Beginning in 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted a series of statutes authorizing the award of early release credits to prison inmates when the state prison population exceeded predetermined levels. In 1986, Kenneth Lynce received a 22-year prison sentence on a charge of attempted murder. In 1992, he was released based on the determination that he had accumulated five different types of early release credits totaling 5,668 days, including 1,860 days of "provisional credits" awarded as a result of prison overcrowding. Lynce was re-arrested and returned to custody shortly thereafter when the attorney general issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as having retroactively canceled all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder and attempted murder. Lynce filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution. The District Court rejected Lynce's argument dismissing the petition on the ground that the sole purpose of these credits was to alleviate prison overcrowding. The Court of Appeals denied a certificate of probable cause.
Does Florida's 1992 statute canceling early release credits to prison inmates after they have been awarded violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution?
Yes. In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the 1992 statute canceling provisional release credits violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution.
Decisions
Decision: 9 votes for Lynce, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10: Ex Post Facto
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Full Opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens
