Cases - 1990 term

Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Tue, 23 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-762

Petitioner

Freytag

Respondent

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 868 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 1991

Advocates

Kathleen M. Sullivan (Argued the case for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the case for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Under 26 U.S.C. 7443A(b), the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court (an Article I Court established by Congress) may appoint special trial judges to certain specified proceedings explicitly laid out in the statute, in which the special trial judges may issue decisions. He may also appoint them to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate," but in those unspecified cases the special trial judge may not issue a final decision, only draft an opinion which must be reviewed by a regular judge of the Tax Court.

Freytag and several other defendants were charged with using a tax shelter to avoid paying roughly $1.5 billion in taxes. They consented to have their case heard by a special trial judge. The trial judge eventually drafted an opinion unfavorable to their position, which was reviewed and adopted by the Chief Judge. They then appealed the case, arguing that their case was too complex to assign to a special trial judge under section 7443A. Congress's decision to allow the Chief Judge to make such an assignment, they argued, violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Article II Section 2), which provides that Congress may "vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Freytag asserted that the "Courts of Law" referred to there were only Article III courts (Federal District Courts, Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, all of which have judges with lifetime tenure), and that the Chief Judge was part of an Article I court, meaning that Congress could not assign him the power of appointment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, affirming the Tax Court's decisions.

Question

Does 26 U.S.C. 7443A(a) permit the assignment of particularly complex cases dealing with large amounts of money to "special trial judges" appointed by the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court, provided that the special trial judges do not enter the decision but simply prepare an opinion for review and adoption by a regular Tax Court judge? Under the Appointments Clause of Article II Section 2, may Congress permit the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court to appoint "special trial judges" to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate"?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 2, Section 2, Paragraph 2: Appointments Clause

Yes and yes. On the question of whether 7443A permitted the assignment of complex cases to special trial judges, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the statute unambiguously did allow such appointments. Justice Harry Blackmun, in the majority opinion, wrote, "The plain language of 7443A(b)(4) surely authorizes the Chief Judge's assignment of petitioners' cases to a special trial judge. When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry should be complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances."

On the Appointments Clause question, however, the Court was divided 5-to-4. Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority that Article I Courts, like Article III Courts, exercised the judicial power of the United States and were therefore "Courts of Law" for purposes of Article II Section 2. While they may have been more dependent on Congress than the other branches, they were nevertheless independent, and it therefore did not violate the separation of powers to allow them to make appointments.

McNeil v. Wisconsin

Tue, 26 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Milwaukee County Jail

949 North 9th Street Milwaukee WI 53233

Milwaukee, WI 53233

United States

43° 2' 32.3124" N, 87° 55' 22.8252" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5319

Petitioner

Paul McNeil

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wisconsin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 171 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 13, 1991

Advocates

Gary M. Luck (argued the cause for petitioner)

David J. Becker (Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for respondent)

Stephen L. Nightingale (argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance)

Facts of the Case

When arrested for armed robbery, Paul McNeil did not initially invoke his Miranda right to counsel provided by the Fifth Amendment. However, he had a public defender represent him at a pretrial hearing at a county court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. After the hearing, sheriffs asked him about his involvement in a unrelated set of crimes, including murder. The sheriffs informed McNeil of his Miranda rights again, but he signed a waiver authorizing his testimony. His answers incriminated him for the crimes and he was charged in a state trial court. He unsuccessfully petitioned the court to invalidate his testimony as evidence. A jury convicted him and sentenced him to 60 years in prison. He contended that having the public defender represent him invoked his Miranda rights, which were later violated. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled against him.

Question

Does the accused's invocation of the Sixth Amendment's provision of legal counsel for one charge also invoke the Fifth Amendment's right to counsel for unrelated offenses charged later?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Wisconsin, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Sixth Amendment ensures competent legal representation in courts of law, whereas the Fifth Amendment ensures adequate counsel when confronting police. Because the Amendments have different purposes, invoking the Sixth Amendment by retaining a public defender does not invoke the Fifth Amendment when speaking with the police about an unrelated criminal charge. The Court reasoned that "[o]ne might be quite willing to speak to the police without counsel present concerning many matters, but not the matter under prosecution." McNeil's decision to have a public defender represent him at a pretrial hearing for armed robbery could not possibly indicate the choices he wished to make in the future regarding other confrontations with police.

Harmelin v. Michigan

Mon, 05 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Harmelin's Car

W 8 Mile Rd Oak Park MI 48237

Oak Park, MI 48237

United States

42° 26' 43.5768" N, 83° 11' 18.7476" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-7272

Petitioner

Harmelin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 957 (1991)

Argued

Monday, November 5, 1990

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 1991

Advocates

Richard Thompson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Carla J. Johnson (By appointment of the Court, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Following his conviction under Michigan law for possession of over 650 grams of cocaine, Ronald Harmelin was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Harmelin challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual, claiming it was disproportionate to the crime he committed and was statutorily mandated without consideration for the fact that he had no prior felony convictions. On appeal from an affirmance by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Is a statutorily mandated sentence that does not allow for consideration of mitigating factors a violation of the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishments?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Michigan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that since the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality guarantee, the determination of whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual" is not made with reference to the particular offense. Moreover, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause protects against unusual methods of punishment, not necessarily cruel ones. As such, while Harmelin's life sentence may have been cruel, it was not constitutionally unusual or unprecedented.

Gollust v. Mendell

Mon, 15 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-659

Petitioner

Gollust

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mendell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 115 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1991

Advocates

Edwin B. Mishkin (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Irving Malchman (on behalf of the Respondents)

James R. Doty (on behalf of SEC, as amicus curiae, in support of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mendell, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

None

Clark v. Roemer

Mon, 22 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-952

Appellee

Roemer

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Clark

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 646 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 22, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 3, 1991

Advocates

Robert B. McDuff (on behalf of the Appellants)

Robert G. Pugh (on behalf of the Appellees)

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the Appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Clark, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

None

Dennis v. Higgins

Wed, 31 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1555

Petitioner

Dennis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Higgins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 439 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 31, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 1991

Advocates

L. Jay Bartel (on behalf of the Respondents)

Richard A. Allen (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Dennis, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander

Mon, 03 Dec 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1474

Petitioner

McDermott International, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wilander

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 337 (1991)

Argued

Monday, December 3, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Advocates

Jennifer J. Bercier (on behalf of the Respondent)

James E. Doyle (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wilander, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Jones, or Death on the High Seas

None

Peretz v. United States

Tue, 23 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-615

Petitioner

Peretz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 923 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 1991

Advocates

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Joel B. Rudin (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 636

None

United States v. Gaubert

Mon, 26 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1793

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gaubert

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 315 (1991)

Argued

Monday, November 26, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, March 26, 1991

Advocates

Stuart M. Gerson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Abbe David Lowell (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Tort Claims, or Alien Tort Statute

None

Firstier Mtge. Co. v. Investors Mtge. Ins. Co.

Wed, 10 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1063

Petitioner

Firstier Mtge. Co.

Respondent

Investors Mtge. Ins. Co.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 269 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 1991

Advocates

Jack S. Dawson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

John P. Roberts (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Firstier Mtge. Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc.

Mon, 29 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1436

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

R. Enterprises, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 292 (1991)

Argued

Monday, October 29, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 22, 1991

Advocates

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Herald P. Fahringer (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell

Tue, 02 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Oklahoma City Board of Education

900 N Klein Av Oklahoma City OK 73106

Oklahoma City, OK 73106

United States

35° 28' 36.9048" N, 97° 31' 54.7716" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1080

Petitioner

Board of Education of Oklahoma City

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robert L. Dowell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 237 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 1991

Advocates

Ronald L. Day (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kenneth W. Starr (argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Julius LeVonne Chambers (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1972, a federal district court issued an injunction ordering the Board of Education of Oklahoma City to implement the "Finger Plan," which bused black students to white schools. In 1977, the district court withdrew its enforcement of the plan, declaring that the Board had complied with the plan and reached "unitary" racial composition. In 1984, the Board passed the Student Reassignment Plan (SRP), which lessened busing in an effort to reduce travel time for black students. The group that originally protested segregation sought to restore the court-ordered desegregation, claiming that the school system again became segregated. The district court declined, but on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the injunction was never formally removed. On reconsideration, the district court again declined to restore the injunction because it found the original "Finger Plan" unworkable. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

If a federal court deems that an injunction to desegregate schools has achieved its goals, can that court permanently dissolve the injunction?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 5-3 court. The Court held that the "federal supervision of local school systems [has always] been intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination." Once a school system demonstrates earnest compliance with an injunction, the federal court can consider removing it. The district court's finding in 1977 that the plan had achieved its goal of racially "unitary" schools was not sufficiently clear to dissolve the 1972 injunction. Instead, the district court could remove the injunction upon finding that "that the school system was being operated in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause, and that it was unlikely that the Board would return to its former ways." If the Board satisfied these goals, the district court could remove the injunction and consider the SRP separately and on its own merits.

