Cases - 1990 term

Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Tue, 23 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-762

Petitioner

Freytag

Respondent

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 868 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 1991

Advocates

Kathleen M. Sullivan (Argued the case for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the case for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Under 26 U.S.C. 7443A(b), the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court (an Article I Court established by Congress) may appoint special trial judges to certain specified proceedings explicitly laid out in the statute, in which the special trial judges may issue decisions. He may also appoint them to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate," but in those unspecified cases the special trial judge may not issue a final decision, only draft an opinion which must be reviewed by a regular judge of the Tax Court.

Freytag and several other defendants were charged with using a tax shelter to avoid paying roughly $1.5 billion in taxes. They consented to have their case heard by a special trial judge. The trial judge eventually drafted an opinion unfavorable to their position, which was reviewed and adopted by the Chief Judge. They then appealed the case, arguing that their case was too complex to assign to a special trial judge under section 7443A. Congress's decision to allow the Chief Judge to make such an assignment, they argued, violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Article II Section 2), which provides that Congress may "vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Freytag asserted that the "Courts of Law" referred to there were only Article III courts (Federal District Courts, Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, all of which have judges with lifetime tenure), and that the Chief Judge was part of an Article I court, meaning that Congress could not assign him the power of appointment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, affirming the Tax Court's decisions.

Question

Does 26 U.S.C. 7443A(a) permit the assignment of particularly complex cases dealing with large amounts of money to "special trial judges" appointed by the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court, provided that the special trial judges do not enter the decision but simply prepare an opinion for review and adoption by a regular Tax Court judge? Under the Appointments Clause of Article II Section 2, may Congress permit the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court to appoint "special trial judges" to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate"?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 2, Section 2, Paragraph 2: Appointments Clause

Yes and yes. On the question of whether 7443A permitted the assignment of complex cases to special trial judges, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the statute unambiguously did allow such appointments. Justice Harry Blackmun, in the majority opinion, wrote, "The plain language of 7443A(b)(4) surely authorizes the Chief Judge's assignment of petitioners' cases to a special trial judge. When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry should be complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances."

On the Appointments Clause question, however, the Court was divided 5-to-4. Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority that Article I Courts, like Article III Courts, exercised the judicial power of the United States and were therefore "Courts of Law" for purposes of Article II Section 2. While they may have been more dependent on Congress than the other branches, they were nevertheless independent, and it therefore did not violate the separation of powers to allow them to make appointments.

McNeil v. Wisconsin

Tue, 26 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Milwaukee County Jail

949 North 9th Street Milwaukee WI 53233

Milwaukee, WI 53233

United States

43° 2' 32.3124" N, 87° 55' 22.8252" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5319

Petitioner

Paul McNeil

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wisconsin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 171 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 13, 1991

Advocates

Gary M. Luck (argued the cause for petitioner)

David J. Becker (Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for respondent)

Stephen L. Nightingale (argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance)

Facts of the Case

When arrested for armed robbery, Paul McNeil did not initially invoke his Miranda right to counsel provided by the Fifth Amendment. However, he had a public defender represent him at a pretrial hearing at a county court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. After the hearing, sheriffs asked him about his involvement in a unrelated set of crimes, including murder. The sheriffs informed McNeil of his Miranda rights again, but he signed a waiver authorizing his testimony. His answers incriminated him for the crimes and he was charged in a state trial court. He unsuccessfully petitioned the court to invalidate his testimony as evidence. A jury convicted him and sentenced him to 60 years in prison. He contended that having the public defender represent him invoked his Miranda rights, which were later violated. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled against him.

Question

Does the accused's invocation of the Sixth Amendment's provision of legal counsel for one charge also invoke the Fifth Amendment's right to counsel for unrelated offenses charged later?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Wisconsin, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Sixth Amendment ensures competent legal representation in courts of law, whereas the Fifth Amendment ensures adequate counsel when confronting police. Because the Amendments have different purposes, invoking the Sixth Amendment by retaining a public defender does not invoke the Fifth Amendment when speaking with the police about an unrelated criminal charge. The Court reasoned that "[o]ne might be quite willing to speak to the police without counsel present concerning many matters, but not the matter under prosecution." McNeil's decision to have a public defender represent him at a pretrial hearing for armed robbery could not possibly indicate the choices he wished to make in the future regarding other confrontations with police.

Harmelin v. Michigan

Mon, 05 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Harmelin's Car

W 8 Mile Rd Oak Park MI 48237

Oak Park, MI 48237

United States

42° 26' 43.5768" N, 83° 11' 18.7476" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-7272

Petitioner

Harmelin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 957 (1991)

Argued

Monday, November 5, 1990

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 1991

Advocates

Richard Thompson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Carla J. Johnson (By appointment of the Court, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Following his conviction under Michigan law for possession of over 650 grams of cocaine, Ronald Harmelin was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Harmelin challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual, claiming it was disproportionate to the crime he committed and was statutorily mandated without consideration for the fact that he had no prior felony convictions. On appeal from an affirmance by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Is a statutorily mandated sentence that does not allow for consideration of mitigating factors a violation of the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishments?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Michigan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that since the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality guarantee, the determination of whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual" is not made with reference to the particular offense. Moreover, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause protects against unusual methods of punishment, not necessarily cruel ones. As such, while Harmelin's life sentence may have been cruel, it was not constitutionally unusual or unprecedented.

Gollust v. Mendell

Mon, 15 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-659

Petitioner

Gollust

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mendell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 115 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1991

Advocates

Edwin B. Mishkin (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Irving Malchman (on behalf of the Respondents)

James R. Doty (on behalf of SEC, as amicus curiae, in support of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mendell, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

None

Clark v. Roemer

Mon, 22 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-952

Appellee

Roemer

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Clark

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 646 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 22, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 3, 1991

Advocates

Robert B. McDuff (on behalf of the Appellants)

Robert G. Pugh (on behalf of the Appellees)

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the Appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Clark, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

None

Dennis v. Higgins

Wed, 31 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1555

Petitioner

Dennis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Higgins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 439 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 31, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 1991

Advocates

L. Jay Bartel (on behalf of the Respondents)

Richard A. Allen (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Dennis, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander

Mon, 03 Dec 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1474

Petitioner

McDermott International, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wilander

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 337 (1991)

Argued

Monday, December 3, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Advocates

Jennifer J. Bercier (on behalf of the Respondent)

James E. Doyle (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wilander, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Jones, or Death on the High Seas

None

Peretz v. United States

Tue, 23 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-615

Petitioner

Peretz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 923 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 1991

Advocates

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Joel B. Rudin (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 636

None

United States v. Gaubert

Mon, 26 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1793

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gaubert

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 315 (1991)

Argued

Monday, November 26, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, March 26, 1991

Advocates

Stuart M. Gerson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Abbe David Lowell (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Tort Claims, or Alien Tort Statute

None

Firstier Mtge. Co. v. Investors Mtge. Ins. Co.

Wed, 10 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1063

Petitioner

Firstier Mtge. Co.

Respondent

Investors Mtge. Ins. Co.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 269 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 1991

Advocates

Jack S. Dawson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

John P. Roberts (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Firstier Mtge. Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc.

Mon, 29 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1436

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

R. Enterprises, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 292 (1991)

Argued

Monday, October 29, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 22, 1991

Advocates

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Herald P. Fahringer (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell

Tue, 02 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Oklahoma City Board of Education

900 N Klein Av Oklahoma City OK 73106

Oklahoma City, OK 73106

United States

35° 28' 36.9048" N, 97° 31' 54.7716" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1080

Petitioner

Board of Education of Oklahoma City

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robert L. Dowell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 237 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 1991

Advocates

Ronald L. Day (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kenneth W. Starr (argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Julius LeVonne Chambers (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1972, a federal district court issued an injunction ordering the Board of Education of Oklahoma City to implement the "Finger Plan," which bused black students to white schools. In 1977, the district court withdrew its enforcement of the plan, declaring that the Board had complied with the plan and reached "unitary" racial composition. In 1984, the Board passed the Student Reassignment Plan (SRP), which lessened busing in an effort to reduce travel time for black students. The group that originally protested segregation sought to restore the court-ordered desegregation, claiming that the school system again became segregated. The district court declined, but on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the injunction was never formally removed. On reconsideration, the district court again declined to restore the injunction because it found the original "Finger Plan" unworkable. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

If a federal court deems that an injunction to desegregate schools has achieved its goals, can that court permanently dissolve the injunction?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 5-3 court. The Court held that the "federal supervision of local school systems [has always] been intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination." Once a school system demonstrates earnest compliance with an injunction, the federal court can consider removing it. The district court's finding in 1977 that the plan had achieved its goal of racially "unitary" schools was not sufficiently clear to dissolve the 1972 injunction. Instead, the district court could remove the injunction upon finding that "that the school system was being operated in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause, and that it was unlikely that the Board would return to its former ways." If the Board satisfied these goals, the district court could remove the injunction and consider the SRP separately and on its own merits.

