The Oyez Project: 1997 Term Decisions

Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller (No. 97-428)

No details yet.

Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (No. 96-1577)

Does the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980's six-year statute of limitations begin to run on a pension fund's action to collect unpaid withdrawal liability on the date the employer withdraws from the plan?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the MPPAA's six-year statute of limitations on a pension fund's action to collect unpaid withdrawal liability does not begin to run until the employer fails to make a payment on the schedule set by the fund. Justice Ginsburg reasoned that a plan's interest in receiving withdrawal liability does not ripen into a cause of action triggering the limitations period until the trustees determine and demand payment and the employer defaults on an installment. The Court's conclusion prompted a second decision, that a pension fund's action to collect unpaid withdrawal liability is timely as to any installment payments that came due during the six years preceding the suit, but payments that came due prior to that time are lost.

Allentown Mack Sales v. NLRB (No. 96-795)

Does 29 USC section 1162(2)(D)(i) allow an employer to deny Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 continuation health coverage to a qualified beneficiary who is covered under another group health plan at the time he makes his COBRA election?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that an employer may not deny COBRA continuation coverage under its health plan to an otherwise eligible beneficiary because he is covered under another group health plan at the time he elects COBRA coverage. "It is undisputed that both before and after James Geissal elected COBRA continuation coverage he was continuously a beneficiary of [his wife's employer's] group health plan," wrote Justice Souter, "[b]ecause he was thus covered before he made his COBRA election, and so did not 'first become' covered under the [his wife's employer's] plan after the date of election, Moore could not cut off his COBRA coverage under the plain meaning of [section 1162(2)(D)(i)]."

Almendarez-Torres v. United States (No. 96-6839)

Currently unknown.

Arkansas Ed. Television Comm. v. Forbes (No. 96-779)

Does the Double Jeopardy Clause preclude retrial on a prior conviction allegation in noncapital sentencing proceedings?

No. In a 5-4 decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect convicted criminals from a second sentencing proceeding in noncapital cases. State prosecutors can try a second time to convince a court to impose an enhanced sentence under a state's "three-strikes" law.

AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, Inc. (No. 97-679)

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Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. IRS (No. 97-147)

No details yet.

Baker v. General Motors Corp. (No. 96-653)

May a state prison death row inmate who already has lost on one or more federal habeas corpus petitions file a subsequent petition to claim that he cannot be executed because he is incompetent?

Yes. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled Martinez-Villareal cannot be barred from raising his incompetency claim in a successive petition because his claim was really amended. The ban imposed by the AEDPA only covers truly successive petitions. "To hold otherwise," declared Rehnquist, "would mean that a dismissal of a first habeas petition for technical procedural reasons would bar the prisoner from ever obtaining federal habeas review."

Bates v. United States (No. 96-7185)

Can homeowners who face foreclosure rescind a mortgage loan on the ground that the lender violated the federal truth-in-lending law?

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled no such defense could be raised after the three-year deadline of the federal Truth in Lending Act expires.

Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. (No. 96-370)

Does the United States Forest Service's Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest present a controversy that is justiciable? If so, does the Plan conform to statutory and regulatory requirements for a forest plan?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the controversy is not yet ripe for judicial review. Justice Breyer wore for the Court that "'withhold court consideration' at present will not cause the parties significant 'hardship.'" "[B]efore the Forest Service can permit logging, it must focus upon a particular site, propose a specific harvesting method, prepare an environmental review, permit the public an opportunity to be heard, and (if challenged) justify the proposal in court," continued Justice Breyer, "[t]he Sierra Club thus will have ample opportunity later to bring its legal challenge at a time when harm is more imminent and more certain."

Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank (No. 97-5310)

No details yet.

Bogan and Roderick v. Scott-Harris (No. 96-1569)

Does an employer who grants paid leave of absence to employees who then go to work as a union's full-time grievance chairmen violate Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act?

After the Supreme Court heard oral arguments, but before it ruled, the Union reached a settlement with Caterpillar rendering the case moot.

Bousley v. United States (No. 96-8516)

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Bragdon v. Abbott (No. 97-156)

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Breard v. Greene (No. 97-8214)

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Brogan v. United States (No. 96-1579)

Does Louisiana's open primary violate the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal election day?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that when Louisiana's open primary is applied to select among congressional candidates in October, it conflicts with federal law and to that extent is void. The Court rejected the argument that Louisiana's system only concerns the manner, not the time, of a federal election. Justice Souter reasoned that a federal election occurs in Louisiana before the federal election date whenever a candidate receives a majority in the open primary.

Bryan v. United States (No. 96-8422)

No details yet.

Buchanan v. Angelone (No. 96-8400)

Is fear of foreign prosecution sufficient grounds to justify the invocation of the Firth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that although resident aliens are entitled to the same Fifth Amendment protections as citizen "persons" the risk of their deportation is not sufficient to sustain a self-incrimination privilege intended to apply only to the United States government. The Court explained that since the Fifth Amendment does not bind foreign governments, and that would not be subject to domestic enforcement of immunity-for-testimony deals, one could not assert a self-incrimination protection against possible prosecution at their hands.

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth (No. 97-569)

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Calderon v. Ashmus (No. 97-391)

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Calderon v. Thompson (No. 97-215)

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California v. Deep Sea Research (No. 96-1400)

Did Congress diminish the boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota in an 1894 statute that ratified an agreement pursuant to the Dawes Act, which permitted the Government to open reservation land to non-Indian settlement?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the 1894 statute's operative language and the circumstances surrounding its passage demonstrate that Congress intended to diminish the Yankton Reservation and as a result the unallotted lands ceded did not retain reservation status. Consequently, because the unallotted lands included the landfill site, which no longer constituted Indian country as defined by 18 USCS 1151(a), South Dakota has primary jurisdiction over the lands. Noting the repudiation of allotment philosophy, Justice O'Connor wrote that, "we must give effect to Congress' intent in passing the 1894 Act. Here... we believe that Congress spoke clearly, and although 'some might wish [it] had spoken differently... we cannot remake history.'"

Campbell v. Louisiana (No. 96-1584)

Does 20 USC section 1097(a), which makes it a felony "knowingly and willfully" to misapply student loan funds insured under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, require an allegation and proof that a defendant specifically intended to injure or defraud either the United States as loan guarantor or another?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the specific intent to injure or defraud someone, whether the United States or another, is not an element of the misapplication of funds proscribed by section 1097(a). Justice Ginsburg wore for the Court that, "the text of [section 1097(a)] does not include an 'intent to defraud' state of mind requirement, and we ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face." In contrast, Justice Ginsburg noted that 20 USC section 1097(d), which makes it a felony "knowingly and willfully" to "destroy or conceal any record relating to the provision of assistance under [Title IV] with intent to defraud the United States" contained an "intent to defraud" element.

Caron v. United States (No. 97-6270)

No details yet.

Cass County, MN v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians (No. 97-174)

No details yet.

Caterpillar, Inc. v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (No. 96-1925)

Did the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, under the Line Item Veto Act, violate the Presentment Clause of Article I?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. The Court then explained that under the Presentment Clause, legislation that passes both Houses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. signed) or rejected (i.e. vetoed) by the President. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by the Act, the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the "finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers.

City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons (No. 96-910)

No details yet.

City of Monroe v. United States (No. 97-122)

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Clinton v. City of New York (No. 97-1374)

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Cohen v. De La Cruz (No. 96-1923)

Did the Supreme Court of New Mexico err in upholding grant of state habeas corpus relief to parolee whom state of Ohio sought to extradite as alleged fugitive from justice by going beyond the scope of permissible inquiry?

Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that "the Supreme Court of New Mexico went beyond the permissible inquiry in an extradition case, and permitted the litigation of issues not open in the asylum State." The opinion stated, "this is simply not the kind of issue that may be tried in the asylum State. In case after case we have held that claims relating to what actually happened in the demanding State, the law of the demanding State, and what may be expected to happen in the demanding State when the fugitive returns, are issues that must be tried in the courts of that State, and not in those of the asylum State."

Crawford-El v. Britton (No. 96-827)

Do federal courts lack jurisdiction over action to reopen a settlement quieting land title in the Federal Government either under Rule 60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent action or under Quiet Title Act?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that this was a sufficient basis to justify reopening the judgment. "[A]n independent action should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "it should be obvious that [the Beggerlys'] allegations do not nearly approach this demanding standard." The Court also concluded that the Court of Appeals extension of the Quiet Title Act's statutory period by equitable tolling was unwarranted, given its generous nature. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion.

