http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Mon, 23 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-428_19980323-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_428/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 10 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) requires employers who withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans to pay a "withdrawal liability," which is dischargeable with an arranged series of periodic payments. The Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund (Fund) is a multiemployer pension plan for laundry workers. The Ferbar Corporation contributed to the Fund, but ultimately ceased doing so. Subsequently, the Fund's trustees demanded payment of Ferbar's withdrawal liability. The trustees decided to allow Ferbar to satisfy its obligation by making monthly payments. However, Ferbar never made a payment. Ultimately, the District Court granted Ferbar summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The court noted that the trustees had filed suit eight days too late. This was the date Ferbar was to make its first payment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the six-year period began to run on the date Ferbar withdrew from the Fund, in March 1985. Under this view, the trustees commenced suit nearly two years too late.</p> <p>Does the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980's six-year statute of limitations begin to run on a pension fund's action to collect unpaid withdrawal liability on the date the employer withdraws from the plan?</p> 96-1577_19971210-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1577/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to permit a beneficiary of an employer's group health plan to elect continuing coverage when he might otherwise lose that benefit because of a "qualifying event," such as the termination of employment. In 1993, when Moore Medical Corporation fired James Geissal, it told him that COBRA gave him the right to elect continuing coverage under Moore's health plan. Later, Moore informed Geissal that he was not entitled to COBRA benefits because he was already covered by a group plan through his wife's employer. Geissal then filed suit against Moore, alleging that Moore was violating CORBA by renouncing an obligation to provide continuing coverage. Ultimately, a Magistrate Judge concluded that an employee with coverage under another group health plan on the date he elects COBRA coverage is ineligible for COBRA coverage under 29 USC section 1162(2)(D)(i), which allows an employer to cancel such coverage as of "the date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of the election... covered under any other group health plan." The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Does 29 USC section 1162(2)(D)(i) allow an employer to deny Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 continuation health coverage to a qualified beneficiary who is covered under another group health plan at the time he makes his COBRA election?</p> 96-795_19971015-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_795/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 14 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Currently unknown.</p> <p>Currently unknown.</p> 96-6839_19971014-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_6839/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 08 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Angel Jaime Monge was convicted on three counts of violating California's drug laws, all felonies. Under California's "three-strikes" law a convicted felon with one prior felony conviction will have his prison term doubled. The state sought to have Monge's sentence enhanced based on a previous assault conviction and the resulting prison term. Subsequently the California trial court doubled his sentence and added a one-year enhancement for the prior prison term. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal ruled that the evidence was insufficient to trigger the sentence enhancement because the prior conviction allegations were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, a retrial to substantiate the allegations would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The California Supreme Court reversed the double jeopardy ruling, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause, though applicable in the capital sentencing context, does not extend to noncapital sentencing proceedings.</p> <p>Does the Double Jeopardy Clause preclude retrial on a prior conviction allegation in noncapital sentencing proceedings?</p> 96-779_19971008-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_779/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 23 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-679_19980323-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_679/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 02 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-147_19980302-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_147/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Ramon Martinez-Villareal was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Arizona. His first three federal habeas corpus petitions were denied because he had not exhausted his state remedies. Martinez-Villareal claimed in his fourth habeas petition that he was incompetent to be executed. The District Court dismissed that claim as premature, but granted the writ on other grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed the writ. Martinez-Villareal moved to reopen his petition despite the fact that review of his incompetency claim might be prevented by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, a prisoner must ask the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to consider such a petition. By now Arizona had obtained a warrant for Martinez-Villareal's execution. Subsequently, he was found fit to be executed. The District Court denied another motion to reopen his incompetency claim, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under AEDPA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the law did not apply to a petition that raises only a competency-to-be-executed claim and that Martinez-Villareal did not, therefore, need authorization to file his petition in the District Court.</p> <p>May a state prison death row inmate who already has lost on one or more federal habeas corpus petitions file a subsequent petition to claim that he cannot be executed because he is incompetent?</p> 96-653_19971015-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_653/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 07 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>David and Linda Beach refinanced their Florida house in 1986 with a loan from Great Western Bank. In 1991, they stopped making mortgage payments. In 1992, Great Western began foreclosure proceedings. While the Beach's acknowledged their default, they alleged that the bank's failure to make disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act gave them the right under federal law to rescind the mortgage agreement. The Florida trial court rejected that defense, holding that any right to rescind had expired in 1989 under federal law which provides that the right of rescission shall expire three years after the loan closes. The state's intermediate appellate court affirmed, as did the Florida Supreme Court.</p> <p>Can homeowners who face foreclosure rescind a mortgage loan on the ground that the lender violated the federal truth-in-lending law?</p> 96-7185_19971007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_7185/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 10 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Pursuant to the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), the United States Forest Service developed a Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest. The Plan sets logging goals, selects the areas suited to timber production, and determines which probable methods of timber harvest are appropriate, but it does not itself authorize the cutting of any trees. Ultimately, the Sierra Club filed suit, alleging that erroneous analysis leads the Plan wrongly to favor logging and clearcutting. The District Court granted the Forest Service summary judgment, finding that the Forest Service had acted lawfully in making the various challenged determinations. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, finding both that the Sierra Club had standing to bring suit, and that since the suit was "ripe for review," there was no need to wait "until a site-specific action occurs," held that the Plan improperly favored clearcutting and therefore violated the NFMA.</p> <p>Does the United States Forest Service's Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest present a controversy that is justiciable? If so, does the Plan conform to statutory and regulatory requirements for a forest plan?