Renne v. Geary

Tue, 23 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-769

Petitioner

Renne

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Geary

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 312 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1991

Advocates

Cedric C. Chao (on behalf of California Democratic Party, et al., as amici curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Arlo Hale Smith (on behalf of the Respondents)

Dennis Aftergut (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Renne, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.

Wed, 27 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-634

Petitioner

Cohen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cowles Media Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 663 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, March 27, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1991

Advocates

Elliot C. Rothenberg (on behalf of the Petitioner)

John D. French (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Cohen was a campaign associate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race. He gave court records concerning another party's candidate for lieutenant governor to the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. Though he had received a promise of confidentiality from the reporters, the papers identified Cohen in their stories. He was fired as a result. Cohen sued the papers in state court, alleging a breach of contract. At trial, Cohen won compensatory damages and the state appellate court upheld the award. But the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Cohen's claim relied on state "promissory estoppel" law, a law that essentially prevented a promisor from breaking a promise. The court ruled that the First Amendment's free press guarantee prevented promissory estoppel from applying to the newspapers.

Question

Does the First Amendment bar a plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Cohen, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Byron White, the Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel suit against the press. The Court first affirmed that such a cause of action, though private, triggered the First Amendment's protection. But the Court went on to rule that the state's promissory estoppel law was generally applicable and did not target the press. The law's enforcement against the press thus did not require stricter scrutiny than would its enforcement against other individuals or institutions.

Michigan v. Lucas

Tue, 26 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-149

Petitioner

Michigan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lucas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 145 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, March 26, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1991

Advocates

Mark H. Magidson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kenneth W. Starr (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Don W. Atkins (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Michigan, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Confront and Cross-Examine, Compulsory Process

None

Chisom v. Roemer

Mon, 22 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Louisiana General Assembly

900 North Third Street Baton Rouge LA 70804

Baton Rouge, LA 70804

United States

30° 27' 19.6488" N, 91° 11' 18.5892" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-757

Petitioner

Chisom

Respondent

Roemer

Consolidation

No. 90-1032

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 380 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 22, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1991

Advocates

Pamela S. Karlan (on behalf of the Petitioners Chisom, et al)

Robert G. Pugh (on behalf of the Respondents)

Kenneth W. Starr (on behalf of the Petitioner United States)

Facts of the Case

The Louisiana Supreme Court had 7 judges. The First Supreme Court District elected 2 judges, and the 5 other districts elected 1 judge each. The Orleans Parish was 1 of 4 parishes in the First Supreme Court District and the majority of its registered voters were black. However, more than 75% of the other 3 parishes’ registered voters were white. Ronald Chisom and the other petitioners in this case, representing New Orleans’s black majority, filed an action in the District Court against Louisiana’s governor, Charles E. Roemer, and state officials, arguing that the state’s justice election procedure weakened the minority’s voting power, allegedly violating section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The 1982 amendment to this act prohibited any voting procedure which caused minority voters to "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." The District Court ruled against the petitioners. When the Court of Appeals evaluated the case, it sent the case back to the District Court with instructions to maintain the original ruling based partly on its claim that the 1982 amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the election of judges. The District Court maintained their original opinion, but the petitioners and the United States appealed.

Question

Does the 1982 amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act apply to judicial elections?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Chisom, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

Yes. In a majority decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court rejected the possibility that Congress had intended for the 1982 amendment to exclude judicial elections. The Court determined that if Congress had that aim, it would have indicated this exclusion explicitly. Consequently, the Court favored a broad interpretation of the word “representative” in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, considering it to encompass all winners of popular elections. Thus, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, sending the original case back to be reevaluated in light of the reversal.

Connecticut v. Doehr

Mon, 07 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-143

Petitioner

Connecticut

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doehr

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 1 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 6, 1991

Advocates

Henry S. Cohn (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Joanne S. Faulkner (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Doehr, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

California v. Hodari D.