Renne v. Geary

Tue, 23 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-769

Petitioner

Renne

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Geary

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 312 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1991

Advocates

Cedric C. Chao (on behalf of California Democratic Party, et al., as amici curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Arlo Hale Smith (on behalf of the Respondents)

Dennis Aftergut (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Renne, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.

Wed, 27 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-634

Petitioner

Cohen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cowles Media Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 663 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, March 27, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1991

Advocates

Elliot C. Rothenberg (on behalf of the Petitioner)

John D. French (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Cohen was a campaign associate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race. He gave court records concerning another party's candidate for lieutenant governor to the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. Though he had received a promise of confidentiality from the reporters, the papers identified Cohen in their stories. He was fired as a result. Cohen sued the papers in state court, alleging a breach of contract. At trial, Cohen won compensatory damages and the state appellate court upheld the award. But the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Cohen's claim relied on state "promissory estoppel" law, a law that essentially prevented a promisor from breaking a promise. The court ruled that the First Amendment's free press guarantee prevented promissory estoppel from applying to the newspapers.

Question

Does the First Amendment bar a plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Cohen, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Byron White, the Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel suit against the press. The Court first affirmed that such a cause of action, though private, triggered the First Amendment's protection. But the Court went on to rule that the state's promissory estoppel law was generally applicable and did not target the press. The law's enforcement against the press thus did not require stricter scrutiny than would its enforcement against other individuals or institutions.

Michigan v. Lucas

Tue, 26 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-149

Petitioner

Michigan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lucas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 145 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, March 26, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1991

Advocates

Mark H. Magidson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kenneth W. Starr (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Don W. Atkins (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Michigan, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Confront and Cross-Examine, Compulsory Process

None

Chisom v. Roemer

Mon, 22 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Louisiana General Assembly

900 North Third Street Baton Rouge LA 70804

Baton Rouge, LA 70804

United States

30° 27' 19.6488" N, 91° 11' 18.5892" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-757

Petitioner

Chisom

Respondent

Roemer

Consolidation

No. 90-1032

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 380 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 22, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1991

Advocates

Pamela S. Karlan (on behalf of the Petitioners Chisom, et al)

Robert G. Pugh (on behalf of the Respondents)

Kenneth W. Starr (on behalf of the Petitioner United States)

Facts of the Case

The Louisiana Supreme Court had 7 judges. The First Supreme Court District elected 2 judges, and the 5 other districts elected 1 judge each. The Orleans Parish was 1 of 4 parishes in the First Supreme Court District and the majority of its registered voters were black. However, more than 75% of the other 3 parishes’ registered voters were white. Ronald Chisom and the other petitioners in this case, representing New Orleans’s black majority, filed an action in the District Court against Louisiana’s governor, Charles E. Roemer, and state officials, arguing that the state’s justice election procedure weakened the minority’s voting power, allegedly violating section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The 1982 amendment to this act prohibited any voting procedure which caused minority voters to "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." The District Court ruled against the petitioners. When the Court of Appeals evaluated the case, it sent the case back to the District Court with instructions to maintain the original ruling based partly on its claim that the 1982 amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the election of judges. The District Court maintained their original opinion, but the petitioners and the United States appealed.

Question

Does the 1982 amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act apply to judicial elections?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Chisom, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

Yes. In a majority decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court rejected the possibility that Congress had intended for the 1982 amendment to exclude judicial elections. The Court determined that if Congress had that aim, it would have indicated this exclusion explicitly. Consequently, the Court favored a broad interpretation of the word “representative” in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, considering it to encompass all winners of popular elections. Thus, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, sending the original case back to be reevaluated in light of the reversal.

Connecticut v. Doehr

Mon, 07 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-143

Petitioner

Connecticut

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doehr

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 1 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 6, 1991

Advocates

Henry S. Cohn (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Joanne S. Faulkner (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Doehr, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

California v. Hodari D.

Mon, 14 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1632

Petitioner

California

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hodari D.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 621 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 14, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Advocates

Ronald E. Niver (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Clifford M. Sloan (on behalf of United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the Petitioner)

James L. Lozenski (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for California, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Martin v. Oshrc

Tue, 27 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1541

Petitioner

Martin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oshrc

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 144 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 27, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, March 20, 1991

Advocates

Clifford M. Sloan (on behalf of the Petitioner)

John D. Faught (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Martin, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Occupational Safety and Health

None

Coleman v. Thompson

Mon, 25 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-7662

Petitioner

Coleman

Respondent

Thompson

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 722 (1991)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1991

Advocates

John H. Hall (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Donald R. Curry (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Thompson, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Mu'min v. Virginia

Wed, 20 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5193

Petitioner

Mu'min

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Virginia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 415 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 1991

Decided

Thursday, May 30, 1991

Advocates

John H. Blume (on behalf of the Petitioner)

John H. McLees (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Virginia, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Trial By Jury

None

American Hospital Assn v. NLRB

Mon, 25 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-97

Petitioner

American Hospital Assn

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 606 (1991)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Advocates

David L. Shapiro (on behalf of the Respondents)

James D. Holzhauer (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for NLRB, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

Demarest v. Manspeaker

Tue, 06 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-5916

Petitioner

Demarest

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Manspeaker

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 184 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Advocates

James E. Scarboro (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Michael R. Lazerwitz (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Demarest, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1821

None

Astoria Federal S. & L. Ass'n. v. Solimino

Wed, 17 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1895

Petitioner

Astoria Federal S. & L. Ass'n.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Solimino

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 104 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, April 17, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1991

Advocates

Paul J. Siegel (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Leonard N. Flamm (on behalf of the Respondent)

Amy L. Wax (as amicus curiae supporting Respondent (pro hac vice))

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Solimino, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

None

United States v. Smith

Wed, 07 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1646

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Smith

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 160 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, November 7, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, March 20, 1991

Advocates

David L. Shapiro (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Walter A. Oleniewski (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Employers' Liability

None

Melkonyan v. Sullivan

Mon, 15 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5538

Petitioner

Melkonyan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sullivan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 89 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1991

Advocates

Clifford M. Sloan (on behalf of the Respondent)

Brian Wolfman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Melkonyan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Access to Justice

None

Grogan v. Garner

Mon, 29 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1149

Petitioner

Grogan

Respondent

Garner

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 279 (1991)

Argued

Monday, October 29, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 1991

Advocates

Michael J. Gallagher (Argued the case for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the case as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Timothy K. McNamara (Argued the case for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Frank Garner was convicted of defrauding Coy Grogan and ordered to repay him. Garner then filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, asking the Bankruptcy Court to discharge (that is, nullify) his court-ordered repayment to Grogan. Grogan argued that the debt should not be discharged because section 523(a) of the bankruptcy code exempts obligations for money obtained by "actual fraud." The Bankruptcy Court, based on portions of the fraud case, agreed and did not allow Garner to discharge the debt. The District Court affirmed, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the standard of proof used in the original fraud case - the "preponderance of the evidence" standard - was lower than the standard of proof demanded under section 523(a) - a "clear and convincing evidence" standard. The Court found that most states used the "clear and convincing" standard in fraud cases and that Congress would have explicitly stated it if they used a different standard. Moreover, it argued that the intention of the bankruptcy code to provide a "fresh start" suggested that the standard most favorable to bankruptcy filers should be used (that is, the more demanding "clear and convincing" standard).

