Argument of Justice Thomas
Mr. Thomas: The second case I have to announce is Florida versus White, No. 98-223.
This case comes to us on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida.
After the police arrested respondent on charges unrelated to this case, they seized his car because they believe that it was forfeitable under Florida's Contraband Forfeiture Act.
They did not secure warrant authorizing the seizure.
During a subsequent inventory search the police discovered cocaine in the car.
As a result, respondent was charged with drug possession.
Respondent moved to suppress the cocaine on the grounds that the warrantless seizure of the car violated the Fourth Amendment.
Although the Trial and Appellate Courts rejected this argument, the Supreme Court held that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless seizure of an automobile under the Forfeiture Act violated the Fourth Amendment.
In an opinion filed with the Clerk today we reverse.
Over 70 years ago in Carroll verus United States we held that the Fourth Amendment does not require police to obtain a warrant before searching a car for and seizing contraband.
Our holding was rooted in federal law enforcement practice at the time that the Fourth Amendment was adopted.
Specifically, we noted that early Congresses authorized federal officers to conduct warrantless searches of ships and to seize concealed goods subject to duties.
The principles underlying the rule in Carroll and the founding-era statutes upon which they were based support our conclusion that the warrantless seizure of respondent's car did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Although the police lacked probable cause to believe that respondent's car contained contraband, they certainly had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband under Florida law.
Recognition of the need to seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away, undoubtedly underlies the early federal laws relied upon in Carroll.
This need is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure.
In addition, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has consistently given police greater latitude in exercising their duties in public places.
Indeed, the facts of this case are nearly indistinguishable from those in G. M. Leasing Corp. versus the United States.
In that 1977 case we held that federal agents did not violate the Fourth Amendment by failing to secure a warrant prior to seizing automobiles in partial satisfaction of income tax assessments.
Therefore, based on the relevant history and our prior precedent, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant to seize respondent's automobile in these circumstances.
Justice Souter has filed a concurring opinion which Justice Breyer has joined; Justice Stevens has filed a dissenting opinion which Justice Ginsburg has joined.
