wolens

Tue, 01 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1286

Petitioner

American Airlines

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wolens

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 219 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, November 1, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 1995

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Cornelia T. L. Pillard (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Gilbert W. Gordon (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer program, AAdvantage, challenged American's retroactive changes in program terms and conditions. Specially, the participants alleged that American's imposition of capacity controls and blackout dates to mileage credits they had previously accumulated violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted a breach of contract. American responded that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) preempted the claim. The ADA prohibits States from "enacting or enforcing any law...relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services." The Illinois Supreme Court ruled to allow the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act monetary relief claims to survive. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, American petitioned for certiorari.

Question

Does the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 preempt a state-court suit, brought by participants in an airline's frequent flyer program, challenging the airline's retroactive changes in terms and conditions of the program?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for American Airlines, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 1305

Yes. In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the ADA bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers, thus claims brought under a state's consumer fraud act are preempted; but that the ADA allows room for court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves, which permits breach of contract claims to proceed. "A remedy confined to a contract's terms simply holds parties to their agreements -- in this instance, to business judgments an airline made public about its rates and services," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justice Thomas Clarence. Justice Antonin Scalia took no part in the decision of the case.

Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital

Mon, 31 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1251

Petitioner

Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Guernsey Memorial Hospital

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 87 (1995)

Argued

Monday, October 31, 1994

Decided

Monday, March 6, 1995

Advocates

Scott W. Taebel (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kent L. Jones (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Medicare--provisions of the Social Security Act

None

United States v. National Treasury Employees Union

Tue, 08 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1170

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Treasury Employees Union

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 454 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, November 8, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 1995

Advocates

Paul Bender (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Gregory O'Duden (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, prohibits members of Congress, federal officers, and other government employees from accepting an honorarium for making an appearance, speech, or writing an article. The prohibition applies even when neither the subject of the speech or article nor the person or group paying for it has any connection with the employee's official duties. The National Treasury Employees Union filed suit challenging the honorarium ban as an unconstitutional abridgement of its freedom of speech. A District Court held the ban unconstitutional and enjoined the government from enforcing it against Executive Branch employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the honoraria ban abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for National Treasury Employees Union, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 6 to 3 decision delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court declared that a flat ban violated free-speech rights. Concerns about impropriety do not apply if there is no link between a government employee's job and "the subject matter of the expression or the character of the payor."

Adarand Constructors v. Pena

Tue, 17 Jan 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Location

U.S. Department of Transportation

"1200 New Jersey Ave**** SE" Washington DC 20590

Washington, DC 20590

United States

38° 54' 19.5228" N, 77° 0' 53.3592" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1841

Petitioner

Adarand Constructors

Respondent

Pena

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 200 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 12, 1995

Advocates

William Perry Pendley (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Drew S. Days, III (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales.

Question

Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and consequent allocation of favored treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection principle embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Adarand Constructors, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547), the Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. In other words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The Court added that compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards. However, since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny.

U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton

Tue, 29 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Arkansas General Assembly

425 W Capitol Ave Little Rock AR 72201

Little Rock, AR 72201

United States

34° 44' 39.3288" N, 92° 16' 31.2348" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1456

Petitioner

U.S. Term Limits

Respondent

Ray Thornton

Consolidation

No. 93-1828

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 779 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, November 29, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 22, 1995

Advocates

Louis R. Cohen (Argued the cause for the respondent Hill in both cases)

J. Winston Bryant (Pro se, argued the cause for petitioner in Bryant v. Hill)

John G. Kester (Argued the cause for U.S. Term Limits, Inc)

Drew S. Days, III (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance)

Facts of the Case

On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. The "Term Limitation Amendment," in addition to limiting terms of elected officials within the Arkansas state government, also provided that any person who served three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Representative from Arkansas. Similarly, the Amendment provided that any person who served two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas.

Question

Can states alter those qualifications for the U.S. Congress that are specifically enumerated in the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Thornton, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Composition of the House of Representatives

No. The Constitution prohibits States from adopting Congressional qualifications in addition to those enumerated in the Constitution. A state congressional term limits amendment is unconstitutional if it has the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and "has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly." Furthermore, "...allowing individual States to craft their own congressional qualifications would erode the structure designed by the Framers to form a 'more perfect Union.'"

United States v. Lopez

Tue, 08 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Edison High School

701 Santa Monica San Antonio TX 78212

San Antonio, TX 78212

United States

29° 28' 22.3068" N, 98° 30' 20.7036" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1260

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lopez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 549 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, November 8, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 1995

Advocates

John R. Carter (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Drew S. Days, III (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.

Question

Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lopez, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 922

Yes. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic activity.

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc.