Dooley v. Korean Airlines (No. 97-704)

No details yet.

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel (No. 97-42)

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Edwards v. United States (No. 96-8732)

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Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (No. 97-282)

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FEC v. Akins (No. 96-1590)

Is the exclusion of a ballot-qualified candidate from a debate sponsored by a state-owned public television broadcaster a violation of the candidate's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?

No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that public broadcasters could selectively exclude participants from their sponsored debates, so long as these were not designed as "public forums." The Court found that by reserving participation rights only to candidates for a particular congressional district, rather then hosting an open-microphone format, and selecting among those which were eligible to participate, based on objective indications of their popular support rather then their view points, AETC's debate was a "nonpublic forum." As such, AETC could decide who should and should not participate in its sponsored event.

Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. (No. 96-1768)

May defendants who pleaded guilty to "using" a firearm in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1) contest the validity of their convictions by claiming that their guilty pleas were not knowing and intelligent because they were misinformed by the District Court as to the nature of the charged crime?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that, although Bousley's claim was procedurally defaulted, Bousley may be entitled to a hearing on the merits of it if he makes the necessary showing to relieve the default. The Court's opinion made Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), which held that section 924(c)(1)'s "use" element requires the Government to show "active employment of the firearm," retroactive. Accordingly, the Court ruled that Bousley need demonstrate no more than that he did not "use" a firearm as defined in Bailey to be entitled to have his defaulted claim of an unintelligent plea considered on its merits.

Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink (No. 96-1370)

May a federal district court conducting "pretrial proceedings" under 28 USC section 1407(a) invoke section 1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a district court conducting pretrial proceedings pursuant to section 1407(a) has no authority to invoke section 1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial. The Court noted that the Panel's section 1407(a) instructions are crouched in the word "shall," which "creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion." Justice Souter wrote for the Court that, "the straightforward language imposing the Panel's responsibility to remand... bars recognizing any self-assignment power in a transferee court." The opinion was unanimous except insofar as Justice Antonin Scalia did not join Part II-C.

Forney v. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security (No. 97-5737)

No details yet.

Foster v. Love (No. 96-670)

Does the Harbor Maintenance Tax, as applied to goods loaded at U.S. ports for export, violate the Export Clause?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that "the [Harbor Maintenance Tax], which is imposed on an ad valorem basis, is not a fair approximation of services, facilities, or benefits furnished to the exporters, and therefore does not qualify as a permissible user fee." The Court noted that the Export Clause does not categorically bar Congress from imposing any tax on exports and that a charge designed as compensation for government-supplied services, facilities, or benefits would pass scrutiny.

GE v. Joiner (No. 96-188)

Does a debt arising from a medical malpractice judgment, attributable to negligent or reckless conduct, fall within section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that a debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another" is not dischargeable?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that "debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of [section 523(a)(6)]." Therefore, the debt is dischargeable. Justice Ginsburg wore for the Court that "[t]he word 'willful' in [section 523(a)(6)] modifies the word 'injury,' indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. Had Congress meant to exempt debts resulting from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead 'willful acts that cause injury.' Or, Congress might have selected an additional word or words, i.e., 'reckless' or 'negligent,' to modify 'injury.'"

Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. School Dist. (No. 96-1866)

Are federal claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 governed by the Alabama Wrongful Death Act?

Unanswered. In an 8-1 decision the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the Court could not rule until the Alabama Supreme Court proceedings were completed and a final decision handed down. The case was dismissed.

Geissal v. Moore Medical Corporation (No. 97-689)

No details yet.

Gray v. Maryland (No. 96-8653)

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Hohn v. United States (No. 96-8986)

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Hopkins, Warden v. Reeves (No. 96-1693)

Does the term "willfully" in 18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) require proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful and that he knew of the federal licensing requirement for dealing in firearms?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the term "willfully" in section 924(a)(1)(D) requires proof only that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, not that he also knew of the federal licensing requirement. Justice Stevens wrote for that court that "the willfulness requirement of [section 924(a)(1)(D)] does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required." In a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that ambiguously worded criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the defendant.