</p> 96-370_19971110-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_370/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 02 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-5310_19980302-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_5310/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 03 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>United Auto Workers and Caterpillar, Inc. were involved in a working agreement that provided for employees of Caterpillar, Inc. to devote part of their time to processing employee grievances on behalf of the union, while still maintaining full-time employment status and benefits. This agreement was eventually expanded to allow employees to continue receiving benefits from Caterpillar while working full time for the union. In 1991, Caterpillar refused to continue paying benefits to workers who were not directly providing services for the company. The union filed with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) asserting that Caterpillar was engaging in unfair labor practices. Caterpillar claimed that the benefit payments violated section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Both the NLRB and the District Court found that the payments did in fact violate Section 302 of the LMRA. <br /> <br />On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and ruled for the union. The Third Circuit found that Congress had not intended the LMRA to ban the type of payments at issue. Then-Judge Samuel Alito dissented, arguing that the payments were illegal under the plain meaning of the legislation.</p> <p>Does an employer who grants paid leave of absence to employees who then go to work as a union's full-time grievance chairmen violate Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act?</p> 96-1569_19971203-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1569/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 96-8516_19980303-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8516/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 30 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-156_19980330-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_156/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 02 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Elections Clause of the Constitution provides that "the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations." 2 USC sections 1 and 7 provide that the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in an even-numbered year is established as the date for federal congressional and presidential elections. In 1975, Louisiana adopted an "open primary," which occurs before the uniform federal election day and in which all candidates appear on the ballot and all voters may vote. If a candidate for a given office receives a majority at the open primary, that candidate is elected and no further act is done on federal election day to fill that office. Louisiana voters challenged the open primary is a violation of federal law. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that Louisiana's system squarely "conflicts with the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal election day."</p> <p>Does Louisiana's open primary violate the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal election day?</p> 96-1579_19971202-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1579/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 31 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 96-8422_19980331-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8422/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 03 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Aloyzas Balsys was subpoenaed by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to testify about his wartime activities between 1940 and 1944 and his subsequent immigration to the United States. Fearing prosecution by a foreign nation, Balsys refused the subpoena by claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court ruling granting OSI's subpoena enforcement petition, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.</p> <p>Is fear of foreign prosecution sufficient grounds to justify the invocation of the Firth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?</p> 96-8400_19971103-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8400/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-569_19980422-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_569/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 24 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-391_19980324-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_391/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 09 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-215_19971209-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_215/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 01 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>An 1858 Treaty between the United States and the Yankton Tribe established the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. The 1887 Dawes Act permitted the Government to allot tracts of tribal land to individual Indians and, with tribal consent, to open the remaining holdings to non-Indian settlement. In 1892, pursuant to the Dawes Act, an agreement between the Tribe and the Government, ratified in 1894, provided that nothing "shall be construed to abrogate the [1858] treaty." In 1992, the Southern Missouri Recycling and Waste Management District acquired land for a solid waste disposal facility that lies on unallotted, non-Indian fee land, but falls within the reservation's original 1858 boundaries. In 1994, the Tribe filed suit to enjoin construction. Ultimately, the District Court declined to enjoin construction of the landfill, but granted a declaratory judgment that the landfill lies within the Yankton Sioux Reservation, where federal environmental regulations apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Did Congress diminish the boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota in an 1894 statute that ratified an agreement pursuant to the Dawes Act, which permitted the Government to open reservation land to non-Indian settlement?</p> 96-1400_19971201-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1400/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1986, Garrit Bates was appointed to serve as the Acme Institute of Technology's treasurer. In 1987, James Jackson, as Acme's president, signed a program participation agreement with the Department of Education that authorized the school to receive student loan checks through the Title IV Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program. Under the GSL program, governing regulations required Acme to return a portion of a loan if the student withdrew from Acme before the term ended. In 1987, Jackson and Bates began a practice of not making GSL refunds. Ultimately, in 1994, Bates was indicted on of "knowingly and willfully misapplying" federally insured student loan funds, in violation of 20 USC section 1097(a). The District Court dismissed Bates's indictment because it lacked an allegation of his "intent to injure or defraud the United States." Reinstating the prosecution, the Court of Appeals concluded that section 1097(a) required the Government to prove only that Bates knowingly and willfully misapplied Title IV funds.</p> <p>Does 20 USC section 1097(a), which makes it a felony "knowingly and willfully" to misapply student loan funds insured under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, require an allegation and proof that a defendant specifically intended to injure or defraud either the United States as loan guarantor or another?</p> 96-1584_19980120-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1584/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-6270_19980421-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_6270/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 24 Feb 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-174_19980224-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_174/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of two cancellations, made by President William J. Clinton, under the Line Item Veto Act ("Act"). In the first, the City of New York, two hospital associations, a hospital, and two health care unions, challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers by the State of New York. In the second, the Snake River farmer's cooperative and one of its individual members challenged the President's cancellation of a provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The provision permitted some food refiners and processors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. After a district court held the Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal.</p> <p>Did the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, under the Line Item Veto Act, violate the Presentment Clause of Article I?</p> 96-1925_19980120-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1925/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 14 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 96-910_19971014-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_910/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-1374_19980427-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_1374/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Extradition Act implements the Constitution's extradition clause and provides for the extradition from one state of a fugitive from justice when a demand for the fugitive's extradition is made by another state. Manuel Ortiz, a parolee from the Ohio correctional system, fled to New Mexico after Ohio prison officials told him that they planned to revoke his parole status. The governor of New Mexico issued a warrant directing Ortiz's return upon Ohio's demand. Ortiz then sought habeas corpus relief in New Mexico. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief. The court expressed the view that Ortiz was a refugee from injustice and that the New Mexico constitution, which guarantees the right of seeking and obtaining safety, prevailed over the state's duty under the extradition clause.</p> <p>Did the Supreme Court of New Mexico err in upholding grant of state habeas corpus relief to parolee whom state of Ohio sought to extradite as alleged fugitive from justice by going beyond the scope of permissible inquiry?</p> 96-1923_19980120-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1923/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 01 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1979, the United States sued Chris W. Beggerly and the Beggerly family to quiet title to Horn Island, located within the state of Mississippi, for a federal park. The Government argued that Beggerly did not have clear title because the Government had never patented the disputed land after acquiring it as part of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1982, a settlement quieted title in the Government's favor. However, in 1994, with new evidence, Beggerly sued, seeking to set aside the settlement agreement and obtain damages. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found jurisdiction under the Quiet Title Act and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as an "independent action." The appellate court then vacated the settlement agreement and instructed the District Court to quiet title in Beggerly's favor.</p> <p>Do federal courts lack jurisdiction over action to reopen a settlement quieting land title in the Federal Government either under Rule 60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent action or under Quiet Title Act?</p> 96-827_19971201-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_827/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-704_19980427-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_704/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 04 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-42_19980304-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_42/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 23 Feb 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 96-8732_19980223-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8732/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 25 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-282_19980325-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_282/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 14 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>During the 1992 race for Arkansas' Third Congressional District, the Arkansas Educational Television Commission (AETC) -- a state-owned public television broadcaster -- sponsored a debate between the major party candidates. Running as an independent candidate with little popular support, Ralph Forbes sought to participate in the debate but was denied permission. After unsuccessfully challenging AETC's refusal in district court, Forbes appealed and won a reversal. AETC then appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p> <p>Is the exclusion of a ballot-qualified candidate from a debate sponsored by a state-owned public television broadcaster a violation of the candidate's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?</p> 96-1590_19980114-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1590/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 21 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1990, Kenneth Eugene Bousley pleaded guilty to "using" a firearm "during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime," in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Ultimately, Bousley sough habeas relief, claiming his guilty plea lacked a factual basis because a connection between the firearms, located in the bedroom, and the location where the drug trafficking occurred, in the garage, was not shown in either the evidence or the plea. Dismissing the petition, the District Court found that a factual basis for the plea existed because the guns were in close proximity to the drugs and were readily accessible. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Bousley's argument, among others, that his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent because he was misinformed about the elements of a section 924(c)(1) offense.</p> <p>May defendants who pleaded guilty to "using" a firearm in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1) contest the validity of their convictions by claiming that their guilty pleas were not knowing and intelligent because they were misinformed by the District Court as to the nature of the charged crime?</p> 96-1768_19980121-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1768/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 03 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Lexecon Inc. was a defendant in a class action lawsuit. Under 28 USC section 1407(a), the lawsuit was transferred for pretrial proceedings to the District of Arizona. Section 1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact "to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings," but provides that the Panel "shall" remand any such action to the original district "at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings." After claims against it were dismissed, Lexecon brought suit against Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach and others (Milberg) in the class action lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois. Ultimately, the Panel, under section 1407(a), ordered the case transferred to the District of Arizona. Afterwards, Lexecon moved for the Arizona District Court to remand the case to Illinois. Milberg filed a countermotion requesting the Arizona District Court to invoke section 1404(a) to "transfer" the case to itself for trial.Ultimately, the court assigned the case to itself and the Court of Appeals affirmed its judgment.</p> <p>May a federal district court conducting "pretrial proceedings" under 28 USC section 1407(a) invoke section 1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial?</p> 96-1370_19971103-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1370/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-5737_19980422-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_5737/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 06 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) obligates exporters, importers, and domestic shippers to pay 0.125 percent of the value of the commercial cargo they ship through the Nation's ports. From April to June 1994, United States Shoe Corporation paid the HMT for articles it exported. U.S. Shoe then filed a protest with the Customs Service alleging that, to the extent the toll applies to exports, the HMT violates the Export Clause of the Constitution, which provides that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." The Customs Service refuted the accusation, stating that the HMT is a statutorily mandated user fee. U.S. Shoe then sued for a refund in the Court of International Trade (CIT). Granting U.S. Shoe summary judgment, the CIT held that the HMT qualifies as a tax, reasoning that the tax is assessed ad valorem directly upon the value of the cargo itself, not upon any services rendered for the cargo. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.</p> <p>Does the Harbor Maintenance Tax, as applied to goods loaded at U.S. ports for export, violate the Export Clause?