Question

What standard of evidence should bankruptcy courts apply in considering whether a debt was the result of "actual fraud" under section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Grogan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

Courts should apply the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Justice John Paul Stevens, for a unanimous Supreme Court, wrote that the lack of a specified standard of evidence in section 523(a) implied that Congress had intended the preponderance of the evidence standard to be used. That lower standard was generally used in civil actions between private parties (including bankruptcy filings) unless particularly important interests were at stake. Protecting a bankruptcy filer who had previously been convicted of fraud was not sufficiently important to demand a higher level of evidence.

Stevens also wrote that the "fresh start" intention of the bankruptcy laws did not suggest a higher standard of evidence. "In the same breath that we have invoked this 'fresh start policy," he wrote, "we have been careful to explain that the Act limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor.'" A debtor previously convicted of fraud did not fit this description.

Illinois v. Kentucky

Mon, 18 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

106 ORIG

Plaintiff

Illinois

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

Kentucky

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 380 (1991)

Argued

Monday, March 18, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, May 28, 1991

Advocates

John Brunsman (on behalf of the Plaintiff)

Rickie L. Pearson (on behalf of the Defendant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Illinois, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc.

Tue, 08 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Theatre and Lounge South Bend, IN

United States

41° 41' 0.1716" N, 86° 15' 0.0252" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-26

Petitioner

Barnes

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Glen Theatre Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 560 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Decided

Friday, June 21, 1991

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Wayne E. Uhl (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Glen Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend, Indiana, operated entertainment establishments with totally nude dancers. An Indiana law regulating public nudity required dancers to wear "pasties" and a "G-string" when they perform. The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop enforcement of the statute.

Question

Does a state prohibition against complete nudity in public places violate the First Amendment's freedom of expression guarantee?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Barnes, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. The Court was fractured and there was no majority opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion, conceded that nude dancing was a form of expressive activity. But he maintained that the public indecency statute is justified despite the incidental limitations on such expressive activity. The statute "furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality." The proscription on public nudity is unrelated to the erotic message the dancers seek to convey.

Riverside County v. McLaughlin

Mon, 07 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

County of Riverside: District Attorney

4075 Main Street Riverside CA 92501

Riverside, CA 92501

United States

33° 58' 46.0344" N, 117° 22' 35.9076" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1817

Petitioner

Riverside County

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

McLaughlin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 44 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 13, 1991

Advocates

Timothy T. Coates (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Dan Stormer (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

McLaughlin was arrested without a warrant and argued that Riverside did not act promptly (within 48 hours) on judicial probable cause determinations and arraignment procedures in his case and others.

Question

Did Riverside violate the Court's holding in Gerstein v. Pugh (420 U.S. 103), which required prompt probable cause determinations?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Riverside County, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

The Court held that Riverside's actions did not comply with the Gerstein precedent. Justice O'Connor argued that it was the state's burden to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances when delaying probable cause determinations beyond 48 hours. The lower court in this case had placed that responsibility on the accused. Intervening weekends or complicated pretrial proceedings were not legitimate reasons for delay.

Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers

Wed, 28 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1416

Petitioner

Air Courier Conference

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Postal Workers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 517 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, February 26, 1991

Advocates

Keith E. Secular (on behalf of the Private Respondents)

L. Peter Farkas (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul J. Larkin, Jr. (on behalf of the Federal Respondent supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Air Courier Conference, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 702

None

Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas Attorney Gen.

Mon, 22 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-813

Petitioner

Houston Lawyers' Ass'n

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Texas Attorney Gen.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 90-974

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 419 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 22, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1991

Advocates

Julius LeVonne Chambers (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Renea Hicks (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Houston Lawyers' Ass'n, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

None

Cottage Savings Assoc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Tue, 15 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1965

Petitioner

Cottage Savings Assoc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 554 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 15, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, April 17, 1991

Advocates

Dennis L. Manes (Argued the case for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

For tax purposes, Cottage Savings Association exchanged its interests in the mortgages of 252 single family homes with several other savings and loan associations, receiving in return 305 mortgages that, taken together, had the same market value. The fair market value of the mortgages it gave away, however, were worth $2.5 million less than their original value. In accordance with the accounting procedures of the federal regulatory body of savings and loan corporations, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), Cottage Savings recorded the exchanged properties as "substantially identical" (because they had the same fair market value).

When Cottage Savings filed its federal income tax return, however, it claimed a $2.5 million loss - the difference between the original value of the mortgages it gave away and the current value of the mortgages it received in return. The IRS refused to recognize the difference as a deductible loss, however, because under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code, the change in a property's value is only taken into consideration when it is realized through the "sale or disposition of [the] property." An exchange of property only constitutes a "disposition" if there is a "material difference" between the properties exchanged. Because Cottage Savings had reported the properties exchanged as "substantially identical," the IRS ruled, a "disposition" could not have taken place and the loss in value could not be deducted. Cottage savings took the issue to a federal Tax Court, which disagreed with the IRS and ruled the deduction permissible. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, siding with the IRS.

Question

Can the exchange of properties considered "substantially identical" for accounting purposes under Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations be considered a "disposition of property" for IRS tax purposes, given that properties exchanged must be materially different to constitute a "disposition" under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Cottage Savings Assoc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the definition of "substantially identical" under the FHLBB regulations was intentionally flexible and broad enough to include even properties that were "materially different" for IRS purposes. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in the majority opinion, wrote that exchanged properties are "materially different" if they "embody legally distinct entitlements." The properties involved in this exchange clearly satisfied that test. "Because the participation interests exchanged by Cottage Savings and the other S & L's derived from loans that were made to different obligors and secured by different homes, the exchanged interests did embody legally distinct entitlements. Consequently, we conclude that Cottage Savings realized its losses at the point of exchange."

Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier

Wed, 24 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1905

Petitioner

Wisconsin Public Intervenor

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mortier

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 597 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, April 24, 1991

Decided

Friday, June 21, 1991

Advocates

Paul G. Kent (on behalf of the Respondents)

Thomas J. Dawson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wisconsin Public Intervenor, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide

None

Stevens v. Department Of Treasury

Tue, 19 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1821

Petitioner

Stevens

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Department Of Treasury

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 1 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, March 19, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, April 24, 1991

Advocates

Alison Steiner (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Amy L. Wax (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Stevens, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

None

Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. Of Treasury

Mon, 01 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1106

Petitioner

Trinova Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan Dept. Of Treasury

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 358 (1991)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Advocates

Richard R. Roesch (on behalf of the Respondent)

Peter S. Sheldon (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Michigan Dept. Of Treasury, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Kay v. Ehrler

Mon, 25 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-79

Petitioner

Kay

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ehrler

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 432 (1991)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 1991

Advocates

Ann M. Sheadel (on behalf of the Respondents)

Timothy B. Dyk (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Robert A. Long, Jr. (on behalf of United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ehrler, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards

None

Lankford v. Idaho

Tue, 19 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-7247

Petitioner

Lankford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Idaho

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 110 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1991

Advocates

Larry Echohawk (on behalf of the Respondent)

Joan Marie Fisher (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lankford, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Ford v. Georgia

Tue, 06 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-6796

Petitioner

Ford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Georgia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 411 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Advocates

Paula K. Smith (on behalf of the Respondent)

Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ford, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Master, Mates & Pilots v. Brown

Tue, 27 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1330

Petitioner

Master, Mates & Pilots

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brown

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 466 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 27, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 1991

Advocates

W. Michel Pierson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

James A. Feldman (as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Paul Alan Levy (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Brown, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

None

Moskal v. United States

Mon, 01 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-964

Petitioner

Moskal

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 103 (1990)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 1990

Decided

Monday, December 3, 1990

Advocates

Stephen L. Nightingale (on behalf of the Respondent)

Dennis M. Hart (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2314

None

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.

Mon, 14 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-18

Petitioner

Gilmer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 20 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 14, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 13, 1991

Advocates

James B. Spears (on behalf of the Respondent)

John T. Allred (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

None

Braxton v. United States

Mon, 18 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5358

Petitioner

Braxton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 344 (1991)

Argued

Monday, March 18, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, May 28, 1991

Advocates

Stephen J. Cribari (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Stephen J. Marzen (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Braxton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

None

Siegert v. Gilley

Tue, 19 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-96

Petitioner

Siegert

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gilley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 226 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Decided

Thursday, May 23, 1991

Advocates

Nina Kraut (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Michael R. Lazerwitz (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Gilley, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Burns v. Reed

Wed, 28 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1715

Petitioner

Burns

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reed

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 478 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 1990

Decided

Thursday, May 30, 1991

Advocates

Michael K. Sutherlin (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Robert S. Spear (on behalf of the Respondent)

Michael R. Lazerwitz (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Burns, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

United States v. France

Tue, 02 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1363

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

France

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 335 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 22, 1991

Advocates

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Michael R. Levine (on behalf of the Respondent (appointed by the Court))

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for France, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

California v. Acevedo

Tue, 08 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Acevedo's Car

West Stevens Avenue Santa Ana CA 92707

Santa Ana, CA 92707

United States

33° 41' 40.8228" N, 117° 52' 16.8204" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1690

Petitioner

California

Respondent

Acevedo

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 565 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Decided

Thursday, May 30, 1991

Advocates

Robert Foster (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Fred W. Anderson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Avecedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle (U.S. v. Ross), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container (U.S. v. Chadwick). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition.

Question

Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a container within an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the container holds evidence?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for California, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a "curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall dissented.

Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.

Wed, 03 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1158

Petitioner

Miles

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Apex Marine Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 19 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, October 3, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, November 6, 1990

Advocates

Allain F. Hardin (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Gerard T. Gelpi (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Apex Marine Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Jones, or Death on the High Seas

None

Arizona v. Fulminante

Wed, 10 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Ray Brook Federal Correctional Institution

128 Ray Brook Road Ray Brook NY 12977

Ray Brook, NY 12977

United States

44° 17' 26.8512" N, 74° 5' 33.4536" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-839

Petitioner

Arizona

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oreste Fulminante

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 279 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, March 26, 1991

Advocates

Barbara M. Jarrett (Senior Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for petitioner)

Paul J. Larkin, Jr. (argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Stephen R. Collins (by appointment of the Court, argued the cause for the respondent )

Facts of the Case

Arizona law officials suspected that Oreste Fulminante murdered his stepdaughter. He was later arrested in New York for an unrelated crime after the murder and incarcerated. While in prison he became friends with Anthony Sarivola, an inmate paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect information on other inmates while he served his term. Fulminante initially denied killing his stepdaughter to Sarivola, but admitted it when Sarivola offered him protection from other inmates in exchange for the truth. After his release, Fulminante also confessed to Donna Sarivola, Anthony's wife. Fulminante was indicted for murder in Arizona. Fulminante argued in trial court that his two confessions to the Sarivolas could not be used as evidence since the first was coerced and the second based on the first. The court admitted his confessions as evidence, convicted him, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court ordered Fulminante to be retried without the use of the confessions.

Question

1. Did the Arizona Supreme Court properly apply the totality of circumstances test when considering whether a suspect's confession to murder was coerced?

2. Did the Arizona Supreme Court properly apply harmless error analysis when considering whether the suspect's coerced confession influenced the trial outcome?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Fulminante, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Split Vote

Yes and yes. Justice Byron R. White and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered parts of the opinion, both majorities by a 5-4 vote. The Court held that Fulminante was coerced to confess in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court found that "it was fear of physical violence, absent protection from his friend Sarivola, which motivated Fulminante to confess." This motivation invalidated his confession. Since Fulminante's confession to Donna Sarivola was closely tied to his first coerced confession, the Court dismissed both. The Court also found that the confessions played a determinative role in the trial. It maintained that a "successful prosecution depended on the jury's believing the two confessions." Because the confessions were critical to the outcome of the trial, the fact that they were obtained coercively could not be dismissed as a harmless error. Four justices dissented to using harmless error analysis for coerced confessions on the ground that confessions always significantly affect a trial's outcome.

Florida v. Bostick

Tue, 26 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Bus where Bostick boarded Fort Lauderdale, FL

United States

26° 7' 20.3088" N, 80° 8' 36.1644" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1717

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bostick

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 429 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1991

Advocates

Kenneth W. Starr (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Joan Fowler (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Donald B. Ayer (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Department officers regularly boarded buses during stops to ask passenger for permission to search their luggage. Terrance Bostick, a passenger, was questioned by two officers who sought permission to search his belongings and advised him of his right to refuse. After obtaining Bostick's permission, the officers searched his bags, found cocaine, and arrested him on drug trafficking charges. Bostick filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, but the trial court denied the motion. Following an affirmance and certification from the Florida Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that the bus searches were per se unconstitutional because police did not afford passengers the opportunity to "leave the bus" in order to avoid questioning. Florida appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Is the acquisition of evidence during random bus searches, conducted pursuant to passengers' consent, a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unconstitutional search and seizure?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Florida, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. The Court, in a 6-to-3 decision, noted that when deciding if a search request is overly coercive, within a confined space such as a bus, one must not look at whether a party felt "free to leave," but whether a party felt free to decline or terminate the search encounter. The Court held that in the absence of intimidation or harassment, Bostick could have refused the search request. Moreover, the fact that he knew the search would produce contraband had no bearing on whether his consent was voluntarily obtained. The test of whether a "reasonable person" felt free to decline or terminate a search presupposes his or her innocence.

Ylst v. Nunnemaker

Tue, 19 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-68

Petitioner

Ylst

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nunnemaker

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 797 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, March 19, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1991

Advocates

Clifford K. Teompson, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Juliana Drous (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Ylst, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

General Motors Corp. v. United States

Wed, 21 Mar 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-369

Petitioner

General Motors Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

496 U.S. 530

Argued

Wednesday, March 21, 1990

Decided

Thursday, June 14, 1990

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None

Leathers v. Medlock

Wed, 09 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-29

Petitioner

Leathers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Medlock

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Meddlock v. Leathers, Commissioner of Revenue of Arkansas, No. 90-38

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 439 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, January 9, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 1991

Advocates

William E. Keadle (Argued the cause for petitioner in No. 90-29 and respondents in No. 90-38)

Eugene G. Sayre (Argued the cause for the petitioners in No. 90-38 and the respondents in No. 90-29)

Facts of the Case

In 1987, Arkansas amended its Gross Receipts Act (GRA), imposing a tax on cable television but not on print media. Cable companies and others filed suit in the State Chancery Court, alleging that taxing cable services, but not print and satellite broadcast services, violated their First Amendment expressive rights and 14th Amendment equal protection rights. In 1989, after the Chancery Court upheld the amendment, Arkansas again amended the GRA, extending the tax to satellite broadcast services. On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the GRA. However, the court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits differential taxation among members of the same medium. Therefore, because cable and scrambled satellite television services are essentially the same, the tax was unconstitutional when it applied only to cable services.

Question

Does differential taxation of different media violate the First and 14th Amendments? Does differential taxation of members of the same medium violate the First and 14th Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Leathers, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held 7-2 that without the intent or effect of suppressing expression, the First Amendment allows differential taxation of different media and differential taxation of some members of the same medium. Specifically, the Court held that the GRA was a generally applicable sales tax, and that its burden on cable television, while exempting the print media, was content- neutral, not directed at a select few, and not intended to interfere with expression. The Court went on to rule that the First Amendment allows a differential tax burden on some members of pay television services (that is, a tax on cable but not satellite services), if the tax is not intended to suppress expression. The Court ordered the State Supreme Court to address the 14th Amendment claim on remand. Dissenting, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, argued that the First Amendment non- discrimination principle prohibits a heavier tax burden on one medium and not other media.

