The Oyez Project: 1995 Term

44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island (No. 94-1140)

Rhode Island passed a statute banning the advertisement of retail liquor prices in places where liquor is not sold. Petitioners filed suit claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found the ban unconstitutional, noting that it did not serve any interest Rhode Island might have had in promoting temperance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that open competition for liquor pricing would be harmful insofar at it would increase consumption. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Auciello Iron Works Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (No. 95-668)

The day after Auciello Iron Works' contract offer was accepted by its union employees' collective-bargaining representative, Auciello disavowed the agreement because of a good-faith doubt, based on knowledge acquired before the offer's acceptance, that a majority of employees supported the Union. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that Auciello's withdrawal was an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act and ordered that the agreement be reduced to a formal written instrument. The Court of Appeals enforced the order as reasonable after the NLRB issued a supplemental opinion to justify its refusal to consider Auciello's defense of good-faith doubt about the Union's majority status.

Bailey v. United States (No. 94-7448)

Roland Bailey and Candisha Robinson were each convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1), which, in relevant part, imposes a mandatory minimum sentence upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" both "during and in relation to" a predicate offense. Bailey's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a loaded pistol which the police found inside a bag in the locked trunk of a car he was driving after they arrested him for possession of illegal drugs. Robinson's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on an unloaded, holstered firearm which the police, executing a search warrant, found locked in a trunk in her bedroom closet, along with drugs and money from an earlier controlled buy. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the Section 924(c)(1) convictions, interpreting "use" of a gun in violation of Section 924(c)(1) in accordance with an "accessibility and proximity" test.

Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co. (No. 94-1175)

The Expedited Funds Availability Act requires banks to make deposited funds available for withdrawal within specified time periods. The act provides for administrative enforcement and civil liability. After a BankOne Chicago customer deposited a check drawn on a Midwest Bank and Trust account, the check was forwarded, but returned unpaid because BankOne's endorsement stamp was illegible. Subsequently, when the check was resubmitted, the account did not have sufficient funds to cover the withdrawal. Bank One then sued Midwest Bank for failing to meet its obligations prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) pursuant to the act. The District Court entered summary judgment for BankOne. The Court of Appeals, vacating the lower court's decision, ordered the action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the act authorizes original federal-court jurisdiction only when a "person other than [a] depository institution" sues a "depository institution," or when a depositor sues a bank.

Barnett Bank Of Marion County, N. A. v. Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner (No. 94-1837)

No details yet.

Behrens v. Pelletier (No. 94-1244)

After the Federal Home Loan Bank Board recommended that Robert Pelletier be replaced because of he was under investigation for potential misconduct relating to the collapse of another financial institution, he was fired as the provisional managing officer of Pioneer Savings and Loan Association. Pelletier then filed suit, seeking damages. John Behrens, the agent responsible for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's recommendation, asserted a statute-of-limitations defense and claimed qualified immunity from suit on the ground that his actions were taken in a governmental capacity. The District Court rejected Behrens' defense of qualified immunity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable "final" decision, that an official claiming qualified immunity is entitled to only one such pretrial appeal, and, ultimately, affirmed the District Court's rejection of Behrens' qualified immunity. On remand, the District Court denied Behrens' motion for summary judgment, which again claimed qualified immunity. On appeal from the latest denial, the Court of Appeals dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.

Bennis v. Michigan (No. 94-8729)

Bennis's husband was convicted of gross indecency following his sexual activity with a prostitute in the couple's jointly-owned car. The local county prosecutor filed a complaint alleging the car was a public nuisance subject to abatement (i.e., to eliminate or confiscate the car). The Circuit Court entered the abatement order, but the Appeals Court reversed. After granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the appellate court's decision and re-entered the abatement order. Bennis appealed to the Supreme Court.

BMW v. Gore (No. 94-896)

After purchasing a new vehicle from an authorized Alabama BMW dealership, Ira Gore, Jr. discovered that his new vehicle had been repainted. He sued BMW's American distributor (BMW), alleging that it committed fraud by failing to inform him that his car had been repainted. The Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment, following a jury verdict, awarding Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal from the trial judge's denial of BMW's post-trial petition to set aside the punitive damages as 'grossly excessive,' the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages were not so excessive as to violate BMW's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Due to a jury calculation error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced Gore's punitive damage award to $2 million. BMW appealed to the Supreme Court.

Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr (No. 94-1654)

Umbehr was an independent trash-hauling contractor for Wabaunsee County, Kansas. He frequently criticized the County's Board of Commissioners (the Board). When the Board voted to terminate his contract, supposedly because the Board grew tired of his constant criticisms, Umbehr filed suit against two of the Board's members. Umbehr alleged that his termination resulted from his criticisms of the Board and, therefore, infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. On appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Board, the Tenth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted Umbehr's petition for certiorari.

Brotherhood Of Locomotive Engineers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co. (No. 94-1592)

No details yet.

Brown v. Pro Football Inc. (No. 95-388)

After their collective-bargaining agreement expired, the National Football League (NFL) -- a group of football clubs -- and the NFL Players Association -- a labor union -- began to negotiate a new contract. The NFL presented a plan that would permit each club to establish a "developmental squad" of substitute players, each of whom would be paid the same $1,000 weekly salary. The union disagreed. When the negotiations reached an impasse, the NFL unilaterally implemented the plan. A number of squad players brought an antitrust suit, claiming that the employers' plan unfairly restrained trade. The District Court awarded damages to the players, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision.

Bush v. Vera (No. 94-805)

Following the 1990 census, Texas planned the creation of three additional congressional districts. Following the redistricting, registered voters challenged the plans as racial gerrymandering. A three-judge federal district court found the plans unconstitutional. The case moved to the Supreme Court on appeal.

Carlisle v. United States (No. 94-9247)

At his trial on a federal marijuana charge, Charles Carlisle filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) after the jury returned a guilty verdict. The District Court granted the motion even though it was filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c), which provides that "[i]f the jury returns a verdict of guilty..., a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period." In reversing and remanding for reinstatement of the verdict and for sentencing, the Court of Appeals held that under Rule 29(c) a district court has no jurisdiction to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, or to enter such a judgment after submission of the case to the jury.