Mon, 09 Jan 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1577

Petitioner

Qualitex Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jacobson Products Co., Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 159 (1995)

Argued

Monday, January 9, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, March 28, 1995

Advocates

Donald G. Mulack (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence D. Strick (on behalf of the Respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Qualitex Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1051

None

Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen

Tue, 17 Jan 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1935

Petitioner

Curtiss-Wright Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Schoonejongen et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 73 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 1995

Decided

Monday, March 6, 1995

Advocates

Richard P. Bress (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Thomas M. Kennedy (on behalf of the Respondents)

Laurence Reich (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Curtiss-Wright Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

None

Garlotte v. Fordice, Governor Of Mississippi

Mon, 24 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-6790

Petitioner

Garlotte

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fordice, Governor Of Mississippi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 39 (1995)

Argued

Monday, April 24, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, May 30, 1995

Advocates

Brian D. Boyle (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Marvin L. White, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Garlotte, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

Witte v. United States

Mon, 17 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-6187

Petitioner

Witte

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 389 (1995)

Argued

Monday, April 17, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, June 14, 1995

Advocates

H. Michael Sokolow (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Edward C. DuMont (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Double Jeopardy

None

Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation

Mon, 03 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1197

Petitioner

Hess et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 30 (1994)

Argued

Monday, October 3, 1994

Decided

Monday, November 14, 1994

Advocates

Lawrence Allen Katz (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Hugh H. Welsh (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Hess, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

None

Anderson, Director, California Department Of Social Services v. Green

Tue, 17 Jan 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-197

Petitioner

Anderson, Director, California Department Of Social Services, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Green et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 557 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 1995

Advocates

Kathleen M. Sullivan (on behalf of the Respondents)

Theodore Garelis (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Green, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

New York State Conference Of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.

Wed, 18 Jan 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1408

Petitioner

New York State Conference Of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans et al.

Respondent

Travelers Insurance Co. et al.

Consolidation

No. 93-1414

No. 93-1415

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 645 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, January 18, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 1995

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Craig P. Murphy (on behalf of the Respondents Travelers Insurance Company, et al)

Harold N. Iselin (on behalf of the Respondents New York State Health, et al)

M. Patricia Smith (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for New York State Conference Of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

None

National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission

Tue, 18 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-688

Petitioner

National Private Truck Council, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oklahoma Tax Commission et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 582 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, April 18, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 19, 1995

Advocates

Stanley P. Johnston (on behalf of the Respondent)

Richard A. Allen (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Oklahoma Tax Commission, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Johnson v. Jones

Tue, 18 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-455

Petitioner

Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jones

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 304 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, April 18, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 12, 1995

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (Argued the cause for petitioners)

Edward G. Proctor, Jr. (Argued the cause for respondent)

Cornelia T. L. Pillard (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Police officers found Houston Jones, a diabetic, on the street while he was having an insulin seizure. The officers arrested Jones because he appeared drunk. Later, Jones found himself with several broken ribs. Jones brought a constitutional tort action against the officers, claiming that they used excessive force when they arrested him and that they beat him at the police station. As government officials, the officers were entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense. Three of the officers moved for summary judgment arguing that he could point to no evidence that these three had beaten him or had been present during beatings. Holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting Jones's theory of the case, the District Court denied the motion. The officers sought an immediate appeal, arguing that the denial was wrong because the evidence in the pretrial record was not sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court of Appeals held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

Question

Is a Federal District Court's determination, in denying a summary judgment motion of police officers entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense, that the record raised a factual issue an appealable final decision?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jones, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 29 U.S.C. 1291

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a defendant, who is entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a District Court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court reasoned, in part, that the competing considerations underlying questions of finality, including the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review, the danger of denying justice by delay, the comparative expertise of trial and appellate courts, and the wise use of appellate resources, argue against allowing immediate appeals of orders of the kind in question and in favor of limiting interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity matters to cases presenting more abstract issues of law.

Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo

Tue, 25 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-820

Petitioner

Metropolitan Stevedore Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rambo

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 291 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, April 25, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 12, 1995

Advocates

Robert E. Babcock (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the Federal respondent supporting the petitioner)

Thomas J. Pierry (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA on the ground that there had been a change in conditions such that Rambo was no longer disabled. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA authorizes modification only where there has been a change in an employee's physical condition.

Question

Does the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act allow a party to seek modification of a disability award on the ground of change in conditions, when there has been no change in the employee's physical condition but rather an increase in the employee's wage-earning capacity due to the acquisition of new skills?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Metropolitan Stevedore Co., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that a disability award may be modified under the LHWCA where there is a change in the employee's wage-earning capacity, even without any change in the employee's physical condition. The Court reasoned that, because an interpretation of the term "change in conditions" to include not only changes in physical condition but also changes in other conditions relevant to the initial entitlement to benefits, such as a change in wage-earning capacity is consistent with the purpose of the LHWCA. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that the term refers to the physical condition of the person receiving compensation and should not be departed from absent any indication from Congress.

Kyles v. Whitley, Warden

Mon, 07 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-7927

Petitioner

Kyles

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Whitley, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 419 (1995)

Argued

Monday, November 7, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, April 19, 1995

Advocates

Jack Peebles (on behalf of the Respondent)

James S. Liebman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kyles, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services v. Whitecotton

Tue, 28 Feb 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-372

Petitioner

Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Whitecotton et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 268 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, February 28, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, April 18, 1995

Advocates

Robert Thomas Moxley (on behalf of the Respondents)

Irving L. Gornstein (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 300

None

United States v. Robertson

Mon, 27 Feb 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-251

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robertson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 669 (1995)

Argued

Monday, February 27, 1995

Decided

Monday, May 1, 1995

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Glenn S. Warren (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

None

California Department Of Corrections v. Morales

Mon, 09 Jan 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1462

Petitioner

California Department Of Corrections et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Morales