Hudson v. United States (No. 96-976)

No details yet.

Jefferson, Individually And As Administrator Of The Estate Of Jefferson, Deceased v. City Of Tarrant, Alabama (No. 96-957)

No details yet.

Kalina v. Fletcher (No. 96-792)

Did the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, err in denying Newsweek access to Florida postpayment remedies for a refund of the taxes it paid under an unconstitutional sales tax scheme?

Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that "Newsweek is entitled to a clear and certain remedy and thus it can use [Florida] refund procedures to adjudicate the merits of its claim." The opinion stated that "[w]hile Florida may be free to require taxpayers to litigate first and pay later, due process prevents it from applying this requirement to taxpayers, like Newsweek, who reasonably relied on the apparent availability of a postpayment refund when paying the tax."

Kawaauhau v. Geiger (No. 97-115)

No details yet.

Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. (No. 96-1037)

Does 8 U.S.C. Section 1409, establishing upon birth the U.S. citizenship of illegitimate foreign-born children whose mothers only are U.S. citizens but failing to do the same if only their fathers are U.S. citizens, violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantees?

No. After ruling that Miller had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute, the Court held that 8 U.S.C. Section 1409 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court reasoned that different treatment of mothers and fathers of out-of-wedlock children was justified since the two parents are not "similarly situated." While the child's relationship with its father may be undisclosed for several years, its blood relationship to its mother is usually apparent through hospital records. Moreover, whereas birth mothers will know immediately of their child's existence, birth fathers and their children may never know each other. The statutory requirement that a child born out of wedlock to a citizen father obtain formal proof of paternity by age 18, either through legitimization, written acknowledgment by the father under oath, or adjudication by a competent court, is well tailored to address the difficulties of establishing a child's citizenship based only on the relation to the father.

LaChance v. Erickson (No. 96-1395)

Does Texas' public use of interest accrued on principal client funds, deposited by mandate into federally funded accounts, violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that TEAJF's used of IOLTA interest funds violated the Takings Clause which prohibits the taking of "private property for public use, without just compensation." The Court noted that since the principal client fees deposited into the IOLTA account are private property, any accrued interest on such fees attaches as a property right incident to ownership of the underlying principal. Thus, since they may not redistribute the principal deposits, TEAJF is also prohibited from assigning any interest accumulated thereon.

Lewis v. United States (No. 96-7151)

May a parent corporation that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of a subsidiary, without more, be held liable under CERCLA Section 107(a)(2) as an operator of a polluting facility owned or operated by the subsidiary?

No, unless the corporate veil may be pierced. But a corporate parent that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of the facility itself may be held directly liable in its own right as an operator of the facility.

Lewis, Deceased v. Brunswick Corporation (No. 97-288)

No details yet.

Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes and Lerach (No. 96-1482)

Is the restitution sought for the Crow Tribe from the State of Montana for the illegal collection of taxes and cola mined on the Tribe's reservation warranted?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the restitution sought for the Tribe of all severance and gross proceeds taxes paid by Westmoreland to Montana and certain counties, before the tribe's severance tax became valid, was not warranted. The Court decision was based on findings that Westmoreland had forfeited its entitlement to a refund, that neither the state nor the tribe enjoyed authority to tax to the total exclusion of the other, and that the tribe could not have taxed the company during the periods in question. The Court also concluded that the District Court had ruled properly where the tribe and the U.S. had argued for total disgorgement rather than a different form of relief. In a partial dissent in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined, Justice David H. Souter argued that nothing disentitled the tribe at least to press for disgorgement of some or all of Montana's tax revenues.

Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal (No. 96-1462)

Do voters have the proper legal standing to challenge the Federal Election Commission's decisions regarding political committees?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that voters seeking information, to which they believe FECA entitles them, have standing to challenge the FEC's decision not to bring an enforcement action. Because FECA seeks to address the voters' injury, the failure to obtain relevant information, Justice Breyer concluded that the voters had prudential standing. Furthermore, because the voters' inability to obtain information constitutes an "injury in fact," continued Justice Breyer, the voters had standing under Article III. The Court did not address the FEC's major purpose test, allowing the FEC to address the issue under newly proposed rules. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined.

Miller v. Albright (No. 96-1060)

Does a lower court's refusal to grant a jury instruction, the substance of which is confessed to and acknowledged by the defendant, grounds for a grant of certiorari to the Supreme Court?

No. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court held that the Government only had to establish that Rogers knowingly possessed a firearm. The government did not have to show that Rogers knew such possession was unlawful or even that his weapons were unregistered. Looking at Rogers' state of mind, the Court reasoned that his repeated admissions during arrest and trial concerning his awareness and knowledge of the weapons found in his truck, sufficiently demonstrated that his possession of the weapons was intentional. The Court dismissed it grant of certiorari as improvidently granted

Monge v. California (No. 97-6146)

No details yet.

Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians (No. 96-1829)

Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review decisions of the courts of appeals denying applications for certificates of appealability?

Yes. A certificate application is a "case in" the court of appeals under Section 1254(1). It presents an immediate and redressable injury, and there is adversity as well as the other requisite qualities of a case. Indeed, Hohn's application moved through the Eighth Circuit as cases in general do, yielding a decision that has been regarded as precedential. Many other factors confirm this conclusion as well. This decision overrules that portion of House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 44 (1945) (per curiam), which held that the Court lacks statutory certiorari jurisdiction to review denials of certificates of probable cause.

Muscarello v. United States (No. 96-1654)

May lawsuits invoking 42 USC section 1983 to allege that a public official violated a prisoner's rights because of an unlawful motive be dismissed because the plaintiff fails to produce clear and convincing evidence of the unlawful motive?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in fashioning a heightened burden of proof for unconstitutional-motive cases against public officials. "Neither the text of [section 1983] or any other federal statute, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides any support for imposing the clear and convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the summary judgment stage or in the trial itself," wrote Justice Stevens. In a dissent joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that a government official was entitled to immunity from a motive-based tort suit if the official could proffer a legitimate reason and the plaintiff could not establish that the reason given was a pretext.

National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank (No. 96-843)

No details yet.

National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley (No. 97-371)

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New Jersey v. New York (No. 120 ORIG)

Are the filled portions on Jersey's Side of Ellis Island under the sovereign authority of the State of New York or the State of New Jersey?

The Court held that the 1834 compact between the two states, although granting New York sovereignty over Ellis Island, did not support an inference that any portions added to the island's New Jersey side would also belong to New York. The lack of meets and bounds descriptions in the compact indicated that it merely applied to Ellis Island as it existed in 1834, and did not contemplate ownership of expanded portions. Moreover, the Court noted that under the common law doctrine of avulsion, sudden shoreline changes have no effect on boundaries. Thus, since New Jersey had sovereignty over previously submerged portions of Ellis Island, it would retain such sovereignty when these portions were filled until raised above the water line on its side of the Island.

New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed (No. 97-1217)

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Newsweek, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue (No. 97-663)

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Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard (No. 96-1769)

Is the setting of maximum prices always ("per se") a violation of the Sherman Act's prohibition on price fixing?

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court overturned the Albrecht decision. The Court noted that antitrust cases are typically decided by weighing the costs and benefits of restrictions in each individual case instead of by per se rules as in Albrecht. Also, there was significant precedent contradicting the assertion that all trade restrictions are illegal, and there was evidence that the effects of price-fixing are not as detrimental as the Court thought at the time of Albrecht.

Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.v. Sierra Club (No. 97-16)

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Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. (No. 96-568)

Did the Court of Appeal's order recalling its mandate denying Thomas M. Thompson all habeas relief violate 28 USC section 2244(b) as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996? Was the order an abuse of the appellate court's discretion?

No and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that although it was consistent with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the recall was a grave abuse of discretion. The Court established that "where a federal court of appeals sua sponte recalls its mandate to revisit the merits of an earlier decision denying habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, the court abuses its discretion unless it acts to avoid a miscarriage of justice as defined by our habeas corpus jurisprudence." Accordingly, Justice Kennedy, noting that Thompson's evidence was not clear and convincing, concluded that California's judgment would not result in a miscarriage of justice. Justice David H. Souter wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer joined.

Oubre v. Entergy Operations Inc. (No. 96-1291)

Does the Eleventh Amendment, limiting federal jurisdiction over maritime matters, bar a federal court's jurisdiction over an admiralty property claim where the property itself is not within the State's possession?

No. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that while precedent interpreting the Eleventh Amendment supports a limited bar on federal admiralty jurisdiction disputes centering on people or property that is in a state's possession, the same does not apply when the concerned state lacks possession of the disputed maritime property. The Court noted that in this case, neither the federal government nor the State of California had possession of the Brother Jonathan and, therefore, the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional ban was inapplicable. The Court concluded by noting that since several outstanding insurance claims were made on the Brother Jonathan at the time of her sinking, the question of whether the wreck was truly "abandoned" remained unresolved. Accordingly, the Court remanded the matter for further consideration.

Penn. Board of Probation v. Scott (No. 97-581)

No details yet.

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey (No. 97-634)

No details yet.

Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation (No. 96-1578)

Does an environmental organization have standing to bring suit against companies that fail to meet the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act Of 1986's deadlines for filing toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports? Does the EPCRA authorize suits for purely past violations?

No and the Court did not answer the question. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held, because none of the relief sought would likely remedy its alleged injury in fact, that Citizens For A Better Environment lacked standing to maintain suit and that the Court and lower federal courts lack the jurisdiction to entertain it. While all nine Justices agreed that the organization lacked standing, they disagreed on the reasons. Lacking jurisdiction, the Court declined to answer whether the EPCRA authorizes suits for purely past violations. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Stephen G. Breyer, John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote concurring opinions.

Quality King Distrib. v. L'anza Research Int. (No. 96-1470)

Does section 504(c) of the Copyright Act or the Seventh Amendment grant a right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, despite section 504(c) of the Copyright Act's silence, the Seventh Amendment provides the right to a jury trial, which includes a right to a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages. Applying a historical Seventh Amendment analysis, Justice Thomas concluded that "there is clear and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff." "As a result, if a party so demands, a jury must determine the actual amount of statutory damages under [section 504(c)] in order 'to preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury,'" wrote Justice Thomas.

Regions Hospital v. Shalala (No. 96-1375)

Are actions by local officials introducing, voting for, and signing an ordinance outside the scope of legislative activities because of the motives of the government actors?

No. Local legislators are entitled to the same absolute immunity from civil liability under Section 1983 for their legislative activities as are federal, state and regional legislators. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act itself, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. The acts at issue here were clearly legislative, and the ordinance itself bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.

Ricci v. Village of Arlington Heights (No. 97-501)

No details yet.

Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana (No. 96-1971)

Is the government's interpretation of reserve strengthening correct in determining property and casualty insurers' liability?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the IRS interpretation of reserve strengthening seemed "reasonable accommodation." It was fair and unabusive. Furthermore, the language of the provision was broad enough to embrace all increases in the reserves.

Rogers v. United States (No. 96-1279)

Is the Secretary of Health and Human Services' "reaudit" rule a reasonable interpretation of the GME Amendment of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the reaudit rule is a reasonable interpretation of the GME Amendment and that it is not impermissibly retroactive. Given that the timing of the "recognized as reasonable" determination is silent and thus ambiguous, the Court concluded that, because it reflects a reasonable interpretation of the law, the reaudit rule merits the Court's approbation. "The Secretary's reaudit rule brings the base-year calculation in line with Congress' pervasive instruction for reasonable cost reimbursement," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined.

Sacramento v. Lewis (No. 96-1337)

Does the Fourth Amendment require that police officers have more than a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence before entering would be dangerous, futile, or inhibit the effective investigation of a crime when a "no-knock" entry results in the destruction of property?

No. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not hold police officers to a higher standard than the test articulated in Richards v. Wisconsin. In Richards, the Court held that a no-knock entry was justified if police had a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be dangerous, futile, or would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime, when a no-knock entry resulted in the destruction of property. "Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search not subject to suppression," noted the Chief Justice.

Salinas v. United States (No. 96-738)

Can a Social Security disability claimant seeking court reversal of an agency decision denying benefits appeal a district court order remanding the case to the agency for further proceeding?

Yes. In a unanimous decision announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a person seeking Social Security disability benefits may appeal to a federal Court of Appeals when a District Court remands the case to the agency for further proceedings.