Citizens Bank Of Maryland v. Strumpf (No. 94-1340)

No details yet.

Colorado Rep Fed Campaign Comm v. FEC (No. 95-489)

Before the Colorado Republican Party selected its 1986 senatorial candidate, its Federal Campaign Committee bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party's likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought suit charging that the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee had violated the "Party Expenditure Provision" of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), which imposes dollar limits upon political party "expenditure[s] in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate." The Colorado Party defended itself by claiming that the FECA expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment as applied to its advertisements, and filed a counterclaim seeking to raise a challenge to the Provision as a whole. The District Court held that the Provision did not cover the expenditure at issue. Therefore, the court entered summary judgment for the Colorado Party and it dismissed the counterclaim as moot. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Provision covered this expenditure and satisfied the Constitution. Subsequently, the court ordered judgment for the FEC.

Commissioner v. Lundy (No. 94-1785)

During 1987, Robert F. Lundy and his wife had $10,131 in federal income taxes withheld from their wages. This amount was substantially more than what the Lundys owed in taxes that year, but they did not file their 1987 tax return when it was due, nor did they file a return or claim a refund of the overpaid taxes in the following 2 1/2 years. In 1990, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed Lundy a notice of deficiency for 1987. Subsequently, the Lundys filed their joint 1987 tax return, which claimed a refund of their overpaid taxes. Lundy also filed a petition in the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the claimed deficiency and a refund. The Commissioner contended that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund, arguing that if a taxpayer does not file a tax return before the IRS mails the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, the Tax Court can only award the taxpayer a refund of taxes paid within two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. The Tax Court agreed, finding also that 2-year "look-back" period applies. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the applicable look-back period in these circumstances is three years and that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to award a refund.

Cooper v. Oklahoma (No. 95-5207)

Byron Keith Cooper was charged with the murder of an 86-year-old man in the course of a burglary. After an Oklahoma jury found him guilty of first-degree murder and recommended punishment by death, the trial court imposed the death penalty. Cooper's competence was considered on five separate occasions, whether he had the ability to understand the charges against him and to assist defense counsel. Oklahoma law presumes that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial unless he proves his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. Despite Cooper's bizarre behavior and conflicting expert testimony, he was found competent on separate occasions before and during his trial. In affirming the conviction and sentence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Cooper's argument that the State's presumption of competence, combined with its clear and convincing evidence standard, placed such an onerous burden on him as to violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Degen v. United States (No. 95-173)

Brian Degen was indicted in 1989 for distributing marijuana, laundering money, and related crimes. On the same day the district court unsealed the indictment, it also unsealed a civil forfeiture complaint for properties allegedly worth $5.5 million and purchased with proceeds of Degen's drug sales or used to facilitate the sales. Degen is a citizen of both the U.S. and Switzerland, and in 1988 he and his family moved to Switzerland. He has not returned to the U.S. to face criminal charges and by treaty the Swiss are not obliged to extradite their nationals to the U.S. While residing in Switzerland, Degen filed an answer in the civil case, claiming that the forfeiture was barred by the statute of limitations and was an unlawful retroactive application of forfeiture laws. The district court did not consider his arguments. Instead, it entered summary judgment against him, holding that he was not entitled to be heard in the civil action because he remained outside the country, unamenable to criminal prosecution. On appeal, the government argued that the district court's inherent powers authorized it to strike Degen's claims under the "fugitive disentitlement doctrine."

Denver Area Consortium v. FCC (No. 95-124)

Sections 10(a) and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act (the Act) empower leased access channel cable operators to control programming that they believe is indecent and obscene. Section 10(b) of the Act requires public access channel cable operators to restrict "patently offensive" programming to a single channel, access to which must be restricted to those subscribers who submit written requests. Petitioners, television access programmers and cable television viewers, filed suit alleging that the Act's empowerments and restrictions violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. This case was consolidated with Alliance for Community Media v. FCC.

Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto (No. 95-559)

Paul Casarotto, a Subway sandwich shop franchisee, sued franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI) and its agent, Nick Lombardi, in a Montana state court when a dispute arose between the parties with regard to a standard form franchise agreement for the operation of the shop. The court stayed the lawsuit pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause set out in ordinary type on page nine of the franchise agreement. In reversing, the Montana Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it did not meet the state-law requirement, 27-5-114(4), that "[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbitration" be "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract." DAI and Lombardi unsuccessfully argued that the state-law requirement was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which declares written provisions for arbitration "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." The Montana Supreme Court focused on the question of whether the application of 27-5-114(4)'s notice requirement would undermine the FAA's goals and policies. In the Montana court's judgment, the notice requirement did not undermine these goals and policies, for it did not preclude arbitration agreements altogether.

Exxon Co. USA v. Sofec (No. 95-129)

An Exxon oil tanker, the Houston, broke free from a mooring facility under control of the respondents, Sofec, Inc. Exxon filed a complaint alleging negligence and breach of warranty in federal district court. Sofec, Inc. filed a successful motion to bifurcate the trial. The trial court considered whether the conduct of the ship's captain, Coyne, was the "superceding and sole proximate cause of the loss of the ship" after the ship had broken free of the moorings in order to determine if the tanker would have been lost despite Coyne's actions. The cause of the ship's release from the moorings became a secondary issue. The court found Coyne negligent, which was the primary cause of the Houston's grounding and subsequent loss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Exxon petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.

Felker v. Turpin (No. 95-8836)

Ellis Felker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellate or certiorari review, and stay of execution after having his convictions for capital murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and false imprisonment affirmed on appeal. Felker's habeas petition challenged the constitutionality of Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "Act"). Title I of the Act requires that all motions for filing a second or successive habeas appeal from a district court be reviewed by an appellate panel whose decision shall not be appealable by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Field v. Mans (No. 94-967)

No details yet.

