The Oyez Project: 1996 Term Decisions

Abrams v. Johnson (No. 95-1425)

Did the District Court's redistricting plan violate the 1965 Voting Rights Act or Article I of the Constitution, guaranteeing "one person, one vote"?

No, in a five-to-four decision. First, the Court held that in re-drafting the plans, the District Court had no obligation to preserve all three of the old plan's black-majority districts, if this would result in racial gerrymandering. Second, the Court supported the District Court's decision not to preserve two black-majority districts as it held that the area's black population was not sufficiently compact to sustain such a plan. Third, the Court ruled that the plan's creation of only one black-majority district would not violate the 1965 Voting Rights Act by causing a retrogression in the political position of Abrams and his fellow plaintiffs. The Court, in addition to noting Abrams' failure to meet his retrogression claim's population density requirement, found that in the last election, held under the challenged plan, all three black incumbents won re-election, two of whom while running against white candidates from white-majority districts. Finally, the Court concluded that the District Court's redistricting plan did not violate the Constitution's guarantee of "one person, one vote." In addition to finding that the plan's overall and average population deviations were acceptable, the Court held that even if these deviations were slightly "off" they must be tolerated given their six year tenure in an area which has seen significant population shifts. Accordingly, any minor errors would be best corrected by the next census rather than by judicial intervention.

Adams v. Robertson (No. 95-1873)

Does the Supreme Court of Alabama's approval of the certification and settlement of a class action lawsuit, whose class members were not afforded the right to opt out of the class or the settlement, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The Court noted that the Alabama Supreme Court did not expressly address the question on which certiorari was granted and that the petitioners had failed to establish that they had properly presented the issue to that court. Therefore, the Court concluded that it could not reach the question presented without unbalancing our dual system of government to "disturb the finality of state judgments on a federal ground that the state court did not have occasion to consider."

Agostini v. Felton (No. 96-552)

Is the Establishment Clause violated when public school teachers instruct in parochial schools?

No. The Court overruled its decision in Aguilar v. Felton. The Court held that there was no evidence to support its former presumption that the entrance of public school teachers into parochial schools will inevitably lead to the indoctrination of state-sponsored religion. The New York program under which public school teachers were sent into parochial schools did not provide parochial schools with any incentive, financial or other, to establish religion in order to attract public school teachers. The Court added that under its new view, only those policies which generate an excessive conflict between church and state will be deemed to violate the Establishment Clause. As such, one should no longer find that all entanglements between church and state have a distinctly positive or negative impact on religion.

Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor (No. 96-270)

May settlement play a role, under FRCP 23, in determining the propriety of class certification?

Yes, but a limited one. While the court of appeals had erred by stating that settlement was not relevant to class certification determinations, the lower court had, in fact, closely examined the terms of the settlement, and remand was therefore not merited. A court considering a class for settlement need not consider whether certification would present intractable management problems at the trial stage, but the remaining requirements of FRCP 23 must be met. Here those requirements were not fulfilled. First, despite the over-arching issue of asbestos-related health problems, common issues did not predominate given the very different injuries suffered by the plaintiffs, and the fact that some class members had not yet manifested physical disease. FRCP 23(b)(3). Second, the named parties would not adequately represent the class because those currently injured had interests distinct from those who had been exposed to asbestos but had not yet exhibited any physical symptoms. FRCP 23(a)(4). In resolving the case the Court declined to reach the issue of whether the settlement proceeding was a justiciable case or controversy under Article III because, it held, determination of class certification was logically antecedent to these issues.

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona (No. 95-974)

Was a challenge to a state's efforts to make English its official language a justiciable controversy after the state employee who mounted the challenge left her government job?

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the dispute was moot due to the previous resignation of Yniguez. The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the article.

Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services (No. 95-1918)

Do Production Credit Associations fall within the exception in the Tax Injunction Act created by Department of Employment v. United States when they sue by themselves?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Production Credit Associations are not included within the judicial exception to the Act by virtue of their designation as instrumentalities of the United States alone. Therefore, the Court continued, PCA's may not sue in federal court for an injunction against state taxation without the United States as co-plaintiff. "The Tax Injunction Act is grounded in the need of States to administer their fiscal affairs without undue interference from federal courts," wrote Justice Kennedy, "[a]s all parties concede, respondents have a 'speedy, plain, and efficient remedy' in state court."

Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (No. 96-454)

Is the value of collateral, under the "cram-down" provision of the Bankruptcy Code, section 1325(a)(5)(B), determined by the "foreclosure-value" standard, or what a secured creditor could obtain through a foreclosure sale of the property?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs the value of a secured claim, directs the application of the replacement-value standard when debtor, in a repayment plan under Chapter 13, has exercised the cram-down provision. Justice Ginsburg wrote that, "under [section 506(a)], the value of property retained because the debtor has exercised the [section 1325(a)(5)(B)] 'cram down' option is the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same 'proposed... use.'" Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens expressed the view that the text of 506(a) pointed to foreclosure as the proper method of valuation in the case at hand.

Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, As Receiver For City Savings, F. S. B. (No. 95-928)

1) Can states apply standards of negligence that are stricter (more inclusive) than the federal standard of "gross negligence" for employees of federally-chartered banks?

2) Is there a federal common law governing negligence by employees of federally-chartered banks?

Yes and no. The unanimous Court concluded that "state law sets the standard of conduct as long as the state standard is stricter than that of the federal statute." The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that the federal "gross negligence" statute was only intended to set a "floor" or minimum standard for state laws governing negligent conduct. The Court also ruled that "[t]here is no federal common law that would create a general standard of care applicable to this case."

Auer v. Robbins (No. 95-897)

Must sergeants and lieutenants in the St. Louis Police Department be paid for working overtime pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938?

No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that sergeants and lieutenants are exempt as salaried employees from the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. The justices rejected the argument that the possibility of suspension without pay moves the officers out of the exempt category.

Babbitt v. Youpee (No. 95-1595)

Does amended Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act violate the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause?

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Court ruled that the amended Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act does not cure the constitutional deficiency The Court identified in the original version of Section 207, which amounted to a taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Ginsburg wrote Section 207 is unconstitutional because it "severely restricts the right of an individual to direct the descent of his property."