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 499 (1995)

Argued

Monday, January 9, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, April 25, 1995

Advocates

James Ching (on behalf of the Petitioners)

James R. Asperger (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for California Department Of Corrections, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10: Ex Post Facto

None

Reich v. Collins, Revenue Commissioner Of Georgia

Tue, 11 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-908

Petitioner

Reich

Respondent

Collins, Revenue Commissioner Of Georgia, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 106 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, December 6, 1994

Advocates

Carlton M. Henson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Warren R. Calvert (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Reich, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Gutierrez De Martinez v. Lamagno

Wed, 22 Mar 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-167

Petitioner

Gutierrez De Martinez et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lamagno et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 417 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, March 22, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, June 14, 1995

Advocates

Michael K. Kellogg (as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below)

Andrew J. Maloney, III (on behalf of Respondent Lamagno)

Isidoro Rodriguez (on behalf of Petitioners)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Federal Respondent in support of Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gutierrez De Martinez, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 2679

None

O'neal v. Mcaninch, Warden

Mon, 31 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-7407

Petitioner

O'neal

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mcaninch, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 432 (1995)

Argued

Monday, October 31, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 1995

Advocates

Richard A. Cordray (on behalf of the Respondent)

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Thomas R. Wetterer, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for O'neal, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

Tome v. United States

Wed, 05 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-6892

Petitioner

Tome

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 150 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, January 10, 1995

Advocates

Joseph W. Gandert (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Tome, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission

Wed, 12 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Ohio Elections Commission

21 West Broad Street Columbus OH 43215

Columbus, OH 43215

United States

39° 57' 43.092" N, 83° 0' 4.86" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-986

Petitioner

McIntyre

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ohio Elections Commission

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 334 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, October 12, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, April 19, 1995

Advocates

Andrew L. Sutter (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David A. Goldberger (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.

Question

Does the prohibition of the distribution of anonymous campaign literature abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for McIntyre, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment and "extends beyond the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes." When a law burdens such anonymous speech, the Court applies "exacting scrutiny," upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.

Arizona v. Evans

Wed, 07 Dec 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1660

Petitioner

Arizona

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Evans

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 1 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, December 7, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, March 1, 1995

Advocates

Carol A. Carrigan (on behalf of the Respondent)

Gerald R. Grant (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Arizona, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Exclusionary Rule (admissibility of evidence allegedly in violation of the Fourth Amendment)

None

Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette

Wed, 26 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-780

Petitioner

Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pinette

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 753 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, April 26, 1995

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1995

Advocates

Michael J. Renner (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Benson A. Wolman (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the Advisory Board responsibility for regulating access to the square. The Board denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on Establishment Clause grounds.

Question

Did the Board's denial of a permit to the Ku Klux Klan violate free speech under the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Pinette, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. The display was private religious speech that "is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression." Because Capitol Square is designated as a traditional public forum, any group may express their views there, and the Board may regulate the content of the Klan's expression on the plaza only if a restriction is necessary and narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.

Vernonia School District v. Acton

Tue, 28 Mar 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Vernonia High School

299 Bridge Street Vernonia OR 97064

Vernonia, OR 97064

United States

45° 51' 30.978" N, 123° 11' 22.5636" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-590

Petitioner

Vernonia School District

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Acton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 646 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, March 28, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 26, 1995

Advocates

Thomas M. Christ (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Timothy R. Volpert (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Richard H. Seamon (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.

Question

Does random drug testing of high school athletes violate the reasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Vernonia School District, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. The reasonableness of a search is judged by "balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." In the case of high school athletes who are under State supervision during school hours, they are subject to greater control than over free adults. The privacy interests compromised by urine samples are negligible since the conditions of collection are similar to public restrooms, and the results are viewed only by limited authorities. Furthermore, the governmental concern over the safety of minors under their supervision overrides the minimal, if any, intrusion in student-athletes' privacy.

U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership

Tue, 04 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-714

Petitioner

U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bonner Mall Partnership

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 18 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, October 4, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, November 8, 1994

Advocates

John Ford Elsaesser, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the U.S., as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Bradford Anderson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bonner Mall Partnership, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick

Wed, 22 Feb 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-286

Petitioner

Freightliner Corp. et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Myrick et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 280 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, February 22, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, April 18, 1995

Advocates

Charles Fried (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Michael H. Gottesman (on behalf of the Respondents)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Myrick, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1381

None

Rosenberger v. University of Virginia

Wed, 01 Mar 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Location

University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA 22904

United States

38° 2' 0.4272" N, 78° 30' 51.3324" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-329

Petitioner

Rosenberger

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

University of Virginia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 819 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 1995

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1995

Advocates

Michael W. McConnell (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

John C. Jeffries, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a diety or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by University guidelines.

Question

Did the University of Virginia violate the First Amendment rights of its Christian magazine staff by denying them the same funding resources that it made available to secular student-run magazines?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Rosenberger, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. The Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion, held that the University's denial of funding to Rosenberger, due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that no matter how scarce University publication funding may be, if it chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Furtheremore, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious content, the Court found the University's publication policy to be neutral toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause. The Court concluded by stating that the University could not stop all funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech as the exclusion of only one. The University must provide a financial subsidy to a student religious publication on the same basis as other student publications.

