Cases - 1993 term

Dalton, Secretary Of The Navy v. Specter

Wed, 02 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-289

Petitioner

Dalton, Secretary Of The Navy, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Specter et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 462 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1994

Advocates

Arlen Specter (on behalf of the Respondents)

Drew S. Days, III (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Dalton, Secretary Of The Navy, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 10 U.S.C. 2687

None

Dolan v. City of Tigard

Wed, 23 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Location

City of Tigard

13125 SW Hall Blvd Tigard OR 97223

Tigard, OR 97223

United States

45° 25' 31.836" N, 122° 45' 56.7792" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-518

Petitioner

Dolan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Tigard

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 374 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, March 23, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1994

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (For the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Timothy V. Ramis (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David B. Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Florence Dolan wanted a permit from the City of Tigard to expand her store and pave her parking lot. The city agreed to grant her permit on the condition that she dedicate part of her land for (1) a greenway along a nearby creek to help alleviate runoff from the pavement, and (2) a pedestrian/bicycle path to relieve traffic congestion from the city's growing business district.

Question

Did the city's conditions for the permit violate the 5th Amendment's "takings" clause as absorbed by the 14th Amendment's due process clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Dolan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Yes. The Court ruled that the city did not present conclusive evidence that the walkway/bicycle path would reduce traffic congestion, and so could not require Dolan to give up her property as a condition of the permit. In addition, the city did not explain why a public greenway was necessary, as opposed to a private one. There must be an "essential nexus" between a legitimate state interest and the permit requirements (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission), and the city failed to demonstrate that the benefits would justify the requirements.

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, Secretary Of Labor

Tue, 05 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-896

Petitioner

Thunder Basin Coal Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reich, Secretary Of Labor, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 200 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, October 5, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, January 19, 1994

Advocates

Wayne S. Bishop (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Reich, Secretary Of Labor, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 30 U.S.C. 813

None

BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, As Receiver Of Imperial Federal Savings Association

Tue, 07 Dec 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1370

Petitioner

Bfp

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Resolution Trust Corporation, As Receiver Of Imperial Federal Savings Association, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 531 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 1993

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1994

Advocates

Ronald J. Mann (on behalf of the Federal Respondent)

Michael R. Sment (on behalf of the Respondents Paul Osborne, et al)

Roy B. Woolsey (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

BFP, a partnership formed by two private investors, bought a home in Newport Beach, CA in 1987. BFP secured the property by obtaining a deed of trust from Imperial Savings Association (Imperial). Imperial owned the property until BFP could pay off the amount borrowed. BFP defaulted on loan repayment and Imperial proceeded to sell the property for $433,000 to settle the loan (foreclosure). Before the title of ownership transferred to the buyer, BFP filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. BFP asked bankruptcy court to nullify the original foreclosure sale because the home was valued at over $725,000. BFP argued that the low sales price constituted a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. Section 548(a)(2)(A), which guarantees that debtors receive "reasonably equivalent value" for property foreclosed. BFP claimed "reasonably equivalent value" was equal to the market value of the property in question. The bankruptcy court denied BFP's claim, and a District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a property's fair market value determine whether the amount of debt settled by a foreclosure sale is "reasonably equivalent" to the property's worth, as required by U.S.C. Section 548(a)(2)(A)?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Resolution Trust Corporation, As Receiver Of Imperial Federal Savings Association, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

No. In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, The Court ruled 5-4 that the value received for a property at a foreclosure sale can be reasonable even if it is different from the "fair market value." A foreclosure sale alters market conditions and can lower a property's selling price. If a foreclosure sale is necessary to settle a debt, the price at which the property is sold is reasonable so long as "all the requirements of the State's foreclosure law have been complied with."

Staples v. United States

Tue, 30 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1441

Petitioner

Staples

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 600 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 1993

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1994

Advocates

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the Respondent)

Jennifer L. De Angelis (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Staples, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 26 U.S.C. 5861

None

Elder v. Holloway

Mon, 10 Jan 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-8579

Petitioner

Elder

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Holloway et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 510 (1994)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Advocates

Michael E. Tankersley (on behalf of the Petitioner)

James J. Davis (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Elder, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

National Labor Relations Board v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation Of America

Tue, 22 Feb 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1964

Petitioner

National Labor Relations Board

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Health Care & Retirement Corporation Of America

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 571 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1994

Advocates

Maureen E. Mahoney (on behalf of the Respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Health Care & Retirement Corporation Of America, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.

Thu, 28 Apr 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Aware Woman Center for Choice

1564 Dixie Way Melbourne FL 32935

Melbourne, FL 32935

United States

28° 10' 9.57" N, 80° 38' 47.0904" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-880

Petitioner

Madsen et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Women's Health Center, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 753 (1994)

Argued

Thursday, April 28, 1994

Decided

Thursday, June 30, 1994

Advocates

Mathew D. Staver (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Talbot D'Alemberte (on behalf of the Respondents)

Drew S. Days, III (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Women's Health Center Inc. operated several abortion clinics throughout central Florida, including the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida. In 1992, in response to anti-abortion protesters, a state court prohibited the protesters from physically abusing those entering or exiting the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic. About 6 months later, Women's Health Center Inc. expressed a need to broaden the court order. The state court agreed, banning demonstrators from entering a 36-foot buffer- zone around the clinic, making excessive noise, using images visible to patients, approaching patients within a 300-foot radius of the clinic, and protesting within a 300-foot radius of staff residences. Petitioner Judy Madsen and her fellow protesters claimed that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech, but the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the court order.

Question

1) Is the prohibition of all protesting within the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic an infringement of the First Amendment right to free speech? 2) Is the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the clinic a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 3) Do the limitations imposed on noise-making constitute a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 4) Do the restrictions placed on the use of images violate the First Amendment right to free speech? 5) Is it a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech to bar protesters from approaching potential patients when they are within a 300-foot radius of the clinic? 6) Is it a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech to prohibit all protesting in a 300-foot radius of clinic staff residences?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Women's Health Center, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No, Yes, No, Yes, Yes, and Yes. In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the state of Florida could only restrict protesters to the extent necessary to allow the clinic to run and the staff to live in their homes without interference. Thus, the majority approved of the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic because it was essential to allow patients and staff to enter and leave the building freely, but disapproved of the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the building because it found no indication that protesting in these areas interfered with the function of the clinic. The Court also determined that the limitations placed on noise-making were necessary to insure the well-being of the patients, whereas those placed on images were not because they were easier to ignore. Finally, the Court concluded that both 300-foot radius rules were too broad, thus restricting the protestors more than was necessary. Therefore, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct Inc.

Tue, 22 Feb 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-405

Petitioner

Digital Equipment Corp.

Respondent

Desktop Direct Inc.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 863 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1994

Advocates

John G. Roberts, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

After Digital Equipment Corporation and Desktop Direct, Inc. arrived at a settlement agreement in a trademark infringement suit, the federal District Court dismissed the case. Several months later, after Desktop claimed that Digital had misrepresented important facts during the settlement negotiations, the Court reopened the case and cancelled the agreement. Digital appealed, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hear the case, holding that it was not immediately appealable under the guidelines laid out by the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463. The court held that the "right not to go to trial" claimed by Digital under the settlement was not sufficiently important to merit an immediate appeal and was different from immunity rooted in an explicit statutory or constitutional provision or compelling public policy rationale, the denial of which had been held immediately appealable.

Question

Is the denial of a "right not to sue" established by a settlement agreement immediately appealable under the Supreme Court's decision in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Desktop Direct Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1291

No. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the denial of immunity - while cause for concern - does not automatically create a right to immediate appeal. It is important to have final judgments before appeals are made, Justice David H. Souter wrote for the Court, and exceptions should only be made in particularly important cases. A "right not to go to trial," while significant, is rarely the key factor in a settlement agreement, and cannot compare in importance to the right to be free from "double jeopardy" in criminal court or the encroachment on public duties caused by a denial of immunity to public officials.

Tennessee v. Middlebrooks

Mon, 01 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-989

Petitioner

Tennessee

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Middlebrooks

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 124 (1993)

Argued

Monday, November 1, 1993

Decided

Monday, December 13, 1993

Advocates

Charles W. Burson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

David C. Stebbins (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Middlebrooks, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Stansbury v. California

Wed, 30 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-5770

Petitioner

Stansbury

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 318 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, March 30, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, April 26, 1994

Advocates

Aileen Bunney (on behalf of the Respondent)

Robert M. Westberg (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Stansbury, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Miranda Warnings

None

Caspari, Superintendent, Missouri Eastern Correctional Center v. Bohlen

Mon, 06 Dec 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1500

Petitioner

Caspari, Superintendent, Missouri Eastern Correctional Center, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bohlen

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 383 (1994)

Argued

Monday, December 6, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Advocates

William K. Kelley (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Richard H. Sindel (on behalf of the Respondent)

Frank A. Jung (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Caspari, Superintendent, Missouri Eastern Correctional Center, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Security Services, Inc. v. Kmart Corp.

Mon, 28 Feb 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-284

Petitioner

Security Services, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kmart Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 431 (1994)

Argued

Monday, February 28, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 16, 1994

Advocates

John F. Manning (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Paul O. Taylor (on behalf of the Petitioner)

William J. Augello (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Kmart Corp., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Interstate Commerce, as amended

None

Department Of Revenue Of Oregon v. Acf Industries, Inc.

Mon, 08 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-74

Petitioner

Department Of Revenue Of Oregon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Acf Industries, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 332 (1994)

Argued

Monday, November 8, 1993

Decided

Monday, January 24, 1994

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (on behalf of the Respondents)

Kent L. Jones (as amicus curiae in support of the Petitioner)

Virginia L. Linder (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Department Of Revenue Of Oregon, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 1150

None

Director, Office Of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department Of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries

Mon, 25 Apr 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-744

Petitioner

Director, Office Of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department Of Labor

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Greenwich Collieries et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 267 (1994)

Argued

Monday, April 25, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 20, 1994

Advocates

Mark E. Solomons (on behalf of the Respondents)

Edward C. DuMont (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Greenwich Collieries, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Administrative Procedure, or Administrative Orders Review

None

Nichols v. United States

Mon, 10 Jan 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-8556

Petitioner

Nichols

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 738 (1994)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1994

Advocates

William B. M. Carter (on behalf of the Petitioner)

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.

Wed, 08 Dec 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1750

Petitioner

Fogerty

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fantasy, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 517 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, March 1, 1994

Advocates

Lawrence S. Robbins (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kenneth I. Sidle (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After successfully defending against a copyright infringement suit filed against him by Fantasy Inc. (Fantasy), John Fogerty sought to recover the cost of his attorney's fees from Fantasy. Fogerty based his claim on 17 U.S.C. section 505 which states in part that: "the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs." On appeal from an unfavorable district court ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed as it found that Fogerty did not demonstrate that Fantasy's original suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith. Fogerty appealed again, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Do federal courts have discretion over whether or not to force a loosing party to pay all or part of the victorious party's attorney's fees?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fogerty, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 17 U.S.C. 505

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that while attorney's fees are awarded from time to time to prevailing defendants or plaintiffs, this practice is entirely subject to the deciding court's discretion. Indeed, the Court observed, that the statute in question emphasizes such discretion by stating in relevant part that a court "may" award attorney's fees. The Court concluded that such discretion is to be applied evenhandedly between victorious defendants and plaintiffs.

Waters v. Churchill

Wed, 01 Dec 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1450

Petitioner

Waters

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Churchill

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 661 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 1994

Advocates

John H. Bisbee (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Lawrence A. Manson (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Richard H. Seamon (As amicus curiae supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A public hospital fired an obstetrics nurse, Cheryl Churchill, for insubordination after she allegedly complained about her superiors to a nurse trainee during a dinner break in the hospital's obstetrics unit. Churchill claimed that the hospital fired her because she opposed its policy of nurse cross-training and said it was leaving certain units understaffed.

Question

Was Churchill's firing impermissible under the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Waters, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes, but the Court was unable to forge a majority opinion. A four-justice plurality held that government workers cannot be dismissed or otherwise punished for their words unless the employer has a reasonable basis for believing that the speech either was disruptive or involved a matter of purely private concern, outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection. The hospital need not conduct a full-scale investigation, but it must have some reasonable, factual basis for its actions.

Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp.

Tue, 12 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1123

Petitioner

Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

U. S. Philips Corp. et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 27 (1993)

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, November 30, 1993

Advocates

Garrard R. Beeney (on behalf of the Respondents)

Herbert H. Mintz (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Thomas G. Hungar (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for U. S. Philips Corp., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Supreme Court Rules

None

Harris v. Forklift Sys.

Wed, 13 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Forklift Systems Inc

884 Elm Hill Pike Nashville TN 37210

Nashville, TN 37210

United States

36° 8' 43.6056" N, 86° 44' 34.5264" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1168

Petitioner

Harris

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Forklift Sys.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 17 (1993)

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, November 9, 1993

Advocates

Stanley M. Chernau (on behalf of the Respondent)

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Irwin Venick (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Teresa Harris was sexually harassed by her employer. She filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the harassment created an "abusive work environment" in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employer countered that the harassment had not been severe enough to seriously affect her psychologically or impair her ability to work, and that it therefore did not create an abusive work environment under the meaning of Title VII. The district court agreed, stating that the decision was a "close case" but that the harassment had not been severe enough to create an abusive work environment in violation of the Act. A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's decision.

Question

Must sexual harassment "seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well being" in order to create an "abusive work environment" that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Harris, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

No. In an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court found that the district court had been wrong to focus on whether or not the harassment had caused "concrete psychological harm." Instead, Justice O'Connor wrote that the court should have focused on whether the conduct was hostile or abusive. "Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive... there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious (in order to find that it violates Title VII)."

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County Of Kent, Michigan

Mon, 29 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-97

Petitioner

Northwest Airlines, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

County Of Kent, Michigan, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 355 (1994)

Argued

Monday, November 29, 1993

Decided

Monday, January 24, 1994

Advocates

Walter A. Smith, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioners)

William F. Hunting, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

Edward C. DuMont (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for County Of Kent, Michigan, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 1513

None

Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall

Mon, 28 Feb 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1956

Petitioner

Consolidated Rail Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gottshall

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 532 (1994)

Argued

Monday, February 28, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1994

Advocates

William L. Myers, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent Gottshall)

J. Michael Farrell (on behalf of the Respondent Carlisle)

Ralph G. Wellington (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) employee James Gottshall observed a fellow worker, Richard Johns, die of a heart attack while on duty. Gottshall's boss postponed seeking medical assistance during Johns' heart attack, insisted that the crew keep working, and left the body at the work site for the remainder of the work day. Shortly after Johns's death, Gottshall was admitted to a psychiatric institution. Gottshall sued Conrail under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for exposing him to distressing circumstances which he claimed caused his illness. A District Court rejected the suit.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and found that Gottshall's injuries were "genuine and severe." The Third Circuit contrasted the liberal injury recovery policy embodied in FELA over the more limited injury relief recovery policy embodied in common law standards, which often applied harsh tests to prove employee injury.