South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe (No. 96-1581)

Does the federal Assimilative Crimes Act make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute applicable on a federal Army base located in Louisiana?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that, because the ACA does not make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute part of federal law, the federal second-degree murder statute governs Lewis' crime. Because the federal second-degree murder statute does not mandate a life sentence, but rather provides for a sentence of "any term of years or life," Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that Lewis was also entitled to resentencing. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion.

Spencer v. Kemna (No. 96-7171)

Does section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act permit a union to sue in federal court to declare a collective bargaining agreement voidable in the absence of any alleged violation of the agreement?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that neither it nor the lower federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction under section 301 because the Union's complaint alleged no violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. "Suits for violation of contracts" under [section 301(a)] are not suits that claim a contract is invalid, but suits that claim a contract has been violated, wrote Justice Scalia. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer filed concurring opinions.

State Oil Co. v. Khan (No. 96-871)

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Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment (No. 96-643)

Does the Federal Boat Safety Act's preemption clause include claims of negligence, property liability, and fraudulent misrepresentation?

Despite its win in the Eleventh Circuit, Brunswick settled the case for approximately $700,000 before the Supreme Court could rule.

Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal (No. 97-300)

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Swidler & Berlin v. United States (No. 97-1192)

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Texas v. United States (No. 97-29)

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Textron Lycoming v. United Automobile Workers (No. 97-463)

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Trest v. Cain, Warden (No. 96-7901)

Did the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' refusal to allow a prison inmate to participate in a motivational boot camp, because of the inmate's history of hypertension, violate Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibiting disability-based discrimination against qualified individuals?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that under the ADA no "public entity" may discriminate against qualified disabled individuals due to their disability. Moreover, the Court stated that the ADA's protections extended to cover prison inmates as well as any other liberated citizen.

United States v. Beggerly (No. 97-731)

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United States v. Bajakajian (No. 96-1487)

Is the abuse of discretion standard the correct standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that abuse of discretion, the standard ordinarily applicable to review of evidentiary rulings, is the proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude expert scientific evidence. Additionally, the Court held that the proper application of the correct standard of review indicates that the District Court did not err in excluding the expert testimony at issue. "The Federal Rules of Evidence," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "leave in place the 'gatekeeper' role of the trial judge in screening such evidence. A court of appeals applying 'abuse of discretion' review to such rulings may not categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings which disallow it."

United States v. Balsys (No. 97-873)

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United States v. Bestfoods (No. 97-454)

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United States v. Cabrales (No. 97-643)

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United States v. Ramirez (No. 96-1469)

Does the fact that guns were found in a locked glove compartment, or the trunk, of a car, preclude the application of 18 U section 924(c)(1), which imposes a 5-year mandatory prison term upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime"?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the phrase "carries a firearm" applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. Exploring the meaning of "carry," Justice Breyer concluded, among other things, that the statute's basic purpose to combat the dangerous combination of drugs and guns does not support limiting "carry" to an "on the person" application. In a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that "carries a firearm" means bearing a firearm in a manner as to be ready to use it as a weapon.

United States v. Romani (No. 96-1613)

Does the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity protect a prosecutor for making false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant against a damages remedy under 42 USC section 1983?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that section 1983 may create a damages remedy against a prosecutor for making false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant, since such conduct is not protected by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Noting that the Fourth Amendment requires that arrest warrants be based "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation," Justice Stevens wrote that," [e]ven when the person who makes the constitutionally required 'Oath or affirmation' is a lawyer, the only function that she performs in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness." Thus, section 1983 may, under some circumstances, provide a damages remedy against such a prosecutor.

United States v. Scheffer (No. 96-1133)

Are the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process protection, or the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against illegal seizure, violated by a police officer who, in the course of pursuing a subject, causes their death through deliberate or reckless indifference?

No. In a unanimous decision the Court first ruled that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standards prevented its illegal seizure protections from applying to high-speed police chases. Such incidents are merely pursuits and do not constitute actual seizures, especially if they fail due to the death of the subject. Moreover, addressing the Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the Court held that Smith's actions, while perhaps unwise, were not intended to injure or kill those pursued. As such, the negligent infliction of harm during a police chase does not violate due process since it is not an unexpectedly shocking or egregious result under the circumstances.

United States v. United States Shoe Corp. (No. 97-372)

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Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht (No. 97-461)

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