Director, Office Of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department Of Labor v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.

Mon, 09 Jan 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1783

Petitioner

Director, Office Of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department Of Labor

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 122 (1995)

Argued

Monday, January 9, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, March 21, 1995

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence P. Postol (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation

None

Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, Dba Deebees

Mon, 07 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-2038

Petitioner

Asgrow Seed Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Winterboer et al., Dba Deebees

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 179 (1995)

Argued

Monday, November 7, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 1995

Advocates

William H. Bode (on behalf of the Respondents)

Richard H. Seamon (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Richard L. Stanley (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Asgrow Seed Company (Asgrow) held two Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) certificates protecting different varieties of soybean seed. These PVPA certificates act like patents in order to promote research on new varieties of plants and to protect the owners of seed varieties from unauthorized sales. However, there is an exemption for farmers who sell seed to other farmers whose primary occupation is growing crops for sale. In 1990, Winterboer planted and harvested 265 acres of land with two Asgrow soybean varieties. He then sold enough to plant 10,000 acres to other farmers for use as seed. Asgrow claimed that the PVPA prohibits anyone from selling for seed more than would be needed to replant his own fields - an amount greatly exceeded by Winterboer's sales. Winterboer argued that the exemptions in the statute protect sales of unlimited amounts of seed as long as both seller and buyer grow crops primarily for "other than reproductive purposes." The District Court ruled in favor of Asgrow, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and denied Asgrow's petition for rehearing.

Question

Is the quantity of protected seed that a farmer can sell under the exemptions in the Plant Variety Protection Act limited to the amount of seed the seller would need to replant his own fields?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Asgrow Seed Co., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 7 U.S.C. 2543

Yes. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a farmer may sell for reproductive purposes only such seed as he has saved for the purpose of replanting his own fields. While the statute allows farmers to save seed to replant and then sell that saved seed to other farmers for planting, the statute prohibits growing protected seed as a "step in marketing" it as seed for planting. The Court held that because Winterboer's planting and harvesting were conducted solely to market (that is, to sell) Asgrow's protected seed varieties, he forfeited eligibility for the PVPA exemption and infringed on Asgrow's protective certificates.

United States v. Hays

Wed, 19 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-558

Appellee

Hays et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 94-627

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 737 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, April 19, 1995

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1995

Advocates

Richard I. Ieyoub (on behalf of the State Appellants)

Drew S. Days, III (on behalf of the Federal Appellant)

Edward W. Warren (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Nationsbank Of North Carolina, N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.

Wed, 07 Dec 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1612

Petitioner

Nationsbank Of North Carolina, N. A., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 93-1613

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 251 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, December 7, 1994

Decided

Thursday, January 19, 1995

Advocates

Steven S. Rosenthal (on behalf of the Petitioners NationsBank, et al)

David Overlock Stewart (on behalf of the Respondents)

Edward C. DuMont (on behalf of the Petitioners Ludwig, et al)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nationsbank Of North Carolina, N. A., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 12 U.S.C. 24

None

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., Fka Alloyd Holdings, Inc.

Wed, 02 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-404

Petitioner

Gustafson et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alloyd Co., Inc., Fka Alloyd Holdings, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 561 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, November 2, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, February 28, 1995

Advocates

Robert J. Kopecky (on behalf of the respondents)

Donald W. Jenkins (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gustafson, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

None

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.

Wed, 30 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Spendthrift Farm

884 Iron Works Pike Lexington KY 40511

Lexington, KY 40511

United States

38° 6' 47.88" N, 84° 25' 49.44" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1121

Petitioner

Ed Plaut et al.

Respondent

Spendthrift Farm, Inc., et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 211 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, November 30, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, April 18, 1995

Advocates

William H. Allen (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Federal Respondent supporting the Petitioners)

Theodore B. Olson (on behalf of the Private Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1987, several Spendthrift Farm shareholders, including Ed Plaut, brought suit against the corporation claiming stock sales in 1983 and 1984 had violated the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court's ruling in Lampf v Gilbertson (1991) set a universal time limit of three years after an alleged violation for suits stemming from the relevant portion the Securities and Exchange Act. Based on this ruling, a district court judge dismissed the shareholders' case on August 13, 1991. On December 19, 1991, Congress enacted the FDIC Improvement Act, which required courts to reinstate cases dismissed under the Supreme Court's limitation in Lampf. The shareholders filed a motion to reinstate. A district court judge agreed the act required the case be reinstated, but denied the request on the ground that Congress had violated separation of powers in requiring the courts to reopen settled matters. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's conclusion on the same ground.

Question

Did Congress violate separation of powers by requiring federal courts reopen settled cases as part of the FDIC Improvement Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court concluded that Congress had usurped power assigned to the judiciary by Article III and thus had violated the separation of powers principle. Justice Scalia notes that Article III assigns to the courts the "judicial power of the United States" and the power to "say what the law is." According to the Court, this clearly includes "the power to render final judgments," and by enacting what Justice Scalia describes as "retroactive legislation, that is, legislation that prescribes what the law was at an earlier time," Congress intruded upon the power of the courts to issue "the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy." Thus, Congress had violated separation of powers.