Conrail employee Alan Carlisle also filed a FELA action against Conrail. He claimed that Conrail subjected him to unsafe working conditions, which caused him stress and lead to health problems. Because the stress related health problems were foreseeable to Conrail, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment for Carlisle.

Question

Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), does "emotional stress" resulting from employer "negligence" constitute an "injury" for which an employee can hold his employer liable?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Consolidated Rail Corporation, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Employers' Liability

No. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a 7-2 Court. The Court categorized FELA emotional stress claims closely with common law treatments of emotional stress claims. The Court rejected the Third Circuit's assertion that common law tests were arbitrary and could be disregarded. Instead, common law standards should be used to verify claims filed under FELA. The Court adopted the "zone of danger test" from common law, which limits relief to those employees who sustain physical injury resulting from emotional stress caused by employer negligence. The Court held that this test would best distinguish between genuine and fraudulent claims, and provide relief in the case of injury. The Court rejected the Third Circuit's holding that employers were liable for causing foreseeably stressful conditions, reasoning that this would extend to many types of everyday employment.

United States v. Carlton

Mon, 28 Feb 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1941

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carlton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 26 (1994)

Argued

Monday, February 28, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1994

Advocates

Kent L. Jones (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Russell G. Allen (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

None

Key Tronic Corp. v. United States

Tue, 29 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-376

Petitioner

Key Tronic Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 809 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1994

Advocates

Mark David Schneider (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 9601

None

Mcfarland v. Scott, Director, Texas Department Of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division

Tue, 29 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-6497

Petitioner

Mcfarland

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scott, Director, Texas Department Of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 849 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 1994

Decided

Thursday, June 30, 1994

Advocates

Margaret P. Griffey (on behalf of the Respondent)

Mandy Welch (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Mcfarland, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 848

None

Landgraf v. Usi Film Products

Wed, 13 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-757

Petitioner

Landgraf

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Usi Film Products et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 244 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, April 26, 1994

Advocates

Glen D. Nager (on behalf of the Respondents)

Eric Schnapper (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Drew S. Days, III (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Usi Film Products, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1991

None

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Meyer

Mon, 04 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-741

Petitioner

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Meyer

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 471 (1994)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Advocates

Paul Bender (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Gennaro A. Filice, III (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Tort Claims, or Alien Tort Statute

None

Boca Grande Club, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Company, Inc.

Tue, 11 Jan 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-180

Petitioner

Boca Grande Club, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida Power & Light Company, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 222 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, April 20, 1994

Advocates

Ronald J. Mann (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Stuart C. Markman (on behalf of the Respondent)

David F. Pope (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Boca Grande Club, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

United States v. Irvine

Mon, 06 Dec 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1546

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Irvine et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 224 (1994)

Argued

Monday, December 6, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, April 20, 1994

Advocates

Phillip H. Martin (on behalf of the Respondents)

Kent L. Jones (on behalf of the Plaintiff)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

None

Barclays Bank Plc v. Franchise Tax Board Of California

Mon, 28 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1384

Petitioner

Barclays Bank Plc

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Franchise Tax Board Of California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 92-1839

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 298 (1994)

Argued

Monday, March 28, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 20, 1994

Advocates

James P. Kleier (on behalf of the Petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Company)

Drew S. Days, III (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Joanne M. Garvey (on behalf of the Petitioner Barclays Bank)

Timothy G. Laddish (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

California used a "worldwide combined reporting" method to determine tax liability for multinational corporations operating inside the state. Under this method, the multinational's income was taxed in proportion to the average percentage of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located inside the state. Barclays Bank of California (Barcal) was wholly owned by a multinational corporation, Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI). Barcal did not include financial data for BBI in its 1977 tax filings. The California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board) determined that Barcal misrepresented the proportion of income subject to taxation, causing a tax deficiency of over one hundred thousand dollars. Barcal and BBI paid, but then sued for the amount paid, complaining that the cost to provide BBI's worldwide financial data was disproportionately large considering that Barcal operated largely independently of BBI and BBI operated largely outside of California. Barcal and BBI contended that this violated the Commerce Clause-derived anti- discrimination requirement, which prevents States from imposing disproportionately large tax compliance burdens upon corporations. The Tax Board allowed BBI to make a "reasonable approximation" of financial data to minimize costs, but BBI claimed that this action violated Due Process by admitting financial data that was possibly inaccurate.

The California Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and remanded the case to a California Court of Appeals, which also did not find the burden disproportionate. Barcal and BBI also contended that the "worldwide combined reporting" method risked double taxation by the state and the federal government. Additionally, The "worldwide combined reporting" method deviated from taxing methods employed by other states, thus transgressing the federal government's interest in providing uniform standards for taxing foreign commerce. (The case was consolidated with Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board Of California.)

Question

1) Does a state violate the Due Process Clause by accepting "reasonable approximations" of financial data?

2) By requiring multinational corporations to provide exhaustive financial information to calculate taxes, does a State impose a disproportionately large compliance burden upon the corporation and thereby violate the anti- discrimination requirement of the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Franchise Tax Board Of California, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Justice Ruth Ginsburg wrote the opinion for a 7-2 Court. (1) The Court dismissed the alleged Due Process violation because a corporation could take action against the Tax Board if it felt the approximated amount was inaccurate. (2) Reasoning that the use of "reasonable approximations" minimized a multinational's compliance burden, the Court also dismissed the alleged Commerce Clause violation. The Court recognized that the "worldwide combined reporting" method carried a risk of double taxation by both the state and the federal government, but reasoned that this did not violate the Commerce Clause because every other method employed by the state to tax foreign commerce carried the same risk. Also, the Court found no "specific indications of congressional intent" to enforce uniformity in taxation of foreign commerce by preempting the California tax laws.

Liteky v. United States

Wed, 03 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-6921

Petitioner

Liteky et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 540 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 1993

Decided

Monday, March 7, 1994

Advocates

Peter J. Thompson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Thomas G. Hungar (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 455

None

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company Of America

Tue, 01 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-263

Petitioner

Kokkonen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Guardian Life Insurance Company Of America

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 375 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 16, 1994

Advocates

Frank C. Morris, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

Michael J. Jencks (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kokkonen, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Cavanaugh v. Roller

Mon, 08 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1510

Petitioner

Michael J. Cavanaugh, Executive Director, South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gary Lee Roller

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 42 (1993)

Argued

Monday, November 8, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, November 30, 1993

Advocates

W. Gaston Fairey (on behalf of the Respondent)

Carl N. Lundberg (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Roller, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Romano v. Oklahoma

Tue, 22 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-9093

Petitioner

Romano

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oklahoma

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 1 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1994

Advocates

Andre' Diane Blalock (on behalf of the Respondent)

Lee Ann Jones Peters (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Oklahoma, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris

Thu, 28 Apr 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-2058

Petitioner

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Norris

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 246 (1994)

Argued

Thursday, April 28, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 20, 1994

Advocates

Susan Oki Mollway (on behalf of the Respondent)

Richard H. Seamon (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Kenneth B. Hipp (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Norris, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Railway Labor

None

Weiss v. United States

Wed, 03 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1482

Petitioner

Weiss

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 163 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, January 19, 1994