</p> 96-670_19971006-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_670/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 14 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1983, Margaret Kawaauhau sought treatment from Dr. Paul Geiger for a foot injury. Later, Geiger cancelled Kawaauhau's transfer, by other physicians, to an infectious disease specialist. Ultimately, Kawaauhau required that her right leg be amputated below the knee. In the subsequently malpractice suit, a jury awarded Kawaauhau approximately $355,000 in damages. Geiger, who carried no malpractice insurance, ultimately filed for bankruptcy. Kawaauhau requested the Bankruptcy Court to hold the malpractice judgment nondischargeable under 11 USC section 523(a)(6), which provides that a "discharge [in bankruptcy]... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt... for willful and malicious injury... to another." The court held the debt nondischargeable. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that section 523(a)(6)'s exemption from discharge is confined to debts for an intentional tort, so that a debt for malpractice remains dischargeable because it is based on negligent or reckless conduct.</p> <p>Does a debt arising from a medical malpractice judgment, attributable to negligent or reckless conduct, fall within section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that a debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another" is not dischargeable?</p> 96-188_19971014-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_188/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 25 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Alberta Jefferson, an African American woman, died as a result of a fire in her home in the city of Tarrant, Alabama. Her survivors filed multiple complaints against Tarrant City: two under state law and two under federal law. The state law complaints alleged wrongful death and the common-law tort of outrage, while the two federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleged that Ms. Jefferson's death was the direct result of indifference and racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The City claimed that the complaints were governed by Alabama's Wrongful Death Act, which the Alabama Supreme Court had interpreted to provide only for punitive damages. The City then argued that it could not be sued under Section 1983 because the Supreme Court had ruled that Section 1983 plaintiffs are not entitled to sue a municipality for punitive damages. <br /> <br />The state court ruled in favor of Jefferson, but the Alabama Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back to the state court after determining that the state Act did in fact govern the claims. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the federal complaints. The City contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the Alabama Supreme Court's order because the case was not yet final.</p> <p>Are federal claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 governed by the Alabama Wrongful Death Act?</p> 96-1866_19980325-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1866/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 29 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-689_19980429-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_689/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 08 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 96-8653_19971208-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8653/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 96-8986_19980303-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8986/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 23 Feb 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) prohibits anyone from "willfully" dealing in firearms without a federal license. The Government presented evidence at Sillasse Bryan's trial to show that he did not have a federal license to deal in firearms, that he was dealing in firearms, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful. No evidence was presented that Bryan was aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that Bryan could be convicted only if he knew of the federal licensing requirement. The trial judge instructed that a person acts "willfully" if he acts with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, but that he need not be aware of the specific law that his conduct may be violating. A jury found Bryan guilty. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the instruction was proper and that the Government had shown that Bryan had acted willfully.</p> <p>Does the term "willfully" in 18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) require proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful and that he knew of the federal licensing requirement for dealing in firearms?</p> 96-1693_19980223-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1693/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 08 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 96-976_19971008-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_976/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 04 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 96-957_19971104-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_957/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 07 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1988, a Florida statutory provision exempted newspapers, but not magazines, from sales tax. In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court found the classification invalid under the First Amendment. Subsequently, Newsweek, a magazine, filed a claim for a refund of the sales tax that it had paid between 1988 and 1990. The Florida Department of Revenue denied the refund. Newsweek then filed suit alleging that Florida's failure to accord the magazine retroactive relief was a violation of due process. Ultimately, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, concluded Newsweek was afforded due process because Florida law permits prepayment tax challenges by filing an action and paying the contested amount into the court registry, posting a bond, or obtaining a court order approving an alternative arrangement, without suffering onerous penalties.</p> <p>Did the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, err in denying Newsweek access to Florida postpayment remedies for a refund of the taxes it paid under an unconstitutional sales tax scheme?</p> 96-792_19971007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_792/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 21 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-115_19980121-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_115/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 12 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Lorelyn Miller was born in the Philippines, in 1970, to a Filipino national woman and an American soldier. Her parents were never married. In 1992, after the State Department rejected her first application for U.S. citizenship, Miller reapplied when a Texas court granted her father's petition for a paternity decree declaring him her father. When the State Department rejected her citizenship application again, claiming that 8 U.S.C. Section 1409(a) required foreign born illegitimate children of American fathers to be legitimated before age 18, Miller challenged the refusal. She claimed that since Section 1409(c) established at birth the citizenship of an illegitimate foreign-born child whose mother was an American citizen, the State Department's refusal to do the same under Section 1409(a), when the father is an American citizen, was unconstitutional. On appeal from an appellate court's decision to affirm the lower court's dismissal of the case, the Supreme Court granted Miller certiorari.</p> <p>Does 8 U.S.C. Section 1409, establishing upon birth the U.S. citizenship of illegitimate foreign-born children whose mothers only are U.S. citizens but failing to do the same if only their fathers are U.S. citizens, violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantees?</p> 96-1037_19980112-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1037/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 02 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Under Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) program, lawyers must deposit their client's funds into a special interest-bearing "NOW" account upon determination that the funds could not earn the client interest or compensate for other financial and accounting fees. Interest federally funded interest accrued on IOLTA accounts is then paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF) which supports legal services for low-income persons. Acting on behalf of others opposed to IOLTA, the Washington Legal Foundation (the "Foundation") challenged TEAJF's receipt and use of the IOLTA funds. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a favorable district court decision, the Supreme Court granted the Foundation certiorari.