The Oyez Project: 1995 Term Decisions

44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island (No. 94-1140)

Is Rhode Island's statute an infringement on the First Amendment right to commercial freedom of speech? If it is, can Rhode Island still pass such legislation under the Twenty-first Amendment which limits the dormant Commerce Clause by empowering the states to regulate the sale of alcohol?

Yes and no. In a fractious opinon for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens found Rhode Island's statutory ban on liquor price advertising to be an unconstitutional infringement of the liquor sellers' First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In response to Rhode Island's claim that it passed the statutory ban to protect consumers from "commercial harms," Justice Stevens held that governmental impediments to truthful and accurate commercial messages rarely protect consumers. On the contrary, courts must take "special care" when considering such "protective" measures since they often hinder public choice and obstruct necessary debate over public policy issues. Furthermore, Rhode Island failed to show that its statutory ban would lower market-wide liquor consumption, must less alter alcohol consumption among abusive drinkers who are most in need of assistance. Finally, Justice Stevens held that although the Twenty-first Amendment did empower Rhode Island to regulate the sale of liquor, such regulatory power is not to be exercised to the detriment of its constitutional obligation to protect and abide by the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee.

Auciello Iron Works Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (No. 95-668)

May an employer disavow a collective-bargaining agreement because of a good-faith doubt about a union's majority status at the time the contract was made, when the doubt arises from facts known to the employer before its contract offer had been accepted by the union?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the NLRB reasonably concluded that an employer challenging an agreement under these circumstances commits an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Court agreed with the NLRB that an employer's precontractual, good-faith doubt is inadequate to support an exception to the conclusive presumption of a union's majority status, which arises at the moment when a collective-bargaining contract offer has been accepted.

Bailey v. United States (No. 94-7448)

Is evidence of the proximity and accessibility of a firearm to drugs or drug proceeds alone sufficient to support a conviction for "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a predicate narcotics offense under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)?

No. The proximity and accessibility test for "use" is so broad that no independent role remains for "carry." "Use" in Section 924(c)(1) requires more than proximity and accessibility that might embolden a defendant. It requires active employment of the firearm by the defendant, making the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.

Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co. (No. 94-1175)

Does the Expedited Funds Availability Act provide for federal-court jurisdiction only in suits between customers and banks?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the act provides for federal-court jurisdiction not only in suits between customers and banks, but also in cases initiated by one bank against another bank. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that section 4010 of the act authorizes claims for relief that are enforceable in federal court. Moreover, Justice Ginsburg continued, "it is implausible that Congress directed the Board to handle such disputes administratively, for [section 4010] does not explicitly confer adjudicatory authority on the Board, nor set forth the relevant procedures for resolution of private disputes." Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia wrote concurring opinions.

Barnett Bank Of Marion County, N. A. v. Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner (No. 94-1837)

No details yet.

Behrens v. Pelletier (No. 94-1244)

Does a defendant's immediate appeal of an unfavorable qualified-immunity ruling on his motion to dismiss deprive the court of appeals of jurisdiction over a second appeal, also based on qualified immunity, immediately following denial of summary judgment?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the court of appeals was not deprived of jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the agent was not limited in such circumstances to one interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. Justice Scalia wrote that, "an order rejecting the defense of qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a 'final' judgment subject to immediate appeal." In a dissent joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote, in such cases, "the law normally permits a single interlocutory appeal, and not more than one such appeal."

Bennis v. Michigan (No. 94-8729)

Does the abatement order entered against Bennis's car constitute a taking of private property for public use in violation of the property clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Writing for a 5-to-4 majority, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist held that the abatement order against Bennis's car did not violate the takings clause. Her innocence and lack of knowledge concerning her husband's illegal and indecent activity, in the couple's jointly owned car, could not serve as a defense against her vehicle's forfeiture. Furthermore, under the present circumstances, the vehicle's forfeiture did not violate Bennis's property rights without due process. Michigan's abatement policy, aimed at deterring criminal uses of property, lawfully transferred her's vehicle to the state. As such, Michigan is not required to compensate Bennis for the vehicle's forfeiture.

BMW v. Gore (No. 94-896)

Assuming that Gore's punitive damage award was grossly excessive, does the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause protect BMW from paying the award?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that while a state may impose punitive damages to further its interest in deterring unlawful conduct, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause prohibits states from imposing grossly excessive punishments on tort-feasors. In the present case, the punitive damage's excessive nature is indicated by the 500 to 1 ratio between the jury's punitive and actual damage awards, the relatively insignificant amount of damage, and the lack of statutory fines that remotely parallel the present award's magnitude. BMW's due process rights were also violated because it could not have possibly anticipated, nor did it receive fair notice, that it might face such a severe punishment.

Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr (No. 94-1654)

Did the Board's termination of Umbehr's contract, presumably as a result of his criticisms, constitute a violation of his First Amendment freedom of speech?

Yes. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech shielded Umbehr, as a government employee, from termination due to things he might have said about the Board. Umbehr successfully proved that his criticisms of the Board preceded his termination and were the primary motivating factor behind its retaliatory termination of his contract. The Court added that, in balancing an employee's interest in commenting on public concerns against an employer's interest in promoting efficient performance by its employees, it could not find any countervailing county interest justifying its infringement of Umbehr's freedom of speech.

Brotherhood Of Locomotive Engineers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co. (No. 94-1592)

No details yet.

Brown v. Pro Football Inc. (No. 95-388)

Are several employers immune from a union anti-trust suit when these employers, bargaining together, unilaterally impose terms on the union if the collective bargaining process reaches an impasse?

Yes. In affirming the Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court held that federal labor laws protect professional football franchises from anti-trust actions brought by their players when those franchises unilaterally impose terms after the collective bargaining process breaks down. Labor laws stabilize, encourage, and protect the collective bargaining process. When that process breaks down, labor laws provide adequate remedies. Employee suits under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, by contrast, might undermine the integrity of collective bargaining and preempt unnecessarily the labor laws.

Bush v. Vera (No. 94-805)

Do the Texas redistricting plans violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Texas redistricting plans were unconstitutional. Supporting its "strict scrutiny" approach, the Court noted that the proposed districts were highly irregular in shape, that their computerized design was significantly more sensitive to racial data, and that they lacked any semblance to pre-existing race-neutral districts. The Court also held that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the proposed districts would deprive minority groups of equal participation in the electoral political processes. Thus, the proposed districts violated the Voting Rights Act's "results" test prohibiting activity that "results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen to vote on account of race or color." Finally, with respect to proposed district 18, the Court held that Texas deliberately designed it to hamper the local African-American minority's ability to elect representatives of their choice. This violated the Voting Rights Act's "nonretrogression" principle, prohibiting state action from obstructing a minority's ability to elect representatives of their choice.

Carlisle v. United States (No. 94-9247)

Does a district court have the authority to grant a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal if the motion is filed beyond the seven-day deadline prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)?

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the District Court had no authority to grant the petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day outside the Rule 29(c) time limit. Judges may not stretch the deadline by even one day; Justice Scalia wrote for the court that, "[t]here is simply no room...for the granting of an untimely post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, regardless of whether the motion is accompanied by a claim of actual innocence...."

Citizens Bank Of Maryland v. Strumpf (No. 94-1340)

No details yet.

Colorado Rep Fed Campaign Comm v. FEC (No. 95-489)

Do the federal campaign-financing limits on the amount of money political parties may spend on congressional races, as established by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, violate First Amendment rights when applied to expenditures a political party has made independently of any candidate's campaign?

Yes. In a plurality decision, Justice Stephen G. Breyer announced the judgment of the Court and authored an opinion, in which the Court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) to the kind of expenditure at issue here-an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate. Justices O'Connor and Souter joined Justice Breyer. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, concluded that, on its face, FECA violates the First Amendment when it restricts as a "contribution" a political party's spending "in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with_a candidate." Justice Thomas concluded that the Provision is unconstitutional not only as applied to the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, but also on its face. Dissenting, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg agreed with the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Commissioner v. Lundy (No. 94-1785)

Can the Tax Court award a refund of taxes paid more than two years prior to the date on which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, when, on the date the notice of deficiency was mailed, the taxpayer had not yet filed a return?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that in these circumstances a 2-year look-back period applies and the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award a refund. Finding that the Tax Court properly applied the 2-year look-back period to Lundy's case, Justice O'Connor noted that Lundy's taxes were withheld from his wages such that they were deemed paid on the date his 1987 tax return was due, which is more than two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. The Lundy was thus seeking a refund of taxes paid outside the applicable look-back period. Justices John Paul Stevens and Clarence Thomas filed dissents.

Cooper v. Oklahoma (No. 95-5207)

May state law presume that defendants are competent to stand trial unless they prove their incompetence by clear and convincing evidence without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that because Oklahoma's procedural rule allows the State to try a defendant who is more likely than not incompetent, it violates due process. Justice Stevens wrote for the court that the stringent standard is "incompatible with the dictates of due process," and that criminal defendants must be allowed to avoid trial if they prove incompetence by a "preponderance of the evidence."

Degen v. United States (No. 95-173)

Should the fugitive disentitlement doctrine be extended to allow a court in a civil forfeiture suit to enter judgment against a claimant, without any opportunity to be heard, because the claimant is a fugitive from, or otherwise is resisting, a related criminal prosecution?

No. Principles of deference to the other branches of government require a court to invoke its inherent power only as a reasonable response to the problems and needs that provoke it. No sufficient reason justifies disentitlement here. Since the court's jurisdiction over the property is secure despite Degen's absence, there is no risk of delay or frustration in determining the merits of the government's forfeiture claims or in enforcing the resulting judgment. Also, the court has alternatives, other than disentitlement, to keep Degen from using liberal civil discovery rules to gain an improper advantage in the criminal prosecution, where discovery is more limited. Finally, disentitlement is an excessive response to the court's interests in redressing the indignity visited upon it by Degen's absence from the criminal proceeding, and in deterring flight from criminal prosecution in general; it is a response that erodes rather than enhances the dignity of the court.

Denver Area Consortium v. FCC (No. 95-124)

Do the Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act's empowerments and restrictions violate the petitioner's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?