Bennett v. Spear (No. 95-813)

Can private parties who claim they have suffered economic harm from enforcement of the Endangered Species Act sue to reverse regulation?

Yes. In the unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the petitioners had standing to ask for judicial review of the minimum water level setting under the Endangered Species Act. The Act explicitly allows "any person" to sue the government over an alleged violation. Justice Scalia asserted this applies to the Secretary's actions over enforcement.

Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n (No. 96-713)

Must the Oregon Bureau of Land Management release a list of people who receive its newsletter under the Freedom of Information Act?

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals engaged in an incorrect public-interest analysis in determining whether the Oregon Bureau of Land Management's mailing list was exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6 of the FOIA. In accordance with previous case history, the Court concluded that "the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis was the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would shed light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what the government was up to." The Court additionally concluded that the purpose of requests have no bearing on disclosure.

Blessing v. Freestone (No. 95-1441)

Can parents sue states under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act to force overall compliance with federal efforts under Title IV-D to collect child-support payments from ex-spouses?

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply with Title IV-D. Justice O'Connor wrote for the court that parents cannot sue merely because a state fails to be in "substantial compliance" with federal collection standards.

Boggs v. Boggs (No. 96-79)

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 pre-empt state community-property law allowing a non-participant spouse to transfer by a testamentary instrument an interest in undistributed pension plan benefits?

Yes. In a opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts state community-property law allowing a non-participant spouse to transfer by a testamentary instrument an interest in undistributed pension plan benefits. Justice Kennedy said "ERISA's solicitude for the economic security of surviving spouses would be undermined" by allowing a previous spouse's heirs to claim a share of such benefits."

Bracy v. Gramley (No. 96-6133)

Does a prisoner make a sufficient factual showing to establish "good cause," as required by Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a), for discovery on his claim by showing that the trial judge was steeped in corruption and by making specific allegations as to how his case was affected?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Bracy had made a sufficient factual showing to establish "good cause," as required by Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a), for discovery on his claim of actual judicial bias in his case. Chief Justice Rehnquist drew heavily on Bracy's contentions that his trial attorney, a former associate of Maloney's, had allegedly been involved in corruption and that he might have agreed to take Bracy's case to trial quickly so that the conviction would deflect any suspicion surrounding the rigged murder cases.

Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown (No. 95-1100)

May municipalities be held liable for hiring employees who injure someone?

No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that municipalities are not liable for hiring employees who violate someone's rights unless a reasonable policymaker would conclude that the "plainly obvious consequence . . . would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected rights. Thus, the county was not financially liable for Sheriff Moore's isolated decision to hire Burns without adequate screening because Brown had not proved that the decision reflected a conscious disregard for a risk that Burns would use excessive force in violation of her federally protected rights.

Calif. Div. of Labor Standards Enf. v. Dillingham Constr. (No. 95-789)

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempt California's prevailing wage law to the extent that the law prohibits payment of an apprentice wage to an apprentice trained in an unapproved program?

No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that California's prevailing wage law does not "relate to" employee benefit plans, and thus is not preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

California v. Roy (No. 95-2025)

Did the Court of Appeals, in applying a special harmless-error standard, apply a too-strict harmless-error standard for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review of a California trial judge's error in instructing a jury as to the elements of the crime of first-degree murder?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that as a federal court reviewing a state-court determination in a habeas corpus proceeding, the Court of Appeals should have applied the harmless-error standard whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. The Court reasoned that the error at issue, a misdescription of an element of the crime, was an error of omission and not an error of the structural sort in the trial mechanism that defies harmless-error analysis.

Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison (No. 94-1988)

Did Maine's tax exemption statute violate the Commerce Clause?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that Maine's tax exemption statute violated the dormant commerce clause since it selectively awarded greater tax benefits to those institutions which served mostly state residents, while penalizing institutions that conducted mostly interstate business. By imposing such selective benefits on a commercial activity in which it did not directly participate, the Court found Maine's governmental tax regulations to be an unconstitutional form of economic protectionism favoring local consumers and business providers.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis (No. 95-1263)

Is the absence of complete diversity at the time of removal from state to federal court fatal to federal adjudication even when there is complete diversity at the time of judgment?

No. A failure to remand a case improperly removed is not fatal to federal adjudication of the case so long as federal jurisdictional requirements are met at the time judgment is entered. When a diversity case has been tried in federal court under state rules of decision, the importance of finality, efficiency and economy in judicial determinations becomes decisive. To remand this case for a new trial after several years of litigation, despite the fact that the jurisdictional defect had been cured by the time of judgment, would be to impose an exorbitant cost on the judicial system.

Chandler v. Miller (No. 96-126)

Did Georgia's drug testing statute violate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against illegal search and seizures?

Yes. In an 8-to-1 opinion, the Court noted that while the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits officials from conducting search and seizures without individualized suspicion, there does exist a narrowly defined category of permissible suspicionless searches and seizures. The Court held, however, that Georgia's statute did not fall in this exceptional category, since it failed to show why its desire to avoid drug users in its high political offices should outweigh candidates' privacy interests. In addition to Georgia's failure to provide evidence of a drug problem among its state officials, the Court concluded that even if such a problem did exist, the affected officials would most likely not perform the kind of high-risk, safety sensitive tasks, which might justify the statute's proposed incursion on their individual privacy rights.

City of Boerne v. Flores (No. 95-2074)

Did Congress exceed its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers by enacting the RFRA which, in part, subjected local ordinances to federal regulation?

Yes. Under the RFRA, the government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]" religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest, and, even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden. The Court held that while Congress may enact such legislation as the RFRA, in an attempt to prevent the abuse of religious freedoms, it may not determine the manner in which states enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions. This, the Court added, is precisely what the RFRA does by overly restricting the states' freedom to enforce its spirit in a manner which they deem most appropriate. With respect to this case, specifically, there was no evidence to suggest that Boerne's historic preservation ordinance favored one religion over another, or that it was based on animus or hostility for free religious exercise.

Clinton v. Jones (No. 95-1853)

Is a serving President, for separation of powers reasons, entitled to absolute immunity from civil litigation arising out of events which transpired prior to his taking office?

No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not grant a sitting President immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusual circumstances. After noting the great respect and dignity owed to the Executive office, the Court held that neither separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified Presidential immunity from judicial process. While the independence of our government's branches must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Constitution does not prohibit these branches from exercising any control over one another. This, the Court added, is true despite the procedural burdens which Article III jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and resources of the Chief Executive.

Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert (No. 95-1402)

Does the cost of administering an estate necessarily reduce the allowed estate-tax deduction for assets left to a spouse or charity?

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court ruled that a taxpayer does not have to reduce the estate tax deduction for marital or charitable bequests by the amount of the administration expenses that were paid from income generated during administration by assets allocated to those bequests. "When income is used . . . to pay administration expenses, this does not require the estate tax deductions be diminished," wrote Justice Kennedy.

DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clin. Service Fund (No. 95-1594)

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act preclude New York's Health Facility Assessment from imposing a gross-receipts tax on the income of medical centers operated by ERISA funds?

No. In a 7-2 decision, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act does not preclude New York from imposing a gross receipts tax on ERISA funded medical centers. Justice Stevens wrote, "Any state tax, or other law, that increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees" will affect the benefit plan, "but that simply cannot mean that every state law with such an effect is pre-empted.

Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (No. 95-1181)

Does the Commodity Futures Trading Commission have the authority to regulate "off exchange" trading in options to buy or sell foreign currency?

No. In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, The Court ruled that the "Treasury Amendment" of the Commodity Exchange Act exempts from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulation off exchange trading in foreign currency options. "The arguments favoring each side in the important public policy dispute over whether off exchange foreign currency options should be exempt from CEA regulation are best addressed to the Congress, not the Courts," wrote Justice Stevens.

Edmond v. United States (No. 96-262)

Has Congress authorized the Secretary of Transportation to appoint civilian members of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals? If so, is this authorization constitutional under the Appointments Clause of Article II?

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the judicial appointments were valid. The Court unanimously found that Congress has authorized the Secretary to appoint civilian members of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the Court also reasoned that the Secretary's 1993 appointments of the two civilian judges in question were valid under the Appointments Clause, since such judges were inferior officers within the clause's meaning, by reason of the supervision of the judges' work by the General Counsel and by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Justice Scalia noted that the Appointments Clause gives the President the exclusive power to select principal officers by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, but authorizes Congress to "vest the Appointment of...inferior Officers...in the Heads of Departments." Justice David H. Souter filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Edwards v. Balisok (No. 95-1352)

May prisoners invoke 42 USC Section 1983 to sue for monetary damages over procedures used to deprive them of good time credit toward early release?

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Balisok's "claim for declaratory relief and monetary damages, based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable...."

Foreman v. Dallas County (No. 96-987)

Are Dallas County, Texas's changed procedures for selecting election judges exempt from preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965?

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the fact that the county had exercised its discretion, pursuant to state statute, to adjust the procedure for appointing election judges according to party power, did not mean that the methods at issue were exempt from section 5 preclearance. The Court also concluded that the county's 1985 submission was insufficient to put the Department on notice that the State was seeking preclearance of the use of partisan affiliations in selecting election judges. Ultimately, the Court remanded the case, noting that because the record was silent as to the procedure used by the county for appointing election judges as of 1972, it could make no final determination as to whether preclearance was in fact required.

General Motors Corp. v. Tracy (No. 95-1232)

Does the State of Ohio's different tax treatment of sales of gas by domestic utilities subject to regulation and sales of gas by other entities violate the Commerce Clause or Equal Protection Clause?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Ohio's differential tax treatment of natural gas sales by public utilities and independent marketers violated neither the Commerce Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause. After concluding that GMC had standing to raise a Commerce Clause challenge, Justice Souter wrote for the Court, "we conclude that Ohio's regulatory response to the needs of the local natural gas market has resulted in a noncompetitive bundled gas product that distinguishes its regulated sellers from independent marketers to the point that the enterprises should not be considered 'similarly situated' for purposes of a claim of facial discrimination under the Commerce Clause. GMC's argument that the State discriminates between regulated local gas utilities and unregulated marketers must therefore fail." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University v. Homar (No. 96-651)

Does a state institution violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by suspending a tenured employee without pay before holding a hearing in which the employee can voice objections?

No. The Court ruled unanimously that a pre-suspension hearing is not necessary to protect the rights of a tenured employee who is suspended without pay. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia balanced three factors relevant to constitutional due process: 1) the weight of the private interest of the accused; 2) the chance of wrongfully depriving the private interest; and 3) the weight of the government's interest. The Court held that "[s]o long as the suspended employee receives a sufficiently prompt post suspension hearing, the lost income is relatively insubstantial."

Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott (No. 95-1184)

Did the AMAA's assessments on product advertising and promotion violate of the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

No. Exempting its financial regulations from the heightened review standard appropriate in most First Amendment issues, the Court's 5-to-4 decision held that just because the AMAA's economic regulations may indirectly result in the reduction of the complaining parties' advertising budgets, they did not violate their free speech. The relevant assessments did not force the growers, handlers, or processors to repeat unsuccessful ads, to respond to negative ads when they preferred to remain silent, or to be publicly identified with messages other than their own. All the AMAA required of these parties were contributions for ad campaigns which were ultimately aimed at promoting their own welfare by encouraging customers to buy their products.

Grimmett, Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Siragusa v. Brown (No. 95-1723)

Does the four-year time limit on a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 begin after a pattern of racketeering activity has been discovered by the plaintiff?

Unanswered. The unanimous Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai (No. 95-1621)

Could a reasonable jury conclude that John Papai is a Jones Act seaman in accordance with his record of employment?

No. In a 6-3 decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that John Papai's record would not permit a reasonable jury to conclude that he is a Jones Act seaman. Jones Act coverage is confined to seamen, those workers who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea. Justice Kennedy wrote, "[a]n important part of the test for determining who is a seaman is whether the injured worker has a substantial connection to a vessel or to a fleet of vessels, and the latter concept requires a requisite degree of common ownership or control."

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer (No. 95-1340)

Does the False Claims Act, as amended in 1986, apply retroactively to qui tam suits regarding allegedly false claims submitted to the government submitted prior to is enactment?

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, because the 1986 amendment does not apply retroactively to qui tam suits regarding allegedly false claims submitted prior to its enactment, Schumer's action should have been dismissed, as required by the pre-1986 version of the FCA. The Court reasoned that, prior to 1986, disclosure to the Government of information about the allegedly false claim would have constituted a full defense, which the retroactive application of the 1986 amendment would deprive Hughes of that defense. "Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of congressional intent to apply the 1986 amendment to conduct completed before its enactment, we apply our presumption against retroactivity," concluded Justice Thomas.

Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho (No. 94-1474)

May Indian Tribes proceed with suits against state officials in light of the sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment?

No. In an 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's suit against the state officials may not proceed in federal court because States enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits filed by Indian tribes. Justice Kennedy concluded, "the present suit is barred unless it falls within the exception this Court has recognized for certain suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers in their individual capacities."

Immigration And Naturalization Service v. Yueh-Shaio Yang (No. 95-938)

May the Imigration and Naturalization Service, when deciding whether to grant a discretionary waiver of deportation under the applicable provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, take into account acts of fraud committed by an alien in connection to his entry into the United States?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that in deciding whether to grant a waiver under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General or her delegate, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, may take into account acts of fraud committed by the alien in connection to his entry into the United States. Justice Scalia wrote, the Act "imposes no limitations on the factors that the INS may consider in determining who, among the class of eligible aliens, should be granted relief."

Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Office of Worker's Comp. Prog. (No. 95-1081)

Is an injured worker's spouse, who may be eligible to receive death benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act after the worker dies, a "person entitled to compensation" when the spouse enters into a settlement agreement with a third party before the worker's death?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that before an injured worker's death, the worker's spouse is not a "person entitled to compensation" for death benefits and did not forfeit the right to collect death benefits under the LHWCA for failure to obtain the worker's employer's approval of settlements entered into by the worker's spouse with third parties before the worker's death. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provided that the "agency" had to be named respondent in an appeal of an order of a federal administrative agency or board to a Federal Court of Appeals, conferred upon the Director the right to appear as a respondent before the Courts of Appeals in appeals from final orders of the Benefits Review Board.

Inter Modal Rail Employees Association v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. (No. 96-491)

Does Section 510 of ERISA bar interference only with vested rights?

No. The plain language of Section 510 indicates that the applicability of its interference clause is not limited to vested rights. Congress used the word "plan" to refer to both pension and welfare benefits, and at the same time indicated that welfare plans are exempt from ERISA's stringent vesting requirements. This statutory language forecloses the possibility that Congress meant to limit the protections of Section 510 to vested rights. The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for determination of whether the fact that the SFTS employees were eligible for welfare benefits meant that they had already "attained" such rights, so that any subsequent actions taken by SFTS could not "interfere" with the "attainment of . . . right[s] . . . under the plan."

Johnson v. Fankell (No. 96-292)

Do defendants in an action brought under 42 USC section 1983 in state court have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity?

No. In unanimous opinion delivered by John Paul Stevens, the Court held that defendants in a state-court section 1983 action do not have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. The Court reasoned that in construing state rules allowing appeals from final judgments, state courts did not need to accept the federal definition of a "final decision" within the meaning of federal law. The right to an interlocutory appeal of a denial of immunity "is a federal procedural right that simply does not apply in a non-federal forum," Justice Stevens wrote for the court.

Johnson v. United States (No. 96-203)

Must criminal convictions for perjury be reversed when a trial judge fails to let the jury rule on whether the underlying statements were material?

No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William J. Rehnquist, the Court held that the trial court's action in this case was not "plain error" of the sort which an appellate court may notice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). The Court reasoned that there was no basis, on the record, for concluding that the materiality error had seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, in that the evidence supporting materiality was overwhelming. "No 'miscarriage of justice' will result here if we do not notice the error and we decline to do so," concluded Chief Justice Rehnquist.

Kansas v. Hendricks (No. 95-1649)

Did the Act's civil commitment provisions, based on its definition of what constitutes a "mental abnormality," violate substantive due process and double jeopardy requirements?

No. Despite Hendricks' claim that a certification of "mental illness" alone was too arbitrary to sustain a civil commitment order, the Court held that the Act met substantive due process standards by requiring considerable evidence of past violent sexual behavior and a present mental inclination to repeat such offenses. Furthermore, the Court held that since it required the release of confined persons who became mentally stable and no longer dangerous, did not speak of scienter, and lacked other procedural safeguards characteristic of criminal trials, the Act did not violate double jeopardy guarantees since it merely authorized "civil" rather than "criminal" commitments

Klehr Et Ux. v. A. O. Smith Corp. (No. 96-663)

1)Does the time limit for filing a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO) begin after the plaintiff discovers the last illegal act ("last predicate act") at the end of a pattern of racketeering activity?

2)If the plaintiff demonstrates "fraudulent concealment" of the injury inflicted, can RICO's civil-claim limitations period be extended?

No and No. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. The "last predicate rule...lengthens the limitations period dramatically" and thereby contradicts Congress's intention of ensuring a time limit for civil RICO claims. Also, "the plaintiff cannot use an independent, new act as a bootstrap to recover for injuries caused by other predicate acts that took place outside the limitations period."

RICO intends "not only to compensate victims but also to encourage those victims diligently to investigate and thereby to uncover unlawful activity." To demonstrate "fraudulent concealment", a plaintiff must have failed to discover injuries inflicted upon him after acting with "reasonable diligence" to discover the source and pattern of the injuries.

Lambert v. Wicklund (No. 96-858)

Is a Montana statute authorizing the judicial bypass of parental notification as to a minor's abortion, under conditions including a showing that notification is not in best interests of minor, constitutional?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals's ruling was in direct conflict with the Court's precedents to the effect that the allowance of a judicial bypass if a minor showed that parental notification was not in her best interests met the constitutional requirement that the minor be allowed to show that the desired abortion would be in her best interests. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment.

Lambrix v. Singletary (No. 96-5658)

Can a Florida killer's death sentence be challenged even though it was based on aggravating factors later ruled to be unconstitutional?

No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that a prisoner whose conviction became final before the ruling, which held that if the sentencing judge in a "weighing" State is required to give deference to a jury's advisory sentencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances, is foreclosed from relying on that decision in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Justice Scalia wrote for the court that the later ruling announced a "new rule" that could not be applied to already-finalized convictions challenged in federal habeas corpus petitions.

Lawyer v. Department of Justice (No. 95-2024)

Did the District Court err in approving a remedial plan for the creation of a Florida state Senate district, which allegedly violated the Equal Protection Clause?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by David H. Souter, the Court held that the State exercised the choice to which it was entitled under our cases, that Lawyer had no right to block the settlement, and that he failed to point out any unconstitutionality in the proposed plan. The Court found that Lawyer's agreement to the provisional settlement did not require the District Court to adjudicate the constitutionality of the plan before approving the settlement and that the court, in redrawing the district, did not subordinate Florida's traditional districting principles to race. Justice Souter wrote that "the evidence amply supports the trial court's views that race did not predominate over Florida's traditional districting principles....[Lawyer] has provided nothing that calls that conclusion into question, much less that points to any clear error." Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Lindh v. Murphy (No. 96-6298)

Does the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which amended the previous federal habeas statute, govern habeas applications in non-capital cases that were pending when the Act was enacted?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the 1996 version of the federal habeas statute, as to standards affecting the entitlement of state prisoners to federal habeas corpus relief, does not to apply to non-capital habeas corpus cases that were pending when the Act was enacted. The Court reasoned that the statute's retroactive application was improper because new legal consequences attached. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined.

Lopez v. Monterey County (No. 95-1201)

May a district court issue an order that authorizes a county covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to conduct judicial elections under an election plan that has not received federal approval pursuant to section 5?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the District Court had erred in ordering the county to conduct the election under a plan that had not received federal approval pursuant to section 5. The Court reasoned that the County had not discharged its obligation of gaining preclearance of its election plan prior to its enactment. On remand, the Court left it to the District Court to decide whether changes in California law transformed the County into a state plan, for which section 5 preclearance is not required.

Lords Landing Village v. Continental Ins. Co. (No. 96-1033)

Is it appropriate, when a holding of the federal appellate court below is called into question by a recent decision of a State's highest court, for the U.S. Supreme Court to grant a petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of the lower court, and remand the case for further consideration?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that this case fits within the category of cases in which the Court has held that it is proper to issue a GVR order, or to grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of the lower court, and remand the case for further consideration. There was reason to question the correctness of the Court of Appeals' original decision because the decision by Maryland's highest court explicitly disapproved the two cases on which the Court of Appeals had primarily relied. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented.

Lynce v. Mathis (No. 95-7452)

Does Florida's 1992 statute canceling early release credits to prison inmates after they have been awarded violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution?

Yes. In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the 1992 statute canceling provisional release credits violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution.

M.L.B V. S.L.J. (No. 95-853)

May a State, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, just as a State may not block an indigent petty offender's access to an appeal afforded others, so Mississippi may not deny M.L.B., because of her poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain a parent. "We place decrees forever terminating parental rights in the category of cases in which the State may not 'bolt the door to equal justice,'" wrote Justice Ginsburg, "recognizing that parental termination decrees are among the most severe forms of state action." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia dissented.

Maryland v. Wilson (No. 95-1268)

Did Maryland's state trooper violate the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure guarantees by ordering Wilson, a mere passenger in the suspect vehicle, to exit the car during a traffic stop?

No. The Court held that after lawfully stopping a speeding vehicle, an officer may order its passengers to step out. While burdening their personal liberty somewhat, officers must be permitted such authority over passengers if the overriding government's interest in officer safety is to be protected.

Mazurek v. Armstrong (No. 96-1104)

Did a Court of Appeals err in holding that the parties seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a Montana statute, which restricted the performance of abortions to licensed physicians, had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their claim of undue burden concerning abortion rights?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals' finding that the practitioners had shown a fair chance of success on the merits was erroneous. The Court noted that its precedents repeatedly stated that the performance of abortions could be restricted to physicians, where there was no evidence of an unlawful motive on the part of the state legislature. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented.

McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama (No. 96-542)

Is a county liable for constitutional violations committed by the county sheriff in matters of law enforcement?

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts. The opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist held that because the county had no authority to make law enforcement policy, Sheriff Tate as a policymaker represented the state rather than the county. According to the Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code, the Court held, Alabama sheriffs "act for the State when exercising their law enforcement functions."

Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley (No. 96-320)

May railroad workers invoke the Federal Employers' Liability Act to sue their employers for emotional distress due to asbestos, or some other disease-causing carcinogen, exposure if it has not made them ill?

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court ruled that railroad workers cannot invoke the Federal Employers' Liability Act to sue their employers for emotional distress due to asbestos, or some other disease-causing carcinogen, exposure unless, and until, they manifest symptoms of a disease. Furthermore, workers are not legally entitled to recover medical monitoring costs insofar as they are contingent upon an underlying injury.

Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo (No. 96-272)

Does the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act bar nominal compensation to a worker who is presently able to earn at least as much as before he was injured?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that nominal compensation is proper when there is a significant possibility that the worker's wage-earning capacity will fall below the level of his pre-injury wages sometime in the future. The Court reasoned that a worker is entitled to nominal compensation under the LHWCA when a work-related injury has not diminished the worker's present wage-earning capacity under current circumstances, but when there is a significant possibility that the injury will cause diminished capacity under future conditions. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.

