The Oyez Project: 1998 Term Decisions

Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg (No. 98-591)

Are all individuals with vision problems of any degree "disabled" under the Americans with Disabilities Act and, therefore, subject to its protections?

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that not all individuals who suffer some sort of physical difficulty are per se "disabled" under the ADA. Instead, those who believe they suffer from a disability must prove their claim on a case-by-case basis by showing that their alleged disability substantially impacts on a major life activity. Moreover, such impact could be mitigated by the availability of artificial aids, such as medications or technical devices, and the body's own corrective measures. As such, Kirkingburg's visual limitation was not reflexively covered under the ADA and so his challenge was inappropriate.

Alden v. Maine (No. 98-436)

May Congress use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts?

No. A sharply divided court held in a 5-4 decision that Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Both the terms and history of the eleventh amendment suggest that States are immune from suits in their own courts. And more generally, the original understanding of the Constitution's structure and the terms of the tenth amendment confirm that states retained much of their sovereignty despite their agreeing that the national government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan (No. 97-2000)

1) Can the private insurers' decision to withhold payment for disputed medical treatment be considered state action, so as to bring them within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment? (2) Do workers have a constitutionally protected property interest in continuing payment of disputed medical treatment before such treatment is determined to be reasonable and necessary?

No to both. A finding of state action requires both that the deprivation be caused by actions taken under state law and that the deprivation be fairly attributable to the state. While the alleged deprivation in this case was clearly taken pursuant to state law, the decision of private insurers to withhold medical payments for disputed treatment is not fairly attributable to the state. Mere creation of a new dispute resolution mechanism by the state does not constitute state encouragement or authorization. Nor has Pennsylvania delegated to private insurers powers that were exclusively those of the state, as Pennsylvania has simply authorized insurers to do what they would do in the absence of regulation: dispute payment of unreasonable and unnecessary treatment. Further, under Pennsylvania law no due process protection attaches to payment of disputed medical expenses before the reasonableness and necessity of those expenses is determined. The Act does not entitle an employee to payment of all medical treatment, but only that treatment which is reasonable and necessary. In order to assert a protected property interest a worker must demonstrate not only that his or her employer was liable for a work related injury, but also that the treatment for which payment is sought was reasonable and necessary. In this case the plaintiffs had only established their initial eligibility for treatment, not that treatment was reasonable and necessary.

Amoco Production Company v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe (No. 98-830)

Does the reservation of coal under the land patents issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 include the coal-bed methane gas found within the coal formation?

No. In a 7-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that, "[t]he term 'coal' as used in the 1909 and 1910 Acts does not encompass CBM gas;" therefore, CBM gas is not included in the reserved coal rights. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "[t]he common understanding of coal in 1909 and 1910 would not have encompassed CBM gas, both because it is a gas rather than a solid mineral and because it was understood as a distinct substance that escaped from coal as the coal was mined, rather than as part of the coal itself." Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that Congress, at the time the Acts were passed, would have assumed that the coal owner had dominion over and responsibility for the CBM gas. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the case.

Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co. (No. 97-1536)

May a state impose a nondiscriminatory tax upon a private company's proceeds from contracts with the Federal Government when the federal contractor renders its services on an Indian reservation?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a "State generally may impose a nondiscriminatory tax upon a private company's proceeds from contracts with the Federal Government, regardless of whether the federal contractor renders its services on an Indian reservation." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "[a]bsent a constitutional immunity or congressional exemption, federal law does not shield Blaze (a federal contractor) from Arizona's transaction privilege tax."

AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board (No. 97-826)

Does the Federal Communication Commission have authority to implement the competition-inducing guidelines set out in the 1996 Telecommunications Act?

Yes. In a complicated split opinion, the Court held that the FCC has rulemaking authority to uphold those provision of the Act in question. Despite the local nature of some of the LECs involved, the Court emphasized their interconnectivity with regional and national carriers. As such, the FCC could also reach local LEC markets and regulate their competitive business practices. Such regulatory authority would include the ability to tell LECs what portions of their services they had to share with new competitors, allow new competitors to use local networks without having to own them, and forbid incumbent LECs from separating their network elements before leasing them to competitors.

Bank of America v. 203 North LaSalle Partnership (No. 97-1418)

May a debtor's prebankruptcy equity holders contribute new capital and receive ownership in a reorganized entity when the creditor objected to the reorganization plan?

No. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled a debtor's prebankruptcy equity holders may not, over the objections of creditors, contribute new capital and receive ownership in the debtor's reorganized entity if no one else has been given a chance to come up with an alternative reorganization plan.

Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc. (No. 97-930)

Did the State of Colorado's imposition of name, badge, and financial disclosure requirements, on initiative-petition proponents and their circulators, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court found the name, badge, and disclosure requirements to be unconstitutional. Weighing Colorado's need to protect the integrity of the initiative-petition process against the burdens that its guidelines placed on political expression, the Court found that the latter outweighed the former. Noting that the appellate court upheld a requirement that each circulator submit an affidavit setting out, among several particulars, his or her name and address, the Court explained that the vital information sought by the three additional restrictions at issue was already being secured either directly or indirectly.

California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission (No. 97-1625)

Does the Federal Trade Commission have jurisdiction over the California Dental Association (CDA), a nonprofit professional association? Does an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis suffice to justify the conclusion that the CDA's advertising restrictions violated the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Act?

Yes and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the FTC's jurisdiction extends to associations like the CDA, which provide substantial economic benefit to their for-profit members, but that because the disputed anti-competitive efforts were not obvious, more than the abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis, performed in this case, was required. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that, "[n]onprofit entities organized on behalf of for-profit members have the same capacity... to engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair and deceptive acts." Justice Souter, however, concluded that the Court of Appeals should have used a less-abbreviated standard of review to determine whether the FTC's invalidation of the CDA's rules was justified.

California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen (No. 97-1732)

Must shareholders formally intervene in a derivative lawsuit before they can appeal its settlement?

The Court did not answer the question. An equally divided Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. and Charlene F. (No. 96-1793)

Do schools that receive federal funding under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act have to pay for one-on-one nursing assistance for certain of their disabled students?

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that if the services in question are "related" to keeping the disabled child in school and able to access educational opportunities available to others IDEA funded school districts must provide such services. The Court added that although the nature and cost of providing certain IDEA "related services" is not determinative of whether their financial burdens must be met, potential financial burdens shall inform any decision governing their provision. In the present case, the benefits of providing Garret with his needed care outweighed the burdens.

Central State Univ. v. AAUP (No. 98-1071)

Does Ohio statutory exemption of state university faculties' instructional workload standards from collective bargaining violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. In an 8-1 per curiam opinion, the Court held that "the Ohio Supreme Court's holding cannot be reconciled with the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause." "One of [section 3345.45's] objectives was to increase the time spent by faculty in the classroom; the imposition of a faculty workload policy not subject to collective bargaining was an entirely rational step to accomplish this objective," stated the opinion. "Under our precedent," the court concluded "this is sufficient to sustain the exclusion of university professors from the otherwise general collective-bargaining scheme for public employees." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Chicago v. Morales (No. 97-1121)

Does Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

Yes. In a plurality ruling, Justice John Paul Stevens delivered an opinion for a marjority on several key points. The Court held that Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and provided law enforcement officials too much discretion to decide what activities constitute loitering. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that the ordinance's definition of loitering as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose" does not give people adequate notice of what is prohibited and what is permitted, even if a person does not violate the law until he refuses to disperse. "'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty."

City of West Covina v. Perkins (No. 97-1230)

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require officers who seize someone's property lawfully to provide the owner with state procedures for the property's return?

No. In a decision authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause does not require police officers to provide property owners with information on how to recover their property in a lawful seizure. The Due Process clause only requires that officers inform property owners that something they own has been seized. Justice Kennedy said the property owner could turn to public sources to learn about the procedures available.

Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems (No. 97-1008)

Does application for, and receipt of, Social Security Disability Insurance reflexively bar alleged victims of discrimination from simultaneously pursuing a claim against their former employers under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act?

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that SSDI and ADA claims do not conflict in such a way as to automatically bar anyone from raising them jointly. The Court explained that when determining SSDI eligibility, the significant ADA question of whether someone would have been capable of performing their job if "reasonable accommodations" had been made by their employer, is not considered. As such, the "reasonable accommodation" issue is left open for resolution during an ADA claim. The Court added that any inconsistencies between ADA and SSDI claims are even more trivial if the ADA claim is brought prior to an actual SSDI award - as Cleveland did. Even in clear cases, where a contradiction would seem to lie between the two claims, alleged victims must still have the opportunity to present their cases.

Clinton v. Goldsmith (No. 98-347)

Does the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have the jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to enjoin the President and various military officials from dropping a convict from the rolls of the Air Force?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that because the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' resort to the All Writs Act was neither in aid of its strictly circumscribed jurisdiction to review court-martial findings and sentences nor "necessary or appropriate" in light of a servicemember's alternative opportunities to seek relief, that court lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction against dropping Goldsmith from the Air Force rolls. Justice Souter's opinion emphasized the alternative avenues of relief available to Goldsmith.

College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid (No. 98-149)

Does the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) permit suits against states for alleged misrepresentations of their own products by providing a constitutionally permissible abrogation of state sovereign immunity? Does the TRCA permit suits against states for alleged misrepresentations of their own products by operating as a waiver of sovereign immunity when a state engages in activities regulated by the Lanham Act?

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "the federal courts are without jurisdiction to entertain this suit against an arm of the State of Florida." Justice Scalia concluded that "the sovereign immunity of the State of Florida was neither validly abrogated by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived by the State's activities in interstate commerce." Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Stephen G. Breyer expressed the view that Congress possesses the authority to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity where necessary and proper to the exercise of a congressional power under the Constitution's Article I. Justice John Paul Stevens filed his own dissenting opinion and joined that of Justice Breyer.

Conn and Najera v. Gabbert (No. 97-1802)

Does a prosecutor violate the opposing attorney's Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession when the prosecutor causes the attorney to be searched at the same time his client is testifying before a grand jury?

No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "[a] prosecutor does not violate an attorney's Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession by executing a search warrant while the attorney's client is testifying before a grand jury." Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[w]e hold that the 14th Amendment right to practice one's calling is not violated by the execution of a search warrant, whether calculated to annoy or even to prevent consultation with a grand jury witness." Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment.

Cunningham v. Hamilton County OH (No. 98-727)

Is an order imposing sanctions on an attorney, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4), a final decision and, thus, immediately appealable?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an order imposing sanctions on an attorney pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4) is not a "final decision," even where the attorney no longer represents a party in the case. "To permit an immediate appeal from such a sanctions order would undermine the very purposes of Rule 37(a), which was designed to protect courts and opposing parties from delaying or harassing tactics during the discovery process," Justice Thomas wrote for the Court. The Court concluded that piecemeal appeals and concomitant delays would preclude final judgement if such immediate appeals were possible. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion.

Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education (No. 97-843)

Can a school board be held responsible under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, meant to secure equal access of students to educational benefits and opportunities, for "student-on-student" harassment?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court began by noting that because there is an implied private right to education under Title IX, private damage actions may lie against schools that act with deliberate indifference to harassment that is severe enough to prevent victims from enjoying educational opportunities. The Court added that Title IX's prohibitions against harassment in school are clear enough to have served proper notice to school boards in general and the Board in particular. As such, consistent with the Spending Clause, the Title IX guidelines that Congress attached to its school funds obligate all recipient schools to comply or face the pain of legal action. The Court also observed that the Board acted with deliberate indifference, since it ignored several complaints by Davis, and that the harassment in question was serious and systematic.

Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc. (No. 97-1642)

Can subcontractors on federal projects force the government to pay when prime contractors fail to do so?

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that "unless waived by Congress, sovereign immunity bars subcontractors and other creditors from enforcing liens on government property or funds to recoup their losses." The APA prohibits people and companies with grievances from suing the government for monetary damages. Blue Fox's lien was ruled "merely a means to the end of satisfying a claim for the recovery of money."

Dept of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives (No. 98-404)

Is the use of statistical sampling in the execution of the census inconsistent with provisions of the Census Act or in conflict with the Census Clause of the Constitution?

Yes with regard to the Census Act. The Court began by noting that the plaintiffs in the joined cases had good standing to bring their challenges because they stood to suffer a decrease in the number of their congressional representatives and a corresponding dilution of voting strength. The Court then added that the disputed Amendment to the Census Act, authorizing the discretionary use of statistical sampling, did not alter the Act's older statutory prohibition against the use of sampling. Consequently, the Court struck down the sampling provision on statutory grounds and avoided the constitutional question.

Dickinson v. Zurko (No. 98-377)

Must the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit use the framework set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act when reviewing the Patent and Trademark Office's findings of fact?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit must use the framework set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act when reviewing PTO findings of fact. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that, "[A] close examination of the...cases reviewing PTO decisions do not reflect a well-established court/court standard." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, dissented, noting that at the time of the enactment of the APA judicial review of fact-finding by the PTO under the "clearly erroneous" standard was an "additional requiremen[t]...recognized by law."

El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng (No. 97-475)

Does the Warsaw Convention preclude international passengers from pursuing personal injury suits under local law?

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that the Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local law when her claim does not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention. In her opinion, Justice Bader wrote, "[w]e would be hard put to conclude that the delegates at Warsaw meant to subject air carriers to the distinct, non-uniform liability rules of the individual signatory nations."

El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie (No. 98-6)

Do tribal courts have the authority to determine its own jurisdiction over damage actions stemming from nuclear incidents under the Price-Anderson Act, which grants federal district courts removal jurisdiction over such actions?

No. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that requiring a district court to stay its hand while a tribal court determines its own jurisdiction, or the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion, does not apply in this case, which if brought in a state court would be subject to removal. "By the Price-Anderson Act's unusual preemption provision Congress expressed an unmistakable preference for a federal forum, at the behest of the defending party," wrote Justice Souter.

Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank (No. 98-531)

Did nullification of state sovereign immunity, under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, constitute valid legislation?

No. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court began by noting that there was no doubt that the Act intended to abrogate states' immunity from patent infringement. The Court then added that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Patent Clause give Congress the power to curtail state sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims. The Court reasoned that although the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to pass "appropriate legislation" to protect parties from being deprived of property without due process, this in itself does not permit the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Only a showing of a consistent pattern of state patent violations, and a lack of adequate legal remedies to address such violations, would justify a limited effort to suspend a state's sovereign immunity. Since College made no such showing, and since the Act's language was overly broad in its scope, the Court dismissed College's suit and declared unconstitutional corresponding segments of the Act.

Florida v. White (No. 98-223)

Does the Fourth Amendment require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband. Thomas wrote: "Although the police here lacked probable cause to believe that [White's] car contained contraband, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband under Florida law. ... [T]he need to seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away...is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure." In dissenting, Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concluded that the seizure was not reasonable without a warrant.

Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc. v. U.S. (No. 98-387)

Does a federal prohibition against advertising lawful privately-held casino-gambling violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court found the advertising restrictions unconstitutional insofar as they applied to Louisiana-based advertisers - where the gambling activities being promoted are legal. The government failed to demonstrate that its restriction would alleviate harmful gambling practices to any material degree. Instead, the Court noted, the regulations in question provided only ineffective and remote support for the government's concerns, since all sorts of other gambling activities would continue unaffected. Thus, the government restrictions unfairly singled out a specific form of speech for regulation while leaving others untouched.

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund (No. 98-231)

Does the District Court, in an action for monetary damages, have the authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing the defendant from transferring assets in which no lien or equitable interest is claimed?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the District Court lacked the authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing defendants being sued by creditors from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of the creditor's contract claim for monetary damages because such a remedy was historically unavailable from a court of equity. Allowing federal courts to grant creditors such injunctions "could radically alter the balance between debtors' and creditors' rights," Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, and "might induce creditors to engage in a race to the courthouse...which might prove financially fatal to the struggling debtor."

Haddle v. Garrison (No. 97-1472)

May at-will employees sue their employers over firings allegedly carried out to retaliate for testimony against their employers?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that such interference may give rise to a claim for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. "The kind of interference with at-will employment relations alleged here is merely a species of the traditional torts of intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective contractual relations," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.

Hanlon v. Berger (No. 97-1927)

Do federal agents violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when they let representatives of the news media accompany and observe their conduct in the execution of a search warrant?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that, although the agents did violate the Fourth Amendment, they were entitled to qualified immunity. The opinion stated that "police violate the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners when they allow members of the media to accompany them during the execution of a warrant in their home. We also hold there that because the law on this question before today's decision was not clearly established, the police in that case were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." Justice John Paul Stevens, concurring and dissenting in part, argued that the constitutional rule recognized had been clearly established long before 1992.

Holloway v. United States (No. 97-7164)

Does the federal carjacking law apply to crimes committed with the "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands?

Yes. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law applies to carjacking crimes committed with "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands. "The intent requirement...is satisfied when the government proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car," wrote Justice Stevens.

Hughes Aircraft Company v. Jacobson (No. 97-1287)

Did an employer violate federal pension protection law when it amended its retirement plan by establishing an early retirement program and creating a noncontributory benefit structure for new participants?

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held Hughes did not violate the ERISA by establishing an early retirement program and creating a noncontributory benefit structure for new participants. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, said the plan amendments "did not affect the rights of pre-existing plan participants and Hughes did not use the surplus for its own benefit."

Humana Inc. v. Forsyth (No. 97-303)

May plaintiffs use the federal anti-racketeering law to sue their health insurers over alleged fraud?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announce by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that because RICO advances states' interests in preventing insurance fraud, and since RICO does not encroach on Nevada law, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not block Forsyth's recourse to RICO in this case.

Hunt v. Cromartie (No. 98-85)

Is the presence of "uncontroverted material facts," concerning the practice of racial gerrymandering, sufficient to sustain a summary judgment even prior to conducting an evidentiary hearing or discovery?

No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that despite strong evidence of racial gerrymandering, the North Carolina General Assembly's motivations were in dispute. As such, further inquiry was warranted on this alone. Moreover, since accusations of racial gerrymandering rise to the level of being constitutionally significant, they must be evaluated with strict scrutiny. Therefore, the dismissal of such serious accusations with a summary judgment was erroneous.

INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre (No. 97-1754)

Does the Immigration and Nationality Act require deportation boards, who face aliens that committed nonpolitical crimes prior to seeking asylum, to: balance the severity of the alien's offenses against the threat of political persecution, compare the atrocities of the crimes with others it faced in the past, or consider whether the crimes were politically necessary or successful?

No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court noted that withholding of deportation is mandatory if an alien establishes that it is more likely than not that he or she will suffer political persecution if deported. The Court added that the BIA was not required to balance the severity of the acts in question against threats of political persecution, compare the actions with others, or pronounce on their political success or necessity. Likelihood of political persecution is the overarching issue when considering an alien's deportability, followed by a determination of whether the crimes at issue were serious and nonpolitical.

Jefferson County v. Acker (No. 98-10)

May Jefferson County impose a "license or privilege tax" upon two U.S. District Judges? Was the dispute properly transferred to the federal district court under the federal officer removal statute? Does the Tax Injunction Act deprive the district court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter?

Yes, yes, and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Jefferson County may impose an occupation tax on the U.S. District Judges, for "Jefferson County's tax operates as a nondiscriminatory tax on the judges' compensation, to which the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 consents when it allows States to tax the pay that federal employees receive if the taxation does not discriminate against [that] employee because of the source of the pay or compensation." Further, the Court held that the case was properly removed under the federal officer removal statute because the Jefferson County tax effects the judges' "performance of federal judicial duties in the county and risks interfering with the Federal Judiciary's operation in violation of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine." The Court also concluded that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar federal-court adjudication of the matter.

Jones v. United States (No. 97-9361)

Is a death-sentence-eligible defendant entitled to a jury instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock? Is there a reasonable likelihood that a jury might believe that a death-sentence-eligible defendant would receive a court-imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that they could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation?

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Jones was not entitled to an instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not require such an instruction and the Court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to require such an instruction in every capital case. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "in a capital sentencing proceeding, the Government has 'a strong interest in having the jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.' [A] charge to the jury of the sort proposed by petitioner might well have the effect of undermining this strong governmental interest." Furthermore, the Court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury had been led to believe that Jones would receive a court-imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that the jury could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that, "'[a]ccurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a [jury's] determination of whether a defendant shall live or die.' That 'indispensable prerequisite' was not satisfied in this case."

Jones v. United States (No. 97-6203)

Does the federal carjacking law define a single crime with three penalty options dependent on sentencing factors?

No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law established three separate offenses by the specification of elements, each of which must be charged by indictment, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.

Knowles v. Iowa (No. 97-7597)

Can a search of a stopped vehicle, that occurs prior to the driver's arrest, be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" exception that permits officers to search stopped vehicles without first obtaining a search warrant?

No. In a unanimous opinion that Court held that full stopped-car searches can only be conducted when the safety of the officers is at risk. One significant indication of such danger is when an officer arrests the subject as a reaction to possible or actual threat. In the present case, no serious danger accompanied the stop of Knowles car as evidenced by the officer's initial decision not to arrest Knowles or even issue him a ticket. As such, regardless of its uncovered contents, the subsequent search violated the "search incident to arrest" power and the Fourth Amendment's prohibition again unlawful search and seizures.

Kolstad v. American Dental Association (No. 98-208)

Does an employer's conduct have to be "egregious" or "outrageous," independent of its state of mind, in order to sustain an award of punitive damages under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act?

No. In a complicated split opinion, the Court held that if an employee can show their employer knowingly acted in violation of federal law then punitive damages may be sustained. The Court explained that the "malice" or "reckless indifference" standard applied to the relationship between employers and federal law, and is not a characterization of the severity threshold that the discrimination itself must meet. In other words, if an employer maliciously or recklessly violates a federal anti-discrimination law, regardless of the severity of their discriminatory acts, them punitive damages may be imposed. The Court remanded Kolstad's case for renewed consideration of her employer's state of mind during the alleged violations.

Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael (No. 97-1709)

Does a federal trial judge's "gatekeeping" obligation, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, apply to testimony based on skill or experience as it does to testimony based on scientific knowledge?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a federal trial judge's "gatekeeping" obligation applies not only to "scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "makes no relevant distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized knowledge. It makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony." The Court concluded that this interpretation of Rule 702 would insure that an expert witness's testimony rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. The Court also concluded that the District Court's determination that Carlson's methodology was not reliable was within the court's discretion.

Lilly v. Virginia (No. 98-5881)

Does trial evidence that includes out-of-court statements, that admit some wrongdoing but place primary blame on the defendant, by an alleged, nontestifying accomplice violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right to confront all adverse witnesses?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the admission of Mark's confession violated Benjamin's Confrontation Clause right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." All nine justices voted to overturn the Virginia Supreme Court's decision that had allowed such hearsay testimony under an exception for statements made against penal interest. Justice Stevens wrote for a plurality that the confession could not be considered "sufficiently reliable as to be admissible without allowing [the defendant] to cross-examine him." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Stephen G. Breyer wrote concurring opinions.

Lopez v. Monterey County (No. 97-1396)

Does the Voting Rights Act's pre-clearance requirement apply to states not explicitly covered by the Act?

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the county is covered by the Act's pre-clearance requirement, but the state was not. Justice O'Connor wrote, "We conclude that the county is required to seek pre-clearance before implementing California laws that effect voting changes in that county."

Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild (No. 97-1056)

Can collective bargaining contracts require membership for employment without articulating what it means to be "in good standing?"

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled collective bargaining contracts do not have to spell out what it means to be "in good standing." Justice O'Conner noted that requiring membership to be specified in a contract would force all terms to be specified. There would be no limit.

Martin v. Hadix (No. 98-262)

Does the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 limit an attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring services that were pending when the Act became effective?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 "limits attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA's effective date, but does not limit fees for monitoring performed before that date." "To impose the new standards now, for work performed before the PLRA became effective, would upset the reasonable expectations of the parties," Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court. All nine justices agreed that the PLRA should apply to services performed after the law's effective date. However, the Court split over whether the new fee limits contained in the law apply to work performed after April 26, 1996, in cases begun before that date. A 7-2 majority said that the new limits do apply to such cases. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens dissented from that part of the Court's conclusion.

Maryland v. Dyson (No. 98-1062)

Does the Fourth Amendment require police to obtain a search warrant before searching a vehicle which they have probable cause to believe contains illegal drugs?

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals rested upon an incorrect interpretation of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that, because the automobile exception has no separate exigency requirement and where there is probable cause to search an automobile, a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant is not actually obtained. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented.

Minnesota v. Carter (No. 97-1147)

In accordance with the Fourth Amendment, do household visitors have the same protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as do residents or overnight social guests?

No. The Court held, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, that people who visit someone's home for a short time do not have the same protection against unreasonable police searches and seizures as do the residents or their overnight guests. Short-term visits for commercial transactions are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that nothing in the case served to show that Carter was accepted into the household.

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians (No. 97-1337)

Does the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians have usufructuary rights on land now part of the state of Minnesota?

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians does have usufructuary rights that were guaranteed to them by the 1837 treaty. After an examination of the historical record, the Court held that the 1850 Executive Order was ineffective to terminate Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary rights, that the Mille Lacs Band did not relinquish its 1837 treaty rights in the 1855 treaty, and that the Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary rights were not extinguished when Minnesota was admitted to the Union.

Mitchell v. United States (No. 97-7541)

Does a guilty plea in federal court waive a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during sentencing? When a defendant invokes his or her Fifth Amendment privilege during sentencing, may a trial court draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence?

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that in the federal criminal system, a guilty plea does not waive the self-incrimination privilege at sentencing and that a sentencing court may not draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence in determining facts relating to the circumstances and details of the crime. "Treating a guilty plea as a waiver of the privilege at sentencing would be a grave encroachment on the rights of defendants," wrote Justice Kennedy for the Court. Justice Kennedy continued that "by holding [Mitchell's] silence against her in determining the facts of the offense at the sentencing hearing, the District Court imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise of the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination." Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the dissenting minority, expressed the view that, while the Court properly held Mitchell did not waive her privilege, she "did not have the right to have the sentencer abstain from making the adverse inferences that reasonably flow from her failure to testify."

Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes At Monterey, Ltd. (No. 97-1235)

Do plaintiffs have a right to a jury trial over land-use regulations when they allege constitutional violations under 42 USC Section 1983?

Yes. The Court held, in an opinion authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, that property owners who file a Section 1983 civil rights suit seeking compensation for an alleged taking of their property can have a jury trial in some circumstances. "[T]he disputed questions were whether the government had denied a constitutional right outside the bounds of its authority, and, if so, the extent of any resulting damages." Justice Kennedy then added: "These were questions for the jury."

Mosley v. United States (No. 97-7213)

Must jurors be instructed in some bank robbery prosecutions to consider the lesser charge of bank larceny?

The Court did not answer the question. In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the order granting the writ of certiorari and dismissed the petition. The Court was "advised that [Sylvester Mosley] died in Springfield, Missouri, on November 16, 1998."

Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipestringing, Inc. (No. 97-1909)

Is the time limit in which a named defendant may remove a state-court action to a federal court, as set forth in 28 U. S. C. ?1446(b), triggered by the mere receipt of a complaint unattended by any formal service?