Advocates

Alan B. Morrison (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Drew S. Days, III (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 2, Section 2, Paragraph 2: Appointments Clause

None

United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property

Wed, 06 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1180

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James Daniel Good Real Property et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 43 (1993)

Argued

Wednesday, October 6, 1993

Decided

Monday, December 13, 1993

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Christopher J. Yuen (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for James Daniel Good Real Property, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Victor v. Nebraska

Tue, 18 Jan 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-8894

Petitioner

Victor

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nebraska

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 92-9049

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 1 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 1994

Advocates

Eric S. Multhaup (on behalf of the Petitioner Alfred Arthur Sandoval)

Donald B. Stenberg (on behalf of the Respondent Nebraska)

Daniel E. Lungren (on behalf of the Respondent California)

Mark A. Weber (on behalf of the Petitioner Clarence Victor)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Nebraska, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Albright v. Oliver

Tue, 12 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-833

Petitioner

Albright

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oliver et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 266 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 1993

Decided

Monday, January 24, 1994

Advocates

John H. Bisbee (on behalf of the Petitioner)

James G. Sotos (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Illinois police obtained a warrant to arrest Kevin Albright after he was seen selling a substance which look liked an illegal drug. Upon hearing of the warrant, Albright surrendered to police detective Roger Oliver. A trial court dismissed the charge because it did not state an offense under Illinois law.

Albright claimed that Oliver violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right by prosecuting him without probable cause. He filed suit against Oliver under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides relief to those deprived of civil rights. The federal District Court dismissed the suit because it did not state a claim under Section 1983. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that relief provided by Section 1983 for prosecution without probable cause is valid only if the prosecution caused a consequence such as loss of employment or incarceration.

Question

Can a citizen prosecuted without probable cause obtain relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for the deprivation of substantive due process rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Oliver, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. The Court ruled that Section 1983 relief for prosecution without probable cause is only valid if the prosecuted party claims Fourth Amendment (pretrial rights) violations. In a 7-2 decision authored by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Courtt reaffirmed its commitment not to extend substantive due process indefinitely and held that substantive due process does not guarantee non-interference by criminal investigations.

ABF Freight System, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

Wed, 01 Dec 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1550

Petitioner

ABF Freight System, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 317 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 1993

Decided

Monday, January 24, 1994

Advocates

John V. Jansonius (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

After employee Michael Manson gave a false excuse for being late to work, ABF Freight System, Inc. (ABF) fired him for tardiness. Manson repeated his false excuse while under oath at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, during which he argued that ABF had fired him in retaliation for his previous union activities. The National Labor Relations Board reversed the judge, ruling that ABF had used Manson's tardiness as a pretext to fire him. The Board reinstated him with backpay.

ABF appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, claiming that the Board could not reinstate an employee who lied under oath. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the Board could determine whether or not to pardon Manson for giving a false excuse.

Question

Can the National Labor Relations Board grant reinstatement with backpay to an employee who lied under oath during his administrative hearing?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for National Labor Relations Board, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that the National Labor Relations Act gave the Board broad authority to adopt laws regarding the reinstatement of employees. The Court called perjury "intolerable in a formal proceeding," but ruled that the National Labor Relations Board was under no obligation to adopt a blanket rule against reinstating employees who have perjured themselves. Reducing the Board's discretion in making rules for employee reinstatement "might force the Board to divert its attention from its primary mission and devote unnecessary time and energy to resolving collateral disputes about credibility."

Beecham v. United States

Mon, 21 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-445

Petitioner

Lenard Ray Beecham

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Nonr

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 368 (1994)

Argued

Monday, March 21, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 16, 1994

Advocates

Edward C. DuMont (on behalf of the Respondent)

Nathan Lewin (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Lenard Ray Beecham was convicted in Federal District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which makes it illegal for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. Beecham argued that according to the statute's exemption clause ("Any conviction...for which a person...has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction...") he was no longer a convicted felon because Tennessee had restored his civil rights. Prosecutors pointed to the statute's "choice of law clause," which states that "What constitutes a conviction...shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held." They argued that because Beecham's prior conviction was under federal law, no state could restore his right to possess a firearm.

The District Court ruled that a state could restore civil rights barred by a federal conviction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision. The Fourth Circuit's rule conflicted with those of the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which held that the since the exemption clause applied to "any conviction," it also permitted states to undo restrictions caused by federal convictions.

Question

Under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), can state procedures for the restoration of the civil rights of felons restore the right of a federal felon to possess a firearm?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 922

No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court applied the choice of law clause to the exemption clause and reasoned that no rights could be restored unless by the jurisdiction that first barred the rights. The Court ruled that though the federal government did not currently have any procedures in place to restore the civil rights of felons, only the federal government had jurisdiction over federal convictions. Therefore, Beecham's state-law restoration of civil rights was insufficient to restore his right to possess a firearm in light of 18 U.S.C. 922(g).

Powell v. Nevada

Tue, 22 Feb 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-8841

Petitioner

Powell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nevada

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 79 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, March 30, 1994

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Michael Pescetta (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Dan M. Seaton (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Powell, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Shannon v. United States

Tue, 22 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-8346

Petitioner

Shannon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 573 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1994

Advocates

Thomas R. Trout (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Amy L. Wax (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 17

None

Florence County School District Four v. Carter

Wed, 06 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-1523

Petitioner

Florence County School District Four

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carter

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 7 (1993)

Argued

Wednesday, October 6, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, November 9, 1993

Advocates

Peter W. D. Wright (on behalf of the Respondent)

Amy L. Wax (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae supporting Respondent)

Donald B. Ayer (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

After Shannon Carter was classified as a learning disabled student, school officials met with her parents to formulate an individualized education program (IEP) as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Unhappy with the IEP developed by the school district, Shannon's parents challenged its appropriateness and enrolled her in a private school while their challenge was pending.

When state and local educational authorities concluded that the IEP was adequate, Shannon's parents sued in Federal District Court, claiming the school district had failed to provide a "free appropriate public education" as required by IDEA and demanding reimbursement for Shannon's education at the private school. The school district argued that the private school did not meet all the requirements of IDEA and therefore did not meet the "appropriate" standard. Because of it was not "appropriate," the school district argued, reimbursement was not required.

The District Court and the Fourth Circuit of Appeals both ruled against the school district, requiring it to reimburse Shannon's parents.

Question

May a court order reimbursement for parents who withdrew their child from a public school providing an inappropriate education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and put the child in a private school that is in substantial - but not complete - compliance with the act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Carter, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Education of the Handicapped, Education for All Handicapped Children, or Individuals with Disabilities Education Acts, or related statutes, as amended; also see ADA

Yes. In an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Supreme Court unanimously held that parents have a right to withdraw their child from a public school providing an inappropriate education under the meaning of IDEA and enroll them in a private school, as long as the private school provides an "appropriate" education. The Court further held that the specific requirements of the Act need not be met when a student is placed in a private school by his or her parents, because the IDEA requirements were not intended to apply to parental placements.

Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.

Wed, 13 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-938

Petitioner

Rivers et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Roadway Express, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 298 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, April 26, 1994

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Roadway Express, Inc., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1991

None

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B.

Tue, 02 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Jackson Circuit Court

102 East Laurel Street Scottsboro AL 35768

Scottsboro, AL 35768

United States

34° 40' 22.188" N, 86° 2' 5.0352" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1239

Petitioner

J.E.B.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alabama ex rel T.B.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 127 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, April 19, 1994

Advocates

Lois N. Brasfield (Argued the cause for the respondent)

John F. Porter, III (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (As amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Alabama, acting on behalf of T.B. (the mother), sought paternity and child support from J.E.B.(the putative father). A jury found for T.B. In forming the jury, Alabama used its peremptory strikes to eliminate nine of the ten men who were in the jury pool; J.E.B. use a peremptory challenge to strike a tenth man in the pool.

