Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes At Monterey, Ltd. - Opinion Announcement
Argument of Speaker
Mr. Speaker: The opinion of the Court in No. 97-1235, the City of Monterey versus Del Monte Dunes of Monterey will be announced by Justice Kennedy.
Argument of Justice Kennedy
Mr. Kennedy: The respondents here were property owners, they owned parcel in excess of 37 acres of real estate within the city limits of Monterey, California.
Those who know Monterey will know the property is to the West as you enter the city from the North on Highway One.
The parcel therefore has some ocean frontage, but it is also the former site of an oil company terminal and a tank firm, and the property suffered from this industrial use.
The owners sought to restore the property to good condition as part of a proposed residential development.
Over the period of some five years the owner submitted repeated plans, each time trying to meet the conditions imposed by city planning officials.
These included restoring natural vegetation to save an endangered butterfly species, providing a public beach, providing view corridors and a buffer zone next to a state park.
With each submission however they were confronted with new demands by planning officials.
The Zoning Ordinance would have permitted the residential development of more than 1,000 units, but the initial proposal was for 344 units.
After the first plan was denied each later proposal proposed a reduced number of dwelling units, the last being for just 190 units, still the proposal was denied.
After five years 19 different site plans and five formal planning decisions all resulting in denials, then owner, respondent Del Monte Dunes, decided the city would not permit development under any circumstances.
Under California law as it then was, the party seemed to agree that the owners could not have sued the city for just compensation based on a regulatory takings theory, so they brought this suit under the Federal Civil Rights statute 42 U.S.C. 1983.
The suit alleged the violation of the Federal Constitution.
The theory of the suit was that the city had taken the property through his actions, and that Del Monte Dunes had neither paid for the taking nor provided a remedy for seeking just compensation.
Just as the planning and permit processes were protracted so too were the legal proceedings, and they’re described in the opinion, eventually, the case was tried to a jury in the United States District Court.
The verdict was returned in favor of the landowners and against the city and Court of Appeals affirmed.
We granted certiorari to determine three questions: The first is whether the Court of Appeals erred in assuming that the rough proportionality standard of our recent holding in Dolan versus City of Tigard applies to this case?
Although in a general sense concerns for proportionality animate the Takings Clause, the rough proportionality test of the Dolan case has not been applied except in the special context.
It has been applied to land use decisions which condition the approval of development on consent by the owners to dedicate part of the owner’s property to a public use.
That was not the essential objection the landowner made in this case.
For this reason we believe the test was not applicable here, there were other basis upon which to sustain the Trial Court’s instructions and the jury’s verdict however, so the Court of Appeals' discussion of rough proportionality is not ground either for reversal or for remand.
The second question was whether the Trial Court erred by using a standard that allowed the jury to reweigh the reasonableness of the city’s land use decision?
The standard or test to which the City objects was in effect contained in an instruction proposed by the City itself, and as to which there was no objection.
The jury was asked to decide in light of the history and context of this particular case whether the denial of the landowners’ development proposal was reasonably related to the City’s profit justification.
To the extent the City argues that its land use decisions are immune from judicial scrutiny under all circumstances, its position is contrary to settle regulatory takings principles.
So, we reject this claim of error.
The third question is the one to which the opinion for the Court and the other separate opinions devote most discussion.
That question is whether the issue of the City’s liability was properly submitted to the jury rather than to the trial judge?
On this ground too we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
This was a suit as mentioned at the outset, under Section 1983.
Section 1983 suits we hold are statutory claims which can be said to sound in tort.
We hold that a party, which like Del Monte Dunes, seeks legal relief under 1983 is guaranteed a jury trial by the Seventh Amendment.
In actions of law predominantly factual issues are in most cases allocated to the jury.
The allocation rest on a firm historical foundation and serve to preserve the right to a jury’s resolution of the ultimate dispute.
Almost from the inception of our regulatory takings doctrine, we have held that whether a regulation of property goes so far that there must be an exercise of eminent domain, and compensation to sustain the action, depends upon the particular facts.
We conclude that whether a landowner who has been deprived of all economically viable use of his property is a predominantly factual question.
In actions of law otherwise within the purview of the Seventh Amendment this question is for the jury.
The jury’s role in determining whether a land use decision substantially advances legitimate public interest within the meaning of our regulatory takings doctrine presents a more difficult question.
In this case the issues submitted to the jury was narrow and fact bound.
Under the circumstances it was proper for the jury’s determination.
Justice Scalia has filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment; Justice Souter has filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In that opinion Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg and Breyer have joined.