Air Line Pilots v. O'neill

Mon, 14 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1493

Petitioner

Air Line Pilots

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

O'neill

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 65 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 14, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, March 19, 1991

Advocates

Marty Harper (on behalf of the Respondents)

Laurence E. Gold (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Air Line Pilots, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas

Mon, 26 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1679

Petitioner

Summit Health, Ltd.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pinhas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 322 (1991)

Argued

Monday, November 26, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, May 28, 1991

Advocates

Lawrence Silver (on behalf of the Respondent)

J. Mark Waxman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (as amicus curiae on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Pinhas, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sherman

None

Mobil Oil Exploration v. United Distribution

Mon, 05 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1452

Petitioner

Mobil Oil Exploration

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United Distribution

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 89-1453

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 211 (1991)

Argued

Monday, November 5, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Federal Petitioner)

Roberta Lee Halladay (on behalf of the Respondents)

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the private Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Mobil Oil Exploration, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Natural Gas, or Natural Gas Policy Acts

None

Cheek v. United States

Wed, 03 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-658

Petitioner

Cheek

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 192 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 3, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Advocates

William R. Coulson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Cheek, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

None

Minnick v. Mississippi

Wed, 03 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-6332

Petitioner

Minnick

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mississippi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 146 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, October 3, 1990

Decided

Monday, December 3, 1990

Advocates

Marvin L. White, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Floyd Abrams (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Minnick, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Self-Incrimination

None

Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.

Wed, 27 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-516

Petitioner

Kamen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kemper Financial Services, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 90 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, March 27, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1991

Advocates

Richard M. Meyer (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Joan M. Hall (on behalf of the Respondents)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission, as amicus curiae in support of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kamen, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

Hernandez v. New York

Mon, 25 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-7645

Petitioner

Hernandez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New York

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 352 (1991)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, May 28, 1991

Advocates

Jay M. Cohen (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kenneth Kimerling (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for New York, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip

Wed, 03 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1279

Petitioner

Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Haslip

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 1 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 3, 1990

Decided

Monday, March 4, 1991

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

Bruce A. Beckman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Haslip, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Rust v. Sullivan

Tue, 30 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The Department of Health and Human Services

200 Independence Avenue S.W. Washington DC 20201

Washington, DC 20201

United States

38° 53' 15.1764" N, 77° 0' 51.9012" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1391

Petitioner

Rust

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sullivan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 89-1392

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 173 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 1990

Decided

Thursday, May 23, 1991

Advocates

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Kenneth W. Starr (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The national government provides funds for family planning services (Title X). The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations limiting the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities. Title X funds were to be used only to support preventive family planning services.

Question

Do the regulations violate the First and Fifth Amendment rights of clients and health providers?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Sullivan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1008

No. The intent of Congress in the enactment of Title X is ambiguous with regard to abortion counseling. Consequently, the Court will defer to the expertise of the administrative agency. The Court held that the "regulations promulgated by the Secretary [of HHS] do not raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful constitutional questions' that would lead us to assume Congress did not intend to authorize their issuance." Should government subsidize one protected right (family planning), as it does in this case, it does not follow that government must subsidize analogous counterpart rights (abortion services).

Yates v. Evatt

Tue, 08 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-7691

Petitioner

Yates

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Evatt

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 391 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, May 28, 1991

Advocates

David I. Bruck (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Miller W. Shealy, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Yates, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Parker v. Dugger

Wed, 07 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-5961

Petitioner

Parker

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dugger

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 308 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, November 7, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 22, 1991

Advocates

Carolyn M. Snurkowski (on behalf of the Respondents)

Robert J. Link (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Parker, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.

Wed, 09 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1909

Petitioner

Feist Publications

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rural Tel. Serv. Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 340 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, January 9, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, March 27, 1991

Advocates

James M. Caplinger, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Kyler Knobbe (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. is a public utility that provides telephone service to several communities in northwest Kansas. Rural also publishes a telephone directory that consists of white and yellow pages. Feist Publications, Inc. is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories that cover a much larger geographic range than Rural's directories. When Rural refused to license its white pages listings to Feist, Feist extracted the listings it needed from Rural's directory without consent. Although Feist altered many of Rural's listings, several were identical to listings in Rural's white pages. The District Court granted summary judgment to Rural in its copyright infringement suit, holding that telephone directories are copyrightable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the copyright in a telephone company's directory protect the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by another telephone directory company?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Feist Publications, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 17 U.S.C. 102

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural's combined white and yellow pages directory. The Court reasoned that Rural's white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection because the information they contained lacked the requisite originality, as Rural had not selected, coordinated, or arranged the uncopyrightable facts in any original way. "Because Rural's white pages lack the requisite originality, Feist's use of the listings cannot constitute infringement," wrote Justice O'Connor.

Powers v. Ohio

Tue, 09 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-5011

Petitioner

Powers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ohio

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 400 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 9, 1990

Decided

Monday, April 1, 1991

Advocates

Alan C. Travis (on behalf of the Respondent)

Robert L. Lane (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Powers, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

Owen v. Owen

Mon, 05 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1008

Petitioner

Owen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Owen

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 305 (1991)

Argued

Monday, November 5, 1990

Decided

Thursday, May 23, 1991

Advocates

Robert L. Fishell (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Timothy B. Dyk (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Owen, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

None

Touby v. United States

Wed, 17 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-6282

Petitioner

Touby

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 160 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, April 17, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1991

Advocates

Joel I. Klein (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 1: Delegation of Powers

None

Florida v. Jimeno

Mon, 25 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-622

Petitioner

Florida

Respondent

Jimeno

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 248 (1991)

Argued

Monday, March 25, 1991

Decided

Thursday, May 23, 1991

Advocates

Michael J. Neimand (Argued the case for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the case for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Jeffrey S. Weiner (Argued the case for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

A Dade County police officer overheard Enio Jimeno arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone. He followed in his car, and eventually pulled Jimeno over for a traffic violation. He told him he had reason to believe Jimeno had drugs in the car, and asked for permission to search it. Jimeno consented, and a search revealed a brown paper bag with cocaine inside it. At trial, Jimeno argued that his consent to the search of the car did not extend to the closed paper bag within the car. The trial court agreed, excluded the drugs found inside the bag as the product of an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court both affirmed.

Question

Does a suspect's consent to a search of his vehicle extend to closed containers found inside?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Florida, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," wrote Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in the majority opinion. "We think it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container."

West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey

Tue, 09 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-994

Petitioner

West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Casey

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 83 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 9, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, March 19, 1991

Advocates

Calvin Royer Koons (on behalf of the Respondent)

Robert T. Adams (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Casey, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards

None

United States v. Centennial Savings Bank

Tue, 15 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1926

Petitioner

United States

Respondent

Centennial Savings Bank

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 573 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 15, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, April 17, 1991

Advocates

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the case for the United States)

Michael F. Duhl (Argued the case for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Centennial Savings Bank exchanged interests in one set of mortgage loans for another set of mortgage loans of the same market value. The mortgages were worth substantially less at the time they were exchanged than they had been at the time they were acquired, however, and Centennial reported the difference as lost income on its income tax return. In a separate set of transactions, Centennial collected early withdrawal penalties from customers who withdrew their certificates of deposit before they were scheduled. Centennial reported the early withdrawal penalties as "income from the discharge ... of indebtedness," meaning that it did not need to be reported as income under 26 U.S.C. 108(a)(1)(C).

With regard to the exchanged mortgages, the IRS did not allow the deduction, ruling that the properties exchanged had not been "materially different" and that the exchange therefore did not actually produce a reportable loss. With regard to the withdrawal penalties, the IRS ruled that they had to be reported as income. Centennial took the issue to federal District Court, where a judge ruled for the IRS on the mortgage exchange issue but for Centennial on the withdrawal penalty one. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the mortgage exchange holding and upheld the withdrawal penalty holding, siding with Centennial on both issues.

Question

Can a bank list the exchange of properties that have equal fair market value as a loss on its federal Income Tax return if the property it loses is worth significantly less at the time of the exchange than it was when the property was initially acquired? May a bank treat money received from early withdrawal penalties as "income from the discharge ... of indebtedness" under 26 U.S.C. 108(a)(1)(C)?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Centennial Savings Bank, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes and no. On the exchanged mortgage question, the Supreme Court referred to a companion case, Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 499 U.S. 554, decided at the same time, in holding that the mortgages exchanged were "materially different" and could therefore be deducted as losses.

On the question of early withdrawal penalties, however, the Court sided with the IRS. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the majority, stated that income comes from the "discharge ... of indebtedness" only when it is the result of the forgiveness of an obligation to repay assumed by the debtor (in this case the bank) at the outset of the debtor-creditor relationship. Because the early withdrawal fee was stipulated in the contract agreed upon at the outset of the certificate of deposit agreements, its payment was not the forgiveness of any obligation on behalf of the bank but rather the fulfillment of an obligation on behalf of the creditor. The bank was therefore required to list the penalties as income.