Question

Was the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely because of their gender a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for J.E.B., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection bars the exclusion of potential jurors on the basis of their sex, just as it bars exclusion on the basis of race. "[G]ender-based classifications," wrote Justice Harry Blackmun for the majority, "require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny." As a consequence, "[P]arties still may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias."

Ibanez v. Florida Department Of Business And Professional Regulation, Board Of Accountancy

Tue, 19 Apr 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-639

Petitioner

Ibanez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida Department Of Business And Professional Regulation, Board Of Accountancy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 136 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, April 19, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1994

Advocates

Silvia S. Ibanez (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lisa S. Nelson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ibanez, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Holder, Individually And In His Official Capacity As County Commissioner For Bleckley County, Georgia v. Hall

Mon, 04 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-2012

Petitioner

Holder, Individually And In His Official Capacity As County Commissioner For Bleckley County, Georgia, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hall et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 874 (1994)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 1993

Decided

Thursday, June 30, 1994

Advocates

Christopher Coates (on behalf of the Respondents)

R. Napier Murphy (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Holder, Individually And In His Official Capacity As County Commissioner For Bleckley County, Georgia, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

None

Tuilaepa v. California

Tue, 22 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-5131

Petitioner

Tuilaepa

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 93-5161

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 967 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 1994

Decided

Thursday, June 30, 1994

Advocates

William George Prahl (on behalf of the Respondent)

Howard W. Gillingham (on behalf of the Petitioner Tuilaepa)

Wendy Cole Lascher (on behalf of the Petitioner Proctor)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for California, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Honda v. Oberg

Wed, 20 Apr 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-644

Petitioner

Honda

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oberg

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 415 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, April 20, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1994

Advocates

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Andrew L. Frey (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Karl Oberg was driving an all-terrain vehicle when it overturned, causing him severe, permanent injuries. The jury in his trial assessed almost $1 million in compensatory damages, and an additional $5 million in punitive damages. A 1910 amendment to the Oregon state constitution prohibited judicial review of jury awards.

Question

Does the Oregon prohibition on judicial review of jury awards violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Honda, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. The denial of judicial review creates the possibility that juries might make arbitrary and excessive awards without offering a way to adjust them. The common-law practice of allowing judicial review for jury awards is important in ensuring that juries do not ignore guidelines.

United States Department Of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

Mon, 08 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1223

Petitioner

United States Department Of Defense et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Federal Labor Relations Authority et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 487 (1994)

Argued

Monday, November 8, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Advocates

David M. Smith (on behalf of the Respondents)

Christopher J. Wright (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States Department Of Defense, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

None

Livadas v. Bradshaw, California Labor Commissioner

Tue, 26 Apr 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1920

Petitioner

Livadas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bradshaw, California Labor Commissioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 107 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, April 26, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1994

Advocates

H. Thomas Cadell, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Richard G. McCracken (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Livadas, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor-Management Relations

None

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music

Tue, 09 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1292

Petitioner

Campbell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Acuff-Rose Music

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 569 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 1993

Decided

Monday, March 7, 1994

Advocates

Bruce S. Rogow (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Sidney S. Rosdeitcher (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. sued 2 Live Crew and their record company, claiming that 2 Live Crew's song "Pretty Woman" infringed Acuff-Rose's copyright in Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman." The District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, holding that its song was a parody that made fair use of the original song. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair.

Question

May 2 Live Crew's commercial parody of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman" be a fair use within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1976?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Campbell, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 17 U.S.C. 107

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a parody's commercial character is only one element to be weighed in a fair use enquiry and that insufficient consideration was given to the nature of parody in weighing the degree of copying. The Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the presumption that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair, as no such evidentiary presumption was available to address either the character and purpose of the use or the market harm. Justice Souter wrote that the appellate court "erred in holding that 2 Live Crew had necessarily copied excessively from the Orbison original, considering the parodic purpose of the use." Justice Anthony M. Kennedy filed a concurring opinion.

Turner Broadcasting v. FCC

Wed, 12 Jan 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Location

FCC

One CNN Center Atlanta GA 30303

Atlanta, GA 30303

United States

33° 45' 28.4436" N, 84° 23' 40.0092" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-44

Appellee

FCC

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Turner Broadcasting

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 622 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 27, 1994

Advocates

H. Bartow Farr, III (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Drew S. Days, III (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Sections 4 and 5 of this Act required cable systems to allocate a percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations, the must-carry rules. The rules limit the cannels available for exclusive control by cable programmers and increase competition for the remaining channels.

Question

Are the must-carry rules content-based and thus a violation of the cable companies' First Amendment right to free speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Turner Broadcasting, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 534

No. The Court held that the must-carry provisions were content neutral, thus not a violation of the First Amendment. The rules were not determined by the programming content, but by broadcast method. The rules promote fair competition in television programming. Congress recognized that the public television stations had an intrinsic value to the American public and were in economic peril of disappearing due to the cable television industry's monopoly. The rules do not force the cable companies to alter their message.

C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town Of Clarkstown, New York

Tue, 07 Dec 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Location

C & A Carbone Inc.

183 Western Highway West Nyack NY 10994

West Nyack, NY 10994

United States

41° 5' 2.526" N, 73° 57' 41.9148" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1402

Petitioner

C & A Carbone, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Town Of Clarkstown, New York

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 383 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 1993

Decided

Monday, May 16, 1994

Advocates

Betty Jo Christian (on behalf of the Petitioners)

William C. Brashares (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A New York town, Clarkstown, allowed a contractor to construct and operate a waste processing plant within town limits. The revenue from the plant would help compensate the contractor. Clarkstown promised that the plant would receive 120,000 tons of solid waste each year, and permitted the contractor to charge an $81 "tipping fee" for each ton received. To meet the 120,000 ton quota, Clarkstown adopted a "flow control ordinance." The ordinance required that all solid waste flowing into and out of the town pass through the new plant. C & A Carbone, Inc. operated a similar plant within the town. To avoid paying the $81 fee, Carbone trucked processed waste directly to an Indiana landfill. In 1991, a Carbone truck carrying illegal waste crashed and police discovered that Carbone was violating the ordinance. Clarkstown sued Carbone in a New York Supreme Court. Carbone responded by suing Clarkstown in a federal District Court, claiming that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. The District Court agreed but dissolved its injunction against Clarkstown when the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clarkstown.

Question

Does a town's "flow control ordinance," which requires that all waste pass through a certain waste processing plant, violate the interstate Commerce Clause by disrupting commerce for waste processing plants in other states?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for C & A Carbone, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. Tthe Court held 6-3 that the Commerce Clause invalidates local laws that discriminate against interstate commerce, disrupt the flow of articles of commerce, and grant municipalities disproportionate market gains. In an opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court found that "the article of commerce...is the service of processing and disposing of [waste]." The Court held that the flow ordinance was discriminatory because "[i]t hoards solid waste...for the benefit of the preferred processing facility." For the ordinance to be constitutional, the municipality would have had to prove that its effects on commerce are nondiscriminatory and justified by a "legitimate local interest."

Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman

Mon, 28 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-397

Petitioner

Associated Industries of Missouri

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lohman

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 641 (1994)

Argued

Monday, March 28, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1994

Advocates

Don M. Downing (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Thomas C. Walsh (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Following Missouri's imposition of a 1.5% statewide "use tax," the Associated Industries of Missouri - representing Missouri businesses that had to collect the tax and a manufacturing firm that had to pay it - filed suit alleging that the tax violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. Such discrimination was said to result from the fact that the use tax exceeded many in-state localities' sales tax rate.

Question

Does Missouri's use tax violate the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce in those localities where the use tax exceeds the local sales tax?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Associated Industries of Missouri, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. The Court held that the use tax was discriminatory in those localities where it exceeded the local sales tax. Such discrepancies, between certain localities' sales taxes and the state use tax, prevented the latter tax from being a valid "compensatory" tax, since it obviously did not impose a "substantially similar" burden on the interstate and intrastate commerce of such localities. The Court added that in those localities where the use tax did not exceed the local sales tax, no discriminatory treatment resulted and so the use tax's application would not be struck down in its entirety. Instead, the Court remanded the case back to Missouri for a decision on how to best correct certain of its localities' existing tax discrepancies.

Williamson v. United States

Mon, 25 Apr 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-5256

Petitioner

Williamson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 594 (1994)

Argued

Monday, April 25, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 27, 1994

Advocates

John F. Manning (on behalf of the Respondent)

Benjamin S. Waxman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Williamson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Evidence

None

Board of Educ.Kiryas Joel Village School v. Grumet

Wed, 30 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Kiryas Joel Village School District

6 Kahan Drive Monroe Monroe NY 10950

Monroe, NY 10950

United States

41° 19' 50.3364" N, 74° 11' 12.5304" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-517

Petitioner

Board of Educ.Kiryas Joel Village School

Respondent

Grumet

Consolidation

No. 93-527

No. 93-539

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 687 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, March 30, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 27, 1994

Advocates

Julie S. Mereson (Argued the cause for the state petitioner)

Nathan Lewin (Argued the cause for the school district petitioners)

Jay Worona (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1989, the New York legislature passed a school districting law that intentionally drew its boundaries in accordance with the boundaries of the Village of Kiryas Joel, a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim who practice a strict form of Judaism. Shortly before the new district commenced operations, the taxpayers and the association of state school boards embarked on a lawsuit claiming that the statute created a school district that limited access only to residents of Kiryas Joel.

Question

Did the 1989 statute violate the First Amendment's Establishment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Grumet, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the statute's purpose was to exclude all but those who lived in and practiced the village enclave's extreme form of Judaism. This exclusionary intent failed to respect the Establishment Clause's requirement that states maintain a neutral position with respect to religion, because it clearly created a school zone which excluded those who were non-religious and/or did not practice Samtar Hasidism. Indeed, the very essence of the Establishment Clause is that government should not demonstrate a preference for one religion over another, or religion over non-religion in general.

Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc. v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.

Tue, 26 Apr 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-609

Petitioner

Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 658 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, April 26, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1994

Advocates

James W. B. Benkard (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Richard G. Taranto (on behalf of the Private Respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Federal Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

National Organization for Women (NOW) v. Scheidler

Wed, 08 Dec 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-780

Petitioner

National Organization for Women (NOW)

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scheidler

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 249 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 1993

Decided

Monday, January 24, 1994

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Fay Clayton (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

G. Robert Blakey (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The National Organization for Women (NOW) sued a coalition of anti-abortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. N.O.W. alleged that Scheidler and other anti-abortion protesters were members in a nationwide conspiracy to obstruct women's access to abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity including the actual or implied threat of violence. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the voluntary contributions are not proceeds of racketeering and that a "racketeering enterprise" must have an economic motive, a fact that NOW could not demonstrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Does RICO require that an organization, to be defined as a racketeering enterprise, must be acting in pursuit of an economic motive?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for National Organization for Women (NOW), 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

The unanimous Court held that organizations without an economic motive can detrimentally "affect interstate or foreign commerce," satisfying the RICO definition of a racketeering enterprise. An "enterprise" does not have to be an economic organization or a principally criminal organization to trigger the RICO act. Consequently, the Court reversed the appeals court decision which allowed the original case to proceed.

Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States

Tue, 05 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-903

Petitioner

Posters 'N' Things, Ltd., et al.

Respondent

United States

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 513 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, October 5, 1993

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1994

Advocates

Alfredo Parrish (on behalf of the Petitioners)

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 857

None

Schiro v. Farley, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison

Mon, 01 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-7549

Petitioner

Schiro

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Farley, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 222 (1994)

Argued

Monday, November 1, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, January 19, 1994

Advocates

Monica Foster (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Arend J. Abel (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Farley, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Double Jeopardy

None

PUD No. 1 Of Jefferson County v. Washington Department Of Ecology

Wed, 23 Feb 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1911

Petitioner

PUD No. 1 Of Jefferson County et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Washington Department Of Ecology et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 700 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 1994

Advocates

Howard E. Shapiro (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Christine O. Gregoire (on behalf of the Respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Washington Department Of Ecology, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

None

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.

Mon, 21 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-356

Petitioner

MCI Telecommunications Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Telephone & Telegraph Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., No. 93-521

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 218 (1994)

Argued

Monday, March 21, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 17, 1994

Advocates

David W. Carpenter (on behalf of the Respondents)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (on behalf of the private Petitioner)

Christopher J. Wright (on behalf of the Federal Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Communication Act of 1934

None

Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S. A.

Wed, 20 Apr 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-670

Petitioner

Howlett

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Birkdale Shipping Co., S. A.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 92 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, April 20, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1994

Advocates

Carl D. Buchholz, III (on behalf of the Respondent)

Charles Sovel (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Howlett, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation

None

West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, Commissioner Of Massachusetts Department Of Food And Agriculture

Wed, 02 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Location

West Lynn Creamery

262 Lynnway Lynn MA 01905

Lynn, MA 01905

United States

42° 27' 10.3788" N, 70° 57' 40.392" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-141

Petitioner

West Lynn Creamery, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Healy, Commissioner Of Massachusetts Department Of Food And Agriculture

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 186 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 17, 1994

Advocates

Steven J. Rosenbaum (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Douglas H. Wilkins (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

On January 28, 1992, in response to the serious financial hardships of Massachusetts dairy farmers, the Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture issued a pricing order. The order required all dealers who sold milk to Massachusetts retailers to make a monthly premium payment to be distributed among in-state dairy farmers. Two Massachusetts milk dealers --West Lynn Creamery and LeComte's Dairy -- sell dairy products in Massachusetts. West Lynn Creamery relies on out-of-state producers; LeComte purchases all of its milk from West Lynn. The dealers filed an action in state court claiming that the order violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The state court rejected their claims; the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed.

Question

Is the Massachusetts pricing order a breach of the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for West Lynn Creamery, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. In a majority decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court determined that the pricing order violated the Commerce Clause because it discriminated against interstate commerce. The majority found that while the pricing order taxed all dealers, the benefit of the tax was reserved exclusively for in-state dairy farmers and outweighed the tax they were required to pay. Thus, the Court concluded that, in effect, the pricing order functioned like a tariff, and was clearly unconstitutional. The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was reversed.