Mon, 14 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1632

Petitioner

California

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hodari D.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 621 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 14, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Advocates

Ronald E. Niver (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Clifford M. Sloan (on behalf of United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the Petitioner)

James L. Lozenski (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for California, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Martin v. Oshrc

Tue, 27 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1541

Petitioner

Martin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oshrc

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 144 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 27, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, March 20, 1991

Advocates

Clifford M. Sloan (on behalf of the Petitioner)

John D. Faught (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Martin, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Occupational Safety and Health

None

Coleman v. Thompson

Mon, 25 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-7662

Petitioner

Coleman

Respondent

Thompson

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 722 (1991)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1991

Advocates

John H. Hall (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Donald R. Curry (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Thompson, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Mu'min v. Virginia

Wed, 20 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5193

Petitioner

Mu'min

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Virginia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 415 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 1991

Decided

Thursday, May 30, 1991

Advocates

John H. Blume (on behalf of the Petitioner)

John H. McLees (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Virginia, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Trial By Jury

None

American Hospital Assn v. NLRB

Mon, 25 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-97

Petitioner

American Hospital Assn

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 606 (1991)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Advocates

David L. Shapiro (on behalf of the Respondents)

James D. Holzhauer (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for NLRB, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

Demarest v. Manspeaker

Tue, 06 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-5916

Petitioner

Demarest

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Manspeaker

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 184 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Advocates

James E. Scarboro (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Michael R. Lazerwitz (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Demarest, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1821

None

Astoria Federal S. & L. Ass'n. v. Solimino

Wed, 17 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1895

Petitioner

Astoria Federal S. & L. Ass'n.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Solimino

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 104 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, April 17, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1991

Advocates

Paul J. Siegel (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Leonard N. Flamm (on behalf of the Respondent)

Amy L. Wax (as amicus curiae supporting Respondent (pro hac vice))

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Solimino, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

None

United States v. Smith

Wed, 07 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1646

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Smith

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 160 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, November 7, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, March 20, 1991

Advocates

David L. Shapiro (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Walter A. Oleniewski (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Employers' Liability

None

Melkonyan v. Sullivan

Mon, 15 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5538

Petitioner

Melkonyan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sullivan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 89 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1991

Advocates

Clifford M. Sloan (on behalf of the Respondent)

Brian Wolfman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Melkonyan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Access to Justice

None

Grogan v. Garner

Mon, 29 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1149

Petitioner

Grogan

Respondent

Garner

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 279 (1991)

Argued

Monday, October 29, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 1991

Advocates

Michael J. Gallagher (Argued the case for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the case as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Timothy K. McNamara (Argued the case for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Frank Garner was convicted of defrauding Coy Grogan and ordered to repay him. Garner then filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, asking the Bankruptcy Court to discharge (that is, nullify) his court-ordered repayment to Grogan. Grogan argued that the debt should not be discharged because section 523(a) of the bankruptcy code exempts obligations for money obtained by "actual fraud." The Bankruptcy Court, based on portions of the fraud case, agreed and did not allow Garner to discharge the debt. The District Court affirmed, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the standard of proof used in the original fraud case - the "preponderance of the evidence" standard - was lower than the standard of proof demanded under section 523(a) - a "clear and convincing evidence" standard. The Court found that most states used the "clear and convincing" standard in fraud cases and that Congress would have explicitly stated it if they used a different standard. Moreover, it argued that the intention of the bankruptcy code to provide a "fresh start" suggested that the standard most favorable to bankruptcy filers should be used (that is, the more demanding "clear and convincing" standard).

Question

What standard of evidence should bankruptcy courts apply in considering whether a debt was the result of "actual fraud" under section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Grogan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

Courts should apply the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Justice John Paul Stevens, for a unanimous Supreme Court, wrote that the lack of a specified standard of evidence in section 523(a) implied that Congress had intended the preponderance of the evidence standard to be used. That lower standard was generally used in civil actions between private parties (including bankruptcy filings) unless particularly important interests were at stake. Protecting a bankruptcy filer who had previously been convicted of fraud was not sufficiently important to demand a higher level of evidence.

Stevens also wrote that the "fresh start" intention of the bankruptcy laws did not suggest a higher standard of evidence. "In the same breath that we have invoked this 'fresh start policy," he wrote, "we have been careful to explain that the Act limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor.'" A debtor previously convicted of fraud did not fit this description.

