The Oyez Project: 1999 Term Decisions

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater (No. 99-295)

Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Adarand Constructors, Inc.'s suit challenging the U.S. Department of Transportation's procedure for certifying contractors as disadvantaged business enterprises as moot when the Colorado Department of Transportation granted Adarand disadvantaged-business status?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that "[b]ecause, under the circumstances of this case, it is impossible to conclude that respondents have borne their burden of establishing that it is 'absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,' [Adarand's] cause of action remains alive." "It is no small matter to deprive a litigant of the rewards of its efforts," concluded the opinion, "[s]uch action on grounds of mootness would be justified only if it were absolutely clear that the litigant no longer had any need of the judicial protection that it sought."

Antonelli v. Caridine (No. 98-9933)

May pro se petitioner Michael C. Antonelli be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Supreme Court Rule 39?

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court denied Antonelli's requests as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Noting that Antonelli had abused the Court's certiorari and extraordinary writ processes, the Court directed the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from Antonelli in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1. "The order," the opinion concluded, "will not prevent Antonelli from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Apprendi v. New Jersey (No. 99-478)

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt?

Yes. In an 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Due Process Clause requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that "the New Jersey procedure challenged in this case is an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system." Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Stephen G. Breyer wrote dissenting opinions that were joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.

Arizona v. California (No. 8 ORIG)

Are the Quechan Tribe and the United States claims for increased water rights for the Fort Yuma Reservation from the Colorado River precluded by the Supreme Court's prior decision in Arizona v. California and by a consent judgement?

No. In a opinion deliver by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court rejected both grounds for preclusion and remanded the case to a Special Master for a determination on the merits of the outstanding claims for additional water rights associated with disputed Fort Yuma Reservation boundary lands. "Those claims are the only ones that remain to be decided in Arizona v. California; their resolution will enable the Court to enter a final consolidated decree and bring this case to a close," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court.

Baral v. United States (No. 98-1667)

Are remittances of withholding tax and estimated income tax paid on the due date of the taxpayer's income tax return?

Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that remittances of withholding tax and estimated income tax are paid on the due date of a calendar year taxpayer's income tax return. The Court concluded that the ceiling on Baral's requested credit was zero, because, rather than being paid within the look-back period, between February 1, 1990 and June 1, 1993, both the withholding and the estimated taxes had been paid on April 15, 1989. The decision means that the three-year time limit for seeking a refund begins running when someone's withholding and estimated tax payments are made to the government. The deadline does not depend on when the person's income tax return is filed, the court said.

Beck v. Prupis (No. 98-1480)

May a person injured by an action furthering a conspiracy sue under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act even if the action itself was not an act of racketeering?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not give rise to a cause of action under RICO. Thus, because Prupis' scheme to remove Beck from SIG was not an act of racketeering itself, Beck had no ground to sue him under RICO. Although Prupis did engage in acts of racketeering, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "the alleged overt act (terminating) in the present case was not independently wrongful under any substantive provision of RICO."

Board of Regents Univ. Wisc. v. Southworth (No. 98-1189)

May public universities and colleges subsidize campus groups by means of a mandatory student activity fee without violating the First Amendment rights of students who find some campus groups objectionable?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the "First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[w]hen a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others." Justice David H. Souter, in an opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment only.

Bond v. United States (No. 98-9349)

Does a law enforcement officer's physical manipulation of a bus passenger's carry-on luggage violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "Agent Cantu's physical manipulation of petitioner's carry-on bag violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches." The Court concluded that Bond "possessed a privacy interest in his bag," and that such an expectation of privacy is reasonable. "Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, a bus passenger "does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner." Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissented, seeing no "reasonable expectation" that strangers would not manipulate luggage in a bus.

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (No. 99-699)

Does the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association." In effect, the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill," and that a gay troop leader's presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."

Brancato v. Gunn (No. 98-9913)

May pro se petitioner Donald H. Brancato be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Supreme Court Rule 39?

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court denied Brancato's request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Noting that Brancato had abused the Court's certiorari process, the Court directed the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Brancato in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1. "The order," the opinion concluded, "will not prevent Brancato from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Calderon v. Coleman (No. 98-437)

Did a court of appeals, in overturning a death sentence due to constitutional errors in the jury instruction, fail to adequately consider whether the errors were "harmless" and made a difference in the final result under Brecht v. Abrahamson?

Yes. In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that "once the Court of Appeals determined that the giving of the Briggs instruction was constitutional error, it was bound to apply the harmless-error analysis mandated by Brecht." The Court held in Brecht that "a federal court may grant habeas relief based on trial error only when that error "'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that "there might have been a slight flaw in the Court of Appeals' brief explanation of why the invalid instruction given to the jury was not harmless, but...the Court's ruling was unquestionably correct." Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined Justice Stevens' dissent.

California Democratic Party v. Jones (No. 99-401)

Does California's voter approved Proposition 198, which changes its partisan primary from a closed primary to a blanket primary, violate political parties' First Amendment right of association?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that California's blanket primary violates a political party's First Amendment right of association. "Proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with -- to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by -- those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival," wrote Justice Antonin Scalia for the majority. "A single election in which the party nominee is selected by nonparty members could be enough to destroy the party." Justice Scalia went on to state for the Court that Proposition 198 takes away a party's "basic function" to choose its own leaders and is functionally "both severe and unnecessary." Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. "This Court's willingness to invalidate the primary schemes of 3 States and cast serious constitutional doubt on the schemes of 29 others at the parties' behest is," Justice Stevens wrote, "an extraordinary intrusion into the complex and changing election laws of the States."