Davis v. United States

Tue, 29 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1949

Petitioner

Davis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 452 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1994

Advocates

Richard H. Seamon (on behalf of the Respondent)

David S. Jonas (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Custis v. United States

Mon, 28 Feb 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-5209

Petitioner

Custis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 485 (1994)

Argued

Monday, February 28, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1994

Advocates

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Mary French (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

None

Heck v. Humphrey

Mon, 18 Apr 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-6188

Petitioner

Heck

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Humphrey et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 477 (1994)

Argued

Monday, April 18, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1994

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Matthew R. Gutwein (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Humphrey, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown

Tue, 01 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1988

Petitioner

Ticor Title Insurance Co. et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brown et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 117 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 1994

Decided

Monday, April 4, 1994

Advocates

Gerald D. W. North (on behalf of the Respondents)

Richard G. Taranto (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Brown, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust And Savings Bank, As Trustee Of The Sperry Master Retirement Trust No.2

Tue, 12 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1074

Petitioner

John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harris Trust And Savings Bank, As Trustee Of The Sperry Master Retirement Trust No.2

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 86 (1993)

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 1993

Decided

Monday, December 13, 1993

Advocates

Howard G. Kristol (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence Kill (on behalf of the Respondent)

Christopher J. Wright (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Harris Trust And Savings Bank, As Trustee Of The Sperry Master Retirement Trust No.2, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

None

O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, As Receiver For American Diversified Savings Bank

Mon, 21 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-489

Petitioner

O'Melveny & Myers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, As Receiver For American Diversified Savings Bank, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 79 (1994)

Argued

Monday, March 21, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1994

Advocates

Paul Bender (on behalf of the Respondents)

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for O'Melveny & Myers, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 12 U.S.C. 1821

None

Ladue v. Gilleo

Wed, 23 Feb 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Residence of Margaret Gilleo

Litzinger Road Ladue MO 63131

Ladue, MO 63131

United States

38° 37' 24.8808" N, 90° 23' 1.2012" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1856

Petitioner

Ladue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gilleo

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 43 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1994

Advocates

Jordan B. Cherrick (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Paul Bender (On behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Gerald P. Greiman (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Margaret Gilleo placed a 24-by-36-inch sign calling for peace in the Persian Gulf on her front lawn. The original sign disappeared and a subsequent sign was knocked down. She reported these incidents to the police who advised her that such signs were prohibited in Ladue. She sued the city and the District Court ordered a preliminary injunction. Ladue repealed the law and replaced it with a new one which also banned window signs. Gilleo then placed another anti-war sign in her second-story window and amended her complaint to challenge the new ordinance.

Question

Does the Ladue ordinance violate Gilleo's right to free speech as protected by the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gilleo, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. Although acknowledging Ladue's police power to minimize visual clutter associated with signs, the Court ruled that the law "almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important." The Court held a "special respect" for an individual's right to convey messages from her home.

Thomas Jefferson University, Dba Thomas Jefferson University Hospital v. Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services

Mon, 18 Apr 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-120

Petitioner

Thomas Jefferson University, Dba Thomas Jefferson University Hospital

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 504 (1994)

Argued

Monday, April 18, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1994

Advocates

Ronald N. Sutter (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Amy L. Wax (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Medicare--provisions of the Social Security Act

None

McDermott, Inc. v. Amclyde

Tue, 11 Jan 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1479

Petitioner

McDermott, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

AmClyde

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 202 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, April 20, 1994

Advocates

Robert E. Couhig, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

William K. Kelley (as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Arden J. Lea (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for McDermott, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

United States v. Granderson

Mon, 10 Jan 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1662

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Granderson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 39 (1994)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 1994

Advocates

Gregory Stuart Smith (on behalf of the Respondent)

Thomas G. Hungar (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Granderson, convicted for mail destruction, faced potential imprisonment of 0-6 months under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced him to five years of probation. When Granderson tested positive for cocaine, the court resentenced him under section 3565 of the U.S. Code. The section says that if a person serving a sentence of probation possesses illegal drugs, "the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one third of the original sentence." The district court interpreted the phrase "original sentence" to refer to the term of probation imposed (60 months), rather than the 0-6 month imprisonment range set by the Guidelines. The court resentenced Granderson to 20 months' imprisonment.

The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Granderson's new sentence. Citing "lenity," the court agreed with Granderson that "original sentence" referred to the potential imprisonment range under the Guidelines, not to the actual probation sentence.

Question

United States Code section 3565 says that if a person serving a sentence of probation possesses illegal drugs, "the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one third of the original sentence." Does "original sentence" refer to the original imprisonment sentence range set by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, or to the term of probation?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Granderson, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3565

In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held 7-2 that the U.S. Code's section 3565 refers to the original sentence range set by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the minimum revocation sentence for drug possession while on probation is one third the maximum of the Guidelines range of imprisonment; the maximum revocation sentence is the Guidelines maximum. The Court pointed out that the statute differentiates between "sentence of probation" and "original sentence." Moreover, the history of the language shows that Congress may not have given it careful attention and that it "may have been composed with an obsolete federal sentencing regime in the drafter's mind." In "circumstances, where the text, structure, and statutory history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct, the rule of lenity... resolve[s] the statutory ambiguity in Granderson's favor."

Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy concurred separately. Dissenting, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, with whom Justice Clarence Thomas concurred, argued that "original sentence" should be interpreted as the term of probation.

Ratzlaf Et Ux. v. United States

Mon, 01 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1196

Petitioner

Ratzlaf Et Ux.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 135 (1994)

Argued

Monday, November 1, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, January 11, 1994

Advocates

Paul J. Larkin, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Stephen R. LaCheen (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Ratzlaf Et Ux., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 31 U.S.C. 5322

None

United Mineworkers of America v. Bagwell

Mon, 29 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1625

Petitioner

United Mineworkers of America

Respondent

Bagwell

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 821 (1994)

Argued

Monday, November 29, 1993

Decided

Thursday, June 30, 1994

Advocates

Laurence E. Gold (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Paul Bender (as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A Virginia trial court warned the United Mine Workers of America union to refrain from certain unlawful strike-related activities. Over the course of the next few months, finding that the union had disregarded the warning more than 400 times, the court fined them more than $64 million in what it termed civil fines, payable to the state of Virginia. After the strike was settled the court refused to cancel the fines, despite the fact that the strike settlement had called for their cancellation. The Court ruled that the fines were payable to the state, not the mining company, and that the settlement could not therefore cancel them. The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed, canceling the fines in accordance with the settlement agreement, but on further appeal the Supreme Court of Virginia reinstated the fines. It held that the union had been warned in advance and could have avoided the fines, meaning that it controlled its own destiny. The fines were therefore not criminal (imposing criminal fines would have required a jury trial) but instead civil, as the trial court had argued, because they were intended to maintain order and respect for the courts by encouraging compliance with a court order.

Question

Were the fines assessed against the United Mine Workers of America union, amounting to more than $64 million, criminal or civil in nature?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United Mineworkers of America, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The fines were criminal in nature. The Supreme Court unanimously held that they had been intended to punish the union, not merely to maintain order or respect for the judiciary, and that the union was therefore entitled to the heightened protections of a criminal proceeding, such as a jury trial. Justice Harry Blackmun in the opinion of the Court, wrote, "The union's sanctionable conduct did not not occur in the court's presence or otherwise implicate the court's ability to maintain order and adjudicate the proceedings before it. ... Instead, the Virginia trial court levied contempt fines for widespread, ongoing, out-of-court violations of a complex injunction. In so doing, the court effectively policed petitioner's compliance with an entire code of conduct that the court itself had imposed. ... Under such circumstances, disinterested factfinding and evenhanded adjudication were essential, and petitioners were entitled to a criminal jury trial."