Illinois v. Kentucky

Mon, 18 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

106 ORIG

Plaintiff

Illinois

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

Kentucky

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 380 (1991)

Argued

Monday, March 18, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, May 28, 1991

Advocates

John Brunsman (on behalf of the Plaintiff)

Rickie L. Pearson (on behalf of the Defendant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Illinois, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc.

Tue, 08 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Theatre and Lounge South Bend, IN

United States

41° 41' 0.1716" N, 86° 15' 0.0252" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-26

Petitioner

Barnes

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Glen Theatre Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 560 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Decided

Friday, June 21, 1991

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Wayne E. Uhl (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Glen Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend, Indiana, operated entertainment establishments with totally nude dancers. An Indiana law regulating public nudity required dancers to wear "pasties" and a "G-string" when they perform. The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop enforcement of the statute.

Question

Does a state prohibition against complete nudity in public places violate the First Amendment's freedom of expression guarantee?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Barnes, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. The Court was fractured and there was no majority opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion, conceded that nude dancing was a form of expressive activity. But he maintained that the public indecency statute is justified despite the incidental limitations on such expressive activity. The statute "furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality." The proscription on public nudity is unrelated to the erotic message the dancers seek to convey.

Riverside County v. McLaughlin

Mon, 07 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

County of Riverside: District Attorney

4075 Main Street Riverside CA 92501

Riverside, CA 92501

United States

33° 58' 46.0344" N, 117° 22' 35.9076" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1817

Petitioner

Riverside County

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

McLaughlin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 44 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 13, 1991

Advocates

Timothy T. Coates (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Dan Stormer (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

McLaughlin was arrested without a warrant and argued that Riverside did not act promptly (within 48 hours) on judicial probable cause determinations and arraignment procedures in his case and others.

Question

Did Riverside violate the Court's holding in Gerstein v. Pugh (420 U.S. 103), which required prompt probable cause determinations?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Riverside County, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

The Court held that Riverside's actions did not comply with the Gerstein precedent. Justice O'Connor argued that it was the state's burden to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances when delaying probable cause determinations beyond 48 hours. The lower court in this case had placed that responsibility on the accused. Intervening weekends or complicated pretrial proceedings were not legitimate reasons for delay.

Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers

Wed, 28 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1416

Petitioner

Air Courier Conference

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Postal Workers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 517 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, February 26, 1991

Advocates

Keith E. Secular (on behalf of the Private Respondents)

L. Peter Farkas (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul J. Larkin, Jr. (on behalf of the Federal Respondent supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Air Courier Conference, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 702

None

Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas Attorney Gen.

Mon, 22 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-813

Petitioner

Houston Lawyers' Ass'n

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Texas Attorney Gen.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 90-974

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 419 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 22, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1991

Advocates

Julius LeVonne Chambers (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Renea Hicks (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Houston Lawyers' Ass'n, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

None

Cottage Savings Assoc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Tue, 15 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1965

Petitioner

Cottage Savings Assoc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 554 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 15, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, April 17, 1991

Advocates

Dennis L. Manes (Argued the case for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

For tax purposes, Cottage Savings Association exchanged its interests in the mortgages of 252 single family homes with several other savings and loan associations, receiving in return 305 mortgages that, taken together, had the same market value. The fair market value of the mortgages it gave away, however, were worth $2.5 million less than their original value. In accordance with the accounting procedures of the federal regulatory body of savings and loan corporations, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), Cottage Savings recorded the exchanged properties as "substantially identical" (because they had the same fair market value).

When Cottage Savings filed its federal income tax return, however, it claimed a $2.5 million loss - the difference between the original value of the mortgages it gave away and the current value of the mortgages it received in return. The IRS refused to recognize the difference as a deductible loss, however, because under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code, the change in a property's value is only taken into consideration when it is realized through the "sale or disposition of [the] property." An exchange of property only constitutes a "disposition" if there is a "material difference" between the properties exchanged. Because Cottage Savings had reported the properties exchanged as "substantially identical," the IRS ruled, a "disposition" could not have taken place and the loss in value could not be deducted. Cottage savings took the issue to a federal Tax Court, which disagreed with the IRS and ruled the deduction permissible. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, siding with the IRS.