Carmell v. Texas (No. 98-7540)

Does an amended Texas statute that authorizes the conviction of sexual offenses on the victim's testimony alone, whereas the statute previously required the victim's testimony along with corroborating evidence, violate the constitutional prohibition against State "ex post facto" laws when applied in a trial for offenses committed before the amendment's effective date?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the retrospective application of Texas's amended statutory provision allowing alleged sexual offense victim's uncorroborated testimony to support a conviction violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that, "[a] law reducing the quantum of evidence required to convict an offender is as grossly unfair as, say, retrospectively eliminating an element of the offense, increasing the punishment for an existing offense or lowering the burden of proof." For the dissenting minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the amended statute accords victims of a sexual offense "full testimonial stature," and that "such a witness competency rule validly may be applied to offenses committed before its enactment."

Carter v. United States (No. 99-5716)

May defendants charged with federal bank robbery have the jury consider whether they committed the lesser crime of federal bank larceny?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that federal bank larceny is not a "lesser included offense" of federal bank robbery. The "[p]etitioner is accordingly prohibited as a matter of law from obtaining a lesser included offense instruction," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Thomas concluded that the larceny law requires proof of three elements not included in robbery: the intent to steal, property worth more than $ 1,000, and proof that the defendant "takes and carries away" the property. Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer, expressed the view that the Court's decision gave "short shrift to the common-law origin and statutory evolution of [18 USC Section 2113]."

Castillo v. United States (No. 99-658)

Does the provision of USC Section 924(c)(1), which imposes a stiffer penalty for using a "machinegun" in a crime of violence, state factors enhancing a sentence rather than elements of a separate offense?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Section 924(c)(1) uses the word "machinegun" (and similar words) to state an element of a separate, aggravated crime." Therefore, the federal law that subjects anyone who carries a machine gun during a violent crime to an additional 30 years in prison states an element of an offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury rather than determined by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence as are sentencing factors. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "our consideration of Section 924(c)(1)'s language, structure, context, history and such factors that typically help courts determine a statute's objectives leads us to conclude that the relevant words create a separate substantive crime."

Christensen v. Harris County (No. 98-1167)

Does the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 prohibit a public employer from compelling its employees to use their compensatory time without a preexisting agreement?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held 6-3 that "[n]othing in the FLSA or its implementing regulations prohibits a public employer from compelling the use of compensatory time." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "under the FLSA, an employer is free to require an employee to take time off work, and an employer is also free to use the money it would have paid in wages to cash out accrued compensatory time. The compelled use of compensatory time challenged in this case merely involves doing both of these steps at once."

Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co. (No. 98-1960)

Do the venue provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act limit motions to confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award to the district where the award was made?

No. In an unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the "FAA's venue provisions are permissive, allowing a motion to confirm, vacate, or modify to be brought either in the district where the award was made or in any district proper under the general venue statute." Writing for the Court, Justice Souter reasoned that because both the history and function of the FAA's venue provisions dictate that they were meant to expand, not limit, venue choice, it was appropriate for Cortez Byrd to seek to vacate the arbitrator's award in federal court in Mississippi.

Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council (No. 99-474)

Is the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricts the authority of its agencies to purchase goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause?

Yes. In a opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "the state Act is preempted, and its application unconstitutional, under the Supremacy Clause." Justice Souter wrote for the Court that Massachusetts' law created an obstacle to the President's discretion to control economic sanctions against Burma, interfered with Congress's intention to limit economic pressure against the Burmese Government, and was at odds with the President's authority to speak for the United States among the world's nations to develop a comprehensive, multilateral Burma strategy. Therefore, the Massachusetts Burma Law "is invalid under the Supremacy Clause...owing to its threat of frustrating federal statutory objectives."

Dempsey v. Martin (No. 99-5283)

May pro se petitioner John B. Dempsey be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Supreme Court Rule 39?

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court denied Dempsey's request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Noting that Dempsey had abused this Court's certiorari and extraordinary writ processes, the Court directed the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from Dempsey in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1. "The order," the opinion concluded, "will not prevent Dempsey from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Dickerson v. United States (No. 99-5525)

May Congress legislatively overrule Miranda v. Arizona and its warnings that govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture," wrote Rehnquist. "Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. We decline to overrule Miranda ourselves," concluded the Chief Justice. Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, blasted the Court's ruling, writing that the majority opinion gave needless protection to "foolish (but not compelled) confessions."

Drye v. United States (No. 98-1101)

Does an heir's interest to an estate constitute "property" or "rights to property" such that federal liens are valid against the heir's interest, even if the heir has disclaimed the interest under state law?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Drye's disclaimer did not defeat the federal tax liens. The Court read the Internal Revenue Code to look to state law for a delineation of a taxpayer's rights or interests, but to leave to federal law the determine whether those rights or interests constitute "property" or "rights to property" under section 6321. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "Drye had the unqualified right to receive the entire value of his mother's estate...or to channel that value to his daughter. The control rein he held under state law, we hold, rendered the inheritance 'property' or 'rights to property' belonging to him within the meaning of [section] 6321, and hence subject to the federal tax liens that sparked this controversy."

Edwards v. Carpenter (No. 98-2060)

May a state prisoner's procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel excuse the procedural default of another habeas corpus claim?

No. In a opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a state prisoner's procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can excuse the procedural default of another habeas claim only if the inmate can demonstrate that the poor lawyering rises to a constitutional level, not only that it prejudiced them at trial. The 7-2 decision means that ineffective-assistance claims filed too late in a state appellate court generally cannot be used in federal court to excuse an inmate's default on other claims. Justice Scalia wrote for the court that it is not enough to say such a claim "was presented to the state courts even though it was not presented in the manner that state law requires."

Erie v. Pap's A. M. (No. 98-1161)

Does Erie, Pennsylvania's public indecency ordinance, as applied to prohibit nude dancing, violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free expression?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Erie's public indecency ordinance did not violate any cognizable First Amendment protections of expressive conduct. In splintered voting that did not yield a majority opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that, "[e]ven if Erie's public nudity ban has some minimal effect on the erotic message by muting that portion of the expression that occurs when the last stitch is dropped, the dancers... are free to perform wearing pasties and G-strings." "The requirement... is a minimal restriction in furtherance of the asserted government interests, and the restriction leaves ample capacity to convey the dancers' erotic message."

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (No. 98-1152)

Does the Food and Drug Administration have the authority to regulate tobacco products as "drugs" and "devices" under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that "Congress has not given the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed." The ruling was based on the FDCA as a whole and in conjunction with Congress' subsequent tobacco-specific legislation. "By no means do we question the seriousness of the problem that the FDA has sought to address," Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority. Nonetheless, Justice O' Connor wrote, "Congress, for better or for worse, has created a distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco products, squarely rejected proposals to give the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco, and repeatedly acted to preclude any agency from exercising significant policymaking authority in the area."

Fiore v. White (No. 98-942)

Should federal habeas corpus relief be extended to protect a defendant whose conviction was upheld even though his co-defendant's conviction under the same law was invalidated after a state court ruled that he had been prosecuted under the wrong law? Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause require that the defendant's conviction be set aside?

The questions were left pending. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court certified to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the question whether the court's interpretation of the statute set forth in Scarpone's case stated the correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law on the date which Fiore's conviction became final. The Court also reserved judgment and further proceedings in the case pending a response by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "the answer to this question will help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this case."

Fischer v. United States (No. 99-116)

Do Medicare funds received by health care providers constitute "benefits" within the meaning of the federal bribery statute prohibiting fraud and other offenses against organizations receiving federal benefits?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Health care providers such as the one defrauded by [Fischer] receive 'benefits' within the meaning of [the federal bribery statute]." Thus, the Medicare funds hospitals receive for treating Medicare patients subject people who bribe hospital officials to federal prosecution. "The government has a legitimate and significant interest in prohibiting financial fraud or acts of bribery being perpetrated upon Medicare providers," Justice Kennedy wrote for the court. "Fraudulent acts threaten the program's integrity. They raise the risk participating organizations will lack the resources...to provide the level and quality of care envisioned by the program." Justice Clarence Thomas, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, argued that "[t]he only persons who receive 'benefits' under Medicare are the individual elderly and disabled Medicare patients, not the medical providers who serve them."

Flippo v. West Virginia (No. 98-8770)

Does the judgment of a West Virginia Circuit Court, which denied a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that the police were entitled to make a thorough search of any crime scene and the objects found there, conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mincey v. Arizona?

Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Circuit Court's "position squarely conflicts with Mincey v. Arizona (437 U.S. 385) where we rejected the contention that there is a 'murder scene exception' to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment." "We noted that police may make warrantless entries onto premises if they reasonably believe a person is in need of immediate aid and may make prompt warrantless searches of a homicide scene for possible other victims or a killer on the premises, but we rejected any general 'murder scene exception' as 'inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments -- . . . the warrantless search of Mincey's apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there,'" stated the opinion.

Florida v. J. L. (No. 98-1993)

Is an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun sufficient under the Fourth Amendment to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that "[a]n anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person." The Court concluded that the officers' suspicion that J. L. was carrying a weapon arose not from their own observations but from an anonymous tip, that the tip lacked reliability, and that the tip "provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility." "An officer, for the protection of himself and others, may conduct a carefully limited search for weapons in the outer clothing of persons engaged in unusual conduct where... the officer reasonably concludes in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons in question may be armed and presently dangerous," Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court.

Free v. Abbott Laboratories Inc. (No. 99-391)

Does federal jurisdiction extend to class actions in which not all the claims of individual class members satisfy the $50,000 amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 USC section 1332, as long as diversity jurisdiction exists over the claims of one named plaintiff and, thus, supplemental jurisdiction exists over the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs?

In a per curiam opinion announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals by an equally divided 4-4 ruling. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (No. 98-822)

Does an environmental group's citizen suit for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act become moot when the defendant, after commencement of the litigation, has come into compliance with its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a citizen suitor's claim for civil penalties need not be dismissed as moot when the defendant, after commencement of the litigation, has come into compliance with its NPDES permit. "A defendant's voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does not suffice to moot a case," Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court. "Congress has found that civil penalties in the Clean Water Act cases do more than promote immediate compliance... they also deter future violations," concluded Justice Ginsburg. The Court also ruled that FOE had standing to bring the suit on behalf on its members.

Garner v. Jones (No. 99-137)

Does the retroactive application of a Georgia provision permitting the extension of intervals between parole considerations violate the Ex Post Facto Clause?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the retroactive application of the Georgia provision permitting extension of intervals between parole considerations does not to necessarily violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court concluded that the key element in deciding whether an increase in the interval between a state's parole hearings for prison inmates violates the Ex Post Facto Clause is whether the change creates a sufficient risk of increasing the punishment attached to the covered crimes. "States must have due flexibility in formulating parole procedure and addressing problems associated with confinement and release," wrote Justice Kennedy.

Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. (No. 98-1811)

Does the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 pre-empt a tort action in which the plaintiff claims that the defendant auto manufacturer, who was in compliance with the safety standard promulgated under the Act, should nonetheless have equipped an automobile with airbags?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "[Geier's] 'no airbag' lawsuit conflicts with the objectives of FMVSS 208 and is therefore pre-empted by the Act." Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that a rule of state tort law imposing a duty to install airbags in cars such as Honda's would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation sought and to the phase-in that the federal regulation deliberately imposed. It would also have made adoption of state mandatory seatbelt laws less likely." The dissent found fault in the majority's "unprecedented use of inferences from regulatory history and commentary as a basis for implied pre-emption."

Gutierrez v. Ada (No. 99-51)

Does the Organic Act of Guam require a runoff election when a candidate slate has received a majority of the votes cast for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, but not a majority of the number of ballots cast in the simultaneous general election?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "[t]he Guam Organic Act does not require a runoff election when a candidate slate has received a majority of the votes cast for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the Territory, but not a majority of the number of ballots cast in the simultaneous general election." Justice Souter wrote for the Court that an "obvious reading" of the law requires only a majority of votes cast in that one specific race, "Congress did not shift its attention when it used 'any election' unadorned by a gubernatorial reference or other definite modifier."

Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc. (No. 99-579)

Does section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which authorizes a "participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary" of a plan to bring a civil action to obtain "appropriate equitable relief" to redress violations of ERISA, extend to a suit against a nonfiduciary "party in interest" to a transaction barred by section 406(a)?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Section 502(a)(3)'s authorization to a plan "participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary" to bring a civil action for "appropriate equitable relief" extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary "party in interest" to a prohibited transaction barred by section 406(a). "We reject," wrote Justice Thomas that, "absent a substantive provision of ERISA expressly imposing a duty upon a nonfiduciary party in interest, the nonfiduciary party may not be held liable under [section 502(a)(3)]." Justice Thomas concluded that "[section 502(a)(3)] itself imposes certain duties, and therefore that liability under that provision does not depend on whether ERISA's substantive provisions impose a specific duty on the party being sued."

Hartford Underwriters v. Union Planters Bank NA (No. 99-409)

Does 11 USC Section 506(c) allow an administrative claimant in a bankruptcy case to seek payment of its administrative claim from the property of a bankrupt estate encumbered by a secured creditor's lien?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "Section 506(c) does not provide an administrative claimant of a bankruptcy estate an independent right to seek payment of its claim from property encumbered by a secured creditor's lien, or subject to secured claims. Justice Scalia noted that plain meaning of the language in Section 506(c) and the "most natural reading" of the section persuaded the court that no one other than the trustee has an independent right to seek payment of administrative claim, like premiums from property secured by a creditor's lien, under the section.

Hill v. Colorado (No. 98-1856)

Does Colorado's statutory requirement that speakers obtain consent from people within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance before speaking, displaying signs, or distributing leaflets to such people violate the First Amendment rights of the speaker?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Colorado statute's restrictions on speech-related conduct are constitutional. The Court concluded that the statute "is not a regulation of speech. Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur." "Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities," Justice Stevens wrote for the Court. "The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases." Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony M. Kennedy dissented.

Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board of California (No. 98-2043)

Does California's exception to its interest expense deduction, which it measures by the amount of nonunitary dividend and interest income that a nondomiciliary corporation has received, violate the Due Process and Commerce Clauses?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the provision violates the Due Process and Commerce Clauses. "California's statute does not directly impose a tax on nonunitary income. Rather, it simply denies the taxpayer use of a portion of a deduction from unitary income..., income which does bear a 'rational relationship' or 'nexus' to California," wrote Justice Breyer. "Because California's offset provision is not a reasonable allocation of expense deductions to the income that the expense generates, it constitutes impermissible taxation of income outside its jurisdictional reach," concluded Justice Breyer.

Illinois v. Wardlow (No. 98-1036)

Is a person's sudden and unprovoked flight from identifiable police officers, patrolling a high crime area, sufficiently suspicious to justify the officers' stop of that person?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held, 5 to 4, that the police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they stopped Wardlow, because the officer was justified in suspecting that the accused was involved in criminal activity and, therefore, in investigating further. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that, "[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion" to justify a stop. The Chief Justice noted that "flight is the consummate act of evasion." Stevens, joined by three other justices, concurred in avoiding a per se rule but dissented from the majority holding.

In re Bauer (No. 99-5440)

May pro se petitioner Frederick W. Bauer be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Supreme Court Rule 39?

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court denied Bauer's request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Noting that Bauer had repeatedly abused the Court's certiorari and extraordinary writ processes, the Court directed the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or extraordinary writs from Bauer in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1. "The order," the opinion concluded, "will not prevent Bauer from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Johnson v. United States (No. 99-5153)

May a district court, under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, impose an additional term of supervised release following the reimprisonment of those who violate the conditions of an initial term of supervised release, without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause?

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that 18 USC section 3583(h) is not retroactively applicable; however, its prior version, 18 USC section 3583(e)(3), authorizes a Federal District Court to impose additional term of supervised release after revocation of initial term and reimprisonment. Thus, Johnson's judgment was affirmed because the federal sentencing statute, which was in effect at the time of his original offense, permitted the imposition of supervised release following recommitment. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that "[p]re-Guidelines practice, linguistic continuity from the old scheme to the current one, and the obvious thrust of congressional sentencing policy confirm that, in applying the law as before the enactment of subsection (h), district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release following reimprisonment." Justice Antonin Scalia dissented.

Jones v. United States (No. 99-5739)

Does the federal arson statute apply to the arson of a private residence?

No. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity, such that arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under section 844(i). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[w]ere we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of section 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain."

Judd v. United States District Court (No. 99-5260)

May pro se petitioner Keith Russell Judd be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Supreme Court Rule 39?

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court denied Judd's request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Noting that Judd had abused the Court's certiorari and extraordinary writ processes, the Court directed the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from Judd in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1. "The order," the opinion concluded, "will not prevent Judd from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents (No. 98-791)

Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the ADEA contains a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the states' immunity, but that the abrogation exceeds Congress' authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. "States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest," wrote Justice O'Connor for the Court. Justice O'Connor noted that, "[o]ld age also does not define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience it." Justice O'Connor concluded that "[i]n contrast, when a State discriminates on the basis of race or gender, we require a tighter fit between the discriminatory means and the legitimate ends they serve." Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer dissented.

Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publishing Corp (No. 98-678)

Does California's amended public record statute, under which an arrestee's address disclosed by governmental agency may not be used to sell a product or service, violate the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the amended statute was not an abridgment of anyone's right to engage in speech, commercial or otherwise, but simply a law regulating access to information in the hands of law enforcement agencies. The Court concluded that United's facial challenge to the statute was not warranted, as there was "'no possibility that protected speech would be muted.'" Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment." Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens expressed the view that the amended statute was invalid as applied to the service, because California was denying access to information based on their intended use of the information for a constitutionally protected purpose, and that such discrimination was not justified by state interests.

Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist. (No. 98-7809)

Does a criminal defendant have a constitutional right to choose to represent himself on direct appeal?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that here is no constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction. "We are not aware of any historical consensus establishing a right of self-representation on appeal," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Noting that the rights established by the Sixth Amendment "are presented strictly as rights that are available in preparation for trial and at the trial itself" and that the Amendment "does not include any right to appeal," Justice Stevens concluded, "[i]t necessarily follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal." Justice Stevens added "[o]ur experience has taught us that "a pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney." Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Antonin Scalia wrote concurring opinions.

Miller v. French (No. 99-224)

Does the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995's "automatic stay" provision preclude courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin such a stay? Does the provision violate the constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine?

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Congress clearly intended to make operation of the PLRA's automatic stay provision mandatory, precluding courts from exercising their equitable power to enjoin the stay and that the PLRA does not violate separation of powers principles. Thus, Congress lawfully imposed deadlines for federal judges to review states officials' motions to discontinue court monitoring and supervision of state prison conditions. Justice O'Connor, in addressing whether the PLRA violated the separation of powers, remarked in a footnote that, "[t]he PLRA does not deprive courts of their adjudicatory role, but merely provides a new legal standard for relief and encourages courts to apply that standard promptly." Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer and John Paul Stevens dissented.

Mitchell v. Helms (No. 98-1648)

Does Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

No. In a 6-3 plurality decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, is not a law respecting an establishment of religion simply because many of the private schools receiving Chapter 2 aid in the parish are religiously affiliated. Turning to neutrality to distinguish between indoctrination attributable to the State and that which is not, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court, "[i]f the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government."

Mobil Oil Exploration v. United States (No. 99-244)

Does the enactment of a new statute, which prevents the Federal Government from following a contractual promise to follow the terms of pre-existing statutes and regulations, constitute the repudiation of a contract?

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Federal Government broke its promise, repudiated the contracts, and must give the companies their money back. "We find that the oil companies gave the United States $158 million in return for a contractual promise to follow the terms of pre-existing statutes and regulations. The new statute prevented the Government from keeping that promise," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court, "therefore the Government must give the companies their money back."

Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc. (No. 99-502)

May a party, who has been made a party to a civil action, be simultaneously made personally liable?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the District Court erred in amending the judgment immediately upon permitting the amendment of the pleading. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[d]ue process, as reflected in Rule 15 as well as Rule 12, required that Nelson be given an opportunity to respond and contest his personal liability for the award after he was made a party and before the entry of judgment against him." Thus, the District Court's granting of Adams' motion to simultaneously make Nelson a party and personally liable violated due process.

New York v. Hill (No. 98-1299)

Does a defense counsel's agreement to a trial date outside the 180-day time period required by Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers waive the defendant's right to a speedy trial?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a defense counsel's agreement to a trial date outside the period provided for by the IAD bars the defendant from seeking dismissal on the ground that trial did not occur within that period. Noting scheduling matters are generally controlled by counsel without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, Justice Scalia wrote, "[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue." In such cases, "[a]bsent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel's word on such matters is the last." Thus, defense counsel's agreement to a later trial date waived Hill's speedy trial rights under the IAD.

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (No. 98-963)

Does Buckley v. Valeo govern state regulations on contributions to state political candidates? Do the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, define the scope of permissible state limitations? Is Missouri's statutory limit on campaign contributions unconstitutional?

Yes, no, and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Buckley is the authority for comparable state regulation and, but that the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, do not define the scope of permissible state limitations. The Court held the Missouri statute not to violate the First Amendment. "Even without the authority of Buckley, there would be no serious question about the legitimacy of the interests claimed, wrote Justice Souter for the Court, "the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." Justices Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, voting to overturn Buckley as a violation of First Amendment speech rights.

Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Shanklin (No. 99-312)

Does the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 pre-empt tort claims, based on State statutory and common law, concerning a railroad's failure to maintain adequate warning devices at crossings where federal funds have participated in the installation of the devices?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that railroads cannot b sued under state tort law over allegedly inadequate warning devices at rail crossings if the equipment installed was federally funded. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that "[o]nce the FHWA approved the project and the signs were installed using federal funds, the federal standard for adequacy displaced Tennessee statutory and common law addressing the same subject, thereby pre-empting [Shanklin's] claim." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote that the consequence of the Court's decision "is that state negligence law is displaced with no substantive federal standard of conduct to fill the void."

Ohler v. United States (No. 98-9828)

Does a defendant waive her right to appeal a ruling granting the government's motion to introduce evidence of a prior conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1), if she introduces the prior conviction while testifying on direct examination?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error." Thus, federal defendants, who choose to acknowledge their prior convictions, waive the right to appeal the evidence's admissibility. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice David H. Souter argued, [t]here is no reason to discourage the defendant from introducing the conviction herself, as the majority's waiver rule necessarily does."

Pegram v. Herdrich (No. 98-1949)

Are treatment decisions made by a health maintenance organization, acting through its physician employees, fiduciary acts within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that mixed treatment and eligibility decisions to delay medical treatment by sending a patient to a HMO owned facility, with adverse consequences, made by a health maintenance organization through its physician, are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA. Thus, Herdrich did not state an ERISA claim. "Herdrich's remedy -- return of profit to the plan for the participants' benefit -- would be nothing less than elimination of the for-profit HMO," wrote Justice Souter for the Court, "no HMO organization could survive without some incentive connecting physician reward with treatment rationing." Justice Souter noted that "the Federal Judiciary would be acting contrary to the congressional policy of allowing HMO organizations if it were to entertain an ERISA fiduciary claim portending wholesale attacks on existing HMOs solely because of their structure."

Portuondo v. Agard (No. 98-1170)

Does a prosecutor's summation comment calling to the jury's attention the fact that the defendant had opportunity to hear all the other witnesses before testifying and tailor his testimony violate the accused's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the prosecutor's comments did not violate Agard's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and that the prosecutor's comments also did not violate Agard's right to due process. "Allowing comment upon the fact that a defendant's presence in the courtroom provides him a unique opportunity to tailor his testimony is appropriate and...sometimes essential to the central function of the trial, which is to discover the truth," Justice Scalia wrote for the Court. Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice David H. Souter, observed that the majority's holding "transforms a defendant's presence at trial from a Sixth Amendment right into an automatic burden on his credibility."

Prunty v. Brooks (No. 99-5316)

May pro se petitioner Robert E. Prunty be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Supreme Court Rule 39?

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court denied Prunty's request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8. Noting that Prunty had abused the Court's certiorari process, the Court directed the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Prunty in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1. "The order," the opinion concluded, "will not prevent Prunty from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Public Lands Council v. Babbitt (No. 98-1991)

Do the Secretary of the Interior's amendments governing grazing preferences, permit issuance, and ownership of range improvements to the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 exceed the authority that this statute grants the Secretary and violate the Act?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "[t]he regulatory changes do not exceed the Secretary's Taylor Grazing Act authority." "Congress itself has directed development of land-use plans, and their use in the allocation process in order to preserve, improve and develop the public rangelands," wrote Justice Stephen G. Breyer. "And the secretary [of the Interior] has always had the statutory authority...to reclassify and withdraw range land from grazing use."

Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue (No. 99-387)

Does the burden of proof on a tax claim in bankruptcy court remain with the trustee in a bankruptcy?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "[w]hen the substantive law creating a tax obligation puts the burden of proof on a taxpayer, the burden of proof on the tax claim in bankruptcy court remains where the substantive law put it (in this case, on the trustee in bankruptcy)." The Court concluded that the bankruptcy estate's obligation to the Department was established by the state's tax code and that the Bankruptcy Code made no provision for altering the burden on a tax claim, and its silence said that no change was intended.

Ramdass v. Angelone (No. 99-7000)

Must a jury must be instructed in the death penalty phase of sentencing that if the defendant is not given the death sentence, that he will be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Ramdass was not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because he was not entitled to instruction on parole ineligibility at sentencing since conviction had not been entered yet on the earlier jury verdict making him parole ineligible. In a plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the Virginia Supreme Court's finding that the state's three-strikes law did not cover the defendant until shortly after he was sentenced must be honored because it "was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application" of a decision in which the justices said that defendants have the right to tell jurors about their parole status in such cases.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products (No. 99-536)

Is a plaintiff's prima facie case of age discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion deliver by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that "[a] plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, may be adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination under the ADEA." The ruling means that an employer is liable to a former employee under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 if a reasonable jury can find that the employer's explanation for the employee's dismissal was pretext for discrimination.

Reno v. Condon (No. 98-1464)

Does the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 violate the constitutional principles of federalism?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and doesn't run afoul of federalism principles. The law "does not require the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. "It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals," the Chief Justice added.

Rice v. Cayetano (No. 98-818)

Does the Hawaiian Constitutional provision, which limits the right to for the trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to qualified "Hawaiians," violate the Fifteenth Amendment by creating a race-based voting qualification?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Hawaii's denial of Rice's right to vote in OHA trustee elections violates the Fifteenth Amendment," in creating a race-based voting qualification. "A state may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, and this law does so," Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court. The court rejected the state's argument that the voting limitation was one based on ancestry, not race. In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for himself and Ruth Bader Ginsburg that the majority's decision "rests largely on the repetition of glittering generalities that have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the state of Hawaii."

Roe v. Flores-Ortega (No. 98-1441)

Does trial counsel have a duty to file a notice of appeal following a guilty plea if the defendant has not requested so, but has been informed of his appeal rights?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that counsel is not always required to file a notice of appeal after their clients plead guilty unless the clients specifically ask them to so. "We cannot say, as a constitutional matter, that in every case counsel's failure to consult with the defendant about an appeal is necessarily unreasonable and therefore deficient," Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority. "We therefore reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal," concluded Justice O'Connor. In dissent, Justice David Souter, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens, wrote that attorneys should be required to consult with their clients about possible appeals in virtually all cases, even those in which the defendants plead guilty.

Rotella v. Wood (No. 98-896)

Does the four year statute of limitations on claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act begin to run before a claimant actually discovers that a defendant's racketeering activity caused the harm?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Rotella's action was not timely, because the start of the 4-year limitations period applicable to a civil RICO action was not governed by an "injury and pattern discovery" accrual rule under which such a civil claim would accrue only when the claimant discovered, or should have discovered, both an injury and a pattern of racketeering activity. In a footnote, Justice Souter noted that "[w]e do not...settle upon a final rule."

Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe (No. 99-62)

Does the Santa Fe Independent School District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."

Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (No. 98-1109)

Does the Medicare Act bar judicial review, under federal-question jurisdiction, of challenges to the validity of Medicare regulations?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Medicare Act barred federal-question jurisdiction of the Council's challenges to the validity of various Medicare regulations. The Court concluded that the Council must proceed instead through the special review channel that the Medicare statutes create. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in his dissent that, "[d]elayed review...may mean no review at all. For when the costs of presenting a claim via the delayed review route exceed the costs of simply complying with the regulation, the regulated entity will buckle under and comply, even when the regulation is plainly invalid."

Sims v. Apfel (No. 98-9537)

Is a Social Security claimant barred from federal judicial review of issues he or she failed to raise during the administrative process?

No. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held, 5 to 4, that Social Security claimants who exhaust administrative remedies need not also exhaust issues administratively in order to preserve judicial review of those issues. Justice Thomas wrote that the issue-exhaustion requirement, usually required even in the absence of a statute or regulation, does not apply in a non-adversarial proceeding, as in Social Security cases. Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.

Slack v. McDaniel (No. 98-6322)

If a person's petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies and is re-filed after those remedies are exhausted, are any claims not raised in the first petition "second or successive" and abusive of the right?

No. In an 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that a federal habeas corpus petition filed by a state prisoner, after an initial petition was dismissed without adjudication on the merits, does not constitute a "second or successive" petition, subject to dismissal for abuse of writ. That "a vexatious litigant could inject undue delay into the collateral review process," wrote Justice Kennedy, can be countered, "the State remains free to impose proper procedural bars to restrict repeated returns to state court for postconviction proceedings."

Smith v. Robbins (No. 98-1037)

Does California's no-merit brief procedure, in which defense counsel has concluded that an appeal would be frivolous, violate a defendant's right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant's right to appellate counsel," as does California's procedure. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that California's procedure "reasonably ensures that an indigent's appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal. Whatever its strengths or weaknesses as a matter of policy, we cannot say that it fails to afford indigents the adequate and effective appellate review that the Fourteenth Amendment requires." The dissenting minority collectively noted that California's procedures allowed attorneys to remain too passive.

Stenberg v. Carhart (No. 99-830)

Does the Nebraska statute, which makes the performance of a "partial birth abortions" a crime, violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution?

Yes. In a complicated 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Nebraska's statute criminalizing the performance of "partial birth abortion[s]" violates the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted in Casey and Roe." The sharply divided Court struck down the statute because it placed an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion and did not allow for exception in cases of threatened health. "All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment," that results in "an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent concluded that "[t]he notion that the Constitution of the United States... prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd."

Texas v. Lesage (No. 98-1111)

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the University of Texas was not entitled to summary judgment for its rejection of an African immigrant Ph.D. applicant of Caucasian descent even if he would have been rejected under a race-neutral policy?

Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that "[i]nsofar as the Court of Appeals held that [the University of Texas was] not entitled to summary judgment on Lesage's section 1983 claim for damages relating to the rejection of his application for the 1996-1997 academic year even if he would have been denied admission under a race-neutral policy, its decision contradicts our holding in Mt. Healthy." "Under Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration," stated the opinion.

Troxel v. Granville (No. 99-138)

Does the Washington statute, which allows any person to petition for a court-ordered right to see a child over a custodial parent's objection if such visitation is found to be in the child's best interest, unconstitutionally interfere with the fundamental right of parents to rear their children?

Yes. In a 6-3 decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Washington Statute violated the right of parents, under the due process clause of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that "[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy dissented.

United States v. Martinez-Salazar (No. 98-1255)

s a defendant's peremptory challenge right impaired or denied when he or she peremptorily challenges a potential juror, whom the district court erroneously refused to excuse for cause, and the defendant thereafter exhausts his peremptory challenges?

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use such a challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "if the defendant elects to cure such an error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right." The Court also concluded that the loss of a peremptory challenge did not constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

United States v. Hubbell (No. 99-166)

Does the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protect a witness from being compelled to disclose the existence of incriminating documents that the Government is unable to describe with reasonable particularity? If the witness produces such documents, pursuant to a grant of immunity, may the Government use them to prepare criminal charges against him?

Yes and no. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court, in order to determine the precise scope of a grant of immunity with respect to the production of documents in response to a subpoena, held that a person responding to subpoena, pursuant to a court order granting immunity, could not be prosecuted on the basis of information in the documents produced if the government did not have any prior, independent knowledge of the documents. Thus, the indictment against Hubbell was dismissed because it was not derived from sources independent of documents produced under his grant of immunity. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, "we have no doubt that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects the target of a grand jury investigation from being compelled to answer questions designed to elicit information about the existence of sources of potentially incriminating evidence." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist was the lone dissenter.

United States v. Johnson (No. 98-1696)

May a federal criminal defendant's excess prison time be credited towards this supervised release term, reducing its length?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the length of a supervised release term cannot be reduced by reason of excess time served in prison. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[t]he objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release." The Court found that Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community life and that supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.

United States v. Locke (No. 98-1701)

Are the State of Washington's maritime regulations on tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements pre-empted by federal law?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Washington's regulations regarding general navigation watch procedures, crew English-language skills and training, and maritime casualty reporting are pre-empted by the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers. "The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and is now well established," wrote Justice Kennedy for the Court. Justice Kennedy also noted that States may regulate their own ports and waterways so long as the rules are based on "the peculiarities of local waters" and do not conflict with federal regulation.

United States v. Morrison (No. 99-5)

Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it redress harm caused by the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that [i]f the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of...Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States." Dissenting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the majority opinion "illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone." Additionally, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, noted that VAWA contained a "mountain of data assembled by Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."

United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. (No. 98-1682)

Is section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 the least restrictive means to block the transmission of cable television channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming, such that it does not violate the First Amendment?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that because the Federal Government failed to show that section 505 was the least restrictive means to further its interests, requiring cable television operators to fully scramble or limit time when sexually-oriented programming was transmitted violated the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. In finding section 505 a content-based regulation, Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that "[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative." In dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer maintained that the majority had not made a "realistic assessment of the alternatives."

United States v. Weatherhead (No. 98-1904)

Is the government justified in rejecting a Freedom of Information Act request and refusing to release a letter from British officials about a British woman's extradition to face a criminal charge in the United States?

The Court did not answer the question. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the appellate court with directions to vacate the judgment of the District Court and dismiss the case as moot. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented. Note: The British Home Office, ultimately, asked the government to provide Weatherhead with a copy of the letter.

Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens (No. 98-1828)

May a private individual bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United States against a state or state agency under the False Claims Act?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act, but that the False Claims Act does not subject a state or state agency to liability in such actions. The Court concluded that the False Claims Act does not include states as "persons" who can be sued under the law. Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter dissented.

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (No. 98-1288)

Does the Equal Protection Clause give rise to a cause of action on behalf of a "class of one" where the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Olech's allegations were sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis. "Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment," stated the unanimous, unsigned opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred.

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc. (No. 99-150)

Is a product's design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, from "knockoffs" in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "[i]n a section 43(a) action for infringement of unregistered trade dress, a product's design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning. The fact that product design almost invariably serves purposes other than source identification not only renders inherent distinctiveness problematic; it also renders application of an inherent-distinctiveness principle more harmful to other consumer interests," Justice Scalia wrote for the Court. "Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness," Justice Scalia concluded.

Weeks v. Angelone (No. 99-5746)

Is the Constitution's due process requirement violated when a trial judge directs a capital jury's attention to a specific paragraph of a constitutionally sufficient instruction in response to a question regarding the proper consideration of mitigating circumstances?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Constitution was not violated by the Virginia trial judge who, during a capital trial's penalty phase, directed the jury's attention to the allegedly ambiguous paragraph of the jury's instruction in response to the jury's question as to mitigating evidence. "Given that petitioner's jury was adequately instructed, and given that the trial judge responded to the jury's question by directing its attention to the precise paragraph of the constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its inquiry, the question becomes whether the Constitution requires anything more," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "[w]e hold that it does not." Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that "[t]he record in this case establishes, not just a 'reasonable likelihood' of jury confusion, but a virtual certainty that the jury did not realize that there were two distinct legal bases for concluding that a death sentence was not 'justified.'"

Weisgram v. Marley (No. 99-161)

May an appeals court order judgment as a matter of law after determining that a plaintiff's expert testimony should have been excluded at trial and that the remaining evidence was insufficient to support the verdict?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 permits an appellate court to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law when it determines that evidence was erroneously admitted at trial and that the remaining, properly admitted, evidence is insufficient to constitute a submissible case. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "if...the court of appeals concludes that further proceedings are unwarranted because the loser on appeal has had a full and fair opportunity to present the case, including arguments for a new trial, the appellate court may appropriately instruct the district court to enter judgment against the jury-verdict winner. "

Williams v. Taylor (No. 99-6615)

Does federal law, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, bar an evidentiary hearing, if the petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis of his claims in State court proceedings despite diligent efforts?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that under federal law, as amended by the AEDPA, "a 'failure to develop' a claim's factual basis in state court proceedings is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or his counsel." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "comity is not served by saying a prisoner 'has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim' where he was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort. In that circumstance, an evidentiary hearing is not barred."

Williams v. Taylor (No. 98-8384)

Was Terry Williams' constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel violated? Was the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court refusing to set aside Williams' death sentence "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States?"

Yes and yes. In a judgment announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court, with different majorities of Justices for each holding, held that Williams had been deprived of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and that the Virginia Supreme Court's refusal to set aside the Williams death sentence was a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Court. This conclusion followed from "'a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different' if competent counsel had presented and explained the significance of all the available evidence.'"