Simmons v. South Carolina

Tue, 18 Jan 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-9059

Petitioner

Simmons

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

South Carolina

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 154 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 17, 1994

Advocates

David I. Bruck (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Richard A. Harpootlian (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Simmons, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Farmer v. Brennan, Warden

Wed, 12 Jan 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-7247

Petitioner

Farmer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brennan, Warden, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 825 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1994

Advocates

Paul Bender (on behalf of the Respondents)

Elizabeth Alexander (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Farmer, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Reed v. Farley, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison

Mon, 28 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-5418

Petitioner

Reed

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Farley, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 339 (1994)

Argued

Monday, March 28, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 20, 1994

Advocates

Jerold S. Solovy (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Arend J. Abel (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Farley, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

Department Of Revenue Of Montana v. Kurth Ranch

Wed, 19 Jan 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-144

Petitioner

Department Of Revenue Of Montana

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kurth Ranch et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 767 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1994

Advocates

Paul Van Tricht (on behalf of the Petitioner)

James A. Feldman (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

James H. Goetz (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kurth Ranch, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Double Jeopardy

None

Central Bank Of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank Of Denver, N. A.

Tue, 30 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-854

Petitioner

Central Bank Of Denver, N. A.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

First Interstate Bank Of Denver, N. A., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 164 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, April 19, 1994

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Tucker Karl Trautman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Miles M. Gersh (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Central Bank Of Denver, N. A., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

None

Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

Tue, 18 Jan 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Landfill

18177 Cedar Springs Ln Arlington OR 97812

Arlington, OR 97812

United States

45° 34' 25.9752" N, 120° 17' 48.8292" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-70

Petitioner

Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Department of Environmental Quality of The State of Oregon et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 93-108

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 93 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 1994

Decided

Monday, April 4, 1994

Advocates

Andrew J. Pincus (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Thomas A. Balmer (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1989, Oregon Legislature imposed a surcharge on solid waste generated out- of-state and disposed of within the state. The Department of Environmental Quality, determined the amount of the surcharge to be $2.25 per ton, significantly higher than the $0.85 per ton fee charged for in-state waste. Two waste disposal companies —Waste Systems Inc. and Columbia Resource Company (CRC) — disposed of waste generated out-of-state in Oregon. Waste Systems Inc. managed and owned a landfill in Oregon, and CRC transported waste from Washington State to Oregon. The companies challenged the surcharge in the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that it breached the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. However, the appellate court upheld the surcharge, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.

Question

Is the surcharge that Oregon imposed on the in-state disposal of waste produced out-of-state a violation of the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Oregon Waste Systems, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. In a majority decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court noted that the Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, and a regulation is discriminatory if it "taxes a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines." The majority determined that the surcharge was clearly discriminatory because waste disposal companies were required to pay three times more to dispose of waste produced out-of- state. Thus, for the surcharge to comply with the Commerce Clause, the Department of Environmental Quality needed to demonstrate that it had no choice but to use discriminatory means to serve some local purpose, but it failed to do so. Consequently, the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court was reversed.

Hagen v. Utah

Tue, 02 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-6281

Petitioner

Hagen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Utah

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 399 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Advocates

Ronald J. Mann (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Martin E. Seneca, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Jan Graham (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Utah, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1151

None

Johnson, Speaker Of The Florida House Of Representatives v. De Grandy

Mon, 04 Oct 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-519

Petitioner

De Grandy et al.

Respondent

Johnson, Speaker Of The Florida House Of Representatives, et al.

Consolidation

No. 92-593

No. 92-767

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 997 (1994)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 1993

Decided

Thursday, June 30, 1994

Advocates

Joel I. Klein (on behalf of Florida, et al)

C. Allen Foster (on behalf of De Grandy, et al)

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the United States)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Johnson, Speaker Of The Florida House Of Representatives, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

None

American Dredging v. Miller

Tue, 09 Nov 1993 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-1950

Petitioner

American Dredging

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Miller

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 443 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Advocates

John F. Manning (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Timothy J. Falcon (on behalf of the Respondent)

Thomas J. Wagner (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Robert Miller, a Mississippi resident who had moved north to find work, was injured while working as a seaman for American Dredging Company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Miller returned home to Mississippi, and filed a suit against the company in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. The suit was filed under the Jones Act, a federal law that allows a seaman to sue his employer in either federal or state court when he suffers personal injury.

American Dredging moved to dismiss the case under the doctrine of "forum non conveniens," which allows a court to dismiss a case if it is filed in a place that is unnecessarily and significantly inconvenient to the defendant. The trial court agreed, holding that a Louisiana law making the doctrine of "forum non conveniens" inapplicable in Jones Act cases was superseded by federal maritime law (law that deals with oceanic commerce). An appeals court affirmed the decision, but the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned it, holding that the Louisiana law was not superseded by federal maritime law.

Question

Does the Constitutional grant of federal jurisdiction over maritime law (found in Article III Section 2) prevent states from prohibiting (in maritime cases) "forum non conveniens" claims that, under federal law, would be permitted?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Miller, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Jones, or Death on the High Seas

No. The Court decided that "forum non conveniens" claims were only procedural, not substantive, and that national uniformity was therefore not required by the Constitution. Writing for the seven-member majority, Justice Antonin Scalia stated "venue is a matter that goes to process rather than substantive rights -- determining which among various competent courts will decide the case. Uniformity of process (beyond the rudimentary elements of procedural fairness) is assuredly not what the law of admiralty seeks to achieve, since it is supposed to apply in all the courts of the world." Further, Scalia wrote that the amount of discretion left to the trial court by the forum non conveniens doctrine necessarily meant that, even if it was embraced by every state, it would still not result in uniformity.

City Of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund

Wed, 19 Jan 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1639

Petitioner

City Of Chicago et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Environmental Defense Fund et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 328 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 2, 1994

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Lawrence Rosenthal (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Richard J. Lazarus (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Environmental Defense Fund, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 6921

None

Department Of Taxation And Finance Of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc.

Wed, 23 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-377

Petitioner

Department Of Taxation And Finance Of New York et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 61 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, March 23, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1994

Advocates

Joseph E. Zdarsky (on behalf of the Respondents)

Beth S. Brinkmann (on behalf of the United States, supporting the Respondents)

G. Oliver Koppell (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Department Of Taxation And Finance Of New York, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 261

None

United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez

Tue, 01 Mar 1994 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1812

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alvarez-Sanchez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 350 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 2, 1994

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Carlton F. Gunn (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Three days after his arrest by local police on state narcotics charges, Pedro Alvarez-Sanchez confessed to the Secret Service that federal reserve notes found in his home were counterfeit. When he was subsequently charged with the federal offense of possession of counterfeit currency, Alvarez defended himself by claiming that the delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered his confession inadmissible. Alvarez cited 18 U.S.C. Section 3501(c), which pronounced separate charge- based confessions inadmissible if obtained after the first six hours of detention. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's decision to uphold the confession, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.

Question

Does federal statute 18 U.S.C. Section 3501(c), declaring separate charge- based confessions inadmissible if obtained after the first six hours of detention, apply to suspects that are held only on state or federal charges?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3501

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the provisions of the federal statute in question do not apply to suspects being held solely on state charges. The Court explained that no delay is said to occur until the suspect is arrested and detained for a federal crime. The six-hour period only begins to expire from the point of a suspect's federal arrest and charging. In this case, Alvarez-Sanchez was presented before a federal judge within six hours of his arrest on a federal counterfeit charge. The fact that he was held for some two and a half days prior has no bearing on his federal status under the statute since he was detained on state and local charges only during this time.