Payne v. Tennessee

Wed, 24 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Shelby County Criminal Court

201 Poplar Avenue Memphis TN 38103

Memphis, TN 38103

United States

35° 8' 57.2568" N, 90° 2' 50.9388" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5721

Petitioner

Pervis Tyrone Payne

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tennessee

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 808 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, April 24, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 1991

Advocates

J. Brooke Lathram (argued the cause for petitioner)

Charles W. Burson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Dick Thornburgh (Attorney General, Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Tennessee court tried Pervis Payne for murdering Charisse Christopher and her daughter Lacie. In hopes of avoiding the death penalty, Payne provided four witnesses testifying to his good character. The prosecution had Charisse's mother share how Charisse's death had impacted her surviving son Nicholas. In closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced Nicholas' loss of his mother when calling for the death penalty. The jury convicted him and sentenced him to death. Payne argued that the prosecution could not use testimony of how the victim's death impacted family members when contending for the death penalty. The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled against him.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment prohibit a capital sentencing jury from considering the impact that a victim's death had upon surviving family members?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Tennessee, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court overruled Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers which prohibited the submission of evidence relating to the harms caused by the victim's death. The Court reasoned that since "[v]irtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances," the prosecution must be allowed to submit similar counter evidence. Evidence regarding the "assessment of the harm caused by the defendant has long been an important factor in determining the appropriate punishment, and victim impact evidence is simply another method of informing the sentencing authority about such harm."

Gozlon-Peretz v. United States

Tue, 30 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-7370

Petitioner

Gozlon-Peretz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 395 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Advocates

Peter Goldberger (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Amy L. Wax (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 841

None

Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute

Tue, 15 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1647

Petitioner

Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shute

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 585 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 15, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, April 17, 1991

Advocates

Richard K. Willard (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Gregory J. Wall (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Mccarthy v. Bronson

Mon, 25 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5635

Petitioner

Mccarthy

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bronson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 136 (1991)

Argued

Monday, March 25, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1991

Advocates

Christopher D. Cerf (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Richard Blumenthal (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bronson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 636

None

Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd

Mon, 29 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1598

Petitioner

Eastern Airlines, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Floyd

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 530 (1991)

Argued

Monday, October 29, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, April 17, 1991

Advocates

Joel D. Eaton (on behalf of the Respondent)

John Michael Murray (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Eastern Airlines, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Treaty

None

Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co.

Mon, 01 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1283

Petitioner

Arcadia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ohio Power Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 73 (1990)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, November 27, 1990

Advocates

Edward Berlin (on behalf of the Respondents)

Carter G. Phillips (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Lawrence G. Wallace (as Federal Respondent in support of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Arcadia, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Power

None

Chapman v. United States

Tue, 26 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5744

Petitioner

Chapman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 453 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, March 26, 1991

Decided

Thursday, May 30, 1991

Advocates

T. Christopher Kelly (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Paul J. Larkin, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 841

None

FMC Corp. v. Holliday

Tue, 02 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1048

Petitioner

FMC Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Holliday

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 52 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, November 27, 1990

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (Argued the cause for the respondent)

H. Woodruff Turner (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David L. Shapiro (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

FMC Corporation (FMC) provided its employees with a self-funded health benefit plan (Plan). The daughter of an FMC employee, Gerald Holliday (Holliday), was seriously injured in a car accident and the Plan paid for a portion of her medical expenses. Holliday also received, in settlement of a negligence action he brought on behalf of his daughter, payment from the driver of the automobile in which his daughter was injured. FMC sought reimbursement under the terms of the Plan. Holliday obtained a declaratory judgment that Section 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law - which precludes reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery for benefit payments by a program, group contract, or other arrangement - prohibited FMC's exercise of subrogation rights. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which applies to employee welfare benefit plans such as FMC's Plan, did not preempt Section 1720.

Question

Does ERISA preempt the Pennsylvania law precluding employee welfare benefit plans from exercising subrogation rights on a claimant's tort recovery?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for FMC Corp., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

Yes. Three provisions of ERISA speak to the question of preemption: the preemption clause, the saving clause, and the deemer clause. The preemption clause establishes as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every state law that "relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. The saving clause returns to the states the power to enforce those state laws that "regulat[e] insurance." The deemer clause dictates that an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be deemed an insurance matter. The Pennsylvania law is covered by the preemption clause since it relates to an employee benefit plan. It also falls within the saving clause because it invalidates certain insurance subrogation provisions. The deemer clause, however, exempts self-funded ERISA plans from being governed by state laws regulating insurance within the meaning of the saving clause. As a result, Section 1720 is preempted insofar as it prohibits FMC's self funded Plan from exercising its subrogation rights.

Gregory v. Ashcroft

Mon, 18 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Residence of Ellis Gregory St. Louis, MO

United States

38° 38' 49.1676" N, 90° 13' 29.8812" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-50

Petitioner

Gregory

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ashcroft

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 452 (1991)

Argued

Monday, March 18, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1991

Advocates

Jim J. Shoemake (on behalf of the Petitioners)

James B. Deutsch (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under Article V, Section 26, of Missouri's Constitution, state court judges must retire at the age of seventy. The two petitioners in this case, both of whom were Missouri state judges, challenged the state constitution's retirement requirement on legislative and constitutional grounds.

Question

Did Missouri's mandatory retirement requirement for its state court judges violate the the 1967 federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ashcroft, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

No and no. Missouri's mandatory retirement requirement for its state court judges did not violate either the ADEA or the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In addition to emphasizing Missouri's, or any other state's, Tenth Amendment right to define the qualifications of its highest state officials, the Court held that the regulations of the ADEA did not apply to "policy-making" appointees such as state court judges. With respect to the petitioners' Equal Protection challenge, the Court employed a rational basis test to examine whether a rational relationship existed between Missouri's goal of promoting competent state court judges and its retirement requirement. Noting the connection between increasing age and declining mental and physical capacities, the Court held that Missouri's retirement requirement for judges who reach the age of seventy was not unreasonable.

Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg

Tue, 09 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1448

Petitioner

Virginia Bankshares, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sandberg

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 1083 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 9, 1990

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 1991

Advocates

Stephen M. Shapiro (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Joseph M. Hassett (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the Securities and Exchange Commission et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance)

Facts of the Case

First American Bankshares, Inc. (FABI) began a "freeze-out" merger in which the First American Bank of Virginia (Bank) merged into Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (VBI), a wholly owned subsidiary of FABI. VBI already owned 85% of the Bank's shares, and would acquire the remaining 15% from the Bank's minority shareholders. The Bank's executive committee and full board approved the merger at $42 a share. The directors then solicited proxies for voting on the proposed merger at the next annual meeting. In their solicitation, the directors stated that they approved the plan because the price allowed the minority shareholders to achieve a "high" value for their stock. Sandberg did not give her approval of the merger and brought suit, the federal ground for which was soliciting proxies in violation of SEC Rule 14a-9, which prohibits the solicitation of proxies by means of materially false or misleading statements. The trial court instructed the jury that it could find for Sandberg as long as the proxy solicitation involved material misstatements, and the proxy solicitation was an "essential link" in the merger process. The jury found for Sandberg, awarding her $18 a share, finding that she would have received that much more if the stock had been valued adequately.

Question

First, can a proxy statement couched in conclusory or qualitative terms, such as "high value," purporting to explain the directors' reasons for recommending a corporate action, be materially misleading within the meaning of Rule 14a-9? Second, can causation of damages compensable under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78n(a), be shown by members of a class of minority shareholders whose votes are not required by law or corporate bylaw to authorize the corporate action subject to the proxy solicitation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

Yes and no, respectively. Terms like "high value," in a commercial context, are reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis, and so could be shown to be misleading by garden-variety evidence. Furthermore, they can be materially misleading even if other information is available in the statement upon which an expert could deduce that they are false. A proxy statement should inform, not challenge the reader's critical wits. However, the link between the statement and the merger process is too speculative and too procedurally intractable to find an implied private right of action in cases in which the minority shareholders' votes are not required by law or corporate bylaw, and where the plaintiff's theory is that the vote was cosmetic.