Question

Can the exchange of properties considered "substantially identical" for accounting purposes under Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations be considered a "disposition of property" for IRS tax purposes, given that properties exchanged must be materially different to constitute a "disposition" under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Cottage Savings Assoc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the definition of "substantially identical" under the FHLBB regulations was intentionally flexible and broad enough to include even properties that were "materially different" for IRS purposes. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in the majority opinion, wrote that exchanged properties are "materially different" if they "embody legally distinct entitlements." The properties involved in this exchange clearly satisfied that test. "Because the participation interests exchanged by Cottage Savings and the other S & L's derived from loans that were made to different obligors and secured by different homes, the exchanged interests did embody legally distinct entitlements. Consequently, we conclude that Cottage Savings realized its losses at the point of exchange."

Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier

Wed, 24 Apr 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1905

Petitioner

Wisconsin Public Intervenor

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mortier

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 597 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, April 24, 1991

Decided

Friday, June 21, 1991

Advocates

Paul G. Kent (on behalf of the Respondents)

Thomas J. Dawson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wisconsin Public Intervenor, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide

None

Stevens v. Department Of Treasury

Tue, 19 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1821

Petitioner

Stevens

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Department Of Treasury

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 1 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, March 19, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, April 24, 1991

Advocates

Alison Steiner (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Amy L. Wax (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Stevens, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

None

Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. Of Treasury

Mon, 01 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1106

Petitioner

Trinova Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan Dept. Of Treasury

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 358 (1991)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Advocates

Richard R. Roesch (on behalf of the Respondent)

Peter S. Sheldon (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Michigan Dept. Of Treasury, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Kay v. Ehrler

Mon, 25 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-79

Petitioner

Kay

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ehrler

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 432 (1991)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 1991

Advocates

Ann M. Sheadel (on behalf of the Respondents)

Timothy B. Dyk (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Robert A. Long, Jr. (on behalf of United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ehrler, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards

None

Lankford v. Idaho

Tue, 19 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-7247

Petitioner

Lankford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Idaho

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 110 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1991

Advocates

Larry Echohawk (on behalf of the Respondent)

Joan Marie Fisher (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lankford, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Ford v. Georgia

Tue, 06 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-6796

Petitioner

Ford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Georgia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 411 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Advocates

Paula K. Smith (on behalf of the Respondent)

Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ford, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Master, Mates & Pilots v. Brown

Tue, 27 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1330

Petitioner

Master, Mates & Pilots

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brown

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 466 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 27, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 1991

Advocates

W. Michel Pierson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

James A. Feldman (as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Paul Alan Levy (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Brown, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

None

Moskal v. United States

Mon, 01 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-964

Petitioner

Moskal

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 103 (1990)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 1990

Decided

Monday, December 3, 1990

Advocates

Stephen L. Nightingale (on behalf of the Respondent)

Dennis M. Hart (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2314

None

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.

Mon, 14 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-18

Petitioner

Gilmer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 20 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 14, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 13, 1991

Advocates

James B. Spears (on behalf of the Respondent)

John T. Allred (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

None

Braxton v. United States

Mon, 18 Mar 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5358

Petitioner

Braxton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 344 (1991)

Argued

Monday, March 18, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, May 28, 1991

Advocates

Stephen J. Cribari (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Stephen J. Marzen (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Braxton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

None

Siegert v. Gilley

Tue, 19 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-96

Petitioner

Siegert

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gilley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 226 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Decided

Thursday, May 23, 1991

Advocates

Nina Kraut (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Michael R. Lazerwitz (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Gilley, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Burns v. Reed

Wed, 28 Nov 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1715

Petitioner

Burns

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reed

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 478 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 1990

Decided

Thursday, May 30, 1991

Advocates

Michael K. Sutherlin (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Robert S. Spear (on behalf of the Respondent)

Michael R. Lazerwitz (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Burns, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

United States v. France

Tue, 02 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1363

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

France

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 335 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 22, 1991

Advocates

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Michael R. Levine (on behalf of the Respondent (appointed by the Court))

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for France, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

California v. Acevedo

Tue, 08 Jan 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Acevedo's Car

West Stevens Avenue Santa Ana CA 92707

Santa Ana, CA 92707

United States

33° 41' 40.8228" N, 117° 52' 16.8204" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1690

Petitioner

California

Respondent

Acevedo

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 565 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Decided

Thursday, May 30, 1991

Advocates

Robert Foster (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Fred W. Anderson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Avecedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle (U.S. v. Ross), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container (U.S. v. Chadwick). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition.