No and yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, The Court held that the Act's grant of authority to leased channel cable operators under 10(a) - allowing them to restrict the transmission of "patently offensive" or indecent programming - is consistent with the First Amendment. The authority's discretionary nature and ultimate objective of protecting young viewers from offensive programming, is a constitutionally permissible method of restoring editorial authority to cable operators. By contrast, the Court found provision 10(c), permitting cable operators to ban offensive or indecent programming on public access channels, to be unconstitutional. Public access channels are already supervised by both private and public elements and have never been edited by cable operators in the past. Furthermore, a "cable operator's veto" is likely to ban many programs that should have been aired, and the volume of "patently offensive" programming on public access channels has never been so high as to warrant severe restrictions on its content. Finally, with respect to Section 10(b), the Court held that its "segregate and block" requirements for public access channels is also unconstitutional. Section 10(b), by enabling cable operators to take as many as 30 days to respond to a consumer's request to unlock their restricted channel, is overly restrictive. Also, by blocking out an entire channel, 10(b) does not permit viewers or operators to discern between offensive and "patently offensive" programming.

Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto (No. 95-559)

Does the Federal Arbitration Act preempt Montana's first-page notice of arbitration requirement?

Yes. In a 8-1 decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that Montana's first-page notice requirement, 27-5-114(4), which governs not "any contract," but specifically and solely contracts "subject to arbitration," conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and is therefore displaced by the federal measure. Justice Ginsburg wrote that Congress "precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status" when it passed the FAA.

Exxon Co. USA v. Sofec (No. 95-129)

Does the "superseding cause" doctrine apply to admiralty cases in which the court previously has adopted a comparative fault principle?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a plaintiff in admiralty that is the superseding cause of its own injury, and thus the sole, proximate cause, cannot recover part of its damages from tort-feasors or contracting partners whose blameworthy actions were causes in fact of the injury.

Felker v. Turpin (No. 95-8836)

Do the Act's Title I provisions, preventing the Supreme Court from reviewing an appellate review panel's denial of leave to file a second habeas petition, unconstitutionally "suspend" the habeas writ and restrict the Court's authority to entertain original habeas petitions?

No. The unanimous Court held that the Act's creation of an appellate panel, charged with reviewing all second or successive habeas applications, is not unconstitutional. The Act simply transfers the duty of habeas review from the district courts to an appellate panel. While the Act prevents an appeal to the Court from an appellate panel's denial of leave to file a second habeas petition, it does not repeal the Court's authority to entertain original habeas petitions. Thus, the shift in habeas "gatekeeping" duties to an appellate panel is neither an unconstitutional "suspension" of the habeas writ which would violate the Exceptions Clause of Article III, nor a deprivation of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.

Field v. Mans (No. 94-967)

No details yet.

Fulton Corporation v. Faulkner (No. 94-1239)

Does North Carolina's "intangibles tax" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by North Carolina residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax violate the Federal Commerce Clause?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that North Carolina's intangibles tax discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Souter reasoned that the tax discriminated on face against interstate commerce by taxing stock only to the extent that its issuing corporation participated in interstate commerce. "North Carolina's intangibles tax facially discriminates against interstate commerce, it fails justification as a valid compensatory tax, and, accordingly, it cannot stand," wrote Justice Souter. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion.

Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc. (No. 95-719)

Does New York's law that empowers appellate courts to review the size of jury's awards conflict with the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of jury trials in civil cases?

No. In a 5-4 plurality decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that New York's law controlling compensation awards for excessiveness or inadequacy can be given effect, without detriment to the Seventh Amendment, if the review standard is applied by the federal trial court judge, with appellate control of the trial court's ruling confined to "abuse of discretion."

Gray v. Netherland, Warden (No. 95-6510)

Can a defendant sentenced to death argue in his habeas corpus petition that prosecutors deceived him, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, by producing surprise evidence in the sentencing phase of the trial?

No. In a 5-4 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that the notice-of-evidence claim would require the adoption of a new constitutional rule and therefore could not be raised in a habeas petition. In her dissent, Justice Ruth Bader maintained that due process allows Gray the right to a "full, fair, potentially effective opportunity to defend against the State's charges." Gary was not given that right.

Henderson v. United States (No. 95-232)

Is service of process under the Suits of Admiralty Act a matter of procedure governed by the uniform Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg contended that process of service was primarily a means to notify another of impending legal action in a way that provides the defendant adequate time to answer and present defenses. The Court held that "[t]he federal rules thus convey a clear message: Complaints are not to be dismissed if served within 120 days, or within such additional time as the court may allow."

Hercules Inc. v. United States (No. 94-818)

May the chemical manufacturers of Agent Orange recover costs incurred from defending and settling third-party tort claims arising out of their performance of Government contracts from the Government on alternative theories of contractual indemnification or warranty of specifications provided by the Government?

No. In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the manufacturers may not recover on their warranty-of-specifications and contractual-indemnification claims. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that the manufactures could not recover from the government because the contracts did not contain warranties or indemnification provisions for costs in defending and settling third-party tort claims resulting from chemical manufacture and use. Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the context in which the government compelled the manufacturer to manufacture Agent Orange did not give rise to an implied-in-fact indemnity agreement. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent that was joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Justice John Paul Stevens did not participate in the case.

Holly Farms Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board (No. 95-210)

Did the National Labor Relations Board correctly classify chicken catchers as employees, and not as exempt agricultural workers, for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the NLRB's determination that the producer's live-haul workers were covered employees rather than exempt agricultural laborers, was a reasonable interpretation to which a reviewing court properly deferred. The Court was also split 5-4 in upholding the Board's classification for forklift operators who work in the chicken industry. In a 9-0 vote, the Court upheld the Board's classification for the live-haul crew's truck drivers.