O'Dell v. Netherland (No. 96-6867)

Is the rule set forth in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, which requires that a capital defendant be permitted to inform his sentencing jury that he is parole-ineligible if the prosecution argues that he presents a future danger, new and thereby inapplicable to an already final death sentence?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the rule was new, and that it could not be used to disturb O'Dell's death sentence, which had been final for six years when Simmons was decided. Justice Thomas reasoned that the rule was new within the meaning of Teague v Lane, 489 U.S. 288. Moreover, Justice Thomas wrote that the rule was not a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding, so as to fall within an exception to Teague, thus making it applicable to O'Dell. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, arguing that the rule was not new and, if it was, its importance to the accuracy and fairness of a capital sentencing proceeding placed it within an exception to Teague.

O'Gilvie v. United States (No. 95-966)

Does the exclusionary provision of 26 USC section 104(a)(2), which excludes from gross income the "amount of any damages received... on account of personal injuries or sickness," apply to punitive damages received by a plaintiff in a tort suit for personal injuries?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the punitive damages received by the O'Gilvies were not received "on account of" personal injuries," and therefore the provision did not apply and the damages were taxable. Agreeing with the Government's definition, Justice Breyer reasoned that the exclusionary provision applied to those personal injury lawsuit damages that were awarded by reason of, or because of, the personal injuries, and not to punitive damages that do not compensate injury, but are private fines to punish and deter reprehensible conduct. Justice Antonin Scalia, who was joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Ohio v. Robinette (No. 95-891)

Does the Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal search and seizures require that a lawfully detained defendant be told that he is "free to go" before he can be said to have voluntarily agreed to any subsequent search?

No. After establishing its federal jurisdiction, despite a claim that the matter involved aspects of Ohio's Constitution, the Court held that when looking at the totality of the circumstances it may be reasonably concluded that if a defendant consents to be searched, even if not first advised that he is "free to go," the ensuing search will be recognized as voluntary. The Court also added that Robinette's arrest on drug possession charges was lawful, even though the arresting officer did not stop him on an initial suspicion of drug possession nor intend to even issue him a speeding ticket.

Old Chief v. United States (No. 95-6556)

Does a District Court have the authority to reject a defendant's offer to conceded a prior conviction and admit the prosecution's presentation of it when the name or nature of the conviction raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction?

No. In an opinion authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that a district court abuses its discretion under the Federal Rules of Evidence if it spurns a defendant's offer to concede a prior judgment and admits the full judgment record over the defendant's objection, when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction.

Pennsylvania v. Labron (No. 95-1691)

Does the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth, require police to obtain a warrant before searching an automobile unless exigent circumstances are present?

No. In a 7-2 per curiam opinion, the Court held that if a vehicle is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits police to search the vehicle and contraband seized from such a search should not be suppressed. The Court noted that early cases establishing the automobile exception were based on the automobile's ready mobility, an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear. Justice John Paul Stevens, who was joined by Justine Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented.

Pounders v. Watson (No. 96-1383)

Did the Court of Appeals misinterpret the Constitution's due process requirements as applied to an attorney's summary contempt conviction for willful defiance when questioning her client?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals had misinterpreted the Constitution's due process requirements for the imposition of a summary contempt order. The Court reasoned that the trial judge's findings concerning jury prejudice, together with the judge's assessment of the flagrance of Watson's defiance, supported the finding of the need for summary contempt to vindicate the court's authority. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. Justice Stevens argued that it was not so clear whether the circumstances justified a summary contempt proceeding by the judge before whom the contempt had occurred as to justify the Court's summary reversal.

Printz v. United States (No. 95-1478)

Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification, can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to regulate handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background-checks?

No. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them.

Raines v. Byrd (No. 96-1671)

Did the congressmen have Article III standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act as a violation of the Presentment Clause in Article I?

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, which avoided the question of the Act's constitutionality, the Court held that the individual congressmen lacked proper Article III standing to maintain their suit. The Court explained that the congressmen failed to show how the allegedly unconstitutional Act resulted in their personal injury, since it applied to the entire institution of Congress. Moreover, the congressmen based their claim on a loss of political power rather then a demonstration of how the Act violated one of their particularized legally protected interests. The Court concluded that, having failed to meet both of these standing requirements, the congressmen did not present the Court with a case-or-controversy over which it had jurisdiction.

Regents of the University of California v. Doe (No. 95-1694)

Does the Eleventh Amendment shield state-run schools from being sued unwillingly in federal court even though any award of monetary damages would not come from the state?

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that the California university could not be sued by Doe regardless of his claim that the job offer was illegally withdrawn and despite the fact the federal government would be responsible for the judgment. Stevens declared that the Eleventh Amendment shields the state from "the risk of adverse judgments even though the state may be indemnified by a third party."

Reno v. ACLU (No. 96-511)

Did certain provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violate the First and Fifth Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their definitions of the types of internet communications which they criminalized?

Yes. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications, limit its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact on adults), provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive" material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that since the First Amendment distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions, protecting only the former, the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent" from its text. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.

Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (No. 95-1455)

Must preclearance be denied under ?5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 whenever a covered jurisdiction's new voting "standard, practice, or procedure" violates ?2 of the Act? Is evidence that a new "standard, practice, or procedure" has a dilutive impact irrelevant to the inquiry whether the covered jurisdiction acted with a discriminatory purpose under ?5 of the Act?

No and no. In an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Conner, the Court ruled that preclearance under ?5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 may not be denied solely on the basis that a covered jurisdiction's new voting "standard, practice, or procedure" violates ? 2 of the Act. Additionally, evidence showing that a jurisdiction's redistricting plan dilutes minorities' voting power may be relevant to establish a jurisdiction's "intent to retrogress" under ?5 of the Act.

Richards v. Wisconsin (No. 96-5955)

Did the officers' use of deception and force, in order to gain entry into Richards' hotel room, violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal search and seizures?

No. After noting the general importance of following conventional "knock-and-announce" procedures, the Court held that in those circumstances when police have good reason to suspect that announcing their presence and intentions may be dangerous, futile, or result in the destruction of evidence, a "no-knock" entry is justified. The Court added that by immediately closing the door after witnessing the officers outside it, Richards gave police sufficient justification for breaking into his room - especially considering the disposable nature of the substances they were seeking.

