Argument of Speaker
Mr. Speaker: The opinion of the Court in No. 99-312, Norfolk Southern Railway Company versus Shanklin will be announced by Justice O'Connor.
Argument of Justice O'Connor
Mr. O'Connor: This case is here on writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
In October 1993 the respondent’s husband was killed at a railroad grade crossing in Western Tennessee, when his vehicle was struck by a train operated by the petitioner railway company.
The respondent filed suit claiming among other things that the petitioner was negligent for failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing.
The warning signs at the crossing had been installed by the State of Tennessee with funding from the Federal Highway Administration.
Petitioner moved for summary judgment on the ground that the claim was preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act.
The District Court held that the respondent’s inadequate warning device claim was not preempted, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
In an opinion filed with the Clerk of the Court today, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Under the Safety Act state law is preempted, if the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation covering the subject matter of the state requirement.
In a case called CSX Transportation versis Easterwood, this Court held that the Secretary’s regulation governing the adequacy of warning devices installed at railroad crossings with the participation of federal funds, preempts state tort law when applicable.
The question here is whether this regulation is applicable whenever the state installs warning devices using federal funds.
We hold that it is.
Our decision in the earlier Easterwood case makes clear that the requirements spelled out in the regulation are mandatory for all devices installed with federal funds, and those provisions establish a federal standard for adequacy that prescribes the warning devices that have to be installed when federal funds are used.
Once the Federal Government has approved and funded the Crossing Improvement Project and the devices have been installed, state law governing the adequacy of those devices is displaced.
This is precisely the interpretation that the government urged us to adopt in the Easterwood case.
The government’s argument here that preemption does not occur until there has been an individualized engineering assessment of the crossing is not entitled to deference, as it is inconsistent with the language of the regulation and contradicts the government’s position in Easterwood, which we adopted as authoritative.
Justice Breyer has filed a concurring opinion; Justice Ginsburg has filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Stevens has joined.