No. In a 6-3 decision, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a named defendant's time to remove a state-court action to a federal court is triggered by the simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, "through service or otherwise," after and apart from service of the summons, but not by the mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service. Justice Ginsburg wrote for that Court that, "[i]t would take a clearer statement than Congress has made to read its endeavor to extend removal time...to effect so strange a change_to set removal apart from all other responsive acts, to render removal the sole instance in which one's procedural rights slip away before service of a summons."

Murphy v. United Parcel Service (No. 97-1992)

Is high blood pressure a "substantial impairment" that might limit one's life activities to such an extent as to justify their being called "disabled" and, therefore, entitled to protection under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act?

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the determination of whether one is "disabled" under the ADA must be made in light of available mitigating circumstances. In the present case, the Court did not find Murphy "disabled" since he could function normally with the help of blood pressure medication. Moreover, although no longer able to serve as a commercial truck driver for UPS, Murphy could still work as a mechanic - the position for which he was officially hired. The Court concluded that in order to be designated as "disabled" an employee must be unable to perform more than just one task.

NASA v. FLRA (No. 98-369)

May an investigator employed in NASA's Office of Inspector General be considered a "representative" of NASA when examining a NASA employee, such that the right to union representation in the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute may be invoked?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that an investigator from NASA's Office of Inspector General is a "representative" of NASA when conducting an employee examination covered by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, such that the right to union representation in the FSLMRS may be invoked. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, declared: "[E]mploying ordinary tools of statutory construction...we have no difficulty concluding that [the law] is not limited to agency investigators representing an entity that collectively bargains with the employee's union." Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia, dissented, citing the independence guaranteed Inspectors General by the Inspector General Act as reason for investigators not representing management with the meaning of the FSLMRS.

NCAA v. Smith (No. 98-84)

Does the National Collegiate Athletic Association's receipt of dues from federally funded member institutions subject it to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that dues payments from recipients of federal funds do not suffice to subject the NCAA to suit under Title IX. Justice Ginsburg distinguished the coverage of Title IX in that "[e]ntities that receive federal assistance, whether directly or through an intermediary, are recipients within the meaning of Title IX; entities that only benefit economically from federal assistance are not." Justice Ginsburg then concluded that "the Association's receipt of dues demonstrates that it indirectly benefits from the federal assistance afforded its members," which without more, "is insufficient to trigger Title IX coverage."

Neder v. United States (No. 97-1985)

Does the District Court's omission of the element of materiality from a jury instruction on tax fraud constitute harmless error? Is materiality an element of federal mail, wire, and bank fraud?

Yes and Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chef Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held 6-3 that under the harmless-error rule, which applies to a jury instruction that omits an element of an offense, the trial court's error did not render Neder's trial "fundamentally unfair." Thus, the error was harmless. In dissent, Justices Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that depriving a criminal defendant of the right to have a jury determine his commission of every element of the crime charged could not constitute a harmless error. Additionally, the Court unanimously held that materiality is an element of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud.

NFFE, Local 139 v. Department of the Interior (No. 97-1184)

Can federal agencies be required to bargain with federal employees' unions over issues that arise during the duration of a contract?

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute gave the Federal Labor Relations Authority power to determine whether parties must engage in midterm bargaining. Justice Breyer wrote, "Congress delegated to the authority the power to determine -- within appropriate legal bounds...whether, when, where and what sort of midterm bargaining is required."

Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc. (No. 96-1570)

Does the antitrust rule outlawing group boycotts apply to a single buyer's decision to buy from one company over another?

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled the group boycott rule does not apply to claims with a single buyer and a single supplier. In the competitive environment antitrust laws seek to encourage, NYNEX had the freedom to switch its vendor. As for the conspiracy to monopolize claim, the Court remanded the case to provide Discon a chance to show that NYNEX agreements possibly harmed the competitive process.

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel (No. 97-2048)

Must a state prisoner present all of his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, 28 U. S. C. Sections 2254(b)(1), (c), for federal habeas relief?

Yes. In a 6-3 decision, delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review when that review is part of the State's ordinary appellate review procedure. Justice O'Connor wrote for the court that "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the state's established appellate review process." Inmates can use federal habeas petitions as shortcuts only if their state's highest court does not allow them to raise all claims before it, she said.

Olmstead v. Zimring (No. 98-536)

Should financial constraints entirely determine whether states comply by the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act guidelines concerning community treatment programs for the mentally handicapped?

No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court began by noting that the question in this case was still ripe even though the two women at issue were placed in communal care since their controversies were initiated. The Court then found that the ADA required the placement of mentally disabled patients in "integrated settings" when they are medically cleared for such settings, they themselves express a desire for such settings, and the resources for such a transfer are available. The Court added that financial constraints might be significant if the state can show that allocation of resources to one patient will cause harm to others. The case was remanded for a better analysis of GRH spending priorities.

Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. (No. 97-1704)

Is a mandatory settlement class in asbestos personal injury litigation certifiable on limited fund theory under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "applicants for contested certification [of a mandatory settlement class on a limited fund theory under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)] must show that the fund is limited by more than the agreement of the parties, and has been allocated to claimants belonging within the class by a process addressing any conflicting interests of class members." "The record on which the District Court rested its certification of the class for the purpose of the global settlement did not support the essential premises of mandatory limited fund actions. It failed to demonstrate that the fund was limited except by the agreement of the parties, and it showed exclusions from the class and allocations of assets at odds with the concept of limited fund treatment and the structural protections of Rule 23(a) explained in [Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor]," concluded Justice Souter.