Fulton Corporation v. Faulkner (No. 94-1239)

After North Carolina levied an "intangibles tax" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax, the Fulton Corporation, a North Carolina company, filed a state-court action against the State Secretary of Revenue, seeking judgment that the tax violated the Federal Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for the Secretary, but North Carolina's Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the taxable percentage deduction violated the Commerce Clause. In reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the State's scheme imposed a valid compensatory tax and that the intangibles tax imposed less of a burden on interstate commerce than the corporate income tax placed on intrastate commerce.

Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc. (No. 95-719)

William Gasperini, a journalist and photographer, loaned 300 original slide transparencies to the Center for Humanities, Inc. When the Center lost the transparencies, Gasperini commenced suit in the District Court. The Center conceded liability. A jury awarded Gasperini $1,500 per transparency, the asserted "industry standard" of compensation for a lost transparency. The Center moved for a new trial contending that the verdict was excessive. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals observed that New York law governed the controversy in this diversity case. Under New York law appellate courts are empowered to review the size of jury verdicts and to order new trials when the jury's award "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation." Contrarily, under the Seventh Amendment, "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." Guided by New York Appellate Division decisions reviewing damage awards for lost transparencies, the court held that the $450,000 verdict "materially deviates from what is reasonable compensation." The court vacated the judgment entered on the jury verdict and ordered a new trial, unless Gasperini agreed to an award of $100,000.

Gray v. Netherland, Warden (No. 95-6510)

Coleman Wayne Gray was tried for the murder of Richard McClelland in Virginia. The prosecution acknowledged that if the trial reached the capital penalty phase they would introduce Gray's admissions to other inmates that he had previously murdered 2 other people. Gray's attorney moved to exclude the evidence because Gray had not been officially charged with such crimes. Gray also claimed such evidence was a surprise tactic and that he could not pose the proper defense immediately. The Virginia trial court denied the motion to exclude. Subsequently, Gray was sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, Gray sough federal habeas corpus relief. He claimed that inadequate notice of evidence prevented him from a fair defense in the penalty phase of his capital trial in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court initially denied the petition because it found Gray had no constitutional right to notice of individual testimony. Later, the District Court amended its ruling, holding that Gray was denied due process when the state failed to provide notice of what murder evidence would be presented. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found that to grant the habeas corpus relief would be to recognize a new federal constitutional law regarding notice-of-evidence claims.

Henderson v. United States (No. 95-232)

Lloyd Henderson, a merchant mariner, was injured while working aboard a United States vessel. After exhausting administrative remedies, Henderson filed a seaman's personal injury action against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act. Henderson's complaint was filed close to, but within, the two-year limit set on complaints by the Act. Henderson then followed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the service of the summons and complaint, or service of process, to the proper authorities. The United States argued that Henderson failed to serve the complaint "forthwith," or without delay. This deprived the court of jurisdiction because "forthwith" service is a prerequisite for the government's waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act. The government's argument prevailed and the federal District Court dismissed Henderson's suit. Henderson lost on appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Hercules Inc. v. United States (No. 94-818)

During the 1960s, the United States government contracted with several chemical manufacturers, including Hercules Incorporated and Wm. T. Thompson Company, to manufacture the herbicide known as Agent Orange. After health problems arose, Vietnam veterans and their families began filing lawsuits against the manufactures. The manufacturers incurred substantial costs defending, and then settling, the claims. The manufactures then filed suit under the Tucker Act to recover such costs from the Government on theories of contractual indemnification and warranty of specifications provided by the government. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected the theory of implied warranty of specifications and the theory of implied promise to indemnify for liabilities incurred in performing the contracts. The appellate court also held that, by settling, the manufactures had voluntarily assumed liability for which the Government was not responsible.

Holly Farms Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board (No. 95-210)

Holly Farms Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc., is a vertically integrated poultry producer. In 1989, the Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391, filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board, seeking an election in a proposed unit that included live-haul employees working out of Holly Farms' Wilkesboro processing plant. The unit included workers described as "live-haul" crews, or teams of chicken catchers, forklift operators, and truckdrivers, who collect for slaughter chickens raised as broilers by independent contract growers, and transport the birds to the processing plant. Classifying the live-haul workers as employees protected by the National Labor Relations Act, rather than agricultural laborers excluded from the Act's coverage, the Board approved the bargaining unit. On petition for review, the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order, holding that the Board's classification rested on a reasonable interpretation of the Act and was consistent with the Board's prior decisions.

Jaffee v. Redmond (No. 95-266)

Mary Lu Redmond, a former police officer, received extensive counseling from a licensed clinical social worker after she shot and killed Ricky Allen. Carrie Jaffee, special administrator for Allen, filed suit in federal District Court alleging that Redmond had violated Allen's constitutional rights by using excessive force in the encounter. During the trial, Jaffee sought access to the notes from Redmond's counseling. Redmond's counsel resisted asserting the conversations were protected against involuntary disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The District Court judge rejected the argument, but the notes were not released. The judge instructed the jury that they could presume that the contents could have been unfavorable to Redmond. The jury awarded monetary damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It found that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 prompted the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.

Koon v. United States (No. 94-1664)

Petitioners Stacey C. Koon and Laurence M. Powell, Los Angeles police officers, were acquitted on state charges of assault and excessive use of force in the beating of Rodney King during an arrest. They were convicted under 18 U. S. C. Section 242 of violating the victim's constitutional rights under color of law. Although the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guideline, 1992 USSG Section 2H1.4, indicated that they should be imprisoned for 70 to 87 months, the District Court granted them two downward departures from that range. The first was based on the victim's misconduct, which significantly contributed to provoking the offense. The second was based on a combination of four factors: (1) that the petitioners were unusually susceptible to abuse in prison; (2) that the petitioners would lose their jobs and be precluded from employment in law enforcement; (3) that the petitioners had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions; and (4) that the petitioners posed a low risk of recidivism. The sentencing range after the departures was 30 to 37 months, and the court sentenced each petitioner to 30 months. The Court of Appeals reviewed the departure decisions utilizing a de novo standard and rejected all of them.

Lane v. Pena (No. 95-365)

The Department of Transportation expelled Lane, a student, from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy because he was diagnosed with diabetes. Lane sued the Department of Transportation alleging that his termination violated section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, which barred "any program or activity under any executive agency" from discriminating on the basis of disability. The district court reinstated Lane, but refused to award damages because the federal government's sovereign immunity had not been waived by Congress. The appeals court affirmed the district court decision.

Lawrence v. Chater (No. 94-9323)

Kemmerlyn Lawrence asserted entitlement to Social Security benefits as the dependant, unmarried minor child of a deceased insured individual. Under the Social Security Act, which requires paternity to be decided by state law, Lawrence acknowledged that her claim appeared defeated, but agued that the relevant North Carolina law's proof of paternity requirements are unconstitutional. After the Federal Government argued that a state paternity law's constitutionality need not be considered before applying it to determine entitlement to Social Security benefits, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Lawrence's benefits. Subsequently, the Social Security Administration reexamined its position and concluded that the Act does require a determination whether a state intestacy statute is constitutional. The Solicitor General thus invited the Court to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case (GVR) to the Court of Appeals to decide the case or remand it to the Social Security Commissioner for reconsideration.

Leavitt v. Jane L. (No. 95-1242)

A Utah district court held that a state statutory provision regulating early-term abortions was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that a similar provision regulating later-term abortions should be invalidated along with the earlier-term provision. The Tenth Circuit held that the Utah Legislature would only have wanted to regulate later-term abortions if it could also regulate earlier-term abortions, and thus concluded that the provisions were not severable (i.e. separable). Utah governor Michael Leavitt appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Utah Legislature intended the two provisions to be severable.

Lewis v. Casey (No. 94-1511)

Fletcher Casey, Jr. and other inmates of various prisons operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), brought a class action against ADOC officials, alleging that the ADOC officials were furnishing them with inadequate legal research facilities and thereby depriving them of their right of access to the courts, in violation of Bounds v. Smith. Bounds held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." The District Court found the ADOC officials in violation of Bounds and issued an injunction mandating detailed, systemwide changes in ADOC's prison law libraries and in its legal assistance programs. The Court of Appeals affirmed both the finding of a Bounds violation and the injunction's major terms.

Lewis v. United States (No. 95-6465)

Ray Lewis, a mail handler for the United States Postal Service, was observed opening several pieces of mail and pocketing the contents. Subsequently, Lewis was charged with two counts of obstructing the mail, where each charge carries a maximum authorized prison sentence of six months. Lewis requested a jury trial. Denying his request, the Magistrate Judge ordered a bench trial, explaining that because she would not sentence him to more than six months' imprisonment, he was not entitled to a jury trial. The District Court affirmed. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right pertains only to those offenses for which the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty of over six months' imprisonment. The Court continued that, because each offense charged was petty in character, the fact that Lewis was facing more than six months' imprisonment in the aggregate did not entitle him to a jury trial. The court also reasoned that because the offense's characterization as petty or serious determined the right to a jury trial, a trial judge's self-imposed limitation on sentencing could not deprive a defendant of that right.

Libretti v. United States (No. 94-7427)

No details yet.

Lockheed Corp. v. Spink (No. 95-809)

Lockheed Corporation hired Paul L. Spink when he was sixty-one. He was excluded from participation in Lockheed's retirement program. Later changes in federal law required Lockheed to add Spink to the retirement program. Lockheed added Spink, but refused accrued benefits for the years he had worked at Lockheed before federal law changed. Lockheed also offered an increased pension benefit to employees who would retire early in exchange for their waiver of any employment claims against the corporation. Spink refused to be added without earning the extra benefits for the previous years he had worked. Spink filed suit alleging he should receive full benefits. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Spink. It held the law applied retroactively which would cover Spink.

Lonchar v. Thomas (No. 95-5015)

Larry Grant Lonchar was sentenced to death for murder nine years ago. After the affirmance of Lonchar's conviction and sentence, his sister and brother filed "next friend" state habeas corpus petitions. Lonchar opposed both. Lonchar then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed. Shortly before Lonchar's scheduled execution, he filed another state habeas corpus petition. When the petition was denied, Lonchar filed an "eleventh hour" federal petition, his first, on the day of his scheduled execution. The District Court held that Lonchar's conduct in waiting almost nine years to file his federal petition did not constitute an independent basis for rejecting the petition and granted a stay to permit time for consideration of other grounds for dismissal raised by the State. The court had reasoned that federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9, not some generalized equitable authority to dismiss, governed the case. The Court of Appeals vacated the stay. Setting aside the Rules and traditional habeas doctrine, the court held that equitable doctrines independent of Rule 9 applied and it concluded that Lonchar did not merit equitable relief.

Lotus Development Corporation v. Borland International, Inc. (No. 94-2003)

Lotus Development Corporation (Lotus) copyrighted a computer spreadsheet program called Lotus 1-2-3. The program's menu options were arranged in a specific menu command hierarchy. Lotus 1-2-3 also allowed users to write "macros," which designate a certain series of commands to be executed with a single keystroke. Competing software-company Borland International, Inc. (Borland) released a similar program called Quattro that contained a program called "Key Reader." Lotus claimed that Key Reader infringed on its copyright because it copied Lotus 1-2-3 macros and arranged them according to the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy. Borland explained that it did this to allow users already familiar with Lotus 1-2-3 to also operate Quattro and argued that the Lotus menu command hierarchy did not constitute copyright-protected material.

After the District Court ruled in favor of Lotus, Borland appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the command menu hierarchy was a "method of operation" - a category excluded from copyright protection under 17 U.S.C.102(b).

Louisiana v. Mississippi (No. 121 ORIG)

No details yet.

Loving v. United States (No. 94-1966)

A general court-martial found Dwight J. Loving, an Army private, guilty of both premeditated murder and felony murder under Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The court-martial sentenced Loving to death based on the aggravating factors that the premeditated murder was committed during a robbery and that he had committed a second murder. The commander who convened the court-martial approved the findings and sentence. In affirming, the U.S. Army Court of Military Review and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces rejected Loving's contention that the President lacked the authority to prescribe aggravating factors in capital murder cases that enabled the court-martial to sentence him to death. Loving claimed that the separation-of-powers principle prevented the President from promulgating the Executive Order.