</p> <p>Does Texas' public use of interest accrued on principal client funds, deposited by mandate into federally funded accounts, violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause?</p> 96-1395_19971202-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1395/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 12 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The site of a chemical manufacturing plant was polluted over many years. During much of the time, the companies running the plant were wholly owned subsidiaries of, first, CPC International Inc. (CPC), and later Aerojet-General Corp (Aerojet). By 1981, the federal Environmental Protection Agency had undertaken to have the site cleaned up. To recover some of the money spent, the U.S. filed an action under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a)(2). Section 107 allows the U.S. to seek reimbursement for cleanup costs from, among others, "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility." The first phase of the trial concerned only liability, and focused on whether CPC and Aerojet had "owned or operated" the facility.</p> <p>May a parent corporation that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of a subsidiary, without more, be held liable under CERCLA Section 107(a)(2) as an operator of a polluting facility owned or operated by the subsidiary?</p> 96-7151_19971112-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_7151/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 02 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-288_19980302-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_288/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 10 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1904, the Crow Tribe ceded part of its Montana Reservation to the United States for settlement by non-Indians, with the U.S holding the rights to the minerals underlying the ceded strip in trust for the Tribe. In 1972, pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), Westmoreland Resources, Inc., a non-Indian company, entered into a mining lease with the Tribe for coal underlying the ceded strip. In 1975, Montana imposed a severance tax and a gross proceeds tax on all coal produced in the State, including coal underlying the reservation and the ceded strip. In 1978, the Tribe brought a federal action for injunctive and declaratory relief against Montana and its counties, alleging that the State's severance and gross proceeds taxes were preempted by the IMLA and infringed on the Tribe's right to govern itself. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that both taxes were preempted by the IMLA and void for interfering with tribal governance. The U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Subsequently, the Tribe sough to recover certain taxes paid by Westmoreland. The District Court then concluded that the disgorgement remedy sought by the Tribe was not appropriate. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Is the restitution sought for the Crow Tribe from the State of Montana for the illegal collection of taxes and cola mined on the Tribe's reservation warranted?</p> 96-1482_19971110-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1482/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 05 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) imposes recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon political committees which receive more than $1,000 in "contributions" or which make more than $1,000 in "expenditures" in a year "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." Certain assistance does not count toward the expenditure cap if it takes the form of a "communication" by a "membership organization or corporation" "to its members" as long as the organization is not "organized primarily for the purpose of influencing [any individual's] nomination... or election." A complaint filed by a group of voters asked the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to order the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to make public the information that FECA demands of political committees. Ultimately, the FEC found that AIPAC was not a political committee because its major purpose was not the nomination or election of candidates. The en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the FEC's major purpose test improperly interpreted FECA's definition of a political committee.</p> <p>Do voters have the proper legal standing to challenge the Federal Election Commission's decisions regarding political committees?</p> 96-1462_19971105-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1462/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 04 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>After searching his truck, Florida police arrested and charged George Rogers with knowingly possessing an unregistered firearm and a silencer. Rogers admitted during his arrest and trial that he knew he was in possession of a silencer. Nonetheless, he requested the District Court to instruct the jury to define the Government's burden of establishing "knowing possession" as proof that he deliberately possessed an item that he not only knew to be a "firearm," but that he knew such possession was illegal. Following the court's refusal of his instruction request, Rogers was convicted. On appeal from the Eleventh Circuit's decision to affirm the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court granted Rogers certiorari.</p> <p>Does a lower court's refusal to grant a jury instruction, the substance of which is confessed to and acknowledged by the defendant, grounds for a grant of certiorari to the Supreme Court?</p> 96-1060_19971104-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1060/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-6146_19980428-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_6146/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 24 Feb 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Arnold Hohn was convicted, among other things, of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Two years after his conviction became final, the Supreme Court decided that the term "use" in 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) required active employment of the firearm. Hohn filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his Section 942(c)(1) conviction on the ground that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to prove use of a firearm. While his motion was pending before the district court, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires a Section 2255 petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability from a circuit justice or judge before he can appeal the denial of a Section 2255 petition. 28 U.S.C. Section 2253(c)(1). The district court denied Hohn's petition and he appealed. The court of appeals treated the notice of appeal as an application for a certificate of appealability, and a three-judge panel declined to issue a certificate. Hohn then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the denial of the certificate, seeking to invoke the Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).</p> <p>Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review decisions of the courts of appeals denying applications for certificates of appealability?</p> 96-1829_19980224-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1829/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 23 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Leonard Crawford-El, a prisoner in the District of Columbia's correctional system, was ultimately transferred to a federal prison in Florida. Crawford-El's belongings were transferred separately. A correctional officer had Crawford-El's brother-in-law pick his belongs rather than ship them. Crawford-El finally received his belongings months after reaching Florida. Crawford-El filed suit under 42 USC section 1983, which provides that "Every person who... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...." Crawford-El alleged that the diversion of his property was motivated by an intent to retaliate against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the complaint. In remanding, the en banc Court of Appeals conclude among other things, that in an unconstitutional-motive case, a plaintiff must establish motive by clear and convincing evidence.</p> <p>May lawsuits invoking 42 USC section 1983 to allege that a public official violated a prisoner's rights because of an unlawful motive be dismissed because the plaintiff fails to produce clear and convincing evidence of the unlawful motive?