Heintz v. Jenkins

Tue, 21 Feb 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-367

Petitioner

Heintz et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jenkins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 291 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, February 21, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, April 18, 1995

Advocates

Daniel A. Edelman (on behalf of the Respondent)

George W. Spellmire (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jenkins, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1692

None

Hurley v. Irish American GLIB Association

Tue, 25 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Location

South Boston Allied War Veterans Council Boston, MA

United States

42° 21' 30.3516" N, 71° 3' 35.1828" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-749

Petitioner

Hurley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Irish American GLIB Association

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 557 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, April 25, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 19, 1995

Advocates

Chester Darling (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

John Ward (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech.

Question

Did a Massachusetts State Court's mandate to Boston's Veterans' Council, requiring it to include GLIB members in its parade, violate the Council's free speech rights as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hurley, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. A unanimous court held that the State Court's ruling to require private citizens who organize a parade to include a group expressing a message that the organizers do not wish to convey violates the First Amendment by making private speech to the public accommodation requirement. Such an action "violate[s] the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say."

United States v. Williams

Wed, 22 Feb 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-395

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Williams

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 527 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, February 22, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, April 25, 1995

Advocates

Philip Garrett Panitz (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kent L. Jones (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Williams, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

None

Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.

Mon, 27 Mar 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-562

Petitioner

Wilton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Seven Falls Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 277 (1995)

Argued

Monday, March 27, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 12, 1995

Advocates

Werner A. Powers (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Michael A. Orlando (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

London Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group, which was involved in litigation over the ownership and operation of Texas oil and gas properties, under several commercial liability insurance policies. After a verdict was entered against the Hill Group, the underwriters sought a federal declaratory judgment that their policies did not cover the Hill Group's liability. The Hill Group filed a state court suit and moved to dismiss or to stay the underwriter's action. The District Court entered a stay on the ground that the state suit encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the federal action. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that a district court has broad discretion to grant or decline to grant declaratory judgment, the appellate court did not require application of the exceptional circumstances test. The appellate court also reviewed the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion and found none.

Question

Does the exceptional circumstances test govern a district court's decision to stay a declaratory judgment action during the pendency of parallel state court proceedings? Should a court of appeals evaluate a district court's decision to do so under an abuse of discretion standard of review?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Seven Falls Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 2201

No and yes. In a 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the discretionary standard of Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, governs a district court's decision to stay a declaratory judgment action during the pendency of parallel state court proceedings and that a district courts' decisions about the propriety of hearing declaratory judgment actions should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Court also concluded that the District Court acted within its bounds in staying the declaratory relief action in this case, since parallel proceedings, presenting an opportunity for the ventilation of the same state law issues, were underway in state court. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate.

Kansas v. Colorado

Tue, 21 Mar 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

105 ORIG

Plaintiff

Kansas

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

Colorado

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 673 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, March 21, 1995

Decided

Monday, May 15, 1995

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the United States)

David W. Robbins (on behalf of the Defendant Colorado)

John B. Draper (on behalf of the Plaintiff Kansas)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Colorado, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 63 Stat. 145

None

Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.

Mon, 05 Dec 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-768

Petitioner

Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 414 (1995)

Argued

Monday, December 5, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 1995

Advocates

Michael G. Bruton (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Richard K. Willard (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

None

Celotex Corp. v. Edwards Et ux.

Tue, 06 Dec 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1504

Petitioner

Celotex Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Edwards Et ux.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 300 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, December 6, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, April 19, 1995

Advocates

Brent M. Rosenthal (on behalf of the Respondents)

Jeffrey W. Warren (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Celotex Corp., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1334

None

Harris v. Alabama

Mon, 05 Dec 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-7659

Petitioner

Harris

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alabama

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 504 (1995)

Argued

Monday, December 5, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 1995

Advocates

P. David Bjurberg (on behalf of the Respondent)

Ruth Friedman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Alabama, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Mon, 07 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1525

Petitioner

Lebron

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 374 (1995)

Argued

Monday, November 7, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 1995

Advocates

David D. Cole (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Kevin T. Baine (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Lebron, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson

Tue, 04 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1001

Petitioner

Allied-Bruce Terminix Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dobson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 265 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, October 4, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 1995

Advocates

Allan R. Chason (Argued the cause for the respondents)

H. Bartow Farr, III (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1987, Steven Gwin, a homeowner in Birmingham, Alabama, bought a lifetime "Termite Protection Plan" from a local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Company. The termite prevention contract specified that any controversy would be settled exclusively by arbitration. After the Gwins sold their house and transferred their plan to the Dobsons, the Dobsons initiated suit against the Gwins, Allied-Bruce, and Terminix following a termite infestation. Allied- Bruce and Terminix asked for, but were denied, a stay to allow for arbitration under the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act. In affirming, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial of the stay on the basis of a state statute making written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. The court also found that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply because the parties entering the contract contemplated transactions that were primarily local and not substantially interstate.

Question

Should the Federal Arbitration Act, making an arbitration provision enforceable in contracts "evidencing a transaction involving commerce," be applied broadly?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 1

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act applied to all disputes involving commerce, and thus the arbitration clause was valid and enforceable. The Court reasoned that the word "involving" in section 2 of the Act signaled an intent to exercise Congress' commerce clause power to the full and that section 2 is to be read requiring only that the "transaction" in fact "involve" interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas filed dissenting opinions.

Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde

Mon, 27 Feb 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-3

Petitioner

Reynoldsville Casket Co. et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hyde

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 749 (1995)

Argued

Monday, February 27, 1995

Decided

Monday, May 15, 1995

Advocates

William E. Riedel (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Timothy B. Dyk (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Reynoldsville Casket Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 6, Section 2: Supremacy Clause

None

Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis

Tue, 21 Feb 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-325

Petitioner

Chandris, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Latsis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 347 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, February 21, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, June 14, 1995

Advocates

David W. McCreadie (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Lewis Rosenberg (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Latsis, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Jones, or Death on the High Seas

None

Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer

Mon, 20 Mar 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-623

Petitioner

Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S. A.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

M/V Sky Reefer et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 528 (1995)

Argued

Monday, March 20, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 19, 1995

Advocates

Stanley McDermott, III (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Thomas C. Walsh (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for M/V Sky Reefer, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 46 U.S.C. 1300

None

Schlup v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center

Mon, 03 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-7901

Petitioner

Schlup

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 298 (1995)

Argued

Monday, October 3, 1994

Decided

Monday, January 23, 1995

Advocates

Jeremiah W. Nixon (on behalf of the Respondent)

Sean D. O'Brien (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Schlup, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

First Options v. Kaplan

Wed, 22 Mar 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-560

Petitioner

First Options

Respondent

Kaplan

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 938 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, March 22, 1995

Decided

Monday, May 22, 1995

Advocates

James D. Holzhauer (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

After the October 1987 stock market crash, First Options of Chicago, Inc., a firm that clears stock trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, demanded that Manuel Kaplan, his wife, and his wholly owned investment company, MK Investments, Inc. (MKI) immediately pay the entire MKI debt. When First Options' demands for payment went unsatisfied, it sought arbitration by a panel of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange based on workout agreements, which governed the working out of debts owned by Kaplan, his wife, and MKI. MKI, which had signed the only workout document containing an arbitration agreement, submitted to arbitration, but the Kaplans, who had not signed that document, filed objections with the panel. The Kaplans argued that their disagreement with First Options not was arbitrable. After deciding that they had the power to rule on the dispute's merits, the arbitrators ruled in First Options' favor. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the award, finding that the dispute was not arbitrable. The appellate court concluded that courts should independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over a dispute, and that it would apply ordinary standards of review when considering the District Court's denial of a motion to vacate the arbitration award.

Question

Is the arbitrability of disputes subject to independent review by the courts? Should courts of appeals apply an "abuse of discretion" standard when reviewing district court upholding arbitration awards?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kaplan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 1

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts and that, rather than a special abuse of discretion standard, courts of appeals should apply ordinary standards when reviewing district court decisions upholding arbitration awards. "We conclude that, because the Kaplans did not clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court.

Brown, Secretary Of Veterans Affairs v. Gardner

Mon, 31 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1128

Petitioner

Brown, Secretary Of Veterans Affairs

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gardner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 115 (1994)

Argued

Monday, October 31, 1994

Decided

Monday, December 12, 1994

Advocates

Joseph M. Hannon, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Edward C. DuMont (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Fred P. Gardner was treated in a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facility. Afterwards, he experienced weakness in his left leg, allegedly a result of the surgery. He claimed disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, which requires the VA to pay disability compensation if an injury occurs as a result of or is worsened by treatment. The VA and the Board of Veterans Appeals denied the claim, stating that the statute, as interpreted by VA regulation 38 CFR 3.358 (c)(3), requires that the claimant prove that the injury arose due to negligence or error by the VA facility. The Court of Veterans Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that the fault-or-accident requirement in 38 CFR 3.358 was not warranted by Section 1151. The decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Question

Is Department of Veterans Affairs regulation 38 CFR 3.358 (c)(3), which restricts disability compensation to injuries caused by accidents or negligence during surgery, consistent with the controlling statute, 38 U.S.C. 1151?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gardner, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 38 U.S.C. 1151

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice David Souter, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision and ruled for Gardner. The Court held that Section 1151 contains no language requiring proof of fault, and it rejected the Government's claims that the requirement was implicit in the language of the statute. The Court acknowledged the 60-year longevity of the regulation and the post-1934 legislative silence on the issue, but neither concern could overcome the plain language of Section 1151.

United States v. Gaudin

Mon, 17 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-514

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gaudin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 506 (1995)

Argued

Monday, April 17, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 19, 1995

Advocates

Richard A. Hansen (on behalf of the Respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gaudin, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Rubin, Secretary Of The Treasury v. Coors Brewing Co.

Wed, 30 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1631

Petitioner

Rubin, Secretary Of The Treasury

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Coors Brewing Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 476 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, November 30, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, April 19, 1995

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Coors Brewing Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 27 U.S.C. 205

None

Reno, Attorney General v. Koray

Mon, 24 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-790

Petitioner

Reno, Attorney General, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Koray

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 50 (1995)

Argued

Monday, April 24, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 5, 1995

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Irwin Rochman (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Reno, Attorney General, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3585

None

Ryder v. United States

Tue, 18 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-431

Petitioner

Ryder

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 177 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, April 18, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 12, 1995

Advocates

Allen Lotz (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the respondent United States)

Facts of the Case

James Ryder, an enlisted member of the Coast Guard, was convicted of drug offenses by a court-martial. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review affirmed. On rehearing, the court rejected Ryder's claim that its composition violated the Appointments Clause because two of the judges on the three-judge panel were civilians appointed by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. The Court of Military Appeals agreed with Ryder that the appointments violated the Clause under its previous decision in United States v. Carpenter that appellate military judges are inferior officers who must be appointed by a President, a court of law, or a head of a department. The court nonetheless affirmed Ryder's conviction on the ground that the actions of the two civilian judges were valid de facto.

