The Oyez Project: 1994 Term Decisions

Adarand Constructors v. Pena (No. 93-1841)

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Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson (No. 93-1001)

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American Airlines v. Wolens (No. 93-1286)

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Anderson, Director, California Department Of Social Services v. Green (No. 94-197)

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Anderson, Director, California Department Of Social Services (No. 93-1883)

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Arizona v. Evans (No. 93-1660)

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Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, Dba Deebees (No. 92-2038)

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Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior v. Sweet Home Chapter Of Communities For A Great Oregon (No. 94-859)

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Brown, Secretary Of Veterans Affairs v. Gardner (No. 93-1128)

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California Department Of Corrections v. Morales (No. 93-1462)

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Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette (No. 94-780)

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Celotex Corp. v. Edwards Et ux. (No. 93-1504)

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Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis (No. 94-325)

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City of Edmonds v. Oxford House (No. 94-23)

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Commissioner Of Internal Revenue v. Schleier (No. 94-500)

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Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen (No. 93-1935)

Is a Federal District Court's determination, in denying a summary judgment motion of police officers entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense, that the record raised a factual issue an appealable final decision?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a defendant, who is entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a District Court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court reasoned, in part, that the competing considerations underlying questions of finality, including the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review, the danger of denying justice by delay, the comparative expertise of trial and appellate courts, and the wise use of appellate resources, argue against allowing immediate appeals of orders of the kind in question and in favor of limiting interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity matters to cases presenting more abstract issues of law.

Director, Office Of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department Of Labor v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. (No. 93-1783)

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Federal Election Commission v. Nra Political Victory Fund (No. 93-1151)

Does the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 preempt a state-court suit, brought by participants in an airline's frequent flyer program, challenging the airline's retroactive changes in terms and conditions of the program?

Yes. In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the ADA bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers, thus claims brought under a state's consumer fraud act are preempted; but that the ADA allows room for court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves, which permits breach of contract claims to proceed. "A remedy confined to a contract's terms simply holds parties to their agreements -- in this instance, to business judgments an airline made public about its rates and services," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justice Thomas Clarence. Justice Antonin Scalia took no part in the decision of the case.

First Options v. Kaplan (No. 94-560)

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Florida Bar v. Went For It Inc. (No. 94-226)

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Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick (No. 94-286)

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Garlotte v. Fordice, Governor Of Mississippi (No. 94-6790)

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Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., Fka Alloyd Holdings, Inc. (No. 93-404)

Is the arbitrability of disputes subject to independent review by the courts? Should courts of appeals apply an "abuse of discretion" standard when reviewing district court upholding arbitration awards?

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts and that, rather than a special abuse of discretion standard, courts of appeals should apply ordinary standards when reviewing district court decisions upholding arbitration awards. "We conclude that, because the Kaplans did not clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court.

Gutierrez De Martinez v. Lamagno (No. 94-167)

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Harris v. Alabama (No. 93-7659)

Does the fact that a plaintiff's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence, together with the existence of a genuine dispute over liability, justify a District Court's departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases?

No. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that neither a good-faith dispute over liability nor the existence of mutual fault justifies the denial of prejudgment interest in an admiralty collision case. In calculating the amount of the loss for which the relatively innocent party is responsible, the Court found that a denial of prejudgment interest on the basis of mutual fault would unfairly penalize a party twice for the same mistake. "The existence of a legitimate difference of opinion on the issue of liability is merely a characteristic of most ordinary lawsuits. It is not an extraordinary circumstance that can justify denying prejudgment interest," wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision.

Heintz v. Jenkins (No. 94-367)

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Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (No. 93-1197)

Can states alter those qualifications for the U.S. Congress that are specifically enumerated in the Constitution?

No. The Constitution prohibits States from adopting Congressional qualifications in addition to those enumerated in the Constitution. A state congressional term limits amendment is unconstitutional if it has the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and "has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly." Furthermore, "...allowing individual States to craft their own congressional qualifications would erode the structure designed by the Framers to form a 'more perfect Union.'"

Hubbard v. United States (No. 94-172)

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Hurley v. Irish American GLIB Association (No. 94-749)

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Interstate Commerce Commission v. Transcon Lines (No. 93-1318)

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Jerome B. Grubart Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock (No. 93-762)

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Johnson v. Jones (No. 94-455)

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Kansas v. Colorado (No. 105 ORIG)

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Kimberlin v. Quinlan 515 U.S. 321 (No. 93-2068)

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Kyles v. Whitley, Warden (No. 93-7927)

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Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (No. 93-1525)

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Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (No. 94-18)

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McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (No. 93-986)

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Mckennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. (No. 93-1543)

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Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo (No. 94-820)

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Miller v. Johnson (No. 94-631)

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Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. (No. 93-768)

Does the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act allow a party to seek modification of a disability award on the ground of change in conditions, when there has been no change in the employee's physical condition but rather an increase in the employee's wage-earning capacity due to the acquisition of new skills?

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that a disability award may be modified under the LHWCA where there is a change in the employee's wage-earning capacity, even without any change in the employee's physical condition. The Court reasoned that, because an interpretation of the term "change in conditions" to include not only changes in physical condition but also changes in other conditions relevant to the initial entitlement to benefits, such as a change in wage-earning capacity is consistent with the purpose of the LHWCA. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that the term refers to the physical condition of the person receiving compensation and should not be departed from absent any indication from Congress.

Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co. (No. 94-788)

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Missouri v. Jenkins (No. 93-1823)

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National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission (No. 94-688)

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Nationsbank Of North Carolina, N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. (No. 93-1612)

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Nebraska Department Of Revenue v. Loewenstein (No. 93-823)

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Nebraska v. Wyoming (No. 108 ORIG)

Is the quantity of protected seed that a farmer can sell under the exemptions in the Plant Variety Protection Act limited to the amount of seed the seller would need to replant his own fields?

Yes. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a farmer may sell for reproductive purposes only such seed as he has saved for the purpose of replanting his own fields. While the statute allows farmers to save seed to replant and then sell that saved seed to other farmers for planting, the statute prohibits growing protected seed as a "step in marketing" it as seed for planting. The Court held that because Winterboer's planting and harvesting were conducted solely to market (that is, to sell) Asgrow's protected seed varieties, he forfeited eligibility for the PVPA exemption and infringed on Asgrow's protective certificates.

New York State Conference Of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. (No. 93-1408)

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North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas (No. 94-834)

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O'neal v. Mcaninch, Warden (No. 93-7407)

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Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation (No. 94-771)

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Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. (No. 93-1677)

Do the Florida Bar rules prohibiting direct mail solicitation of accident victims violate the free speech of personal injury attorneys?

No. Lawyer advertising is commercial speech and as such, is accorded only a limited measure of First Amendment protection. Under this "intermediate scrutiny," restriction on commercial speech is permissible if the government (1) asserts a substantial interest in support of its regulation; (2) establishes that the restriction directly and materially advances that interest; and (3) demonstrates that the regulation is narrowly drawn.

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (No. 93-1121)

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Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc. (No. 93-1577)

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Reich v. Collins, Revenue Commissioner Of Georgia (No. 93-908)

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Reno, Attorney General v. Koray (No. 94-790)

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Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde (No. 94-3)

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Rosenberger v. University of Virginia (No. 94-329)

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Rubin, Secretary Of The Treasury v. Coors Brewing Co. (No. 93-1631)

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Ryder v. United States (No. 94-431)

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Sandin, Unit Team Manager, Halawa Correctional Facility v. Conner (No. 93-1911)

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Schlup v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center (No. 93-7901)

Does the definition of "harm" as an expansion of the word "take" in the Endangered Species Act include habitat modification that kills or injures wildlife?

Yes. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that habitat modification is a legitimate application of the word "harm." First, the Court found that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in assuming that the words in the definition of "take" only apply to actions involving direct contact with endangered animals. Then, based on the Act itself, the Court determined that the ordinary meaning of harm would in fact include changes in habitat that hurt the endangered animals. Also, the Court held that the intent of the Act to give broad protection to endangered species must include even actions that may have minimal or unforeseeable effects.

Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital (No. 93-1251)

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Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services v. Whitecotton (No. 94-372)

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Stone v. Immigration And Naturalization Service (No. 93-1199)

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Swint v. Chambers County Commission (No. 93-1636)

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Tome v. United States (No. 93-6892)

Does the Fourth Amendment's reasonable search and seizure clause require police officers to knock and announce their presence before entering a private residence?

Yes. A unanimous Court held that the common-law "knock-and announce" principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. "Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice of announcement, and the wealth of founding-era commentaries, constitutional provisions, statutes, and cases espousing or supporting the knock-and-announce principle,...the Amendment's Framers thought that whether officers announced their presence and authority before entering a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing a search's reasonableness." Countervailing law enforcement interests, such as officer safety, may, however, establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.

U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership (No. 93-714)

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U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton (No. 93-1456)

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United States v. Aguilar (No. 94-270)

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United States v. Gaudin (No. 94-514)

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United States v. Hays (No. 94-558)

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United States v. Lopez (No. 93-1260)

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United States v. Mezzanatto (No. 93-1340)

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United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (No. 93-1170)

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United States v. Robertson (No. 94-251)

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United States v. Shabani (No. 93-981)

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United States v. Williams (No. 94-395)

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United States v. X-Citement Video (No. 93-723)

Is racial gerrymandering of the congressional redistricting process a violation of the Equal Protection Clause?

Yes. In some instances, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based on race. Applying the rule laid down in Shaw v. Reno requires strict scrutiny whenever race is the "overriding, predominant force" in the redistricting process.

Vernonia School District v. Acton (No. 94-590)

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Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer (No. 94-623)

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Wilson v. Arkansas (No. 94-5707)

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Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. (No. 94-562)

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Witte v. United States (No. 94-6187)

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