Jaffee v. Redmond (No. 95-266)

Can psychotherapists be forced to provide evidence about their patients in federal court cases?

No. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 protects the conversations between Redmond and her therapist from compelled disclosure. The Rule recognizes a "psychotherapist-patient privilege."

Koon v. United States (No. 94-1664)

Did the Court of Appeals use the wrong standard in deciding whether a federal trial judge had erred in departing from the federal Sentencing Guidelines and giving lighter sentences to two ex-policemen convicted in the beating of Rodney King?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Court of Appeals should not review de novo a decision to depart from the Guideline sentencing range, but instead should ask whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. Furthermore, because the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting certain of the downward departure factors relied upon by the District Judge, wrote Justice Kennedy, significant parts of the appellate court's rulings require reversal.

Lane v. Pena (No. 95-365)

Did Congress waive the federal government's sovereign immunity against monetary damages with respect to section 504(a) of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act?

No. Although the related provisions of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and the 1991 Civil Rights Act might in combination be read as waiving the federal government's sovereign immunity, absent an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity, the court cannot permit damages to be awarded.

Lawrence v. Chater (No. 94-9323)

Does the U.S. Supreme Court have the authority to set aside a lower court's ruling and remand the case without finding that the lower court committed some error?

Yes. In a 7-2 per curiam opinion, the Court held that it had the power to issue a GVR order and that such an order is an appropriate exercise of its discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. "In an appropriate case, a GVR order conserves the scarce resources of this Court that might otherwise be expended on plenary consideration, assists the court below by flagging a particular issue that it does not appear to have fully considered, assists this Court by procuring the benefit of the lower court's insight before we rule on the merits, and alleviates the 'potential for unequal treatment' that is inherent in our inability to grant plenary review of all pending cases raising similar issues," stated the unsigned opinion.

Leavitt v. Jane L. (No. 95-1242)

Was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit correct to invalidate a Utah statutory provision regulating later-term abortions after a similar provision regulating earlier-term abortions was ruled unconstitutional?

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's ruling. The anonymous Per Curiam opinion held that the Utah Legislature had explicitly stated that each of the two abortion provisions was meant to stand independent of the other. The Court called the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Utah legislature's intent "questionable when considered in isolation" and "plainly error" when considered in light of the statutory text. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the case should not have been granted, because it dealt with an issue of Utah state law that was better left to the lower courts.

Lewis v. Casey (No. 94-1511)

Did a federal trial judge err when ruling that Arizona prison officials unconstitutionally failed to provide inmates with adequate legal research facilities?

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the success of Casey's systemic challenge was dependent on the ability to show widespread actual injury, and the District Court's failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of actual injury rendered its finding of a systemic Bounds violation invalid. Justice Scalia said the court's 1977 ruling in Bounds v. Smith "does not guarantee [inmates] the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims."

Lewis v. United States (No. 95-6465)

Does a defendant who is prosecuted in a single proceeding for multiple petty offenses have a constitutional right to a jury trial where the aggregate prison term authorized for the offenses exceeds six months? May a defendant who would otherwise have a constitutional right to a jury trial be denied that right because the presiding judge has made a pretrial commitment that the aggregate sentence imposed will not exceed six months?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is prosecuted for multiple petty offenses. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury trial does not extend to petty offenses, and its scope does not change where a defendant faces a potential aggregate prison term in excess of six months for the petty offenses charged. Because the Court ruled that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is charged with multiple petty offenses, it did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined.

Libretti v. United States (No. 94-7427)

No details yet.

Lockheed Corp. v. Spink (No. 95-809)

May a business offer early retirement benefits on the condition that an employee give up the right to sue over any job-related claim? Can the federal government retroactively apply retirement income benefit laws?

Yes and no. In unanimous and 7-2 decisions, announced by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that businesses may condition early retirement benefits on the forfeiture of the right to sue in a job-related claim. The Court also ruled that the government could not retroactively apply retirement income benefit laws.

Lonchar v. Thomas (No. 95-5015)

May a federal court dismiss a first federal habeas petition for general "equitable" reasons beyond those embodied in the federal Habeas Corpus Rules?

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9, not some general "equitable" power to create exceptions to the Rule, should have determined whether or not a petition's dismissal was appropriate. Justice Breyer wrote for the court that a long delay does not generally constitute an abuse of the system, adding, "[d]ismissal of a first habeas petition is a particularly serious matter for that dismissal denies the petitioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely."

Lotus Development Corporation v. Borland International, Inc. (No. 94-2003)

Is a computer program's menu command hierarchy a "method of operation" under 17 U.S.C.102(b), and therefore uncopyrightable?

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit without opinion in an equally divided, per curiam decision. Justice John Paul Stevens did not take part in the case.

Louisiana v. Mississippi (No. 121 ORIG)

No details yet.

Loving v. United States (No. 94-1966)

Does the President have the authority, consistent with the separation-of-powers principle, to prescribe aggravating factors that permit a court-martial to impose the death penalty upon a member of the armed forces convicted of murder?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that not only does the Constitution require the aggravating factors of the military's death penalty, but that the President's prescription of the challenged aggravating factors did not violate the separation-of-powers principle. Justice Kennedy wrote, "[a]lthough it may not delegate the power to make the law...Congress may delegate to others the authority or discretion to execute the law under and in pursuance of its terms."