Question

Is it proper to accord de facto validity to the actions of civilian judges on a military appellate panel, when the accused challenges the composition of the panel as a violation of the Constitution's Appointments Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ryder, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 2, Section 2, Paragraph 2: Appointments Clause

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the judges' actions were not valid de facto. The Court reasoned that a defendant who made a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case was entitled to a decision on the merits of the question and whatever relief may be appropriate if a violation had occurred. The Court also noted that review by the properly constituted Court of Military Appeals did not necessarily give Ryder all the possibility for relief that review by a properly constituted Coast Guard Court of Military Review would have given him.

Florida Bar v. Went For It Inc.

Wed, 11 Jan 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-226

Petitioner

Florida Bar

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Went For It Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 618 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, June 21, 1995

Advocates

Barry Scott Richard (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Bruce S. Rogow (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Went For It, Inc., (a lawyer referral service) and John T. Blakely (a Florida attorney) were sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives who had been injured in an accident. According to Florida Bar rules, such direct and targeted mailings are prohibited for thirty days following an accident or disaster.

Question

Do the Florida Bar rules prohibiting direct mail solicitation of accident victims violate the free speech of personal injury attorneys?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Florida Bar, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. Lawyer advertising is commercial speech and as such, is accorded only a limited measure of First Amendment protection. Under this "intermediate scrutiny," restriction on commercial speech is permissible if the government (1) asserts a substantial interest in support of its regulation; (2) establishes that the restriction directly and materially advances that interest; and (3) demonstrates that the regulation is narrowly drawn.

Kimberlin v. Quinlan

Wed, 26 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-2068

Petitioner

Kimberlin

Respondent

Quinlan et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 321 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, April 26, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 12, 1995

Advocates

Paul Bender (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Michael L. Martinez (on behalf of the Respondents)

Howard T. Rosenblatt (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kimberlin, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Transcon Lines

Tue, 01 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1318

Petitioner

Interstate Commerce Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Transcon Lines et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 138 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, November 1, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, January 10, 1995

Advocates

Leonard L. Gumport (on behalf of the Respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Interstate Commerce Commission, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Interstate Commerce, as amended

None

United States v. Aguilar

Mon, 20 Mar 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-270

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Aguilar

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 593 (1995)

Argued

Monday, March 20, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, June 21, 1995

Advocates

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Robert D. Luskin (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1503

None

Wilson v. Arkansas

Tue, 28 Mar 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-5707

Petitioner

Wilson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arkansas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 927 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, March 28, 1995

Decided

Monday, May 22, 1995

Advocates

J. Winston Bryant (Argued the cause for the respondent)

John Wesley Hall, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1992, Sharlene Wilson sold illicit narcotics to undercover agents of the Arkansas state police. Police officers then applied for and obtained warrants to search Ms. Wilson's home and to arrest her. When the police arrived, they found the main door to Ms. Wilson's house open. The officers opened the unlocked screen door and walked in, identified themselves as police officers, and said that they had a warrant. Ms. Wilson's attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search, claiming it was invalid on the grounds that the officers had failed to "knock and announce" before entering.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment's reasonable search and seizure clause require police officers to knock and announce their presence before entering a private residence?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wilson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. A unanimous Court held that the common-law "knock-and announce" principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. "Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice of announcement, and the wealth of founding-era commentaries, constitutional provisions, statutes, and cases espousing or supporting the knock-and-announce principle,...the Amendment's Framers thought that whether officers announced their presence and authority before entering a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing a search's reasonableness." Countervailing law enforcement interests, such as officer safety, may, however, establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.

Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.

Mon, 28 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1677

Petitioner

Oklahoma Tax Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jefferson Lines, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 175 (1995)

Argued

Monday, November 28, 1994

Decided

Monday, April 3, 1995

Advocates

Stanley P. Johnston (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Steven D. DeRuyter (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Oklahoma Tax Commission, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co.

Mon, 24 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-788

Petitioner

Milwaukee

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cement Div., National Gypsum Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 189 (1995)

Argued

Monday, April 24, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 12, 1995

Advocates

Harney B. Stover, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

David A. Strauss (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After a ship owned by the Cement Division of National Gypsum Co. sank in a winter storm while berthed in a slip owned by Milwaukee, National Gypsum brought an admiralty suit for damages, alleging that the city had negligently breached its duty as a wharfinger. The city denied fault and filed a counterclaim for damage to its dock, alleging that National Gypsum was negligent in leaving the ship virtually unmanned. The District Court found that both parties were negligent, apportioned liability primarily to National Gypsum, and entered a partial judgment for the stipulated amount of National Gypsum's damages, excluding prejudgment interest. The court held that the fact that National Gypsum's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence and the existence of a genuine dispute over the City's liability were special circumstances justifying a departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that mutual fault cannot provide a basis for denying prejudgment interest.

Question

Does the fact that a plaintiff's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence, together with the existence of a genuine dispute over liability, justify a District Court's departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Cement Div., National Gypsum Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that neither a good-faith dispute over liability nor the existence of mutual fault justifies the denial of prejudgment interest in an admiralty collision case. In calculating the amount of the loss for which the relatively innocent party is responsible, the Court found that a denial of prejudgment interest on the basis of mutual fault would unfairly penalize a party twice for the same mistake. "The existence of a legitimate difference of opinion on the issue of liability is merely a characteristic of most ordinary lawsuits. It is not an extraordinary circumstance that can justify denying prejudgment interest," wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision.

City of Edmonds v. Oxford House

Wed, 01 Mar 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-23

Petitioner

City of Edmonds

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oxford House

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 725 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 1995

Decided

Monday, May 15, 1995

Advocates

Paul Bender (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent United States)

William F. Sheehan (Argued the cause for the private respondents)

W. Scott Snyder (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In Washington State, the City of Edmonds' zoning code provides that the occupants of single-family dwelling units must compose a family, defined as "persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons." Under the code, Oxford House, which operates a group home for 10-12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences, was issued a citation. Oxford House asserted that under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prohibits discrimination in housing against persons with handicaps, the city had failed to make reasonable accommodations permitting the maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. Edmonds sought a declaration that the FHA did not apply to the city's zoning code. The District Court held that the city's zoning code rule defining family was exempt from the FHA under as a reasonable restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Does the City of Edmonds' zoning code provision covering areas zoned for single-family dwelling units -- which defines family as persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer unrelated persons -- qualify for exemption from the Fair Housing Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Oxford House, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Housing

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Edmonds' zoning code definition of the term "family" is not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from the FHA. Noting that it was designed to foster the family character of a neighborhood, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the provision was a family composition rule and was not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from FHA scrutiny because, while it capped the number of unrelated persons allowed to occupy a single-family dwelling at five, it did not cap the total number of people permitted to live in such a dwelling. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.

Swint v. Chambers County Commission

Tue, 10 Jan 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1636

Petitioner

Swint et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chambers County Commission et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 35 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, January 10, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, March 1, 1995

Advocates

Robert B. McDuff (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Paul M. Smith (on behalf of the Respondents)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Swint, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior v. Sweet Home Chapter Of Communities For A Great Oregon

Mon, 17 Apr 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-859

Petitioner

Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sweet Home Chapter Of Communities For A Great Oregon et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 687 (1995)

Argued

Monday, April 17, 1995

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1995

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioners)

John A. Macleod (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Endangered Species Act requires that no person "take" an endangered or threatened species. The Act defines take as "harass, harm, pursue," "wound," or "kill." The Secretary of the Interior further characterizes "harm" as including "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife." Several persons within forestry industries sued the Secretary, asserting that Congress did not intend for the regulation to include changes in habitat. The District Court found for the Secretary of the Interior.

The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of noscitur a sociis, which means that the meaning of words is determined by the words around it. Thus, "harm" could only include actions applying direct force to the animal.

Question

Does the definition of "harm" as an expansion of the word "take" in the Endangered Species Act include habitat modification that kills or injures wildlife?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 16 U.S.C. 1531

Yes. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that habitat modification is a legitimate application of the word "harm." First, the Court found that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in assuming that the words in the definition of "take" only apply to actions involving direct contact with endangered animals. Then, based on the Act itself, the Court determined that the ordinary meaning of harm would in fact include changes in habitat that hurt the endangered animals. Also, the Court held that the intent of the Act to give broad protection to endangered species must include even actions that may have minimal or unforeseeable effects.

United States v. Mezzanatto

Wed, 02 Nov 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1340

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mezzanatto

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 196 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, November 2, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 1995

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Mark R. Lippman (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

Nebraska v. Wyoming

Tue, 21 Mar 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

108 ORIG

Petitioner

Nebraska

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wyoming et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 1 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, March 21, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, May 30, 1995

Advocates

Dennis C. Cook (on behalf of the Defendant Wyoming)

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the United States)

Timothy M. Tymkovich (on behalf of the Defendant Colorado)

Richard A. Simms (on behalf of the Plaintiff Nebraska)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Wyoming, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Sandin, Unit Team Manager, Halawa Correctional Facility v. Conner

Tue, 28 Feb 1995 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1911

Petitioner

Sandin, Unit Team Manager, Halawa Correctional Facility

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Conner et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 472 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, February 28, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 19, 1995

Advocates

Steven S. Michaels (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul L. Hoffman (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Sandin, Unit Team Manager, Halawa Correctional Facility, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Jerome B. Grubart Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock

Wed, 12 Oct 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-762

Petitioner

Jerome B. Graubart Inc.

Respondent

Great Lakes Dredge and Dock

Consolidation

No. 93-1094

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 527 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, October 12, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 1995

Advocates

Ben Barnow (on behalf of the Petitioner Jerome B. Grubart, Inc.)

Lawrence Rosenthal (on behalf of the Petitioner City of Chicago)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Great Lakes Dredge and Dock, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1331

None