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (No. 95-26)

Herbert Markman owns the patent to a system that tracks clothing through the dry-cleaning process using a keyboard and data processor to generate transaction records, including a bar code readable by optical detectors. According to the patent's claim, the portion of the patent document that defines the patentee's rights, Markman's product can "maintain an inventory total" and "detect and localize spurious additions to inventory." Westview Instruments, Inc.'s product also uses a keyboard and processor and lists dry-cleaning charges on bar-coded tickets that can be read by optical detectors. In an infringement suit, after hearing an expert witness testify about the meaning of the claim's language, a jury found that Westview's product had infringed Markman's patent. However, the District Court directed a verdict for Westview on the ground that its device is unable to track "inventory" as that term is used in the claim. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the interpretation of claim terms is the exclusive province of the court and that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is consistent with that conclusion.

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Epstein (No. 94-1809)

In 1990, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. made a tender offer for the common stock of MCA, Inc., a Delaware corporation, which resulted in Matsushita's acquisition of MCA. Subsequently, two lawsuits followed. First, a class action filed in Delaware, alleged that, among other things, Matsushita and MCA conspired violating Delaware law. The second suit, filed in federal court, alleged that Matsushita's tender offer violated certain Securities and Exchange Commission Rules promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts in such suits. After Matsushita won the federal case, and while it was on appeal, the parties to the state action reached a settlement. The class-action settlement stated that class members who did not opt out of the class would waive all claims in connection with the tender offer, including those asserted in the federal action. As members of both state and federal plaintiff classes, who neither opted out of the settlement class nor appeared to contest the settlement or the representation of the class, pursued the federal appeal, Matsushita argued that the Delaware judgment was a bar to further prosecution under the Full Faith and Credit Act.

Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr (No. 95-754)

The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) provides for "the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use," and classifies such devices based on their level of risk. Class III devices pose the greatest risk and, thus, are subject to a rigorous premarket approval (PMA) process. However, two statutory exceptions to this process exist. Because Medtronic, Inc.'s pacemaker is a Class III device found substantially equivalent to a pre-existing device, it can avoid the PMA process. In 1990, Lora Lohr's Medtronic pacemaker failed, allegedly according to a defect. Lohr and her spouse filed a Florida state-court suit, alleging both negligence and strict-liability claims. Medtronic removed the case to federal district court. The court then dismissed the case as pre-empted by 21 USC section 360k(a), which provides that "no State...may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under [the MDA] to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under [the Act]." Reversing and affirming in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Lohrs' negligent design claims were not pre-empted, but that their negligent manufacturing and failure to warn claims were. (This case was decided together with 95-886, Lohr et vir v. Medtronic, Inc.)

Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. (No. 95-83)

Three years after complying with a county order to clean up petroleum contamination discovered on its property, KFC Western, Inc. brought an action under the citizen suit provision -- Section 6972 -- of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) to recover its cleanup costs from the Meghrigs. KFC claimed that the contamination had previously posed an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to health or the environment and that the Meghrigs were responsible for "equitable restitution" under the Act because, as prior owners of the property, they had contributed to the contaminated site. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that 6972(a) does not permit recovery of past cleanup costs and that 6972 does not authorize a cause of action for the remediation of toxic waste that does not pose an "imminent and substantial endangerment" at the time suit is filed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court on both issues.

Melendez v. United States (No. 95-5661)

After purchasing cocaine, Juan Melendez was charged with violating federal drug laws. The law carried a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Melendez signed a plea agreement stating he would be cooperative. In turn the government agreed to give him a short sentence. The District Court thus sentenced Melendez to ten years in prison, the mandatory minimum. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Montana v. Egelhoff (No. 95-566)

James Allen Egelhoff was tried in Montana courts for two counts of homicide. Egelhoff claimed that extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing or recalling the crimes. Montana law did not allow Egelhoff's intoxicated condition to be considered. Subsequently, Egelhoff was found guilty. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the decision. It held Egelhoff had a due process right to present all relevant evidence. Moreover, it held that Montana law's denial of such a presentation relieved the state from part of its burden of proof needed to convict Egelhoff.

Morse v. Republican Party Of Virginia (No. 94-203)

In 1994, the Republican Party of Virginia held a state convention to nominate the Republican candidate for United States Senator. A local political committee could certify any voter as a delegate to the convention by paying a registration fee of $35 or $45. Fortis Morse, Kenneth Curtis Bartholomew, and Kimberly J. Enderson, registered voters in Virginia willing to declare their intent to support the Party's nominee, were eligible to participate. Bartholomew and Enderson refused to pay the fee and did not become delegates. Morse paid the fee with funds advanced by supporters of the eventual nominee. Moore and others then filed a complaint seeking an injunction preventing the Party from imposing the fee, alleging that that the imposition of the fee violated sections 5 and 10 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed the claims.

National Labor Relations Board v. Town & Country Electric, Inc. (No. 94-947)

Town & County Electric, Inc., a non-union company, sought to fill several positions for a construction job in Minnesota. Town & Country received applications from union staff, but refused to interview any of the applicants except one, who was eventually hired and fired soon thereafter. These individuals applied with the intention to organize Town & Country and were to remain on Union payroll during their time of employment. The union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town & Country had refused to interview and retain the workers because of their union affiliation, a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board held that the 11 individuals met the definition of employees under the Act and rejected Town & Country's claims that the individuals had been refused for other reasons.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that the term "employee" does not include those individuals who remain on Union payroll during their time of employment with another company.

Neal v. United States (No. 94-9088)

A federal District Court sentenced Meirl Gilbert Neal on two plea-bargained convictions involving possession of LSD with intent to distribute. The amount of LSD was determined, under both the federal statute directing minimum sentences and the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual, by the whole weight of the blotter paper, or carrier medium, containing the drug. The combined weight of the blotter paper and LSD actually sold by Neal was 109.51 grams. Thus, the court ruled that Neal was subject to 21 U.S.C. 841(b) (1)(A)(v), which imposes a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on anyone convicted of trafficking in more than 10 grams of "a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of LSD. After the Commission revised the Guidelines' calculation method by instructing courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight, Neal filed a motion to modify his sentence, contending that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was only 4.58 grams, well short of 841(b)(1)(A)(v)'s 10-gram requirement, and that the Guidelines' presumptive-weight method controlled the mandatory minimum calculation. The District Court held that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, was determinative of whether Neal crossed the 10-gram threshold and that the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence still applied to him notwithstanding the Guidelines. In affirming, an en banc Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights.

Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Hiles (No. 95-6)

Railroad cars are connected by couplers consisting of knuckles - clamps that lock with their mates - joined to the ends of drawbars, which are fastened to housing mechanisms on the cars. Cars automatically couple when they come together and one car's open knuckle engages the other car's closed knuckle. The drawbar pivots in its housing, allowing the knuckled end some lateral play to prevent moving cars from derailing on a curved track. As a consequence of this lateral movement, drawbars may remain off-center when cars are uncoupled and must be realigned manually to ensure proper coupling. William J. Hiles injured his back while attempting to realign an off-center drawbar on a car at one of Norfolk & Western Rail Company's yards. Hiles sued in Illinois state court, alleging that Norfolk & Western had violated Section 2 of the federal Safety Appliance Act (SAA), which requires that cars be equipped with "couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals going between the ends of the vehicles." The trial court granted Hiles a directed verdict on liability, and the state appellate court affirmed.

O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. (No. 95-354)

James O'Connor, 56, was fired by Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. and replaced by a 40-year-old worker. O'Connor filed suit alleging that his discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The District Court granted Consolidated's summary judgment motion. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that O'Connor failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination because he failed to show that he was replaced by someone outside the age group protected by the ADEA since his replacement was 40 years old.

O'Hare Truck Service v. Northlake (No. 95-191)

O'Hare Truck Service was one among several towing companies employed by the city of Northlake. Northlake kept a list of available towing companies and would only remove a company from its list after a showing of cause. In the present case, however, Northlake removed O'Hare Truck Service from its list because O'Hare's owner did not support Northlake's mayoral candidate in his reelection campaign. Instead, O'Hare's owner supported the opposition candidate. Upon removal from Northlake's employment list, O'Hare Truck Service filed suit alleging that its dismissal was a retaliation for its lack of support for Northlake's mayoral candidate. The dismissal was the cause of substantial loss in income. On appeal from the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a First Amendment violation, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Ornelas v. United States (No. 95-5257)

Saul Ornelas and Ismael Ornelas-Ledesma were arrested in Wisconsin after suspicious activity led to the discovery of cocaine in the defendants' car. In a motion to suppress the evidence, the defendants alleged that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in their detainment and in the police search of the car. The District Court denied the motion and the defendants pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the District Court but for different reasons.

Peacock v. Thomas (No. 94-1453)

In 1987, Jack L. Thomas filed an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) class action against his former employer Tru-Tech, Inc. and D. Grant Peacock, an officer and shareholder of Tru-Tech. Thomas alleged that they had breached their fiduciary duties to the class in administering Tru-Tech's pension benefits plan and sought the benefits due under the plan. The District Court ruled in Thomas's favor, but found that Peacock was not a fiduciary. After the Court of Appeals affirmed and attempts to collect from Tru-Tech failed, Thomas sued Peacock. The District Court, agreeing with Thomas to pierce the corporate veil, entered judgment against Peacock in the amount of the judgment against Tru-Tech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' suit.

Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance (No. 95-244)

The California Insurance Commissioner filed a state court action against Allstate Insurance Co. seeking damages for Allstate's alleged breach of reinsurance agreements in an effort to gather the assets of the defunct Mission Insurance companies. Allstate removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds and filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Commissioner sought to remand the case to state court, arguing that the court should abstain from hearing the case, under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., because its resolution might interfere with California's regulation of insurance insolvencies and liquidations. The District Court agreed, concluded that an abstention was appropriate, and remanded the case to state court without ruling on Allstate's arbitration motion. After determining the appealability of the District Court's remand order, the Court of Appeals vacated the decision and ordered the case sent to arbitration. The court held that abstention was inappropriate in this damages action because a Burford abstention is limited to equitable actions.

Richards v. Jefferson County (No. 95-386)

Jason Richards and others, who are privately employed in Jefferson County, filed a state court class action suit claiming that the county's occupation tax violates the Federal and Alabama Constitutions. The Alabama trial court found that their state claims were barred by a prior adjudication, Bedingfield v. Jefferson County. The unsuccessful Bedingfield adjudication of the tax was brought by Birmingham's acting finance director and the city itself, consolidated with a suit by three county taxpayers. However, the court found that their federal claims had not been decided in that case. On appeal, the county argued that the federal claims were also barred. The State Supreme Court agreed, concluding that the doctrine of res judicata applied because Richard and others were adequately represented in the Bedingfield action.

Romer v. Evans (No. 94-1039)

Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial, legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Following a legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties, the state trial court entered a permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.

Rutledge v. United States (No. 94-8769)

Tommy L. Rutledge was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. The District Court convicted Rutledge on both counts. It sentenced him to life imprisonment without possible release on each count. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It rejected Rutledge's argument that his convictions and concurrent life sentences punished him twice for the same offense.

Seminole Tribe v. Florida (No. 94-12)

The Seminole Tribe brought suit against the State of Florida for violating the good faith negotiations requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Under the IGRA, the Tribe may engage in gaming (i.e., casino gambling) activities subject to Florida's good faith regulations. Florida moved to dismiss the Tribe's action, alleging that the lawsuit violated Florida's sovereign immunity. On appeal from the District Court's denial of Florida's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded Florida from federal suit and that under Ex Parte Young, the Tribe may not enforce its right to good faith negotiations by naming Florida's governor as a party to the suit.

Shaw v. Hunt (No. 94-923)

Residents of North Carolina challenged a plan to create two congressional districts on the ground that the proposed districts were racially gerrymandered. On initial review, a three-judge District Court panel dismissed the action only to have its decision reversed and remanded to it by the Supreme Court. However, the Court's standard for review left very little room for racial engineering of congressional voting districts. On remand, the District Court found the redistricting plans to be racially tailored and, therefore, unconstitutional. Again, the matter was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota) (No. 95-860)

Barbara Smiley, a resident of California, possessed credits cards issued by Citibank, a national bank located in South Dakota. Under certain circumstances, Citibank will issue late-payment fees. In 1992, Smiley brought a class action against Citibank on behalf of herself and other California holders of Citibank's credit cards, alleging that the late-payment fees charged by Citibank, although legal under South Dakota law, violated California law. In response, Citibank argued that a provision of the National Bank Act of 1864, which permits a national bank to charge its loan customers "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is located," pre-empted Smiley's state law claims. After accepting Citibank's argument that late-payment fees constituted "interest," the California Superior Court ruled in its favor. The California Superior Court Supreme Court affirmed.

Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca (No. 94-1530)

Anthony Petrarca commenced an action in Ohio state court to collect rent allegedly owed by Child World, Inc. under two commercial leases and to enforce Cole National Corporation's guarantee of Child World's performance under the leases. After Child World filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, Cole's successor in interest, Things Remembered, Inc., removed the action to federal court under the bankruptcy removal statute and the general federal removal statute. The Bankruptcy Court held that the removal was timely and proper and that it had jurisdiction. The District Court reversed and remanded the case to state court, holding that the removal was untimely and that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed Things Remembered's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Thompson v. Keohane, Warden (No. 94-6615)

No details yet.

Tuggle v. Netherland (No. 95-6016)

Lem Tuggle was convicted of murder. After the Commonwealth presented unrebutted psychiatric testimony of his future dangerousness, the jury found two statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Tuggle to death. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, which held that when the prosecution presents psychiatric evidence of an indigent defendant's future dangerousness in a capital sentencing proceeding, due process requires the State to provide the defendant with the assistance of an independent psychiatrist. On remand, the State Supreme Court invalidated the future dangerousness aggravating factor, but upheld the death sentence based on the vileness aggravator under Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862. Agreeing, the Court of Appeals construed Zant as establishing a rule that in nonweighing States a death sentence may be upheld based on one valid aggravating circumstance, regardless of the reasons for finding another aggravating factor invalid.

United Food Workers v. Brown Group Inc. (No. 95-340)

The United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 filed suit alleging that Brown Group, Inc. began to lay off workers in connection with the closing of one of its plants, Brown Shoe Company, before giving the union the closing notice required by the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the WARN Act). The union sought backpay for each of its affected members. Under modern associational standing doctrine, an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries when: 1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and 3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The District Court dismissed the compliant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that "[e]ach union member who wishes to recover WARN Act damages from Brown Shoe must participate in the suit so that his or her right to damages can be determined and the quantum of damages can be calculated by the court on the basis of particularized proof." Therefore, the court concluded that the suit was barred because the union failed to meet the third part of the test for asserting associational standing.

United States v. Noland (No. 95-323)

The IRS filed claims in Bankruptcy Court for taxes, interest, and penalties that accrued when Thomas R. Noland, the trustee of the in-debt First Truck Lines, Inc., sought relief under federal Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court held that the claims for taxes and interest were the first priority in the case. Consequently, the court subordinated the penalties, to be adjudicated following the taxes and interest, because the penalties were not financial losses for the IRS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

United States v. Armstrong (No. 95-157)

Christopher Lee Armstrong and others were indicted on federal charges of "conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) and conspiring to distribute the same." The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had monitored Armstrong and others prior to their indictment and arrest. Armstrong filed a motion for discovery or dismissal, alleging that he was selected for prosecution because he was black. The District Court granted the discovery order. It ordered the government to provide statistics on similar cases from the last three years. The government indicated it would not comply. Subsequently, the District Court dismissed the case. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. It held that the proof requirements for a selective-prosecution claim do not require a defendant to demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated.

United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company Of Virginia 516 U.S. 415 (No. 94-1893)

To prevent "local media monopolies," Section 533(b) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 barred local phone service providers (local exchange carriers or LECs) from directly providing video programming to their local phone service subscribers. The government claimed that because LEC-controlled phone lines could also transmit video signals, allowing LECs to provide video programming would hurt competing cable companies. First, LECs could deny competitors access to their data lines. Second, LECs could offer lower cable prices than competitors by raising the costs of telephone service and using the extra profits to subsidize the costs of cable service.

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia (Chesapeake) challenged the constitutionality of the statute, pointing out that "video programming" is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. The government argued that the statute's regulation of the cable market had a "content-neutral" objective. The District Court ruled that the statute's restrictions were not "narrowly tailored" to serve the statute's objective. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adding that the statute did not leave open "ample alternative channels for communication" between LECs and local residents. The Supreme Court consolidated the case with National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.

United States v. International Business Machines Corp. (No. 95-591)

Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) paid a tax on insurance premiums it paid to foreign insurers to insure exports from the U.S. to foreign countries. IBM sought a refund on the tax and filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims when its refund claim was denied by the IRS. IBM contended the tax violated the Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that "[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." The court agreed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

United States v. Reorganized CF& I Fab. of UT (No. 95-325)

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 obligated CF&I Steel Corporation (CF&I) to make annual funding contributions to pension plans they sponsored. The required contribution for the 1989 plan totaled $12.4 million. CF&I failed to make the payment and petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for Chapter 11 reorganization. The Government filed a proof of claim for tax liability arising under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 4971(a), which imposes a 10 percent "tax" on any "accumulated funding deficiency" of plans such as CF&I's. The court allowed the claim, but rejected the Government's argument that the claim was entitled to priority as an "excise tax" under the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court also subordinated the Section 4971 claim to those of all other general unsecured creditors under the Bankruptcy Code's provision for equitable subordination. The court later approved a reorganization plan for CF&I giving lowest priority (and no money) to claims for non-compensatory penalties. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

United States v. Ursery (No. 95-345)

Alleging that Ursery manufactured marijuana on his property, the United States government initiated criminal proceedings against Ursery and began civil forfeiture proceedings against his property. On appeal from his conviction in District Court, the Court of Appeals reversed on double-jeopardy grounds. The government then initiated a second set of proceedings against Ursery's property, which was reversed on new double-jeopardy grounds. The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

United States v. Virginia (No. 94-1941)

The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer "substantively comparable" educational benefits. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.

United States v. Winstar (No. 95-865)

During the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board encouraged thrifts in good standing and outside investors to take over ailing thrifts in supervisory mergers. The Board agreed to permit acquiring entities to designate the excess of the purchase price over the fair value of identifiable assets as an intangible asset referred to as supervisory goodwill and to count such goodwill and certain capital credits toward the capital reserve requirements imposed by federal regulations. Subsequently, Congress's passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) forbade thrifts from counting goodwill and capital credits in computing the required reserves. Three thrifts, created through supervisory mergers who consequently ran into financial troubles, each filed suit against the United States for breach of contract. Agreeing with the thrifts, the District Court granted each summary judgment. The court rejected Government's arguments that surrenders of sovereign authority, such as the promise to refrain from regulatory changes, must appear in unmistakable terms in a contract in order to be enforceable and that a public and general sovereign act, such as FIRREA's alteration of capital reserve requirements, could not trigger contractual liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Varity Corp. v. Howe (No. 94-1471)

Charles Howe and others used to work for Massey-Ferguson, Inc., a farm equipment manufacturer, and a wholly owned subsidiary of the Varity Corporation. These employees all were participants in, and beneficiaries of, Massey-Ferguson's self-funded employee welfare benefit plan, an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA protected plan that Massey-Ferguson administered itself. When certain divisions in Massey-Ferguson stared losing money, Varity decided to transfer them to a separately incorporated subsidiary, Massey Combines. Varity also persuaded the employees of the failing divisions to change employers and benefit plans, conveying the message that employees' benefits would remain secure when they transferred. Ultimately, the employees lost their nonpension benefits. The employees filed an action under ERISA, claim that Varity, through trickery, had led them to withdraw from their old plan and forfeit their benefits. The District Court found that Varity and Massey-Ferguson, acting as ERISA fiduciaries, had harmed plan beneficiaries through deliberate deception, which gave the employees to right to relief, including the reinstatement to the old plan. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Whren v. United States (No. 95-5841)

Whren and Brown were driving in a 'high drug area.' Some plainclothes officers, while patrolling the neighborhood in an unmarked vehicle, noticed Whren and Brown sitting in a truck at an intersection stop-sign for an usually long time. Suddenly, without signaling, Whren turned his truck and sped away. Observing this traffic violation, the officers stopped the truck. When they approached the vehicle, the officers saw Whren holding plastic bags of crack cocaine. Whren and Brown were arrested on federal drug charges. Before trial, they moved to suppress the evidence contending that the officers used the traffic violation as a pretext for stopping the truck because they lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop them on suspicion of drug dealing. The District Court denied the motion to suppress and convicted the petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Wisconsin v. New York (No. 94-1614)

Under the Constitution's Census Clause, Congress is vested with the responsibility of conducting an "actual enumeration" of the American public every ten years, primarily for the purpose of aportioning congressional representation among the states. Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce who, in the 1990 census, decided not to use a statistical correction, known as the post-enumeration survey (PES), to adjust an undercount in the initial population count. Acting on behalf of several citizens' groups, states, and cities, Wisconsin challenged the Secretary's decision not to use the PES; claiming that it resulted in an undercounting of certain identifiable minority groups.

Wood v. Bartholomew (No. 94-1419)

Dwayne Bartholomew was convicted in a Washington state court of murder during a robbery. Bartholomew admitted the robbery, but claimed the victim was killed accidentally. At trial, Bartholomew's brother Rodney testified that Bartholomew had told them of his robbery plans and his intent to leave no witnesses. The prosecution never disclosed that Rodney's responses to questions about the robbery and murder weapon, during a pretrial polygraph examination, indicated deception. Bartholomew filed for federal habeas, claiming that because the polygraph results were material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, which provides that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a state prosecutor is required to disclose material evidence favorable to an accused, the prosecution's failure to disclose them justified setting aside the conviction. The District Court denied the writ. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the polygraph results, although inadmissible under Washington law, were material under Brady because they may have given Bartholomew's counsel known of the results a stronger reason to investigate Rodney's story.

Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun (No. 94-1387)

In 1989, 12-year-old Natalie Calhoun died in a collision in territorial waters off Puerto Rico while riding a Yamaha jet ski. Natalie's parents, invoking Pennsylvania's wrongful-death and survival statutes, filed a federal diversity and admiralty action for damages against Yamaha. Yamaha argued that, because Natalie died on navigable waters, state remedies could not be applied, and that federal, judge-declared maritime law controlled to the exclusion of state law. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the District Court held that the federal maritime wrongful-death action excluded state law remedies, but that loss of society and loss of support and services were compensable. Both sides ask for an appeal. After granting the interlocutory review petition, the appellate panel held that state remedies remain applicable in accident cases of this type and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death action.

Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. (No. 94-1361)

In 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed, including Muriel Kole. Subsequently, Marjorie Zicherman and Muriel Mahalek, Kole's sister and mother sued KAL under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which governs international air transportation. Zicherman and Mahalek were awarded loss-of-society damages. The Court of Appeals set aside the verdict, holding that general maritime law supplied the substantive compensatory damages law to be applied in an action under the Warsaw Convention and that, under such law, a plaintiff can recover for loss of society only if he was the decedent's dependent at the time of death. The appellate court found that Mahalek had not established dependent status and remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether Zicherman was a dependent of the decedent.