Salve Regina College v. Russell

Tue, 27 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1629

Petitioner

Salve Regina College

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Russell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 225 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 27, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, March 20, 1991

Advocates

Steven E. Snow (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Edward T. Hogan (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Salve Regina College, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

James M. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia

Tue, 30 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-680

Petitioner

James M. Beam Distilling Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Georgia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 529 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 1990

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1991

Advocates

Amelia W. Baker (on behalf of the Respondents)

Morton Siegel (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for James M. Beam Distilling Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.

Wed, 27 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-256

Petitioner

Chambers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nasco, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 32 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, February 27, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 6, 1991

Advocates

Mack E. Barham (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Joel I. Klein (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Nasco, Inc., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers

Mon, 03 Dec 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1027

Petitioner

Norfolk & Western R. Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Train Dispatchers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 89-1028

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 117 (1991)

Argued

Monday, December 3, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, March 19, 1991

Advocates

Jeffrey S. Berlin (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the Federal Respondents supporting the Petitioners)

William G. Mahoney (on behalf of the private Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Norfolk & Western R. Co., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Interstate Commerce, as amended

None

Johnson v. Home State Bank

Tue, 16 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-693

Petitioner

Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Home State Bank

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 78 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, April 16, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1991

Advocates

Calvin Dee Rider (on behalf of the Respondent)

W. Thomas Gilman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Johnson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

None

Gentile v. State Bar Of Nevada

Mon, 15 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1836

Petitioner

Gentile

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

State Bar Of Nevada

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 1030 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 1991

Advocates

Robert H. Klonoff (on behalf of the Respondent)

Michael E. Tigar (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gentile, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Split Vote

None

Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Di

Wed, 10 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1166

Petitioner

Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Di

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 168 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 1990

Decided

Monday, December 10, 1990

Advocates

Terence V. Page (on behalf of the Respondent)

Laurence E. Gold (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Groves, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor-Management Relations

None

Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

Mon, 14 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

New Yorker Magazine

4 Times Sq New York NY 10036

New York, NY 10036

United States

40° 45' 23.1552" N, 73° 59' 13.866" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1799

Petitioner

Masson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 496 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 14, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1991

Advocates

Charles Morgan, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

H. Bartow Farr, III (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

After Jeffrey Masson was fired from his position at the Sigmund Freud Archives, Janet Malcolm interviewed him for an article in the New Yorker magazine. Malcolm_s article included many long direct quotations from Masson. The article presented Masson as extremely arrogant and condescending; at one point, he was quoted as calling himself "the greatest analyst who ever lived." However, Malcolm fabricated many of the more distasteful quotations. Masson sued for libel. The District Court dismissed the case on First Amendment free speech grounds because Masson was a public figure.

Question

Does the First Amendment give the New Yorker a right to publish fabricated quotations attributed to a public figure?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Masson, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 9-0 vote, the Court ruled that the First Amendments free expression clause could not protect the distortions in Malcolms article. Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion also explained when a direct quotation can be considered false, and therefore potentially libelous. The First Amendment limits libel suits by public figures. A report about a public figure cannot be considered "false" unless it is a gross distortion of the truth. Justice Kennedy's opinion explained that a direct quotation will qualify as such a distortion if the quoted words differ in their factual meaning from anything the public figure really said. Malcolm_s fabrication qualified as a "gross distortion," and the Court granted Masson standing to sue.

Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines

Wed, 20 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1714

Petitioner

Pauley

Respondent

Bethenergy Mines

Consolidation

No. 90-113

No. 90-114

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 680 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1991

Advocates

Mark E. Solomons (on behalf of the Respondents Bethenergy Mines, et al)

Julian N. Henriques, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioners Harriet Pauley, et al)

Christopher J. Wright (on behalf of the Respondent Director, OWCP, U.S. Department of Labor)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Bethenergy Mines, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 30 U.S.C. 901

None

Wilson v. Seiter

Mon, 07 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Hocking Correctional Facility

16759 Snake Hollow Rd Nelsonville OH 45764

Nelsonville, OH 45764

United States

39° 28' 24.6324" N, 82° 13' 35.0616" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-7376

Petitioner

Pearly L. Wilson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Richard Seiter et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 294 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1991

Advocates

Elizabeth Alexander (argued the cause for the petitioner)

William C. Bryson (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Rita S. Eppler (Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

While detained at the Hocking Correctional Facility in Nelsonville, Ohio, Pearly Wilson claimed he experienced cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Wilson sought financial awards and an injunction against the prison under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He filed suit in a federal district court against two state prison officials, Richard P. Seiter and Carl Humphreys. The District Court ruled against Wilson, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that Wilson had to show that the prison officials had a "culpable state of mind" when inflicting harm upon him.

Question

Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit err by holding that prison officials must have a "culpable state of mind" in order to establish cruel and unusual punishment of an inmate? Did the Court of Appeals err by overlooking an inmate's claim that prison officials showed "deliberate indifference" to his conditions of confinement?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Seiter, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No and Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court referred to its earlier decisions in Francis v. Resweber and Estelle v. Gamble to establish that cruel and unusual punishment required the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." For this to occur, the prison officials had to exhibit intentional cruelty, which would result in a "culpable state of mind." However, "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's conditions also constituted abusive treatment according to this standard. Therefore the Court of Appeals should have considered this aspect of Wilson's grievances.

Oklahoma v. New Mexico

Tue, 16 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

109 ORIG

Plaintiff

Oklahoma

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

New Mexico

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 221 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, April 16, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1991

Advocates

Paul Elliott (on behalf of the Plaintiff Texas)

Marian Matthews (on behalf of the Defendant)

R. Thomas Lay (on behalf of the Plaintiff Oklahoma)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Oklahoma, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc.

Mon, 15 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-34

Petitioner

Exxon Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Central Gulf Lines, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 603 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 3, 1991

Advocates

Francis A. Montbach (on behalf of the Respondents)

Stephen L. Nightingale (as amicus curiae, in support of the Petitioner)

Armand Maurice Pare, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Exxon Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1333

None

Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Mcclendon

Tue, 09 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1298

Petitioner

Ingersoll-Rand Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mcclendon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 133 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, October 9, 1990

Decided

Monday, December 3, 1990

Advocates

John W. Tavormina (on behalf of the Respondent)

Hollis T. Hurd (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Christopher J. Wright (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ingersoll-Rand Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

None

Perry v. Louisiana

Tue, 02 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-5120

Petitioner

Perry

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Louisiana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 38 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, November 13, 1990

Advocates

Keith B. Nordyre (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Rene' I. Salomon (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Perry, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Farrey v. Sanderfoot

Mon, 25 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-350

Petitioner

Farrey

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sanderfoot

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 291 (1991)

Argued

Monday, March 25, 1991

Decided

Thursday, May 23, 1991

Advocates

Harvey G. Samson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Brady C. Williamson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Farrey, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

None

Mccleskey v. Zant

Wed, 31 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-7024

Petitioner

Mccleskey

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Zant

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 467 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 31, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 1991

Advocates

John Charles Boger (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Mary Beth Westmoreland (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Zant, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.

Wed, 10 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Johnson Controls, Inc.

5757 N. Green Bay Ave. Milwaukee WI 53201

Milwaukee, WI 53201

United States

43° 7' 23.8404" N, 87° 56' 5.9964" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1215

Petitioner

Automobile Workers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Johnson Controls, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 187 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, March 20, 1991

Advocates

Marsha S. Berzon (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Stanley S. Jaspan (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Johnson Controls, Inc. ("Johnson") manufactures batteries whose assembly process entails exposure to high levels of lead. After discovering that eight of its female employees became pregnant while maintaining blood lead levels in excess of those thought safe by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Johnson barred all its female employees - accepting those with medically documented infertility - from engaging in tasks that require exposure to lead in access of recommended OSHA levels. Following its passage, the United Automobile Workers (UAW) challenged Johnson's fetal- protection policy as sexually discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Act). When the Appellate Court affirmed a district court decision in favor of Johnson, the UAW appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Does a policy barring the participation of potentially fertile and pregnant women in occupations that could be detrimental to their reproductive capacities constitute sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Automobile Workers, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court noted that even well intentioned proposals are forbidden if they result in discrimination. Johnson's fetal- protection plan discriminated against women by not requiring their male counterparts to demonstrate proof of medical sterility, despite the fact that lead exposure has also proved hazardous to male reproductive systems. The Court added that Johnson's fetal-protection plan fell outside the bona fide occupational qualification exception of Title VII, since the exception only permits employers to discriminate based on qualities that detrimentally impact on an employee's job performance. In the present case, although lead exposure may be harmful to the unborn, Johnson furnished no proof that it detracted from its female employees' abilities to perform any of their essential tasks.