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (No. 95-26)

Is the interpretation of a patent's claim, the portion of the patent document that defines the scope of the patentee's rights, a matter of fact to be decided by jurors?

No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court. Justice Souter wrote that "judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms."

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Epstein (No. 94-1809)

May a federal court refuse to grant full faith and credit to a state-court judgment approving a class-action settlement simply because the settlement releases claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, absent a partial repeal of the Full Faith and Credit Act by another federal statute, a federal court must give the judgment the same effect that it would have in the courts of the State in which it was rendered. Writing for the court, Justice Thomas said the federal Full Faith and Credit Act "is generally applicable in cases in which the state-court judgment at issue incorporates a class-action settlement releasing claims solely within the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Justice John Paul Stevens penned an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, and was joined in part by Justice David H. Souter.

Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr (No. 95-754)

Do the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 pre-empt a state common-law negligence action against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective medical device?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals decision was reversed insofar as it held that any of the claims were pre-empted and affirmed insofar as it rejected any pre-emption defense. In a 9-0 vote, the Court allowed the lawsuit based on alleged defects in the pacemaker's design to proceed. In a 5-4 vote, the Court allowed the lawsuit to proceed on its claims of alleged defects in its manufacturing and failure to warn. Justice Stevens reasoned that the MDA was not intended to pre-empt "traditional common-law remedies against manufacturers and distributors of defective devices," as long as they paralleled federal requirements.

Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. (No. 95-83)

May plaintiffs use the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 to sue and recover money they spent to clean up hazardous waste on their property?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor the Court held that section 6972 does not authorize a private cause of action to recover the prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that does not, at the time of suit, continue to pose an endangerment to health or the environment. Writing for the court, Justice O'Connor said the law only allows private citizens to sue to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment and is not directed at providing compensation for past cleanup efforts.

Melendez v. United States (No. 95-5661)

Does a federal prosecutor's plea agreement that a cooperating defendant be given the minimum sentence authorize a judge to depart below a statutory minimum?

No. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, in the absence of a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court to "impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence," a prison sentence must not violate the statutory sentencing minimum.

Montana v. Egelhoff (No. 95-566)

May a state restrict the elements of a defense in criminal prosecution, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause?

Yes. The Court could not reach a majority on the reasons for its decision. Justice Antonin Scalia, who announced the judgment of the Court, declared that defendants do not have an absolute constitutional right to present all relevant evidence in their defense.

Morse v. Republican Party Of Virginia (No. 94-203)

Does section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 require preclearance of the Republican Party of Virginia's decision to exact a fee to nominate the party's candidate for senator? Are voters permitted to challenge the fee as a poll tax prohibited by section 10?

Yes and yes. In a 5-4 plurality opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, five Justices of the Court, although unable to agree on an opinion, agreed that the party's imposition of the registration fee was subject to the preclearance requirements of section 5 and that a private right of action existed to enforce section 10. "By limiting the opportunity for voters to participate in the Party's convention, the fee undercuts their influence on the field of candidates whose names will appear on the ballot, and thus weakens the 'effectiveness' of their votes cast in the general election itself," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the opinion, in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and David H. Souter joined. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy filed separate dissents. Each emphasized First Amendment concerns.

National Labor Relations Board v. Town & Country Electric, Inc. (No. 94-947)

Does a worker qualify as an "employee" under the National Labor Relations Act if, while he is working, he is simultaneously paid by a union to help the union organize a company?

Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Supreme Court ruled for the Board and held that individuals can meet the definition of employee even if they are paid by a union to organize a non-union company while on company payroll. The Court found this result consistent with the language and purpose of the Act as well as the dictionary definition of "employee." The Court also reasoned that the language of the Act seemed to specifically take into account the possibility of workers who are paid union organizers.

Neal v. United States (No. 94-9088)

Does U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual's revised system for determining LSD amounts take precedence over 21 U.S.C. 841 in determining sentencing?

No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Section 841(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to take into account the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD, even though the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual requires a different method of calculating the weight of an LSD mixture or substance.

Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Hiles (No. 95-6)

Is a railroad liable, under the federal Safety Appliance Act, for injuries incurred by a railroad employee while trying to straighten a misaligned drawbar?

No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Section 2 of the Safety Appliance Act does not make a railroad liable as a matter of law for injuries incurred by a railroad employee while trying to straighten a misaligned drawbar. "We are understandably hesitant to adopt a reading...that would suggest that almost every railroad car in service for nearly a century has been in violation of the SAA," wrote Justice Thomas.

O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. (No. 95-354)

Can an employee file an age discrimination suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 if his or her replacement is 40 or older?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 limits its protection to those who are 40 or older, it prohibits discrimination against those protected employees on the basis of age, not class membership. "That one member of the protected class lost out to another member is irrelevant, so long as he lost out because of his age. The latter is more reliably indicated by the fact that his replacement was substantially younger," wrote Justice Scalia.

O'Hare Truck Service v. Northlake (No. 95-191)

Did O'Hare Truck Service's removal from Northlake's employment list, as a result of its support for an opposition mayoral candidate, violate O'Hare Truck Services freedom of speech?