Question

Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a container within an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the container holds evidence?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for California, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a "curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall dissented.

Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.

Wed, 03 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1158

Petitioner

Miles

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Apex Marine Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 19 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, October 3, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, November 6, 1990

Advocates

Allain F. Hardin (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Gerard T. Gelpi (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Apex Marine Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Jones, or Death on the High Seas

None

Arizona v. Fulminante

Wed, 10 Oct 1990 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Ray Brook Federal Correctional Institution

128 Ray Brook Road Ray Brook NY 12977

Ray Brook, NY 12977

United States

44° 17' 26.8512" N, 74° 5' 33.4536" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-839

Petitioner

Arizona

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oreste Fulminante

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 279 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, March 26, 1991

Advocates

Barbara M. Jarrett (Senior Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for petitioner)

Paul J. Larkin, Jr. (argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Stephen R. Collins (by appointment of the Court, argued the cause for the respondent )

Facts of the Case

Arizona law officials suspected that Oreste Fulminante murdered his stepdaughter. He was later arrested in New York for an unrelated crime after the murder and incarcerated. While in prison he became friends with Anthony Sarivola, an inmate paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect information on other inmates while he served his term. Fulminante initially denied killing his stepdaughter to Sarivola, but admitted it when Sarivola offered him protection from other inmates in exchange for the truth. After his release, Fulminante also confessed to Donna Sarivola, Anthony's wife. Fulminante was indicted for murder in Arizona. Fulminante argued in trial court that his two confessions to the Sarivolas could not be used as evidence since the first was coerced and the second based on the first. The court admitted his confessions as evidence, convicted him, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court ordered Fulminante to be retried without the use of the confessions.

Question

Did the Arizona Supreme Court properly apply the totality of circumstances test when considering whether a suspect's confession to murder was coerced? Did the Arizona Supreme Court properly apply harmless error analysis when considering whether the suspect's coerced confession influenced the outcome of the trial

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Fulminante, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Split Vote

Yes and yes. Justice Byron R. White and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered parts of the opinion, both majorities by a 5-4 vote. The Court held that Fulminante was coerced to confess in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court found that "it was fear of physical violence, absent protection from his friend Sarivola, which motivated Fulminante to confess." This motivation invalidated his confession. Since Fulminante's confession to Donna Sarivola was closely tied to his first coerced confession, the Court dismissed both. The Court also found that the confessions played a determinative role in the trial. It maintained that a "successful prosecution depended on the jury's believing the two confessions." Because the confessions were critical to the outcome of the trial, the fact that they were obtained coercively could not be dismissed as a harmless error. Four justices dissented to using harmless error analysis for coerced confessions on the ground that confessions always significantly affect a trial's outcome.

Florida v. Bostick

Tue, 26 Feb 1991 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Bus where Bostick boarded Fort Lauderdale, FL

United States

26° 7' 20.3088" N, 80° 8' 36.1644" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1717

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bostick

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 429 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1991

Advocates

Kenneth W. Starr (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Joan Fowler (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Donald B. Ayer (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Department officers regularly boarded buses during stops to ask passenger for permission to search their luggage. Terrance Bostick, a passenger, was questioned by two officers who sought permission to search his belongings and advised him of his right to refuse. After obtaining Bostick's permission, the officers searched his bags, found cocaine, and arrested him on drug trafficking charges. Bostick filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, but the trial court denied the motion. Following an affirmance and certification from the Florida Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that the bus searches were per se unconstitutional because police did not afford passengers the opportunity to "leave the bus" in order to avoid questioning. Florida appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Is the acquisition of evidence during random bus searches, conducted pursuant to passengers' consent, a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unconstitutional search and seizure?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Florida, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. The Court, in a 6-to-3 decision, noted that when deciding if a search request is overly coercive, within a confined space such as a bus, one must not look at whether a party felt "free to leave," but whether a party felt free to decline or terminate the search encounter. The Court held that in the absence of intimidation or harassment, Bostick could have refused the search request. Moreover, the fact that he knew the search would produce contraband had no bearing on whether his consent was voluntarily obtained. The test of whether a "reasonable person" felt free to decline or terminate a search presupposes his or her innocence.