Richardson v. McKnight (No. 96-318)

Are prison guards, who are employees of a private prison management firm, entitled to a qualified immunity from suit under 42 USC section 1983?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that prison guards employed by a private firm are not entitled to a qualified immunity from suit by prisoners charging a section 1983 violation. Emphasizing that a private firm was systematically organized to manage the prison, Justice Breyer wrote that, "[o]ur examination of history and purpose...reveals nothing special enough about the job or about its organizational structure that would warrant providing these private prison guards with a governmental immunity." Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the Court had routinely determined section 1983 immunity on the basis of the public function being performed. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined Justice Scalia.

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. (No. 95-1376)

Does the term "employees," as used in under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes former employees, such that a petitioner may bring suit against his or her former employer for post-employment actions allegedly taken in retaliation for having filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission?

Yes. In an unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that because the term "employees," as used Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes former employees, Robinson may sue Shell for its allegedly retaliatory post-employment actions. Justice Thomas wrote for the court that barring such protection to former employees, while current employees have it, "would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring . . . claims" under Title VII.

Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac & Co. (No. 95-1764)

Can extra equipment, added to a ship after it was constructed, be considered "other property" for which the ship manufacturer is liable?

Yes. In a decision authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that equipment added by the initial user before he sold the ship to the subsequent user is "other property," and as Justice Breyer wrote, "[e]quipment added to a product after the manufacturer . . . has sold the product to an initial user is not part of the product that itself caused the physical harm."

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York (No. 95-1065)

Did either or both types of "buffer zones" violate Schenck's First Amendment right to freedom of speech.

The Court held that while the "fixed buffer zones" were constitutional, the "floating buffer zones" were not. It distinguished between the two types of "buffer zones." The Court supported the "fixed buffer zones" because they protected the government's interest in public safety, by preventing protesters from engaging in unlawful conduct (i.e. spitting on and shouting in clinic users' faces, blocking doorways), while still allowing them to be heard from a short distance. "Floating buffer zones," by contrast, were struck down by the Court since they imposed a greater burden on free speech than was required to protect the government's interest in public safety and free traffic flow. The Court found that forcing demonstrators to remain at least 15 feet away from the people they wished to communicate with would create an inordinate amount of dangerous confusion and congestion.

Strate v. A-1 Contractors (No. 95-1872)

Does a tribal court have jurisdiction over a civil action against an allegedly negligent driver and the driver's employer, neither of whom is a member of the tribe, when an accident occurs on a portion of a public highway maintained by the State under a federally granted right of way over Indian reservation land?

No. In an unanimous decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that when an accident occurs on a public highway maintained by the State pursuant to a federally granted right of way over Indian reservation land, a civil action against allegedly negligent nonmembers falls within state or federal regulatory and adjudicatory governance; absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers driving on the State's highway, tribal courts may not exercise jurisdiction in such cases.

Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (No. 96-243)

Must property owners attempt to sell their developmental rights before claiming the regulatory taking of property without just compensation, in accordance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Suitum's regulatory taking claim was ripe for adjudication. Justice Souter reasoned that, by determining that Suitum's property was ineligible for development, the agency had had made final determination, even though she had not attempted to sell the TDRs which she had received, or was eligible to receive, under the agency plan. "While the pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDRs both to the claim that a taking has occurred and to the constitutional requirement of just compensation, we have no occasion to decide, and we do not decide, whether or not these TDRs may be considered in deciding the issue of whether there has been a taking in this case, as opposed to the issue of whether just compensation has been afforded for such a taking," wrote Justice Souter.

Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party (No. 95-1608)

Did Minnesota's anti-fusion laws, banning a candidate from appearing on more than one party's ballot, violate the association rights protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

No. In its 6-to-3 opinion, the majority weighed the character and magnitude of the burden imposed by anti-fusion laws on association rights against Minnesota's stated interest in the necessity of such laws. It upheld Minnesota's interest in ballot integrity and political stability. According to the Court, prohibiting political parties from naming another party's candidate as their own did not overly burden their association rights since they were still free to endorse the other party's candidate. The only thing they could not do was "fuse" another party's candidate to their own petitions.

Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC (No. 95-992)

Is the 1992 "must carry" law an unconstitutional intrusion on cable operators' editorial autonomy, a form of Government-compelled speech that violates the First Amendment?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Congress "has an independent interest in preserving a multiplicity of broadcasters." The outcome supported Congress's right to judge what approach would best insure a competitive communications marketplace.

United State Dept of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs v. Legal Assistance For Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc. (No. 95-1521)

Did the United States State Department violate the Immigration and Nationality Act by instructing a foreign consulate to cease issuing visas to a class of applicants?

Unanswered. Before the Supreme Court could decide the case, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRA), which clarified that no provision in the INA "shall be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of State to determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa applications or the locations where such applications will be processed." The Supreme Court, in a unanimous per curiam decision, instructed the District Court to reconsider the case in light of the IIRA's clarification.

United States v. Alaska (No. 84 ORIG)

Does the United States own disputed submerged lands along Alaska's Arctic Coast?

Yes. In a decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the federal government, the United States, owned the disputed submerged lands - adjacent to the National Wildlife Refuge and the National Petroleum Reserve - along Alaska's Arctic Coast.

United States v. Brockamp (No. 95-1225)

May courts toll, for nonstatutory reasons, the statutory time limitations for filing tax refund claims set forth in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986?

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that Congress did not intend the "equitable tolling" doctrine to apply to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986's time limitations for filing tax refund claims. Justice Breyer wrote that allowing such exceptions to the filing deadline "could create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, large numbers of late claims."

United States v. Gonzales (No. 95-1605)

Can the federal mandatory five-year prison term for carrying a gun while committing a crime be served concurrently with a separate state sentence?

No. In a 7-to-2 decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court announced "[t]he plain language of (the law) forbids a district court to direct that a term of imprisonment under the statute run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, whether state or federal."

United States v. Hyde (No. 96-667)

No details yet.