Yes. The Court held, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, that independent contractors, such as O'Hare Truck Service, are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as those afforded to government employees. Accordingly, Northlake could not condition the towing company's employment on its political affiliations or beliefs unless Northlake could demonstrate that O'Hare's political affiliations had a reasonable and appreciable effect on its job performance. The Court held that Northlake neither attempted nor would it have been able to make such a demonstration. Therefore, Northlake's removal of O'Hare Truck Service from its employment list was unconstitutional.

Ornelas v. United States (No. 95-5257)

Should courts use a de novo standard in determining if a police search conducted without a warrant was based on reasonable suspicion and probable cause?

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held "[t]he ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo." The principle details in such a review should be an analysis of events leading up to the search and the objective review of the search.

Peacock v. Thomas (No. 94-1453)

Do federal courts possess ancillary jurisdiction over new actions in which a federal judgment creditor seeks to impose liability for a money judgment on a person not otherwise liable for the judgment?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Thomas's subsequent suit. The Court found that neither ERISA's jurisdictional nor the general federal question jurisdictional provision supplied the District Court with subject matter jurisdiction over the suit against the corporate officer. The Court noted that is was unaware of any provision under ERISA for imposing liability under the circumstances for an extant ERISA judgment against a third party. Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dissent, argued that a federal court's jurisdiction encompasses a claim by a judgment creditor that a party in control of the judgment debtor has fraudulently exercised that control to defeat a judgment.

Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance (No. 95-244)

Is an abstention-based remand order appealable as a final order? Can the abstention doctrine recognized in Burford v. Sun Oil Co. be applied in a suit for damages?

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that an abstention-based remand order is appealable because the "remand order here falls within that narrow class of collateral orders that are immediately appealable." Further, the Court held that the "federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary," and because "this was a damages action, the District Court's remand order was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine." Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy wrote concurring opinions.

Richards v. Jefferson County (No. 95-386)

May the Alabama residents, who claim that the Jefferson County occupation tax violates the Federal and Alabama Constitutions, proceed with their class action suit in court in light of a prior, similar adjudication?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that because Richards and others received neither notice of, nor sufficient representation in, the Bedingfield litigation, that adjudication, as a matter of federal due process, may not bind them and thus cannot bar them from challenging an allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of their property.

Romer v. Evans (No. 94-1039)

Does Amendment 2 of Colorado's State Constitution, forbidding the extension of official protections to those who suffer discrimination due to their sexual orientation, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution violated the equal protection clause. Amendment 2 singled out homosexual and bisexual persons, imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal protection from discrimination. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection clause, even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group, so long as it can be shown to "advance a legitimate government interest." Amendment 2, by depriving persons of equal protection under the law due to their sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate interest. Justice Kennedy concluded: "If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."

Rutledge v. United States (No. 94-8769)

Can a criminal be given concurrent life sentences for conspiring to distribute drugs and operating a continuing criminal enterprise?

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled one of the two sentences must be dropped. Both of the offenses were based on the same criminal act. Justice Stevens wrote, "A guilty verdict on a (continuing criminal enterprise) charge necessarily includes a finding that the defendant also participated in a conspiracy."

Seminole Tribe v. Florida (No. 94-12)

Does the Eleventh Amendment provide Florida with immunity from the Tribe lawsuit?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, The Court held that Congress did intend to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the IGRA but that the Indian Commerce Clause (and by implication the Commerce Clause) did not give Congress that power. Under the Eleventh Amendment, all states are regarded as sovereign entities. Such sovereignty inherently implies that states may not be sued by parties without their consent, even if they are given authority to regulate those parties' activities through receipt of federal funds. Finally, Ex Parte Young's ruling does not justify the Tribe's suit against Florida's governor in light of certain IGRA provisions which specifically prohibit such an action.

Shaw v. Hunt (No. 94-923)

Does North Carolina's redistricting plan constitute racial gerrymandering in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court first confronted the threshold question of "standing." It held that some of the appellants lacked proper standing to challenge the redistricting plan. Only those voters who resided in a congressional district alleged to have been created by racial gerrymandering had proper standing to challenge the constitutionality of that district's creation. Those voters who did not reside in one of the two allegedly racially gerrymandered districts, and who failed to provide evidence that they were assigned to their district of residence on the basis of race, lacked proper standing to participate in the racial gerrymandering claim. After noting the challenged district's unusually non-compact serpentine shape, and the appellants' admission that the districts' were primarily designed to create black voting majorities, the Court applied "strict scrutiny" to the facts at hand. Finding no narrowly tailored plans aimed at serving a compelling state interest that would justify the creation of racially gerrymandered districts, the Court concluded that the redistricting plans violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.

Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota) (No. 95-860)

Does the National Bank Act of 1864 authorize a national bank to charge late-payment fees that are lawful in the bank's home State but prohibited in the States where the cardholders reside?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the National Bank Act of 1864 authorizes such charges because a regulation adopted by the Comptroller of the Currency, which defined interest to include late-payment fees, was a reasonable interpretation of the act and entitled to deference. The Court rejected arguments that late-payment fees do not constitute interest because they do not vary based on the payment owed or the time period of delay and because they are penalties.

Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca (No. 94-1530)

May a federal court of appeals review a district court order remanding a bankruptcy case to state court on grounds of untimely removal?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that if an order remands a removed bankruptcy case to state court because of a timely raised defect in removal procedure or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review the order under the provisions of the general federal removal statute. The Court reasoned that the general removal statute bars appellate review of any order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed so that only remands based on the grounds recognized by the statute, such as a timely raised defect in removal procedure or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, are immune from review under the statute.

Thompson v. Keohane, Warden (No. 94-6615)

No details yet.

Tuggle v. Netherland (No. 95-6016)

Did the Court of Appeals correctly interpret Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, to establish a rule that, in States that do not weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances, a death sentence may be upheld on the basis of one valid aggravating circumstance, regardless of the reasons for which another aggravating factor may have been found to be invalid?

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Zant was incorrect. The Court reasoned that the record here does not provide comparable support for the death sentence because, even after elimination of the invalid aggravator, the death sentence in Zant rested on two remaining unimpeached aggravating factors. Moreover, the Court noted, the Ake error prevented Tuggle from developing his own evidence to rebut the Commonwealth and to enhance his defense in mitigation, allowing the Commonwealth's psychiatric evidence to go unchallenged, which may have unfairly increased its persuasiveness and affected the jury's decision to impose death rather than life imprisonment.

United Food Workers v. Brown Group Inc. (No. 95-340)

May a labor union sue on behalf of its members over alleged violations of the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act grants unions authority to sue for damages on behalf of their members. Therefore, the union had standing to bring such an action. Justice Souter wrote that the court's ruling was based on previous decisions that state that "an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries even without a showing of injury to the association itself."

United States v. Noland (No. 95-323)

May a bankruptcy court subordinate government attempts to collect tax penalties?

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that giving tax-penalty claims a lower priority than other claims contradicts Congress_ scheme of priorities regarding federal bankruptcy law.

United States v. Armstrong (No. 95-157)

Must criminal defendants who pursue selective-prosecution claims demonstrate people of other races were not prosecuted for similar crimes?

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that in order to file selective-prosecution claims, defendants must show that the government failed to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races. "If the claim . . . were well founded," wrote Rehnquist, "it should not have been an insuperable task to prove that persons of a different race were not prosecuted."

United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company Of Virginia 516 U.S. 415 (No. 94-1893)

Does 47 U.S.C. 533(b), which bars local telephone companies from directly providing video programming to their local phone service subscribers, violate the First Amendment's protection of free speech?

Unanswered. After the Court heard oral arguments, the President signed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 into law. The Act repealed Section 533(b), allowing LECs to provide local cable service if they complied with a series of regulatory measures. The Court instructed the Fourth Circuit to reconsider the case and determine whether it had become moot.

United States v. International Business Machines Corp. (No. 95-591)

May the federal government impose a tax on premiums that U.S. businesses pay foreign insurers for risks that could arise in this country?

No. In a 6-2 decision, announced by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled the tax did violate the Export Clause and was therefore unconstitutional.

United States v. Reorganized CF& I Fab. of UT (No. 95-325)

Is the Internal Revenue Code's 10% tax liability claim on any "accumulated funding deficiency" in pension plans an "excise tax" under the Bankruptcy Code? May the Government's tax claims be given a lower priority than competing claims by other creditors in bankruptcy proceedings?

No and no. In an opinion authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Internal Revenue Code's 10% tax liability claim on any "accumulated funding deficiency" in pension plans, 26 U.S.C. Section 4971(a), does not create an excise tax under the Bankruptcy Code. Additionally, the Court held that the subordination of the Government's tax claim to those of other creditors was an error.

United States v. Ursery (No. 95-345)

Do civil property forfeitures ("in rem" forfeiture) constitute a "punishment" in terms of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause which forbids successive prosecutions and punishment for the same crime?

No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in an 8-to-1 decision, held that civil property forfeitures did not constitute a "punishment" for purposes of the double jeopardy clause. While the double jeopardy clause protects a defendant from being punished twice for the same offense, criminal and civil sanctions for the same offense are distinguishable. The civil property forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction not a punitive criminal "punishment." Applying a two-part test to determine if a forfeiture constitutes a "punishment" in terms of the double jeopardy clause, the Court held that it was both Congress's intention that property forfeitures be civil in nature and that they be remedial rather than punitive. The mere resemblance between Ursery's property forfeiture and criminal drug and money-laundering punishments, did not constitute the "clearest proof" that Congress did not intend to levy both civil and criminal sanctions on Ursery's conduct. Furthermore, property forfeiture's non-punitive remedial nature is also evident in its goal of encouraging owners to care for their property by guarding against its illegal usage.

United States v. Virginia (No. 94-1941)

Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy, as a comparable program to a male-only academy, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

No. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. The VWIL would not provide women with the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses, facilities, financial opportunities, or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords its male cadets. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" between VMI and VWIL was misplaced. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard, requiring that "all gender-based classifications today" be evaluated with "heightened scrutiny." When evaluated with such "heightened scrutiny," Virginia's plan to create the VWIL would not provide women with the same opportunities as VMI provides its men and so it failed to meet requirements of the equal protection clause. [NOTE: Justice Ginsberg's announcement of the Court's opinion (below) may be considered an address to the American public. It is a plain-spoken and forceful summary of the majority position.]

United States v. Winstar (No. 95-865)

Can the federal government be sued by thrifts that were sent into financial trouble when Congress changed the computation of required reserves after the Federal Home Loan Bank Board encouraged actions based on premise that the rules would not change?

Yes. In a 7-2 plurality opinion delivered Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the terms assigning the risk of regulatory change to the Government are enforceable and that the Government is therefore liable in damages for breach, although Congress changed the relevant law, and thereby barred the Government from specifically honoring its agreements. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer joined all of the plurality opinion, and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined in part. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the unmistakability doctrine was not intended to displace the rules of contract interpretation applicable to the government. In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the contracts at issue gave rise to an obligation on the part of the government to afford the three thrifts favorable accounting treatment and the contracts were broken by the government's discontinuation of that favorable treatment. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented in an opinion joined in part by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Varity Corp. v. Howe (No. 94-1471)

Did the Varity Corporation and Massey-Ferguson, Inc. act their capacity as an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974fiduciary when they significantly and deliberately misled the beneficiaries? By doing so, did Varity and Massey-Ferguson violate the fiduciary obligations that ERISA imposes upon plan administrators? Does ERISA authorize a lawsuit in such cases?

Yes, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that, under the specific factual circumstances, Varity and Massey-Ferguson acted in their capacity as an ERISA fiduciary when they significantly and deliberately misled the plan's beneficiaries, thereby violating their fiduciary obligations imposed by ERISA. Finding that ERISA's general purpose of protecting beneficiaries' interests also favors a reading that provides a remedy, Justice Breyer said that Varity and Massey-Ferguson violated the fiduciary obligations imposed upon the plan's administrator by ERISA, by knowingly and significantly deceiving the employees as to the financial viability of the new entity and the future of the new entity's benefits plan, in order to save the employer money at the expense of the beneficiaries and that they could thus be sued for equitable relief by the individual beneficiaries. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia joined.

Whren v. United States (No. 95-5841)

Did the officers conduct an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

No. The unanimous Court held that as long as officers have a reasonable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, they may stop any vehicle. In the present case, the officers had reasonable cause to stop the petitioners for a traffic violation since they sped away from a stop sign at an 'unreasonable speed' and without using their turn signal. Thus, since an actual traffic violation occurred, the ensuing search and seizure of the offending vehicle was reasonable, regardless of what other personal motivations the officers might have had for stopping the vehicle. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the anxiety, confusion, and haste which the petitioners experienced from the stop-and-search outweighed the government's interest in traffic safety. While the Fourth Amendment does require a balancing test between a search-and-seizure's benefits and the harm it might cause to the individual, such a test only applies to unusually harmful searches and seizures. There was nothing unusually harmful about this traffic stop.

Wisconsin v. New York (No. 94-1614)

Did the decision of the Secretary of Commerce not to use the PES in the 1990 census violate the constitutional right of certain minorities to be counted?

No. The Court held that the decision not to use the PES-based statistical correction would not be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard of "one person - one vote" because there was no showing of intentional discrimination by the Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary's decision was consistent with past census practices in which the promotion of distributive accuracy, rather than numerical accuracy, was the primary objective. This is because errors in numerical accuracy are less likely than errors in distributive accuracy to impact on the apportionment of representatives among the states. Moreover, the Court added that significant deference - regarding how best to conduct the census - must be accorded to the Secretary since he directly received such latitude from Congress which, in turn, received such latitude from the Constitution.

Wood v. Bartholomew (No. 94-1419)

Did a Court of Appeals err in concluding, in habeas corpus proceedings, that the prosecution's failure to disclose to the accused the inadmissible results of a polygraph test of a witness violated due process?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals's decision was a misapplication of the Court's Brady jurisprudence. Because evidence is material under Brady and the failure to disclose it justifies setting aside a conviction, only where there exists a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed the result at trial would have been different, the Court reasoned that the polygraph results were not evidence and their disclosure would have had no direct effect on the trial's outcome because Bartholomew could have made no mention of them. Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer dissented from the summary disposition of the case.

Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun (No. 94-1387)

Do state remedies apply in maritime wrongful-death cases in which no federal statute specifies the appropriate relief and the decedent was not a seaman, longshore worker, or person otherwise engaged in a maritime trade?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that state remedies remain applicable in such cases and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death action recognized in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375. The Court rejected Yamaha's argument that Moragne's wrongful-death action covers the waters, creating a uniform federal maritime remedy for all deaths occurring in state territorial waters, which replaces all state remedies previously available to supplement general maritime law.

Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. (No. 94-1361)

May a plaintiff, in a suit brought under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention governing international air transportation, recover damages for loss of society resulting from the death of a relative in a plane crash on the high seas?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the relatives could not recover loss-of-society damages under the Warsaw Convention because Article 17 left it to the adjudicating court to specify what harm was cognizable as determined by domestic law, which is supplied by the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). Justice Scalia then reasoned that, because DOHSA permits only pecuniary damages, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover loss-of-society damages. The Court, therefore, did not reach the question whether, under general maritime law, dependency is a prerequisite for loss-of-society damages. Thus, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal's judgement insofar as it permitted Zicherman to recover loss-of-society damages if she could establish her dependency on the decedent and affirmed its decision with regards to vacating the award of loss-of-society damages to Mahalek is affirmed.