</p> 96-1654_19980323-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1654/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 06 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 96-843_19971006-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_843/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 31 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-371_19980331-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_371/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 12 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Under an 1834 compact between New York and New Jersey, Ellis Island was deemed part of New York. It was later determined, by the Supreme Court, that New Jersey would have sovereign rights over all submerged lands on its side of the Hudson River. During the time Ellis Island was used to receive immigrants, the Federal Government filled around the island adding some 24.5 acres to its original size over 42 years. When immigration was diverted from Ellis Island in 1954, New York and New Jersey asserted rival sovereignty claims over the Island's filled portions. New Jersey finally invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to solve the matter once and for all time.</p> <p>Are the filled portions on Jersey's Side of Ellis Island under the sovereign authority of the State of New York or the State of New Jersey?</p> 120orig_19980112-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_120_orig/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 10 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Barkat U. Khan and his corporation contracted with State Oil to lease and run a gas station. Under the agreement, State Oil set a maximum profit margin for gasoline and required Khan to return any excess profits to State Oil. Khan fell behind in lease payments and was evicted. Khan then sued State Oil claiming that State Oil had engaged in price fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which disallows restrictions on trade. State Oil claimed that in setting profit margins, they had not prevented Kahn from setting prices and therefore were not guilty of price fixing. <br /> <br />On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in favor of Kahn based on the logic of <i>Albrecht v. Herald Co.</i> in which the Supreme Court ruled that some restrictions on trade, such as price-fixing, always have such negative effects coupled with such little competitive benefit that these restrictions are always unlawful.</p> <p>Is the setting of maximum prices always ("per se") a violation of the Sherman Act's prohibition on price fixing?</p> 96-1769_19971210-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1769/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 25 Feb 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-16_19980225-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_16/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 03 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1983, Thomas M. Thompson was convicted of the rape and murder of Ginger Fleischli in California state court. The special circumstance found by the jury of murder during the commission of rape made Thompson eligible for the death penalty. In 1995, a federal District Court invalidated Thompson's death sentence by granted relief on his rape conviction and the rape special circumstance. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reinstated Thompson's death sentence, noting that the State presented strong evidence of rape at trial. The Court of Appeals then issued a mandate denying all habeas relief. Two days before Thompson's execution, the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate and granted Thompson relief. The appellate court found that Thompson was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial.</p> <p>Did the Court of Appeal's order recalling its mandate denying Thomas M. Thompson all habeas relief violate 28 USC section 2244(b) as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996? Was the order an abuse of the appellate court's discretion?</p> 96-568_19971203-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_568/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 12 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>After several expeditions, Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR) located the wreck of the S.S. Brother Jonathan and its cargo which sank off the California coast in 1865. When DSR sought rights to the wreck and her cargo, under Article III, Section 2, federal admiralty jurisdiction, California challenged DSR claiming that it had title to the wreck under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA). The ASA requires the federal government to transfer title over "abandoned shipwrecks" to the states in whose submerged lands the wrecks are found. California also noted that under Section 6313 of its own public code, title to all abandoned shipwrecks found off its coast vests in the state. In light of its claims to the Brother Jonathan, California claimed that DSR's federal title action violated its rights under the Eleventh Amendment, even though it lacked possession of the wreck.</p> <p>Does the Eleventh Amendment, limiting federal jurisdiction over maritime matters, bar a federal court's jurisdiction over an admiralty property claim where the property itself is not within the State's possession?</p> 96-1291_19971112-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1291/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 30 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-581_19980330-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_581/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-634_19980428-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_634/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 13 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1995, Citizens For A Better Environment, a environmental protection organization, filed an enforcement action for relief under the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986's (EPCRA) Citizen-Suit Provision. Citizens alleged that the Chicago Steel And Pickling Company had violated the EPCRA by failing to file timely toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports since 1988. Ultimately, Chicago Steel filed all of the overdue forms with the relevant agencies by the time the complaint was acted on. Arguing this fact and that the EPCRA does not allow suit for purely historical violations, Chicago Steel filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Citizens' allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court agreed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for purely past violations.</p> <p>Does an environmental organization have standing to bring suit against companies that fail to meet the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act Of 1986's deadlines for filing toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports? Does the EPCRA authorize suits for purely past violations?</p> 96-1578_19980113-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1578/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 08 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1991, Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., terminated agreements licensing several television series, including "Who's the Boss," "Silver Spoons," "Hart to Hart," and "T. J. Hooker," to three television stations owned by C. Elvin Feltner after the stations' royalty payments became delinquent. Columbia sued Feltner after his stations continued to broadcast the programs for copyright infringement. After winning partial summary judgment as to liability on its copyright infringement claims, Columbia attempted to recover statutory damages under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act. The District Court denied Feltner's request for a jury trial and awarded Columbia statutory damages following a bench trial. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that neither section 504(c) nor the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on statutory damages.</p> <p>Does section 504(c) of the Copyright Act or the Seventh Amendment grant a right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages?</p> 96-1470_19971208-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1470/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 01 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Janet Scott-Harris filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, the city's mayor, Daniel Bogan, the vice president of the city counsel, Marilyn Roderick, and others, alleging that the elimination of the city department in which Scott-Harris was the sole employee was motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights. The jury found the city, Bogan and Roderick liable on the First Amendment claim. The First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city, but affirmed the judgments against Bogan and Roderick. The court held that although Bogan and Roderick had absolute immunity from civil liability for their performance of legitimate legislative activities, their conduct in voting for and signing the ordinance that eliminated Scott-Harris's office was motivated by considerations relating to a particular individual and was therefore administrative rather than legislative in nature.