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Abstract
| Argument: |
Tuesday, October 31, 1995
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| Decision: |
Wednesday, February 21, 1996 |
| Issues: |
Economic Activity, State Tax |
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Advocates
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Facts of the Case
After North Carolina levied an "intangibles tax" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax, the Fulton Corporation, a North Carolina company, filed a state-court action against the State Secretary of Revenue, seeking judgment that the tax violated the Federal Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for the Secretary, but North Carolina's Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the taxable percentage deduction violated the Commerce Clause. In reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the State's scheme imposed a valid compensatory tax and that the intangibles tax imposed less of a burden on interstate commerce than the corporate income tax placed on intrastate commerce.
Question
Does North Carolina's "intangibles tax" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by North Carolina residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax violate the Federal Commerce Clause?
Conclusion
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that North Carolina's intangibles tax discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Souter reasoned that the tax discriminated on face against interstate commerce by taxing stock only to the extent that its issuing corporation participated in interstate commerce. "North Carolina's intangibles tax facially discriminates against interstate commerce, it fails justification as a valid compensatory tax, and, accordingly, it cannot stand," wrote Justice Souter. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion.