United States v. Morrison

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Oral Argument
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Advocates
Michael E. Rosman (Argued the cause for the respondents)
Julie Goldscheid (Argued the cause for the petitioner in No. 99-29, Brzonkala v. Morrison)
Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States in No. 99-5)
Case Basics
Docket No.: 
99-5
Petitioner: 
United States
Respondent: 
Morrison
Consolidation: 
No. 99-29
Opinion: 
529 U.S. 598 (2000)
Categories: 
gender, federalism, commerce clause, police power, jurisdiction, sex discrimination, fourteenth amendment

Cite this page
The Oyez Project, United States v. Morrison , 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
available at: (http://oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_5)
Facts of the Case: 

In 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university's administrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be "excessive." Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question: 

Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion: 

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it redress harm caused by the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that [i]f the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of...Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States." Dissenting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the majority opinion "illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone." Additionally, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, noted that VAWA contained a "mountain of data assembled by Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."

Decisions

Decision: 5 votes for Morrison, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1398

Sort by Ideology

Wrote the majority opinion
Rehnquist
Voted with the minority, joined Souter's dissent, joined Breyer's dissent
Stevens
Voted with the majority
O'Connor
Voted with the majority
Scalia
Voted with the majority
Kennedy
Wrote a dissent, joined Breyer's dissent
Souter
Wrote a regular concurrence
Thomas
Voted with the minority, joined Souter's dissent, joined Breyer's dissent
Ginsburg
Wrote a dissent, joined Souter's dissent
Breyer

Full Opinion by Justice William H. Rehnquist