Blatchford v. Native Village Of Noatak

Tue, 19 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1782

Petitioner

Blatchford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Native Village Of Noatak

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 775 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1991

Advocates

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence A. Aschenbrenner (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Blatchford, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

None

Lampf v. Gilbertson

Tue, 19 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-333

Petitioner

Lampf

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gilbertson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 350 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1991

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

F. Gordon Allen, III (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lampf, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

None

Business Guides v. Chromatic Comm. Enterprises

Mon, 26 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1500

Petitioner

Business Guides

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chromatic Comm. Enterprises

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 533 (1991)

Argued

Monday, November 26, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, February 26, 1991

Advocates

Stephen V. Bomse (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Neil L. Shapiro (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Chromatic Comm. Enterprises, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

Burns v. United States

Mon, 03 Dec 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-7260

Petitioner

Burns

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 129 (1991)

Argued

Monday, December 3, 1990

Decided

Thursday, June 13, 1991

Advocates

Stephen J. Marzen (on behalf of the Respondent)

Steven H. Goldblatt (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Burns, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

Irwin v. Veterans Administration

Mon, 01 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-5867

Petitioner

Irwin

Respondent

Veterans Administration

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 89 (1990)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 1990

Decided

Monday, December 3, 1990

Advocates

Jon T. Ker (Argued the case for the petitioner)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Shirley Irwin filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that he had been unlawfully fired by the federal Veterans Administration on the basis of his race and disability. In order to sue the federal government for unlawful discrimination, one must obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC (which is a waiver of the government's sovereign immunity from private suits). The EEOC mailed right-to-sue letters to both Irwin and his attorney. His attorney was out of the country, however, so while the letter arrived at his office on March 23, the attorney did not receive it until April 10. Irwin receive his copy of the letter on April 7. Less than a month from when Irwin received the letter, but more than a month from when the letter arrived at his attorney's office, Irwin filed suit in federal District Court. The court dismissed the suit, however, because it was filed more than a month after the attorney's office received the letter. Under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c), suits against the government must be filed within 30 days "of receipt of notice of final action taken" by the EEOC. The court ruled that the 30-day window began when the attorney's office received the letter. On appeal, Irwin argued that the window should have started when he or his attorney - not just the attorney's office - actually received the letter. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, however, upholding the District Court's decision.

Question

Does the 30-day window after "receipt of notice of final action taken" by the EEOC within which a suit against the federal government must be filed begin when an attorney's office receives notification, or when the attorney or client himself receives notification?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Veterans Administration, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

The 30-day window begins as soon as either the attorney's office, the attorney, or the client receives notification - whichever comes first. In an opinion written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that lower courts have consistently held that notice to an attorney's office qualifies as notice to the client. "The practical effect of a contrary rule would be to encourage factual disputes about when actual notice was received, and thereby create uncertainty in an area of the law where certainty is much to be desired," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Department Of Revenue, Florida

Tue, 06 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1847

Petitioner

Ford Motor Credit Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Department Of Revenue, Florida

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 172 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 1990

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1991

Advocates

Mark L. Evans (on behalf of the Appellant, appointed by this Court)

H. Bartow Farr, III (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Department Of Revenue, Florida, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Toibb v. Radloff

Mon, 22 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-368

Petitioner

Toibb

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Radloff

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 157 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 22, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 13, 1991

Advocates

Stephen J. Marzen (on behalf of the Respondent United States supporting the Petitioner)

James Hamilton (as amicus curiae in support of judgment below)

Peter M. Lieb (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Toibb, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

None

Schad v. Arizona

Wed, 27 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5551

Petitioner

Schad

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arizona

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 624 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, February 27, 1991

Decided

Friday, June 21, 1991

Advocates

Denise I. Young (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

R. Wayne Ford (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

An Arizona prosecutor brought a charge of first-degree murder against Schad after he was found with a murder victim's vehicle and other belongings. In Arizona, first-degree murder is murder committed with premeditation or murder committed in an attempt to rob. Schad maintained that circumstantial evidence established at most that he was a thief. The jury's instructions addressed first- and second-degree murder, not theft. The jury convicted Schad of first- degree murder. The judge sentenced Schad to death.

Question

Does the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment require juries in capital cases to be instructed on every lesser offense, includeding non-capital offenses, (e.g., robbery) that are supported by the evidence?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Arizona, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a complex decision, Souter's plurality opinion acknowledged that jury instructions offering all-or-nothing alternatives in capital cases may overstep the Due Process Clause. But Schad's jury was not faced with such a choice. His jury had been instructed on the non-capital offense of second- degree murder.

Ohio v. Huertas

Wed, 16 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1944

Petitioner

Ohio

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Huertas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 336 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, January 16, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, January 22, 1991

Advocates

Joann Bour-Stokes (on behalf of the Respondent)

Jonathan E. Rosenbaum (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Huertas, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Mcnary v. Haitian Refugee Center., Inc.

Mon, 29 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1332

Petitioner

Mcnary

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Haitian Refugee Center., Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 479 (1991)

Argued

Monday, October 29, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 1991

Advocates

Ira Jay Kurzban (on behalf of the Respondents)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Haitian Refugee Center., Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

None

EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.

Wed, 16 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1838

Petitioner

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arabian American Oil Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 89-1845

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 244 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, January 16, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, March 26, 1991

Advocates

Kenneth W. Starr (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Paul L. Friedman (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Arabian American Oil Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

None

Airports Auth. v. Citizens For Noise Abatement

Tue, 16 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-906

Petitioner

Airports Auth.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Citizens For Noise Abatement

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 252 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, April 16, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1991

Advocates

William T. Coleman, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioners)

David L. Shapiro (on behalf of Respondent United States, supporting the Petitioners)

Patti Goldman (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Citizens For Noise Abatement, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Primate Protection League v. Tulane Ed. Fund

Wed, 20 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-89

Petitioner

Primate Protection League

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tulane Ed. Fund

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 72 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, March 20, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1991

Advocates

Richard H. Seamon (on behalf of the Respondents)

Margaret E. Woodward (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Primate Protection League, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB

Wed, 20 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-285

Petitioner

Litton Financial Printing Div.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 190 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, March 20, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 13, 1991

Advocates

David A. Rosenfeld (on behalf of the Respondent Printing Specialties)

Mathias J. Diederich (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Respondent NLRB in support of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Litton Financial Printing Div., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Potawatomi Tribe

Mon, 07 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1322

Petitioner

Oklahoma Tax Comm'n

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Potawatomi Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 505 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, February 26, 1991

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae)

Michael Minnis (on behalf of the Respondent)

David Allen Miley (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn

Mon, 05 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1217

Petitioner

Lehnert

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ferris Faculty Assn

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 507 (1991)

Argued

Monday, November 5, 1990

Decided

Thursday, May 30, 1991

Advocates

Robert H. Chanin (on behalf of the Respondents)

Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lehnert, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Mccormick v. United States

Tue, 08 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1918

Petitioner

Mccormick

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 257 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Decided

Thursday, May 23, 1991

Advocates

Rudolph L. di Trapano (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Christopher J. Wright (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Mccormick, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1951

None

Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.

Wed, 28 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1671

Petitioner

Columbia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 365 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 1990

Decided

Monday, April 1, 1991

Advocates

Joel I. Klein (on behalf of the Petitioner)

A. Camden Lewis (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Columbia, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sherman

None

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.

Tue, 15 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-7743

Petitioner

Edmonson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Leesville Concrete Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 614 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 15, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 3, 1991

Advocates

John S. Baker, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

James E. Doyle (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Edmonson, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None