Peguero v. United States (No. 97-9217)

Does a District Court's failure to advise a defendant of his right to appeal, as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provide ground for habeas relief when the defendant was aware of his right and elected not to appeal?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that "a district court's failure to advise the defendant of his right to appeal does not entitle him to habeas relief if he knew of his right and hence suffered no prejudice from the omission." Noting the importance of the rule and acknowledging that the omission was an error, Justice Kennedy stated "[t]rial judges must be meticulous and precise in following each of the requirements of Rule 32 in every case." The Court concluded that Rule 32 violations do not entitle defendants to relief in all circumstances, rather only when the defendant is prejudiced by the court's error.

Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. (No. 97-1130)

Does the confirmation of a commercial sale mark the beginning of the one year period inventors have to file for a patent, despite the fact the invention has not been produced?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled federal patent law does not permit patents to be granted if an invention has been on sale for more than one year in this country before the patent application is filed. Moreover, a patent is on sale when a commercial sale offer has been made and when the inventor has made the invention, prepared drawings, or described the invention enough to be produced.

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (No. 97-1252)

Does the IIRIRA deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over aliens' suits alleging that actions of the Attorney General are selectively enforced?

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the IIRIRA deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over the selective-enforcement claim. Justice Scalia wrote, "[a]s a general matter -- and assuredly in the context of claims such as those put forward in the present case -- an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation."

Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (No. 98-405)

Does section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that section 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. "As we have repeatedly noted, in vote-dilution cases [section 5] prevents nothing but backsliding, and preclearance under [section 5] affirms nothing but the absence of backsliding," wrote Justice Scalia. Justices David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the opinions of Justices Souter and Stevens. "Now executive and judicial officers of the United States will be forced to preclear illegal and unconstitutional voting schemes patently intended to perpetuate discrimination," argued Justice Souter.

Richardson v. United States (No. 97-8629)

Does the "continuing criminal enterprise" statute require juror unanimity as to each specific violation of federal law for conviction?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a jury in a "continuing criminal enterprise" case is required to agree unanimously not only that accused committed continuing series of violations, but also which specific violations made up the continuing series. Looking to the language of the statute, Justice Breyer concluded that in the law "each 'violation' amounts to a separate element" and that combined with a "tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the law," calls for juror unanimity. In dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed the view that the Court's decision "rewards those drug kingpins whose operations are so vast that the individual violations cannot be recalled or charged with specificity."

Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc. (No. 97-53)

Must a plaintiff prove that a hospital acted with an improper motive in failing to stabilize a patient in order to prove a violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act?

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Section 1395dd(b) of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act contains no expressed or implied "improper motive" requirement. According o the Court's opinion, "there is no question that the text of Section 1395dd(b) does not require an "appropriate stabilization, nor can it reasonably be read to require an improper motive."

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. (No. 98-470)

Is a federal district court barred from dismissing a removed case for lack of personal jurisdiction without first deciding its subject-matter jurisdiction?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that in cases removed from a state court to federal court there is "no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy requiring the federal court to adjudicate subject-matter jurisdiction before considering a challenge to personal jurisdiction." Customarily, however, a federal court would first resolve doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter. Justice Ginsburg wrote, "[w]here...a district court has before it a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the alleged defect in subject matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction."

Saenz v. Roe (No. 98-97)

Does a state statute, authorizing states receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families to pay the benefit amount of another State's TANF to its first year residents, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's right-to-travel protections?

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to travel in three ways by: allowing citizens to move freely between states, securing the right to be treated equally in all states when visiting, and securing the rights of new citizens to be treated like long-time citizens of a state. The Court explained that by paying first-year residents the same TNF benefits they received in their state of origin, states treated new residents differently than others who have lived in their borders for over one year. As such, enforcement of the PRWORA power unconstitutionally discriminated among residents.

South Central Bell Telephone v. Alabama (No. 97-2045)

Does Alabama's franchise tax discriminates against interstate commerce, in violation of the Commerce Clause? Did the Alabama Supreme Court's refusal to permit the South Central Bell Telephone Company and others to raise their constitutional claims because of res judicata deprive them of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Alabama franchise tax was unconstitutional. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that, "Alabama law gives domestic corporations the ability to reduce their franchise tax liability..., while it denies foreign corporations that same ability. And no one claims that the different tax rates for foreign and domestic corporations offset the difference in the tax base. The tax therefore facially discriminates against interstate commerce and is unconstitutional unless the State can offer a sufficient justification for it." The Court concluded the State could not justify the tax. The Court also held that the State Supreme Court's decision was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee because the South Central Bell case was unrelated to the court's prior judgement and thus could not be bound by it. Furthermore, the Court rejected the State's argument that the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.

Stewart v. LaGrand (No. 98-1412)

Did Walter LaGrand waive his claim that execution by lethal gas constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment by electing to be executed by lethal gas, when Arizona's default form of execution is lethal injection?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that "[b]y declaring his method of execution, picking lethal gas over the state's default form of execution--lethal injection--Walter LaGrand has waived any objection he might have to it." Additionally, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals injunctive order. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. Arguing for full briefing and argument, Justice Stevens stated that "the answer to the question whether a capital defendant may consent to be executed by an unacceptably torturous method of execution is by no means clear."

Strickler v. Greene (No. 98-5864)

Did Virginia violate Brady v. Maryland, which provides for the disclosure of all possible exculpatory evidence, when a prosecutor failed to disclose all the exculpatory materials in the police's files? Was there an acceptable reason for Tommy Strickler's failure to raise a Brady claim in state court after such an event? Would the outcome of Strickler's trial been different in presence of the exculpatory evidence?

No, yes, and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that although Strickler demonstrated cause for his failure to raise a Brady claim, Virginia did not violate Brady by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to him. Further, the Court held that Strickler received a fair trial in the absence of the exculpatory evidence and did not show a "reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence would have been different had these materials been disclosed," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court.

Sutton v. United Air Lines (No. 97-1943)

(1) Should the determination of disability under 42 U.S.C. Section12102(2)(A) be made without reference to corrective measures that mitigate the impairment? (2) Is poor vision regarded as an impairment that substantially limits the Suttons in a major life activity?

No and no. Determination of disability under the ADA should be made in reference to an individual's ability to mitigate his or her impairment through corrective measures. This reading is in harmony with the statutory language and history of the ADA because (1) the phrase "substantially limits" requires consideration of present, not future or hypothetical, impairment; (2) the ADA calls for individualized assessments of impairment; and (3) Congress found that approximately 43 million Americans were disabled, a number that would be far too low if Congress had meant to include all those with correctable impairments. Also, assuming without deciding that working is a major life activity for purposes of the ADA, poor vision cannot be regarded as a substantially limiting impairment because it has only foreclosed the Suttons from pursuing work as "global airline pilots," not from numerous other positions in the aviation industry.

United States v. Haggar Apparel Company (No. 97-2044)

Is the United States Customs Service's regulation regarding permapressing entitled to judicial deference?

The Court did not expressly answer the question. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court vacated and remanded the case. The Court concluded that the regulation in question was subject to further analysis. Additionally, the Court held that if the regulation was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision, then it required judicial deference in the Court of International Trade.

United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno (No. 97-1139)

Is the venue for prosecuting a violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1), which proscribes using or carrying a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of violence," proper only in the district were the firearm was used or carried?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "[v]enue in a prosecution for using or carrying a firearm 'during and in relation to any crime of violence' in violation of section 924(c)(1) is proper in any district where the crime of violence was committed." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "A kidnapping...does not end until the victim is free. It does not make sense...to speak of it in discrete geographic fragments....[I]t does not matter that respondent used the revolver...only in Maryland because he did so 'during and in relation to' a kidnaping that was begun in Texas and continued in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland." Justice Antonin Scalia, with joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented, expressing the view that the crime defined in 924(c)(1) could be "committed only where the defendant both engages in the acts making up the predicate offense and uses or carries the gun." Moreover, Justice Scalia argued, because the accused's use of the gun occurred only in Maryland, venue was proper only there.

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers (No. 98-131)

Must there be a specific link between the giving of a gratuity to a government official and the latter's performance of a specific act in order to sustain an illegal-gratuity-statute conviction?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that to sustain conviction for federal bribery there must be a clear quid pro quo link between the gratuity received and performance of a specific past, present, or future "official" act. The Court reasoned that a statutory interpretation that punished the giving of any gifts to public officials would not fit comfortably with the legislation's spirit and traditions. The Court noted that the giving of gratuities to officials, by virtue of their position, is not the same as bribery of officials for the performance of specific conduct.

UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward (No. 97-1868)

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempt California's common-law agency rule, under which a California employer administering an insured group health plan should be deemed to act as the insurance company's agent? Does ERISA preempt California's "notice-prejudice" rule?

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that California's agency rule is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that California's common-law agency rule "would have a marked effect on plan administration," adding that it would force employers to take on a role for which they had not volunteered. Further, the Court held that California's notice-prejudice rule is not preempted by ERISA because it is a "law ... which regulates insurance." Thus, Ward's insurance claim may go forward even though he filed for benefits after the deadline because UNUM did not suffer any prejudice from the delay. "By allowing a longer period to file than the minimum filing terms mandated by federal law, the [California] rule complements rather than contradicts ERISA and the regulations," wrote Justice Ginsburg.

West v. Gibson (No. 98-238)

Does the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission possess the legal authority to require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they discriminate in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission possess the legal authority to require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they discriminate in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the dissenting minority, expressed the view that that the EEOC could not have awarded compensatory damages against the United States under Title VII because the statute did not authorize such awards in explicit terms. Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy, it did not provide the required waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity.

Wilson v. Layne (No. 98-83)

Is the accompaniment of law enforcement authorities by media personnel, during the execution of an arrest warrant in a home, a violation of the homeowner's Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful search and seizure?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the presence of media during the execution of an arrest warrant in a home was in no way related to the officers' task at hand. Reporters neither assist officers nor do they have anything to do with the warrant's execution. Moreover, the connection between their presence and furthering positive publicity for law enforcement is unclear at best. The Court added, however, that in this case the officers had no reason to believe that permitting media to accompany them would be illegal, since no prior rule existed in this matter. Accordingly, the officers in question were granted qualified immunity.

Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp. (No. 97-889)

May employees sue over alleged discrimination under the ADA when their union contract requires grievances to be handled through arbitration?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the CBA's arbitration clause did not require Wright to use the arbitration procedure for the alleged violation of the ADA. In his opinion, Scalia wrote that the CBA did not contain a waiver of the employee's right to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment discrimination.

Wyoming v. Houghton (No. 98-184)

May police officers, with probable cause to search a car, inspect personal items belonging to its passengers without violating the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court held that so long as there is probable cause to search a stopped vehicle, all subsequent searches of its contents are legal as well. The Court added that such searches are especially warranted if aimed at looking into objects or personal belongings capable of concealing items that are the object of the search.

Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala (No. 97-1489)

Can Medicare-reimbursed health care providers appeal a fiscal intermediary's refusal to reopen previous reimbursement decisions?

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the Board does not have jurisdiction to review a fiscal intermediary's refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. Moreover, the Court held that the federal-question statute and mandamus statute do not entitle Your Home Visiting Nurse to judicial review of the intermediary's reopening decision.