United States v. Jose (No. 95-2082)

Is a Federal District Court's order, which enforced IRS summonses but required the IRS to give notice prior to any internal transfer of summoned documents, appealable as final decision?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the District Court issued a final, appealable order. The Court reasoned that the District Court's final order was indeed final because it was a decision dispositively granting in part and denying in part the remedy requested by the IRS. The Court also noted that finality, not ripeness, is the doctrine governing appeals from the District Court to the Court of Appeals. To appeal the District Court's decision, the IRS was neither obligated to defy the order nor required to provide notice of its intention to transfer documents internally, concluded the Court.

United States v. LaBonte (No. 95-1726)

Did Congress intend by "maximum term authorized" in 28 USC section 994(h) the maximum term available for the offense of conviction including any applicable statutory sentencing enhancements?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Commission's interpretation was inconsistent with section 994(h)'s plain language, and therefore "maximum term authorized" must be read to include all applicable statutory sentencing enhancements. "Congress surely did not establish enhanced penalties for repeat offenders only to have the Commission render them a virtual nullity," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Stephen G. Breyer in a dissent, in which Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, argued that the words "maximum term authorized" in section 994(h) were ambiguous, thus the Court should defer to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation.

United States v. Lanier (No. 95-1717)

Did the Court of Appeals use a too demanding standard when it ruled that freedom from sexual assault, as included under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process right to liberty, has never been recognized as a federally protected constitutional right and therefore cannot be the basis for a federal prosecution?

es. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the standard of notice that the Court of Appeals employed was higher than the Constitution requires and too demanding. Justice Souter wrote that the Court of Appeals mistakenly concluded that it takes a Supreme Court decision in a "fundamentally similar" case to make a constitutional right specific enough that its violation can be prosecuted. Law makes it a crime to deprive anyone of rights "secured . . . by the Constitution."

United States v. O'hagan (No. 96-842)

1) Does a security-trader violate the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 by trading securities on the basis of misappropriated information pertaining to a company other than his own?

2) Did the Security Exchange Commission have the authority to make Rule 14e-3(a), which forbids security trading on nonpublic foreknowledge of a tender offer?

Yes and Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion in the Court's 6-3 decision. The Court ruled that a security-trader who fails to disclose personal profits gained from reliance on exclusive information is guilty of employing "a deceptive device...in connection with the purchase of a security." The security-trader knowingly abuses the duty owed toward the source of information, whether the source is the company he works for or not.

The Court also held that the SEC has authority to "define and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent...acts...in connection with any tender offer." Rule 14e-3(a) of the Exchange Act, adopted under this fraud-prevention authority, forbids security-traders from trading on the basis of information they know should be kept private unless they publicly disclose their trades.

United States v. Watts (No. 95-1906)

May sentencing courts consider the conduct of a defendant's underlying charges of which she or he has been acquitted?

Yes. In a 7-2 per curiam opinion, the Court held that a jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent a sentencing court from considering a defendant's conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen G. Breyer concurred. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the additional offense should have been required to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt for sentencing purposes, where a defendant's sentence was lengthened. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, also dissenting, expressed the view that the cases should have been set for full briefing and consideration.

United States v. Wells (No. 95-1228)

Is the materiality of falsehood an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank?

No. In an 8-1 decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that the materiality of falsehood is not an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank. Justice Souter wrote for the court that prosecutors need not prove that a lie was relevant enough to affect the outcome of a bank's decision because the law does not require such materiality.

Vacco v. Quill (No. 95-1858)

Did New York's ban on physician-assisted suicide violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by allowing competent terminally ill adults to withdraw their own lifesaving treatment, but denying the same right to patients who could not withdraw their own treatment and could only hope that a physician would do so for them?

No. Employing a rationality test to examine the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held that New York's ban was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting medical ethics, preventing euthanasia, shielding the disabled and terminally ill from prejudice which might encourage them to end their lives, and, above all, the preservation of human life. Moreover, while acknowledging the difficulty of its task, the Court distinguished between the refusal of lifesaving treatment and assisted suicide, by noting that the latter involves the criminal elements of causation and intent. No matter how noble a physician's motives may be, he may not deliberately cause, hasten, or aid a patient's death.

Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises (No. 95-259)

Does an employer "have" an employee on any working day on which the employer maintains an employment relationship with the employee as pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the ultimate touchstone under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is whether an employer has employment relationships with 15 or more individuals for each working day in 20 or more weeks during the year in question.

Warner Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. (No. 95-728)

Is the "doctrine of equivalents" a legitimate test for determining how similar a new invention must be to an existing patent to be deemed an illegal infringement?

Yes. In a decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that it adheres to the "doctrine of equivalents," which is not superseded by the Patent Act of 1952. However, the Court held that the Court of Appeals had not considered all of the requirements of the doctrine of equivalents as described by the Court in this case on which the case was reversed and remanded.

Washington v. Glucksberg (No. 96-110)

Did Washington's ban on physician assisted-suicide violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by denying competent terminally ill adults the liberty to choose death over life?

No. Analyzing the guarantees of the Due Process Clause, the Court focused on two primary aspects: the protection of our nation's objective fundamental, historically rooted, rights and liberties; and the cautious definition of what constitutes a due process liberty interest. The Court held that the right to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause since its practice has been, and continues to be, offensive to our national traditions and practices. Moreover, employing a rationality test, the Court held that Washington's ban was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting medical ethics, shielding disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice which might encourage them to end their lives, and, above all, the preservation of human life.

Young v. Ford Ice (No. 95-2031)

Did the state of Mississippi violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by implementing a new voter registration policy, the "New System," without explicit approval from the U.S. Attorney General?

Yes. The unanimous Court reversed the District Court and ruled that Mississippi must submit the New System to the Attorney General for pre-clearance. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that "the New System contains numerous examples of new, significantly different administrative practices [....]" Therefore, the Attorney General must ensure that the proposed policy does not discriminate against minorities.

Young v. Harper (No. 95-1598)

Is Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program sufficiently like parole that participants are entitled to procedural protections, such as the due process safeguards set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program, as it existed when Leroy L. Young was released, was equivalent to parole and therefore he was entitle to procedural due process safeguards.