</p> <p>Are actions by local officials introducing, voting for, and signing an ordinance outside the scope of legislative activities because of the motives of the government actors?</p> 96-1375_19971201-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1375/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-501_19980421-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_501/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 21 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Internal Revenue Code allowed property and casualty insurers to fully deduct "loss reserves," or unpaid losses. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 altered the deduction formula. Under the Act, increases in loss reserves that constitute "reserve strengthening," or additions to the loss reserve, were excepted from a one time tax benefit because it would result in a tax deficiency. Treasury regulation and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue interpreted the law to say that any increase in loss reserves constituted reserve strengthening. The Commissioner then determined Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company had engaged in reserve strengthening. The Tax Court disagreed with the government's interpretation. It held reserve strengthening referred only to increases resulting from computational methods. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held reserve strengthening to encompass any increase in loss reserves.</p> <p>Is the government's interpretation of reserve strengthening correct in determining property and casualty insurers' liability?</p> 96-1971_19980121-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1971/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 05 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Under the Medicare Act a hospital may obtain a reimbursement for certain graduate medical education (GME) programs for interns and residents by preparing certain reports. The GME Amendment, section 9202(a), of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985 directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine, for a hospital's cost reporting period starting during fiscal year 1984, the amount "recognized as reasonable" for GME costs. The Amendment then directs the Secretary to use the 1984 amount, adjusted for inflation, to calculate a hospital's GME reimbursement for subsequent years. The Secretary's "reaudit" regulation permits a second audit of the 1984 GME costs to ensure accurate reimbursements in future years. A reaudit of Regions Hospital significantly lowered the Hospital's allowable 1984 GME costs. Subsequently, the Hospital challenged the validity of the reaudit rule. Ultimately, the District Court granted the Secretary summary judgment, concluding that the rule reasonably interpreted Congress' prescription and that the reauditing did not impose an impermissible "retroactive rule." The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Is the Secretary of Health and Human Services' "reaudit" rule a reasonable interpretation of the GME Amendment of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985?</p> 96-1279_19971105-lq-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1279/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 09 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>While in route to testify, Alan Shelby, a dangerous prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences, escaped custody. An ATF Agent, based on an informant's information, observed a person resembling Shelby at Hernan Ramirez's home in Boring, Oregon. Subsequently, the Government obtained a "no-knock" warrant to enter and search the home. Executing the warrant, officers broke a single window in Ramirez's home. Awakened, Ramirez fired a pistol into the garage ceiling. After being arrested, because of a stash of weapons in his garage, Ramirez was indicted on federal charges of being a felon in possession of firearms. Shelby was not found. Granting Ramirez's motion to suppress evidence regarding his possession of the weapons, the District Court found that the officers had violated the Fourth Amendment because there were "insufficient exigent circumstances" to justify the police officer's destruction of property in their execution of the warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Does the Fourth Amendment require that police officers have more than a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence before entering would be dangerous, futile, or inhibit the effective investigation of a crime when a "no-knock" entry results in the destruction of property?</p> 96-1337_19971209-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1337/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 08 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Sandra K. Forney applied for Social Security disability benefits. A Social Security Judge determined Forney was minimally disabled, but that she was not disabled enough to qualify for benefits. Consequently she was denied her disability claim. The Social Security Administration's Appeals Council denied Forney's request for review. Forney then sought judicial review in federal District Court. The District Court found that the final determination was inadequately supported by the evidence and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings. Forney appealed the remand order to the Court of Appeals. She contended that the agency's denial of benefits should be reversed outright. The Court of Appeals did not hear her claim, however, for it decided that Forney did not have the legal right to appeal.</p> <p>Can a Social Security disability claimant seeking court reversal of an agency decision denying benefits appeal a district court order remanding the case to the agency for further proceeding?</p> 96-738_19971008-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_738/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 08 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>While living on the federal Army base Fort Polk, Debra Faye Lewis was charged with the murder of her four year-old daughter. Under the federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which provides that "whoever within... any [federal enclave], is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable... within the jurisdiction of the State... in which such place is situated, ...shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment," Lewis' indictment charged a violation of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. Lewis was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by the District Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the ACA did not apply because Congress made Lewis' acts punishable as federal second-degree murder. The appellate court, however, affirmed Lewis' conviction because the jury had necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree murder.</p> <p>Does the federal Assimilative Crimes Act make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute applicable on a federal Army base located in Louisiana?</p> 96-1581_19971208-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1581/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 12 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its Local 187 are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that required Textron to notify the Union before entering into any agreement to "subcontract out" work that would otherwise be performed by Union members. In 1994, Textron announced plans to subcontract out work that would have caused approximately one-half of the Union members to lose their jobs. Subsequently, the Union filed suit, alleging that Textron had fraudulently induced the Union to sign the collective-bargaining agreement. The complaint invoked section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over "suits for violation of contracts" between an employer and a labor organization. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the cause of action alleged did not come within section 301(a). The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Does section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act permit a union to sue in federal court to declare a collective bargaining agreement voidable in the absence of any alleged violation of the agreement?