Clinton v. Jones - Opinion Announcement

Argument of Speaker

Mr. Speaker: The opinion of the Court in No. 95-1853, Clinton against Jones will be announced by Justice Stevens.

Argument of Justice Stevens

Mr. Stevens: This case comes to us from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

It raises a constitutional and a prudential question considering the office of the President of the United States.

Respondent, a private citizen, seeks to recover damages from the current occupant of that office based on actions allegedly taken before his term began.

The President submits that in all but the most exceptional cases, the constitution requires Federal Court to defer such litigation until his term end and that in any event, respect for the office warrants such a stay.

The petitioner, William Jefferson Clinton was elected to the presidency in 1992 and re-elected in 1996.

Respondent, Paula Corbin Jones, is a resident of California.

On May 6, 1994, invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, she commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

In essence, her complaint alleges that on the afternoon of May 8, 1991, when she was employed by the Arkansas Industrial Commission, the petitioner who was then Governor of the State of Arkansas engage in tortious conduct for which he seeks to recover money damages.

In response to the complaint, petitioner filed a motion seeking to postpone the proceeding until he is no longer president.

The district judge ordered a postponement of the trial that allowed discovery to go forward.

Both parties appealed.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the order postponing the trial until the president relieves office.

We granted the President’s petition for certiorari and now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Our opinion first discusses cases and materials from the historical record that support the recognition of an immunity from damages liability, for actions taken by the President in his official capacity.

We conclude that those precedents do not apply to private conduct that occurred before becoming president.

We then turned to the President’s strongest argument, a claim that is grounded in the character of the office that was created by Article II of the Constitution and relies on separation of powers, principles, that has structured our constitutional arrangements since the founding.

As a starting premise, petitioner contends that he occupies a unique office with powers and responsibilities, so vast and important that the public interest demands that he devote his undivided time and attention to his public duties.

He submits that given the nature of the office.

The doctrine of separation of powers places limits on the authority of the federal judiciary to interfere with the Executive Branch that would be transgressed by allowing this action to proceed.

We have no dispute with the initial premise of the argument.

Former presidents from George Washington to George Bush have consistently endorsed the dismiss characterization of the office.

It does not follow, however that separation of powers, principles would be violated by allowing this action to proceed.

The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three coequal branches of our government.

In this case, however, there is no suggestion that the federal judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as executive.

Respondent is merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies.

The litigation of question that relate entirely to the unofficial conduct of the individual who happens to be the president poses no perceptible risk or misallocation of either judicial power or executive power.

Nevertheless, petitioner contends that as a by-product of an otherwise traditional exercise of judicial power, burdens will be placed on the President that will hamper the performance of his official duty.

His concern is that this particular case as well as the potential additional litigation that an affirmance of the Court of Appeals judgment may spawn, may impose an unacceptable burden on the President’s time and energy and thereby impair the effective performance of the office.

Petitioner’s predictive judgment signed a little support in either history or the relatively narrow compass of the issues raised in this particular case.

In the entire history of the republic, only three sitting presidents have been subjected to suits for their private action.

As for the case at hand, if properly managed by the District Court, it appears to us highly unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of petitioner’s time.

Of greater significance, petitioner urged by presuming that interactions between the Judicial Branch and the Executive, even quite burdensome interactions, necessarily rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive’s ability to perform his constitutionally mandated function.

The fact that a Federal Court’s exercise of its traditional Article III jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief Executive is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution.

Two long settled propositions first announced by Chief Justice Marshall support that conclusion.

First, we have long held that when the President takes official action, the court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of such a case is our holding that President Truman exceeded his constitutional authority when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of the Nation’s steel mills to avert the national catastrophe.

Second, it is also settled that the President is subject to judicial process in appropriate circumstances.

If the judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President’s official conduct, and if it may direct appropriate process to the President himself, it must follow that the Federal Courts have power to determine the legality of his unofficial conduct.

The burden on the President’s time and energy is a mere by product of such review, surely cannot be considered as onerous as the direct burden imposed by judicial review and the occasional invalidation of his official action.

We therefore hold that the doctrine of separation of powers does not require Federal Courts to stay all private actions against the president until he leaves office.

The reason for rejecting such a categorical rule apply as well to a rule that would require a stay in all but the most exceptional cases.

The question whether a specific case should receive exceptional treatment is more appropriately the subject of the exercise of judicial discretion than an interpretation of the Constitution.

Accordingly, we turn to the question whether the District Court’s decision to stay the trial until after the President leaves office was an abuse of discretion.

Although we have rejected the argument that the potential burdens on the President violates separation of power and principle, those burdens are appropriate matters for the District Court to evaluate in its management of the case.

The higher respect that is owned to the office of the Chief Executive, though not justifying a rule of categorical immunity is a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding including the timing and scope of discovery.

Nevertheless, we are persuaded that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to defer this trial until after the President leaves office.

Such a lengthy and categorical state takes no account whatever of the respondent’s interest in bringing the case to trial.

Delaying trials always increases the danger of prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence including the inability of witnesses to recall specific facts or the possible death of a party.

Moreover, the proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need.

Other than the fact that a trial may consume some of the President’s time and attention, there is nothing in the record to identify any potential harm that might ensue from scheduling the trial promptly after discovery is concluded.

The Federal District Court has jurisdiction to decide this case.

Like every other citizen who properly invokes that jurisdiction, respondent has a right to an orderly disposition of her claim.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Justice Breyer has filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.