</p> 96-7171_19971112-mq-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_7171/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 07 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 96-871_19971007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_871/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 06 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Kathryn Lewis was killed during a boating accident in which she fell into the water and was struck repeatedly by a boat's propellers. Her parents, Gary and Vicki Lewis, sued Brunswick Corporation on behalf of their daughter for negligence, property liability, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Lewis claimed that Brunswick negligently failed to fit the boat with a propeller guard, prevented other companies from manufacturing propeller guards for their engines, and discouraged government regulation by exaggerating the performance benefits of unguarded engines. Brunswick claimed that the Federal Boat Safety Act (FBSA) preempted all of Lewis's claims. Both the District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found for Brunswick, holding that the scope of the preemption clause in the FBSA did include Lewis's claims.</p> <p>Does the Federal Boat Safety Act's preemption clause include claims of negligence, property liability, and fraudulent misrepresentation?</p> 96-643_19971006-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_643/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 25 Feb 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-300_19980225-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_300/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 08 Jun 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-1192_19980608-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_1192/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 14 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-29_19980114-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_29/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 23 Feb 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-463_19980223-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_463/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 10 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>After being sentenced to 18 to 36 months in prison, Ronald Yeskey was recommended as a candidate for a Motivational Boot Camp for first-time offenders. Successful completion of the Boot Camp could have resulted in Yeskey's early parole after just six months. When the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections discovered Yeskey's medical history of hypertension, he was denied admission to the Boot Camp. Yeskey challenged the refusal as discriminatory. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p> <p>Did the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' refusal to allow a prison inmate to participate in a motivational boot camp, because of the inmate's history of hypertension, violate Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibiting disability-based discrimination against qualified individuals?</p> 96-7901_19971110-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_7901/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-731_19980427-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_731/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 04 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1992, Robert Joiner, after being diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer, sued General Electric Co. in Georgia state court, alleging that his disease was promoted by workplace exposure to chemical "PCBs" and their derivatives, including polychlorinated dibenzofurans (furans) and polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (dioxins). Ultimately, Joiner provided the District Court with expert witnesses' depositions that testified that PCBs, furans, and dioxins can promote cancer and that this was the likely cause of his cancer. The court granted GE summary judgment, reasoning that there was no genuine issue as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins and that his experts' testimony had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in excluding the testimony of Joiner's expert witnesses. The appellate court applied a stringent standard of review to reach its conclusion.</p> <p>Is the abuse of discretion standard the correct standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony?</p> 96-1487_19971104-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1487/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 20 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-873_19980420-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_873/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 24 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-454_19980324-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_454/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 29 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-643_19980429-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_643/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 13 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>18 USC section 924(c)(1) subjects a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime" to a 5-year mandatory prison term. In 96-1654, police officers found a handgun locked in Frank J. Muscarello's truck's glove compartment. Muscarello was transporting marijuana for sale in his truck. Muscarello argued that his "carrying" of the gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope of the statutory word "carries." In 96-8837, federal agents found drugs and guns in Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana's car at a drug-sale point. The Court of Appeals, in both cases, found that the defendants had violated section 924(c)(1).</p> <p>Does the fact that guns were found in a locked glove compartment, or the trunk, of a car, preclude the application of 18 U section 924(c)(1), which imposes a 5-year mandatory prison term upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime"?</p> 96-1469_19980113-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1469/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 12 Jan 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Lynne Kalina, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for King County, Washington, commenced criminal proceedings against Rodney Fletcher, in connection with a school robbery, by filing the appropriate documents. Included in those documents was a "Certification for Determination of Probable Cause." Based on the certification, the trial court found probable cause, and Fletcher was arrested. Kalina's certification contained two inaccurate factual statements: that Fletcher had "never been associated with the school in any manner and did not have permission to enter the school or to take any property," and that Fletcher had been identified asking for an appraisal of a computer stolen from the school. Subsequently, Fletcher sued Kalina for damages, alleging that she had violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The Federal District Court denied her motion for summary judgment, holding that she was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity and that whether qualified immunity would apply was a question of fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Does the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity protect a prosecutor for making false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant against a damages remedy under 42 USC section 1983?</p> 96-1613_19980112-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1613/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 03 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Philip Lewis was a passenger on a motorcycle that was involved in a high-speed police chase. The chase ended when the motorcycle's driver lost control and tipped the bike over, hurling both riders to the pavement. James Smith, one of two pursuing Sacramento county sheriff's deputies, was unable to stop his car in time and skidded into Philip, causing fatal injuries. Philip's parents, Teri and Thomas Lewis, accused Smith and the Sacramento county police department of deliberate and reckless conduct which ultimately deprived their son of his due process right to life and his protection against unconstitutional seizure. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court decision favoring Smith, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p> <p>Are the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process protection, or the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against illegal seizure, violated by a police officer who, in the course of pursuing a subject, causes their death through deliberate or reckless indifference?</p> 96-1133_19971103-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1133/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 04 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-372_19980304-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_372/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 20 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 97-461_19980420-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_461/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist